Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection
Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection Pamela Samuelson* Section 102 is one of the few elegant and concise provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act).' Section 102(a) sets forth the subject matter eligible for copyright protection. "Copyright protection subsists," it says, "in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... 2 Nicely complementing this provision is its statutory cousin, § 102(b), which provides: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.",3 Once a work qualifies for copyright protection under § 102(a), § 102(b) informs its author and the rest of the world about certain aspects of the work that are not within the scope of copyright protection. Surprisingly few cases and very little commentary have probed the meaning of § 102(b), and in particular, of the eight words of exclusion it contains.4 Most often, courts and commentators have characterized § 102(b) * Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of Law and Information, University of California at Berkeley. I wish to thank Robert Barr, Brian Carver, Julie E. Cohen, Phil Frickey, Andy Gass, Paul Geller, Dennis S. Karjala, Mark A. Lemley, Jessica Litman, Robert P. Merges, David Nimmer, Margaret Jane Radin, Anthony Reese, Jerome H. Reichman, Kate Spelman, and Molly Shaffer van Houweling for insightful comments on an early draft. Daniel Schacht provided outstanding research assistance.
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