Quick viewing(Text Mode)

The Next Mr. Putin? the Question of Succession

The Next Mr. Putin? the Question of Succession

The Next Mr. Putin? The Question of Succession

Fiona Hill

Abstract: , the person and the president, is the wild card in Russian politics. After what Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 could be a quarter of a century in power by 2024 (either as president or prime minister), Putin’s depar- ture could prove utterly destabilizing. ’s principal political problem is determining who or what re- places Putin as the fulcrum of the state system in the decade ahead. This essay considers the question of whether “Putin’s Russia”–a hyperpersonalized supported by informal elite networks–can transform into a depersonalized system that is rooted in formal institutions with clear, predictable mech- anisms to mitigate the risks of a wrenching presidential succession.

Since the beginning of his third presidential term in 2012, Vladimir Putin has moved to shield himself against challenges to his authority, using his presi- dential prerogative to sap power from bases outside the Kremlin. State institutions, like the Office of the Prime Minister, the of Ministers, the Con- stitutional Court, the Russian (the of parliament), and local government struc- tures have been systematically downgraded. The presidential administration and the Russian Secu- rity Council now function simultaneously as Putin’s personal staff, the core of critical decision-making, FIONA HILL is Director of the and the apparatus for overseeing affairs of state. Rus- Center on the and sian political parties have been eviscerated–their Europe and Senior Fellow in the political platforms appropriated and repropagated Foreign Policy program at the by the Kremlin.1 Brookings Institution. Her publi- The increased preponderance of power in the cations include Mr. Putin: Operative Kremlin has created greater risk for the Russian po- in the Kremlin (with Clifford Gad- litical system now than at any other juncture in recent dy, 2015), Energy Empire: Oil, Gas and Russia’s Revival (2004), and The history. Theoretically, at least, the Russian constitu- Siberian Curse: How Communist Plan- tion offers a formal process to safeguard the presi- ners Left Russia Out in the Cold (with dency and the presidential person. If Putin sudden- Clifford Gaddy, 2003). ly dies in office, the sitting prime minister (and for-

© 2017 by Fiona Hill doi:10.1162/DAED_ a_00433

41 The Next mer president), Dmitrii Medvedev (as of braced new technology with gusto. Med- Mr. Putin? this writing), would act as temporary head vedev was offered to the Russian electorate The Question of Succession of state. New would take place as the kinder, gentler, socially networked within a three-month period. However, version of Putin, more in tune with the the institutions intended to produce pres- Russian zeitgeist of 2007–2008, which, idential candidates and oversee the suc- against the backdrop of high and rising cession process during these critical three oil prices, was perceived as a time of do- months have been hollowed out. If Putin mestic prosperity and political stability.2 eventually leaves office, the Russian con- Recreating the tandem with Medvedev, stitution guarantees him immunity from or a different protégé, remains an option for

harm and prosecution. It cannot guaran- Putin at the end of his fourth presidential Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 tee against extralegal actions like a coup term. But having already done this once, is or assassination. it really politically feasible or desirable to Putin has the capacity to designate a suc- do it again? Medvedev returned to the po- cessor–the “next Mr. Putin”–to maintain sition of prime minister in 2012. He knows the personalized nature of the current Rus- what role he has to play, if and when neces- sian presidency and secure his legacy, but sary, and seems to have been kept in place even this could prove a heavy lift for the as a tried and trusted “executor of the will” system. The Russian media is dominated for emergency purposes. The circumstanc- by news of President Putin and his exploits es of Medvedev’s departure from the pres- at home and abroad. Few political figures, idency, however, cast doubt on his future either close to the Kremlin or in the nomi- suitability for anything more than a tran- nal Russian opposition, get airtime. Only sitional role in a new power configuration. a candidate from among Putin’s close as- Since 2012, Medvedev has become a scape- sociates could gain traction at the nation- goat for criticism, undercutting whatever al level. This was the case in 2008, when, independent popularity he gained during as mandated by the , Putin his tenure as president.3 stepped aside from the presidency after Even though Putin and Medvedev had serving two consecutive terms. He hand- worked in lockstep since the , when picked Medvedev, one of his most trust- they both served in the mayor’s office in St. ed and loyal lieutenants, as his successor. Petersburg, the tandem was fraught with difficulty. The tandem’s dual-power mech- In 2008, Medvedev was Putin’s first dep- anism created deep uncertainties about uty prime minister. Putin switched plac- who was really in charge of what in Rus- es with Medvedev (although taking the sian politics. Once he was head of the Rus- higher prime minister slot) to create the sian government rather than , so-called tandem power arrangement. He popular dissatisfaction with the govern- prepared the ground for the tandem well in ment’s performance was transferred onto advance, beginning in 2007, by repeatedly Putin personally.4 From 2008 to 2011, Pu- stressing the dangers of having too much tin’s poll ratings declined, with a notable political power concentrated in the hands drop in 2010–2011.5 Rumors circulated of of one man and calling for system mod- a potential “coup” against Putin by groups ernizations and modifications. Putin pre- around Medvedev.6 International securi- sented Medvedev as the representative of ty crises–from Russia’s 2008 war with a new professional generation of Russian Georgia to the 2011 Arab Spring upheavals politicians–a child of the mid-1960s, rath- –and the impact of the global financial and er than Putin’s early 1950s, who had em- Eurozone crises on the Russian economy

42 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences changed the relatively benign environment power by transferring the presidency had Fiona in which the tandem had been conceived. proven a mistake. Putin’s succession plans Hill In speeches, Putin talked of a more uncer- still needed some work. Dmitrii Medvedev tain world and further shocks ahead. Med- and the tandem were not yet the man and vedev himself spoke of the surprising turn mechanism to ensure Putin’s person. of events in such a relatively short period of In 2012, Putin had to prove he was back in time.7 In September 2011, Putin appears to charge of the presidency. He clamped down have been convinced that he had to end the on those who had initiated and participated ambiguity of the tandem right away to fore- in the street protests and moved to emascu- stall being ousted from the premiership. He late Russia’s already weak opposition par-

had seen a risk to his personal position and ties. The Kremlin decapitated the leader- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 moved to reassert his authority over the po- ship of the nascent opposition outside the litical system.8 formal structures, steadily harassing, marginalizing, and then picking Putin’s fears were compounded by the De- them off with individually targeted lawsuits cember 2011 Duma elections. United Rus- and court convictions.11 The February 27, sia, the ruling party, failed to reach its pre- 2015, assassination of –the dicted number of votes in many Russian re- last Russian opposition leader with nation- gions. Footage of heavy-handed efforts to al name recognition, who had a test run as stack the vote in the party’s favor was cap- Yeltsin’s heir apparent in the 1990s–pro- tured by observers and circulated hibitively decreased the odds of any authen- on social media, provoking street protests tic Russian opposition movement or party in and other major cities. The pro- emerging to challenge Putin.12 tests occurred against the backdrop of past The Kremlin pushed legal prohibitions crises and changes of government follow- against street protests through parliament, ing electoral upsets in so-called color rev- raised the costs for parties and their candi- olutions in Georgia, , and Kyrgyz- dates to campaign in big cities, replaced the stan; and shortly after the toppling of Egyp- head of the Central Election Commission, tian President Hosni Mubarak and Libyan and imposed constraints on election mon- leader Muammar Gaddaffi during the Arab itoring.13 All of these efforts ensured that Spring.9 the next Duma election, on September 18, The electoral results and protests weak- 2016, produced a low voter turnout in previ- ened Putin’s authority and destabilized ous big-city trouble spots like Moscow and the system. Putin’s declining ratings even St. Petersburg, no significant demonstra- raised the possibility that he could be de- tions, and a very comfortable electoral re- feated in the 2012 . Pu- sult for . Regaining the super tin and those around him were convinced or constitutional majority of two-thirds of that the United States and the West were the parliament’s seats, which it had lost in encouraging a “color revolution” in Russia. 2011, meant United Russia’s position as the As it turned out, there was no Russian op- ruling party was secure once more.14 position movement or set of leaders who could organize themselves sufficiently to In the Russian political system, security take advantage of the situation. Nonethe- considerations are always paramount. In less, Putin had been dealt a blow. He took addition to the fears about his own personal back the presidency in May 2012, but with security, one of the determining factors for far less of a resounding victory than he Putin’s return in 2011–2012 was the nega- would have liked.10 Diluting his personal tive shift in Russia’s internal and external

146 (2) Spring 2017 43 The Next security environment. The political, eco- like a younger “Putin clone.”18 In July 2016, Mr. Putin? nomic, and international conditions that Putin appointed a new head of the Russian The Question of Succession shaped Putin’s decision then have only de- federal customs service, four presidential teriorated since. As a result of Russia’s mil- envoys to federal districts, and four gov- itary interventions in Ukraine in 2014 and ernors; in August, he removed a well-re- Syria in 2015, security elites gained consider- spected peer and Kremlin veteran, Sergei able traction at the top of the Russian polit- Ivanov, from his post as presidential chief ical system. The security sector is tradition- of staff. ally the area of greatest risk in any political More reshuffling of top cadres came af- setting: security elites literally call the shots ter the September 18 parliamentary elec-

and are the power base for potential coups, tions, including transferring Duma Speak- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 like the attempted putsch against Soviet er Sergei Naryshkin to head the foreign leader in August 1991. intelligence service and putting close pres- That episode propelled the ussr into the idential political aide Vyacheslav Volo- abyss and into power as pres- din in his place. All these appointments ident of a new Russia. ensured that people in charge of impor- In 2016, Putin moved to consolidate Rus- tant state institutions and functions would sia’s military and paramilitary structures have close individual relationships with and to weaken the power bases and inde- Vladimir Putin. Many of the replacements pendent authority of individual agencies were, like Dyumin, younger figures from by putting in place a smaller cadre at the the security services and Putin’s body- top of the security elite who directly report guard corps.19 Given their age and rela- to him. In April 2016, Putin issued a decree tive lack of experience, in contrast to their on creating the new National Guard–es- predecessors, they had not (yet) achieved sentially his own personal army–appoint- the independent standing or built a pow- ing , the former head of his er base to challenge him.20 Presidential Security Service (sbp), to lead it.15 In September 2016, sources around the Vladimir Putin already faces the challenge Kremlin floated the idea of reviving the So- of how to preserve the system he has built, viet-era or Committee of State Secu- as do those around him. In 1999, Putin’s rity as a mega ministry of state security, mandate from Boris Yeltsin was to prevent the “mgb,” which would bring together a political vacuum and attempts to usurp the Federal Protective Service that hous- state power, and to guarantee Yeltsin and es the sbp, as well as domestic and foreign his family immunity from prosecution. intelligence operations.16 Yeltsin’s team expected Putin to maintain Over the course of several months, Putin the political and economic structures they steadily installed loyalists in key positions had put in place and to continue the thrust in Russia’s regions and in Moscow. In Feb- of Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. Pu- ruary 2016, Putin named Aleksei Dyumin, tin has done this in his own inimitable way. a member of his personal bodyguard, as At some point, someone (or something) else acting of Tula, an important will have to do the same for Putin. manufacturing region close to Moscow.17 One commonly held view of Putin is that Dyumin’s selection raised eyebrows and he is a kleptocrat whose actions are dictated questions when the new governor was in- by how much he and his friends and fami- terviewed by Putin-sanctioned biographer ly can steal.21 Putin and his immediate cir- and journalist Andrei Kolesnikov, who cle may well have enriched themselves on pointed out that Dyumin seemed almost an impressive scale, but, as president, Putin

44 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences has taken actions, such as launching wars tem relies on: top economists at the Cen- Fiona in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, that have tral Bank and in the finance and econom- Hill had negative consequences for the person- ic ministries, intelligence operatives in al businesses and freedoms of those around the , and mem- him, including his own family.22 He has not bers of the uniformed military. Putin has, immediately changed course to reverse for example, retained a first-rate econom- them.23 In speeches and articles throughout ics team in the finance ministry and at the his tenure, Putin has also repeatedly fused Central Bank, almost without any signifi- the micro history of his family–especially cant changes in spite of purging similarly the loss of a brother and his parents’ near- minded people at the political level since

death experiences during World War II– 2012. Millions of people, not just Putin’s Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 with the macro history of the state.24 These closest associates, are either directly vest- narratives, along with his momentous deci- ed in the current political system or see sion to annex Crimea in March 2014, indi- their livelihoods as dependent on it.26 Al- cate that Putin wants to leave some indel- though Russian polling indicates consider- ible mark on Russian history, not just a gi- able dissatisfaction with the performance gantic hole in its state coffers. of the Russian government and concern “Putin’s Russia” is more than just Putin about the future trajectory of the country, the person. The Russian political system there is no evident demand for a different is large and complex. Power in the sense system, or, as yet, a different president.27 of the ability to exert traction inside the system, or to transmit ideas and lobby for In any future configuration of political benefits or changes in course, is rooted in power, those who work within the sys- networks of connections, not in institu- tem will want to retain their positions and tions and job titles. The sheer size of these opportunities for advancement. With so networks, however, provides a base for re- many people standing to lose if the system configuring power and managing the fu- is upended, the challenge is how to formal- ture succession. The elites who have clout ize the informal networks to create robust have been recruited from a network of per- power structures to carry the system be- sonal relationships spanning Putin’s youth yond the next set of presidential elections, in Soviet Leningrad and his entire career. and beyond Vladimir Putin. The most log- Putin has actively encouraged system re- ical, and low (political) cost, way of doing newal by bringing in not only the sons this is to amend and adapt existing consti- (and infrequently the daughters) of the tutional and institutional frames for the men from his inner circle, but also mem- purpose. In the Soviet period, the Commu- bers of youth movements and wings of po- nist Party took care of the business of suc- litical parties that they create, support, and cession and system renewal. In the earlier mentor, and a new generation of security phases of Putin’s presidency, and during personnel.25 Although they may not have the tandem, the Kremlin paid considerable a direct link to him, these system entrants attention to political party development essentially owe their positions to Putin. and consolidation. The men in the Krem- “Putin’s people” or Putin loyalists are lin could do so again with United Russia embedded throughout the Russian power obtaining a constitutional majority in the complex in all the groups that bring collec- September 2016 parliamentary elections. tive weight to the political, economic, and Putin is not currently the leader of Unit- security bargaining table. These groups in- ed Russia, although the party and other clude those with special skills that the sys- political movements, like the All-Russian

146 (2) Spring 2017 45 The Next Peoples Front, operate in support of him.28 above and be sure that things will get done Mr. Putin? Unlike the Soviet period, there is currently outside the Kremlin walls. The president’s The Question of Succession no defined collective leadership in a formal legitimacy depends on proof, in both elec- politburo or political party around the Rus- toral results and opinion polls, that he is sian president.29 Instead, the Russian con- genuinely popular. After Putin’s rough re- stitution and the Russian presidency are entry in 2012, the next presidential elec- fused together. Each guarantees the other, tion will be an important pivot point for standing above any other state institution, the system, as will the subsequent Duma entity, or individual. Putin’s relationship elections, and the projected end of Putin’s with the Russian people is direct and un- presidential terms in 2024. Putin and the

mediated. Russia thus has a “Putin prob- ruling party will have to clear each elec- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 lem.” The longer he is in office, the more toral hurdle with a resounding victory and he becomes the constitutional source of significant majority of the votes. both stability and instability. Putin and those around him need to During his long years in office as presi- remedy this without rupturing the con- dent and prime minister, Putin’s popular- stitution, given its role in underpinning ity has become closely tied with the idea the legitimacy of the presidency. In 2008, that he is the decisive factor at all levels of when his first two consecutive terms as Russian politics. Putin is the locus of pow- president ended, Putin was careful not to er and the agent of continuity or change. insist on a parliamentary or popular refer- Every problem, large or small, has to come endum to remain in office. It was Dmitrii to Putin’s attention. This generates con- Medvedev who introduced a constitution- siderable tension around the presidency, al amendment extending each presidential and nervous scrutiny in the Kremlin of term from four to six years.30 Indeed, Putin Russian public opinion.33 If Putin is seen has a personal obsession with the idea of by the population to be ineffective or weak, Russia as a “ of the law,” where if he is incapacitated in some way, and if law is an instrument of the state that di- public opinion polls indicate that the Rus- rects and constrains political and individ- sian people have lost their faith in Putin as ual behavior.31 The Russian constitution is president, then this changes the system’s the law above all laws. It was drafted by a operating context. team led by Putin and Medvedev’s men- In large part, this is a problem of Putin’s tor at Leningrad University Law Faculty own making. Early in his first presidency, –and their boss as mayor of St. Petersburg Putin initiated an annual televised town –Anatolii Sobchak. The team drew on hall with the Russian public, Direct Line Sobchak’s work on nineteenth-century with Vladimir Putin, to showcase his ef- Russian legal and constitutional thought. forts to address their questions.34 These So, in this respect, the Russian president is have ranged from banal issues, like how the first Russian constitutional monarch, to tackle inadequate social services and albeit in an elected monarchy.32 fix bad roads in remote rural areas, to af- In the constitution, elections reaffirm fairs of high state and foreign policy, such the president’s relationship with the Rus- as his relations with the U.S. president. sian public. They serve the same functional Through the medium of the town halls, the purpose as a coronation. The Russian pres- Russian population watches Putin micro- ident is not an autocrat like the tsar with manage immediate responses to person- divine right to rule. Nor is the president a al appeals. During Putin’s April 14, 2016, dictator, who can simply give orders from session, for example, officials in the city

46 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences of Omsk tweeted pictures of roads being In some respects, to facilitate a system Fiona repaired in real time after an on-air com- transition, Russia needs to emulate the Hill plaint about their conditions.35 ussr of the late Soviet period, when the By making himself the country’s “fixer- state was institutionally and politically in-chief,” Putin has generated high and en- complex. Each individual Soviet tirely unrealistic expectations that even he had its own party and government struc- does not want to meet. Putin himself fre- tures. Their intraelite politics contribut- quently complains that presidential decrees ed to the leadership dynamics of the cen- are not fulfilled and that he has to exert too tral Communist Party and the politburo. much manual control, or direct oversight, The different levels and layers of political

of Russian affairs. Yet, in the Russian pub- machination pluralized the Soviet system. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 lic’s assessments, Putin’s perceived ability The politburo and upper echelons of the to fix specific problems has become as im- Communist Party provided the mechan- portant as his fitness to rule, his health and ics for leadership selection, producing new mental capacities, and his skill in juggling people to step forward and move up the competing political interests. If the onus is ranks. The party’s cadres, traditions, and always on Putin to get things done, who will rituals, including regular congresses, en- play this role when he is gone? To survive sured system continuity and renewal. In without Putin, the society and system need the 1980s, when and two to move away from these spectacles of pres- successors, Yurii Andropov and Konstan- idential micromanagement. tin Chernenko, died in a three-year period, the party ensured they were all replaced Putin’s placement of loyalists at all lev- without any ostensible conflict. els of the system in 2016 and his swap- Over the next decade, the existing frame- ping out of older “lieutenants” for young- work of United Russia, or movements like er “guards” suggests that he, and others in the All-Russian People’s Front and Kremlin- the Kremlin who are vested in the contin- sponsored youth organizations, could be uation of the system, may already be think- drawn on to create a new structure with ing along these lines. Putting youthful Putin bureaucratic instruments to carry the sys- clones like Aleksei Dyumin in regions like tem forward. This would, in essence, be a Tula may facilitate an eventual devolution, holding mechanism for powerful people, or transfer of some of the powers now fo- and one powerful person in particular. One cused in the presidency. In 2008, when Pu- potential model, which could address the tin spoke about the risks of too much power many facets of the “Putin problem,” might in the hands of one man, he used the tandem be the moderately conservative Liberal to divide authority and responsi- Democratic Party (ldp) of Japan. The ldp bility between two men. Putin stated that is a pragmatically motivated power struc- after he had switched places with Medve- ture that serves as a frame for collective dev, he would take some presidential pow- bargaining among major power-brokers ers with him to strengthen the position of to avoid ruinous factional battles. Since its prime minister, the role of the government, creation in the 1950s, the ldp has provid- and the functions of the cabinet of minis- ed a “home” for former powerful prime ters.36 In the next decade, given the sheer ministers between elections and at the end size of the country, Russia needs to move of their terms.37 Russian officials have pe- beyond one man, or two men, to many men riodically shown considerable interest in (and also a few women) if it is to find a more the creation and structures of the ldp in stable configuration for executive power. bilateral meetings with Japanese counter-

146 (2) Spring 2017 47 The Next parts, and notably returned to this theme tion to a final term in 1996. Putin’s selection, Mr. Putin? in 2016.38 first as prime minister, then as acting presi- The Question of Succession The Chinese Communist Party plays a dent in December 1999, was the end result similar role to the ldp in regulating term of three frenetic years of cycling through limits and managing major changes of per- deputy prime ministers and prime minis- sonnel on a ten-year rotation basis. Par- ters–dubbed “Operation Successor” by the ty rules and structures have enabled even media.40 Yeltsin’s decision to resign while historic, transformative leaders like Deng he was still physically standing was hailed Xiaoping to leave the center of the politi- as a “brilliant move.”41 cal system and still wield clout over a suc- The ailing Yeltsin lived on for another 39

cessor or set of successors. In China there seven years. Mikhail Gorbachev celebrat- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 has been no need, to date, to invent a new ed his eighty-fifth birthday in 2016, twenty- power arrangement like Putin did during five years after resigning as the last leader the tandem. of the . Putin may still have decades of natural life ahead of him; he Absent a formal power arrangement, will need his own “brilliant move” to en- choosing a successor is a risky business in sure continued influence in Russian poli- a political culture like Russia’s. Name a suc- tics and a safe retirement. Given the num- cessor too early in the process and he, or his ber of examples of party-based power and supporters, may be emboldened to accel- succession mechanisms, including past So- erate your departure. Pick a weak succes- viet and Russian precedents, shifting to a sor and all bets are off. Imperial Russia saw party rather than a personalized presidency its fair share of palace coups. After the 1917 for system management could be one move. Russian Revolution, Vladimir Lenin’s death A formalized ruling party-like structure, in January 1924 resulted in a bloody jock- in which Putin as Russian president be- eying for power among his close associates comes the titular head, could pave the way that Joseph Stalin eventually won. Stalin’s for Putin to eventually assume “president own death in March 1953 also created a sys- emeritus” status while retaining a leader- temic crisis. The vacuum at the center was ship role. In the meantime, a more robust ultimately filled by a collective leadership bureaucratic structure would groom new around Nikita Khrushchev, who was then cadres for a range of executive positions ousted from the prime leadership spot by and could provide an anchor for security his colleagues in 1964. Mikhail Gorbachev elites by also drawing them into its mem- was forced into “retirement” in 1991 by the bership. The party would coordinate elec- combination of a coup followed, in its after- tions and govern the legislative branch. In math, by a group of other Soviet leaders, led the next decade, Putin could redistribute by Boris Yeltsin, conspiring to dissolve the power and pass on the presidential baton ussr behind his back. to an anointed heir, all within the frame The year 2024, Putin’s constitutional- of a party or leadership convention at an ly designated departure date, will be the appropriate and propitious moment. The one-hundredth anniversary of Lenin’s job of figuring out how to modernize the death. In a country where anniversaries Russian political system would then be in frequently frame contemporary events, the others’ hands. prospect that Putin also plans on dying in office will become the topic of commentary. Putin’s predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, suffered a major heart attack on the eve of his reelec-

48 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences endnotes Fiona Hill 1 The analysis of the nature of the Russian presidency and political system in this essay draws heavily on Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Press, 2015). 2 Ibid., 193–194, 201–202, 216–217. Author notes from Valdai Discussion Club meeting with Vladimir Putin in , Russia, , 2007. 3 See, for example, Natal’ya Vasileva, “Tens of Thousands Call for Russian pm’s Dismissal,” As- sociated Press, August 5, 2016, http://midco.net/front_controller.php/news/read/category/ Europe%20News/article/the_associated_press-tens_of_thousands_call_for_russian_pms_ dismissal-ap. 4 Russian pollsters frequently point out that, as president, Vladimir Putin has become insep- arable from the Russian state in public opinion. Expressing a favorable view of Putin is sim- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 ilar to attesting patriotism and affection for the state irrespective of any deficiencies in Pu- tin’s conduct or his inner circle’s. See Aleksei Levinson, “Reiting i korruptsiya: dlya bol’shin- stva rossiyan president–ne chinovnik,” Vedomosti, May 24, 2016, https://www.vedomosti .ru/opinion/columns/2016/05/24/642141-reiting-korruptsiya. 5 Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, 230. Russia’s leading independent polling agency, the Levada Center, has maintained a monthly index of Putin’s approval rating since he first became president in 2000, as well as indexes on public attitudes toward the state of the country and the performance of the government. These can all be found at http://www .levada.ru/old/indeksy. 6 See Tom Parfitt’s January 2012 interview with Gleb Pavlovsky for The Guardian, published in full as Gleb Pavlovsky, “Putin’s World Outlook,” New Left Review 88 (July/August 2014), https://newleftreview.org/II/88/gleb-pavlovsky-putin-s-world-outlook. 7 Comments made by Dmitrii Medvedev to author and small group on the side of a formal pre- sentation at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., April 13, 2010. 8 Will Englund and Kathy Lally, “Medvedev Confirms He Will Step Aside for Putin to Return to Russia’s Presidency,” The Washington Post, September 24, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost .com/world/europe/dmitry-medvedev-asks-putin-to-run-for-president-of-russia/2011/09/24/ gIQAXGwpsK_story.html. The timing of Putin’s decision was linked to the schedule for the December 2011 parliamentary elections. 9 For a more detailed discussion of these developments see Pavlovsky, “Putin’s World Outlook”; and Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, 227–259. Putin expressed an extremely neg- ative reaction to Muammar Gaddaffi’s death, in Libya in October 2011, just a few weeks later at the November 11, 2011, session of the Valdai Discussion Club meeting (from author notes). 10 Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, 231–232. 11 Ibid., 249–251. 12 See Sergei Aleksashenko, “Period poluraspada: god posle ubiistva Borisa Nemtsova,” Forbes.ru, February 26, 2016, http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-column/vertikal/313657-period-poluraspada -god-posle-ubiistva-borisa-nemtsova. 13 Kathrin Hille, “Russia: How to Exercise Political Control,” Financial Times, September 7, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/94c679fc-7418-11e6-b60a-de4532d5ea35. 14 Matthew Bodner and Mikhail Fishman, “Elections 2016: An Overwhelming Victory for the Kremlin: The Ruling United Russia Party Dominates the 2016 State Duma Elections,” The Moscow Times, September 19, 2016, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/duma-election -wrap-up-55383. 15 Roger McDermott, “Countering Color Revolution Drives Russia’s Creation of National Guard,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 13 (71) (April 12, 2016).

146 (2) Spring 2017 49 The Next 16 See Timofey Timofeychev, “Russia to Resurrect Soviet-Era Ministry of State Security,” Russia Mr. Putin? Beyond the Headlines, September 20, 2016, http://rbth.com/politics_and_society/2016/09/20/ The Question russia-to-resurrect-soviet-era-ministry-of-state-security_631663. See also Pavel Baev, “Younger of Succession Crowd Will Not Rejuvenate Putin’s Court,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 13 (158) (October 3, 2016), https://jamestown.org/program/younger-crowd-will-not-rejuvenate-putins-court/. 17 Andrei Kolesnikov, “‘V kontse kontsov, zhizn’ ne raz kruto menyalas’: Aleksei Dyumin rass- kazal ‘B,’ kak on doshel do Tuly,” Kommersant, February 9, 2016, http://www.kommersant .ru/doc/2911780. 18 Kolesnikov, along with two other journalists, Nataliya Gevorkyan and Natal’ya Timakova, produced Putin’s first presidential campaign biography. See Nataliya Gevorkyan, Natal’ya Ti- makova, and Andrei Kolesnikov, Ot pervogo litsa: razgovory s Vladimirom Putinom (Moscow: Va-

grius, 2000). Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 19 Daria Litvinova, “Putin’s Game of Thrones: The Men in Epaulets Take Over,” The Moscow Times, July 29, 2016, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/game-of-thrones-russian-regions -and-districts-get-new-leaders-in-epaulets-54782; Tom Balmforth, “Putin Reshuffles Regional Leaders Ahead of Vote: Russian Customs Chief Out,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 28, 2016, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-putin-reshuffle-balyaninov-zurabov/27886343 .html; and Andrew Monaghan, “Putin’s Removal of Ivanov as Chief of Staff is More About Rejuvenation,” Chatham House Expert Comment, August 15, 2016, https://www.chatham house.org/expert/comment/putins-removal-ivanov-chief-staff-more-about-rejuvenation. 20 Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Incredible Shrinking Circle,” European Council on Foreign Relations Commentary, August 17, 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_putins_incredible_ shrinking_circle_7099; Andrei Kolesnikov, “Out With the Old, In With the New for Russia’s Political Elite,” Moscow Times, August 25, 2016, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/out-with -the-old-in-with-the-new-for--political-elite-55110; and Mike Eckel, “Putin Taps Duma as New Foreign Spy Boss in Latest Kremlin Shakeup,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 22, 2016, http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-naryshkin-svr/28007297.html. 21 See Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2014). 22 After Russian-backed rebel forces shot down Malaysian airlines flight mh17, flying from Am- sterdam to Kuala Lumpur over Ukraine on July 17, 2014, it was revealed that Putin’s oldest daughter and her Dutch husband had a residence in The Hague. Reports suggested that the couple were subsequently forced to relocate to Moscow. Similarly, members of Putin’s in- ner circle were hit with personal sanctions and visa bans by the United States and European Union after the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine. See, for example, Philip Oltermann and Shaun Walker, “mh17: Dutch Mayor Wants Vladimir Pu- tin’s Daughter Maria Deported,” The Guardian, July 23, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/jul/23/mh17-dutch-mayor-vladimir-putin-daughter-deport; and Stefan Wagstyl, “U.S. Targets Vladimir Putin’s Inner Circle: eu Takes New Steps to Punish Russia,” Financial Times, March 21 2014, https://next.ft.com/content/635bf2b4-b013-11e3-b0d0-00144feab7de. 23 Author’s private discussion with former senior U.S. Treasury and official on the U.S. government’s expectations that Putin might reverse course in Ukraine after the im- position of sanctions on his associates, April 13, 2016. 24 Fiona Hill, “Putin kämpft den Krieg seines Vaters,” Die Zeit, May 6, 2015, http://www .zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-05/gedenken-zweiter-weltkrieg-wladimir-putin-tag-des-sieges. 25 See Julie Hemment, Youth Politics in Putin’s Russia: Producing Patriots and Entrepreneurs (Blooming- ton: Indiana University Press, 2015); and Andrew Monaghan, The New : Inter- preting Change (Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 2016). 26 A July 2015 report, produced by the Russian Academy of Economics and State Service, conclud- ed that the bulk of the Russian middle class was now primarily composed of state bureaucrats and employees of the Russian security services. See “Srednim klassom v Rossii stanovyatsya si- loviki i chinovniki,” Ekho Rossii, August 4, 2016, http://ehorussia.com/new/node/12724.

50 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 27 Andrei Kolesnikov, Russian Ideology after Crimea (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2015), Fiona http://carnegie.ru/2015/09/22/russian-ideology-after-crimea/ihzq. See also presentation by Hill Kirill Rogov, “The Authoritarian Bias: Measuring Public Opinion in Russia,” Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., April 20, 2016, http://www.global interests.org/2016/04/19/the-authoritarian-bias-measuring-public-opinion-in-russia/?mc_ cid=f699005c47&mc_eid=d22f87d69d; and Leon Aron, ed., Putin’s Russia: How it Rose, How it is Maintained, and How it Might End (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2015). 28 Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, 68, 231. 29 In late September 2016, several Russian commentators discussed rumors that the Kremlin was considering the establishment of a “” to create a more “collegial administration” to shepherd the presidential succession. See, for example, Paul Goble, “A State Council Would

Be a New Politburo Designed to Make Succession Easier, Solovey Says,” Window on Eurasia Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 Blog, September 26, 2016, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/09/a-state-council -would-be-new-politburo.html. But as another prominent Russian commentator noted shortly afterward, at an off-the-record meeting at the Brookings Institution on October 3, 2016: “This is the job of some people in the Kremlin to spread rumors to see how they are received.” Oth- er similar rumors at this juncture included the possibility that the Kremlin would bring for- ward the presidential election from 2018 to 2017 to take advantage of the postelection “boost” to United Russia from the September 18, 2016, parliamentary election. 30 Philip P. Pan, “Russia’s Medvedev Signs to Lengthen Presidential Terms,” The Washington Post, , 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2008/12/30/AR2008123000839.html. 31 Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, 51–53. 32 The only foreign reference point the constitutional scholars considered, in the words of one member of the Sobchak team, Sergei Shakhrai, was the “British Queen.” See ibid., 196. For a broader discussion of Sobchak’s role and the legal theory underpinning the constitution, see ibid., 51–55. 33 For a detailed discussion of this issue and how the Russian political system functions, see ibid., 190–224. 34 Literally millions of questions are solicited and fielded by an advance team, months ahead of the Direct Line. Ibid., 173–174. 35 Neil MacFarquhar, “Vladimir Putin’s Vulnerable Side is at Fore in Call-In Show,” The New York Times, April 14, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/world/europe/vladimir-putin -russia.html; and Lucian Kim, “Vladimir Putin Feels Your Pain: The Surreal Spectacle of the Russian President’s Annual Call-In Show,” Slate, April 14, 2016, http://www.slate.com/articles/ news_and_politics/foreigners/2016/04/vladimir_putin_promises_to_fix_potholes_in_ annual_live_call_in_show.html. See also Vladimir Putin, “Otvety na voprosy zhuranlistov po itogam ‘Pryamoi linii,’” April 14, 2016, http://special.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51718. The transcript for the full event is on the Kremlin’s official presidential website at http:// kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51716. 36 Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, 216–217. Author notes from Valdai Discus- sion Club meeting with Vladimir Putin in Sochi, Russia, September 14, 2007. 37 The ldp’s website provides a fairly detailed history of the establishment and goals of the party; see https://www.jimin.jp/english/index.html. 38 Author notes from interview with the Deputy Director General of the European Affairs Bureau at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., June 30, 2016. 39 See Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). 40 Ben Judah, Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2013), 26–28.

146 (2) Spring 2017 51 The Next 41 Celestine Bohlen, “Yeltsin Resigns: The Overview; Yeltsin Resigns, Naming Putin as Acting Mr. Putin? President to Run in March Election,” The New York Times, January 1, 2000, http://www.nytimes The Question .com/2000/01/01/world/yeltsin-resigns-overview-yeltsin-resigns-naming-putin-acting of Succession -president-run-march.html?pagewanted=all. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/41/1830952/daed_a_00433.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021

52 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Top View