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Elections, Political Participation, and Authoritarian Responsiveness in Russia

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Elections, Political Participation, and Authoritarian Responsiveness in Russia ELECTIONS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, AND AUTHORITARIAN RESPONSIVENESS IN RUSSIA by YANA GOROKHOVSKAIA B.A. (Highest Honours), Carleton University, 2007 M.A., Carleton University, 2009 A DISSERTATION SUMBITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Political Science) The University of British Columbia (Vancouver) August 2016 © Yana Gorokhovskaia, 2016 Abstract For decades, elections were thought of as the necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. After the end of the Cold War, however, the world witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of regimes that combined the democratic institution of elections with authoritarian practices. Despite the presence of regular and free multi-party elections, these regimes did not liberalize or democratize. However, elections continued to matter and sporadically elections became focal points for social dissent and protest. In a series of three papers, this dissertation examines elections in Russia. The first paper presents an in-depth analysis of the 2013 Moscow mayoral election. I make the argument that in order to secure the legitimacy that elections can bestow, the authorities in this case promoted electoral competition by helping all the candidates for mayor surmount a high procedural barrier to participation. This paper contributes to scholarship on the manipulation of elections which has previously only considered measures that restrict electoral competition. Elections where authorities promote competition are still unlikely to result in opposition victories but may dampen voter participation. The second paper uses Albert Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty framework and evidence from twenty-nine semi-structured interviews to analyze political participation in an authoritarian state through the experience of individuals running for local political office in Moscow’s municipalities. I find that citizens without substantial previous political experience, but galvanized by anti-fraud protests, ran successful political campaigns with help from civil society organizations and political parties. Counterintuitively, once in office, they adopted hyper- legal strategies to combat corruption and waste. ii The third and final paper uses regression analysis to test two explanatory models for electoral competition under authoritarianism: voter preferences and regime manipulation. Relying on an original dataset of protests across Russia’s regions, I find partial support for both models. Previous protest activity both increases electoral competition and provokes more pre- election manipulation of the field of candidates. In addition, voter mobilization in support of regime candidates is especially effective in generating pro-regime results. Replacing long-sitting but economically predatory governors before the election can dampen the impact of voter disapproval again boosting pro-incumbent results. iii Preface This dissertation is an original intellectual product of the author, Yana Gorokhovskaia. The interviews conducted as part of fieldwork undertaken in Russia from July to December of 2013 and included in Chapters 2 and 3 are covered by UBC Ethics Certificate Number H13-01613. The dataset of protest used in the regression analysis in Chapter 4 was compiled by the author for the years 2012, 2013, and 2014. Data on protest in 2011 was taken with permission from a dataset compiled by Dr. Tomila Lankina. iv Table of Contents Abstract ...........................................................................................................................................ii Preface ...........................................................................................................................................iv Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................v List of Tables ................................................................................................................................viii List of Figures ...............................................................................................................................ix Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................x Dedication .....................................................................................................................................xii 1. Introduction .........................................................................................................................1 1.1 Russia’s hybrid authoritarianism .............................................................................8 1.2 Methodology .........................................................................................................11 1.3 Overview................................................................................................................15 2. Restricting and promoting competition on an uneven playing field: Moscow’s mayoral election ................................................................................................................19 2.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................19 2.2 Manipulation and authoritarian elections ...............................................................21 2.2.1 The uneven playing field ...........................................................................24 2.2.2 Scaling down and promoting competition.................................................26 2.3 Background and methodology. .............................................................................28 2.3.1 Methodology..............................................................................................32 2.4 Competing on Moscow’s uneven playing field .....................................................34 2.4.1 State resources ...........................................................................................34 2.4.2 Media .........................................................................................................36 v 2.4.3 Unequal application of the law and regulations ........................................39 2.5 Election result .......................................................................................................44 2.5.1 Public opinion ...........................................................................................44 2.5.2 A clean election .........................................................................................47 2.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................48 3. Exercising voice: Explaining political participation in Moscow’s municipal elections.............................................................................................................52 3.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................52 3.2 Exit, voice, and loyalty .........................................................................................54 3.3 Exit, voice, and loyalty in Russia ...........................................................................58 3.3.1 Declining quality? .....................................................................................59 3.3.2 Choosing exit and voice ............................................................................60 3.3.3 Apathy as a form of exit: Are Russians inherently undemocratic?............................................................................................63 3.4 Opportunities and constraints: Local self-government in Russia ................................................................................................................66 3.4.1 Local self-government ...............................................................................67 3.5 Methodology .........................................................................................................71 3.6 At the periphery of power: Exercising voice under authoritarianism ...........................................................................................72 3.6.1 The experience from within: “If you’re afraid, don’t do it. If you do it, don’t be afraid.” ....................................................79 3.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................85 4. Testing for sources of electoral competition under authoritarianism: An analysis of Russia’s gubernatorial elections .................................................................88 4.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................88 vi 4.2 Elections and electoral competition in authoritarian regimes ................................90 4.3 Explaining competition: Voter preferences or regime manipulation? ............................................................................................97 4.3.1 Voter preferences ......................................................................................97 4.3.2 Manipulation ...........................................................................................110 4.4 Variables and data sources...................................................................................114 4.5 Analysis
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