Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 40–51

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Journal of Eurasian Studies

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The failure of democratization in : A comparative perspective

Alfred B. Evans

California State Univ., Dept. of Political Science, article info abstract

Article history: During the 1990s American leaders and many others in the West viewed Russia as the Received 6 September 2009 most important test case for a transition to democracy. Today the consensus of scholarly Accepted 19 December 2009 analyses in the West concludes that, if Russia did enter a transition to democracy, that transition was not successful. This article attempts to suggest some of the main lessons about democratization that may be derived from the study of the experience of post- communist Russia, seen in a comparative perspective. The thesis that the first competitive national election after the downfall of an authoritarian regime marks a decisive breakthrough for forces striving for democratization has not proved true for Russia. Yet the withering of democracy and the consolidation of a semi- authoritarian regime followed the period of competitive . In the early and mid-1990s scholars who had specialized in the study of communist regimes warned that the post-communist states would need to carry out radical economic and social changes as well as sweeping political transformation. In Russia, however, the consequences of a corrupted process of privatization of state assets were enormously damaging for the institutionalization of democracy. As was shown in a number of countries in the 1970s and 1980s, a strong civil society can play an important role in a nation’s transition to democracy. The barriers to the devel- opment of civil society within the Soviet system and the conditions causing weakness in social organizations in post-communist Russia made it easier for members of the elite to subvert reform and guaranteed that there would be fewer restraints on the tendency toward more authoritarian control after 2000. Among post-communist nations, those in which a consensus of most segments of the elite and the public was committed to a radical break with the old system have been much more successful in carrying out marketization and democratization. The combination of historical conditions that had created a strong anti-communist consensus in most of Eastern Europe had not taken shape in Russia. The absence of a fusion of democratization and national liberation in Russia explained the lack of a clear national consensus in favor of political and economic transformation. One of the main lessons from the course of events in Russia from the early 1990s to the present is that change away from one form of authoritarian rule, which usually has been labeled as a transition to democracy, is not irreversible. Some democratic transitions may prove to be shallow, and the changes in post-communist Russia have provided a good example of a shallow transition. The scholarly literature on transitions to democracy that

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1879-3665/$ – see front matter Copyright Ó 2010, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.euras.2010.10.001 A.B. Evans / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 40–51 41

appeared after the early 1980s departed from earlier writings’ emphasis on the growth of social, economic, and cultural conditions for the institutionalization of democracy in the political system. The experience of Russia may encourage us to return to the study of the long-term trends facilitating or inhibiting the growth of democratic institutions. Copyright Ó 2010, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction1 ‘something else,’” which could consist of democracy or “a new, and possibly more severe, form of authoritarian rule” After the middle of the 1970s authoritarian regimes (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, 3).2 Perhaps those scholars were replaced in many countries, and the political systems should not be held responsible for the policy decisions of in a number of those countries showed signs of becoming the political leaders who chose to interpret the nuanced more democratic, in some cases experiencing changes of findings of academic research in an oversimplified manner. apparently fundamental importance. Most of the nations Nevertheless, as Thomas Carothers attests, at the height that experienced the dramatic growth of democratic of enthusiasm for democratization in the 1980s and 1990s, features in their governmental institutions and political Western advocates of democracy promotion “embraced processes in the 1970s and 1980s were in Southern Europe the view that democracy could succeed anywhere, and (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) and South America (Brazil, could do so quickly” (Carothers, 2007, 24), and were willing Chile, and others). A large number of scholarly writings to believe that any country whose leaders offered any attempted to develop comparative generalizations about political opening was in a “transition to democracy” transitions to democracy based on the evidence gleaned (Carothers, 1997, 92). We should recognize that optimism from the transformations that had taken place in those about the potential (if not the inevitability) of imitation countries. Then in the late 1980s startling changes began of the values of American democracy by other nations had in the and Eastern Europe. In the 1990s, after been a traditional theme in the political culture of the the Soviet bloc disappeared and the Soviet Union itself United States (Kagan, 2008) since the late eighteenth fragmented, the leaders of many states that had been century. It is obvious that the discussion of transitions to under communist rule announced that they were deter- democracy by political scientists had not created such mined to institutionalize the principles of democracy. As hopes, but it did help to heighten expectations among a result there was a burst of unbounded optimism con- politicians and the public for the rapid spread of cerning the prospects for the triumph of democracy in democracy until it would be overwhelmingly dominant in most of the nations of the world. As Martin Dimitrov has the world. reported, “When the Berlin Wall fell, political scientists During the 1990s the country that was viewed by were wildly optimistic about the global spread of democ- American leaders and many others in the West as the most racy” (Dimitrov, 2008, 24). Samuel Huntington believed important test case for a transition to democracy was that scores of countries in different regions of the world Russia. The Clinton administration emphasized that one had been swept up in a “third wave” of democratization of its highest priorities in foreign policy was the success of (Huntington, 1991). Francis Fukuyama argued that there the movement to democracy and a market economy in was no longer any viable alternative to the liberal demo- the states of the former Soviet Union (Christopher, 1993; cratic model for political and economic institutions Talbott, 1993a). US Secretary of State Warren Christopher (Fukuyama, 1992). Larry Diamond published an article asserted that “helping the Russian people to build a free titled, “The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic World society and market economy is the greatest strategic chal- Order” (1994), and some scholars envisioned a world in lenge of our time,” and that “Russia was the single most which all major states would be liberal democracies (Smith, important foreign policy priority” of the Clinton adminis- 2007, 116). tration (Marsden, 2005, 47). Russia is by far the largest of Such optimism proved infectious, and political leaders the former of the USSR in both population and in the USA were receptive to the influence of superficial land area; indeed, it is the largest country in the world in interpretations of the writings of academic specialists. It terms of territory. In addition, its geographical location should be noted that the scholars in the field of political gives it influence on issues in several regions in which the science who produced the most influential writings on USA is interested, and it has greater strategic military transitions to democracy (the so-called “transitologists”) capability than any other country except the United States. hedged their generalizations with qualifications that often On a deeper level, psychologically, as the main successor were disregarded by journalists and politicians. For of Soviet Union, Russia represents the core of the former example, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter said superpower that had been the main geopolitical and that a volume they authored dealt with “transitions from ideological rival of the USA from the late 1940s until the certain authoritarian regimes toward an uncertain

2 It is worth noting that the subtitle of that volume, the single most 1 The author would like to thank Valerie Sperling and Andrei Tsy- widely quoted book about democratization by “transitologists,” is gankov for their comments on an earlier version of this essay. “Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies.” 42 A.B. Evans / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 40–51 early 1990s. If the state that had been the core of the light on that question. Also, there is now a substantial superpower that was the main adversary of democracy scholarly literature on post-communist political trends, could, within a relatively short time, be changed into an which permits us to compare Russia’s experience after ideological soul mate of our country, the symbolic impli- the disintegration of the Soviet system with that of other cations would be profound. nations that formerly were under communist rule. A And yet, as the current decade nears its end, the number of scholars have remarked on the high degree of consensus of scholarly analyses and popular perceptions in diversity in the trajectories of change among the post- the West indicates that, if Russia did enter a transition to communist countries, which in the political sphere have democracy, that transition was not successful. From the produced results ranging from thoroughly authoritarian point of view of those in the United States and Western states to democracies that function much like those of Europe who had high hopes for the spread of democracy, Western Europe (Ekiert and Hanson, 2003, 29, 31; Ekiert, the most important test case for democratization was 2003, 91, 94; Pop-Eleches, 2005, 2). In fact, Herbert Kit- largely a disappointment.3 During the 1990s, while Boris schelt has concluded that “there is no region or set of Yeltsin was the , most Western academic countries on earth with a currently larger diversity of specialists regarded that country as a democracy that was political regimes” than is found in the post-communist in an early stage of transition, with some imperfections segment of the world (Kitschelt, 2003, 49). We may expect that did not negate the fundamentally democratic char- that revealing insights will emerge from the contrast acter of the political regime. Within a few years after Vla- between political change in Russia and that in other post- dimir Putin became the president of that country, however, communist nations. We should admit, however, that in this the assessment of that regime by most political scientists article, space does not permit us to attempt an exhaustive specializing in the study Russia changed. Between 2000 discussion of the factors conditioning the results of and 2005 the outlook of Russia watchers in the West democratization in Russia in comparative perspective. shifted, so that many began to refer to the political system This article will attempt to contribute to an ongoing of that country as authoritarian (Hahn, 2004; McFaul, discussion by suggesting some of the main lessons about 2004). Stephen Whitefield has noted that during Putin’s democratization that may be derived from the study of the time as president of Russia, there was an “increasing experience of post-communist Russia, seen in a compara- consensus among scholars, journalists, and policy-makers tive perspective.4 in the West” that Russian politics had moved “significantly ” fi off a democratic pathway (White eld, 2009, 93). Consid- 2. The electoral fallacy ering both the undemocratic features and the elements of pluralism remaining in Russian politics, however, it would By the early 1990s those in the West who enthusiastically fi ’ seem justi able to apply Marina Ottaway s category of supported the promotion of democracy attached great “ ” semi-authoritarian (Ottaway, 2003) to the Russian polit- importance to the “founding election” in a new democracy. ical system. Most Western scholars who focus on that They assumed that in a country that had been under an ’ country would seem to agree with Steven Fish s assertion authoritarian regime, the first election in which different “ ” that democratization has failed in Russia (Fish, 2005, 81). parties competed would be a breakthrough of change, an What lessons about the conditions affecting transitions important starting point in the transition to democracy ’ to democracy can be learned from the study of Russia s (Schraeder, 2002, 229), and “the primary indicator of demo- experience of apparently unsuccessful democratization in cratic progress” (Marsden, 2005,135). The institutionalization the post-Soviet period? We may ask how much the model of electoral competition in a series of elections was thought for a successful transition to democracy that was created by to be “sufficient to consolidate democracy” (Rose and Shin, some scholars in the 1980s has proved applicable to Russia. 2001, 332). Thomas Carothers has observed that democracy That model was developed in response to dramatic changes promoters tended “to overestimate the power of elections in the political systems of countries in Southern Europe and to produce fundamental political change” (Carothers, 2007, South America. By the middle of the 1990s there was 24). The dominant school of thought in the USA during a debate in scholarly circles about the degree to which the 1990s (and to a lesser extent in Western Europe) believed generalizations derived from the study of political trans- that Russia had gone through a breakthrough toward formation in those countries might be proved valid with democratization during the early 1990s, and that Russia respect to nations that formerly were under communist subsequently faced the task of consolidating the features of rule (Bunce, 1995; Schmitter and Karl, 1994). Perhaps its infant democracy (McFaul,1999,117). Michael McFaul and enough time has passed to make it possible to shed more Sarah Mendelson took comfort in the fact that elections had become “the only legitimate means to power in post-Soviet Russia,” and added, “the emergence of electoral democracy, 3 The interpretation that sees political change in Russia from the early 1990s to the present in terms of a failed transition to democracy is not the only possible framework for perceiving change in that country during 4 One question that this article will not address is that of the impact of that period, of course. The writings of many Russian scholars and the the efforts of outside actors, such as foreign governments, international speeches of a number of Russian politicians would frame change in other organizations, foundations, and transnational NGOs, on the results of perspectives. One interpretation that is popular in Russia depicts attempted democratization in Russia. A good analysis of democracy a breakdown of order in the late 1980s and early 1990s, leading to a “time promotion in Russia by the Clinton administration of the USA is that of of troubles” under , followed by a restoration of order and the Marsden (2005). This author is preparing an essay evaluating the United revival of national pride under after 2000. States government’s policies affecting democratization in Russia. A.B. Evans / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 40–51 43 however fragile and flawed, must be recognized as a revolu- different points on the same learning curve” (266). Wilson tionary achievement” (McFaul and Mendelson, 2000, 332). adds that under Putin, “the Kremlin has simply got better at After all, post-Soviet Russia had held its first competitive fixing elections” (ibid.). Alexander Lukin agrees that during election for its national parliament in December 1993, in the post-Soviet years, “elections became more and more which a large number of parties supported candidates. fraudulent and subject to manipulation” (Lukin, 2009, 87).5 If one competitive national election is a sign of a break- In summary, the idea that the first competitive national through to democracy, then Russia should have made a good election after the downfall of an authoritarian regime marks start on the road to democracy by the time the votes from a decisive breakthrough for forces striving for democrati- its first multiparty election were counted. And yet, even zation (a notion that undoubtedly was valid in some earlier though various parties competed in parliamentary elections cases) has not proved true of Russia at all. in Russia in 1993, 1995, 1999, 2003, and 2007, and elections for the presidency took place in the post-communist period 3. The legacy of economic reform under Yeltsin in 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 (with real competition in 1996 and some competition in 2000), Russia has moved toward The model of change offered by those who had exam- greater authoritarianism during the last several years. The ined the experience of countries that had carried out tran- decline in political pluralism is reflected in the fact that in sitions to democracy in the 1970s and 1980s in Southern election results the ruling Party has steadily Europe and South America focused primarily on the goals increased its dominance, as it won more than 64 percent of and actions of groups in each nation’s political elite (Smith, the vote for the of the national parliament (the 2007, 130; Schmitz, 2004, 406). That approach contrasted Duma) in December 2007, and has received over 70 percent sharply with decades of previous research that had of the vote in each of the last two presidential elections. The emphasized the importance of building up the economic transfer of presidential power from Vladimir Putin to Dmitrii and social prerequisites for democracy (Carothers, 1997, 92; Medvedev during 2007–2008 was managed smoothly Smith, 2007,126–127). Thomas Carothers summarizes the within the highest level of the political elite, so that the outlook embodied in the new model: “So long as the elites results of the presidential election in 2008 were carefully in a country embraced the democratic idealdsomething predetermined. The stage of the first competitive elections elites everywhere seemed to be doingddemocracy would was followed by the withering of democracy and the spring into being” (Carothers, 1997, 92). Political leaders in consolidation of a semi-authoritarian regime. the USA focused intently on interactions within the national Earlier writings about transitions to democracy assumed political elite when they looked at political events in post- that during the period of a breakthrough, the main threat Soviet Russia. The pronouncements of high-ranking offi- to greater pluralism would be the potential of a coup by cials in the Clinton administration who played the principal forces seeking to restore the old authoritarian system role in shaping policy toward Russia revealed a strong who would eliminate competitive elections if they were tendency to dichotomize factions in the political elite of successful in seizing power. The assumption that the danger that country between those who were seen as favoring of such a coup “hangs like a sword of Damocles over the democracy and those who were on the side opposed to possible outcome” of a transition to democracy (O’Donnell democracy. President Clinton and others typically depicted and Schmitter, 1986, 23) reflected the fact that in Southern the struggle going on in Russia as if it were a confrontation Europe and South America the prevalent form of an between the forces of light and the forces of darkness. authoritarian regime had been one in which the military Strobe Talbott, the main official in the administration held power. In sharp contrast, in post-communist Russia specializing on policy toward Russia, spoke of a Manichean a group from the ruling circles, consisting of Vladimir Putin struggle between supporters and opponents of democracy and his closest supporters, has concentrated almost in that country: “On the one side . were the forces of the unchecked power in its hands, and has continued parlia- past, of the old Soviet Union and the old Soviet system . mentary and presidential elections, but has mastered tech- On the other side were the forces of the new Russia, niques that make it possible for the ruling faction to personified by President Yeltsin, committed to democracy, manipulate the mass media, political parties, and public reform, respect for human life, and civic pride” (Talbott, opinion so thoroughly that the outcome of a national elec- 1993b). A similar perspective was found in the writings of tion is always a foregone conclusion. Andrew Wilson’s some scholars, although in a bit more sophisticated and highly insightful work, Virtual Politics, describes those complex form. The Clinton administration asserted techniques in vivid detail (Wilson, 2005), and that book repeatedly that Boris Yeltsin was committed to democracy has enriched our knowledge of the means that are used and a market economy and placed its bet on him as the to substitute the appearance of competition for real person who would lead Russia into the community of pluralism in Russian politics. Wilson shows that Putin did democratic nations. That administration saw the Commu- not invent the techniques of manipulating the voters to nist Party of the Russian and extreme national- predetermine the results of elections; Boris Yeltsin and ists like as posing the main potential others, including regional chief executives and the leaders of threat to reverse the changes introduced by Yeltsin. some other post-Soviet states, began to develop those techniques in the 1990s. As Wilson puts it, “the Putin era has only perfected techniques that were already common under 5 It also is true that, in addition to public relations gimmicks and illegal Yeltsin, and already common elsewhere in the former USSR” actions, a genuinely high level of approval from the Russian public has (2005, 39), and “the Yeltsin and Putin eras can be plotted at been a very important asset for Putin and his associates. 44 A.B. Evans / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 40–51

With the wisdom of hindsight we can realize that the degree of political transformation among countries actual character of the changes that were generated by formerly under communist rule (Fish, 1998, 1999, 2005). the Yeltsin leadership was highly mixed. On the one Post-communist countries in which reformers committed hand, Yeltsin was determined to prevent the Communists to radical political and economic changes gained control from returning to power; he did allow greater freedom of usually made successful transitions to democracy, while expression than Russia had known before (though in that the nations in which there were pacts between moderate area he continued changes that had reformers and members of the old ruling elite typically initiated in the Soviet Union); he did permit rapid growth got bogged down in incomplete change, stalemating the in the number of political parties legally operating in movement toward democracy (and creating greater Russia; and he did make a commitment to abandoning potential for movement back toward more authoritarian major parts of the Soviet economic model. In their totality, rule). Bunce has observed that “in the post-communist though, the changes that occurred under the Yeltsin world, there is a very high correlation between democrati- administration presented a very mixed picture. In many zation and economic reform” (Bunce, 2004, 223), and that areas there was a wide gap between Yeltsin’s statements among post-communist countries, the relationship on fundamental principles and the changes that took place between democratization and successful market reform is in practice while he was president of Russia. To borrow “robust and positive” (Bunce, 2001, 54, 59). from the language of the Soviet Marxists, in Yeltsin's legacy In the political sphere, as we have seen, Russia falls there was a lack of unity of theory and practice. We have in the category of the cases of compromised and incom- already mentioned the beginning of techniques of manip- plete democratic transitions. The relationship between ulation of voters and elections under Yeltsin’s leadership in economic transformation and democratization in post- the 1990s. communist countries that has been identified in compar- This section of the article will concentrate on the ative perspective by scholars such as Hellman, McFaul, character of the transformation of Russia’s economy that Bunce, and Fish can help us understand the political was guided by Yeltsin’s policies. In the early and mid- consequences of the form of economic reform in Russia in 1990s, when some scholars were debating the possible the 1990s. Though Boris Yeltsin made an emphatic differences between earlier transitions to democracy and commitment to fundamental economic transformation on the path that lay ahead for the post-communist states of the level of theory, he made a series of compromises in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, those who practice that prevented his economic reforms from reach- had specialized in the study of communist regimes ing some of their central goals. Most importantly, the warned that the post-communist states would need to integrity of the privatization of state economic enterprises carry out radical economic and social changes as well as was undermined when the Yeltsin administration, under sweeping political transformation (Bunce, 1995, 121). In political pressure, allowed people with political skills the countries that had embarked on transitions to and connections to exploit the process of distribution of democracy in the 1970s and 1980s, the institutions of shares in those enterprises to amass assets for their own capitalist market economies had already been in place purposes (Gill and Markwick, 2000, 213). In the first major before dramatic political change had begun, but the post- stage of privatization during 1992 and 1993, factory direc- communist states that wanted democracy and a market tors were able to gain control of most of the shares that economy would attempt to move toward both at the were supposed to belong to the workers in their enterprises same time. That observation has proved to be particularly (Rutland, 1994, 1109, 1113, 1124; Appel, 1997, 1427; pertinent. The central thesis of the literature of the 1980s Goldman, 2003,81–82). As Dimitri Simes says, “the prin- on transitions to democracy was that pacts between cipal beneficiaries of privatization were the remnants of factions in the elite were of crucial significance in the old nomenklatura and speculators out to make a quick bringing the end of authoritarian rule and the break- ruble” (Simes, 1999,146–147). During the next few years through to democracy (Bunce, 2004, 220). A pact based the transfer of massive state assets to bankers and indus- on compromise, “bridging” the differences between trialists who were close to the government accelerated, moderate defenders of authoritarianism and moderate aided by scams such as the “loans for shares” program leaders of the democratic opposition, was thought to be (Appel, 2004, 97). Thus within a short time, privatization most favorable for a successful transition from authori- “created a powerful small circle of fabulously wealthy tarian to democratic governance. business elitesdthe so-called ‘oligarchs’” (Appel, 2004, As the record of experience of post-communist change 104). accumulated, however, empirically grounded works by As it had been envisioned by US Secretary of State Joel Hellman and Michael McFaul demonstrated that the Warren Christopher, privatization in Russia was supposed thesis of the importance of pacted transitions for ushering to create millions of independent property owners and in successful democratization was inapplicable to the foster the growth of a middle class with a commitment to post-communist countries (Hellman, 1998; McFaul, 2002). continued reform, (Marsden, 2005, 75). In reality, however, Valerie Bunce remarks that what we discover among post- the manner in which privatization took place insured that communist states is “that the opposite strategydthat is, the new economic elite of Russia was created by the state breakage, not bridgingdemerges as the most successful and remained closely tied to the state (Easter, 2008,212; approach to political and economic transformation” (Bunce, Gustafson, 1999,111–112; Rutland, 2001, 19). Not only did 2004, 222). Steven Fish has shown a strong relationship the oligarchs depend on the state for their status; they also between the degree of economic transformation and the had great influence in the national and regional A.B. Evans / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 40–51 45 governments (Rutland, 2006, 77), as signified in part by the primarily on maneuvering and agreements at the level of fact that some of them periodically occupied high-ranking political elites (Bermeo, 1990, 361). The generalizations posts in the national government (Gill and Markwick, 2000, offered by those scholars on the basis of changes that had 219), and played a role in decisions about the choice of taken place in some countries in Southern Europe and leaders (Goldman, 2003, 139). Olga Kryshta- South America placed little emphasis on pressures from novskaya and Stephen White affirm, “it began to appear as the masses and activity by popular organizations, such if the state itself had been ‘privatized,’ and that all impor- as labor unions, in democratic transitions (Collier, 1999,5, tant decisions were being made by a small group of 5, 110; Edles, 1995, 362). Some of the literature on financial magnates” (Kryshtanovskaya and White, 2005, democratization suggested that too much mass mobili- 294). The oligarchs, some of whom controlled media zation and pressure from below could endanger the outlets, became an indispensable part of Yeltsin’s base of success of a democratic transition (Bermeo, 1997, 305).6 support. Their financial contributions and their manipula- We must note, however, that other scholars have carried tion of television coverage helped to deliver victory for out research that has called into question the accuracy of Yeltsin in the Russia presidential election of 1996 even those assumptions even with regard to some of the though his popularity had fallen drastically. The oligarchs countries that made successful transitions to democracy were also a source of funding for political parties and the in the 1970s and 1980s. Several researchers have argued governors of the regions. In short, “the oligarchy and its that forces in civil society played a much larger role in allies represented a fusion of financial and industrial capital such transitions in some countries in Southern Europe with direct access to government” (Sakwa, 2008, 468). and Latin America than was originally supposed (Bermeo, The consequences of the corrupted process of privat- 1997, 309). Recently Monica Threlfall has argued that ization of state assets were enormously damaging for the organized groups in civil society in Spain exerted strong institutionalization of democracy in Russia. After the end pressure to replace authoritarian political institutions of the 1990s, Joseph Stiglitz observed that “privatization, as (Threlfall, 2008), a factor in the dynamic of change that it was imposed in Russia . undermined confidence in earlier writings on Spain’s widely admired transition had government, in democracy, and in reform” (Stiglitz, 2002, neglected. Several scholars have presented evidence that 159). The majority of felt that they had been in some cases of successful democratization, the labor deceived by a process of privatization that had failed to movement exerted a crucial influence on the calculations produce the benefits that had been promised to them of factions in the political elite by creating pressures that (Appel, 2004, 90). As a result of insider privatization, the were potentially destabilizing (Collier and Mahoney, 1997, broad majority of Russians did not feel themselves to be 285–286; Collier, 1999, 127). Elisabeth Jean Wood has stakeholders in the new economic system, while they saw documented the way in which political mobilization in a class of “new Russians” flaunting their newfound wealth the working class in South Africa and El Salvador forced (Appel, 1997, 1434). Most Russians found that their living elite figures in the political regime of each country to standards were declining sharply, while a small minority negotiate a transition to democracy (Wood, 2000, 10). became conspicuously better off (Appel, 2004, 98; Ruth Berins Collier concludes, “in most cases the politics Goldman, 2003, 3). Surveys that were taken several years of democratization is a combination of processes from after the Yeltsin government had launched economic above and below” (Collier, 1999, 20).7 So the scholarly transformation revealed that most Russians believed that literature on transitions to democracy has increasingly privatization had mainly benefited members of the old recognized the importance of the influence of social nomenklatura class and organized crime groups (Gustafson, groups and mass organizations in democratic transitions 1999, 42). Opinion surveys demonstrated that the course outside the sphere of post-communist countries. of privatization had been accompanied by “declining The trend should encourage us to reexamine the hopes and skepticism toward the overall direction of assumptions, common in earlier writings, that organiza- the economic transformation” (DeBardeleben, 1999, 456). tions in civil society would not play much of a role in The power and privileges of the oligarchs, along with the a transition to democracy, and that the strength of civil growth of organized crime and corruption in the 1990s, society was not particularly relevant to the chances for undermined the legitimacy of the political regime headed successful democratization. The Western conception of by Boris Yeltsin, and made most Russians skeptical about civil society refers to the sphere of the largely indepen- the merits of democracy in the style in which it was pre- dent and self-directed organizational activity of citizens sented in Russia. Western leaders, particularly in the Clin- (Diamond, 1999, 249). It has been described as “a space of ton administration, had portrayed Yeltsin as leading the citizen-directed collective action, located between the drive for democracy and a market economy, but in balance Yeltsin’s legacy damaged the potential for successful democratization in Russia and helped to set the stage for 6 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 48, 54) did acknowledge that in some the consolidation of more authoritarian control under countries, once a movement toward democratization had become Putin. evident, there had been a surge of activism by social groups that had exerted “strong pressures to expand the limits of mere liberalization and ” 4. The weakness of Russian civil society partial democratization. They did not see popular pressures as a major factor behind the initial decisions that had created an opening for democratization. fl 7 The most in uential Western scholars who wrote Similarly, Wood (2000, 17) says of democratization that “nearly all about transitions to democracy in the 1980s focused transitions combine elements ‘from above’ with elements ‘from below.’” 46 A.B. Evans / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 40–51 family and the state, and not directed solely toward social base, their financial assets, their impact on society, private profit” (Henry and Sundstrom, 2006, 5). With the and their influence in politics (Evans, 2002). On the level wisdom that comes from broader comparative experience of popular attitudes, part of the cultural legacy of the Soviet that has accumulated since the 1980s, we now can see system was pervasive distrust of social organizations and how much the authors of democratic transition theory even of the whole public sphere. In addition, the deep took for granted the relatively high level of development decline in the economy made it impossible for most citizens of the organizations of civil society in the countries from to give financial support to such organizations even if they which their generalizations had been derived. In general had been willing to. Finally, the evolution of the political the growth of independent social organizations under system placed a premium on exploiting personal connec- states controlled by communist parties was far more tions with individuals in positions of power, rather than limited than in the nations of Southern Europe and South the drawing support from sizable groups in society (Fish, America that moved toward democracy. In Russia, where 2001, 22). After 1991 the Yeltsin leadership deliberately the Soviet model had been invented and where it had discouraged the mobilization of Russian citizens for orga- been in place longer than anywhere else in the world, the nized political actions other than voting in electionsdand ruling party and state had created a network of organi- Yeltsin’s lieutenants were not very successful in gaining zations that permeated the entire society and was support from citizens in parliamentary elections. Relying directed in detail by the Communist Party of the Soviet heavily on dominance by the institution of the presidency Union (Evans, 2006). Since no legal, independent, orga- and making deals with the oligarchs and governors, Yeltsin nized groups were permitted, there was no civil society in sought to introduce change almost exclusively from the the Soviet Union, according to the usual Western top down. And yet, as Steven Fish has pointed out, in every conception. Nevertheless, there was a burst of optimism post-communist state “where democratization did not concerning the possibility for the rise of civil society in happen or was initiated and then reversed, a top-down the Soviet Union in the late 1980s when, as a part of dynamic has been at work” (Fish, 2005, 186). Fish adds that reforms introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev, “informal” “strong, autonomous societal organizations and networks groups appeared and proliferated quickly. That phenom- may not always be democracy’s allies, but their absence is enon was followed by the emergence of the Democratic almost always democracy’s enemy” (Fish, 2005, 187).8 The Russia political movement, a quasi-party that supplied barriers to the development of civil society in Russia within active assistance for Boris Yeltsin’s victory in the presi- the Soviet system and the conditions causing weakness dential election in the Russian of the USSR in in social organizations in post-communist Russia made it 1991 (Sakwa, 2008, 130). The base of support for most of easier for members of the elite to subvert reform and the informal groups proved to be shallow, however, and guaranteed that there would be fewer restraints on the the Democratic Russia movement fragmented and dis- tendency toward more authoritarian control after 2000. In appeared within a short time. the words of Graeme Gill and Roger Markwick, “It has been As was shown in a number of countries in the 1970s and the weakness of such civil society forces in the Soviet Union 1980s, a strong civil society can play an important role in and Russia which has left excessive power in the hands a nation’s transition to democracy. Pressure from the of political elites and undercut the emergence of a stable bottom up can interact with initiatives from the top down and robust democracy” (Gill and Markwick, 2000, 251). to build momentum for institutional change. Once such a transition has begun, independent social organizations 5. The influence of historical factors with substantial numbers of loyal members can be valuable assets to members of the political elite who encounter In recent years a number of scholars writing about post- opposition to further change. Also, vigilance by vigorous communist states have begun to search for the historical organizations outside the state can help to keep the leaders roots of the patterns of change and continuity that have of the transition on track if they begin to betray their ideals. been evident during the past two decades. That trend in That did not happen in Russia when the Yeltsin adminis- scholarly works reflects dissatisfaction with earlier writings tration allowed the privatization of state assets to be which had attempted to explain the divergence in the hijacked by avaricious insiders, and when the oligarchs trajectories of post-communist states in terms of statistical achieved dominance of political parties, the media, and relationships between potential independent and depen- the government. Perhaps surprisingly, in the face of sharply dent variables, all of which had been measured by various declining economic security during the 1990s, most of organizations, offering information that was readily avail- the population of Russia withdrew from political life and able. When researchers found that the countries in which became cynical about parties and politicians (Gill and noncommunist parties won clear victories over communist Markwick, 2000, 249). During that decade most citizens parties in the first competitive elections were likely to of Russia immersed themselves in the struggle for survival achieve the most thorough political and economic trans- as individuals or families, and had little hope for positive formation, their finding was interesting, though not political changes. surprising, and it was dismissed by one scholar as “not much Despite the increase in the freedom to form nongov- ernmental organizations in Russia after the fall of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, civil society in Russia 8 Valerie Bunce (2008, 30) also emphasizes the importance of a “robust was weak after the end of the old regime, as almost all and pluralist civil society” for a successful post-communist transition to independent organizations were marginal in terms of their democracy. A.B. Evans / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 40–51 47 of an insight” (Kitschelt, 2003, 72). The disclosure of such Hungary, there was the historical memory of intervention statistical relationships left unexplained “the why of the by Tsarist Russia to block their striving for national libera- why”dthe more fundamental question of “why some tion. In most of the region, the imposition of communist countries managed to remove their communists from regimes after the Second World War ensured that in the power and why others did not” (Kopstein and Reilly, 1999, minds of the local population those systems would be 614). The factors that serve as proximate explanatory vari- associated indelibly with Soviet domination. As a result, ables may be seen as “intervening links in a causal chain that the people of Eastern European countries felt closer to leads from the deep attributes to the political outcome” the West, and to Europe in particular, than ever before (Møller and Skaaning, 2009, 316). Herbert Kitschelt has (Brown, 1991, 262). Bunce observes that “state socialism commented, “Shallow explanations provide . high statis- had created in some countries a popular consensus around tical explanatory yields but little insight into the causal democratization, if only because democracy represented genealogy of a phenomenon” (Kitschelt, 2003, 68). Deeper the polar opposite of the authoritarian regime” (Bunce, causes may account for what is happening with both the 2001, 57). In the post-communist period, democracy and proximate independent variable and the dependent vari- a market economy represented not only a different way able in an apparent empirical relationship. Grigore Pop- of life, but also the promise of integration with the West Eleches suggests that the results of initial competitive and independence from Russia, creating a fusion of liberal elections “may be signals about the nature of historical ideology and nationalism. In several countries in Eastern legacies, which drive the long-term prospects of democ- Europe after 1989–1991, the replacement of the old racy” for post-communist states (Pop-Eleches, 2007, 921). order was simultaneously “a process of national liberation” A growing number of studies have attempted to identify (Bunce, 1995, 120), which generated more determined the influence of crucial differences in the historical experi- support for a course of radical change (Bunce, 2000, 719). ences of nations that formerly were under communist rule. In Russia, however, there was a lack of a consensus at the Pop-Eleches argues persuasively that “historical legacies elite and popular levels about the desired character of have to constitute the starting point for any systematic political and economic transformation (Bunce, 2004, 229; analysis of democratization in the post-communist context” Easter, 2008, 225; Goldman, 2003, 68). The combination of (Pop-Eleches, 2007, 909). Similarly, Grzegorz Ekiert historical conditions that had created a strong anti- contends that “historical legacies determine the available communist consensus in most of Eastern Europe had not alternatives and make some institutional choices more taken shape in Russia. The Russians did not have a reason likely” in post-communist countries (Ekiert, 2003, 93). to believe that the Soviet system had been forced on them by Among those who examine historical backgrounds, some a foreign power, or to see that system as blocking aspirations scholars attach primary importance to the experiences of for national independence. In Russia, the predominant the period of communist rule in various countries (Ekiert, attitude toward a rapprochement with the West was much 2003,92–93; Kopstein, 2003, 233), while others trace the more ambivalent (Appel, 2004, 170), and the majority of sources of post-communist differences back to the histor- citizens had no desire to cast their future with Europe.9 That ical legacies of those countries before the creation of is not surprising, because for centuries Russians had viewed communist regimes (Kopstein, 2003, 239; Pop-Eleches, Europe with deep ambivalence (Stent, 2007, 398–399, 435). 2005, 15, 25). All of those scholars would agree that As Hillary Appel remarks, “the rejection of the communist historical, cultural, and geographical factors play a large past in favor of a Western liberal regime has often been role in accounting for the divergence in the political and interpreted in post-Soviet Russia as a repudiation of Russia’s economic paths of post-communist nations, which has past and national character,” and as even demeaning to become more pronounced from the early 1990s to the aspects of one’s own personal history (Appel, 2004, 170, present (Pop-Eleches, 2007, 914). 173). Appel notes that in the Czech Republic in the 1990s, the Among post-communist nations, those in which privatization of industry could be portrayed as anti- a consensus of most segments of the elite and the public communist, pro-European, and therefore essentially in was committed to a radical break with the old system accordance with Czech character (Appel, 2004, 20, 173). In have been much more successful in carrying out market- Poland, the consensus based on nationalism lengthened the ization and democratization (Orenstein, 2001, 43). Valerie time horizon of the public in favor of economic trans- Bunce (2006, 607) points out that in some countries in formation, producing persistence of support for the main Eastern Europe “democratic breakthroughs” were based direction of change (Bunce, 2005, 436). on a “widespread societal consensus that produced early In post-communist Russia, on the other hand, there and sustained economic reforms and democratic deep- was no consensus among the public in favor of the ening.” Such an overwhelming consensus among social groups in favor of fundamental change was not present in Russia in the early 1990s. That crucial contrast between 9 In 2000, a survey by the Levada Center asked a representative sample Russia and the countries in Eastern Europe that have gone of Russians, “Which historic road should Russia follow?” Only 15 percent farther in institutionalizing democratic processes can be of the respondents opted for the “European road,” and 18 percent favored explained primarily by differences in historical legacies. As a return to the Soviet model, while 60 percent said that Russia should Bunce puts it, in the countries in Eastern Europe that have follow “its own unique road” (Lukin, 2009, 83). A survey that was taken in 2005 found that 31 percent of Russians thought that Russia’s future lies made successful transitions to democracy, “a liberal agenda with the countries of Western Europe, while 69 percent said that their ” combined with a nationalist agenda (Bunce, 2003, 178). In country’s future lies with “countries in the CIS,” meaning other states that some countries in Eastern Europe, such as Poland and formerly were part of the Soviet Union (Rose and Munro, 2008, 53). 48 A.B. Evans / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 40–51 movement to a market system (Simes, 1999, 152; Goldman, (Geddes, 1999, 131); none took place in a country that had 2003,65–66). Alexander Lukin reports that the substantial been under a single-party regime that subdued the state and degree of disillusionment with the Soviet system among the military as thoroughly as in the Soviet Union. In each of the population of Russia “was caused not by a desire to live the nations where those earlier transitions took place, the in a Western-type society, but rather by a desire to live in basic institutions of a market economy had already devel- a system that was different from the Stalinist system” oped before a political transition began. In no country in (Lukin, 2009, 67). Surveys of the Russians showed not Southern Europe or South America that moved toward only that there was no overwhelming rejection of the old democracy had social organizations been as thoroughly political and economic system, but also that there was controlled by a single ruling party as in most of the nations a lack of general agreement in favor of a new set of insti- under communist rule, and in none of those countries that tutions.10 In that country, the “deep popular ambivalence” had gone through earlier transitions had the growth of civil toward radical change in the economy (Gustafson, 1999,21) society been blocked as firmly as in the Soviet Union. The key led the Yeltsin leadership to buy the support of interests thesis of the transitological literature, that of the positive in the elite by making concessions that undermined the effects of pacts between moderate reformers and moderate realization of some of the key goals of privatization, as we defenders of the old order, has proved inapplicable in rela- have seen (Appel, 2004, 81, 175; Bunce, 2004, 224; Rutland, tion to the post-communist states. 2006, 78). Those compromises institutionalized partial One of the main lessons from the course of events in and distorted reform, with political and economic conse- Russia from the early 1990s to the present is that the change quences that became fully evident only after the 1990s, but away from one form of authoritarian rule, which usually has were of the sort that Joel Hellman had predicted. The been labeled as a transition to democracy, is not irreversible. absence of a fusion of democratization and national liber- Some democratic transitions may prove to be shallow ation in Russia was a major reason for the lack of a clear (Ottaway, 2003, 165), and the changes in post-communist national consensus in favor of political and economic Russia have provided a good example of a shallow transition. transformation, with profound implications for the course The introduction of democratic institutions of government of reform in that country. and competing political parties may not prove to be a breakthrough to democracy. The metaphor of a break- 6. Conclusions through implies a decisive change with lasting results, even if that is not asserted explicitly. Stable democracy depends The evidence presented in this article makes it clear on the existence of a multi-layered infrastructure, including that the model of transition derived from changes that had not only competing political parties, independent mass occurred in a number of countries in Southern Europe and media, and protection for individual rights, but alsodon South America in the 1970s and 1980s did not hold up well a deeper leveldsupportive economic and social institutions. when it traveled to Russia and the other post-communist In most countries that have made successful transitions states. Perhaps the one point made by transitologists that from authoritarianism to democracy in recent decades, has proved to have the most general applicability is that in a large parts of that infrastructure had come into being as period of instability, the actions of political elites are a result of gradual economic and social changes before of particular importance. Instability enhances the opportu- the old authoritarian regime entered its last years. nity for political leaders to engage in the restructuring As was mentioned earlier in this article, the scholarly of political institutions and policies. Having acknowledged literature on transitions to democracy that appeared after that insight from the transitologists, we must add that their the early 1980s departed from the emphasis of the writings point of view was limited by distinctive historical conditions of the previous decades, which had focused on the growth and geographical boundaries much more than they realized. of social, economic, and cultural conditions for the insti- Almost all the transitions that were the basis of their model tutionalization of democracy in the political system. In took place in nations that had been ruled by the military recent years the limitations built into the approach of the transition paradigm have become apparent. The experience of Russia, which leaders in Western Europe and North 10 In 1992, when major economic reform began under Yeltsin, 50 America had regarded as the most important test case for percent of Russians gave a positive evaluation of the political system that democratization in the 1990s, may prompt us to return to had existed “before the start of ” (before the Gorbachev the study of the long-term trends facilitating or inhibiting period), and 62 percent gave a positive assessment of the economic the growth of democratic institutions. Thomas Carothers system that had been in place at the same time. In sharp contrast, only 14 percent approved the political system that was operating in 1992, and has urged that we do so: “As the third wave has aged, . only 10 percent positively evaluated the “current economic system” of and many ‘transitional countries’ have fallen short of early that year (Rose and Munro, 2002, 63; Rose et al., 2004, 203; Rose, Mishler, hopes, the importance of underlying conditions and and Munro, 2006, 154). The percentage of respondents giving a positive structures for democratic success has become increasingly evaluation of the old (Soviet) political and economic system increased ” 11 steadily during the 1990s, which says something about the population’s apparent (Carothers, 2007, 24). A return to the study of reaction to the changes that took place in that decade. In each year from 1992 on, “the percentage of Russians [who were] positive about the former communist regime has always been greater than that endorsing the current regime” (Rose et al., 2006, 132). On public opinion in Russia 11 Thomas Carothers had offered a similar warning earlier: “Recent about the communist regime and the new regime, as expressed when events highlight the folly of ignoring the broad set of social, political, and radical economic reform began under Yeltsin, see also (White, Rose, and economic factors bearing on democratization” (Carothers, 1997, 93). A McAllister 1997,181–182). number of scholars continued to ignore his warning, however. A.B. Evans / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 40–51 49 the conditions favorable for successful democratization liberal intelligentsia constitute a small minority in their might help to overcome the excessive optimism that has own society, and their ideas have not won widespread been exhibited by many scholars and political leaders in the support among the majority of Russians (Fish, 1996, 107; West in recent decades. For some years, as Peter Rutland Gill and Markwick, 2000, 255; Rose, Munro, and Mishler, says, “building democracy and building a market economy 2004, 213). Relying primarily on that section of society to were assumed to be compatible and complementary bring political change in Russia has brought disappoint- processes which could be introduced to any country on the ment in the past, and it is sure to bring disappointment in planet” (Rutland, 2000, 244). That optimism produced the future if Western leaders persist in that habit. That a tendency to believe that a country had entered a transi- approach is not received well by the majority of Russians. It tion to democracy if its old authoritarian leadership had makes Westerners appear to be either naive (well-meaning been replaced and the new leadership of the country but clueless) or cynical (disguising ulterior motives), and claimed that it was devoted to the values of democracy. neither reading of our actions is likely to inspire much trust. Western leaders were slow to admit that they had been It is time to stop looking at Russia as if it were in the naïve in their assessment of Russia’s executive leadership middle of an incomplete transition. There was a transition in the 1990s. After a few years of supporting the Yeltsin in Russia, but it did not go where many Western scholars administration, the Clinton administration in the United had hoped. We should heed the advice that the late James States had too much of a stake in Yeltsin to admit the depth Millar sagely offered several years ago: “The transition is of the problems that he had created. After Putin replaced over. Get over it” (Millar, 2000). A growing body of schol- Yeltsin, President George W. Bush continued to praise arly literature in the field of comparative politics seeks Russia’s executive leadership as democratically oriented to delineate the dynamics of semi-authoritarian regimes even as late as 2003.12 The leaders who undermined the (Brownlee, 2007; Ottaway, 2003; Smith and Zeigler, 2008; success of a democratic transition in Russia in the 1990s Zakaria, 1997). That trend reflects the fact that many of and those who introduced more authoritarian rule in the the supposed transitions to democracy proved to be next decade were the same ones whom Western leaders shallow, like that in Russia. Increasingly, scholars writing had regarded as the main agents of democratization in about semi-authoritarian or “hybrid” regimes recognize that nation. that many of those regimes are likely to persist for a long In the 1990s the transition paradigm that had been time (Rose and Shin, 2001,333;Diamond, 2002, 23). It is created in the 1980s seized the imagination of the leaders worth noting, however, that during the last few years and the public in some Western countries, and especially there has been an increase in research on the factors in the USA. Now it is time for that model to lose its grip on affecting stability and instability in semi-authoritarian our consciousness. That is one of the main lessons to be states. The study of contemporary Russian politics should learned from the disappointment of earlier expectations for draw insights from that literature and add to our knowl- a transition to democracy in post-communist Russia. In edge of the character of semi-authoritarian political light of the course of recent change in that country, one systems. Some recent writings on the regime that was might expect that the illusions encouraged by that model crafted by Vladimir Putin have begun to do that (March, would have been left behind by scholars who specialize 2009; Robertson, 2009). An approach to Russia that is in the study of the politics of Russia, but there are signs that informed by “historically grounded realism”(Pop-Eleches, some prominent scholars who write about Russia are still 2007, 925) is likely to yield information that is more thinking within the frame of reference of the transition useful for scholars, the public, and political leaders. paradigm. It was understandable that as late as 2000, Michael McFaul and Sarah Mendelson could assert that Russia was “midstream” in a radical transformation as it References moved toward democracy and a market economy (McFaul and Mendelson, 2000, 348). 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