Motion of the Respondent, the Librarian of Congress, to Dismiss The
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT D ECEllVK INTERCOLLEGIATE BROADCAST SYSTEM, et al., Petitioners OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL No. 02-1220 JAMES H. BILLINGTON, Librarian RIh@QLt'pp+D of Congress, NOltt Respondent. GEiitERAL C00838. QF COPVRl6%'OTION OF THE RESPONDENT, THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS, TO DISMISS THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FOR LACK OF STANDING Pursuant to Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Local Rule 27(g), the respondent, James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress ("the Librarian"), hereby respectfully moves this Court to dismiss the petition for review jointly filed on July 8, 2002, by Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc. ("Intercollegiate") and by Harvard Radio Broadcasting Co., Inc. ("Harvard"), on grounds that neither Intercollegiate nor Harvard has standing to seek judicial review of the decision of the Librarian challenged in their petition. That petition was filed under 17 U.S.C. 802(g), which provides this Court with jurisdiction only over petitions filed by an "aggrieved party" to those proceedings. Here, neither Intercollegiate nor Harvard was a party in the administrative proceedings. Thus, neither has standing under Section 802(g) to seek judicial review. Apart from Section 802(g), there is no other jurisdictional basis to entertain the petition filed by Intercollegiate and Harvard. Dismissal is thus required. STATEMENT l. Intercollegiate and Harvard seek judicial review ofthe Librarian's order of June 20, 2002, as published in July 8, 2002 Federal Register, 67 FED. REG. 45240 (July 8, 2002). In that order, the Librarian announced his determination of the reasonable rates and terms for compulsory licenses for certain digital performances of sound recordings and the making of ephemeral recordings. These rates are for the compulsory licences granted by 17 U.S.C. 112(e) and 17 U.S.C. 114 ofthe Copyright Act, as amended by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, P.L. 105-304. See generally, RIAL v. Librarian ofCongress, 176 F.3d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Administrative proceedings for the establishment ofsuch rates are governed by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-198, 107 Stat. 2304 ("Reform Act" or "Act"). Under that Act, in cases where the parties are unable to agree on rates, the Librarian will appoint an ad hoc Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel ("CARP" or "Panel"). See 17 U.S.C. 801-803. In a rate adjustment proceeding, the Panel is charged with the initial responsibility for formulating a rate schedule and establishing terms. 17 U.S.C. 801-802. Under Section 802(c), 17 U;S.C. 802(c), any person entitled to a compulsory license has the right to become a party to proceedings before the panel by submitting "relevant information and proposals" to the Panel; such parties to the panel proceedings "shall bear the entire cost thereof in such manner and proportion as the arbitration panels shall direct." The Panel has 180 days to hear evidence, develop a schedule of rates and terms and prepare a report to the Librarian of Congress. 17 U.S.C. 802(e). The Reform Act provides that the Panel act on the basis of a written record, prior decisions of the Tribunal, prior Panel decisions and prior rulings of the Librarian of Congress. 17 U.S.C. 801(c). Section 802(f) of the Reform Act directs that the Librarian of Congress, within 60 days of receiving the Panel's report and upon the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, "adopt or reject the determination of the arbitration panel." 17 U.S.C. 802(f). The Librarian adopts "the determination of the arbitration panel unless the Librarian finds that the determination is arbitrary or contrary to the applicable provisions of this title." (Id.). If the Librarian rejects the Panel's report, the Librarian "shall, before the end of that 60-day period, and after full examination of the record created in the arbitration proceeding, issue an order setting the royalty fee or distribution of fees, as the case may be." (Id.). The Librarian then is required to publish in the Federal Register both the Panel's determination and the decision of the Librarian. (Id.). Judicial review of "[a]ny decision of the Librarian of Congress under subsection (f) with respect to a determination of an arbitration panel" is pursuant to section 802(g), 17 U.S.C. 802(g), which provides that such decision "may be appealed, by any aggrieved party who would be bound by the determination, to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit." Section 802(g) further provides that "[t]he court shall have jurisdiction to modify or vacate a decision of the Librarian only if it finds, on the basis of the record before the Librarian, that the Librarian acted in an arbitrary manner." This Court has held that this standard of review is "exceptionally deferential," requiring that the Librarian's determination be sustained "if the Librarian has offered a facially plausible explanation for it in terms of the record evidence." National Association ofBroadcasters v. Librarian ofCongress, 146 F.3d 907, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In this case, the administrative proceedings began when the Copyright Office publically announced a six-month voluntary negotiation period to set rates for the first licensing period. See 63 FED. REG. 6555 (Nov. 27, 1998). No voluntary agreement was reached. The Recording Industry Association of America thereafter petitioned the Copyright Office to convene a CARP, which was duly scheduled by Federal Register notice. See 64 FED. REG. 52107 (Sept. 27, 1999). Pursuant to Copyright Office regulations, this Notice specifically established a "date certain by which parties wishing to participate in the proceeding must file with the Librarian a Notice of Intention to Participate." 64 FED. REG. at 51108, citing 37 C.F.R. 251.45(a). The filing of such a Notice of Intention to Participate is expressly required by the regulations as a necessary prerequisite to participation as a party in the formal proceedings set up by these regulations. See also 37 C.F.R. 251.41; 37 C.F.R. 251.43(a). Neither Intercollegiate nor Harvard filed a Notice of Intention To Participate and were never parties to the webcasting administrative proceeding under the regulations. See Declaration of Eugenia L. Giuffreda, $ 5, accompanying this Motion. Specifically, according to official records maintained by the Copyright Office, 141 entities filed a notice of intention to participate in the administrative proceedings. See Giuffreda Declaration, Attachment A.. Most ofthese 141 entities, however, either withdrew from the proceeding or failed to file a direct case and were therefore dismissed from the proceeding. The service list for the parties that did elect to participate in proceedings before the Panel likewise is devoid of any mention ofthese two entities. Giuffreda Declaration, Attachment B. Intercollegiate and Harvard also do not appear as "parties" specifically identified in the Librarian's July 8, 2002 decision, as published in the Federal Register. See 67 FED. REG. at 45241 (July 8, 2002). Finally, neither Intercollegiate nor Harvard is even listed as a party in the -4- "Certificate As To Parties, Rulings, and Related Cases" filed by petitioners in this appeal. In short, the non-party status of Intercollegiate and Harvard is beyond dispute. ARGUMENT Section 802(g), 17 U.S.C. 802(g), expressly limits the right to seek judicial review ofthe Librarian's decision to "any aggrieved party who would be bound by the determination" ofthe Librarian. (Emphasis supplied).'hile this language of Section 802(g) has yet to be specifically construed by this Court, in other contexts, such a restriction ofjudicial review to "parties" has uniformly been construed by this Court and other courts of appeals to mean that the person seeking judicial review must have had a more than de minimis participation in the agency proceedings under review. This body ofprecedent is fully applicable to Section 802(g). Here, it is undisputed that neither Intercollegiate nor Harvard participated in the administrative proceedings before the Panel or the Librarian in any manner, much less in a more than de minimis manner. Accordingly, neither Intercollegiate nor Harvard has standing to seek judicial review ofthe Librarian's decision under Section 802(g). Dismissal oftheir appeal is thus required. 'ection 802(g) provides the exclusive means for seekingjudicial review ofthe Librarian's decisions under the Reform Act. See, e.g., Whitney National Bank v. Bank ofNew Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 422 (1965) (noting that where Congress "has enacted a specific statutory scheme for obtaining review" then "the statutory mode ofreview [must] be adhered to notwithstanding the absence of an express statutory command of exclusiveness"); Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority v. E.P.A., 916 F.2d 317, 321 (6th Cir. 1990) ("It is a well settled principle that where Congress establishes a special statutory review procedure for administrative action, that procedure is generally the exclusive means of review for those actions"); Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("a statute which vests jurisdiction in a particular court cuts off original jurisdiction in other courts in all cases covered by that statute"). -5- 1. The leading case on this question in this Circuit is Simmons v. ICC, 716 F.2d 40, 42 (D.C. Cir.1983). Simmons arose under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2344, which provides that a "party aggrieved" by an agency order reviewable under that Act may file a petition for review in the court of appeals otherwise having venue. In Simmons, this Court noted that this "party aggrieved" language meant that the petitioners must "be parties to any proceedings before the agency preliminary to issuance of its order." (716 F.2d at 42).