DOCSLIB.ORG

Rethinking Scout/ Sniper Employment in the Infantry Battalion What Scout/Snipers Should Be Doing by Capt Adam M

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Rethinking Scout/ Sniper Employment in the Infantry Battalion What Scout/Snipers Should Be Doing by Capt Adam M Rethinking Scout/ Sniper Employment in the Infantry Battalion What scout/snipers should be doing by Capt Adam M. Fountain he purpose of this article is completely that we need to continue to address the way that we training to support counterinsurgency think about the role of snipers >Capt Fountain is assigned to II MEF. missions, we must not lose focus on sup- in the infantry battalion. My porting conventional operations. This Taudience is both commanders who wish is where we have missed the mark on to employ snipers as well as my brothers employing to our full capabilities. in the sniper community who may not revolve around counter-IED missions. be familiar with some of the nuances For Marine Corps snipers, this mindset What Infantry Battalion Scout/Snip- of the capabilities that we can bring to permeates our thinking because this is ers Are bear that can significantly increase the the way that we have been employed in We are taught in sniper school that decisive power of our supported units. combat and “the way we grew up” as a sniper is “a Marine highly skilled in For the purposes of this article, I focus snipers. Judging from my time serving fieldcraft and marksmanship who deliv- primarily on everything that scout/ as both an enlisted sniper and as an ers long range precision fire on selected sniper teams should be doing prior to officer commanding a sniper platoon, targets from concealed positions in sup- engaging targets with precision fire. My I think that what we believe a sniper port of combat operations.” hopes are to broaden the employment to be has become somewhat narrow in This definition, learned verbatim, can opportunities of sniper platoons across scope compared to the full capability be rattled off by any Marine sniper at the Marine Corps and put the “scout” that we can bring to bear. While I agree a moment’s notice. So why begin here? back into the term “scout/sniper.” The Bottom Line Up Front The past decade and a half of war in both Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that snipers are indeed a valuable force multiplier. We supported a few con- ventionally styled offensive operations during these wars; however, most of our time has been spent supporting counterinsurgency operations through counter-IED missions. These missions have been very effective in saving the lives of friendly forces and damaging the morale and manpower of the en- emy. Yet, this may be where we have gradually boxed ourselves in when it comes to thinking about the role of the scout/sniper and overall scout/sniper employment. If you ask any sniper who has served with an infantry battalion in The author, second from left, served as the Sniper Team Leader, V22, in Rama, Iraq. (Photo by a combat zone, their story will likely author.) Marine Corps Gazette • May 2020 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 49 IDEAS & ISSUES (GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT) Tactical Control Measure (TCM) Re- connaissance As far as what snipers can do to sup- port infantry, TCM reconnaissance is our biggest shortfall. The infantry needs to move quickly and decisively onto the objective. In order to do so, they need very specific knowledge of the area they are moving into. This is done at the small unit level through a leader’s recon- naissance where the unit leader and his subordinate element leaders go forward to confirm the TCMs that will be uti- lized when attacking the objective as well as the routes that the elements will use to infiltrate into those positions. At higher echelons of command, this sort of leader’s reconnaissance rarely happens and is primarily done through overhead The author’s squad supported the battalion snipers during deployment to Karmah, Iraq. The author (Santa hat) was the Squad Leader, 1st squad, 2d Platoon Co G. (Photo by author.) imagery, maps, UAV feeds, and, to a lesser degree, our ground-based recon- naissance units. Currently, the leader’s As any of us that have supported con- enabled them to plan the quickest and reconnaissance is conducted only after ventional operations either in training most decisive actions possible in order to the infantry is already on the deck and or in combat can attest, a sniper is far destroy the enemy and secure the objec- moving toward the objective. This con- more than just a guy in a ghillie suit tive. This is our primary mission and our strains the infantry to using preplanned shooting long distances from a hide site. ultimate goal. This should be the mind- routes, assault positions, and support by When in support of offensive operations, set we train to. When we think about fire positions as well as other TCMs, we normally conduct surveillance on ourselves as scout/snipers, we should that have been selected without prior the objective, report on the enemy, and see ourselves as much more than the confirmation on whether or not they control preparatory fires ahead of in- expert handlers of precision rifles and are actually tenable on the ground. fantry Marines in the assault. At some the masters of camouflage. We should With properly skilled reconnaissance time during the infantry’s assault, we be fully aware of what we can provide personnel on the deck, these TCMs can may begin engaging with precision fire to our supported units and have a well be confirmed or denied well ahead of by targeting enemy personnel based instructed appreciation for what we are L-Hour and adjusted if needed. If the on a predetermined target precedence. in conventional combat—the facilitators planned TCMs are not tenable, it can However, the effects of our precision of large-scale death and destruction. be of extreme importance to have men fires seem somewhat insignificant when The entire Marine Corps ultimately on the deck who can make educated compared to the close air support, artil- supports the infantry. The best way to and experienced recommendations for lery, and mortar fires that we facilitate determine the roles and responsibili- alternatives. Properly communicated, when prepping the objective ahead of ties of any supporting unit is to first these adjustments to TCMs can make our maneuver units. The precision fire look at the supported unit’s scheme of the infantry faster and more decisive. from a couple of weapons systems pales maneuver and then look at our own ca- Having preplanned and confirmed in- in comparison to the death and destruc- pabilities to determine how we can best filtration routes from the insert points tion that we are facilitating through the support them. This is the proverbial “ted to the assault positions and support by infantry rifle unit. This infantry unit is and ting” relationship (supported and fire positions is a game changer for the the main effort—the commander’s bid supporting) that is pounded into our infantry on the deck conducting the at- for success—which all other units are infantry officers daily at the Infantry tack. The time that it takes from when supporting. By our actions, we facilitate Officer Course. The infantry is continu- the ramp drops until they are conduct- as many of the enemy killed or neu- ously looking for ways to be faster and ing actions on the objective should be tralized as possible before the infantry more decisive in their actions. Speed, minimized to the utmost. This can be steps foot onto the objective. If our job surprise, and violence of action is the done by reconnaissance assets confirm- has been done to its fullest capability, name of the game and, as the infantry ing, at the very least, the landing zones, we have properly prepared the objective battalion’s organic reconnaissance asset, dismount points, infiltration routes, as- area with close air support and fires, and there are a few tasks that we should be sault positions, and support by fire posi- communicated vital information to the capable of conducting that will enable tions. Infiltration by our infantry can supported unit commanders, which has this. be assisted by reconnaissance personnel 50 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • May 2020 conducting initial terminal guidance hard charging 0311s will have the saf- fi res should be the ultimate goal of our and acting as guides once linkup has est situation possible for the fi ght. In sniper teams. Anything that we can do been made with the supported units order to facilitate this, we need shap- to make this happen quickly and ef- on the deck. Properly communicated ing fi res that are decisive and fl exible fi ciently should be one of the primary and executed, the attack becomes much as well as forward observers who are focuses of training. faster and more decisive. The scout/ very familiar with controlling the assets sniper has suddenly become one of the providing indirect fi res and close air Advocating for Snipers battalion’s most valuable enabling as- support. As the infantry makes their The infantry schools for both offi cer sets—without even fi ring a single shot. infi ltration, and the fi re support teams and enlisted do not focus very much on (FiSTs) get into position to observe the employment of snipers and ground Prepping of the Battlespace for the fi res, the sniper teams initiating and reconnaissance assets. In an infantry Infantry observing these shaping fi res should battalion, the commanders who get Shaping the battlespace with close have a solid SOP for battle handover snipers attached to them do so with a air support and indirect fi res ahead of of fi res with the infantry unit’s FiST.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Peacetime Espionage, International Law and the Existence of Customary Exceptions I˜Naki Navarrete† & Russell Buchan‡
    \\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-4\CIN403.txt unknown Seq: 1 8-APR-19 15:07 Out of the Legal Wilderness: Peacetime Espionage, International Law and the Existence of Customary Exceptions I˜naki Navarrete† & Russell Buchan‡ This Article demonstrates that peacetime espionage does not benefit from permissive customary international law exceptions. The mainstream view contends that, though peacetime espionage may contravene interna- tional law, developments in customary international law (CIL) nevertheless undercut State responsibility for such conduct. The gist of this view is that acts of espionage benefit from permissive CIL exceptions because its prac- tice is widespread and accepted within the international society. However, the mainstream literature has rarely— if ever— meaningfully engaged with the practice of espionage in an effort to tease out the objective and subjec- tive elements supportive of customary espionage exceptions. This Article closes this gap and debunks the mainstream view. We show that, although widespread, most acts of espionage are committed in secret and, as such, they cannot qualify as State practice for the purpose of CIL formation. We further demonstrate that States have failed to issue expressions of the sub- jective element in support of customary espionage exceptions. We con- clude by suggesting that, while States are entitled to develop customary espionage exceptions in the future, for now they have yet to come out of the legal wilderness. Introduction ..................................................... 898 R I. International Law and Peacetime Espionage............... 901 R A. Principle of Territorial Sovereignty ..................... 905 R B. Law of the Sea ........................................ 909 R C. Diplomatic and Consular Law ......................... 910 R II. Customary Exceptions and Peacetime Espionage .........
    [Show full text]
  • Jungle Operations International Course – Guidelines to Candidates
    Jungle Operations International Course – Guidelines to Candidates ANNEX E – STUDENTS’S PREPARATION FOR THE DOCTRINAL INTERACTION GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR THE STUDENTS’S PREPARATION – CIOS 2018 The Doctrinal Interaction will take place on 03 (three) distinct days, and each day a specific block of issues will be dealt with in the jungle environment. During the selection process, still in the country of origin, the future student should receive, through the Military Attaché of his country, the subjects that will be addressed in the Doctrinal Interaction. Each subject contains requests with questions that must be answered and presented by the student in the Doctrinal Interaction. The requests, requisites, maps, letters and information required to resolve the requests are contained in the body of this document. Each student must answer all the questions of the requests in a single document in the ".doc" format and also in a single file in the ".ppt" format. These files must be recorded in a flash drive or CD – Rom and brought to CIGS with the student. A military from the Doctrinal and Research Division will collect the files on the first day of the Mobilization Week at CIGS. During the Doctrinal Interaction each student should present the answers to the questions as follows: - On the 1st day the student will have 30 min to present the requests 1, 2, 3 and 4. - On the 2nd day the student will have 30 min to present 5, 6, 7 and 8. - On the 3rd day the student will have 30 minutes to present the requests 9 and 10.
    [Show full text]
  • Marine Corps Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV)
    Updated June 10, 2021 Marine Corps Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV) What Is the Advanced Reconnaissance anti-armor capability to defeat close-in heavy armor Vehicle (ARV)? threats; According to the Marine Corps, the Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV) aims to be a new armored precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to defeat threats vehicle family to replace the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) beyond the engagement range of threat systems; (Figure 1): Since the 1980s, the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) unmanned systems swarm capability to provide persistent, multifunction munitions; has supported Marine Air-Ground Task Force missions on the battlefield. While the LAV remains advanced, networked, multifunctional electronic warfare operationally effective, the life cycle of this system (EW ) capabilities; is set to expire in the mid-2030s…. The Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV) [the LAV’s a modern command-and-control suite and a full range of replacement] will be highly mobile, networked, sensors to enhance and extend reconnaissance and transportable, protected, and lethal. The capability surveillance ranges; will provide, sensors, communication systems and lethality options to overmatch threats that have organic unmanned aerial and ground systems historically been addressed with more heavily (UAS/UGS) that can be deployed from the ARV; armored systems. The ARV will be an advanced combat vehicle system, capable of fighting for active and passive vehicle protection capabilities to information that balances competing capability sense, orient, classify, track, and defeat incoming demands to sense, shoot, move, communicate and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), anti-tank guided remain transportable as part of the naval missiles (ATGMs), and PGM threats with hard-and soft- expeditionary force.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Command and Control and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Aircraft
    U.S. Command and Control and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Aircraft Jeffrey Nelson US Air Force Fellow July 15, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44108 c11173008 . U.S. Command and Control and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Aircraft Summary The fleet of manned aircraft accomplishing the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions for the joint military community (E-8, E-3, RC-135, WC-135, OC-135, and E-6) is primarily based on Boeing 707 aircraft procured from the 1960s to the early 1990s. As the age of these legacy C2ISR aircraft increases, understanding the Air Force and Navy modernization and recapitalization plans is likely important for Congress. This report examines the Air Force’s and Navy’s current sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization efforts for these Boeing 707-based aircraft, and issues Congress may take into account when considering appropriating funds for continued sustainment and modernization of these aircraft versus funding for recapitalization of these missions to new aircraft. This report addresses potential congressional oversight and appropriations concerns for the sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization of the DOD’s Boeing 707-based legacy C2ISR aircraft fleet. It does not address options for recapitalization currently being offered by industry to other countries. Congress has the authority to approve, reject, or modify Air Force and Navy funding requests for C2ISR aircraft sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization, as well as oversight of the nation’s C2ISR requirements and capabilities. Congress’s decisions on appropriations for the C2ISR force could impact the nation’s C2ISR capabilities and have additional consequences for the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorist and Insurgent Teleoperated Sniper Rifles and Machine Guns Robert J
    Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CGU Faculty Publications and Research CGU Faculty Scholarship 1-1-2016 Terrorist and Insurgent Teleoperated Sniper Rifles and Machine Guns Robert J. Bunker Claremont Graduate University Alma Keshavarz Claremont Graduate University Recommended Citation Bunker, R. J. (2016). Terrorist and Insurgent Teleoperated Sniper Rifles and Machine Guns. Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), 1-40. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in CGU Faculty Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WL KNO EDGE NCE ISM SA ER IS E A TE N K N O K C E N N T N I S E S J E N A 3 V H A A N H Z И O E P W O I T E D N E Z I A M I C O N O C C I O T N S H O E L C A I N M Z E N O T Terrorist and Insurgent Teleoperated Sniper Rifles and Machine Guns ROBERT J. BUNKER and ALMA KESHAVARZ August 2016 Open Source, Foreign Perspective, Underconsidered/Understudied Topics The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an open source research organization of the U.S. Army. It was founded in 1986 as an innovative program that brought together military specialists and civilian academics to focus on military and security topics derived from unclassified, foreign media. Today FMSO maintains this research tradition of special insight and highly collaborative work by conducting unclassified research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues that are understudied or unconsidered.
    [Show full text]
  • The Success of the Light Armoured Vehicle
    Canadian Military History Volume 20 Issue 3 Article 9 2011 The Success of the Light Armoured Vehicle Ed Storey Canadian Expeditionary Forces Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Recommended Citation Storey, Ed "The Success of the Light Armoured Vehicle." Canadian Military History 20, 3 (2011) This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Storey: Light Armoured Vehicle The Success of the Light Armoured Vehicle Ed Storey s a military vehicle enthusiast make them cost effective and easier AI was quite excited to see the Abstract: In order to understand the to deploy. article by Frank Maas in Canadian purchase of military vehicles, one must The AVGP series of vehicles Military History dealing with the understand the vehicle and where it falls purchased by Canada in 1976 was in the evolution of vehicle procurement. Canadian Light Armoured Vehicle This article, written in response to an a 10.7 ton, 6 wheeled amphibious (LAV) series of vehicles (vol.20, earlier article in Canadian Military vehicle based on the Swiss Mowag no.2 Spring 2011). I was also keenly History by Frank Maas, examines the Piranha I. Canada bought three interested in the article as my Father chronology and motivations behind versions: the Cougar 76 mm Fire was stationed at CFB Petawawa in the Canadian acquisition of wheeled Support Vehicle, the Grizzly armoured fighting vehicles.
    [Show full text]
  • The Law of Air Warfare
    The Law of Air Warfare by Javier Guisandez Gomez Hostile aerial action Under aerospace doctrine an aerial action is a set of aerial sorties of the same nature which take place simultaneously in pursuit of a common aim. In other words, an action of this type would attain the objective pursued if it involved two or more aircraft engaging in any of a range of operations, namely attacks, reconnaissance, transportation and special aerial missions. The possible situations in which aerial actions may take place range from peacetime to warfare, including all the intermediate stages. It may therefore be said that when aerial action is described as hostile, it is because it is actually carrying out or intended to carry out acts that have a single common characteristic, that is, violence. In this context, violence must be understood as acts which are com- mitted without the consent of the affected group or country and which therefore constitute a violation of the rights or the status of other com- munities or nations. It is important to clarify this point, as otherwise hostile Francisco Javier Guisandez Gomez is a colonel in the Spanish Air Force and heads the Tactics and Doctrine Department at the Air Force Academy in Madrid. Colonel Guisandez Gomez teaches the law of war at the Academy, at the Madrid Centre for the Study of International Humanitarian Law, at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy, and also as an instructor for the ICRC in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Original: Spanish 347 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS aerial action would cover only aerial attack missions, while those involv- ing transportation or reconnaissance and special missions, and also electronic warfare, in-flight refuelling and so on, would not be classified as hostile action.
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems Lt Col Thomas R
    DIGITAL-ONLY COMMENTARY Chinese Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems LT COL THOMAS R. MCCABE, USAFR, RETIRED he best weapons in the world are useless unless aimed accurately, which requires a sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system to detect and track targets, preferably in as close to real time Tas possible. Even more important, at the strategic level, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) views war between modern states as a conflict between systems of systems,1 which means weapons and targeting require an accurate and compre- hensive view of those enemy systems to target them. China has been building a wide variety of ISR systems to provide its forces with such capabilities, including systems that we must expect will be available for military use even if nominally civilian. (China has said its policy of military-civil­­ fusion will include the outer space and maritime domains; so, we must assume that all the surveillance re- sources PRC civilian agencies have will be integrated into crisis/wartime military ISR.2) These systems include the following: Satellites. China has developed and deployed constellations of dual-­­use and military satellite reconnaissance systems, especially the Yaogan (“China remote-­­ sensing satellite”) systems, with both electro-­­optical imagery reconnaissance sat- ellites and synthetic aperture radar satellites.3 Many of the Yaogan satellites are also reported to be electronic intelligence satellites,4 intended to track and locate foreign warships by their
    [Show full text]
  • ATP 3-01.8 Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense Headquarters
    ATP 3-01.8 Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Headquarters, Department of the Army This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site (http://), and the Central Army Registry site (https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard) To receive publishing updates, please subscribe at (http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/new_subscribe.asp) *ATP 3-01.8 Field Manual ATP 3-01.8 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense Contents Page PREFACE.............................................................................................................. iii INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... iv SUMMARY OF CHANGES .................................................................................... v Chapter 1 AERIAL THREATS AND DEFENSIVE PLANNING .......................................... 1-1 Anticipate Aerial Threats .................................................................................... 1-1 Analyze Air Threat Capabilities .......................................................................... 1-4 Threat Application ............................................................................................... 1-7 Defensive Planning ............................................................................................. 1-9 Chapter 2 TECHNIQUES FOR WARNING AND CONTROL ............................................
    [Show full text]
  • Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop Mechanized
    R D EP A RT ME NT F I E LD M A N UA L CAVALRY CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOP MECHANIZED WAR DEPARTMENT : 24 FEBRUARY 1944 CHANNON, R. r. WJ R D E PA R T M EN T F I E L D M A N U AL FM 2-20 This manual supersedes FM 17-20, 30 May 1942 CAVA L R Y CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOP, MECHANIZED WAR DEPARTMENT · 24 FEBRUARY 1944 United States Go-ernment Printing Offce IYashington : 1944 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 25 D. C. - Price 25 cents WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 24 February I944. FM 2-20, Cavalry Field Manual, Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops, Mechanized, is published for the information and guid- ance of all concerned. [A. G. 300.7 (11 Jan. 44).] BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: G. C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff. OFFICIAL: J. A. ULIO, Major General, The Adjutant General. DISTRIBUTION: B and H I, 2, 7, 17 (5); R I, 2, 7, I7, i8 (2); Bn 2, 7, 17, i8 (5); I C 2 (20). (For explanation of symbols see 2i-6.) Contents CHAPTER 1. GENERAL. Paragraph Page Section 1. Purpose and scope .................... - 2 1 II. Mission ............................. 3 2 111. Organization and equipment ........... 4- 6 2 IV. Training ............................ 7- 9 5 V. Duties of personnel ................... I- 14 I0 VI. Drill, ceremonies, inspections ........... I5 i6 CHAPTER 2. EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY RECON- NAISSANCE TROOP, MECHAN- IZED, INFANTRY DIVISION. Section 1. General .... ........................ I6- i8 17 II. Reconnaissance ....................... 19- 38 I8 III. Security ............................
    [Show full text]
  • Open PDF 71KB
    AJA0022 Written evidence submitted by Patrick Benham-Crosswell SUMMARY 1. Ajax is not fit for its primary purpose as an armoured reconnaissance vehicle. Whether it is suitable for the secondary role, providing direct firepower to strike brigades is questionable. 2. If the current problems afford an opportunity to cancel the project and procure an existing vehicle (or vehicles) it should be taken. 3. Suitable alternatives include something based on the Stormer (already in service with the British Army, so logistically compelling) or the new French Jaguar (which is wheeled, and therefore a closer fit into Boxer battlegroups and brigades). 4. This failed procurement is symptomatic of an Army not understanding what it needs, does or wants. The reasons for this are complex and beyond the scope of this document, but it’s premature and (probably) unjustified to lay blame at the door of the PE or GDLS. THE AUTHOR 5. I am an ex-Army officer with extensive experience in armoured reconnaissance. Specifically: a. I was a troop leader and squadron second in command of a reconnaissance regiment in Germany at the end of the Cold War. b. I was the second in command of a squadron in the WHITE ERMINE exercises investigating CVR(T) replacement in 1988. c. I was an expert contributor to subsequent computer simulations of reconnaissance at DERA Fort Halstead. d. I was a subject matter expert for DERA Fort Halstead on a series of simulations on FCLV, FLAV, MRAV and FRES (as well as other programmes). 6. I am in touch with military affairs and write for several publications.
    [Show full text]
  • Preparing for Contested War: Improving Command and Control of Dynamic
    PREPARING FOR CONTESTED WAR: IMPROVING COMMAND AND CONTROL OF DYNAMIC TARGETING Biography Name: Nicholas J. Hall Rank: Major Service: USAF Education: BA, International Studies, Baylor University, Waco, TX MA, Global Security Studies, American Military University, Charles Town, WV Current School: Air Command and Staff College Major Nicholas J. Hall is a career intelligence officer in the United Stated Air Force. Maj Hall received his commission in 2005 from ROTC at Baylor University, Waco, Texas. He has served at the unit level within AFSOC, as a targeting officer at the MAJCOM and joint level, as a Mission Intelligence Coordinator in an MQ-1B squadron, and as an analyst within USAFCENT and the PACOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center. Following his current assignment as a student in Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Maj Hall will move to Langley AFB to become the Director of Operations for the 15th Intelligence Squadron, 365th ISRG, 363rd ISRW, which is responsible for target systems analysis for 25th Air Force. Contact information: Maj Nicholas J. Hall 15 IS/DO DSN: 575-4365 Comm: 757-225-4365 [email protected] Abstract In a contested war, the joint force will need to identify, nominate, and strike a greater number of targets in a shorter amount of time than currently required. These conditions will stress the current command and control of a dynamic targeting process characterized by lengthy target development timelines that allow for high-confidence, centralized decision making. The traditional Air Force solution to this problem is to increase the targeting manpower and scope of responsibility at the AOC.
    [Show full text]