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The Next Mr. Putin? the Question of Succession

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The Next Mr. Putin? the Question of Succession The Next Mr. Putin? The Question of Succession Fiona Hill Abstract: Vladimir Putin, the person and the president, is the wild card in Russian politics. After what Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 could be a quarter of a century in power by 2024 (either as president or prime minister), Putin’s depar- ture could prove utterly destabilizing. Russia’s principal political problem is determining who or what re- places Putin as the fulcrum of the state system in the decade ahead. This essay considers the question of whether “Putin’s Russia”–a hyperpersonalized presidency supported by informal elite networks–can transform into a depersonalized system that is rooted in formal institutions with clear, predictable mech- anisms to mitigate the risks of a wrenching presidential succession. Since the beginning of his third presidential term in 2012, Vladimir Putin has moved to shield himself against challenges to his authority, using his presi- dential prerogative to sap power from bases outside the Kremlin. State institutions, like the Office of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Con- stitutional Court, the Russian State Duma (the lower house of parliament), and local government struc- tures have been systematically downgraded. The presidential administration and the Russian Secu- rity Council now function simultaneously as Putin’s personal staff, the core of critical decision-making, FIONA HILL is Director of the and the apparatus for overseeing affairs of state. Rus- Center on the United States and sian political parties have been eviscerated–their Europe and Senior Fellow in the political platforms appropriated and repropagated Foreign Policy program at the by the Kremlin.1 Brookings Institution. Her publi- The increased preponderance of power in the cations include Mr. Putin: Operative Kremlin has created greater risk for the Russian po- in the Kremlin (with Clifford Gad- litical system now than at any other juncture in recent dy, 2015), Energy Empire: Oil, Gas and Russia’s Revival (2004), and The history. Theoretically, at least, the Russian constitu- Siberian Curse: How Communist Plan- tion offers a formal process to safeguard the presi- ners Left Russia Out in the Cold (with dency and the presidential person. If Putin sudden- Clifford Gaddy, 2003). ly dies in office, the sitting prime minister (and for- © 2017 by Fiona Hill doi:10.1162/DAED_ a_00433 41 The Next mer president), Dmitrii Medvedev (as of braced new technology with gusto. Med- Mr. Putin? this writing), would act as temporary head vedev was offered to the Russian electorate The Question of Succession of state. New elections would take place as the kinder, gentler, socially networked within a three-month period. However, version of Putin, more in tune with the the institutions intended to produce pres- Russian zeitgeist of 2007–2008, which, idential candidates and oversee the suc- against the backdrop of high and rising cession process during these critical three oil prices, was perceived as a time of do- months have been hollowed out. If Putin mestic prosperity and political stability.2 eventually leaves office, the Russian con- Recreating the tandem with Medvedev, stitution guarantees him immunity from or a different protégé, remains an option for harm and prosecution. It cannot guaran- Putin at the end of his fourth presidential Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 tee against extralegal actions like a coup term. But having already done this once, is or assassination. it really politically feasible or desirable to Putin has the capacity to designate a suc- do it again? Medvedev returned to the po- cessor–the “next Mr. Putin”–to maintain sition of prime minister in 2012. He knows the personalized nature of the current Rus- what role he has to play, if and when neces- sian presidency and secure his legacy, but sary, and seems to have been kept in place even this could prove a heavy lift for the as a tried and trusted “executor of the will” system. The Russian media is dominated for emergency purposes. The circumstanc- by news of President Putin and his exploits es of Medvedev’s departure from the pres- at home and abroad. Few political figures, idency, however, cast doubt on his future either close to the Kremlin or in the nomi- suitability for anything more than a tran- nal Russian opposition, get airtime. Only sitional role in a new power configuration. a candidate from among Putin’s close as- Since 2012, Medvedev has become a scape- sociates could gain traction at the nation- goat for criticism, undercutting whatever al level. This was the case in 2008, when, independent popularity he gained during as mandated by the constitution, Putin his tenure as president.3 stepped aside from the presidency after Even though Putin and Medvedev had serving two consecutive terms. He hand- worked in lockstep since the 1990s, when picked Medvedev, one of his most trust- they both served in the mayor’s office in St. ed and loyal lieutenants, as his successor. Petersburg, the tandem was fraught with difficulty. The tandem’s dual-power mech- In 2008, Medvedev was Putin’s first dep- anism created deep uncertainties about uty prime minister. Putin switched plac- who was really in charge of what in Rus- es with Medvedev (although taking the sian politics. Once he was head of the Rus- higher prime minister slot) to create the sian government rather than head of state, so-called tandem power arrangement. He popular dissatisfaction with the govern- prepared the ground for the tandem well in ment’s performance was transferred onto advance, beginning in 2007, by repeatedly Putin personally.4 From 2008 to 2011, Pu- stressing the dangers of having too much tin’s poll ratings declined, with a notable political power concentrated in the hands drop in 2010–2011.5 Rumors circulated of of one man and calling for system mod- a potential “coup” against Putin by groups ernizations and modifications. Putin pre- around Medvedev.6 International securi- sented Medvedev as the representative of ty crises–from Russia’s 2008 war with a new professional generation of Russian Georgia to the 2011 Arab Spring upheavals politicians–a child of the mid-1960s, rath- –and the impact of the global financial and er than Putin’s early 1950s, who had em- Eurozone crises on the Russian economy 42 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences changed the relatively benign environment power by transferring the presidency had Fiona in which the tandem had been conceived. proven a mistake. Putin’s succession plans Hill In speeches, Putin talked of a more uncer- still needed some work. Dmitrii Medvedev tain world and further shocks ahead. Med- and the tandem were not yet the man and vedev himself spoke of the surprising turn mechanism to ensure Putin’s person. of events in such a relatively short period of In 2012, Putin had to prove he was back in time.7 In September 2011, Putin appears to charge of the presidency. He clamped down have been convinced that he had to end the on those who had initiated and participated ambiguity of the tandem right away to fore- in the street protests and moved to emascu- stall being ousted from the premiership. He late Russia’s already weak opposition par- had seen a risk to his personal position and ties. The Kremlin decapitated the leader- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 moved to reassert his authority over the po- ship of the nascent opposition outside the litical system.8 formal political party structures, steadily harassing, marginalizing, and then picking Putin’s fears were compounded by the De- them off with individually targeted lawsuits cember 2011 Duma elections. United Rus- and court convictions.11 The February 27, sia, the ruling party, failed to reach its pre- 2015, assassination of Boris Nemtsov–the dicted number of votes in many Russian re- last Russian opposition leader with nation- gions. Footage of heavy-handed efforts to al name recognition, who had a test run as stack the vote in the party’s favor was cap- Yeltsin’s heir apparent in the 1990s–pro- tured by election observers and circulated hibitively decreased the odds of any authen- on social media, provoking street protests tic Russian opposition movement or party in Moscow and other major cities. The pro- emerging to challenge Putin.12 tests occurred against the backdrop of past The Kremlin pushed legal prohibitions crises and changes of government follow- against street protests through parliament, ing electoral upsets in so-called color rev- raised the costs for parties and their candi- olutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyz- dates to campaign in big cities, replaced the stan; and shortly after the toppling of Egyp- head of the Central Election Commission, tian President Hosni Mubarak and Libyan and imposed constraints on election mon- leader Muammar Gaddaffi during the Arab itoring.13 All of these efforts ensured that Spring.9 the next Duma election, on September 18, The electoral results and protests weak- 2016, produced a low voter turnout in previ- ened Putin’s authority and destabilized ous big-city trouble spots like Moscow and the system. Putin’s declining ratings even St. Petersburg, no significant demonstra- raised the possibility that he could be de- tions, and a very comfortable electoral re- feated in the 2012 presidential election. Pu- sult for United Russia. Regaining the super tin and those around him were convinced or constitutional majority of two-thirds of that the United States and the West were the parliament’s seats, which it had lost in encouraging a “color revolution” in Russia.
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