The Global Spread of Cyber Forces, 2000–2018
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Report Criminal Law in the Face of Cyberattacks
APRIL 2021 REPORT CRIMINAL LAW IN THE FACE OF CYBERATTACKS Working group chaired by Bernard Spitz, President of the International and Europe Division of MEDEF, former President of the French Insurance Federation (FFA) General secretary: Valérie Lafarge-Sarkozy, Lawyer, Partner with the law firm Altana ON I SS I AD HOC COMM CRIMINAL LAW IN THE FACE OF CYBERATTACKS CRIMINAL LAW IN THE FACE OF CYBERATTACKS CLUB DES JURISTES REPORT Ad hoc commission APRIL 2021 4, rue de la Planche 75007 Paris Phone : 01 53 63 40 04 www.leclubdesjuristes.com FIND US ON 2 PREFACE n the shadow of the global health crisis that has held the world in its grip since 2020, episodes of cyberattacks have multiplied. We should be careful not to see this as mere coincidence, an unexpected combination of calamities that unleash themselves in Ia relentless series bearing no relation to one another. On the contrary, the major disruptions or transitions caused in our societies by the Covid-19 pandemic have been conducive to the growth of offences which, though to varying degrees rooted in digital, are also symptoms of contemporary vulnerabilities. The vulnerability of some will have been the psychological breeding ground for digital offences committed during the health crisis. In August 2020, the Secretary-General of Interpol warned of the increase in cyberattacks that had occurred a few months before, attacks “exploiting the fear and uncertainty caused by the unstable economic and social situation brought about by Covid-19”. People anxious about the disease, undermined by loneliness, made vulnerable by their distress – victims of a particular vulnerability, those recurrent figures in contemporary criminal law – are the chosen victims of those who excel at taking advantage of the credulity of others. -
Creating a Total Army Cyber Force: How to Integrate the Reserve Component Into the Cyber Fight
No. 103W SEPTEMBER 2014 Creating a Total Army Cyber Force: How to Integrate the Reserve Component into the Cyber Fight Christopher R. Quick Creating a Total Army Cyber Force: How to Integrate the Reserve Component into the Cyber Fight by Christopher R. Quick The Institute of Land Warfare ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AN INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER The purpose of the Institute of Land Warfare is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of ILW’s editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the paper but does suggest that the Association believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues. LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. 103W, September 2014 Creating a Total Army Cyber Force: How to Integrate the Reserve Component into the Cyber Fight by Christopher R. Quick Lieutenant Colonel Christopher R. Quick is currently the J39 Information Operations Branch Chief for Special Operations Command Forward–West Africa in Kelly Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany. He previously served as the Information Operations Branch Chief and Director of Communication Synchronization for U.S. Army Cyber Command/Second Army at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. -
University of Azuay
UNIVERSITY OF AZUAY FACULTY OF LAW SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Topic: EVALUATION OF ECUADORIAN PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS: MISSION IN HAITI (MINUSTAH): 2004 - 2015 INVESTIGATION PROJECT TO OBTAIN THE BACHELOR DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, BILINGUAL MENTION IN FOREIGN TRADE AUTHOR: JENNYFER RAMON THESIS DIRECTOR: MST. ANA MARÍA BUSTOS CUENCA, ECUADOR 1 I would like to express my gratitude to God, to my family for their love, support, and generosity. To my friends Paola, Priscila, Daniela and Katheryn, to the University of Azuay. To all my teachers who have made this work possible, specially to Mst. Ana Maria Bustos who has guided me expertly and patiently during the process of studying this career. 2 I would like to dedicate this work to my family, my dad Rodrigo (my hero); my mom Blanquita (my role model) and, my sisters who have always wondered why I have to study. With this work, I show them that a person never knows enough to stop learning, and also that people can get everything they want only with determination and a lot of effort. 3 Abstract Haiti, has always been present in the international sphere in particular because of the numerous humanitarian aid from which it has benefited for its cause, the consequences of natural disasters and, among other things, the internal situations that have prevented this Caribbean country from re-emerging its agonizing situation This work aims to highlight the contributions of the Peace Missions commanded by the United Nations, and their impact to restore order and international security. In turn, numerical data are also presented that allow us to verify the Ecuadorian participation to achieve the aforementioned purpose. -
Trend Analysis the Israeli Unit 8200 an OSINT-Based Study CSS
CSS CYBER DEFENSE PROJECT Trend Analysis The Israeli Unit 8200 An OSINT-based study Zürich, December 2019 Risk and Resilience Team Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study Author: Sean Cordey © 2019 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich Contact: Center for Security Studies Haldeneggsteig 4 ETH Zurich CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland Tel.: +41-44-632 40 25 [email protected] www.css.ethz.ch Analysis prepared by: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich ETH-CSS project management: Tim Prior, Head of the Risk and Resilience Research Group, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Deputy Head for Research and Teaching; Andreas Wenger, Director of the CSS Disclaimer: The opinions presented in this study exclusively reflect the authors’ views. Please cite as: Cordey, S. (2019). Trend Analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study. Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich. 1 Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study . Table of Contents 1 Introduction 4 2 Historical Background 5 2.1 Pre-independence intelligence units 5 2.2 Post-independence unit: former capabilities, missions, mandate and techniques 5 2.3 The Yom Kippur War and its consequences 6 3 Operational Background 8 3.1 Unit mandate, activities and capabilities 8 3.2 Attributed and alleged operations 8 3.3 International efforts and cooperation 9 4 Organizational and Cultural Background 10 4.1 Organizational structure 10 Structure and sub-units 10 Infrastructure 11 4.2 Selection and training process 12 Attractiveness and motivation 12 Screening process 12 Selection process 13 Training process 13 Service, reserve and alumni 14 4.3 Internal culture 14 5 Discussion and Analysis 16 5.1 Strengths 16 5.2 Weaknesses 17 6 Conclusion and Recommendations 18 7 Glossary 20 8 Abbreviations 20 9 Bibliography 21 2 Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study selection tests comprise a psychometric test, rigorous Executive Summary interviews, and an education/skills test. -
Cyber Mission Analysis
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Cyber Mission Analysis Mission Analysis for Cyber Operations of Department of Defense Submitted in compliance with the reporting requirement contained in the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act section 933(d), Public Law 113-66 Preparation of this study/report cost the Department of Defense approximately $587,000 for the 2014 Fiscal Year. This includes $15,000 in expenses and $572,000 in DoD labor Generated on 2014 August 21 RefID: E-0CD45F6 1 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table of Contents I. Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... 4 II. Current State .......................................................................................................................... 6 Threat Landscape ............................................................................................................. 6 Policies, Oversight, and Relationships ............................................................................. 6 Cyber Missions ................................................................................................................ 8 Operational Command & Control (C2) ......................................................................... 10 Resilience, Mission Assurance, and Continuity of Operations...................................... 10 Recruitment, Retention, Management, Equipping, and Training the Force .................. 10 III. Current -
Secrecy and Human Capital Management in US NSA and Israel Unit 8200
LOOSE LIPS BUILD SHIPS? Secrecy and Human Capital Management in US NSA and Israel Unit 8200 A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE INTERSCHOOL HONORS PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION FREEMAN SPOGLI INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES STANFORD UNIVERSITY By: Lisa Catherine Wallace June 2014 Advisors: Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar Colonel Joseph Felter Abstract ! How do intelligence organizations attract and make use of top talent? This paper approaches this question through a comparative case study of the labor ecosystems surrounding both the US’ National Security Agency and IDF’s signals intelligence branch, Unit 8200. As the cyber realm continues to assume a growing role in modern national security threat environments, intelligence organizations must grow and adapt to accommodate these new objectives. This inevitably involves the question of how to attract and make use of top talent in order to solve difficult and highly technical national security problems. Israel and the United States share similar national security interests, and both possess burgeoning and impressive high-technology clusters. This paper claims that a growing, public network of Unit 8200 and other Intelligence Corps alumni is extant in Israel’s high-technology sector. Furthermore, affiliation with Unit 8200 has a positive signaling and social capital value. By contrast, this paper argues that alumni from the NSA do not possess as strong of a signaling or social capital value in the US. This paper argues that the NSA is hindered by the ontology, secrecy, and culture of the organization itself, as well as US public understanding of national security organizations and cyber threats. -
Location, Event&Q
# from what/ where which how why who for MOBILE versi on click here when who who where when index source "location, event" "phys, pol, med, doc" detail physical detail political name "9/11 Truth Interactive Spreadsheet Click on dow n arrow to sort / filter, click again to undo." Top 100 / compilations entity entity detail country / state date Item .. right-click on li nk to open in new tab 1 "Francis, Stephen NFU" WTC physical Controlled demolition Explosive experts "Overwhelming evidence indicates that a combination of n uclear, thermitic and conventional explosives were used in a controlled demoliti on of the WTC on 9/11. Nanothermite contributed but does not have sufficient det onation velocity to pulverize the WTC into dust. Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth is leading gatekeeper trying to deflect Israel's role. See Cozen O'Connor 9/11 lawsuit." pic "9/11 Truth, anti-Zionists" Engineers / Scie ntists "U.S., Israel, SA, Britain" 2 "Francis, Stephen NFU" "WTC, Pentagon, PA" political False flag Cabal "The cabal: U.S., Britain, Saudi Arabia and Israel execu ted the 9/11 false flag attack in order to usher in a new 'war on terror' along with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and fullfil the PNAC's 'Full Spectrum Dominan ce' of the Middle East and its resources ... all have roots that go back to Zion ist / Nazi Germany, the Cold War ... 9/11 was a planned step." lnk Intel ag encies "Cabal: US, UK, Israel & SA" Mossad / Sayeret Matkal "U.S., Israel, S A, Britain" 3 "Fox, Donald" WTC 1-2 physical "Mini Neutron, Fissionless Fusio n" Controlled demolition "VeteransToday: Fox, Kuehn, Prager, Vike n,Ward, Cimono & Fetzer on mini neutron bombs discuss all major WTC theories micr o nuke (neutron) most promising comparatively low blast effects, a quick blast o f radiation that doesn't linger, a series of shape charged mini-neutron bombs we re detonated from top to bottom to simulate a free fall collapse. -
Perspectives on Building a Cyber Force Structure
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or parts of 163 this work for internal use within NATO and for personal or Conference on Cyber Conflict educational use not done for profit or commercial purpose Proceedings 2010 is granted providing that copies bear this notice and a full C. Czosseck and K. Podins (Eds.) citation on the first page. Any other reproduction or trans- CCD COE Publications, 2010, Tallinn, Estonia. mission requires prior written permission. PERSPECTIVES ON BUILDING A CYBER FORCE STRUCTURE Stuart STARRa,1, Daniel KUEHLb,2, Terry PUDASc,3 aCenter for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), Washington, DC, USA biCollege of the NDU. Washington, DC, USA cCTNSP, NDU, Washington, DC, USA Abstract: This paper explores the US’s cyber force structure with special em- phasis on the cyber workforce. To achieve that goal, this paper addresses several issues: it characterizes the nature of the cyber security problem; it draws on insights from senior decision-makers to identify cyber force struc- ture needs; it characterizes current capabilities by summarizing the key ini- tiatives that are being pursued by the US Services and key joint activities; and it identifies a spectrum of actions to mitigate shortfalls in the existing cyber forces structure (i.e. education; higher education and recruitment; cer- tification, retention, professional development, and workforce management; exercises; and security clearance requirements). The paper concludes by iden- tifying actions that NATO might pursue to improve its cyber force structure (e.g. conduct realistic, stressful exercises) and by identifying residual issues to address (e.g. career progression; value of employing “patriotic hackers”). -
National Security Agency
Coordinates: 39°6′32″N 76°46′17″W National Security Agency The National Security Agency (NSA) is a national-level intelligence agency of the United National Security Agency States Department of Defense, under the authority of the Director of National Intelligence. The NSA is responsible for global monitoring, collection, and processing of information and data for foreign and domestic intelligence and counterintelligence purposes, specializing in a discipline known as signals intelligence (SIGINT). The NSA is also tasked with the protection of U.S. communications networks and information systems.[8][9] The NSA relies on a variety of measures to accomplish its Seal of the National Security Agency mission, the majority of which are clandestine.[10] Originating as a unit to decipher coded communications in World War II, it was officially formed as the NSA by President Harry S. Truman in 1952. Since then, it has become the largest of the U.S. intelligence organizations in terms of Flag of the National Security Agency personnel and budget.[6][11] The NSA currently conducts worldwide mass data collection and has been known to physically bug electronic systems as one method to this end.[12] The NSA is also alleged to have been behind such attack software as Stuxnet, which severely damaged Iran's nuclear program.[13][14] The NSA, alongside the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), maintains a physical presence in many countries across the globe; the CIA/NSA joint Special Collection Service (a NSA Headquarters, Fort Meade, Maryland highly classified intelligence team) inserts eavesdropping devices in high value targets (such Agency overview as presidential palaces or embassies). -
Crisis on Impact: Responding to Cyber Attacks on Critical Information Infrastructures, 30 J
The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law Volume 30 Issue 1 2013 Article 3 2013 Crisis on Impact: Responding to Cyber Attacks on Critical Information Infrastructures, 30 J. Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy L. 31 (2013) Eugenia Georgiades William Caelli Sharon Christensen W.D. Duncan Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl Part of the Computer Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons Recommended Citation Eugenia Georgiades, William Caelli, Sharon Christensen & W.D. Duncan, Crisis on Impact: Responding to Cyber Attacks on Critical Information Infrastructures, 30 J. Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy L. 31 (2013) https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl/vol30/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CRISIS ON IMPACT: RESPONDING TO CYBER ATTACKS ON CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURES EUGENIA GEORGIADES, WILLIAM J. CAELLI, SHARON CHRISTENSEN, & W.D. DUNCAN* ABSTRACT In the developing digital economy, the notion of traditional attack on enterprises of national significance or interest has transcended into different modes of electronic attack, surpassing accepted traditional forms of physical attack upon a target. The terrorist attacks that took place in the United States on September 11, 2001 demonstrated the physical devastation that could occur if any nation were the target of a large-scale terrorist attack. -
S Black Agents Bang-And-Burner 14 “Bang and Burn” Jobs Involve Sabotage, Usually Through Demolitions Or Arson
night’'s black agents Bang-and-Burner 14 “Bang and burn” jobs involve sabotage, usually through demolitions or arson. This skill set translates with unnerving ease to EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) and arson investigation. Bang- and-burners set and disarm everything from booby traps to car bombs to ship- scuttling charges. Specific Examples: IRA or ETA bomb- builder, Albanian mafia arsonist, Polish Army combat engineer, Special Branch bomb disposal expert. INVESTIGATIVE ABILITIES: Architecture 2, Chemistry 2, Criminology 1, Intimidation 1 GENERAL ABILITIES: Conceal 4, Explosive Devices 8, Infiltration 2, Mechanics 4 Black Bagger A “black bag job” is FBI slang for a breaking-and-entry intrusion, usually intended to copy (or steal) documents or plant bugs or wiretaps. British spies often call break-in artists “box men,” a term originating in Victorian criminal slang. By any name, it’s burglary. Specific Examples: Cat burglar in Naples, Bulgarian NIS officer INVESTIGATIVE ABILITIES: on the Riviera, Bundespolizei handling “renditions” for the CIA. Bureaucracy 1, Forgery 4, museum security specialist, INVESTIGATIVE ABILITIES: Bureaucracy Photography 1 DGSE or Mossad covert entry 2, Cop Talk 1, Criminology Alternates: Cryptography specialist, NSA contractor. 2, Urban Survival 1 GENERAL ABILITIES: Cover 6, INVESTIGATIVE ABILITIES: Data Alternates: Chemistry, Data Digital Intrusion 4, Disguise 2, Recovery 1, Electronic Surveillance 2, Recovery, Electronic Surveillance, Infiltration 4, Mechanics 2 Photography 2, Streetwise 1 Notice, Streetwise Alternates: Architecture, Notice GENERAL ABILITIES: Conceal 6, Cuckoo GENERAL ABILITIES: Conceal 2, Digital Disguise 2, Driving 4, Explosive The cuckoo lays its eggs in another bird’s Intrusion 2, Filch 6, Infiltration 8 Devices 2, Infiltration 2, Stability 2 nest, convincing the stranger to raise its Alternates: Preparedness Alternates: Digital Intrusion chicks. -
Ecuador Last Updated: April 2020
Ecuador Last Updated: April 2020 CYBERSECURITY POLICY Strategy Documents National Plan for Electronic Governance 2018-2021 (Plan Nacional de Gobierno Electrónico 2018 - 2021) Ministry of Telecommunications and the Information Society (Ministerio de Telecomunicaciones y de la Sociedad de la Información) Proposed initiatives for strengthening cybersecurity: Issue standardized cybersecurity model for the Central Public Administration (APC); Promote the strengthening of the CERT currently managed by ARCOTEL; Train APC officials in the implementation of the cybersecurity model; and Disseminate the benefits of having this model to citizens. Source October 2017 STRUCTURE National Centre or Responsible Agency Ministry of Telecommunications and the Information Society (Ministerio de Telecomunicaciones y de la Sociedad de la Información) Govement of Ecuador Contributes to the security of telecommunications networks through national and international coordination of technical tasks by EcuCERT. Source Key Positions Minister of Telecommunications and the Information Society Source Director de Ciberdefensa, Fuerzas Armadas Dedicated Agencies and Departments Comando de Ciberdefensa (Cyber Defense Command) Armed Forces of Ecuador Responsible for the methodologic implementation of the Armed Forces' strategic capcity in cyber defense, with special attention to the ability to determine the dangers to critical infrastructures, and the development of operations in cyberspace for defence. Source 2 November 2014 Centro de Operaciones Estratégico Technológico (Strategic