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Daniel B. Ous

Dr. Bouilly

Military History Competition

January 6, 2003

The Battle ofValverde

Surrounded by the fog of war, Confederate President Jefferson Davis faced mounting challenges to feed and equip his young army. The prospect ofuntapped mineral reserves in the

Southwest served as a long shot worthy of speculation. In June 1861, Henry H. Sibley emerged with a grandiose plan that sounded too good to be true. The former Union Army Major impressed the Rebel high command with a campaign to capture the silver and gold in Colorado and followed by seizing the strategically important West coast (Niderost 11).

President Davis did not consider the Southwest an immediate threat compared to the chaos in

Richmond and the Southeast. Davis also did not want to invest a lot oftime checking out the character ofSibley or the details ofthe operation, both of which would prove to be a mistake.

Davis authorized Sibley the rank ofbrigadier general and sent him to San Antonio to gather a force ofabout 3,500 Texans under the Confederate flag and invade the Territory as the first phase ofthe campaign (Kliger 9).

Meanwhile, the Union forces in the New Mexico Territory faced serious problems. General

Sibley's brother-in-law, Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, took command ofthe New Mexico

Department ofthe U.S. Army in June of 1861. A Mexican War hero and seasoned frontier officer, Canby's mission to protect the Southwest took a back seat to main Civil War effort. The

War Department reassigned large numbers ofhis enlisted soldiers to the Eastern Theater and Ous2 many of his officers resigned to join the Confederacy. The sentiment of the citizens ofthe

Southern New Mexico Territory was generally pro-Confederate (Niderhost 12).

Colonel Canby's dilemma was no secret to the Confederate forces. While General Sibley was building his force in San Antonio, a group ofover 500 rebels ofthe 2nd Texas Mounted Rifles led by Lieutenant Colonel John R. Baylor moved to seize and probe north up the Rio

Grande Valley in July of 1861. While moving north, Baylor attacked Fort Fillmore, the southern

Union stronghold ofthe Valley. The Union commander ofFort Fillmore, Major

Isaac Lynde, proved to be a bumbling idiot by burning the fort and retreating north in the middle ofJuly with insufficient water. Lynde and his command ofabout 500 soldiers surrendered shortly afterward. Baylor stopped his advance in the town ofMesilla and set up a headquarters to wait for the main invasion force. The loss ofmen and supplies devastated Canby (Arneson 6).

News of the Confederate victory fueled the recruiting drive in San Antonio. In August of

1861, General Sibley's popularity reached its peak as over 3,500 good quality recruits formed the

Sibley Brigade. However, unknown to the recruits, Sibley's battle plan was loaded with outrageous assumptions that would erode his popularity in short order.

On the surface, General Sibley appeared to have the perfect qualifications to lead the invasion. Like Canby, Sibley was a Mexican War hero and spent a lot oftime on the frontier maintaining peace. He skillfully convinced his followers that he had a good understanding of the terrain and people ofthe Southwest.

Sibley was backed by the Confederate label in name only. He was responsible for gathering supplies and equipment for the campaign. His recruits were required to have personal weapons, ammunition, and horses. Standard uniforms across the board for all soldiers would not be feasible. Supplies appropriated from a variety ofsources met with limited success. Equipment Ous3 included a battery of 12 pounder howitzers. General Sibley had no desire to develop a realistic logistical plan to support his operation. Instead, he assured his men they could live offthe land as they conquered the Southwest. Sibley believed captured Union equipment, Mexican sympathizers, and supporters ofthe Rebel cause would fuel the war effort. The drought that plagued the region for the past few years did not register as a concern to a man who relied on hope as a course ofaction (Kliger 12).

Perhaps the most devastating assumption General Sibley made was very personal in nature.

Years ofheavy drinking slowly took its toll on the 45 year-old soldier's ability to lead. It did not take long for the brilliant officers and tough soldiers he recruited to figure out something was wrong. The very nature ofthe disease did not permit Sibley to believe there was a problem.

Nevertheless, the staggered movement west began in October of 1861 (Kliger 13).

The 600-mile journey to Fort Bliss effectively weeded out the weak soldiers not fit for battle.

In late December of 1861, the last elements ofthe Sibley Brigade closed in on Fort Bliss.

Sibley's first attempt to live offthe land met with fierce resistance. In the short time Colonel

Baylor and his victorious force were in the area, they managed to alienate the local population by plundering everything ofvalue they could get their hands on. The Mexicans were no strangers to conflict and would have no part ofthe rough treatment the Confederates planned to dish out.

Word quickly spread throughout the region about the lack ofdiplomacy employed by the Rebels.

General Sibley'S hope to gain Mexican support was shattered before the invasion even began.

There were some Mexicans still willing to make a buck, but for cash only. The credit backed by

Colorado silver that worked well in San Antonio was ofno value to the Mexican businessmen who were well aware ofthe poor credit history ofthe Gringo. For the time being, Sibley'S wagons were still full of supplies and so this setback was not an immediate concern (Arneson 9). Ous4

The Yankee and Rebel forces spent the month ofJanuary preparing for battle. Sibley sent his

friend Canby a letter urging him to surrender his forces and join the Confederacy. Canby

respectfully declined but their friendship continued causing a perception between both sides that

would flare up occasionally in the coming months. Each camp was also tinkering with

experimental war fighting techniques. General Sibley had about 40 regal lancers that were his

pride and joy. Apparently, he was interested in seeing how well this medieval charge would fare

against a well-fortified line of soldiers with very accurate rifles. Some members ofthe Union

forces attempted to beat the cabin fever ofa long winter by trying to figure out how to persuade a

mule loaded with explosives to move 200 yards in the proper direction. Colonel Canby had no

problem staying busy during this period.

Having abandoned requests for assistance from the Union Army in favor ofhelp from the

Governors ofColorado and New Mexico, Canby managed to raise his troop strength to about

3,800 men. The overall quality ofhis force was nowhere near the caliber ofSibley's men. Of

particular concern were about 1,000 members ofthe New Mexico Militia. Canby assessed these

men as untrained and ofquestionable motivation. The bulk ofhis force consisted of 1,200

regulars and 2 howitzer batteries. Colonel Christopher "Kit" Carson of frontier fame

commanded about 500 volunteers from New Mexico (McCoy 25). Various additional colonels

appointed by the governor ofNew Mexico led the other four regiments consisting ofabout 1,000 more volunteers from New Mexico. The governor ofColorado managed to send only two companies at this point (Arneson 7). Rounding out the force was a character named Captain

Paddy Graydon and his company ofvolunteer scouts. Colonel Canby analyzed the capabilities of his force and decided to consolidate his defense ofthe Rio Grande Valley at . Ous5

Fort Craig was about the size of a football field surrounded by adobe walls complete with

artillery mounts and firing ports for small arms. The fort was built to protect against Indian

attacks and situated along the western side ofthe Rio Grande River about 100 miles north of

Sibley'S force in Mesilla. In early February, Canby was poised to receive the inevitable

Confederate invasion into the New Mexico Territory (McCoy 24).

Down south in the Confederate camp, Colonel Thomas Green emerged as General Sibley's

right hand man. Green commanded the 5th Regiment consisting often companies and the

lancers. The 5th Regiment served as the advance guard to spearhead the invasion. Finally, on 7

February, the 5th started moving north. Temperatures in the low 30s combined with strong

winds, freezing rain, and snow slowed the movement ofthe Rebel forces. Canby relayed the

situation up the chain ofcommand. The Union high command decided it was time to pay some

attention to Canby's dilemma and started arranging for good quality reinforcements. Little good that would do him now as the entire 2,500-man Confederate force lined up a mile and a half

outside the gates ofFort Craig (Arneson 9).

General Sibley made a bold attempt to lure Canby out ofthe fort and into an open fight. In the first of several deceptive tactics he would employ in the next few days, Canby countered by

posting a strong show offorce just outside the fort. The last thing Canby wanted at this point was to have his mediocre volunteers conducting maneuvers on the open battlefield so he ordered his men not to bring an engagement. Sibley decided against a frontal attack on the fort and pulled his forces back seven miles south ofthe fort to study the situation (McCoy 25).

Meanwhile, Colonel Canby launched his scouts to keep an eye on the Confederate force and protect his defensive posture. The 44 year-old Canby, considered reserved but competent by his superiors, vigorously established a strategy to defend the fort. He located all possible fording Ous6 sites along the river and posted scouts to monitor avenues ofapproach. A lava rock formation on the eastern side ofthe Rio Grande provided a potential concealed route to the eastern flank ofthe fort. The western flank ofthe fort was wide open and defendable from the fort. The area north ofthe fort along the western side ofthe Rio Grande was Canby's supply and communication route. Of interest in this area was a mesa five miles north ofthe fort on the western side ofthe river. Just beyond the mesa was fertile grazing land known as Valverde and a good fording site.

Canby thoroughly understood the terrain he had to work with, but the fighting ability ofhis men was a different story (McCoy 25).

Colonel Canby and his second in command, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts, decided to blend the untrained volunteers with the regulars when possible on the battlefield. This technique would present a larger force to the enemy and spread out the experience among the units. Morale was low among the soldiers due to desertions and lack ofregular pay, but Canby had a firm grip on logistical operations as long as his supply route stayed open. Canby believed

Sibley would struggle keeping his men and animals fed as they moved north (Arneson 9).

With less than ten days of supplies left, General Sibley was starting to feel the pressure ofhis weak logistical plan. On February 19th, Sibley decided to move his force north on the eastern side ofthe river under the cover ofthe lava rock formations in an attempt to draw Canby out of the fort. Led by Colonel Green, the Rebels moved to a location about three miles east ofthe fort and six miles south ofValverde. They arrived late on the 20th after traveling through deep sand and had to settle for a waterless camp, expecting the Yankees to attack at any time (Kliger 15).

Colonel Canby positioned a force of300 men to overwatch the river but had no plans to attack. Later that night, 150 pack animals broke out ofa Rebel corral and stampeded to the river for water. The Yankee scouts rounded up the animals and herded them to the fort. This caused a Ous 7 serious blow to the Confederates that forced them to abandon over 25 wagons. Sometime after the stampede, Captain Graydon requested to take a few ofhis scouts on a raid ofthe Confederate camp. Without asking for details on the execution ofthe raid, Canby granted the request. The scouts grabbed two mules along with some explosives and maneuvered very close to the

Confederate camp. The plan was to strap the explosives to the mules, light the fuzes, and send the mules into the camp. To the delight ofmules everywhere, the plan failed. After lighting the fuzes and sending the mules toward the camp, the mules abruptly turned around and started heading back to the fort. The scouts barely escaped the blast and cancelled all covert activities for the rest ofthe night (Kliger 16).

The next morning around 8 a.m., General Sibley feinted an attack on the fort and sent an advance party to secure the Valverde ford so he could water his thirsty force and cut offthe

Union supply route. Colonel Canby figured out what was happening and sent Colonel Roberts and 750 soldiers to block the Rebels at the ford. Roberts found 180 Rebels at the river positioned under a grove of cottonwood trees. Roberts sent 350 cavalrymen across the river and drove the Rebels back after an intense skirmish. Roberts then positioned two artillery guns on the shore and started shelling the Confederate force (Arneson 10).

As Sibley'S main body elements were moving north, Canby monitored the activity and fed proportionate numbers ofUnion forces parallel to the Confederate forces. Canby planned to stay at the fort with a sizeable force until he was convinced the battle would take place at Valverde.

By 10 a.m., a thundering artillery barrage by both sides was filling the battlefield with smoke.

Confederate attempts to retake the cottonwood grove ended when Union Captain Seldon's regulars fixed bayonets and successfully drove back the Rebel forces (Niderhost 16). Ous 8

The gallant lancers immediately staged a counterattack on the far left ofthe Yankee line. The courageous lancers charged with fury but the waiting Union line easily slaughtered them with their modem firearms. Colonel Roberts took advantage ofthe shift in momentum and moved howitzers across the river, placing a battery offour guns on the left flank and two 24 pounders on the right flank ofthe Union line (McCoy 51).

By early afternoon, General Sibley was apparently too drunk and tired to continue with the battle and turned command ofthe Confederate army over to Colonel Green. The move was not a big surprise as Green assumed command on numerous occasions in the past for the same reason

(Niderhost 16). However, Sibley'S decision to leave the battle did not help his image among his men, who already held him in utter contempt for his weak leadership. Colonel Green took command and rallied his men. Most units on both sides had arrived at the battle by this point, with the exception ofCanby and a small force back at the fort.

Colonel Canby finally completed his assessment ofthe Rebel force across the river from the fort and determined it was only a small unit guarding equipment. He left a superior force at the fort and took the remaining men to Valverde. Canby did a battle hand-off with Colonel Roberts and finished shaping the battlefield. He had four howitzers on the left flank and two howitzers on the right flank. Colonel Carson's unit was in the center, flanked on the right by Captain

Duncan and Captain Seldon on the left. Five companies ofvolunteers refused to cross the river and join the fight (Arneson 10).

Colonel Green realized he had to destroy the superior Union artillery in order to decisively engage the remaining ground forces. Driven back by a sustained artillery bombardment, Green reorganized his force on a two-pronged axis ofadvance. The main effort consisting of750 Ous9

Rebels would destroy the artillery on the Union left flank. The secondary effort of250 men led by Major Ragnet focused on the two 24 pounders on the Union right flank (Niderhost 16).

Around 5 p.m. Major Ragnet's soldiers assaulted their objective. Canby countered by slightly shifting Carson's force in the middle to orient on the charging Rebels. The superior Union force quickly annihilated Ragnet's screaming warriors (Niderhost 16).

Colonel Green immediately launched his main effort before Colonel Canby had a chance to reorganize his line. As the main effort fiercely approached the left flank, Union forces started to buckle and many ofthe soldiers assigned to protect the guns would not fight. Those that would fight found themselves engaged in hand-to-hand combat but were no match for the hearty

Texans. The capture ofthe battery dealt a stunning blow to Canby (Kliger 18).

Sensing disaster as the captured guns turned on his men, Canby signaled retreat. Since many ofthe untrained volunteers were already retreating, Canby did not have much choice, but the

Union soldiers that were willing to fight were deeply disappointed. Canby left his best unit behind to cover the withdrawal back to the fort. The Battle ofValverde was over and the

Confederates celebrated their stunning victory by vigorously pursuing the retreating Union forces back to the fort. Colonel Canby may have lost the battle but he had no plans to stop fighting the war (Arneson 11).

Just before entering the gates ofFort Craig, Canby sent a flag oftruce to Colonel Green requesting a cease-fire to care for the wounded and dead. A truce would give Canby enough time to prepare the fort for further combat. Sensing the exhaustion ofhis own force, Green agreed and efforts to clean up the battlefield were underway. Casualties were high, claiming the lives ofaround 80 soldiers on each side. The wounded that survived the battle numbered about

140 for the Union and 100 for the Confederacy (Arneson 11). Ous 10

The next morning on February 22, General Sibley was back in the saddle commanding the

Confederate camp. He dispatched one ofhis colonels and two subordinates to demand the surrender ofFort Craig and offer parole to all Union combatants. The resolute Canby had already done his homework and decided he had enough equipment and supplies to defend the fort.

Canby allowed the Confederate detachment inside the walls of the fort to present the demand for surrender. While waiting for the response, the Rebel colonel noticed the stoutness ofthe fort and the large amount ofcannons ready for action on the artillery mounts. Unknown to him, many ofthe cannons were "Quaker" guns made oftree trunks. After reviewing the terms of surrender,

Canby declined and sent the detachment back to confederate headquarters (Kliger 19).

Disappointed with the unsuccessful demand for surrender and the trumped up report on the strength ofthe fort, General Sibley faced a serious dilemma. He decided his weakened force could not attack the fort. Continuing the invasion north with Canby's force to his rear was not tactically smart. Moving south to regroup would mean failure ofthe invasion.

General Sibley weighed his options and decided to continue the invasion up the Rio Grande

Valley, officially closing out the final phase ofthe Battle ofValverde fought on 21 February

1862 (Kliger 19). Today, this memorable Civil War battle continues to provide valuable lessons learned for students ofwarfare and serves as a link to our military heritage. Ous 11

Works Cited

Arneson, David. "Rio Grande: The Battle for Valverde, 1861-1862". Strategy and Tactics.

June 1991 (143): 5-17.

Kliger, Paul I. "The General's Tour - The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico". Blue and

Gray. June 1994~ 11 (5): 8-21.

McCoy, Raymond. "The Battle of Valverde". New Mexico. September 1953: 24-25, 51-53.

Niderost, Eric. "River Crossing Contested". Military History Magazine's Great Battles. 5(3):

10-11+.

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