DOCSLIB.ORG

How Iran Operates in Iraq by NED PARKER, BABAK DEHGHANPISHEH and ISABEL COLES

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
How Iran Operates in Iraq by NED PARKER, BABAK DEHGHANPISHEH and ISABEL COLES IRAQ Key figures in a secretive government committee that coordinates Iraq’s Shi’ite militias detail the way it works How Iran operates in Iraq BY NED PARKER, BABAK DEHGHANPISHEH AND ISABEL COLES SPECIAL REPORT 1 IRAQ INSIDE IRAN’S OPERATION BAGHDAD, FEBRUARY 24, 2015 he face stares out from multiple bill- boards in central Baghdad, a grey- Thaired general casting a watchful eye across the Iraqi capital. This military com- mander is not Iraqi, though. He’s Iranian. The posters are a recent arrival, reflecting the influence Iran now wields in Baghdad. Iraq is a mainly Arab country. Its citi- zens, Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims alike, have long mistrusted Iran, the Persian nation to the east. But as Baghdad struggles to fight the Sunni extremist group Islamic State, many Shi’ite Iraqis now look to Iran, a Shi’ite theocracy, as their main ally. In particular, Iraqi Shi’ites have grown to trust the powerful Iranian-backed mi- litias that have taken charge since the Iraqi army deserted en masse last summer. MILITARY MIGHT: Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi during Iraqi Army Day celebrations in January. The Dozens of paramilitary groups have united Iraqi military has slowly started rebuilding after its near total collapse in the summer of 2014. On the under a secretive branch of the Iraqi gov- cover, a fighter from the Badr Organisation patrols a road outside Suleiman Beg in northern Iraq last ernment called the Popular Mobilisation September. REUTERS/THAIER AL-SUDANI; AHMED JADALLAH Committee, or Hashid Shaabi. Created by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s prede- FROM BATTLEFIELD TO HOSPITAL cessor Nuri al-Maliki, the official body now Khamenei would place the takes the lead role in many of Iraq’s security interests of the Iraqi people above Hashid Shaabi is headed by Jamal Jaafar operations. From its position at the nexus all else. Mohammed, better known by his nom de between Tehran, the Iraqi government, and guerre Abu Mahdi al-Mohandis, a former the militias, it is increasingly influential in Hadi al-Amiri Badr commander who once plotted against determining the country’s future. Leader of Badr Organisation Saddam Hussein and whom American of- Until now, little has been known about ficials have accused of bombing the U.S. the body. But in a series of interviews with Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. But they also cite embassy in Kuwait in 1983. Reuters, key Iraqi figures inside Hashid the religious guidance of Ayatollah Ali Iraqi officials say Mohandis is the Shaabi have detailed the ways the paramili- Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, as a right-hand man of Qassem Soleimani, tary groups, Baghdad and Iran collaborate, key factor in their decision to fight and – as head of the Quds Force, part of Iran’s and the role Iranian advisers play both in- they see it – defend Iraq. Revolutionary Guard. Mohandis is praised side the group and on the frontlines. Hadi al-Amiri, the leader of the Badr by some militia fighters as “the commander Those who spoke to Reuters include two Organisation, told Reuters: “The majority of all troops” whose “word is like a sword senior figures in the Badr Organisation, of us believe that ... Khamenei has all the above all groups.” perhaps the single most powerful Shi’ite qualifications as an Islamic leader. He is the The body he heads helps coordinate paramilitary group, and the commander leader not only for Iranians but the Islamic everything from logistics to military op- of a relatively new militia called Saraya nation. I believe so and I take pride in it.” erations against Islamic State. Its members al-Khorasani. He insisted there was no conflict be- say Mohandis’ close friendships with both In all, Hashid Shaabi oversees and coor- tween his role as an Iraqi political and mili- Soleimani and Amiri helps anchor the dinates several dozen factions. The insiders tary leader and his fealty to Khamenei. collaboration. say most of the groups followed a call to “Khamenei would place the interests of The men have known each other for arms by Iraq’s leading Shi’ite cleric Grand the Iraqi people above all else,” Amiri said. more than 20 years, according to Muen SPECIAL REPORT 2 IRAQ INSIDE IRAN’S OPERATION al-Kadhimi, a Badr Organisation leader in western Baghdad. “If we look at this histo- ry,” Kadhimi said, “it helped significantly in organising the Hashid Shaabi and creating a force that achieved a victory that 250,000 (Iraqi) soldiers and 600,000 interior minis- try police failed to do.” Kadhimi said the main leadership team usually consulted for three to four weeks before major military campaigns. “We look at the battle from all directions, from first determining the field ... how to distribute assignments within the Hashid Shaabi bat- talions, consult battalion commanders and the logistics,” he said. Soleimani, he said, “participates in the operation command centre from the start of the battle to the end, and the last thing (he) does is visit the battle’s wounded in the hospital.” Iraqi and Kurdish officials put the num- ber of Iranian advisers in Iraq between 100 BOSS: Head of the Badr Organisation Hadi al-Amiri (front right) with officers on the outskirts of and several hundred - fewer than the nearly Muqdadiyah in Diyala province, in January. REUTERS/STRINGER 3,000 American officers training Iraqi forc- es. In many ways, though, the Iranians are a far more influential force. The U.S. stayed all these Iraqi army and never taught them to use Iraqi officials say Tehran’s involvement years with the Iraqi army and drones or how to operate a very sophisti- is driven by its belief that Islamic State is never taught them to use drones cated communication network, or how to an immediate danger to Shi’ite religious or how to operate a sophisticated intercept the enemy’s communication,” he shrines not just in Iraq but also in Iran. communication network. said. “The Hashid Shaabi, with the help of Shrines in both nations, but especially in (Iranian) advisers, now knows how to oper- Iraq, rank among the sect’s most sacred. Muen al-Kadhimi ate and manufacture drones.” The Iranians, the Iraqi officials say, Badr Organisation leader in western Baghdad A MAGICAL FIGHTER helped organise the Shi’ite volunteers and militia forces after Grand Ayatollah Sistani the semi-autonomous Iraqi region of One of the Shi’ite militia groups that best called on Iraqis to defend their country Kurdistan, said Iranian troops often work shows Iran’s influence in Iraq is Saraya al- days after Islamic State seized control of with Iraqi forces. In northern Iraq, Kurdish Khorasani. It was formed in 2013 in re- the northern city of Mosul last June. peshmerga soldiers “dealt with the techni- sponse to Khamenei’s call to fight Sunni Prime Minister Abadi has said Iran has cal issues like identifying targets in battle, jihadists, initially in Syria and later Iraq. provided Iraqi forces and militia volunteers but the launching of rockets and artillery The group is responsible for the with weapons and ammunition from the – the Iranians were the ones who did that.” Baghdad billboards that feature Iranian first days of the war with Islamic State. Kadhimi, the senior Badr official, said General Hamid Taghavi, a member of the They have also provided troops. Several Iranian advisers in Iraq have helped with Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Known to Kurdish officials said that when Islamic everything from tactics to providing para- militia members as Abu Mariam, Taghavi State fighters pushed close to the Iraq- military groups with drone and signals ca- was killed in northern Iraq in December. Iran border in late summer, Iran dis- pabilities, including electronic surveillance He has become a hero for many of Iraq’s patched artillery units to Iraq to fight and radio communications. Shi’ite fighters. them. Farid Asarsad, a senior official from “The U.S. stayed all these years with the Taghavi “was an expert at guerrilla war,” SPECIAL REPORT 3 IRAQ INSIDE IRAN’S OPERATION KEEPING WATCH: Fighters from the Badr Organisation (above left) guard a checkpoint along a highway outside the town of Sulaiman Pek soon after they took it from Sunni militants last September. Billboards showing Iranian General Hamid Taghavi, who was killed in action late last year, now dot central Baghdad. REUTERS/AHMED JADALLAH; AHMED SAAD said Ali al-Yasiri, the commander of Saraya In November, Taghavi was back in and members of parliament. Giant pictures al-Khorasani. “People looked at him as Iraq for a Shi’ite militia offensive near the of Taghavi and other slain al-Khorasani magical.” Iranian border. Yasiri said Taghavi for- fighters hang from the exterior walls of the In a video posted online by the mulated a plan to “encircle and besiege” group’s villa. Khorasani group soon after Taghavi’s Islamic State in the towns of Jalawala and Commander Yasiri walks with a cane death, the Iranian general squats on the Saadiya. After success with that, he began after he was wounded in his left leg dur- battlefield, giving orders as bullets snap to plot the next battle. Yasiri urged him to ing a battle in eastern Diyala in November. overhead. Around him, young Iraqi fight- be more cautious, but Taghavi was killed by On his desk sits a small framed drawing of ers with AK-47s press themselves tightly a sniper in December. Iran’s Khamenei. against the ground. The general wears rum- At Taghavi’s funeral, the head of Iran’s He describes Saraya al-Khorasani, along pled fatigues and has a calm, grandfatherly Supreme National Security Council, Ali with Badr and several other groups, as “the demeanour.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Iran's Men in Baghdad
    IRAQ Iran’s men in Baghdad Three Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias have together become the most powerful military force in Iraq BY BABAK DEHGHANPISHEH BAGHDAD, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 PULITZER PRIZE ENTRY INTERNATIONAL REPORTING 1 IRAQ IRAN’S MEN IN BAGHDAD mong the thousands of militia fighters who flocked to northern Iraq to battle militant Agroup Islamic State over the summer was Qais al-Khazali. Like the fighters, Khazali wore green camouflage. But he also sported a shoulder-strapped pistol and sunglasses and was flanked by armed bodyguards. When he was not on the battlefield, the 40-year-old Iraqi donned the robes and white turban of a cleric. Khazali is the head of a militia called Asaib Ahl al-Haq that is backed by Iran. Thanks to his position he is one of the most feared and respected militia leaders in Iraq, and one of Iran’s most important POWER: Iranian-backed Qais Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, votes representatives in the country. in Iraq’s parliamentary election in April. Below, members of his group His militia is one of three small Iraqi Shi’ite carry coffins of fighters killed during clashes with Islamic State in July. On armies, all backed by Iran, which together have the cover, a fighter from the Badr Brigades guards a checkpoint seized become the most powerful military force in Iraq since from Islamic State militants outside Amerli in early September. REUTERS/ the collapse of the national army in June. AHMED JADALLAH (ABOVE, COVER); REUTERS/ALAA AL-MARJANI (BELOW) Alongside Asaib Ahl al-Haq, there are the Badr Brigades, formed in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War, and the younger and more secretive Kataib Hezbollah.
    [Show full text]
  • Badr Brigade
    Badr Organization Type of Organization: militia, political party, religious, social services provider, terrorist, transnational, violent Ideologies and Affiliations: Iranian-sponsored, Islamist, jihadist, Khomeinist, Shiite Place(s) of Origin: Iraq Year of Origin: 19831 Founder(s): Iraqi Shiites loyal to the al-Hakim Shiite clerical dynasty,2 with the help of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)3 Place(s) of Operation: Iraq, Syria 4 Also Known As: 5 • Badr Brigade 6 • Badr Brigades 7 • Badr Corps 8 • Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development 9 • Badr Organisation in Iraq 10 • Martyr Mohamed Baqir al-Sadr Forces 1 Jon Lee Anderson, “The Candidate,” New Yorker, February 2, 2004, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/02/02/the-candidate-3; Mahan Abedin, “Dossier: The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, 5 (October 2003): 10, http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0310_iraqd.htm. 2 Eli Lake, “Iran's Militias Are Taking Over Iraq’s Army,” Bloomberg View, February 3, 2015, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-02-03/exclusive-iran-s-militias-are-taking-over-iraq-s-army. 3 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq,” Congressional Research Service, June 4, 2009, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA501453. 4 Michael Knights, “Iran’s Foreign Legion: The Role of Iraqi Shiite Militias in Syria,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 23, 2013, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-foreign-legion-the-role-
    [Show full text]
  • Theire Journal
    CONTENTS 20 A MUCKRAKING LIFE THE IRE JOURNAL Early investigative journalist provides relevant lessons TABLE OF CONTENTS By Steve Weinberg MAY/JUNE 2003 The IRE Journal 4 IRE gaining momentum 22 – 31 FOLLOWING THE FAITHFUL in drive for “Breakthroughs” By Brant Houston PRIEST SCANDAL The IRE Journal Globe court battle unseals church records, 5 NEWS BRIEFS AND MEMBER NEWS reveals longtime abuse By Sacha Pfeiffer 8 WINNERS NAMED The Boston Globe IN 2002 IRE AWARDS By The IRE Journal FAITH HEALER Hidden cameras help, 12 2003 CONFERENCE LINEUP hidden records frustrate FEATURES HOTTEST TOPICS probe into televangelist By MaryJo Sylwester By Meade Jorgensen USA Today Dateline NBC 15 BUDGET PROPOSAL CITY PORTRAITS Despite economy, IRE stays stable, Role of religion increases training and membership starkly different By Brant Houston in town profiles The IRE Journal By Jill Lawrence USA Today COUNTING THE FAITHFUL 17 THE BLACK BELT WITH CHURCH ROLL DATA Alabama’s Third World IMAM UPROAR brought to public attention By Ron Nixon Imam’s history The IRE Journal By John Archibald, Carla Crowder hurts credibility and Jeff Hansen on local scene The Birmingham News By Tom Merriman WJW-Cleveland 18 INTERVIEWS WITH THE INTERVIEWERS Confrontational interviews By Lori Luechtefeld 34 TORTURE The IRE Journal Iraqi athletes report regime’s cruelties By Tom Farrey ESPN.com ABOUT THE COVER 35 FOI REPORT Bishop Wilton D. Gregory, Paper intervenes in case to argue for public database president of the U. S. Conference By Ziva Branstetter of Catholic Bishops, listens to a Tulsa World question after the opening session of the conference.
    [Show full text]
  • Observations on the Air War in Syria Lt Col S
    Views Observations on the Air War in Syria Lt Col S. Edward Boxx, USAF His face was blackened, his clothes in tatters. He couldn’t talk. He just point- ed to the flames, still about four miles away, then whispered: “Aviones . bombas” (planes . bombs). —Guernica survivor iulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, Billy Mitchell, and Henry “Hap” Arnold were some of the greatest airpower theorists in history. Their thoughts have unequivocally formed the basis of G 1 modern airpower. However, their ideas concerning the most effective use of airpower were by no means uniform and congruent in their de- termination of what constituted a vital center with strategic effects. In fact the debate continues to this day, and one may draw on recent con- flicts in the Middle East to make observations on the topic. Specifi- cally, this article examines the actions of one of the world’s largest air forces in a struggle against its own people—namely, the rebels of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). As of early 2013, the current Syrian civil war has resulted in more than 60,000 deaths, 2.5 million internally displaced persons, and in ex- cess of 600,000 refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon.2 Presi- dent Bashar al-Assad has maintained his position in part because of his ability to control the skies and strike opposition targets—including ci- vilians.3 The tactics of the Al Quwwat al-Jawwiyah al Arabiya as- Souriya (Syrian air force) appear reminiscent of those in the Spanish Civil War, when bombers of the German Condor Legion struck the Basque market town of Guernica, Spain, on 26 April 1937.
    [Show full text]
  • US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War
    University of Connecticut OpenCommons@UConn Doctoral Dissertations University of Connecticut Graduate School 4-29-2014 U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: A Case Study Analysis of Presidential Decision Making Dennis N. Ricci University of Connecticut - Storrs, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations Recommended Citation Ricci, Dennis N., "U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: A Case Study Analysis of Presidential Decision Making" (2014). Doctoral Dissertations. 364. https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/364 U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: A Case-Study Analysis of Presidential Decision Making Dennis N. Ricci, Ph.D. University of Connecticut 2014 ABSTRACT The primary focus of this study is to explain presidential decision making, specifically whether to intervene militarily or not in a given circumstance in the Post-Cold War era. First, we define military intervention as the deployment of troops and weaponry in active military engagement (not peacekeeping). The cases in which we are interested involve the actual or intended use of force (“boots on the ground”), in other words, not drone attacks or missile strikes. Thus, we substantially reduce the number of potential cases by excluding several limited uses of force against Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan in the 1990s. Given the absence of a countervailing force or major power to serve as deterrent, such as the Soviet enemy in the Cold War period, there are potentially two types of military interventions: (1) humanitarian intervention designed to stop potential genocide and other atrocities and (2) the pre-emptive reaction to terrorism or other threats, such as under the Bush Doctrine.
    [Show full text]
  • The Specter of Sunni Military Mobilization in Lebanon
    The Specter of Sunni Military Mobilization in Lebanon Patricio Asfura-Heim • Chris Steinitz with contributions by Ghassan Schbley Cleared for public release DOP-2013-U-006349-Final November 2013 Strategic Studies is a division of CNA. This directorate conducts analyses of security policy, regional analyses, studies of political-military issues, and strategy and force assessments. CNA Strategic Studies is part of the glob- al community of strategic studies institutes and in fact collaborates with many of them. On the ground experience is a hallmark of our regional work. Our specialists combine in-country experience, language skills, and the use of local primary-source data to produce empirically based work. All of our analysts have advanced degrees, and virtually all have lived and worked abroad. Similarly, our strategists and military/naval operations experts have either active duty experience or have served as field analysts with operating Navy and Marine Corps commands. They are skilled at anticipating the “prob- lem after next” as well as determining measures of effectiveness to assess ongoing initiatives. A particular strength is bringing empirical methods to the evaluation of peace-time engagement and shaping activities. The Strategic Studies Division’s charter is global. In particular, our analysts have proven expertise in the follow- ing areas: The full range of Asian security issues The full range of Middle East related security issues, especially Iran and the Arabian Gulf Maritime strategy Insurgency and stabilization Future national security environment and forces European security issues, especially the Mediterranean littoral West Africa, especially the Gulf of Guinea Latin America The world’s most important navies Deterrence, arms control, missile defense and WMD proliferation The Strategic Studies Division is led by Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran-Backed Shiite Militias in Iraq
    Behnam Ben Taleblu September 26, 2018 Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Trade, and Nonproliferation at the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, thank you for inviting me to testify. It is a privilege to present my analysis alongside Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Mr. Michael Pregent, and Ambassador Barbara Leaf, all of whose work on Iraq and Iran, as well as their service to our country, I respect and admire. Today, I will focus my comments on Iran’s proxy strategy and militias while highlighting measures to counter these forces in Iraq. Designating Iran’s armed agents of influence can serve as a predicate for a new Iraq policy beyond the anti-Islamic State mission. It can also help implement the regional component of a more comprehensive Iran policy, which the current U.S. administration called for almost one year ago.1 Broader Iranian Motivations and Strategy Properly orienting the present discussion about Iranian militias in Iraq begins not in Baghdad but in Tehran. The radical Khomeinist interpretation of Shiite Islam underpinning the 1979 Islamic Revolution was something Iranian revolutionaries intended for export. Despite emphasis on the prioritization of “regime survival”2 in assessments of Iranian strategy, the regime’s ideology and desire to export the revolution remain important drivers of Iranian foreign and security policy. Indeed, surveying the chaos in the Middle East in 2015, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds-Force (IRGC-QF), Qassem Soleimni, boasted, “We are witnessing the export of the Islamic Revolution throughout the region.
    [Show full text]
  • What General Soleimani's Death Means for the Middle East
    What General Soleimani’s Death Means for the Middle East ALINA V. GUERRA n January 3, 2020, General Qasem Soleimani – commander of the Quds Force, a powerful branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – was assassinated in a OUS drone strike.1 Prior to his assassination, Soleimani’s significance as a military leader and prominent figure in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was largely underappreciated in the West. In this article, I first review Soleimani’s background and achievements to draw ‘lessons learned’ from his career and then I assess the implications of his assassination for Iran, the future of the Middle East, and US strategic interests in the region. Who was Qasem Soleimani? Qasem Soleimani was one of Iran’s leading military officers and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s top military advisor. Born and raised in a village in the Kerman Province near Afghanistan and Pakistan, Soleimani from a young age showed interest in the Arab world. Soleimani entered the IRGC after the 1979 revolution, becoming a new recruit trainer following graduation from basic training.2 During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), Soleimani’s unfaltering leadership earned him a fast track to the top of the IRGC. He became the commander of the Quds Force by 1997. Though Khamenei generally set term limits of ten years for top military and political positions, General Soleimani kept his military command for over twenty years until his death. As Khamenei’s right-hand military man, Soleimani was nearly indispensable in loyally propping up Iran’s theocratic regime and in attacking Iran’s enemies.3 In a 2018 speech, at a memorial service for Imad Mughniyeh – the former deputy leader of Lebanese Hezbollah who was assassinated by a CIA car bomb in 2008 – a fiery Soleimani warned that the “enemy knows that punishment for Imad’s blood is not firing a missile or a tit-for-tat assassination.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East
    CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and EDUCATION AND THE ARTS decisionmaking through research and analysis. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service INFRASTRUCTURE AND of the RAND Corporation. TRANSPORTATION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY Support RAND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Purchase this document TERRORISM AND Browse Reports & Bookstore HOMELAND SECURITY Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East F. Stephen Larrabee, Alireza Nader C O R P O R A T I O N NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East F.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Proxy War Against the United States and the Iraqi Government
    A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM A paratrooper from 1-501 Airborne escorts a rogue Jaish Al Mahdi rocket cell militant to the pickup zone after completing a precision raid to disrupt the cell on August 12. SGT. ERNEST HENRY / U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PHOTO DEFENSE OF DEPARTMENT / U.S. HENRY ERNEST SGT. May 2006 – August 20, 2007 Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government by KIMBERLY KAGAN Summary Iran, and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah, have been actively involved in supporting Shia militias and encouraging sectarian violence in Iraq since the invasion of 2003—and Iranian planning and preparation for that effort began as early as 2002. The precise purposes of this support are unclear and may have changed over time. But one thing is very clear: Iran has consistently supplied weapons, its own advisors, and Lebanese Hezbollah advisors to multiple resistance groups in Iraq, both Sunni and Shia, and has supported these groups as they have targeted Sunni Arabs, Coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and the Iraqi Government itself. Their infl uence runs from Kurdistan to Basrah, and Coalition sources report that by August 2007, Iranian-backed insurgents accounted for roughly half the attacks on Coalition forces, a dramatic change from previous periods that had seen the overwhelming majority of attacks coming from the Sunni Arab insurgency and al Qaeda. The Coalition has stepped-up its efforts to combat
    [Show full text]
  • Dropped Calls: the Extent of the Free Speech Guarantee to Wireless Communications Service Candice Shin
    Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal Volume 35 | Number 1 Article 5 1-1-2012 Dropped Calls: The Extent of the Free Speech Guarantee to Wireless Communications Service Candice Shin Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/ hastings_comm_ent_law_journal Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons Recommended Citation Candice Shin, Dropped Calls: The Extent of the Free Speech Guarantee to Wireless Communications Service, 35 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 227 (2012). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol35/iss1/5 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Dropped Calls: The Extent of the Free Speech Guarantee to Wireless Communications Service by CANDICE SHIH I. INTRODUCTION As President Hosni Mubarak scrambled to hold on to control of Egypt in the face of tens of thousands of protesters in January 2011, he made a most modern decision. “One by one, the lines of communication that connected Egypt to the 21st century shut down. Twitter, Facebook, and eventually all Internet access were cut off; text messaging became impossible, and then millions of mobile phones went silent across the country.”1 As the world knows, it was for naught; Mubarak’s retirement was announced on February 11, 2011.2 Egypt has not been alone in disabling such infrastructure during the Middle East uprisings known as the Arab Spring that began in late 2010.3 As the anti-government protests spread across the region, Libya cut off Internet almost entirely,4 Syria intermittently shut down 1.
    [Show full text]
  • The Contested Ethics of Mainstream Reporting of Terrorism in the Social Media Age
    The Contested Ethics of Mainstream Reporting of 249 Terrorism in the Social Media Age The Contested Ethics of Mainstream Reporting of Terrorism in the Social Media Age * SOYEON LIM I INTRODUCTION The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a movement that has continued to rattle news media in recent times. Since this article’s first draft was completed in July 2015, ISIL has claimed responsibility for more large scale, high profile terrorist attacks, such as those in Paris, Beirut, Tunis and Brussels. Each time, chilling headlines and even more chilling photographs of ISIL’s brutality appeared on the front pages of newspapers and their online counterparts. These recent terrorist attacks were preceded by a phase in which ISIL frequently released videos on the internet documenting its hostage executions. In September 2014, ISIL released a YouTube video displaying James Foley, an American freelance journalist, in an orange jumpsuit being beheaded with a knife (the Foley video).1 In three hours, the video was disseminated by over 2,000 ISIL militants using the Twitter hashtag “#NewMessageFromISIStoUS”.2 In February 2015, an ISIL video showed ISIL militants burning Jordanian fighter pilot Muadh al-Kasasbeh alive in a locked cage. He, too, wore an orange jumpsuit, only this time petrol-soaked. This extremely graphic YouTube video was also widely viewed and shared.3 This article studies the ethical dilemma that the news media faced in reporting on these videos.4 In each case, it was and had to be news that ISIL had beheaded a hostage. Yet the hostages were pawns in a terrorist visual propaganda game.5 Unlike its jihadist predecessors, particularly al-Qaeda, ISIL exploits social media with its graphic videos to not * BA/LLB(Hons).
    [Show full text]