Ous 1 Daniel B. Ous Dr. Bouilly Military History Competition
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Ous 1 Daniel B. Ous Dr. Bouilly Military History Competition January 6, 2003 The Battle ofValverde Surrounded by the fog of war, Confederate President Jefferson Davis faced mounting challenges to feed and equip his young army. The prospect ofuntapped mineral reserves in the Southwest served as a long shot worthy of speculation. In June 1861, Henry H. Sibley emerged with a grandiose plan that sounded too good to be true. The former Union Army Major impressed the Rebel high command with a campaign to capture the silver and gold in Colorado and California followed by seizing the strategically important West coast (Niderost 11). President Davis did not consider the Southwest an immediate threat compared to the chaos in Richmond and the Southeast. Davis also did not want to invest a lot oftime checking out the character ofSibley or the details ofthe operation, both of which would prove to be a mistake. Davis authorized Sibley the rank ofbrigadier general and sent him to San Antonio to gather a force ofabout 3,500 Texans under the Confederate flag and invade the New Mexico Territory as the first phase ofthe campaign (Kliger 9). Meanwhile, the Union forces in the New Mexico Territory faced serious problems. General Sibley's brother-in-law, Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, took command ofthe New Mexico Department ofthe U.S. Army in June of 1861. A Mexican War hero and seasoned frontier officer, Canby's mission to protect the Southwest took a back seat to main Civil War effort. The War Department reassigned large numbers ofhis enlisted soldiers to the Eastern Theater and Ous2 many of his officers resigned to join the Confederacy. The sentiment of the citizens ofthe Southern New Mexico Territory was generally pro-Confederate (Niderhost 12). Colonel Canby's dilemma was no secret to the Confederate forces. While General Sibley was building his force in San Antonio, a group ofover 500 rebels ofthe 2nd Texas Mounted Rifles led by Lieutenant Colonel John R. Baylor moved to seize Fort Bliss and probe north up the Rio Grande Valley in July of 1861. While moving north, Baylor attacked Fort Fillmore, the southern Union stronghold ofthe Rio Grande Valley. The Union commander ofFort Fillmore, Major Isaac Lynde, proved to be a bumbling idiot by burning the fort and retreating north in the middle ofJuly with insufficient water. Lynde and his command ofabout 500 soldiers surrendered shortly afterward. Baylor stopped his advance in the town ofMesilla and set up a headquarters to wait for the main invasion force. The loss ofmen and supplies devastated Canby (Arneson 6). News of the Confederate victory fueled the recruiting drive in San Antonio. In August of 1861, General Sibley's popularity reached its peak as over 3,500 good quality recruits formed the Sibley Brigade. However, unknown to the recruits, Sibley's battle plan was loaded with outrageous assumptions that would erode his popularity in short order. On the surface, General Sibley appeared to have the perfect qualifications to lead the invasion. Like Canby, Sibley was a Mexican War hero and spent a lot oftime on the frontier maintaining peace. He skillfully convinced his followers that he had a good understanding of the terrain and people ofthe Southwest. Sibley was backed by the Confederate label in name only. He was responsible for gathering supplies and equipment for the campaign. His recruits were required to have personal weapons, ammunition, and horses. Standard uniforms across the board for all soldiers would not be feasible. Supplies appropriated from a variety ofsources met with limited success. Equipment Ous3 included a battery of 12 pounder howitzers. General Sibley had no desire to develop a realistic logistical plan to support his operation. Instead, he assured his men they could live offthe land as they conquered the Southwest. Sibley believed captured Union equipment, Mexican sympathizers, and supporters ofthe Rebel cause would fuel the war effort. The drought that plagued the region for the past few years did not register as a concern to a man who relied on hope as a course ofaction (Kliger 12). Perhaps the most devastating assumption General Sibley made was very personal in nature. Years ofheavy drinking slowly took its toll on the 45 year-old soldier's ability to lead. It did not take long for the brilliant officers and tough soldiers he recruited to figure out something was wrong. The very nature ofthe disease did not permit Sibley to believe there was a problem. Nevertheless, the staggered movement west began in October of 1861 (Kliger 13). The 600-mile journey to Fort Bliss effectively weeded out the weak soldiers not fit for battle. In late December of 1861, the last elements ofthe Sibley Brigade closed in on Fort Bliss. Sibley's first attempt to live offthe land met with fierce resistance. In the short time Colonel Baylor and his victorious force were in the area, they managed to alienate the local population by plundering everything ofvalue they could get their hands on. The Mexicans were no strangers to conflict and would have no part ofthe rough treatment the Confederates planned to dish out. Word quickly spread throughout the region about the lack ofdiplomacy employed by the Rebels. General Sibley'S hope to gain Mexican support was shattered before the invasion even began. There were some Mexicans still willing to make a buck, but for cash only. The credit backed by Colorado silver that worked well in San Antonio was ofno value to the Mexican businessmen who were well aware ofthe poor credit history ofthe Gringo. For the time being, Sibley'S wagons were still full of supplies and so this setback was not an immediate concern (Arneson 9). Ous4 The Yankee and Rebel forces spent the month ofJanuary preparing for battle. Sibley sent his friend Canby a letter urging him to surrender his forces and join the Confederacy. Canby respectfully declined but their friendship continued causing a perception between both sides that would flare up occasionally in the coming months. Each camp was also tinkering with experimental war fighting techniques. General Sibley had about 40 regal lancers that were his pride and joy. Apparently, he was interested in seeing how well this medieval charge would fare against a well-fortified line of soldiers with very accurate rifles. Some members ofthe Union forces attempted to beat the cabin fever ofa long winter by trying to figure out how to persuade a mule loaded with explosives to move 200 yards in the proper direction. Colonel Canby had no problem staying busy during this period. Having abandoned requests for assistance from the Union Army in favor ofhelp from the Governors ofColorado and New Mexico, Canby managed to raise his troop strength to about 3,800 men. The overall quality ofhis force was nowhere near the caliber ofSibley's men. Of particular concern were about 1,000 members ofthe New Mexico Militia. Canby assessed these men as untrained and ofquestionable motivation. The bulk ofhis force consisted of 1,200 regulars and 2 howitzer batteries. Colonel Christopher "Kit" Carson of frontier fame commanded about 500 volunteers from New Mexico (McCoy 25). Various additional colonels appointed by the governor ofNew Mexico led the other four regiments consisting ofabout 1,000 more volunteers from New Mexico. The governor ofColorado managed to send only two companies at this point (Arneson 7). Rounding out the force was a character named Captain Paddy Graydon and his company ofvolunteer scouts. Colonel Canby analyzed the capabilities of his force and decided to consolidate his defense ofthe Rio Grande Valley at Fort Craig. Ous5 Fort Craig was about the size of a football field surrounded by adobe walls complete with artillery mounts and firing ports for small arms. The fort was built to protect against Indian attacks and situated along the western side ofthe Rio Grande River about 100 miles north of Sibley'S force in Mesilla. In early February, Canby was poised to receive the inevitable Confederate invasion into the New Mexico Territory (McCoy 24). Down south in the Confederate camp, Colonel Thomas Green emerged as General Sibley's right hand man. Green commanded the 5th Regiment consisting often companies and the lancers. The 5th Regiment served as the advance guard to spearhead the invasion. Finally, on 7 February, the 5th started moving north. Temperatures in the low 30s combined with strong winds, freezing rain, and snow slowed the movement ofthe Rebel forces. Canby relayed the situation up the chain ofcommand. The Union high command decided it was time to pay some attention to Canby's dilemma and started arranging for good quality reinforcements. Little good that would do him now as the entire 2,500-man Confederate force lined up a mile and a half outside the gates ofFort Craig (Arneson 9). General Sibley made a bold attempt to lure Canby out ofthe fort and into an open fight. In the first of several deceptive tactics he would employ in the next few days, Canby countered by posting a strong show offorce just outside the fort. The last thing Canby wanted at this point was to have his mediocre volunteers conducting maneuvers on the open battlefield so he ordered his men not to bring an engagement. Sibley decided against a frontal attack on the fort and pulled his forces back seven miles south ofthe fort to study the situation (McCoy 25). Meanwhile, Colonel Canby launched his scouts to keep an eye on the Confederate force and protect his defensive posture. The 44 year-old Canby, considered reserved but competent by his superiors, vigorously established a strategy to defend the fort. He located all possible fording Ous6 sites along the river and posted scouts to monitor avenues ofapproach.