The U.S. Response to Russia's Assertiveness

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The U.S. Response to Russia's Assertiveness CONGRESSIONAL PROGRAM The U.S. Response to Russia’s Assertiveness: Economic, Military and Diplomatic Challenges March 28-April 3, 2015 Vol. 30, No. 2 Dan Glickman Vice President, The Aspen Institute Executive Director, Congressional Program Washington, DC This project was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York, with supplemental support from the Democracy Fund, the Holthues Trust, the Ford Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Henry Luce Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Rockefeller Foundation. Copyright © 2015 by The Aspen Institute The Aspen Institute One Dupont Circle, nw Washington, DC 20036-1133 Published in the United States of America in 2015 by The Aspen Institute All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 0-89843-624-9 Pub #15/13 2034/CP/BK Table of Contents Rapporteur’s Summary ..................................................................1 Robert Legvold An Overview of the U.S.-Russia Relationship: Challenges, Dangers and Opportunities ................13 John Beyrle Russia and the World Order .............................................................17 Dmitri Trenin The Ukraine Crisis and the West’s Response: Diplomatic, Economic and Military Options ............21 Steven Pifer The Moment of Truth: Ukraine has a Historic Chance to Transform, if it Survives the War on the Eastern Front.................................................27 Vitaly Sych Who Really Owns Russia?...............................................................31 Robert Coalson interview with Alena Ledeneva Sistema, Power Network and Informal Governance in Putin’s Russia..............................35 Alena Ledeneva American Perceptions and the Realities of Russia’s Behavior.....................................41 Sergei Rogov The Geopolitics of European Security and Cooperation: The Consequences of US-Russia Tension.......49 Matthew Rojansky A New Agenda for Russian Foreign Policy ..................................................57 Andrei Kortunov Conference Participants ................................................................63 Conference Agenda....................................................................65 Rapporteur’s Summary Robert Legvold Marshall D. Shulman Professor Emeritus Columbia University The Aspen Institute Congressional Program assem- Russia, and, second, if we set about designing U.S. bled 16 congressmen and women and five senators, policy toward Russia without listening to the insights along with scholars from the United States, Europe, of thoughtful Russians, the results will be less than and Russia, in Berlin from March 28-April 3, 2015 optimal. He noted what he called “the burden of to reflect on the topic: The U.S. Response to Russia’s historical memory,” and the degree to which past Assertiveness: Economic, Military, and Diplomatic images of the Soviet Union continue to shape—or Challenges. The seminar began by exploring the misshape—our view of today’s Russia. Over nearly deteriorated state of U.S.-Russian relations and the two-hundred years of history, he stressed, the two factors that had brought this about. Participants countries have never gone to war against one another; probed more deeply a key element in the deteriora- on the contrary, in the two prior centuries they have tion, the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, developments in been wartime allies three times. Russia as well as the internal and external forces shap- His primary point, however, focused on the cycli- ing Russian foreign policy. In the final session they cal nature of U.S.-Russia relations over the years broadened their perspective and considered possible since the end of the Cold War—the tendency of paths forward. the relationship to seesaw between periods of hope and constructive interaction with those of tension Day One and deterioration—only this time, the “downturn has a different feel.” It does for three reasons: First, Because the seminar’s purpose was not simply to because Putin’s Russia has set about redefining the detail the trouble the relationship was in, but rather country’s identity on fundamentally anti-Western to stand back and weigh the basic elements at work, terms. Second, because Russia’s now vastly larger the opening session focused on the impulses driv- economic engagement with the EU and the United ing Russian policy, the depth and likely duration of States yields the West leverage but poses the delicate the crisis in U.S.-Russian relations, and the role of choice between “calibrated sanctions designed to NATO, the European Union (EU), and third par- influence Russia’s policy choices on the one hand, ties such as China. John Beyrle, former ambassador and the strategic benefit of Russia’s continued inte- to Russia, launched the discussion with reflections gration into a rules-based global economic order on on the U.S.-Russian relationship over time. These the other.” And, third, the degree to which Russians included two personal axioms: one should approach are now “integrated into the world around them” the subject with humility, because we probably only places real limits on how far the Russian leadership know 20 percent of what we need to know about can go in divorcing the country from a global setting 1 in which Western influence remains key. Hence, he in the course of events. Did the United States, one concluded, it is very much in U.S. interest to “stay member asked, fail to understand the chaos likely to engaged” with Russia, knowing that a sizable portion follow the collapse of an empire like the Soviet Union of its people want to have “constructive, positive ties and do too little to guard against its consequences, with the United States and Europe.” such as the distorted privatization process, corrup- Dmitri Trenin, the director of the Carnegie Moscow tion, and the rise of the oligarchs. That, responded a Center, followed with a still more fundamental assess- participant who had been close to policy-making over ment. We are where we are, he argued, because over these years, was not so much the problem. The chaos the post-Cold War years three attempts to integrate was in fact less than might have been expected, and Russia with the West failed, and that option is now U.S. policy was focused on keeping it to a minimum, gone. Whether it could ever have worked may be while promoting Russia’s transition to democracy questioned—and surely it would not have, if it meant and a market economy. The difficulty stems from the subordinating Russia to U.S. leadership. Be that as it sad reality that, whatever have been U.S. intentions, may, “having failed to find a place for itself within an the popular impression in Russia is the opposite. Too expanded West,” Russia “is now working to expand many Russians believe that the change we want for the influence of the non-West.” Its strategic posture is Russia is meant to harm, even destroy the country. more than ever intent on preserving an independent It is important that somehow this impression be cor- hand and jealously defending national sovereignty. rected, difficult as that may be to do. In sum, Putin’s Russia resists the idea of a single state If anything, one European argued, U.S. respon- dominating the international scene, particularly if it sibility lay in yielding too much to the Russian side mistrusts its purposes, as it does the United States’, by not pressing ahead on Georgian membership in expects to have a veto over key developments affecting NATO, by backing away from European missile its interests, and “reserves the right to do anything” the defense as originally planned, and, more recently, by United States permits to itself. eschewing the prospect of deploying nuclear weapons The current crisis in U.S.-Russian relations, he in new NATO-member states. Concessions, he said, warned, would be long-lasting and with large conse- are the wrong way to build a cooperative relationship quences. While different from the Cold War, it car- with Russia. It was a line of argument that echoed ries considerable risks. There will be “no Berlin Wall more softly in comments of congressional participants and no Iron Curtain,” he predicted, but, because of who suggested that the United States had been most the asymmetry of power, the complete “absence of successful in dealing with Russia when it had adopted mutual respect,” the intensified economic and infor- a firm line and stuck to it. mation warfare, and the failure of strategic vision on Other congressional participants, struggling with either side, the chance that any escalation of the crisis the role that misunderstanding on both sides had in Ukraine could get out of hand is alarmingly great. played in producing the current state of affairs, Trenin’s ultimate point, however, focused on stressed the need to restore dialogue where possible, Russia itself. If the country copes successfully with including the re-establishment of inter-parliamentary the enormous pressures it is now under, because of contacts. Beyond this, one member asked whether it the collapse of oil prices, Western sanctions, and its might not be useful to organize a visit to Russia by a “semi-isolation,” it will emerge with a stronger hand special bicameral congressional delegation. Coming and in a position to demand a more accommodat- at the problem from another direction, a second ing U.S. response. If not, the system could collapse congressional participant hoped that the importance and the country could come undone. Thus, for both that Beyrle attached to Russian society’s increased Russia and the West, it is crucial that calm heads integration with the West through education, travel, prevail and great care be taken to ensure that the con- and the internet might significantly reduce the gap, frontation remain contained. but wondered whether it would be so. A number of congressional participants probed the Much of the discussion, however, centered on the different ways U.S. policy might have played a role struggle participants were having trying to understand 2 the nature of the challenge that Russia represented. and China.
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