No. 20-927 In the Supreme Court of the United States UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER v. DUSTIN JOHN HIGGS (CAPITAL CASE) ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT JEFFREY B. WALL Acting Solicitor General Counsel of Record DAVID P. BURNS Acting Assistant Attorney General HASHIM M. MOOPPAN Counselor to the Solicitor General CHRISTOPHER G. MICHEL BENJAMIN W. SNYDER Assistants to the Solicitor General JEFFREY A. HALL ELLEN E. NAZMY Attorneys Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
[email protected] (202) 514-2217 QUESTION PRESENTED In 2001, the United States District Court for the Dis- trict of Maryland imposed on respondent Dustin John Higgs nine sentences of death based on respondent’s convictions for the kidnapping and murder of three women on federal land beside the Baltimore-Washington Parkway. Under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (FDPA), 18 U.S.C. 3591 et seq., “[w]hen the sentence is to be implemented,” a United States marshal “shall su- pervise implementation of the sentence in the manner prescribed by the law of the State in which the sentence is imposed. If the law of the State does not provide for the implementation of a sentence of death, the court shall designate another State” as an alternate. 18 U.S.C. 3596(a). At the time of respondent’s sentencing, the State of Maryland had death-penalty laws, and so his criminal judgment incorporated the FDPA but did not designate an alternate State.