EVALUATING THE PRRI REBELLION AS A WEST SUMATRAN PEASANT MOVEMENT

Kevin W. Fogg

Albukhary Foundation Fellow in the History of in Southeast Asia at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies.*) [email protected].

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the following questions: Had the peasants understood the vision of the leadership, would they still have participated in the revolt? Was the swift reluctance towards active military participation the result of a better understanding of the rebellion’s aims as espoused by the core leadership? Are the peasantry prone to future profanations of great tradition narratives? By way of using various sources, the writer tries to trace the PRRI Rebellion in the light of grass-root perspective as it is reflected in the eye of interviewee given Om Fahmi’s description, that believed that the Minang will continue to protest against the imperialism of until this state of affairs appeared.

Keywords: PRRI rebellion, peasant movement, revolt

ABSTRACT

Artikel ini berupaya untuk menjawab pertanyaan berikut: apakah para petani paham dengan pandangan para pemimpin mereka?, apakah mereka masih akan tetap ikut terlibat dalam pemberontakan? Apakah sikap lekas curiga terhadap keterlibatan militer aktif merupakan bentuk pengertian yang lebih baik tentang tujuan pemberontakan seperti yang dipahami dan didukung oleh kepemimpinan inti mereka? Apakah petani Minangkabau cenderung menolak borok masa depan dalam narasi tradisi besar. Dengan menggunakan pelbagai sumber penulis coba melacak pemberontakan PRRI dari sudut pandang akar- rumput (petani) sebagaimana tercermin di mata orang yang diwawancarai seperti dikemukakan lewat deskripsi Om Fahmi yang percaya bahwa orang Minang akan tetap melakukan protes melawan imperialism Jakarta selama keadaan yang ditentang di masa pemberontakan itu masih tetap ada.

Kata Kunci: Pemberontakan PRRI, pergerakan kaum petani, protes

*) This paper was first prepared in 2006, and no attempt has been made to bring it fully up to date for this publication. The author’s thanks go to James C. Scott, Michael Dove, and Mestika Zed for their input.

160 TINGKAP Vol. XI No. 2 Th. 2015 A. Introduction In the twenty-first century, Bagindo PRRI rebellion of 1958 to gain a Fahmi lived a fairly quiet life in a popular following among the cement house behind the Taman Minangkabau such that it was able to Budaya (Cultural Park – the local sustain a guerilla war for several performing arts complex) in , years? Furthermore, how was the West , . He popular inspiration and understanding watched his grandchildren enter high of this conflict different from other school, and welcomed the few people Minangkabau rebellions that who stopped by, either to chat or to preceded it? To answer these use the pay phone that his wife questions, this paper will first give a administered to keep up some income. brief analysis of three previous In February 1958, however, Om rebellions in the Minangkabau region: Fahmi was at the head of a line of the Padri Wars (1821-1838), the Tax students rallying to the cry of the Rebellion of 1908, and the Revolutionary Government of the Communist uprising of 1927. Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Bearing in mind the tradition of these Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, rebellions, it will be possible to PRRI). He presented a petition to the evaluate the nature of popular support PRRI leaders with over ten thousand for the PRRI. Finally, it will be student signatures, he alleged, calling possible to evaluate to what extent for the military and civilian leaders the PRRI rebellion deviated from gathered in Padang to revolt against previous revolts and whether or not it the central government. Not only did can be classified as a peasant Om Fahmi and his fellow students rebellion. support the rebellion, but the support of the vast majority of citizens in B. A Survey of West Sumatran Re- province allowed an bellions2 alternative government to maintain Whether or not Om Fahmi is correct itself for years in the jungle while in his assessment of his own people, low-level fighting waged with it is true that the Minangkabau have Javanese troops stationed in the cities. risen in rebellion several times since Perhaps all of this support came, as the beginning of the nineteenth Om Fahmi said, because the Minang- century. Often, scholars have seen kabau are the most likely people in these revolts as being religiously Indonesia, even all the world, to 1 protest. 2 One major armed conflict in the province Surely there must be, however, has not been included in this survey: the war specific forces and reasoning leading for independence against the Dutch, 1945- the Minang people of West Sumatra 49. Although West Sumatra had an import- to protest for specific causes. What ant role to play in that conflict, and despite popular understanding of that war as serving were these reasons that allowed the local interests, I have chosen not to include it because it was neither centered in the province, led by Minangkabau militarily, 1 Interview with Bagindo Fahmi by the nor fundamentally dependent on Minang author, Padang, 17 June, 2006. peasant participation.

Evaluating The PRRI Rebellion As A West Sumatran Peasant Movement … 161 inspired, or nationalists have religious revival morphed into the absorbed the story of the rebellions full-scale invasion of lowland towns into the narrative of resistance to by Muslim leaders and peasant Dutch imperialism. While both followers from their home districts. religion and rejection of Dutch rule The towns and communities who certainly played a role in all the were averse to the puritanical reforms uprisings examined here, a closer and harsh penalties of the Padris lost examination will show how peasants most of their strongholds in the usually also worked for their own upland valleys, and they eventually best interest in these rebellions, called upon the Dutch stationed on sometimes using religious or the coast to come to their aid. The nationalist rhetoric to cover over Dutch began direct armed conflict more economic motives. with the Padri forces in 1821. They Among all the conflicts in West quickly conquered much of the Sumatra since European arrival, the Minangkabau hinterlands, but did not Padri War is arguably the most sustain their control over this territory. famous.3 Its foremost leader, Tuanku In ten years’ time the Dutch entered Imam Bonjol, has been enshrined as a the Minang highlands again, this time national hero (pahlawan negara) and holding onto all of their conquered is currently featured on the five territories. By 1837, all of the Padri thousand Rupiah note.4 Imam Bonjol leaders were captured or defeated, was one of several Minangkabau and Dutch forced the Minangkabau to religious leaders who returned from agree to humiliating terms in a treaty the in the late eighteenth century that established Dutch “supervision” and felt compelled to change their over the area without giving them the native society to eliminate the vice responsibility of direct governance. and paganism that they believed ran Despite its relative fame, rampant. The movement began as scholars long misunderstood the reforms in home villages of these conflict as being narrowly religious, hajjis, called Padris because they had “a clash between the lineage heads of departed for the Holy Lands from the Minangkabau village society and port of Pedir. Around the second Islamic teachers penetrating the decade of the nineteenth century the Minangkabau world with new ideas from outside”5. Another interpretation, offered mostly by Indonesian scholars 3 In this account of the Padri Wars, I follow Christine Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a working toward the nationalist Changing Peasant Economy: Central project, sees the Padri War as early Sumatra, 1784-1847 (London: Curzon, resistance to the Dutch as foreigners 1983), and Rusli Amran, Sumatera Barat and non-Muslims. 6 Scholars agree hingga Plakat Panjang (Jakarta: Sinar that the two sides aligned as Harapan, 1981). traditional Minang leaders who did 4 For more on this figure, see Jeffrey Hadler, “A Historiography of Violence and the 5 Dobbin, viii. See also Hadler’s intervention Secular State in Indonesia: Tuanku Imam on this point. Bondjol and the Uses of History,” Journal of Asian Studies vol. 67, no. 3 (August 6 This, for example, is the dominant 2008): 971-1010. interpretation for Rusli Amran.

162 TINGKAP Vol. XI No. 2 Th. 2015 not follow Islamic precepts versus Just more than a century after Wahhabi-influenced Muslim leaders the Padri leaders returned from the who sought to impose strict religion hajj and began their revival and throughout the region. This division rebellion, a new storm began to brew between the two sides presents an in West Sumatra. 10 After eighty incomplete picture of motivations, years of demanding corvée labor however; Christine Dobbin has from the Minangkabau as one of their brought to light the additional spoils from winning the Padri War, economic and local incentives for the the Dutch found that tax in labor was supporters of the Padri Islamist cause. no longer economically most The Padris were supported most beneficial to them. So, in 1908, the strongly by non-subsistence farmers Dutch broke their own conditions in out of the valley, wet-rice heartlands. the 1837 treaty and implemented a These communities had to bring their money tax.11 This first faced passive goods to market in order to sustain resistance from village heads and the themselves, and therefore required communities they led, but the Dutch safe travel conditions and clear law then arrested most of the resistance for handling economic disputes, leaders, sending a clear message and conditions which were not present eliminating the option of continued before the Padri Islamic revivalist passive dissent. An armed uprising movement. It was natural, then, that then began in the valley of Agam, led upland farmers try to bolster Islam, by leaders of the Syattariyah Sufi which provided both strict moral tariqa. This uprising was widespread rules (thus eliminating banditry on but fairly short-lived, however, as the the highway) and well-developed amulets and other protections that jurisprudence (allowing for the should have warded off bullets regulation of transactions).7 Similar- proved ineffective and the peasants in ly, once the Dutch entered the fray, the Padri side was fighting against their foreign economic incursions and where peasant economic demands under- control of a previously free market, scored all other developments. again protecting small-scale pro- 10 In this account of the Anti-Tax Rebellion, I 8 ducers’ interests. Seen in this light, follow Ken Young, Islamic Peasants and religion in the Padri Wars merely the State: The 1908 Anti-Tax Rebellion in gave expression to the needs of non- West Sumatra (New Haven, CT: Yale subsistence agrarian communities University Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 9 and Rusli Amran, Sumatera Barat who sought economic stability. Pemberontakan Pajak 1908 (Jakarta: Gita Karya, 1988).

11 Most accounts agree that this treaty, called 7 Dobbin, 127. the “Plakat Panjang” or “Long Decla- 8 Ibid, 187. ration,” was already a dead letter. For example, Elizabeth Graves testifies to the 9 Of course, this is a gross generalization of extent of Dutch intervention in The Dobbin’s well-developed and nuanced Minangkabau Response to Dutch Colonial argument. Nevertheless, I believe that her Rule in the Nineteenth Century (Ithaca, NY: key innovation is the repositioning of Cornell Modern Southeast Asia Project, religious issues as one of many factors, 1981), Chapter 2. even a responsive factor, in a situation

Evaluating The PRRI Rebellion As A West Sumatran Peasant Movement … 163 revolt were quickly defeated by act. The mood of the gathering superior Dutch firepower. crowds forced their hand, and they Although the Dutch Resident in began to assassinate Dutch officials Padang and many of his military and collaborators in town. This action colleagues were eager to call the happened even though most of the uprising the work of “religious movements’ leaders had been fanatics” opposed to Dutch inter- arrested in the previous months and vention, scholarship has shown that the specific plans for that night’s the “demand for cash from villagers uprising could not be executed. The would have been alarming for many Dutch had been alerted of the peasants on purely economic intended revolt and responded grounds.”12 Again, as with the Padri quickly by sending in more Wars, religious and anti-foreign reinforcements and quelling the issues certainly came into play, but uprising. While around twenty-four the 1908 rebellion should be seen as Dutch were killed, more than a primarily launched to serve the hundred Minangkabau died and well- economic interests of the peasant over a thousand were imprisoned.14 class in the face of major upheaval. In this case, the antagonism After a shorter interlude, against the Dutch and the desire for a rebellion again broke out in 1927, this new socio-economic order served time in the form of a Communist peasants’ interests. “Both Minang- uprising centered around the town of kabau merchants and the Muslim Silungkang. 13 After months of community as a whole felt squeezed incessantly vacillating between action out by Dutch protection of European and inaction, the uprising finally and Chinese traders in Sumatra’s reached the point of no return on the west coast ports.”15 Furthermore, this night of January 1, 1927. A large “Communist” uprising must be seen group of local men assembled in as a local, not national or inter- Silungkang and other villages in that national, event because it was not at region of West Sumatra and were all well-connected with doctrinal armed and prepped for battle, despite ideas of Marxism. In fact, it directly the fact that the leaders of the local opposed the national party’s Communist movement were still directives and was based on unsure of whether they intended to furthering local and personal agendas. The most successful propaganda in 12 Young, 256. the area had not used the themes of 13 international Communism but rather In this account of the Communist Uprising “play[ed] on the grievances and ill- of 1927, I follow Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey, eds., The Communist Uprisings defined aspirations” of the local 16 of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Docu- population. The leaders who ments (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern organized the uprising came largely Indonesia Project, 1960), specifically the introduction and translation of Schrieke’s report, and Audrey Kahin, Rebellion to 14 Kahin, 48. Integration: West Sumatra and the 15 Kahin, 34. Indonesian Polity (Amsterdam: Ams- terdam UP, 1999), Chapter 1. 16 Benda and McVey, xxi.

164 TINGKAP Vol. XI No. 2 Th. 2015 from the lowest classes in the Sumatra for several reasons. First rebellious villages: a barber, an and foremost, happening after electrician, an old-style tram con- Indonesian independence, it pitted ductor, a discharged railway employ- two Indonesian groups against each yee, an illiterate old man and several other. The two sides cannot, though, “infamous gamblers” figured promi- both be called indigenous; the PRRI nently.17 Clearly this was an uprising rebels encompassed most of the driven by local, low-level motives Minangkabau population native to the rather than doctrinal ambitions, and province, whereas the central peasants participated, even started, government troops and leadership the rebellion because of their own were largely Javanese, leading to frustrated ambitions. many accusations of neo- or internal colonialism. Be that as it may, the C. The PRRI Rebellion rebel cause also included several The PRRI Rebellion 18 stands apart prominent leaders from (among from earlier movements in West them and Djojohadikusomo) and allied 17 B. Schrieke, “The Course of the Com- itself with a parallel rebellion in munist Movement on the West Coast of North called . Sumatra,” in Benda and McVey, 168. This makes the PRRI unique in that it 18 Although various aspects of the PRRI have aligned the Minangkabau both with been well-documented in scholarly works, and squarely against groups who had there is not yet a satisfying survey of the very recently been their allies in the rebellion. Perhaps the closest thing is struggle for independence. Audrey Kahin’s survey in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 of Rebellion to Integration. An This incorporation of other Indonesian work which focuses entirely on areas points to another major the PRRI and its sister rebellion Permesta difference between the PRRI and is R.Z. Leirissa, PRRI/ Permesta: Strategi previous movements; the PRRI was Membangun Indonesia Tanpa Komunis led by people not emerging directly (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1991). Sadly, this book focuses exclusively on the leadership from agrarian communities. Unlike struggles leading up to the rebellion; less the previous rebellions, where small- than fifteen pages out of 306 deal with the time religious leaders, peasants and period after the declaration of a even barbers became the leaders of revolutionary government, and no revolts, the heads of the PRRI were treatment of peasant involvement is included in the book. Other books, such as career generals, politicians, and some Audrey R. and George McT. Kahin, holders of doctoral degrees from Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret abroad.19 Thus, when evaluating the Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in PRRI as a peasant rebellion, one must Indonesia (New York: New Press, 1995), and James Mossman, Rebels in Paradise: Indonesia’s Civil War (London: Jonathan 19 Probably the most well-educated and Cape, 1961), focus on the extensive distant from the Minangkabau peasantry foreign involvement in the PRRI. The was the Javanese economist turned account given here will utilize primarily politician, . He Kahin and Leirissa, as well as reports had studied at the Sorbonne and had a issued by actors directly involved in the doctorate in economics from Economische PRRI rebellion and scholarly articles Hogeschool in . See Mossman’s treating specific aspects of the conflict. personal appraisal of him in Mossman, 59.

Evaluating The PRRI Rebellion As A West Sumatran Peasant Movement … 165 remember that the leaders were quite had been crucial for all three previous distant from the peasant class, even if uprisings. Lastly, and most import- participation in this uprising served antly for examination here, the peasant interests. success of the PRRI was dependent Connected with this, the PRRI upon the participation and colla- was the first rebellion which boration of Minangkabau peasants established a polity over the region. with the rebel cause. Although the Padri successfully To frame analysis of the causes changed the leaders in many and nature of peasant participation, it communities, it maintained the will be useful here to provide a decentralized, diffuse system of general outline of the leadership and village government. The Anti-Tax chronology of the rebellion. The and Communist uprisings were never Revolutionary Government of the able to set up a formal administration, Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah even in a local area. PRRI, on the Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or other hand, established itself as a PRRI) was declared on February 15, government in the modern sense, and 1958, but its roots trace back until at thus had a greater impact on the lives least 1955. After the election of that of people throughout the province year, the government seated a new during the short time in which it People’s Representative Council functioned fully as a revolutionary (DPR), Indonesia’s legislative body, state. with the most seats going to the Despite these differences, there Indonesian National Party (PNI) and are also several similarities between Masyumi (the Muslim coalition), the PRRI and previous rebellions in followed by the Nadhatul West Sumatra. One might first note (traditionalist Islamic party) and the that the Minang have ultimately Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). failed in achieving their goals in all of This new legislature proved less than the rebellions examined in this ecstatic in following the lead of an paper.20 Beyond this, the PRRI were increasingly authoritarian President also involved in guerilla tactics which . After going through several had been well honed in previous cabinets rapidly because of their conflicts. Local knowledge of the stalemate on policy, Sukarno in 1957 jungle and ability to fade away into it declared a new principle in government, “Guided Democracy,” in

20 This point can, of course, be debated. which allowed him to pull together a Insofar as the Padri Wars were to establish cabinet without the oversight of the greater Muslim piety, they did achieve DPR. The group which felt most their goals, but the leaders were forced in injured by this development was the end to surrender to the Dutch on very Masjumi, the Muslim coalition with degrading terms. With regards to the PRRI, there are those in West Sumatra now strong roots in West Sumatra which (largely veterans of the movement) who lost most of its influence in the argue that they achieved their goal with a government. Party leaders were also forty-year delay, referencing the regional deeply concerned about the apparent autonomy law after ’s downfall. rise of the PKI and Sukarno’s left- Taufik Dt. Mangkuto Rajo, interview with the author, Padangpanjang, 21 June 2006. leaning tendencies.

166 TINGKAP Vol. XI No. 2 Th. 2015 Similar concerns were rising in Hussein, the head of the Banteng the military. Key military leaders in Division and thus the top military West Sumatra, led by Colonel officer in the province, decided with Djambek, created the “Movement much popular support to replace the Against Communism,” railing against appointed governor in December political developments on Java. Of 1956. Hussein as acting governor equal or greater concern for the then began several stalled develop- military, though, was their own ment projects and called loudly for a decline in power. The West Sumatra- more local distribution of the income based Banteng Division, despite from the oilfields in the province being the most heavily decorated of (near the east coast town of the three divisions on the island, was Pekanbaru). In these actions he and being dissolved into the North and his collaborators gained tremendous commands as part of a popularity and also meaningfully simplification of the armed forces.21 increased the standard of living for Furthermore, General Abdul Haris several more remote areas. Nasution, a long-time enemy of the Throughout the course of 1957, leading Sumatran officers (despite the rhetoric on both the Sumatran and being a Sumatran himself), had Jakartan sides escalated, requiring been reinstated as head of the armed Sukarno to call a “National forces. In response to these develop- Consultation” (Musyawarah Nasional) ments and the discontent among the in September with the goal of ending rank and file because of their poverty, regional dissent. The commanders a series of councils was held from North, Central, and South demanding reforms in Jakarta politics. Sumatra all presented a united front Among these reforms were the end of at this conference, but very few “Guided Democracy,” return to the concrete results emerged. Over the 1945 Constitution, the replacement of next few months, accusations that Nasution, and the reincorporation of linked the military leaders with a former vice-president Hatta (the botched assassination attempt on country’s most prominent Minang- Sukarno, as well as bellicose kabau, but one who did not support statements from fringe military and the rebellion) into the government. civil leaders associated with the The dynamics of regionalism movement, pushed the conflict to the are perhaps the most interesting. brink. On February 10, 1958, Ahmad Central Sumatra (of which West Hussein issued an ultimatum on Sumatra was a part) had already gone behalf of both the Sumatran military without a democratically elected leaders and several civilian poli- governor for years when the 1955 ticians (led by Mohamed Natsir, head elections took place. As the province of Masyumi), demanding that the remained in political limbo, Ahmad current government step down and allow a new administration to form 21 This insight regarding Banteng’s superior without Sukarno or his un- record comes directly from Mestika Zed, constitutional innovations. The Revo- “PRRI dalam Perspektif Militer dan Politik lutionary Government was declared Regional: Sebuah Reinterprestasi,” Dia- kronika, 1, no. 1 (Juni 2001), 7.

Evaluating The PRRI Rebellion As A West Sumatran Peasant Movement … 167 five days later, and armed conflict Sumatran leadership), that the began within a week. government would impose atheism One question to ask when on the people and forbid all prayer.25 assessing the peasant side of the Even with these factors, there are PRRI rebellion is when in this conflicting reports of the level of process the popular support of the support at the very outset of the movement emerged. The Minang- armed rebellion. As James Mossman, kabau in the military were drawn into a British journalist who traveled into the struggle by some of the same Central Sumatra in March, 1958, later issues that caused discontent among wrote, the rebels’ “appeal touched the their generals; many of them opposed faith and commercial instincts of the the break-up of the Banteng Division, Menangkabau [sic], who responded and the poor conditions for soldiers warmly, until the shooting started. during the 1950’s. Most of all, though, Thus at the outbreak of the civil war those in the military felt a great Central Sumatra offered an loyalty to their leaders, particularly apparently united front.”26 Interviews Ahmad Hussein, and so followed him with West Sumatra residents who into rebellion. 22 The local military witnessed the events suggest that the men, then, should be seen starting wider population was not sold on the their support in 1956 with the various idea of rebellion until the central councils. Among the rest of the government army began to attack. populace, scholarly assessments have When the Indonesian Armed Forces pointed to strong support for the (ABRI) began to strafe the towns and PRRI because of the development roads to prepare for their invasion, work which had been done under “all of society wanted to participate Ahmad Hussein since he assumed the in the struggle.”27 position of governor.23 This support The armed struggle ended fairly would have been building from the quickly for the cities, but stretched on end of 1956, roughly the same time for years in the countryside. The period as the rise of military rank- government began to strike almost and-file support. Finally, others cite immediately, dropping bombs on intimidating propaganda for a year major cities and potential invasion leading up to the proclamation that sites starting on February 22.28 The led them to join the movement. 24 One of the most peculiar but telling 25 Nazwir L.D. Simarajo, interview with the pieces of propaganda was the myth author, Padang, 1 June, 2006. This myth that if Sukarno succeeded in his was told both in Pak Nazwir’s village and desire to implement Communism his wife’s hometown. (which was ascribed to him by the 26 Mossman, 107. 27 22 “Semua masyarakat mau ikut perjuangan- Ismael, interview with the author, Bonjol, nya.” Nazwir L.D. Simarajo. Some other 22 June 2006. interviews echoed this sentiment, but none 23 Leirissa, 58; Kahin, 190. stated the idea so strongly. 24 Taufik Dt. Mangkuto Rajo; Roslaini Binti 28 Makmum Salim, Sedjarah Operasi2 Sabirin, interview with the author, Padang Gabungan Terhadap PRRI-Permesta Panjang, 21 June, 2006. (Jakarta: Pusat Sedjarah ABRI, 1971), 20.

168 TINGKAP Vol. XI No. 2 Th. 2015 more striking action was when it had been driven into the jungles, dropped paratroopers on the airfields where it was able to sustain itself for outside Pekanbaru on March 12, quite a long time. Volunteer soldiers taking the city, the nearby oilfields, lived in the forests for up to two years, and the recently dropped American while their families provided for them weapons cache (intended for the as best as possible. 33 The rebel rebels) “without a single shot coming leadership sustained itself in the out of the mouths of their woods, as well, keeping up the weapons;” 29 the PRRI soldiers had pretense of a government and even fled in the face of invading forces. going so far as to declare a new state, The response was a disheartened the Federal Republic of Indonesia rebel military leadership, trying to (Republik Persatuan Indonesia, RPI) excuse the loss by pointing to the in early 1960. 34 For the most part, extenuating circumstances of fighter however, the years from 1959 to 1961 planes. 30 Although this loss was were marked by an uneasy ABRI followed shortly by the brief occupation of West Sumatra’s major occupation of by a sympa- towns while guerilla attacks, thetic Batak general, the rebels had to increasingly sporadic and insigni- surrender Padang in April following ficant, were the only sign of the another well-executed air strike by rebels in the province. the central government forces.31 This Popular favor during the armed signaled the beginning of an all out conflict definitely rested with the retreat by the rebel forces as the PRRI, as can be seen from enlistment government troops worked their way practices. At the outset most of the up the coast and into the mountains to men of the province enlisted as Padangpanjang, also working their soldiers for the PRRI militias. Some way up from the east coast towards joined feeling compelled to do so, the central Minangkabau valleys. By fearing that their non-participation October 1958 the PRRI propaganda would cause them to be labeled as a magazine distributed abroad could Communist or jailed as a central only say “Apart from the major towns government spy. 35 Others were along the belt of Padang-- genuinely supportive of the cause and Pajakumbuh [which is to say, all the the leaders, and ready to commit major towns in the province], the themselves with a passion not seen whole area is practically under PRRI since the war for independence from control.” 32 The PRRI cause, then, the Dutch.36 Even among those who supported the cause, however, many

29 Ibid, 23. West Sumatran geography will testify as to how mild this assertion really is. 30 Mossman, 111. 33 Roslaini Binti Sabirin; Taufik, interview 31 Kahin, 216. Kahin points out just how with the author, Bonjol, 22 June, 2006. poor the PRRI defenses and planning were in addition to the good execution of the 34 Kahin, 224. government troops under . 35 Taufik. 32 PRRI Bulletin: Voice of New Indonesia, 1 36 Bagindo Fahmi. [October 15, 1958], 6. A familiarity with

Evaluating The PRRI Rebellion As A West Sumatran Peasant Movement … 169 chose not to join the rebel army During this period, rapes, kid- because of their disapproval of the nappings, and on-the-spot executions methods or their doubts about the were not uncommon for those PRRI’s odds for success; this was suspected of withholding information especially prominent in border areas about rebel activities. 40 Also, by as opposed to the Minang heartland.37 1961 the central government troops Soon after the conflict began, had burned over 10,000 homes in popular support even in the heartland West Sumatra, mostly of accused shifted forms rather quickly from rebel collaborators. 41 The strong overt military to covert moral statement from these incidents was contributions. This was in response that the general populace of West to the early PRRI losses and Sumatra was willing to suffer through pressures exerted on the families of them and not turn in the rebel militias. rebel soldiers by the occupying Not all of society supported the central government army.38 After the rebellion, however. In the plantations shift the most significant marker of on the eastern coast, for example, the general support for the rebels was plantation workers and their providing them food and supplies. In supervisors alike hated the rebel Padang Panjang, the West Sumatran troops, who would come around city where the occupation was longest demanding taxes from the and reputedly the harshest, a thriving plantation. 42 Others felt that the black market conducted primarily by principles on which the rebels were teenagers and women sustained the protesting were just, but did not militias in the jungle. 39 Additional justify a military revolt. 43 These support was provided by silence, groups were a minority, though, which often came at a very high cost. perhaps a growing minority through- out the course of the struggle.

37 This is reported in Edward M. Bruner, The militias, irregulars, and "The Toba Batak Village," in Local, Ethnic leadership of the PRRI did not and National Loyalties in Village descend from the jungles until 1961, Indonesia: A Symposium, ed. G. William Skinner (New York: Institute of Pacific 40 Roslaini Binti Sabirin; Sutina Binti Sabirin; Relations and Yale University Cultural and Betti Yusfa, “Kekerasan Dalam Zaman Report Series, Southeast Asian Studies, PRRI di Tilitang Kamang, 1958-1961,” 1959), 52, on the northern fringe of the Diakronika, 1, no. 1 (Juni 2001), 59-66. movement, and in Mossman, 119, on the border with South Sumatra. 41 “Lebih 10.000 Buah Rumah Rakjat Terbakar di Sumatera Barat,” ANTARA, no. 38 Maryam Zunaria, interview with the author, 107/A (18 April, 1961), 4, cited in Lubuk Alung, 18 June, 2006. Hudayasri, “Komando Daerah Militer III 39 Taufik Dt. Mangkuto Rajo; Roslaini Binti 17 Agustus di Sumatera Barat (1959- Sabirin; Sutina Binti Sabirin, interview 1963),” (Thesis, Universitas Andalas, with the author, Padang Panjang, 21 June, 1990), 40. 2006; and Mak Katik, interview with the 42 Ann Laura Stoler, Capitalism and author, Padang, 7 April, 2006. Sutina Binti Confrontation in Sumatra's Plantation Belt, Sabirin was one of the smugglers who 1870-1979 (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, specialized in cooking oil at 15 years old; 1985), 151. Mak Katik dealt in cigarettes at the precocious age of 11. 43 Mossman, 107.

170 TINGKAP Vol. XI No. 2 Th. 2015 when a general amnesty was offered The dual levels at which the to them by the central government.44 PRRI rebellion functioned, that of the Most of the leadership were given educated leadership and of the amnesty but exiled from public life peasant rank-and-file, makes this the permanently; this fate even extended first revolt in West Sumatra where down to local heads of the PRRI.45 the goals were widely disparate The majority of the rank and file was among the various participants. integrated back into society, and While in previous rebellions, such as some even went on to have leadership the Communist uprisings of 1927, positions in society again.46 different locals may have been avenging different personal vendettas D. Conclusions in their participation, they all shared a Given the character and extent of the basic understanding of the uprising as popular support given to the PRRI redressing their dissatisfaction with rebellion, it is apparent that this Dutch economic dominance. By rebellion differed from those which contrast, in the PRRI the leadership preceded it. Like previous rebellions, spoke and wrote of a struggle against Communism and constitutional it depended on peasant participation; 48 in 1959, 85% of Indonesians still infidelity by Sukarno, whereas the lived in a village setting, 47 and peasants were focused on their own attempting a movement without them economic prosperity and personal would be inconceivable. The PRRI, freedoms. however, did not grow out of lower- This split understanding of the class society; rather it was formulated PRRI is a classic example of the great and led by generals and intellectuals. and little traditions at play in the same movement. Furthermore, 44 Kahin, 226. judging from the accounts given above, the peasant concept of the 45 Ismael, Maryam Zunaria. Ismael was the military commander in Bonjol, who was mission of the PRRI was not unlike forced into retirement at age 41 and never other little movement conceptions of held a job again. Maryam Zunaria’s father, contemporary rebellions in Southeast Hj. St. Zainal Abidin, was the civilian Asia. In the Vietnam struggle for leader for PRRI in Pariaman district; he independence, for example, “sal- was forbidden to hold any public leadership positions ever again, including vation from the foreigner was taken at his local mosque, and died in disgrace in by the peasantry to include salvation 1963, soon after the rebellion ended. from hunger, tenancy and taxes.” 49 46 Taufik. Taufik was a student soldier who functioned as a guerilla fighter in the forest for two years; after returning to society he 48 This is apparent in the PRRI Bulletin: eventually was elected to the state Voice of New Indonesia series, a series of legislature. One of his colleagues appa- English language public relations propa- rently became the president of the State ganda journals issued from the PRRI University of Padang. foreign office in Europe. 47 Rudi Pirngadie, The Problems of the 49 David Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, Government and the Army in Indonesia 1885-1925 (Berkeley: UCalifornia Press, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Center for 1971), 277, cited in James C. Scott, “Protest International Affairs, 1960), 3. and Profanation: Agrarian Revolt and the

Evaluating The PRRI Rebellion As A West Sumatran Peasant Movement … 171 This is not very distant from the core leadership? Are the Minang- explanation overheard by James kabau peasantry prone to future Mossman: “When the revolution profanations of great tradition swept the nobility away, many of the narratives? These are questions which new leaders spoke of the rediscovery require further study, or even of an older, more truly Indonesian speculation. It is likely, however, order; a golden age, when the given Om Fahmi’s description, that peasants had stood firmly on the the Minang will continue to protest. ground of their liberties and the economy had been varied and vital.”50 Peasants in the Minangkabau territory and the surrounding area believed that since this goal had not been fully achieved through the independence movement, the struggle must be continued against the imperialism of Jakarta until this state of affairs appeared. Thus, following James C. Scott’s idea of the adaptation or profanation of the narrative of the leadership, 51 the narrative among the peasants twisted the leadership’s concept of gaining greater autonomy from Jakarta to say that this struggle would bring about freedom from all government interference and an age of prosperity. Of course, earlier rebellions had carried similar idealistic dreams, but the PRRI was the first incidence in West Sumatra where the leadership did not share the millennial vision of the masses. Had the peasants understood the vision of the leadership, would they still have participated in the revolt? Was the swift reluctance towards active military participation the result of a better understanding of the rebellion’s aims as espoused by the

Little Tradition, Part II,” Theory and Society, 4, no. 2 (Summer 1977), 241. 50 Mossman, 77. 51 Scott, 242.

172 TINGKAP Vol. XI No. 2 Th. 2015 BIBLIOGRAPHY Printed Materials Amran, Rusli. Sumatera Barat hingga Plakat Panjang. Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1981. Amran, Rusli. Sumatera Barat Pemberontakan Pajak 1908. Jakarta: Gita Karya, 1988. Bagindo Fahmi. Interview with the Author. Padang, 17 June, 2006. Benda, Harry J., and Ruth T. McVey, eds. The Communist Uprisings of 1926- 1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960. Bruner, Edward M. “The Toba Batak Village.” in Local, Ethnic and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia: A Symposium. ed. G. William Skinner. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations and Yale University Cultural Report Series, Southeast Asian Studies, 1959. 52-64. Dobbin, Christine. Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy: Central Sumatra, 1784-1847. London: Curzon, 1983. Graves, Elizabeth. The Minangkabau Response to Dutch Colonial Rule in the Nineteenth Century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Southeast Asia Project, 1981. Hadler, Jeffrey. “A Historiography of Violence and the Secular State in Indonesia: Tuanku Imam Bondjol and the Uses of History.” Journal of Asian Studies vol. 67, no. 3 (August 2008), 971-1010. Hudayasri. “Komando Daerah Militer III 17 Agustus di Sumatera Barat (1959- 1963).” Thesis, Universitas Andalas, 1990. Interviews Ismael. Interview with the Author. Bonjol, 22 June 2006. Kahin, Audrey R., and George McT. Kahin. Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. New York: New Press, 1995. Kahin, Audrey. Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and the Indonesian Polity. Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 1999. Leirissa, R.Z. PRRI/ Permesta: Strategi Membangun Indonesia Tanpa Komunis. Jakarta: Grafiti, 1991. Mak Katik. Interview with the Author. Padang, 7 April, 2006. Maryam Zunaria. Interview with the Author. Lubuk Alung, 18 June, 2006. Mossman, James. Rebels in Paradise: Indonesia’s Civil War. London: Jonathan Cape, 1961.

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