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Beyond the Build How the Component Commands Support the U.S U.S. Navy’s fourth Mobile User Objective System communications satellite will bring advanced, new global communications capabilities to mobile military forces (Courtesy United Launch Alliance/U.S. Navy) Beyond the Build How the Component Commands Support the U.S. Cyber Command Vision Compiled by the U.S. Cyber Command Combined Action Group etworked technology is trans- went largely unrecognized. Today, works as a subordinate, unified com- forming society. That transfor- cyberspace ranks as its own warfighting mand under U.S. Strategic Command N mation has come with signifi- domain—one that intersects the four (USSTRATCOM) to conduct the cant change to war and the military natural domains. full scope of cyberspace operations. art. Until recently, cyber considerations Cyberspace operations demand un- These have three distinct mission areas: rarely extended beyond the comput- precedented degrees of collaboration, to secure, operate, and defend the ers and cables that supported kinetic which the U.S. Government must ap- Department of Defense Information warfighting functions. The natural proach holistically—leveraging resources Network (DODIN); to provide combat- domains—land, sea, air, and space— and expertise from industry, academia, ant command support; and to defend dominated the planning and conduct of and state/local governments, as well the nation against strategic cyber attack. operations, while the risks entailed in as allied and coalition partners. U.S. USCYBERCOM is building the cyber- using cyberspace for military purposes Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) space operations force of tomorrow, and 86 Commentary / Beyond the Build JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 looking beyond that build to how the Motivated by Mission operate Navy spacecraft, oversee infor- command will operate with mission part- Each of the Service components con- mation operations, coordinate Navy ners in this dynamic and contested space. tributes to USCYBERCOM missions by electronic warfare, and plan and direct USCYBERCOM and its components providing an array of cyber forces and operations under USCYBERCOM. act to help the joint force operate globally capabilities in order to defend DOD The Coast Guard focuses on three with speed, flexibility, and persistence. Information Networks, bolster the strategic priorities in the cyber domain: USCYBERCOM headquarters focuses capabilities of combatant commands, defending cyberspace, enabling op- on defining and achieving strategic objec- and strengthen our nation’s ability erations, and protecting infrastructure. tives and has delegated operational-level to withstand and respond to cyber CGCYBER ensures the security and cyber mission areas to three types of attacks of significant consequence. Each resiliency of Coast Guard information headquarters. The first of these is the component also fulfills Service-specific technology systems and networks to Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), requirements in cyberspace, which are ensure the full scope of Coast Guard ca- which defends the United States and correlated with and unique to the indi- pabilities. Maritime critical infrastructure its interests against strategic cyber at- vidual Service’s role in the domain of and the Maritime Transportation System tacks. The second type of headquarters land, sea, air, or space. (MTS) are vital to our economy, national comprises four distinct joint force head- ARCYBER’s three priorities are to security, and national defense. The quarters (JFHQs) in addition to Coast operationalize cyberspace operations to MTS includes ocean carriers, coastwise Guard Cyber Command (CGCYBER) support combatant and Army commands shipping along our shores, the Western to support the geographic and functional at echelon; pursue a more defensible rivers and Great Lakes, and the Nation’s combatant commands across the globe. network; and organize, man, train, and ports and terminals. Cyber systems not The standup of a JFHQ-Cyber by each equip ready cyber forces. These priorities only enable the MTS to operate with of the USCYBERCOM Service cyber strengthen both joint and Army cyber unprecedented speed and efficiency, components—Army Cyber Command capabilities, enable ground forces to but also create potential vulnerabilities. (ARCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command continue their dominance in the land This technology is inextricably linked (FLTCYBER), Marine Corps Cyberspace domain, and support the Army’s top goal with all aspects of Coast Guard opera- Command (MARFORCYBER), and of readiness to fulfill its primary mission tions. As the maritime transportation Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER)—con- to win in ground combat. ARCYBER Sector Specific Agency (as defined by the stitutes a vital first step to integrating supports Army tactical forces and has National Infrastructure Protection Plan), cyberspace operations to deliver effects made delivering cyberspace operations the Coast Guard provides the unity of ef- in support of combatant commanders. capabilities to Army corps and below fort required to protect maritime critical The third type of JFHQs and newest a major focus. The integration of net- infrastructure from attacks, accidents, and of USCYBERCOM’s operational com- works, systems, and data has delivered disasters. mands, JFHQ-DODIN, provides unity unprecedented awareness and warfight- Along similar lines, MARFORCYBER of command and unity of effort to secure, ing capability to the tactical edge—to the is shaping the tools, doctrine, processes, operate, and defend the DODIN. point that it is now a dependency, which and capabilities to ensure Marine cyber Each of these components and its by extension makes it a vulnerability that mission teams provide effective support respective joint force headquarters have a must be protected. to USCYBERCOM and the joint force, vital role to play as we finish building the FLTCYBER’s missions align to while also ensuring Marine Air Ground Cyber Mission Force (CMF) and work those of USCYBERCOM. They are to Task Forces (MAGTFs) achieve victory together to bring the USCYBERCOM operate Navy networks as a warfighting on the modern battlefield. AFCYBER’s Vision to fruition. The main elements of platform, produce signals intelligence, mission statement—“Fly, Fight and Win this vision serve to organize and guide deliver warfighting effects through cy- In, Through, and From Cyberspace”— their efforts (see the interview with berspace, create shared cyber situational captures a breadth of responsibilities to Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, in this awareness, and establish and mature the include extending cyber capabilities to edition of Joint Force Quarterly). JFQ Navy’s cyber mission forces. FLTCYBER the tactical edge of the battlefield. asked each of the component commands conducts operations in and through cy- Each Service, as part of the broader to summarize its efforts on behalf of the berspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, joint force team, is responsible for pro- collective enterprise toward implement- and space to ensure Navy and joint free- tecting its Service-specific cyber network ing the vision. This article represents a dom of action and decision superiority (for example, LandWarNet, AFNET, compendium of these contributions, while denying the same to the adversary. Marine Corps Enterprise Network, Navy organized around the main elements of Achieving this requires FLTCYBER to Marine Corps Intranet) to ensure its the vision’s intent. operate and defend the Navy’s networks ability to detect, mitigate, and defeat and shore-to-ship communications in- advanced persistent threats capable of cluding Nuclear Command and Control compromising the network and DODIN Communications (NC3), plan for and itself. The scale of this mission cannot JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. Cyber Command Combined Action Group 87 U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley watches officers from Army Cyber Institute demonstrate Cyber Capability Rifle during 2015 Association of the U.S. Army annual meeting, Washington, DC (U.S. Army/Chuck Burden) be overstated. The Navy Marine Corps the unity of effort for the operation and operating across the spectrum of conflict Intranet, for instance, consists of more defense of the entire DOD information in cyberspace, with appreciation for the than 500,000 end user devices, approxi- environment. effects that cyberspace operations have on mately 75,000 networked devices, and With its standup in 2010, the physical warfighting domains. nearly 45,000 applications and systems USCYBERCOM rapidly focused on The CNMF is a joint force of military across three security enclaves. providing mission assurance for the and civilian members from the Army, Each Service cyber component DOD information network, deterring or Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Coast focuses on configuring and operating defeating strategic threats to U.S. inter- Guard, and Intelligence Community. It layered defense-in-depth capabilities to ests and infrastructure, and supporting will comprise 39 teams and nearly 2,000 prevent malicious actors from gaining joint force commander objectives. While personnel spread over four locations. The access to Service-specific networks. This responding to evolving threats, a new force consists of three types of maneuver is an enterprise-wide effort in which the need surfaced for an agile force ready to elements, each with a unique and speci- components work in collaboration with engage adversaries in the tactical cyber fied mission. National Cyber Protection their parent Services, USCYBERCOM, fight when directed by the President. Teams
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