'Stabilitocracy' And/Or Radicalism ZAGREB BEOGRAD SARAJEVO Skopje Tirana

Issue No 7 November 2019

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

'stabilitocracy' and/or radicalism ZAGREB BEOGRAD SARAJEVO Skopje TiranA

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

Fostering democracy and upholding human rights, taking action to prevent the destruction of the global ecosystem, advancing equality between women and men, securing peace through conflict prevention in crisis zones, and defending the freedom of individuals against excessive state and economic power – these are the objectives that drive the ideas and actions of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. We maintain close ties to the German Green Party (Alliance 90/The Greens) and as a think tank for green visions and projects, we are part of an international network encompassing well over 100 partner projects in approximately 60 countries. The Heinrich Böll Foundation works independently and nurtures a spirit of intellectual openness. We maintain a world wide network with currently 30 international offices. Our work in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia concentrates on the democratization process, political education, and environmental protection and sustainable development. We support and open public fora about topical and marginalized social-political issues and we enable networking of local and international actors close to the Green values. contents

introduction 2 never-ending transition Srđan Dvornik 6 radicalisations. creating wars, for now without weapons Marion Kraske suffocated by stability 11 populism as business as (un)usual Zlatiborka Popov Momčinović 17 features of competitive authoritarian rule in the western Balkans Florian Bieber 23 illiberal tendencies in Croatia after Trump and Brexit Dario Čepo 28 the hidden radicalism of the ruling ideologies Nerzuk Ćurak radicalisation against external ‘others’ 34 between the humanitarian and the securitized approach to the refugee crisis in Croatia: is there an alternative to policies grounded in populism? Viktor Koska 40 a Croatian story: “an extraordinary EU Member” at the price of human rights Boris Pavelić perpetuating past wars 46 unrealised in the wars of the ‘90s, the idea of an all-Serb state is maintained by other means in peace Latinka Perović 53 revisionism in Croatia 1989-2019 Ivo Goldstein 59 the different faces of fascism Erich Rathfelder radicalisation and maintenance of power 63 the ‘stability’ of Albanian democracy without rule of law: political polarization, captured institutions and periodical crisis Arolda Elbasani 69 ‘fool’s gold’: the Macedonian journey from stabilitocracy to radicalization and back Biljana Vankovska 75 Europe’s longest-standing leader survives with Western support, while oppressively ruling the country Milka Tadić 79 stabilitocracy and political stability – a view from Serbia Vladimir Veljković 85 non-implementation of ECtHR and BH Constitutional Court decisions in the rule of law and policy context Dženana Karup Druško civil society vs establishment 90 another view – in the eye of the political storm. stabilo-radical rhapsody in Montenegro Damir Nikočević, Daliborka Uljarević 93 on the margins of political discourse Gresa Hasa 2 introduction never-ending transition

introduction never-ending transition

Srđan Dvornik

In the wake of several recent ethnic inci- Thus, regardless of almost thirty dents that happened in Croatia, a well known representative of the minority whose years since the fall on undemo- members were attacked expressed a harsh cratic regimes, it seems that the critique of the political climate in which expected transition to democ- numerous expressions of intolerance by racy and free market economy prominent public figures sooner or later had in ‘western Balkans’ has become to result in insults, physical attacks and violence. He expressed his concern that today’s a never-ending story. Societies Croatia could end up becoming similar to its are weak, pluralism develops alleged predecessor. His statement was met slowly and with great difficulties, with a new wave of intolerant responses. political elites still dominate, and Most of those who reacted recognised the economies are still dependent ‘predecessor’: the ‘Independent State of Croatia’ (NDH), the puppet state created by either on political authorities or the Nazis in the Second World War in the ter- on international companies. At ritories which nowadays belong to Bosnia- the same time, we witness to au- Herzegovina and Croatia. In the country thoritarianism, intolerance, more where extremists more or less overtly com- or less constant popular support memorate the quisling regime, and official institutions downplay its crimes while com- to the same political leaders memorating its soldiers and officials who or parties who get re-elected fell as victims of the victorious partisans, in spite of the poor economic and where it seems more important that and social performance of their the ‘NDH’ was a Croatian entity than that respective governments, and the it was a fascist-style regime, all of a sudden widespread corruption. everybody seemed hurt by the comparison between the contemporary Croatia and the regime which was defeated three quarters of a century ago. As though everybody suddenly woke up from a nightmare and realised that the ‘Croat state’ from WW2 was really something to be ashamed of.

Srđan Dvornik Sociologist, consultant, translater Zagreb never-ending transition introduction 3

This might be a symptom of the divided nity, and ethnic minorities are viewed with national ‘self’ of a nation guided by a dou- suspicion; the would-be guardians of stabil- ble ideology: on one hand, believing in its ity easily turn into investigators looking for unique ethno-national identity which must enemies (internal and external) and destroy- not be mixed with anyone else’s, in language, ing what little trust people might have devel- culture, economy, territory, and, of course, oped in each other and in the institutions sovereignty; on the other, proud of being that are supposed to be concerned with the fundamentally different from the primitive public good and equal rights for all. While ‘Balkans’, of having belonged to ‘Europe’ praising stability and boasting as its reputed from times immemorial. For household guarantors, they demonstrate how close purposes, we may have not entirely negative their societies are to its opposite, and how memories of the ‘NDH’, but if a representa- close their own methods are to something tive of a minority, a non-Croat, especially a generating instability and radicalism. representative whose words are noticed by Why is that? foreign media and politicians, makes such a Three decades after the symbolic begin- comparison, which immediately gets inter- ning of the democratisation of socialist preted as equalisation, we are offended. countries in central and eastern Europe, But what was more surprising was that marked by the fall of the Berlin wall, a even more ferocious reactions were pro- recent study found that significant portions voked by another statement by the same of these societies feel democracy is under person: that, by pursuing such ethnically threat. Two decades ago, various research- biased politics, Croatia turns from a fac- ers were publishing papers which argued tor of stability into a cause of instability in that democracy in European post-socialist the neighbouring region. Before that, one countries was consolidated. That meant was hardly aware that stability played such that, in the opinion of considerable parts a prominent role on the list of Croatian of these societies, democracy was “the only national priorities. But on a closer look, one game in town”. In other words, two or three quickly realises that all neighbouring coun- election cycles passed without crises or tries which share with Croatia the recent major conflicts; all the major political par- history of transition are highly sensitive to ties were ready to accept electoral defeat stability as a component of their interna- without putting into question the whole sys- tional reputation. tem of democratic representation. Mean- At the same time, however, these are while, most of these countries successfully the countries where, more often than not, completed the procedure of accession to changes of government after elections are the European Union and became members; followed by the vehement resistance of the conditions they had to meet additionally defeated side, be it by staged protests or by cemented democracy and the rule of law. physical violence. In this region there is no What happened in the meantime to loyalty or patriotism based on respect for the make democracy seem not so consolidated constitution and rule of law; instead, the pol- as twenty years ago is beyond the scope of ity is still equated with the ethnic commu- an introduction into this collection of arti- 4 introduction never-ending transition

We also see waves of political mobilisation of ethnic nationalism, on the fertile soil of inter- or intra-state tensions (like those between Serbia and Kosovo, or entities and ethnic ‘communities’ in Bosnia and Hercegovina or Macedonia). Even the migrations of millions caused by wars, terror, climate changes or famine provide a new occasion to spread fear of ‘others’, foreigners, people of different cultures…

cles focused on developments in south- In the part of Europe stretching from eastern Europe. Suffice it to say that there Croatia to Albania (the so-called Western is less trust in the guarantees of the rule of Balkans) the post-socialist development was law, in information from public sources, additionally burdened either by wars (the and in protection of the rights to protest post-Yugoslavian countries) or by the legacy and criticise authorities in public. In short, of the most strict totalitarianism (Albania). people feel more distant from centres of Apart from economic consequences – power. Still, they believe that various forms destroyed resources, slow growth, misman- of self-organisation and grass-roots activ- agement of public assets, significantly lower ism (summarily called ‘civil society’) can (and slower) foreign direct investments, help them accomplish objectives neglected higher unemployment and poverty rates – by the state. The cause underlying this grow- this also entailed greater authoritarian ten- ing distance might lay in the fact that soci- dencies, manifested as ethnic tensions and eties which emerged from the collapse of strong inclinations towards politics of col- the old regime have never developed their lective (ethnic) identity. own strength similar to that which had over- Thus, regardless of almost thirty years turned absolute monarchies two centuries since the fall of undemocratic regimes, before. The ‘revolutions’ that ended the it seems that the expected transition to rule of communist parties were not of such democracy and free market economy in kind: instead of growing industry and finan- the ‘western Balkans’ has become a never- cial business, and capitalist classes getting ending story. Societies are weak, pluralism stronger, societies under the communist develops slowly and with great difficulties, rule suffocated under the non-democratic political elites still dominate, and econo- regimes and only experienced stagnation mies are still dependent either on political and decay. The new democratic orders authorities or on international companies. lacked the fundamental condition of a sub- At the same time, we bear witness to stantial, not just formal democracy: the dif- authoritarianism, intolerance, more or less ference, indeed tension between state and constant popular support for the same polit- society, which is the condition necessary for ical leaders or parties, who get re-elected in people to decide freely and for democratic spite of their respective governments’ poor checks and balances to work. economic and social records, and wide- While in many post-socialist countries spread corruption. We also see waves of this defect was compensated by market political mobilisation of ethnic nationalism, liberalisation and opening to investments on the fertile soil of inter- or intra-state ten- from developed markets, it came with a sions (like those between Serbia and Kosovo, price. National governments were too weak or entities and ethnic ‘communities’ in Bos- – or unwilling – to defend national welfare nia and Hercegovina or Macedonia). Even systems and environment from capital- the migrations of millions caused by wars, ist appetites. Moreover, to a certain extent terror, climate change or famine provide a they were ‘captured’ by local oligarchs, a new occasion to spread fear of ‘others’, for- peculiar category of tycoons that emerged eigners, people of different cultures… under political patronage. Economic growth Although they try to project an image has been paid for with the decrease in social of stability, the regimes in the region con- and human security. In such circumstances, stantly generate new waves of radicali- tendencies of authoritarianism and seeking sation. The authorities do not represent collective ‘shields’ in nationalist policies specific social and/or economic categories, come as an almost natural outcome. classes, or interest groups; on the contrary, never-ending transition introduction 5

such groups are dependent on political this provides numberless opportunities to support and mediation, so the society is indirectly interfere in BH internal affairs, not even a junior partner in the relation- claiming that they are only taking care of ship with the state; politically, it appears the ‘equal rights’ of the members of their almost as an amorphous mass. Therefore, respective ethnic communities. the ruling parties, as well as those that try to To be sure, such a political mentality is replace them, pretend to speak not for spe- not unique to this group of countries. Some cific parts of the societies, with their specific members of the EU display similar attitudes. interests, to which specific policies should The best example connected to this region correspond, but for society as a whole. In is the case of Greece blocking Macedonia’s short, in a populist style, for the ‘nation’. accession to the EU. The conflict was not Hence their proneness to authoritarianism, caused by any act of the latter somehow populism, and nationalism. infringing the rights of, or deteriorating the In most cases, ideologies that dominate situation in the former; it was merely a con- the societies in the region involve ideas of sequence of the Greek claim on the monop- some kind of collective enemy, in opposi- oly over the name of Macedonia. In other tion to which the national identity is typi- words, a mere matter of an identity symbol, cally asserted. Coming mostly from a former which turned into a real barrier owing to the multi-ethnic state, the post-Yugoslavian superior position of Greece as a member of countries have at their disposal a rich sup- the EU and NATO. And again, this act of ply of candidates for the role of the enemy. interference was framed as defence of their The establishment of new states defined own identity. as the nation-states of their respective eth- The questions which the authors in this nic majority ‘communities’ was carried issue of Perspectives have tried to answer out through various policies whose func- were the following: What is the actual relation was to assert dominance of the eth- tion between the stability of the existing nic majorities. This happened both within regimes of governance and the radicalisa- the former Yugoslavian federal units and tion tendencies? What are the specific phe- beyond their borders. At the same time, nomena that motivate participants of public and typically through the same process, debates to use exclusionary characterisa- the nation which ‘defends’ and ‘affirms’ its tions like ‘traitor’, or ‘enemy’, or terms like collective identity, both symbolically and ‘fascism’? Is it a general authoritarianism in real, physical space, by drawing virtual of mass attitudes and political culture? Or and palpable demarcation lines which the dominance of a rather intolerant ethnic should separate it from other such nations, nationalism? Or the relatively high level of appears to the other nation as the same kind violence in society, as well as threats of vio- of enemy, against which defences must be lence in political disagreements? Is there erected. something ‘fascist’ in the ability of national- The most remarkable case of such inter- ist leaders to mobilize masses? ferences is Bosnia and Hercegovina. The Seen from an opposite angle, what is the overture to the aggression of Serb nationalist destiny of such basic ideals like democracy forces was the political propaganda which and the rule of law? Have there been any warned against potential Muslim aggression developments? What is the situation like for allegedly threatening ethnic Serbs in Bosnia opponents of authoritarian political ideas and Hercegovina. Eventually, such politics and practices? Are the human rights of those was successful, and the separate Serb entity who defend human rights and freedom of was established, at the price of tens of thou- speech effectively protected? Are there sands people killed, and more than a million transforming movements present not only displaced. Croat nationalist forces were not in civil society but on the political scene, so successful, so they – continuously sup- acting as advocates of sustainability of living ported by the leading Croatian nationalist conditions, rule of law, public accountabil- party and more or less all Croatian govern- ity of authorities, solidarity with refugees/ ments – continue to present Croats as an migrants, openness to different cultures, endangered community, which claims its and other basic tenets of a civilised society? own ‘entity’ and political representation These questions can be answered from based on ethnicity (‘constitutiveness’ in BH a variety of angles, and this issue presents jargon). For Croatia and Serbia respectively, some attempts to answer them. 6 introduction radicalisations

radicalisations creating wars, for now without weapons

Marion Kraske

It must be a unique case worldwide. In All things considered, it will cost the EU dearly Bosnia and Herzegovina, unfortunately it that it has acted in detrimental partnership with is reality: a President openly and brutally the corrupt and criminal elites of the Balkans contributing to the destruction of the coun- for far too long; through a crude appeasement try he is politically heading: Milorad Dodik, policy an apparent stability was bet on, true the Serb representative in the Bosnian-Her- zegovinian State Presidency, has applied democratic processes were put back. With fatal himself to that task, the separation of the consequences: Democratic values in the Balkan Serb entity, which came into being based states have been in free fall for some time now, on systematic expulsion policies and kill- the best-networked clans have put state institu- ings between 1992-95, from the state union tions and the media largely under their control. of the unitary state Bosnia and Herzegovina. Judicial systems are groaning under endemic Hardly a week goes by in which the professional provocateur does not publicly discuss corruption, (party) influences are on the daily the topic of secession. agenda. Croat representatives likewise hold on to the old, inhuman politics: In August 2019, a high-ranking representative of the Croa- tian HDZ party honoured the 25th anniversary of the foundation of Herceg-Bosna, the para-state whose founders were punished by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague with 111 years of imprisonment. The HDZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, led by Dragan Čović, in a manner just as uninhibited, promotes the murderous project as the future solution for the country, cheered by HDZ representatives in Croatia. The weird flags with the lidded crest, similar to a jam pot, additionally orna- mented with a chess pattern, are hanging around all Croat-dominated local communities in BH. The open glorification of war crimes accompanying this, of all things fired by representatives of the governing party of an EU country, is likely to endanger Marion Kraske the peace process in Bosnia and Herzego- Director of Heinrich Böll vina – and thereby the whole Balkans – in Foundation Office for BiH, North the long run. Macedonia, Albania radicalisations introduction 7

Photo by Andrew Butler, FilmsForAction.org, CC-BY-NC-SA 4.0

And finally the Bosniak party, the SDA, Vučić: misguided German maintaining close relations with Turkish foreign policy ruler Recep Tayyip Erdogan and thereby pursuing a creeping turkification of Bosnia’s In the meantime, Serbia under Aleksandar rather European-minded Islam. War is like- Vučić has increasingly developed into a wise frequently mentioned by the Bosniaks disaster of German foreign policy. Appar- as an option. ently, it was believed for a long time that Fuelling doom and gloom scenarios Vučić must be supported as a guarantor of works wonderfully on all sides in Bosnia the country’s orientation towards the EU, and Herzegovina, as nationalist elites use it in order to achieve some sort of pacifying to continue defending the power they have leverage for the rest of the Western Balkans held on to for over two decades. as well. However, the authoritarian tenden- 24 years after the end of the war, Bosnia cies of the power-seeking politician prone and Herzegovina is a perfect example of the to manoeuvring are becoming increas- dilemma of the whole region: political awak- ingly apparent. In this, Vučić is supported ening, sustainable democratisation have yet more and more openly by Moscow, which to be realised, whereas the nationalisms and is increasingly focusing on the region for its the radical extermination ideologies of the interventions. 90ies, leading to hundreds of thousands of If it hadn’t been so before, the Russian displacements and deaths, have hardly been support became apparent during Putin´s overcome, quite the contrary. They are once visit in January 2019, when Belgrade cheered again on the rise, reinforcing each other and the Russian guest like a hero. During recent fostering new radicalisations. years, Vučić has repeatedly called for more Croatia, the newest EU member coun- stability and peace in the region, but the try, which will take over the Presidency of targeted attacks on the Bosnian state by the Council of the European Union in Janu- Milorad Dodik, his partner in the Bosnian- ary 2020, is attracting attention with an Herzegovinian Republika Srpska, he con- alarming revanchism. Reinterpretations of spicuously does not comment on. history, openly nationalist hostilities – there Even so, in North Macedonia the is no neighbouring country with which Cro- destructive policy approaches could be atia has not clashed recently. thwarted by Social Democrat and vision- In addition to that, there is the ingra- ary Zoran Zaev. The settlement of the name tiation with extreme right-wing and fas- dispute with Greece with the Prespa agree- cist traditions pursued by the right-wing ment amounted to a historical act: It hasn’t nationalist HDZ (especially President occurred much in the region over the past Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović); preferring to years that a bilateral agreement signalled visit Bleiburg in Austria, the Mecca of the the readiness to compromise and put the neo-Nazi scene, instead of sending signs of public interest above personal or party reconciliation. Those crude tendencies are interests. being stirred up, not for the first time, by the Catholic Church. 8 introduction radicalisations

All the more incomprehensible there- the great failure of the fore that France prevented the opening of negotiations with North Macedonia during EU – the extermination the EU summit in October 2019 – further ideologies bounce back evidence that individual EU member states are lacking a sense of responsibility for the With fatal consequences: Democratic values region. The country has anyway barely in the Balkan states have been in free fall for recovered from the disintegrating narratives some time now, the best-networked clans of a true “Macedonianism“ by the former have put state institutions and the media governing party VMRO-DPMNE (backed largely under their control. Judicial systems by Russia). It had deliberately promoted are groaning under endemic corruption, exclusionary and rabble-rousing political (party) influences are on the daily agenda. approaches, which in April 2017 even led There is a grotesque reversal of the para- to supporters of this nationalist orienta- digm of law and order. It is not laws or inter- tion storming the Parliament in Skopje and national standards that determine what is severely beating MPs. Apparently, France rightful, but criminal power cartels, which has already forgotten that bloody scenario; closely overlap with the dominant parties. the irresponsible rejection of North Mac- As a consequence, personal and human edonia, as well as the snubbing of the Zaev rights are largely cancelled out, the individ- government and the initiated reforms, thus ual barely stands a chance of asserting his/ represent a historical mistake: Instead of her rights in those structures that are out- now helping North Macedonia to continue side the law. The West, above all the EU has on the reform path, it is accepted that the not been able to contain those destructive nationalist forces surrounding the VMRO forces and to emphatically campaign for its will again make headway and the big roll- agenda – democracy, liberality, diversity. back will happen. In so doing, the EU is With its trepidation, which it had already undoubtedly contributing to further radi- displayed during the Bosnian War, the EU calisation in the region. now fails anew to defend European values With the ground-breaking decision in the Balkans. This, however, increasingly in favour of NATO membership, Monte- also endangers the EU in its very founda- negro has at least limited the possibilities tions: raging destructive ideologies, which of Russia´s exertion of influence, albeit have forged ahead during the 1990ies, are thereby, of all people, Milo Đukanović, one now bouncing back into the EU, endanger- of the most controversial political char- ing the cohesion of the Union. acters in the region, has risen to become Croatia, the newest EU member, is a historical figure. An elimination squad, increasingly pushing aside its democra- apparently paid by Moscow, which arrived tisation success from the EU integration in 2016 for the coup d´état in order to elimi- process. The open revisionism, the romanti- nate Đukanović, has since been prosecuted cisation of the Ustasha past, thereby go side and subsequently convicted. by side with the glorification of the acts of That is a radical example of how the West an agenda striving for a greater Croatia dur- is no longer alone in the Balkans in shaping ing the Bosnian War 1992-95 – all that has its the future of the fragile region enduringly impact on the social climate. In 2019 there and according to its own ideas. Other stake- were several attacks on members of the Serb holders like Russia, Turkey, China and the minority, and in October in Zadar two black Arab states started a while ago to expand the Americans were even severely beaten up; scope of their influence – those influences apparently the attackers thought the two unequivocally laying the foundations for military officers were homosexuals. further disputes and trouble spots. And yet, that relapse into the 1990ies, the All things considered, it will cost the EU hatred towards people of a different ethnic dearly that it has acted in detrimental part- origin, in the middle of an EU country, barely nership with the corrupt and criminal elites gets noticed in the EU. Notwithstanding the of the Balkans for far too long; through a actual problems, the new Commission Presi- crude appeasement policy an apparent sta- dent Ursula von der Leyen recently described bility was bet on, true democratic processes Croatia as a “model of success“. Instead of were put back. unmasking them, such misjudgements only further encourage the relevant actors and their dangerous agendas to further pursue their anti-democratic political approaches. radicalisations introduction 9 the EU – highly hazardous How blind the EU sometimes political approaches instead acts with regard to dangerous of enlargement efforts situations in the Balkans was demonstrated most recently by How blind the EU sometimes acts with regard to dangerous situations in the Bal- the example of the former High kans was demonstrated most recently by the Representative for Foreign Af- example of the former High Representative fairs and Security Policy, who of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security in the latter period of her time Policy, Federica Mogherini, who in the latter in office contributed to foster- period of her time in office contributed to fostering crisis scenarios anew. ing crisis scenarios anew. The The discussion on the land swap discussion on the land swap between Serbia and Kosovo decisively between Serbia and Kosovo deci- pushed by the Italian was aimed at organ- sively pushed by Federica Mogh- ising a territorial exchange between the erini was aimed at organising countries according to ethnic principles – with that approach, which would in effect a territorial exchange between have fuelled new “cleansing policies“, the the countries according to ethnic murderers of the Balkan wars, from Rado- principles – with that approach, van Karadžić and Ratko Mladić to Slobodan which would in effect have Praljak or Jadranko Prlić, would retroactively fuelled new “cleansing policies“, have received a clean bill for their scorched earth policies. the murderers of the Balkan It can be difficult to understand why wars, from Radovan Karadžić such tendencies towards radicalisation are and Ratko Mladić to Slobodan backed by none other than the EU – was it Praljak or Jadranko Prlić, would not the EU that was once founded as the retroactively have received a antithesis to nationalism and ethnic racial fanaticism? And it is precisely that Union, clean bill for their scorched which after all was honoured with the Nobel earth policies. Peace Prize, that promotes ethnically clean solutions à la the land swap for the Balkans? A new proof that the European family quite and Vučić are working on a united Greater obviously has lost its compass when it comes Serbia, the Croats are breathing new life into to the most fragile part of the continent. Franjo Tuđman’s dream of a Greater Croatia, Instead of promoting such gambling, and even the Albanian Prime Minister Edi the EU would be well advised to contribute Rama now and then plays the Greater Alba- to supporting those civic actors in the Bal- nia card in order to signal: If you do not want kan countries who, sometimes in the face of us – there is another way for us to go. massive threats and hostilities, work on the The region is at a dead end, weary of EU democratisation of their countries. The EU policies devoid of vision, and increasingly should provide them with unwavering sup- under the pressure of geostrategic power port; it is not unusual for those actors to risk games of other actors with dubious agen- their lives in order to fight for the basic rules das. Already there are open confrontations of democracy. The small Davids fighting about Bosnia and Herzegovina’s member- overpowering Goliaths often lack strategic ship in NATO – Serbs on both sides of the support in order to successfully overcome border are strictly against such an alliance. corruption and captured state structures. The big players are increasingly meddling Up to now, the EU has offered little to the in the already tense situation in the Balkans. democrats in the Balkans. Here, there is The EU is thereby in danger of losing its considerable need for action. influence in the unstable South-east of the Furthermore, the EU should take the continent. The perils of such a “hostile take- long overdue peace process seriously and over“ of the Balkans are obvious – with their give it fresh impetus. The radicalisations of illiberal agendas, the restless other actors are the past years have led to the new circula- doubtlessly creating the breeding ground tion of ideologies of uniting greater territo- for further radicalisations – new hotbeds for ries based on nationalist principles. Dodik potential security risks are emerging. 10 introduction radicalisations

Admittedly, there is a way out of the the law, functioning institutions, unre- dilemma: Deliberately moving away from stricted personal and human rights, and not the policy of cozying up to criminal elites to to forget: minority rights. a reinforced legal offensive aiming at imple- For those who plunder the systems and menting basic democratic values. Corrupt utilise the state systems for their own self- state prosecutors and judges must, similarly enrichment, while the societies are sinking to what has been done in Albania, resign deeper and deeper into poverty and per- their posts, criminal financial transfers must spectivelessness, those who hold political be prosecuted and sanctioned – a function- responsibility and are gambling away the ing judiciary is the key to the recovery of the future of their countries and simultaneously whole region. enhancing the potential risk for the EU by Moreover, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, endangering the fragile peace, firm dead- high-profile verdicts of the European Court lines must be set and boundaries drawn. of Human Rights (ECtHR) have waited for Using the so-called Bonn powers of the years to be implemented, verdicts with High Representative for Bosnia and Herze- which all citizens would finally be granted govina again should likewise be considered, equal rights. Something that really should whereby action against dangerous destruc- be a matter of course, but is not in a country tion may be taken. in which the idea of ethnic apartheid is still The currently on-going mass exodus to celebrated. And thus even 24 years after the West Europe is an alarm signal. Hundreds end of the war, Jews and the Roma, as well as of thousands of people are no longer will- people who see themselves as citizens and ing to endure the conditions in their home do not wish to be ethnically pigeonholed, countries. The high level of demand on the still cannot run as candidates for the elec- Western European labour markets allows tions for the State Presidency; this is how it them to leave the Balkans – and take with was stipulated by the Dayton Peace Agree- them arguably the most valuable capital the ment in 1995 as a minimal compromise, and region possesses. Above all, what leaves the now the time has come to correct the wrong Balkans are those potential agents of change course that had been set. who might initiate democratic and reform One thing is certain: Such excesses of processes. Their departure therefore dra- categorisation into first- and second-class matically diminishes the prospects of future people, which ultimately led to the devastat- democratisations. ing Balkan wars, must finally be done away The radicalisations in the Western Bal- with. The implementation of European law kans are real; the verbal rearmament is must be given highest priority; the EU has already afoot. All that Europe believed to avoided those delicate issues for far too long. have overcome is erupting anew. Europe What is necessary is determined advo- must hurry in order to contain those ten- cacy by the EU and the USA for the funda- dencies. Others are already awaiting their mental pillars of democracy: equality before chance to give a new twist to the region. populism as business as (un)usual suffocated by stability 11 suffocated by stability populism as business as (un)usual

Zlatiborka Popov Momčinović

In the Balkans, populism is part of the official establishment, the local political class, or, better yet, caste, because it is a closed oligarchic structure, is essentially populist, even though it is embedded in the system itself. This is its differentia specifica, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As the distinguished political scientist von Whatever the meaning of the term, popu- Beyme noted, a spectre is haunting Europe, lists have in fact, as is frequently asserted, the spectre of populism. Despite this fact, re-awakened the so-called “common peo- testified to by the success of populist par- ple’s” interest in politics. If it hadn’t been for ties in elections in many countries over populism, politics would have boiled down the past two decades, the concept is moot, to administration by the establishment, the despite being the most studied in contem- so-called “political class” (a favourite term porary political science (Stockemer, 2019: among populists1) would still govern unin- 1). Is it an ideology, a style, folklore, logic, hibited, and dangerous questions would not discourse or something else? (Mudde, Kalt- have been posed. However, as theoreticians, wasser, 2017: 3-7). Moreover, the overuse of and not infrequently also politicians from the concept itself leads to it losing its differ- so-called traditional parties, have indicated, entia specifica. The concept is, therefore, in populism poses the right questions, but it crisis, and populists themselves keep using does not supply the right answers. On the the term crisis (whether economic, social, other hand, the establishment has shirked cultural, political). And as it happens, the from even so much as asking the dangerous overuse further compounds the crisis, questions, giving populism free rein to make producing additional confusions of ideas. its ascent. That is to say, the key questions Populism is thus spoken about as a form of today are what went wrong, who is respon- post-politics, in terms of it being a result of sible, what should be done. the crisis of the political establishment, so- According to some opinions, one of called traditional parties and the ideologi- the causes lies in the fact that we are liv- cal spectrum itself, that is, of anti-politics, ing the aforementioned post-political age, in the context of the critique of the existing, wherein so-called classical parties (the and championing different, political forms left-centre-right triad) have lost their ideo- (such as the Yes to Europe, No to the Euro- logical reference points, became bureau- pean Union slogans, advocating certain cratic, not needing their membership for forms of direct democracy and similar). campaigning, while the social groups they Despite these ambiguities, it is evi- are addressing cannot be clearly defined. dent that populism has been penetrating, This fosters discord, that is, the alienation impinging, accusing..., and, paradoxically, between the people and politicians. This Zlatiborka Popov Momčinović also obliges. Thus, in Germany in 1992, the Associate Professor, Department of Journalism and Political word of the year was so-called politische Ver- 1 The use of the term elite is avoided, as it carries a Science, Faculty of Philosophy, drossenheit, or indifference towards politics. certain moral connotation. Eastern Sarajevo University 12 suffocated by stability populism as business as (un)usual

is precisely what populists use when they allegedly address the common, simple peo- When it comes to the former ple living an honest, hardworking life. In Yugoslavia, the people happened its 1993 programme, the Italian Lega Nord in these regions a long time ago, has stressed that it is essential to return the and no new happening is needed, dignity of the productive segment of the people, as opposed to the government and making populism business as usu- financial (global) capital (Betz, 2017: 94). al. “Our” nationalists, champions With the inflow of migrants from Muslim of one’s own kin, patriots in in- countries, these propositions have been definite political employment are extended to encompass protecting one’s in power. They are “authenti- own people not only from one’s own political elite, but also from “aliens” that same cally” of the people, even though elite falsely protects in the name of alleged they are elitists of many years’ multiculturalism and humanism, on which standing. They have success- it has actually leached. fully remained in government by Also contributing to this trend are new creating a subservient network media and popular (populist) modes of communication, as well as provocation. of followers and clients, so what After president Trump quoted Mussolini in the citizens who don’t belong to a tweet, a TV presenter asked him whether the network of patronage think he identified with fascism, to which the USA doesn’t actually concern them president replied, not with fascism, but yes with the quoted sentence (McGaughey, 2018: 294). For Bosnia and Herzegovina, that col- A large number of voters have turned umn remained empty – precisely because towards alternative options, such as the populism here is not anti-systemic, but Greens and environmentalist parties, but an integral part of the system. Politics is also towards populist parties, especially reduced to gossip, to hearsay, not to solv- right-wing ones that we focus on here. ing concrete problems. And while western Apart from a few exceptions, they do not populists criticise EU bureaucracy and their feature the term “party” in their names, but own technocracy as it is too removed from Alternativa, League, Front, Alliance, as they real life, politics in BH just cannot find its seek to represent themselves as something identity as a profession, but boils down to completely different through, among other continuous sloganeering and counterslo- things, markers of this kind. In addition, ganeering in the aim of covering up politi- it is clear that the names of the parties are cal incompetence. There is constant talk of themselves misleading (von Beyme, 2019: protecting one’s own ethnic community and 30), as many of them contain the prefixes its cultural specificity, while less than 0.5% free (in Austria, Holland), progressive (in of GDP is allocated to culture. The media Denmark and Norway) and similar. Style, have lost their essential functions (such as rhetoric, image, using various metaphors education, critical, watchdog), turning into rather than clearly defined views in terms megaphones for populists, their political of ideas, are among their key features. That incorrectness and unculturedness. For this is why it is said that this is a so-called thin reason, the political system of BH society is ideology. in a constant crisis that never lets up. And as In the Balkans, populism is part of the the aforementioned political scientist von official establishment, the local political Beyme states, populists use the term crisis class, or, better yet, caste, because it is a constantly and egregiously. closed oligarchic structure, is essentially populist, even though it is embedded in the go west system itself. This is its differentia specifica, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a To our eyes at least, the West has long well-known comparative analysis on the seemed the best of all possible worlds, subject of populism, when it came to par- like in Ahmed Imamović’s film, Go West. ties, the names of European countries were Wellbeing, functioning democracy, and followed by the names of their populist a high standard of human rights, unob- parties, their strength in percentages and trusive orderliness. But were we Plato’s the period when they were at their zenith. children, naively rejoicing in watching col- populism as business as (un)usual suffocated by stability 13

ourful flowers, replete with sensory, shal- (their parties’ and movements’ names often low impressions? What remained outside contain the attribute “freedom” – the Free- this general image appeared as a random dom Party of Austria, the Party for Freedom excess. The question remains whether this from Holland), something the Fascists was really an accident, or if there are more would never countenance. With an aside permanent structures that are concealed that these libertarian values are imperilled beneath the top of the iceberg, which make by aliens, especially Muslims, who, arriving populism possible. This question too is in the West, carry with them their baggage of difficult to answer, which does not deny values, incompatible with European values. anyone the right to try to ponder it. Nation- Due to such xenophobic attitudes, they are alism in these societies had the marks of often thought to resemble certain forms of so-called banal nationalism, as defined fascism. by Billig. It is continuously present in the And furthermore, western populists context of reminders of the nation, on the often insist on a Judeo-Christian tradition of occasion of national holidays and the simi- a “true” Europe, which clearly clashes with lar, so as to evoke one’s own belonging to the anti-Semitism of the National Socialists. the community, only to be mobilised and The Alternative for Germany (AfD) views become more visible and militant in certain itself as a friend of Israel. Likewise, the AfD periods when this is needed – for instance, underlines that it does not hate foreigners in Britain during the Falklands War, in the and Muslims, and that it is therefore not USA during its blitzkrieg in Iraq in 1991 (Bil- fascist. This is in fact what is sometimes lig, 1995: 3). called multi-fascism, or fascism-lite, where On the one hand, notwithstanding its certain groups (in this case cultures and theatricality, boosted by the new media nations) are not considered to be higher hungry for scandal and triviality, populism or lower, but essentially different. Never- is often associated with fascism. Still, a theless, when it comes to populism, there direct, unequivocal link cannot be made, are certain similarities with fascism, in its even notionally. Western populists do not xenophobia, its spreading of intolerance have paramilitary squads, do not aspire to – especially towards Islam – and its black- territorial expansion etc. (Bar-On, 2017: and-white Manichean worldview. Islam 28). They simply appeal to the people living itself is not infrequently viewed as a totali- its true identity in its authentic simplicity tarian ideology, or worldview (die Weltan- threatened by the (European) elite, globali- schauung), while fascism is only ascribed to sation, multinational companies, uncon- Islam. The Dutch politician Geert Wilders, trolled immigration. Contemporary western leader of the Party for Freedom, thus com- populists frequently invoke liberal values pared Mein Kampf to the Kur’an (Bar-On,

Photo by "Dr Case", Populism, flickr CC-BY-NC 2.0 14 suffocated by stability populism as business as (un)usual

2017: 34), while members of the right-wing phy, the Hungarian Jobbik party (Movement movement Pegida,2 based in Dresden, com- for a Better Hungary) uses uniforms remi- pare Islam to a cancer, indeed, equate them niscent of Nazi uniforms, and it glorifies the (Islam=Karzinom). period of the rule of the fascist and Hitler’s Certain parties’ views – for instance, that collaborationist Miklós Horthy.3 social benefits and assistance should only Anti-Semitism is present in populism be extended to “our people”, which the mul- in this part of Europe, with the Roma being ticultural European elite with its lavishing a frequent target of attacks (as in the cases of cash on various minorities at the expense of the Partidul Romania Unita, Slovenska of the ordinary, hardworking man and the narodna strana from Slovakia, the Bulgarian “real” people, the parasite-immigrants, the Ataka, the aforementioned Jobbik...), which global monetary structures imposing strict is undoubtedly reminiscent of National rules of austerity that threaten the wellbe- Socialism (Bar-On, 2017: 34, 35). The threats ing of our people, the governments using to “one’s own” in neighbouring states are money to save banks and corporations all pointed up, much like Hitler lamented over endanger. This somewhat resembles the the fate of the Sudeten Germans whom he fascist corporate state and the Nazi employ- had to bring under the Reich’s wing, and so ment of Germans ruined by the economic irredentism too is present. As these coun- crisis, as well as the Kauft nicht bei Juden! tries do not exactly represent a promised (Do not buy from Jews!) slogan. land, unlike the more “western” ones, there The (post)modern world is to a great is less immigration, but the enemies threat- extent a society of fear, one of the conse- ening our people are still sought and found quences of so-called progress. “Instead of outside, as well as inside, most often among great expectations and sweet dreams, ‘pro- the so-called indigenous minorities such as gress’ evokes an insomnia full of nightmares the Roma, and among the eternal enemies of ‘being left behind’, of missing the train or and global conspirators, the Jews. The case falling out of the window of a fast accelerat- of the construction of a concrete wall some ing vehicle,” Zygmunt Bauman writes in his 2 m tall in a northern Romanian town that famous book, Liquid Life. The advertising de facto ghettoised a Roma community une- industry fuels these fears, as symbolised, quivocally reminds of the Nazi period. according to the author, by the huge sales of What they have in common with the near-armoured, overexpensive SUVs, mar- populism described above is anti-elit- tial arts courses, prevention from the spec- ism, as well as calls for government to be tres of high blood pressure, cancer etc. This is returned to the hands of “their own” people further compounded by the all-encompass- (for instance, the SNS slogan in the 2010 ing fear of terrorism, crime, environmental election: “We are Slovaks. Slovak govern- disasters. Uncontrolled immigration creates ment for the Slovak people”). Democracy parallel societies, or ghettoes in the large cit- is invoked, but it is often stressed that it ies of Europe, that are difficult to control. need not be liberal. Thus Fidesz leader Vik- tor Orban, following his 2014 election vic- a little bit further east tory, publicly stated that if something is not liberal, it doesn’t mean it is undemocratic, A little bit further east, but still in Europe, thus repeating the mantras of Nazi jurist populism attains a more fascist-like form, Carl Schmitt. But when populists come to with the cause often, and sometimes with power, as it happened in Hungary, what oversimplification, reduced to the so-called comes with them is not just an attack on the vulnerability of the “new” post-socialist freedom of association and the media, but democracies and the anti-Zionism that was also a concentration of power. Something present in real-socialist countries. However, similar happened in Poland, after the vic- this often ignores the arrogance of techno- tory of the Law and Justice (PiS) party in the cratic leaders of the transition, who turned 2015 elections, when it undertook a series the people into an apolitical mass to be of measures to take control of the judici- modelled, not suspecting that there might ary (Stanley, Czesnik, 2019: 80) in order to come a payback, as highlighted by, among solidify its rule. And again – in the name of others, certain people acquainted with the the people and for the people, its original (poor) situation in Hungary. In its iconogra- values and some kind of “real” democracy only for one’s own definition of the demos. 2 Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islami- sation of the West) 3 https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/jobbik populism as business as (un)usual suffocated by stability 15

The culture is also cleansed of foreign influ- which provoked BH intellectuals and activ- ences and last traces (such as the produc- ists to protest, warning of hidden ambitions tion of forgetfulness of the fact that Hungary to turn BH into Erdo˘g an’s pashalik.5 But this had ever been ruled by the Ottoman Empire, isn’t without its contradictions, as populism the removal of the statue of the Jewish Marx- is often a conglomerate of opposites that ist theorist György Lukács...4). (do not) rule each other out. Before the presidential election in Serbia, at a large “popu- outside the EU in Europe lar rally” Šešelj called the Ukrainian regime Nazi, while at once declaring Orban a great The Balkans are a symbol of underdevelop- politician and leader, with the one differ- ment, an otherness, or liminality, within ence being that Šešelj wouldn’t erect walls Europe itself and its imagination, but also and barbed wire along Serbia’s borders, but of its own self-reflection (Todorova, 2009). minefields (!). As Bauman might put it, there It is a great buffer for various contradictions, is no fear in these regions of the train run- an eternal in-betweenness. ning off the tracks at full speed, while the When it comes to the former Yugosla- people are more of an orphan of globalisa- via, the people happened* in these regions tion than the people in the west. We fell off a long time ago, and no new happening is the train a long time ago, and the ultimate needed, making populism business as usual. subconscious desire is for a “great” leader “Our” nationalists, champions of one’s own to take us under his wing: Putin, Erdo˘g an, kin, patriots in indefinite political employ- Trump; to become some kind of governo- ment are in power. They are “authentically” rate, a pashalik, and thus create some kind of the people, even though they are elitists of protection from the external and internal of many years’ standing. They have success- “enemy”. In this, historical anachronisms fully remained in government by creating a and myths of the bulwark of Christendom, subservient network of followers and clients, of the good Bosniaks (Mujkić, 2007), of the so what the citizens who don’t belong to the rule of the Ottoman Empire as a form of Pax network of patronage think doesn’t actually Ottomana (Todorova, 2009: 50) are often concern them (Lasić, 2016: 157). They like to used in order to “prettify”, or camouflage sing, to use the simplest possible language such inclinations. (Chomsky would say, child language), to As Justus Bander, an expert on the AfD have people’s marches and processions, and award-winning journalist for the Frank- make amusing statements in the style of Ber- furter Allgemeine Zeitung, pointed out, this lusconi, who loved to “entertain” the Italian is a party that considers itself a party of so- people. At the same time, they are also tragic called common sense (Bander, 2017: 41). It figures fated to defend their culture and is perfectly in line with the principles of cer- tradition and martyrology, visit “their” sites tainty in the Cartesian sense that German of massacres, build up their victims while workers shouldn’t have to support migrants downplaying or denying “others’”. and foreigners with their own taxes. In the Although they nurture fear of the other context of the dysfunctionality of BH insti- and the different, they love “others’” popu- tutions, it is perfectly evident that at a com- lists and autocrats (if they suit them, of monsense level, BH is an impossible state course). Familiarity is considered one of and an artificial construct, as alleged by the instruments of populism, and it also Dodik,6 that is, that it needed to be reorgan- appears that there is such a thing as a popu- ised in line with ethnic principles and fur- list family. Marine le Pen, the leader of the ther divisions along the territorial principle, French National Front, thus stated: “If I as stressed by Čović. Draft amendments to were American, I would vote for Trump”. the electoral legislation by the BH CDU and Similarly, Dodik called on Serbs living in the phrase “legitimate representatives of the Austria to vote for the FPÖ’s Hofer because Croats” also show that there are aspirations he is a friend of the Serb people, while Bakir regarding the existence of “real Croats”, Izetbegović doesn’t hide his sympathies for that is, the real, authentic Croatian people, the true, pure Turk, the “Sultan” Erdo˘g an, 5 https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/apel-grupe- 4 http://hungarianfreepress.com/2017/02/16/hungary- intelektualaca-potvrdite-da-bih-nije-vise-pasaluk-u- is-removing-statue-of-philosopher-gyorgy-georg-lu- kome-se-bespogovorno-izvrsavaju-naredbe-iz-stambo- kacs-he-was-marxist-and-jewish/ la-476747 * “Događanje naroda” [the people happening] - a turn 6 This play on words with BH as an artificial construct of phrase used in the late Eighties to denote the so- represents a kind of “revenge” on the peoples of the called anti-bureaucratic, nationalist rallies in support former SFRY, who have opted for separation while of- of Slobodan Milošević. tn ten stating that Yugoslavia was an artificial construct. 16 suffocated by stability populism as business as (un)usual

which is mainly that which lives in Herze- govina and which the attempt is to protect. Literature: Discourses coming from the neighbour- Bander, J. (2017). Was will die AfD? hood contribute to this. As Asim Mujkić has Eine Partei verändert Deutschland. suggested, “every little while, certain media München: Pantheon Verlag and circles in Croatia produce an image of Bauman, Z. (2009). Fluidni život a Bosnian Croat as ‘true’, ‘pure’, as a ‘victim’ [Liquid Life]. Novi Sad: Mediterran or a ‘hero’ standing firm in his Croatness. A Publishing true, uncompromising Serb [...] in BH: there Betz, H-G (2018). The Radical Right our hero defiantly struggles for Serbian- and Populism. In J. Rydgren (Ed.), The ness” (Mujkić, 2007: 72). And furthermore, Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right if the Balkans are indeed Europe’s imagina- (pp. 86-104). New York City: Oxford tion, BH is the country of the subconscious, University Press of epic imagination and fantasy of Croatia Billig, M. (1995). Banal Nationalism. and Serbia wherein the ideal national arche- London: SAGE Publications type dwells (ibid, 73). Copsey, N. (2018). The Radical Right They often seek to conceal their authori- and Fascism. In J. Rydgren (Ed.), The tarianism by supporting certain rights and Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right liberties, at least as a performance, which (pp. 105-21). New York City: Oxford is manifest in Vučić’s appointment of Ana University Press Brnabić, a member of the LGBT popula- Lasić, M. (2016). Avanti diletanti. Sa- tion, to the post of Prime Minister of Serbia. rajevo-Zagreb: Synopsis This is an attempt to create a semblance of McGaughey (2018). Fascism-lite in commitment to European values, similar to America (or the Social Ideal of Donald western populists. They often point out that Trump). British Journal of American Islam is undesirable in Europe, among other Legal Studies 7 (2), 292-315 things, because of its rigid attitudes towards Mudde, C., Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). this population. The senior ranks of the party Populism. A Very Short Introduction. often include people from the group (as is Oxford / New York: Oxford University the case with AfD’s Alice Weidel). The per- Press formance is also evident in public appear- Mujkić, A. (2007). Mi, građani etnopo- ances flaunting philosemitism (especially in lisa. Sarajevo: Šahinpašić the case of Milorad Dodik), while among the Stanlye, B., Czesnik, M. (2019). Popu- Bosniak section, especially through portals lism in Poland. In D. Stockemer (Ed.), and social networks, anti-Semitism circu- Populism Around the World. A Compa- lates and smoulders continuously. rative Perspective (pp. 67-87). Springer But when it comes to the populist lead- (e-book) ers themselves, in comparison to those Stockemer, D. (2019). Introduction. In in the west, they nevertheless lag behind D. Stockemer (Ed.), Populism Around when it comes to using the Internet. Popu- the World. A Comparative Perspective list parties in Europe make copious use of (pp. 1-7). Springer (e-book) the Internet to disseminate their ideas and Todorova, M. (2009). Imagining the for so-called direct contact with their sup- Balkans. New York: Oxford University porters.7 In turn, studies conducted in BH Press show that local populist politicians are Von Beyme, K. (2019). Rightwing Po- “unskilled” in this sense – one of the reasons pulism. An Element of Neodemocracy. certainly being that populism here is of the Springer (e-book) systemic type, that is, business as usual. Of course, this does not mean that supporters and clients do not make use of so-called new media, especially web portals (both legal and unregulated), through which the “right of the stronger” from the previous war is sublimated into the “right of the louder” (Bandera’s phrase).

7 An erstwhile member of the Alternative for Germany expressed how disappointed she was when Angela Merkel stated that the Internet was for her a new world which she found hard to get used to. features of Competitive Authoritarian Rule in the Western Balkans suffocated by stability 17

features of Competitive Authoritarian Rule in the Western Balkans*

Florian Bieber

Over the past decade, the Western Balkans The informal competitive author- has experienced the reemergence of competitive authoritarian regimes, which rule itarian regimes which emerged with authoritarian means in a formally in the Western Balkans over democratic environment. These regimes are the past decade are based on part of a larger global trend and can draw on ‘strongmen.’ These strongmen earlier practices in the region, in particular are by no means unique, as we from the 1990s. There is no one-size-fits-all pattern in the region, and the authoritar- can note the centrality of au- ian features are the most pronounced in thoritarian male figures in other Serbia, North Macedonia under the rule undemocratic regimes, be they of Nikola Gruevski, in Montenegro, and Vladimir Putin in Russia, Recep Republika Srpska under Milorad Dodik’s Tayyip Erdo˘gan in Turkey, or dominance. However, similar patterns can be found elsewhere. These regimes are not Viktor Orbán in Hungary. While openly rejecting democracy, but have to bal- these might have developed a ance the formal structures of democracy, stronger ideological footing than not least to keep the EU integration pro- the regimes in the Western Bal- cess alive, with the will to retain power and kans, the authoritarianism has extract resources from the state. In my book The Rise of Authoritarian- not emancipated itself from the ism in the Western Balkans (Palgrave 2020), leading figure of the regime. I have sought to identify the emergence of these regimes, as well as their key features, which I introduce briefly below. The 8 features of competitive authoritarian regimes combine some aspects that can be found more widely among similar regime types with others based on the specific circum- stance of the Western Balkans.

Florian Bieber Professor in South East European History and Politics and * Shortened, adapted and revised version of Chapter 4, director of the Center for South The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans, East European Studies at the Palgrave Macmillan. University of Graz 18 suffocated by stability features of Competitive Authoritarian Rule in the Western Balkans

1 the constant state of 2 the dynamics of crisis stabilitocracy

Crises have served autocratic rulers in the External legitimacy accorded to competi- Western Balkans to create a continued tive authoritarian regimes can be termed suspension of normal politics. This kind “stabilitocracy”, as it thrives on the prom- of ‘crisis management’ does not mean the ise of stability, especially towards outsid- conventional understanding of resolving ers, and short-changes democracy and the or mitigating crises so much as their crea- rule of law for it. This does not suggest that tion and subsequent resolution. A number outsiders, whether parties, EU institutions, of authors have noted the broader use of national ministers or others, want to sup- security crises by authoritarian regimes, port autocrats or that they are always fully including competitive authoritarian ones, aware (or want to be aware) of the undem- from the Russian apartment bombings in ocratic practices of those they support. 1999 facilitating Putin’s rise to power, to the Instead, there is a complex set of reasons failed coup attempt in Turkey in 2016 that that have enhanced the external negligence shifted Erdoğan’s rule towards a competitive of democracy and the rule of law. authoritarian regime. However, the West- The chasm between formal commit- ern Balkan cases of such security crises are ment to EU membership and authoritari- less intense than the 2016 coup attempt anism at home undermined the assumption in Turkey and the subsequent crackdown, of the simultaneity of pro-EU positions and better serving the more subtle function of democracy. It is this gap that enabled the highlighting (to Western actors) the impor- rise of stabilitocracy. tance of governments in ensuring stabil- What facilitated this dynamic is the rise ity and extending prolonged uncertainty of geopolitical considerations in the EU and among citizens. This is not to suggest that international politics. For the EU, it was the all the crises are entirely made up or even multiple shocks of the late 2000s that made instigated by governments. Instead, they are the Union more inward-looking. The eco- instrumentalized, and sometimes made up, nomic and financial crises, the Eurozone to consolidate power. crisis, Brexit, and the migration crisis – if Instead of instigating large-scale vio- one accepts this nomenclature – all shifted lence, we can observe the production of the attention of the Union and its member crises. These crises come in four types. One states towards its survival and away from is a crisis that includes a threat against the promoting democracy and enlargement, government and thus constitutes an oppor- including in the Western Balkans. The EU’s tunity to describe the opposition as trai- more isolationist position focused its atten- tors and/or identify foreign enemies and tion in the region on issues of more direct securitize domestic politics. The second is national or EU concern, such as closing the focused on interethnic relations and the risk ‘Western Balkan route’. Next to migration, of renewed violence, serving as a distraction the threat of foreign fighters for the Islamic from everyday politics and playing to ethno- State from the Balkans became another key national discourse. The third is a crisis over Western focus, casting the region once more bilateral relations with a neighbour and the as a dangerous source of radicalism, in this creation of tensions. All three of these types case Islamic extremism. The consequence is have both domestic and international uses. a focus on law enforcement and border con- Finally, the fourth type of crisis is snap elec- trols rather than democracy and the rule of tions, called ahead of their due date. These law, even if the link between radicalization may not be a crisis as such, but they are an and democratic inclusive governance exists. opportunity to suspend everyday government and use campaigning to continue targeting the opposition and utilizing state resources for party purposes. features of Competitive Authoritarian Rule in the Western Balkans suffocated by stability 19

The Western Balkan cases of se- 4 state capture and weak curity crises are less intense than institutions the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey In its annual report on Macedonia in 2016, and the subsequent crackdown, the European Commission used the term better serving the more subtle “state capture” for the first time to describe function of highlighting (to West- how the institutions in an accession country ern actors) the importance of were being undermined and could not work governments in ensuring stability for the common good, “affecting the functioning of democratic institutions and key and extending prolonged uncer- areas of society. In early 2018, the European tainty among citizens. Commission extended the concept’s reach to all countries of the Western Balkans in its new regional strategies to note that “the 3 the rise of new external countries show clear elements of state cap- actors ture, including links with organized crime and corruption at all levels of government While the EU and the US had been the and administration.” prevalent actors in the Balkans since the This re-assertion of party control is early 1990s, other countries have become articulated through the erosion of inde- increasingly engaged. Some, like Russia or pendent institutions, the penetration of Turkey, have a long history of relations with state administration by party members and Balkan countries, bringing with them both the use of informal mechanisms to secure the advantage of intense ties to some com- control. In the early 2000s, a wave of new munities and the burden of preconceptions, independent institutions was established, stereotypes, and worries about competi- often to comply with EU and Council of tion. Other countries, such as China or the Europe requirements. These included United Arab Emirates, have few historical ombudspersons and other regulatory and connections, making their relationship less consultative bodies, created with external burdened but also denying them easy entry support. In addition, considerable resources points. were invested in the reform of the judiciary External actors can contribute econom- and strengthening parliaments to ensure a ically to the region, but also can contribute separation of powers so that these institu- to strengthening authoritarianism. Most tions could effectively oversee the work of directly, outsiders, such as Russia, openly governments. In comparison to the 1990s, support authoritarian leaders and con- this was a significant change. During the demn protests and the opposition as was 1990s the judiciary remained subordinated the case during the Colourful revolution in to governments and parliaments were North Macedonia. In other instances, non- underfunded, serving mostly to rubber- transparent economic engagement favours stamp executive decisions and making a strong men and informality, such as high- mockery of democracy through polarizing profile investments from the United Arab debates without any discernible substance, Emirates in Serbia. Finally, the increasing usually broadcast live on TV. While these visibility of outsiders provide for greater institutions have survived, they have been opportunity for governments in the region beset by institutional uncertainty and usu- to either assert their independence and ally deprived of their independence balance between actors or to disguise their In addition to weakening independent own democratic shortcomings by pointing institutions, the competitive authoritarian to outsiders. regimes have been using informal patterns to rule, weakening rule-based institutions while keeping formal democratic mechanisms intact. The use of informality is often reflected in the exercise of power bypassing formal, legal mechanisms. 20 suffocated by stability features of Competitive Authoritarian Rule in the Western Balkans

5 weak opposition and civil 6 strongmen in charge society The role of strong leaders finds support Rising authoritarianism has thrived and among citizens, where surveys suggest that amplified weak and divided opposition. support for democracy has declined in the This has been particularly pronounced in past decade, while the number of those Serbia and Montenegro, where more than supporting a strong leader has increased. a dozen opposition parties vie for electoral Furthermore, by 2017, a majority across the support and often shatter after electoral fail- region believes that strong leaders are com- ure. Cooptation of parts of the opposition patible with democracy, suggesting that and civil society by regimes further under- many who support democracy would also mine viable political alternatives. support a strong leader within a democratic Fragmented opposition and weak civil system. society are both structurally embedded and The informal competitive authoritar- encouraged by the competitive authoritarian regimes which emerged in the Western ian regimes. This fragmentation has been Balkans over the past decade are based on particularly intense in Montenegro, Bosnia, ‘strongmen.’ These strongmen are by no or Serbia, where the lines of fragmentation means unique, as we can note the central- and polarization do not follow the line of ity of authoritarian male figures in other division between government and opposi- undemocratic regimes, be they Vladimir tion, but also fragment the opposition on Putin in Russia, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in issues of national identity, be it along ethnic Turkey, or Viktor Orbán in Hungary. While lines as in Bosnia, the political orientation these might have developed a stronger of the state in Montenegro, or the position ideological footing than the regimes in the towards the past and the national interest as Western Balkans, the authoritarianism has in Serbia. not emancipated itself from the leading fig-

Photo by Jimmi Kristensen, flickr, CC-BY-NC 2.0 features of Competitive Authoritarian Rule in the Western Balkans suffocated by stability 21

ure of the regime. The same can be said of Macedonia and Bosnia, did exclusionary the regimes in the Western Balkans. Neither nationalism become more central to the Đukanović nor Vučić nor Gruevski offer(ed) regimes. Throughout, latent nationalism an ideologically coherent authoritarian sys- remains potent, as the fundamental narra- tem that could persist without these figures. tives of the wars in the 1990s have not been The ideological heterogeneity and the bal- substantially reshaped or, in some cases, ancing act between domestic authoritarian returned to the dominant lines of argument control and external democratic legitimacy that emphasize one’s own innocence (and make these highly personalized and infor- usually victimhood) and shift blame to oth- mal regimes. As noted above, the leaders ers. As Dejan Jović has argued for Croatia, emerged as ‘pragmatic reformers’, often the wars remain ever-present and are fre- with considerable external support. Thus, quently evoked to generate political legiti- their ascent to power was not based on the macy. Thus, while nationalism might not promise of authoritarian rule. be a constitutive force of most regimes, it continues to be an important resource. This does not mean that nationalism automati- 7 nationalism as a variable cally generates support, but rather that it resource triggers different, context-specific dynamics that reinforce polarization, marginalize par- While the competitive authoritarian regimes ticular political actors, or divide opponents. of the 1990s were firmly rooted in nationalism, this ideological choice is less perti- nent today. The ruling parties in Croatia 8 reestablishing a loyal and Serbia, as well as in Montenegro (until media 1997) and Bosnia, were based on the use of nationalism, even if formally they identified One of the main pillars of democracy that themselves respectively as Christian demo- emerged and thrived after 2000 was the crats and socialists. In the Western Balkans independent media. Private media, some- today, nationalism is less central to most times with foreign ownership, as well as of the regimes’ ideological foundations. efforts to transform government-controlled In part, EU integration and reform have media into public broadcasters, created become largely discursive alternatives, and fairly vibrant media scenes in the region. the number of disputes that can be framed Independent media, such as Radio B92 in in ethno-nationalist terms has declined. Serbia or the weekly Feral Tribune in Croa- By extension, there is no single regional tia, had already emerged in the region dur- pattern, but rather two types of regimes ing the 1990s, often with external support in terms of nationalism. One, exemplified and despite pressure from the government. by the ethno-nationalist parties in Bosnia, This level of media independence has including Milorad Dodik, or by Macedonia considerably decreased over the past dec- under VMRO-DPMNE, is where exclusion- ade. The transformation of government ary nationalism has become increasingly media into independent public broadcast- central to the government policy and ers stalled across the region, as most state trumps the rhetorical commitment to EU media continue to favour the governments. integration. In the other type, exemplified Among private media, lack of independ- by Montenegro under DPS rule, nationalism ence has been reflected in both the own- has been an occasional and often pragmatic ership structure, as well as the reporting. tool to reinforce regime control, but without Critical and independent media during a central function. the 1990s either folded due to commercial While nationalism has been a less cen- pressures, as did the Feral Tribune in Croa- tral feature of more recent competitive tia, or became largely uncritical through authoritarian regimes than their precur- weak sales and the loss of their initial eco- sors in the 1990s, nationalism is part of nomic independence (usually precarious the legitimizing strategies, moderated or and donor-supported), as in the case of the rather modified in the context of the cen- Serbian media group B92. Foreign media trality of external legitimacy. This results engagement in the region was strong in the in EU accession-compatible nationalism 2000s, but following the economic crisis and that tests the boundaries of historical revi- the general decline of print media, most sionism, as in Serbia. Only when EU acces- have left the region, including, notably, the sion becomes impossible or remote, as in German WAZ group, which was once strong 22 suffocated by stability features of Competitive Authoritarian Rule in the Western Balkans

in Serbia and Macedonia. The more repu- In the 1990s, influential media were table external investors have been replaced still under state control or ownership, so with opaque ownership structures. the channel of governmental influence was Throughout the region, the high number more direct than today. Today, we can note of media outlets has resulted in low quality, that competitive authoritarian regimes rely great pressure on journalists to produce on a combination of loyal media owned material, and little space for investigative by businesses with murky and convoluted reporting. This makes media susceptible ownership structures, economic pressure to government pressure, especially when on independent media, and threats and governments are important advertisers and censorship of journalists and media. Thus, funds are allocated in a non-transparent control of the media constitutes a central manner. The sometimes-opaque ownership element of the competitive authoritarian structures also give rise to suspicions that regimes, albeit less heavy-handed than media are kept by individuals and groups during the 1990s, with critical reporting in in the service of particular interest, be they many cases available only through online political or economic, rather than for com- platforms. mercial motivations. illiberal tendencies in Croatia after Trump and Brexit suffocated by stability 23 illiberal tendencies in Croatia after Trump and Brexit

Dario Čepo

Croatia has long been (since 2000 at least) An overarching reason might be deemed a “success story” of the EU enlargement policy. The principle of conditional- a myth which became a part of ity, a steady dose of Europeanization, and the HDZ origin story, and which pro-EU domestic political elites, supporters has been religiously repeated of Croatia-as-a-success-story proclaimed, throughout the last three dec- are obviously enough to push a transitional ades – the HDZ as the creator country that was on the brink of falling into authoritarianism, towards the path of stable of modern Croatia and its first liberal democracies. Even today, some EU leader, F. Tuđman, as the father politicians (the latest being European Com- of Croatian independence. If you mission President-Elect U. von der Leyen, see yourself as the creator and during her visit to Zagreb in the summer of the father, then all other actors 2019) treat Croatia as a success story, especially when compared to the Western Bal- that compete with you are seen kans countries. However, there are growing not as equal competitors and at signs that Croatia is closer to the political times potential coalition partners, systems bred in Budapest and Warsaw, than but as enemies and a hindrance the one exported from Brussels. to your natural right to rule over This essay depicts, in broad strokes, the reasons, influences, and actors responsible a system you created. And if for the obvious liberal backsliding and dem- other political parties (and, by ocratic stagnation of Croatia. This outline is extension, all those who support intended as the starting point for a more them) are seen as enemies, then in-depth analysis of “what happened” and no option is out of bounds in “how did we get here”, where the democratic order to defend both your right character of Croatia is concerned. I propose that it started with the 2013 accession and to rule and the system you built the loss of the stick part of the carrot-and- and set in motion. This leads to stick approach linked to the conditionality my conclusion that the HDZ was principle. I also propose that it has gained (and still is) one of the strongest strength due to the populist and illiberal supporters and promoters of the tendencies of two of the major political events of the 2010s – the election of Don- populist turn in Croatia, espe- ald Trump as the President of the United cially post-2013. States of America and the triumph of the YES vote on the referendum on the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. Many impulses toward increased illiberal- Dario Čepo ism and authoritarianism came from these Assistant Professor, University three events. However, none of this would of Zagreb, Faculty of Law 24 suffocated by stability illiberal tendencies in Croatia after Trump and Brexit

have such a profound influence on Croatia’s can witness it in the radical right turn of for- liberal and democratic backsliding were mer French president N. Sarkozy, for exam- it not for one crucial actor – the Croatian ple. It is also a favourite tool of ambitious Democratic Union (HDZ). My last propo- yet weak politicians, like S. Kurz of Austria sition, hence, is that the HDZ’s behaviour or M. Rajoy of Spain. Such a strong move both during its years in power, and espe- towards the radical right is also visible in cially during its opposition years, has been our two previously mentioned examples. the major driver of the democratic backslid- Trump won on the basis of overwhelming ing of Croatia. support from nativists, white supremacists, The HDZ is the dominant political party and religious-political social movements. in Croatia. In the 29 years of multiparty Brexit succeeded because the leadership democracy, it has ruled for all but seven of the Conservative Party wanted to suffo- years, for long stretches as the sole party cate competitors to the right of them and to of government, and recently through coa- assuage radical right members of their own litions with much smaller and weaker jun- party. ior partners. It is a special kind of political However, the example of the HDZ is actor. Like almost all right-of-centre politi- particularly interesting for two reasons. cal parties, it has a radical right wing or The first one is the dominant position of faction whose influence waxes and wanes that party in the political system of Croatia, depending on the strength or weakness of especially on the subnational level, where it the current president. At the same time, the rules in all but a handful of municipalities HDZ is fond, again like many other main- and counties. The second one is the utter stream right-of-centre parties, of flirting hatred the HDZ shows toward losing elec- with extremist positions and groups in the tions and being in opposition. Political par- society, including nationalists, populists, ties, of course, like winning elections more and outright neofascists, if that secures than losing them. That is, in the end, the them more votes and hence more politi- raison d’etre of political parties – you win an cal power. This can be seen not only in the election and that gives you the opportunity leading representatives of the HDZ, such as to introduce preferred policies and reform the current and (many) former presidents, the system. If you succeed in persuading the giving interviews to radical right media, but voters that you did a good job, you win the also in the HDZ building national, local, next elections too. If not, you go into opposi- and even European-level electoral coalition and readjust your programme. A strong tions with parties to the right of them, many liberal democracy needs both a strong party with chequered histories of supporting illib- in power and a strong opposition to keep eral and even undemocratic tendencies in the ruling party in check and to convince Croatia. citizens that there is an alternative. Hence, This tactic is not something unique to one can test a political party’s dedication to the HDZ, though. It is a tried and tested democracy by how it acts during its time in means of holding on to power for many opposition. If we apply such a test, we see right-of-centre parties across Europe. We that the HDZ does not fare particularly well.

European Parliament, flickr, CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 illiberal tendencies in Croatia after Trump and Brexit suffocated by stability 25

This was visible in the criticisms the HDZ Croatia is neither a special case and its leaders doled out to minority groups, nor a poster child of European ideological opponents, and critics, and has integration. If anything, its ruling manifested itself in many different forms, through many different, usually intercon- political elite is using institutions, nected actors, as well as in the way windows establishing structures, and of opportunity opened by the developments adopting policies that are turn- within the political system were used. Here, ing Croatia into a run-of-the-mill I will focus on several actors and show the stabilitocracy. Will this stripping opportunities they used in the last five years. Before that, however, we need to of democracy be stopped, i.e. briefly mention the groups that were often what are the chances of progress attacked by the HDZ and their allies in the for Croatia on its democratic political system and the society at large. path? In the short-to-medium Since the mid-2010s, certain collec- term it seems that Croatia’s tive actors and societal groups have come democracy will continue to stag- under heavy criticism either by the HDZ government, the HDZ itself (when they nate or even backslide. There were in opposition), HDZ proxy parties are four major reasons that or individuals, or powerful veto actors support this conclusion: the HDZ aligned with HDZ ideology. The most heav- as the dominant party; weak op- ily criticised groups include, but are not position; dire demographic situa- limited to, the Serb minority, the LGBTQ* community, left and liberal civil society tion in the country; and external organizations, migrants, and some public influences from both the EU and intellectuals. The reasons for criticism and global powers. attacks directed at these groups are diverse, linked to these groups’ specific interests and needs, or by ideological differences between The reasons why the HDZ turns into them and the HDZ rank and file. For exam- Mr Hyde during its years in the opposition ple, representatives of the Serb minority in are manifold and surely have to do with a Croatia came under attack by the HDZ and lack of intra-party democracy. However, an their allies because of their wish to enjoy overarching reason might be a myth which their constitutionally guaranteed right to became a part of the HDZ origin story, use their minority language and script in and which has been religiously repeated municipalities where they represent a sig- throughout the last three decades – the HDZ nificant percentage of the population (more as the creator of modern Croatia and its first than a third). The LGBTQ* groups were criti- leader, F. Tuđman, as the father of Croatian cised for their insistence on marriage equal- independence. If you see yourself as the ity, although no such calls came from them creator and the father, then all other actors in the first place. Left and liberal civil society that compete with you are seen not as equal organizations have been a favourite target competitors and at times potential coalition ever since the independence of Croatia, as partners, but as enemies and a hindrance to the HDZ saw them as obstructors of their your natural right to rule over a system you intention to acquire complete power in the created. And if other political parties (and, nascent nation. Currently they are criti- by extension, all those who support them) cised for supporting a variety of progressive are seen as enemies, then no option is out international treaties and agreements, like of bounds in order to defend both your right the Istanbul Convention or the Global Com- to rule and the system you built and set in pact on Migration. Migrants are, of course, motion. a perennial scapegoat for any national- This leads to my conclusion that the ist, but the HDZ’s focus on them and their HDZ was (and still is) one of the strongest allies is particularly cynical as it goes along supporters and promoters of the populist with hiding their nationalist disdain behind turn in Croatia, especially post-2013. In the veneer of following EU rules regarding Croatia, as in many other countries, pop- its external borders. Hence, they are not ulism, more often than not, manifests itself against migrants, but only against “illegal through ultranationalism. To paraphrase migration”, at the same time making it hard Trump’s leading motto, it is “Croatians First”. for migrants to use the instruments of “legal 26 suffocated by stability illiberal tendencies in Croatia after Trump and Brexit

migration”, and securitizing migration the economic crisis, yet was blamed by their policy, at the expense of the humanitarian rivals and much of the public for not resolv- approach some (mostly liberal and social ing it. This allowed the HDZ to denounce democratic governments and actors) pro- every policy the government introduced fess. In the end, some public intellectuals as lacking legitimacy, forcing the govern- are always seen by the HDZ as enemies aid- ment to either backpedal or spend energy ing the other side by criticising the HDZ and on defending their proposals instead of their policies. Some examples of recent crit- implementing them. The second opportu- icisms directed at certain public intellectu- nity was much more important however, als were linked to the HDZ’s refusal to allow as it is structural and, hence, can be used critical evaluation of the rule of the HDZ’s in the future as well. The HDZ and its allies (and country’s) first president, Tuđman, have been using (and continue to use) or the support of many in the intellectual and misusing legal norms and institutions community for the reform of the education that form the core of the political system system, including the introduction of civic of Croatia, hence undermining the system education and health education for primary using its own tools and from within. These and secondary school pupils. norms and institutions include, but are not In this activity of attacking, the most limited to, legislation on citizens’ initiatives important strength of the HDZ is all the and referenda, the Constitutional Court, the proxies, allies, and individuals they can parliamentary majority, and independent deploy when it is not politically opportune executive agencies. for them to be seen as the main attackers. To conclude, Croatia is neither a spe- Some of these actors are major veto play- cial case nor a poster child of European ers, like the Catholic Church and the vet- integration. If anything, its ruling politi- erans’ groups. Some are conservative civil cal elite is using institutions, establishing society organizations, either having sprung structures, and adopting policies that are up as offshoots of similar organizations turning Croatia into a run-of-the-mill sta- already existing in the West (or established bilitocracy. Will this stripping of democ- by returning members of the Croatian dias- racy be stopped, i.e. what are the chances pora), or established as astroturf organiza- of progress for Croatia on its democratic tions to delegitimize the existing ones. If all path? In the short-to-medium term it seems else fails, the HDZ can count on the myriad that Croatia’s democracy will continue to of small radical right political parties and stagnate or even backslide. There are four individuals allowed to voice statements major reasons that support this conclusion. that are too radical for the HDZ’s European These are: the HDZ as the dominant party; partners. weak opposition; dire demographic situa- Having introduced both the criticised tion in the country; and external influences actors and those helping the HDZ do the from both the EU and global powers. The criticising, it is time to see which windows first and second reasons go hand in hand. of opportunity the HDZ and its allies used The HDZ, as the dominant political party in to optimise their attacks on the government the Croatian party system, bears the great- (when they were in opposition) and on other est responsibility for the current situation. actors (when they were in power). The first Hence, it will be the most influential in the major opportunity was the economic crisis future democratic trajectory of Croatia. that started in 2009 in Croatia and lasted for Having that in mind, it seems that Croatia seven years, the longest in the EU. The sec- will remain strongly under the sway of the ond opportunity the HDZ and its allies used supporters of the illiberal democratic turn. to the greatest possible extent was that pro- Due to the internal conflict between the vided by the existing legal norms and insti- nominally moderate and openly nationalis- tutions, used strategically and in bad faith tic wings of the HDZ, this can only become (yet completely legally). worse post-2019, depending on the success The first window of opportunity needs or failure of the HDZ candidate in the presi- no in-depth explanation. The left-of-centre dential election. At the same time, the oppo- government in Croatia came to power amid sition is weak, self-imploding, or unable to illiberal tendencies in Croatia after Trump and Brexit suffocated by stability 27

cooperate with the goal of giving the citizens Italy, lead us to believe that the international an alternative to HDZ rule. What is worse, political climate is not favourable for safe- the opposition is becoming populated by guarding democracy in a small, open, and anti-establishment, anti-system, and radi- impoverished country. cal right political forces. They are not only Not to end on a completely pessimis- uninterested in safeguarding the liberal tic note, there are some structural forces democratic political system, but are focused that may maintain positive pressure on the on revisionist policies, isolation, and align- political elite. This could then help safe- ing themselves with autocratic regimes like guard Croatia’s democratic development. Russia or Hungary. There are three main forces; political, eco- The third reason, however, is going to nomic, and societal. The first is linked to the have the most long-term consequences elite’s interest in Croatia’s further European for Croatia as a whole, and especially for integration. All mainstream political actors, its democratic character – demography. including the HDZ, support the further The demographic picture of Croatia is dire integration of Croatia into the structure of and getting worse. Ever since the war in the the EU, mainly by entering Schengen and early 1990s, demographic trends in Croatia the Eurozone. These goals are coupled with have been negative. Low or negative fertility Croatia’s dependence on EU funds, which rates are now exacerbated by intense emi- if used as carrot or stick by the European gration of the young and educated to other Commission may induce Croatian govern- EU member states, as well as by restrictive ments to work on at least maintaining the immigration policies that basically exclude levels of democratic development reached all except members of the Croatian dias- so far. The second, economic, force is linked pora. Those who are emigrating are taking to the ever-growing dependence of the their families with them, which allows us to Croatian economy on tourism. The annual conclude that they will not be coming back influx of fresh cash from the tourism indus- any time soon. Those who are staying have try, together with remittances sent by the fallen into political apathy or readily sup- emigrant community, and profits from the port anti-systemic forces due to cynicism, grey economy, are lifelines that are keeping fatalism or disappointment. a large percentage of the population from The final reason for pessimism lies in falling below the poverty line. Hence, the the character of current international arena, tourism industry keeps the population from both on the global and regional levels. Brexit engaging in anti-elite social activities (pro- has empowered Eurosceptic forces in Croa- tests, boycotts, insurrections) and helps the tian society to come up with an alterna- elite maintain the status quo as any sign of tive to the European integration. Although societal or political trouble would frighten their influence is still weak, Brexit proved the tourists away, which would be detri- that their positions are not impossible and mental for citizens living off the tourism hence allowed them to enter the public industry. The last, societal, force is linked to debate as legitimate political and societal those migrating to other countries, many of actors. This will have repercussions on Cro- which are on a higher level of liberal-demo- atia’s integration stance down the line and cratic development. The assumption is that attempts to introduce Croatia into the core they would adopt political ideas, behaviour, of member states supporting ever closer and norms, which they would internalize union. As in many other countries around and transmit to their families back home. the world, in the USA the Trump presidency Afterwards, both they and their families allowed the mainstreaming of the nativist, would be able to promote the same norms, ultra-nationalist “US First” mentality, which values, activities, and ideas in their local many in Croatia nurtured for a long time but communities as well. This “spillover effect” were now allowed to display publicly. These might prove to be the most important ele- two global cases, as well as more regional ment in safeguarding Croatia’s democratic ones, like the case of competitive authori- character for this and future generations. tarianism in Orban’s Hungary, or the mainstreaming of the radical right in Austria and 28 suffocated by stability the hidden radicalism of the ruling ideologies

the hidden radicalism of the ruling ideologies

Nerzuk Ćurak

The world today has lost its good judgment, The world is entering a new era, and so Aristotle’s well-known idea of virtue and this tracing of new political as the mean between two extremes finds patterns undoubtedly belongs to itself trampled under the feet of radicalism. political radicalism, because it is In the “age of extremes”, the middle path is possible that the world we had no longer a virtue of human existence, but, in the interpretation afforded by various known until today will undergo radical views on the world, is considered a radical changes. This means that defeated ideology of liberal weaklings and the phenomenon of radicalism cowards. Indeed, after the epic opening up should not be limited merely to of the world in the Nineties and the global the world of terrorism and the triumph of American liberal hegemony ideologies behind it. The sub- that westernised the world while promoting the importance of the key accomplish- stance of the concept of politi- ments of liberal democracy, especially to cal radicalism must also include the citizens of post-totalitarian, oppressive mainstream ideologies emanat- single-party systems of the collapsed Soviet ing a new political culture, at empire, it seemed as if radical and extremist whose core lies the return of the ideologies had been brought to their natural ends, and that in the post-totalitarian era, old world as new. humanity will, more or less successfully, live Fukuyama’s liberal dream of a history that had reached its vertical apex, and all that remains for it is to spread out and horizon- tally develop at its liberal end.

Nerzuk Ćurak Full Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo. the hidden radicalism of the ruling ideologies suffocated by stability 29

This illusion was both metaphorically, elites, that are the political radicals, away symbolically and in reality knocked down from the centre as a political virtue. Indeed, on 11 September 2001, when, following the in the security sphere, a concept has been terrorist strike on the USA, the American developed that appears as the opposite of government led by president Bush jr. opted terrorism, radicalism and violent extrem- for a violent return to history, burying liber- ism, and which has become a platitude alism as an idea of freedom, replacing it with used by national and international political neoliberalism, the rigid, extremist variant of and security elites. Ah, the stability and its political conservatism and economic pre- derivative, stabilitocracy. Sounds promis- dation. This murderous political-economic ing, proper, meek, strong, dominant vis à vis synthesis lead to the War on Terror as a new the radical and extremist challenges of the political paradigm in international rela- world today. It sounds like something worth tions, which for over two decades already, supporting in the confrontation against the under various guises, has significantly world of unrest, violence, uncertainty pro- shaped the dominant structures of inter- duced by forces that are not integrated into national politics that had returned to the our world. However, the problem is that sta- conventional patterns of action and a well- bility is a narrative of stasis, which becomes trodden methodology of the realist school more important than the developmen- of international relations. This means that tal dimension, encouraging the return of we have been exposed to the end of multi- archetypal images of the world; the enemy lateralism and the restoration of bipolar Us- lurking behind the fence, intent on destroy- Them views of the world. ing our way of life. The construction of the world based Are the current Croatian and Serbian on enemy figures has gained such momen- presidents not a true example of a prejudi- tum that it threatens to cancel the achieved cial understanding of stability as the domi- degree of liberal construction as a construc- nant form of political existence, and do they tion of freedom, drowning the universal not encourage their followers in Bosnia and idea of free human individuals in a destruc- Herzegovina in a primitive, quasi-imperial, tive political manifest of old conservatives and essentially provincial fashion in order who awoke in the twenty-first century in the to fan the flames of hallucinogenic images shape of white supremacists. Donald Trump of Bosnian Muslims, with the aim of their is the expression of the old world’s yearning symbolical and real transformation into a to sell itself to younger generations as a new radical anti-European Other, even though world. the newest public opinion surveys confirm The key instrument for this civilisational that of all the ethnic communities in the restructuring lies in political radicalism, BH, the Bosniaks are most loyal to the idea with a Hegelian cunning of reason: we must of Europe and belonging to the European sell our radicalism to the world as pure nor- Union. mality, directing all decision-making energy The missing developmental under- decision-makers in the political and secu- standing of BH, as opposed to primitive rity spheres have towards the radicalism didactic patronage, is what Bosnia needs, and extremism of those others, others who, and what is radically absent as a condi- according to our preemptive strategy, are tion to open the gates of the West, to whose radicals and extremists by their own nature. moral universe BH has the right to belong Given that American political, security, without exclusionary disqualifications of economic and cultural power is still the the authentic Bosnian world. It is precisely only potential all-pervading, comprehen- due to the long-lasting attempts to locate sive might, and might is right, and bearing and recognise BH as the land of darkness, in mind, regardless of the dark clouds gath- although both historic and recent events ering over the American democracy, that for have confirmed that in relation to the BH, many humiliated and disenfranchised peo- our neighbours are no less, if not more, sites ple, the USA is still the most intense dream of darkness, and due to the overall theo- of liberty, this combination of the value of retical and political wandering as far as the power and the power of value tip the bal- topic of radicalism goes, in the following ance in decisions by most political elites in paragraphs, I will offer a view of radicalism modern states to consider themselves like- from an non-consenting angle. wise champions of the struggle against radi- Radicalism today is a global social calism and extremism, in no way suspecting phenomenon, and as such, has predomi- that it might be that it is precisely they, these nantly occupied the international public 30 suffocated by stability the hidden radicalism of the ruling ideologies

sphere. The main reason for the irruption of radicalism should not be limited merely of the phenomenon of radicalism both into to the world of terrorism and the ideologies political theory and the media, as well as behind it. The substance of the concept of into politics as a process of decision-mak- political radicalism must also include main- ing, is tied to the incursion of the terrorist stream ideologies emanating a new political organisation ISIS into history, using brutal culture, at whose core lies the return of the violence to promote the culture of death as old world as new. a way of life, challenging the political and When I say return of the old world, non-political actors of our world to widen isn’t what the Hungarian Prime Minister the field of struggle, not only against terror- Orbán advocates political radicalism? Is ism as organised political violence, but also the triumph of extreme right, xenophobic, against political radicalism itself as an ideol- anti-Semitic, islamophobic conceptions ogy of violence. not radicalism? To me, it seems an awful However, the pronounced reduction of kind of radicalism that, say, in the election radicalism, largely to ISIS and the phenom- campaign for the latest election in Hungary, enology generated from this horrendous a de facto anti-Semitic strategy directed culture of oppression and death, may have against George Soros has emerged as a pub- caused more harm than good. Observing lic policy, a public exhibit. This is horrifying an extremely important, yet in a historical political radicalism, which may not lead to sense nevertheless secondary phenome- violent extremism, but can and will erect non, as primary allows the primary subjects razor wires against people fleeing terror and of radicalism to avoid being recognised as unfreedom. political radicals; indeed, it so happens that In his day, Karl Marx said, “to be radical they are designated as the greatest fight- is to go to the root of the matter. For man, ers against political radicalism and violent however, the root is man himself.” It appears extremism. The search for the truth, in to me, unlike Marx, whose self-birthing defi- turn, involves standardising certain politi- nition had in mind the emancipation of the cal subjects belonging to the conventional humiliated subject of history, that today’s sphere of politics as radical subjects, as they radicalism is aimed at a different direction lead, or can lead to, the production of social – at the destruction of the achieved cosmo- relations that are true political radicalism, politan values, the humanist regression of yet are considered as pure normality. For man, and the ambition to revive a hard sov- instance, the world is entering a new era, ereignty that leads us all towards the return and this tracing of new political patterns of the nation-fortress and the – potential undoubtedly belongs to political radical- – destruction of the best of all worlds – the ism, because it is possible that the world we European Union. had known until today will undergo radical We are living the paradox wherein radi- changes. This means that the phenomenon cal ideologies that underpin the govern-

Trending Topics 2019, flickr, CC-BY 2.0 the hidden radicalism of the ruling ideologies suffocated by stability 31

ment in many countries around the world, tives, transforming Marx’s eleventh thesis are tasked with pacifying the political radi- on Feuerbach into a winner’s slogan: Phi- calism that transforms itself into terror- losophers have only interpreted the world ism. We have sailed into a world where a in various ways; the point, however, is for large number of citizens value the ideas of the new media to change it. And in terms of a closed society, ideas of fear of the Other its intention and motto, Fox News is a new and the Different, thanks to contemporary medium: not to inform, but to lie, spin, means of communication, the megavirtual fake, hate... It was on this anti-journalistic and telekinetic civilisation that has trimmed platform that Ailes became the key player space and thickened time; an ambient in the modelling of the American electoral in which the policies and ideologies that basis, with this programmatic bombshell: proliferate are those that demand nothing “People don’t want to be informed. They and, as if on an assembly line, only make want to feel (underlined by N.Ć.) informed.” promises. The poisoned media and political This is the difference that this unscrupulous atmosphere, where bad news triumph over media schemer, sexist, bad human being, good news, with the migration vector that conspiracy theorist and practitioner has so can be read from radical political ideolo- brilliantly grasped, and upon which he built gies through Huntington’s clash of civilisa- the conditions for a new world, with the tions (an idea that found its way to citizens idea of undoing the American liberal herit- of varying levels of educational attainment, age. He projected Trump as someone who including those people that are among the could possibly carry out this work, and they least well educated in our world), has pro- won. They convinced millions of viewers duced a situation which appears to resem- that truth is lie, and that their everyday lie ble a change of eras, as if we were present is truth, as their viewers weren’t interested at an historical retreat of the world, giving in information, but the feeling that they up from a journey into a good society, the were informed. And the feeling that they utopia of Europe, an European republic. were informed meant merely that Ailes and Europe is breaking down as concepts I had Trump confirmed their deep-rooted fears, hoped belonged to a finished history are prejudice, conspiratorial thinking and simi- coming back to life. lar. Nowadays, the most active in our region Following his, I hope, final re-election as on a similar platform is the Radio-Television the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban of the Republic of Srpska. This is how Fox said, I paraphrase, that liberal democracy News become the TV network that changed was over, and that it is time for a 21st century the world. For the worse – so much worse christian democracy, which corroborates that it arrested the journey towards freedom my claim about the beginning of a European and reaffirmed notoriety and ignorance as materialisation of Huntington’s paradigm. the criteria of political victory, and thence And indeed, we are witnessing the imperil- the victory of values. Thus, political radical- ment of the idea of liberalism as an idea of ism became the mode of governing for the freedom, stupidity becoming more impor- long run, because the citizenry identified tant than knowledge, and ignorance gain- with the political radicalism of Fox News, ing primacy over intellect. We have entered but not as radicalism, but as something that an era where facts are endangered, do not is politically correct; something that there- shape policy, mean nothing, and a world fore isn’t radicalism. I believe that a signifi- without facts is a world where lie is the truth cant part of the world is now engulfed in this of a being. kind of radicalism. In the extraordinary new seven-part In a way, President Trump has been HBO series, The Loudest Voice, where Rus- trying to render multilateralism senseless, sel Crowe gave a first-class performance as make it irrelevant by reducing diplomacy a right-wing media visionary Roger Ailes, to bilateral relations only. This is the return the man who made Fox News into the most of the old world. This tells us how much a watched TV network in the USA, Ailes utters personality can after all influence the pro- the sentence that is the heart of the regres- duction of history, especially in a country sive transformation of the world, a thought such as the USA. And now, if this stage of that led to the triumph of populism, regres- such political radicalism or radicalist pop- siveness, xenophobia, islamophobia and ulism, a more precise definition, were to anti-Semitism, and which confirmed that, go on, we would be heading for a world I’d when they so desire, the media can rule define as the end of politics, as non-politics. the world by setting up dominant narra- We can see what Trump is doing. At home 32 suffocated by stability the hidden radicalism of the ruling ideologies

and abroad, he is banalising and rendering Both BH’s and the region’s biggest prob- senseless a world that had had significant lem is not violent extremism, but ruling support from Democrats (but also liberal ideologies’ political radicalism. There is no Republicans), a world of multilateralism, doubt that we are living in a world where of free media, non-governmental organisa- security is more important than freedom, in tions, think tanks and civil society... He abol- a world where the security industry is more ishes expertise, degrades political science important than freedom and democracy. and in effect reduces politics to his Twitter When you live in such a world, it means account. It is a terrible assault on political we have a very extended security system, literacy, a radicalised populism. (Which is which can control groups inclined towards why it is extremely important to politics, violence, the production of death and so on. especially international politics, that both Unfortunately, we have political systems George Soros and the conservative philan- whose political radicalism cannot be con- thropist Charles Koch together stood up trolled because the majority of this political against this degradation of knowledge and radicalism belongs to the mainstream zone fundamental American values, by giving and possesses the instruments to multiply considerable financial support to the estab- its authority, to expand it, to survive, and for lishment of the Quincy Institute, whose citizens not to even experience it as political opening is planned for this autumn, and radicalism. On the contrary, the structures whose expertise should support the idea of of political radicalism understood this way international peace as the dominant Ameri- are part of the structure of stabilitocracy, the can foreign policy agenda.) And then, since instrument tasked with combating radical- America is the role model, this is transferred ism and violent extremism. to other countries as a desirable model. Just Necessity demands that the ruling like Clinton and Obama transmitted to radical nationalist ideologies step down. the world the positive values of American These ideologies have normalised politi- democracy, making east European and Bal- cal extremism, as if this was third way poli- kan countries keen to identify themselves tics. The long-term survival of the Chetnik as much as possible with America as it was and Ustasha ideologies, as well as the then, nowadays there are many countries long-term relativisation and normalisa- seeking to identify themselves with this new tion of the imported ideologies of evil that Trumpian America. I am not sure whether directly resulted in young people leaving such an understanding of politics will lead for Daesh terrorist camps, are this country’s to laying violent extremism and terrorism and the Dayton triangle countries’ prob- to rest, especially within unintegrated parts lem, generated by certain ruling ideologies of the world and in regions marked by long- normalising the radicalist discourse, even term instability. Here such violent extrem- introducing it into the sphere of politics. All ism – even though ISIS’s head has now been of a sudden, we are living in countries where severed – might take other forms, allowing the Chetnik discourse has been normalised, the culture of death to go on and continue where the Ustasha discourse has been nor- to develop forcefully, which may have the malised, where the neo-Salafist religious worst consequences for those elements radical discourse has been normalised, I’d within the Middle East and Central Asia say to a lesser extent, but nevertheless, hav- that wish to democratise this world and try ing not yet reached the level of normalcy of to create model democratic societies that Chetnikism and Ustashism, as it is under wouldn’t be exposed to constant oppres- much more stringent security control by sion, whether by local religious or dictato- the two previous radicalisms that evade easy rial structures, or by power structures from labelling and very easily penetrate the struc- further abroad. Only the Israeli Jerusalem tures of our society, our education system, has been reviving, and will revive the worst the fabric of our lives, so that a huge num- terrorist rituals – on the part of both state ber of citizens get used to this as if it were and non-state agents. normality; but it is an abnormal normality, a pathology. the hidden radicalism of the ruling ideologies suffocated by stability 33

is there a cure? Both BH’s and the region’s biggest problem is not violent extremism, but ruling ideologies’ I believe that overall, the permanent cure political radicalism. There is no doubt that we lies in the emancipation of humanity. It is are living in a world where security is more important to develop the idea of liberal democracy, with dedicated work on creating important than freedom, in a world where the the conditions for social justice and equality security industry is more important than free- of opportunity, while being heedful of local dom and democracy. We have political systems contexts. Many people either reduce lib- whose political radicalism cannot be controlled eral democracy merely to an ideology of an because the majority of this political radical- unfettered free market, which is both theo- retically and historically untenable, or stuff ism belongs to the mainstream zone and pos- the concept with all manner of things. It is sesses the instruments to multiply its authority, crucially important to view liberal democ- to expand it, to survive, and for citizens not to racy as a request for freedom that manifests even experience it as political radicalism. On the itself in the political and social spheres as contrary, the structures of political radicalism freedom of association, as individual freedom, as freedom, rather than an ideology of understood this way are part of the structure of human rights, as a freedom of opinion, free- stabilitocracy, the instrument tasked with com- dom from some kind of overbearing force bating radicalism and violent extremism. that will keep watch over you, as is unfortunately the case today in many quasi-democratic, but illiberal states... These notions of freedom need the added value of a request for increased justice and solidarity among people. I believe these values are worth fighting for, that they are, both potentially and intentionally, a part of the EU’s repertory of values (with all the emancipatory objections by the European left, which are sensible and also need to become part of the repertory of values of the transforming European Union), and that we should not give up on them. That is why I think BH’s accession to the EU is our most important cultural and civilisational task, unless in the meantime, under assault by the awoken nationalisms of its member-states, the European Union becomes benumbed, diminished, rendered senseless, radically incapacitated or reduced to a mere coordination mechanism – that is, to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 34 radicalisation against external ‘others’ between the humanitarian and the securitized approach to the refugee crisis

radicalisation against external ‘others’ between the humanitarian and the securitized approach to the refugee crisis in Croatia: is there an alternative to policies grounded in populism?

Viktor Koska

Neither the humanitarian nor the ‘securitising’ approach were grounded in evidence-based policy approaches or on the comprehensive research and estimation of Croatian society’s capacities to accept and integrate migrants. Croatia lacks clear and defined short, medium and long-term goals of migration policies and the stakeholders involved in the issue are implementing their decisions in the ad hoc manner. The legitimization of any migration-related measure in public discourse resorts to populist approaches, in which the migrants are considered fundamentally as the objects of the policy and always portrayed as a political other against whom, or by whom, the desired self-perception of Croatian society is constructed.

introduction broadcasts which provided daily updates on the ongoing conflict. If the events of the In 2015, for the second time in the short his- 1990s, through personal experiences and tory of its statehood, Croatia was faced with media broadcasts, produced what Benedict the challenge of massive forced migration. Anderson (1983) called imagined com- The country that only 20 years ago had to munities, where many Croatian citizens, organize its capacities and, during wartime at least in the first months of the conflict, conditions, provide shelter and develop could identify strongly with the sufferings of integration policies for several hundred forced migrants seeking shelter in the Croa- thousands of refugees and internally dis- tian territory, the events of 2015 brought a placed persons, who were forced to flee slightly different challenge to the Croatian as a direct or indirect consequence of the state and society. war that followed the turbulent break-up This time, the forced migrants were of the former Socialist Federative Repub- coming from conflicts and countries about lic of Yugoslavia, was once again forced to which average Croatian citizens knew very develop ad hoc measures to tackle the influx little. For years before the escalation of what of thousands of refugees. is now called the migration crisis, Croatian However, this time the forced migrants society had a general notion of the asylum were not coming from the republics of the crisis going on in Europe. However, asylum- former Yugoslavia, with whom Croatian related issues were perceived as distant people shared very similar cultures, lan- problems affecting the countries that are guages and habits, nor they were fleeing the final destination of migratory routes or due to the horrible war atrocities with which that are on the fence at the entry points for almost every Croatian citizen was very a large influx of forced migrants. For Croatia, familiar either through experience of direct these events were happening on physically Viktor Koska Political scientist, shelling of their towns or personal losses in distant localities and Croatia did not (and Msc in forced migration the ravages of war, or through regular media still does not) consider itself as a country of between the humanitarian and the securitized approach to the refugee crisis radicalisation against external ‘others’ 35

final destination but, at best, as a transition country for migration. While there is no extensive aca- In such a context Croatian governments demic research on Croatian in- have enacted two fundamentally differ- tegration capacities, the existing ent approaches to tackle the ongoing crisis literature reveals some data on over the last few years. The humanitarian approach was adopted by the left-wing gov- public perception of immigrants ernment in the first months of the emer- and readiness of the society to gence of the crisis in 2015. However, after accept different categories of the Parliamentary election in 2015 and the immigrants. Even though Croa- forming of two consecutive conservative tian society never experienced governments, Croatia shifted towards policies that were built on the securitization dis- high levels of immigration, stud- course. The rhetoric and practices involved ies reveal that there is a predom- in the latter approach could easily be inter- inantly exclusive attitude toward preted as the manifestation of the migration migrants, which frames potential policies developed in accordance with the migrations within the frame- rise of right-wing populist sentiments in Europe. work of economic burden and However, as I will argue in this essay, cultural threat. Foreign workers both approaches in Croatian society have are perceived as socio-cultural been underpinned by a populist rationale, threat, while asylum seekers where various categories of forced migrants are dominantly seen as security remained the distinctive Others, against and economic threat. Consider- whom the national image may be shaped, and mass mobilization pursued. In the long ing that the migration policies run, the sustainability and success of the in Croatia are developing in the development and implementation of migra- vacuum of real-life experience tion policies that could both meet the needs of contemporary immigration and human rights of various categories of and (un)successful outcomes of forced migrants and benefit the interests of the state, depends on the capacity of the immigrant integration and its society to frame the policy debates related consequences to society, general to migration within an evidence-based public attitudes are moulded approach and less in terms of populist sen- primarily through stereotypes. timents.

borders, and, as in case of Hungary, right emergence of the crisis and wing populist inflammatory discourse that the humanitarian approach framed refugees as security threats and threats to European culture and values, the With the escalation of the migration crisis Croatian approach looked like it was based in 2015, on the eve of the forthcoming par- on a strong dedication to human rights liamentary election, the left-wing Croatian protection and solidarity. Even though coalition government responded to the not all stakeholders in the Croatian public crisis with an approach which will in aca- unanimously accepted such an approach demic and public discourse be framed as to the crisis, the general notion was that the the humanitarian approach (see Tatalović humanitarian approach that was taken had and Jakešević, 2016). Croatia decided to broad public support. provide safe passage for thousands of Media coverage provided a discourse forced migrants passing through its territory which emphasized that these migrants towards more economically developed EU are refugees and focused on the solidarity countries, which were at the time willing to of Croatian citizens, many of whom were accept refugees and provide them with safe themselves refugees during the 1990s. This haven. was supplemented with images of Croatian In contrast to the practices of Slove- citizens and policemen providing help and nian and Hungarian governments, which moral support to refugees. While political implemented restrictive immigration poli- actors from the conservative sphere of policies marked by installing fences along their tics called for the issue to be securitised, with 36 radicalisation against external ‘others’ between the humanitarian and the securitized approach to the refugee crisis

Photo by Marion Kraske

some politicians even advocating deploy- and opt to analyse how in a country which ing the army along the border, the Croatian never sought to develop a comprehensive Government firmly refused to adopt exclu- migration strategy and policy, political and sionary policies; the public statements of policy decisions on migration come to be. Prime Minister Milanović elevated the issue It may be argued that both approaches, to the level of taking the states’ reactions to the humanitarian one endorsed by the the pressing needs of migrants as the dis- left-wing government, and the later grad- tinction between countries that are civilized ual move towards securitization and anti- and those that are not.1 immigrant attitudes implemented by the In such a discourse, anti-immigrant two right wing conservative governments policies were seen as a mere reflection of formed after the parliamentary elections of the rise of the right-wing populism that had 2015 and 2016, shared populist foundations. been gaining momentum in many countries Neither approach was grounded in evi- in Europe. With hundreds of Croatian vol- dence-based policy or on comprehensive unteers heading to the borders and the tran- research and estimation of the Croatian sit camp in Slavonski Brod to aid refugees, it society’s capacities to accept and integrate seemed that Croatian society was develop- migrants. Croatia lacks clear and defined ing a distinctive approach. The advocates of short-, medium- and long-term goals of restrictive approaches in Croatia seemed as migration policies, and the stakeholders if they wanted to build on the rise of right- involved in the issue implement their deci- wing populism in Europe, and benefit from sions on an ad hoc basis. The legitimization introducing of a similar discourse into the of any migration-related measure in public Croatian political area. discourse resorts to populist approaches, in which the migrants are essentially considered as the objects of the policy and always populism and the populist portrayed as a political other against which, or by means of which, the desired self-per- foundation of refugee ception of Croatian society is constructed. policies in Croatia In social sciences, the term populism has lately been used to describe and define In order to adequately understand how poli- various socio-political phenomena. It has cies towards forced migration and related been used to represent a particular type of issues have developed in Croatia, neutral party organization (Taggart 1995), to define researchers should aim to distance them- specific political strategies for the mobiliza- selves from personal attitudes on this topic, tion of marginalized segments of societies to challenge a given social order by invok- 1 To ne želimo raditi, to može svaka budala napraviti. ing right-wing and anti-intellectual rhetoric To je ružno, to je krivo. [We don't want to do that, any idiot could do it. It is ugly and wrong.] Dnevnik. and celebrate the common people (Jansen hr, 19.10.2015. https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/ 2011), a specific type of political commu- izbjeglicka-kriza-2015-zoran-milanovic-nemojte-to- raditi-hrvatskoj-vlada-ima-apsolutno-sve-pod-kontro- nication adopted by the actors who claim lom---412908.html to represent the interest of the majority of between the humanitarian and the securitized approach to the refugee crisis radicalisation against external ‘others’ 37

citizens and frame their statements in an citizens with refugees passing through their (over)simplified and direct manner (Kazin towns.3 1995) or a new form of political ideology The inalienable rights of refuges seemed which sees politics as a struggle between to be of secondary significance to the pub- two clearly demarcated antagonistic groups lic, the government, as well as the media; the (Mudde 2004). Government used the humanitarian and sol- The theoretical elaboration of all these idarity discourse to mobilize its constituency approaches goes beyond the scope of this in light of the forthcoming elections, but also article, as my aim here is not to make a cat- to position Croatia as an antagonistic other egorical claim on what populism is. Rather, in the face of anti-migrant policies enacted I aim to focus on the features that are undis- by Slovenia and Hungary (which were them- putedly populist in the framework of all selves a reflection of the right-wing pop- these approaches in order to demonstrate ulism sentiments in their societies). that populism is not an exclusive feature Additionally, in the months that fol- only of anti-immigrant right-wing senti- lowed the escalation of the crisis, human ments, but that it may be found in founda- rights organizations advocated for refu- tions of policies that, on the surface, benefit gees’ rights and integration by focusing on the forced migrants in the short term. developing positive images of the refugee What seems to be shared by all of the communities – on positive individual cases approaches is that populism claims to rep- of successful integration4 and seeking to resent the attitudes and values of the major- demystify attempts by the more right-wing ity of ordinary people of the polity; it is segments of the public to frame refugees as marked by oversimplified representation of a security and cultural threat. otherwise very complex social realities and While these combined efforts of vari- a focus on the creation and maintenance of ous stakeholders (government, media and the image of politics as the constant struggle NGOs) resulted with a regime which, at least between antagonistic groups. during the first few months of the crisis, pro- The 2015’s humanitarian approach vided support and protection to refugees, shared almost all of these populist features. in practice it did not contribute to develop- Croatia’s policies at the beginning of the ment of a stable framework for evidence- crisis depended on the ad hoc measures based decision-making on migration issues, that were enacted in accordance with Ger- which would remain in place once popular many’s readiness to accept large numbers sentiment turned to the right. of refugees. However, they also went hand While the Croatian government repre- in hand with the media attitudes and public sented its approach as humanitarian, on the sentiments towards the refugees. In the con- other hand it continuously emphasized that text where it was evident that people migrat- Croatia is not going to become a hotspot ing through the country in general had no for migrants. Alternatively, too much focus intentions to stay in Croatia, the media were on the uncritical construction of the posi- predominantly using the term refugees, not tive stereotype of refugees as individuals migrants,2 in framing the news from the bor- who can easily integrate to society may be ders and from the transit camp in Slavonski counterproductive for developing a respon- Brod. Furthermore, the media were empha- sible framework for public deliberation and sizing the solidarity of ordinary Croatian creation of efficient migration policies in the long term; society may develop the notion 2 The distinction between the terms refugee and migrant used in public discourse has a strong implication on that refugee rights are a privilege that can be the political framing of the migration crisis. The term granted to especially deserving individuals, refugee inherently contains the message that the person who migrated was forced to leave their country and not as a universal right that belongs to due to well-founded fear of persecution and has a each individual regardless of the pace and legitimate claim to international protection. By label- scope of the benefits and/or their (un)suc- ling migrants as refugees or other categories of forced migration, the media delivers a message that their cessful integration into society. pleass for acceptance and protection are legitimate, Dependence of the pro-refugee regime and it may even be the society’s and country’s duty to respond affirmatively to such pleas. On the other hand, on the sustainability of the construction of by assigning the term migrant to a person in flight, one puts the person’s reasons to migrate into the realm 3 See for example: Nevladine udruge pozvale EU da of pure individual choice. Such framing of migration otvori granice izbjeglicama, HRT Vijesti, 12.9.2015. contributes to construction of migrants’ requests to be https://vijesti.hrt.hr/298494/u-zagrebu-obiljezen-dan- allowed to enter the country beyond the responsibility solidarnosti-s-izbjeglicama of the nation-state, the society’s duty to respond to 4 See for example: https://www.okus-doma.hr/hr/teksto- such requests and outside the scope of the interna- vi/najave/premijera-dokumentarnog-filma-okus-doma- tional refugee rights regime. na-zagrebdox-u-22-02-2016-18h 38 radicalisation against external ‘others’ between the humanitarian and the securitized approach to the refugee crisis

positive generalizations, however beneficial The new governments built on the in the short term, can easily wither away examples of the restrictive anti-immigrant with a similarly selective focus of the right policies in the neighbouring countries and wing media on individual cases of deviant unwillingness of Germany to accept the behaviour, that in the situation of mass same number of refugees as during the migration of desperate people fighting to beginning of the crises, and implemented survive, will sooner or later inevitably arise. the more restrictive policies based on the securitization of the migration issue. In such context, the actors willing to utilize right- from humanitarization wing anti-immigrant populist discourse could easily do so by exploiting the already towards securitization of present anti-immigrant sentiments. migration The manifestations of this change toward restrictive policies were manifold. How fragile the humanitarian approach is in Over the last few years, Croatia closed its the long run, if it is not based on solid evi- borders to the large number of potential dence-based policies but on ad hoc meas- asylum seekers, and a number of NGO and ures and public sentiments, became clear media reports show the rise of Croatian after the parliamentary election in late 2015 police brutality against potential asylum and subsequent early elections in 2016. seekers.5 Public statements by important With the two conservative coalition Govern- political actors, such as Croatian President ments, Croatian policies towards migrants Kolinda Grabar Kitarović, are less concerned developed more along the line of the restric- with the potential human rights abuses tive Hungarian and Slovenian approaches. against the forced migrants on the borders, While there is no extensive academic but focus on Croatia’s task to protect its bor- research on Croatian integration capaci- ders, maintain security and demonstrate ties, the existing literature reveals some the sovereign right of Croatia to act by police data on public perception of immigrants force against illegal migrants.�6 The media and readiness of the society to accept dif- framework has predominantly changed; ferent categories of immigrants. Even refugee, as a label to mark the migrant in though Croatian society never experi- passage through Croatia in the early months enced high levels of immigration, stud- of the crisis, has been replaced by the dis- ies such as Kumpes, Gregurović and Čačić course of migrants and illegal migrants on Kumpes (2012) reveal that there exists a Croatia’s borders.6 predominantly exclusive attitude toward In such context, human rights activ- migrants, which frames potential migra- ists and NGOs entered into an almost tion as an economic burden and cultural latent conflict with the authorities, by threat. A similar result has been found in constantly raising awareness of the viola- the research conducted by Kuti, Gregurovič tions of immigrants’ human rights and the and Župarić-Iljić (2016), which demon- right of thousands of forced migrants cur- strated that in Croatian Osijek-Baranja and rently stranded on the Croatian borders to Vukovar-Srijem counties, foreign workers seek asylum. Unfortunately, in the policy are perceived as a socio-cultural threat, framework founded more on the populist while asylum seekers are dominantly seen sentiments and less on solid evidence and as a security and economic threat. Con- deliberation, which has been a practice of sidering that migration policies in Croatia all Croatian governments so far, any such have developed in a vacuum of real-life report paradoxically maintains the status experience of contemporary immigration quo and objectifies the immigrant issue as and (un)successful outcomes of immigrant part of the national order of things. While integration and its consequences for soci- it homogenizes the sentiments of the pro- ety, general public attitudes are moulded refugee segments of society, it also homog- primarily through stereotypes. With the 5 See for instance: Zeleno svjetlo za ulazak u Schengen already existing predisposition for negative je i zeleno svjetlo za nasilje na granicama, Dobrodošli, evaluation of immigration into Croatia, it is centralni hrvatski informativni portal za izbjeglice, not a surprise that any policy which lacks 25.10.2019. https://welcome.cms.hr/index.php/ hr/2019/10/25/zeleno-svjetlo-za-ulazak-u-schengen- support in empirical research may easily je-i-zeleno-svjetlo-za-nasilje-na-granicama/ slip into the realm of right-wing populism. 6 For example see: Hrvatska se pretvorila u zemlju koja otvoreno mrzi migrante, 22.07.2019. https://www. This happened in Croatia with the rise of index.hr/vijesti/clanak/hrvatska-se-pretvorila-u-ze- the right-wing government. mlju-koja-otvoreno-mrzi-migrante/2102955.aspx between the humanitarian and the securitized approach to the refugee crisis radicalisation against external ‘others’ 39

enizes the public sentiments of those who lenges as security, economic and cultural do not recognize the human rights plights threats. Considering that the country does of the refugees as legitimate. not have a long history of non-ethnic immigration, and that Croatia has a very high in lieu of conclusion level of ethnic and religious homogeneity, these sentiments towards the culturally dif- The short recent history of Croatia’s ferent do not stem from respondents’ per- approach to the challenges of migration sonal experiences. reveals that discussions and later creation Rather, they represent the attitudes and and implementation of policies related to beliefs that respondents developed from the migration occur within the populist dis- negative stereotypes about the cultural oth- course, and are not grounded in empirical ers that have been constructed by various research and long-term discussions among actors: media sensationalism, stereotypes various stakeholders on what future migra- and negative portrayal of immigrants by the tion and integration policies should look media and politicians abroad. Whatever lies like. While the country’s recent turn towards at the root of these anti-immigrant attitudes, the securitization of the issue can be seen the response to the negative stereotypes and as the reflection of the move towards exclu- aggressive right-wing populism cannot lie sionary practices and sliding into populism in attempts to replace one stereotype with when it comes to migration issues in the EU another, or one populism with another (even in general, even the humanitarian approach if the latter is more favourable towards the advocated by the left-wing Croatian gov- refugees). For Croatia to develop sustain- ernment was contained within the realms able and efficient long-term policies towards of populist legitimization of public policy. refugees and other categories of migrants, Even though the latter approach entailed a comprehensive research on country’s inte- reasonably high level of protection of refu- gration capacities will be needed, which gees’ rights, unfortunately it did not lead should stimulate the public deliberation on to developing a policy framework within the topic. However, such research is only which migration related decision-making the first step. It would be more challenging will be based on research and evidence to have a consensus between all stakehold- rather than on ever-changing popular sen- ers (media, political elites and society) that timents towards people in flight. durable solutions can only be based on solid The existing literature on attitudes research and guided by evidence. Without towards migrants in Croatia reveals that such an approach, any migration policy may there already exists a predisposition and be grounded in populism, with potentially attitudes on the part of the general public devastating effects for both the society and to accept the framing of the migration chal- the rights of the forced migrants.

references: Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities. London: Verso. Čačić-Kumpes, J., S. Gregurović and J. Kumpes, 2012. Migracija, integracija i stavovi prema imigrantima u Hrvatskoj. Revija za sociologiju, 42 (3): 305–336. Jansen, R. S. 2011. Populist mobilization: A new theoretical approach to populism. Sociological Theory 29 (2): 75-96. Kazin, M. 1995. The populist persuasion: An American History. New York: Basic Books. Kuti, S., S. Gregurović i D. Župarić-Iljić D. 2016. Stavovi prema migrantskim radnicima i tražiteljima azila u istočnoj Slavoniji: dimenzije, odrednice i razlike. Migracijske i et- ničke teme 32(1): 91–122. Mudde, C. 2004. The populist Zeigeist. Government and Opposition, 39 (4): 541-563. Taggart, P. 1995. New populist parties in Western Europe. West European Politics 18(1): 34-51 Tatalović, S. and Jakešević, R. 2016. Novopristigli migranti i nacionalne manjine u Hr- vatskoj. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Zagreb 40 radicalisation against external ‘others’ a Croatian story: “an extraordinary EU Member” at the price of human rights

a Croatian story: “an extraordinary EU Member” at the price of human rights

Boris Pavelić

“Let there be no doubt about this: when After the Ombudswoman and the she speaks about refugees, Kolinda Grabar human rights activists reminded Kitarović’s language, in its callous coldness, of what were then already regu- is no different from that which Heinrich lar accusations of violence and Himmler and his crew used to refer to the illegal conduct towards refugees Jews.” This sentence was written by Viktor Ivančić, one of Croatia’s most distinguished that were being levelled against critical journalists, in a 8 July text criticising the police, Lora Vidović asserted statements by the Croatian president. “that we will remain without Four days earlier, Kolinda Grabar security as well, unless we view Kitarović visited the border police station security from the standpoint of in Kordunski Ljeskovac to show her support for the policemen preventing migrants ille- human rights.” Because, she gally entering Croatia from Bosnia and Her- added: “The police that today zegovina. This at a time when the Croatian beats up migrants, thinking police has for months been facing critiques that nothing needs to change, by non-governmental organisations and the might tomorrow beat up football media that its treatment of these people has hooligans, and after them, trade been violent and illegal. Having visited the forested part of the border, the President unionists too.” The rest was left dismissed such accusations with the fol- hanging: and after them... lowing sentence: “When someone crawls through such terrain, it is to be expected that they’ll have scratches, bruises and bod- ily injuries. Have that in mind when you hear stories that our policemen are brutal. They are not, I guarantee it.”

Boris Pavelić Journalist, Zagreb a Croatian story: “an extraordinary EU Member” at the price of human rights radicalisation against external ‘others’ 41

To the Croatian president, Ivančić will the rigorous anti-refugee policy Croatia has comment, refugees are “two-legged brutes implemented for the past three years, and stalking our forests, sullying our environ- because of which nearly all this time it has ment, harassing our citizens, scaring our been a focus of well-argued accusations that women, slaughtering our chickens and, to it has violated the rights of “people on the top it all off, running into beech branches move” with violent and illegal acts. as if into police truncheons; in short: inhu- It hasn’t always been this way: accord- man creatures who by the natural order of ing to information put forward by Ranko things should be dealt with by hunters’ asso- Ostojić, the former Croatian interior min- ciations, bodies with experience in chas- ister, in an 20 June 2018 interview to the ing after foxes and wild boar.” “Although”, Croatian Novi list journal, between 16 Sep- the journalist famed for his unrelenting tember 2015 and February 2016, 682 thou- critique and stringent analysis continues, sand people were allowed passage through “the President’s rhetoric lacks the raw racial Croatia in an organised, humane way. “The explanations, a sop to the spirit of the times, crisis began early in the morning of 16 Sep- the moaning tone of the warning that the tember 2015. Already on that first day, there national territory needs to be protected by were more than four thousand people in all means, and cleansed of those who pol- Croatia. We had an average of four migrants lute it, continuously vibrates, while each of every minute; 250 per hour; six thousand the President’s words makes it clear that “the people on average daily. That lasted for five way she views migrants is as a dehumanised months,” said Ostojić, minister of police in image.” the Croatian Social-Democrat government Kolinda Grabar Kitarović herself made of the time, which transported all these peo- sure that this judgment is not unfounded: ple in an organised fashion, without a single “As an external frontier of the EU, Croatia incident, from Croatia’s eastern border with cannot allow itself illegal crossings, but our Serbia to its western border, with Slovenia. primary goal is absolutely to protect the But this was the time of the “Wir schaf- national interest, to protect the population fen das” – “We can do it” – policy of German on our side of the border,” she said, won- chancellor Angela Merkel, who strove to dering “whether it is true that in encounters bring the Germans, and with them all Euro- with the Croatian police, they (refugees, peans as well, around to the policy of open author’s note) sometimes form battle forma- borders and integration of refugees. As is tions, that they have military experience, as well known, Merkel failed. Her policy soon well as that they know the maps and the ter- collapsed, causing an explosive growth of rain well.” the extreme right throughout Europe, and Four days after visiting the border, the so she announced a radical turn. Croatian president further bolstered such The moment the developed EU mem- militaristic discourse regarding “people on bers, led by Germany, closed their borders the move”, as human rights activists are to “people on the move”, it was as if Croatia given to calling the strangers arriving at had turned into what it had already once the Croatian border, wishing to avoid the been, during the resistance to the Ottoman political and value judgements implicit in empire: the “Antemurale Christianitatis”, the titles “refugee” or “migrant”. “Of course the “Bulwark of Christendom”, the fron- you’ll need a little force when you are push- tier region that is to “protect” Europe from ing people back, but you need to see what unwanted newcomers from the East. kind of a terrain this is,” the President of the In Croatia, the first victim of this dra- Republic admitted in an interview she gave matic turn was – a five-year-old Afghan girl. to a Swiss TV channel while on an official Madina Huseini was killed by a speeding visit to Switzerland. train on the night of 21 November 2017, on This statement of hers was interpreted the Zagreb-Belgrade railway line, just on the in the public as an open admission by the Serbian side of the Croatian-Serbian border, highest representative of the Croatian after her mother and another six children authorities that the police have been apply- were sent by Croatian policemen to return, ing force while illegally driving out refugees on foot, along the tracks from Croatia into as part of a pushback policy, not allowing Serbia. them to request asylum in Croatia, in line It has never been precisely established with European and Croatian legislation. who was responsible for the death of the The Croatian president’s rhetoric towards child. The Croatian Police denied respon- “people on the move” has faithfully reflected sibility; the Croatian State Attorney’s Office 42 radicalisation against external ‘others’ a Croatian story: “an extraordinary EU Member” at the price of human rights

dismissed the criminal complaint filed by regarding the work of the police. This was Croatian non-governmental organisations the first time at a parliamentary session that against an unknown perpetrator, and the the fear that police intransparency regard- attempt by the Ombudswoman Lora Vidović ing its treatment of aliens might imperil the to investigate the case was also unsuccess- overall state of human rights in the whole of ful: the police informed her office that the Croatia was expressed at an official level. infrared camera recordings that may have After the Ombudswoman and the registered what had happened had “disap- human rights activists reminded of what peared”. were then already regular accusations of The death of Madina Huseini marked violence and illegal conduct towards refu- the beginning of a tragic sequence of inci- gees that were being levelled against the dents that has gone on until today, brought police, Lora Vidović asserted “that we will about by Croatia’s unremitting closed door remain without security as well, unless we policy, which has been supported, and view security from the standpoint of human financed with huge amounts of money, by rights.” Because, she added: “The police that the European Union. today beats up migrants, thinking that noth- In May 2018, near Donji Srb, in the ing needs to change, might tomorrow beat vicinity of the BH border, the police shot at a up football hooligans, and after them, trade van that had ignored two police instructions unionists too.” The rest was left hanging: to stop. Two refugee children, a boy and a and after them... girl aged 12, were wounded along with their The Ombudswoman’s warning had father. According to reports in the media, no effect. On the contrary, after a pause of another thirteen children were in the van, sorts, caused in the movement of people but were fortunately uninjured. The police towards the West by the winter cold, spring said the shooting was “justified and legal”, brought new mass attempts of illegal cross- and the Croatian non-governmental organ- ings, and with them accusations against the isation “Are You Syrious” stated that “the Croatian police. In mid-March, a recording problem lay in the institutional violence was uploaded to social networks, showing being carried out against refugees.” a policeman forcing a group of migrants to In July last year, at the request of the chant the name of a Croatian football club. media, the Croatian Ministry of Internal Following this, the police officer in ques- Affairs has reported that between the begin- tion was suspended under the weight of ning of 2017 and mid-June 2018, twelve evidence. “people on the move” have perished in However, the MIA do not recognise the Croatian territory, four of whom died the accusations of violence, even though in 2017, and eight a year later. At the same a stream of accusations by refugees and time, according to MIA data, fifteen peo- migrants who have been failing to cross Cro- ple were seriously injured; four in 2017 and atian territory has continuously flowed from eleven in 2018. the neighbouring BH. These people make However, the Centre for Peace Studies always nearly the same claims: that police- (CPS), a non-governmental human rights men beat them, take their mobile phones organisation from Croatia, presented infor- and money, and drive them on foot across mation according to which there were two the green border back into BH, not following more migrants than the police had reported any kind of procedure. Similar accusations who had died in 2017. “We fear that the have been made by Croatian and interna- number of those who died is in fact much tional human rights organisations. greater, that there are many deaths that we In mid-May, the Swiss TV broadcast never even become aware of, and there are a recording showing Croatian policemen also no overall statistics for states on whose driving migrants over the border back into borders people die,” CPS activist Julija Kran- BH. Interviewed by journalists, the expelled jec stated. people testified that policemen had used In the autumn of last year, suspicions as force against them, taken their money and to the conduct of the Croatian police have destroyed their mobile phones. The Croa- made their way into official debate in the tian police confirmed that the event took Croatian Parliament. In October 2018, the place on 24 April, but rejected accusations Parliamentary Human and National Minor- of illegal treatment. “This event involves no ity Rights Committee discussed the objec- illegal actions or violent deportations. The tions raised by Croatian Ombudswoman video has showed police officers perform- Lora Vidović, as well as human rights NGOs, ing their duties in the aim of discouraging a Croatian story: “an extraordinary EU Member” at the price of human rights radicalisation against external ‘others’ 43

a group of people from illegally entering the migrants is not the result of arbitrariness, European Union, at a location which is not violence and unprofessionalism on the part an official border crossing,” the Croatian of individual policemen, but a systematic, MIA reported. systemic and planned state policy carried However, in a statement to the Swiss TV out by the police hierarchy. carried by Croatian media, German migra- In mid-July, several days after the Croa- tion expert Marcus Enger claimed that “it is tian president admitted that “a little force clear that this was a violation of European is necessary when you are pushing people and international law, as collective expul- back” in the interview with the Swiss TV, sions without due process are not permit- the international human rights organisa- ted.” tion Human Rights Watch (HRW) asked her How was it then nevertheless possible for in an open letter to “cease with the illegal the Croatian police to dismiss all the accu- practice of returning people to BH” and to sations with such ease? This is explained by initiate an investigation into such claims. A Marcus’ following sentence, which sheds a day later, on 16 July, the Croatian president great deal of light on the broader context of “decisively dismissed” the HRW letter, call- the drama that had for months already been ing it “an attempt to reinterpret the state- playing out on the Croatian-Bosnian border, ments related to issues of protection of the that eastern frontier of the European Union: state border.” of the practice recorded by Swiss TV Engler However, as a curious coincidence claims that “Croatia is not the only one to would have it, that same day, 16 July, the blame, but the entire EU.” “We must criti- Ombudswoman Lora Vidović made public cise the Croatian government, but in this the disturbing testimony of a group of “dis- case Croatia has not acted on its own, but gruntled policemen” from a border police together with the rest of the EU. The Croa- station. “On the basis of an order by the tian border police is financed by European police station commander and the ‘head money. Other countries support such prac- and administration’, police officers were tice as it is politically profitable for them,” directed to return all refugees and migrants Engler warned. to BH territory, without documents and In such political circumstances, Croa- without processing them in order to leave tian authorities are entirely free to ignore no trace, and to take their money, destroy dramatic human rights violations that – by their mobile phones and throw them in all accounts – its own police has carried out a river or keep them for themselves,” the on its borders. This ignoring of the state of Ombudswoman described these police- affairs wasn’t shaken even by two dramatic men’s testimonies in a public statement. testimonies by policemen themselves, who “Every day they return between 20 and 50 dared to testify to what non-governmental persons in this manner, and especially cruel activists have been warning of for ages: that in their behaviour are police officers on illegal and violent police conduct towards secondment from other police constabu-

Migrant Camp "Vučjak" Photo by Dirk Planert 44 radicalisation against external ‘others’ a Croatian story: “an extraordinary EU Member” at the price of human rights

In such political circumstances, Croatian authorities are entirely free to ignore dramatic human rights violations that – by all accounts – its own police has carried out on its borders. This ignoring of the state of affairs wasn’t shaken even by two dramatic testimonies by policemen themselves, who dared to testify to what non-governmental activists have been warning of for ages: that illegal and violent police conduct towards migrants is not the result of arbitrariness, violence and unprofessionalism on the part of individual policemen, but a systematic, systemic and planned state policy carried out by the police hierarchy.

laries, who ‘beat and seize’, that is, ‘do what The Ombudswoman gave as good as she they want, without control... and with the got. “This is no longer a question of migrants’ blessing of the leaderships of the police con- rights, it is a question of the security of us all, stabulary and directorate’.” including those police officers who do their Policemen have testified that “there are job honourably, in a state that ought to guar- women and children among migrants, and antee the exercise of guaranteed rights to all, the actions taken are ‘the same against all’, and adequately and efficiently investigate and that people being brought from other violations,” she responded in an interview constabularies come exhausted, some- with the Croatian daily, Novi list. If there is times also beaten up, yet police officers still no practical guarantee of an efficient inves- ‘transfer them forcibly over night into Bos- tigation, there is effectively no barrier to the nia’, sometimes even pulling their weapons”. authorities’ arbitrariness and unbounded- The Ombudswoman has also disclosed that ness, no guarantee of the division of power, she received this testimony as far back as 20 and this should particularly represent an March, but did not present it to the public extreme danger to the personal and politi- for four months while she was waiting for cal liberties of all the citizens of RC,” Lora a reaction by the competent institutions – Vidović reminded. the Attorney’s Office and the Croatian Par- One didn’t need to wait too long for liament – to which she had delivered this the unsettling testimony of the policemen testimony. There had been no reaction, just who rebelled against the unlawfulness to as there was none after the Ombudswoman receive a still more dramatic confirma- published the testimony. tion. On 24 July, the Croatian freelance Indeed, instead of institutions request- journalist Barbara Matejčić published the ing and initiating investigations into the first personal testimony by a police officer claims made by the police whistleblower in about the illegal expulsions that he and line with their authorities, the President of his colleagues were forced to carry out on the Republic and the State Attorney’s Office orders from above. In a wide-reaching tes- attacked – the Ombudswoman’s office. “I timony by a “Zagreb policeman” published condemn the Ombudswoman’s action, as on the telegram.hr portal, the man whose such anonymous reports may be fabricated, identity the journalist has protected, told of invented,” the President of the Republic how “he and his colleagues policemen car- declared. The Attorney’s Office announced ried out illegal transports of migrants from that it has “initiated inquiries” following the Zagreb to Croatia’s border with BH and release of the testimony – which in terms of Serbia. We would bring them to the green the criminal law still doesn’t mean an inves- border and tell them to cross back into Bos- tigation – but also claimed that “it is not nia or Serbia. We didn’t register them. Such under an obligation to inform the Ombuds- were the orders we received from above in woman’s office about its actions on the basis the police station, it wasn’t the policemen’s of reports it sends it.” own idea.” a Croatian story: “an extraordinary EU Member” at the price of human rights radicalisation against external ‘others’ 45

The policeman told that he returned extent and consistency of the reports, video the first group of migrants “in early 2017”. “I recordings and distressing testimonies by received my orders from the shift supervisor. people who experienced bad treatment at So, I call the boss, tell him we’ve got a group the hands of the Croatian police point to a of migrants. Citizens often report migrants systematic and deliberate policy of the Cro- when they see them, and sometimes we atian authorities,” Zajović said. find them on the street ourselves. The shift None of this has so far swayed the Cro- supervisor then tells me he’ll call back in 10 atian authorities. Why should it, a cynic minutes. He calls my private number, where would wonder: on 30 July, Croatia became conversations aren’t recorded, tells me we’re one of the first three countries visited by the taking them to the border. The migrants newly elected president of the European say: ‘Asylum’, and we say: ‘No asylum’ and Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. “Croa- put them in a police van where we discon- tia is the youngest member of our Union nect the GPS emitter, so that no-one can tell and a true European success story!”, von where we are,” the policeman declared in a der Leyen tweeted ahead of her arrival to comprehensive testimony. the Croatian capital. A day later, at a press The journalist also visited Velika conference with Croatian prime minister Kladuša and Bihać, towns in western BH Andrej Plenković, she rephrased the same near the border with Croatia, where there thought: “Croatia is the youngest EU mem- are the most refugees and migrants. There, ber state, but extraordinary. The fact that she claims, “in late June 2019 [she] heard you will hold the presidency early next year dozens of similar refugees’ testimonies: shows that Croatia is an exceptional success they crossed the Croatian border, the police story for the European Union and that it can caught them, smashed their mobile phones be a role model to other countries.” so they couldn’t prove where they were Journalists couldn’t ask questions, and caught, or document what the policemen of their own accord, von der Leyen and had done to them, as well as to make it diffi- Plenković said not a word about human cult to cross again. The majority, they claim, rights violations. Or maybe they did? “I have were also beaten up by the Croatian police. great respect for the effort Croatia has made Many showed us fresh injuries, as well as on its path towards the goal of accession to healed scars inflicted by, they assert, the the Schengen Area and the Eurozone,” said Croatian police.” the European Commission president. In the same article, Milena Zajović from The path is clearly open for “the extraor- the non-governmental organisation Are You dinary member” and “European success Syrious (AYS) stated that, according to AYS story”: for if the EU is willing to pay for its estimates, “there were as many as 10,000 own illusion of cleanliness and security expulsions from Croatia in 2018”. “The with a “Himmler-like merciless coldness” Croatian police’s illegal practices transcend towards human rights, and even lives, why any plausible possibility of denial. The indeed wouldn’t Croatia do the same? 46 perpetuating past wars unrealised in the wars of the ‘90s, the idea of an all-Serb state is maintained by other means in peace

perpetuating past wars unrealised in the wars of the ‘90s, the idea of an all-Serb state is maintained by other means in peace

Latinka Perović

The continuation of the crisis for which no end seems to be in sight, constant tensions between Serbia and the neighbouring countries – former Yugoslavian republics that have rounded themselves out as nation states; the deepened mistrust that works against reconciliation; public speech suffused with nationalism and racism; the illusiveness of political pluralism (all the political parties in Serbia offer variations on the same national programme) and a de facto party monism with the unavoidable party state; absence of reforms and the real question marks on the western European orientation of the political establishment, as well as the Serbian society; the unconvincing nature of the foreign policy; the “hollowed out” nature of institutions; academically “questionable” elite in institutions and the “unquestionable” one on the streets; in a word – the state between anarchy and autocracy – all this leads to the question, first, whether Ser- bia is returning to the nineties, and second, has Serbia ever left the nineties, and was the removal of Slobodan Milošević as a consensual autocrat enough for this to happen?

If I wished to use one word to describe the although not of Serb descent, was congen- state of consciousness in the Serbian body ial to Serb interests (the renewal of Yugo- politic – in Serbia and in the states where slavia, reliance on Russia, strong military, Serb people also live – this word would cer- state socialism as opposed to the western tainly be – frustration. And after all, it is frus- European path of development with capi- tration upon which the defeated programme talism and liberalism), history, according to of solving the Serb question as a question of some historians, “blew up in our faces”. In state has smouldered. Naturally there is also fact, the controlled polarities of the second confusion. But, above all, it is a long-running Yugoslavia came into view. Now without an phenomenon, an ideology whose reach is arbiter, but also without a mechanism to extensive and whose grasp is deep. resolve them. Throughout its history, Yugoslavia As early as the mid-80s, a consensus was (1918-1941 and 1945-1991) has sought “a established among the intellectual, politi- sustainable form”. Hence the dictatorships: cal, religious and military elite of Serbia on personal and class – both in the name of ide- the solution to the Serb question. Due to ology – and frequent changes to the Consti- scholarly authority of the institution, the tution. Not even the wars of the ‘90s were key role was played by the Memorandum unexpected when they came. Soon after of the Serbian Academy of the Sciences and

Latinka Perović the death of Josip Broz Tito (1980), who, the Arts [SANU Memorandum] (1986). Historian, Belgrade unrealised in the wars of the ‘90s, the idea of an all-Serb state is maintained by other means in peace perpetuating past wars 47

The role of detonator in turn was played resentative of Serbia in the party and state by the dissatisfaction with the 1974 Consti- leadership of Yugoslavia, was removed from tution, which had been adopted on the basis political life (1966). Representatives of the of balance of power (Serbia on one side, and intellectual elite, themselves members of all the other republics and both provinces the Communist movement, welcomed the on the other). rift in the Serbian party leadership “with By stating that Yugoslavia was in crisis, hope”. It does not matter whether Slobodan the SANU Memorandum did not call into Milošević took on the role of leader of the question the dominant political and eco- Serb people for pragmatic and political, or nomic system (one party and state-man- for ideological reasons; he gave the already aged economy), but it did open the Serb achieved and articulated consensus on the question in Yugoslavia. A leader of the Serb solution of the Serb question as a question people was also soon nominated (1987), of state a new impetus. which required a rift in the League of Com- The wars of the ‘90s were led “in the munists of Serbia, which at the time was name” of the unity of the Serb people, its the sole political party. An active role in this equality with other peoples, and returning a was played by military and security circles, “lost” dignity. Serb interests were identified which had themselves remained frustrated with a centralised and unitary Yugoslavia. after Aleksandar Ranković, the main rep- As the majority people in Yugoslavia, but

Photo by Ivan Marovic, Serious Games, flickr CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 48 perpetuating past wars unrealised in the wars of the ‘90s, the idea of an all-Serb state is maintained by other means in peace

In the seven years it has ruled, with an opposition that does not oppose it with any substantially alternative programme, the Serbian Progressive Party has shown itself to be the inheritor of the idea of an all-Serb state. It has done so in two ways: first, by denying Serbia’s responsibility for the wars of the ‘90s, and by ignoring the international institutions that reacted to the consequences of these wars – primarily, the Srebrenica genocide. A dramatic relativisation of war crimes is afoot in Serbia. Those convicted, once they see out their sentences, return to public life as deserving citizens. However, there are sources on everything, books have been written, films made. Serbia is therefore retreating into its own “truth”. This deepens others’ mistrust, and creates dangerous confusion in Serbia itself.

also on grounds of the number of victims in had been earlier attempts, while Josip Broz the creation of Yugoslavia (First World War) Tito was still alive, to change the status of the and its renewal (Second World War), it was autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvo- as if its right to political hegemony in the dina (“Blue book” 1977), since the mid-80s, state was taken as a given. The other peoples no-one in the Serbian public scene champi- were expected to place the unity of the state oned the 1974 Constitution (an illustrative above their own national interests. Much example would be the cult book The Ser- like the leader of the People’s Radical Party, bian Side of the War. Trauma and Catharsis Nikola Pašić, placed the freedom of the Serb in Historical Memory). On the contrary, the people as a whole above the civil liberty of centralisation of Serbia through revoking Serbs in the Kingdom of Serbia. This, essen- the autonomy of the provinces was just the tially imperialist, concept of the state, with a first step in the imagined centralisation of strategy of expansion to the south (the Bal- Yugoslavia. When the latter came up against kan wars of 1912-1913) and the west (First resistance, a second path was taken, organ- World War 1914-1918), was defeated in the ising the Serb population and creating Serb wars of the end of the 20th century. Resist- entities in other Yugoslavian republics with ance to hegemony brought to a conclusion the goal of rounding out the greater Serbian the process of integration of other Yugosla- state (the latest generation of authors of vian nations. However, the “reserve” concept books on the dissolution of Yugoslavia has was likewise never realised. In addition to shown that the organisation, arms, paroles ethnic cleansing (termed the humane reset- and “trailblazers” of the anti-bureaucratic tlement of population), the “Greater Serbia” revolution came from Serbia and received also entailed changing the internal bounda- assistance from the Yugoslav People’s Army ries, which couldn’t be done without wars. and members of the State Security Service, After the wars of the ‘90s, there were that is, those institutions that were created expectations, fed also by the international during the 1941-1945 war to rebuild the public, that the new reality will be accepted, Yugoslavian state, and after 1945 to con- and that quick internal changes will ensue, solidate it and defend it from internal and by means of the European integration that external enemies). All the rest belongs to the had become the spirit of the times – espe- history of warfare and the break-up of the cially following the fall of the Berlin wall Yugoslavian state. Many details have been (1989). History needed to be “jumped over”: illuminated, but it is as if an overall expla- the development of the real state estab- nation keeps slipping away, yet only that lished as a priority, since the idea of “all the might help tell apart confusion, and even Serbs in a single state” had suffered defeat. understandable nostalgia, from a more or Such expectations were quickly put paid to less open repetition of history; ultimately, in Serbia with the murder of reformist prime to articulate the real problems. minister Zoran Đinđić (2003). The war did not happen because a solu- *** tion to the Yugoslavian crisis couldn’t be The continuation of the crisis for which found, but because Serbia, in opposition to no end seems to be in sight, constant ten- all other Yugoslavian republics, rejected the sions between Serbia and the neighbouring federal/confederal solution. Although there countries – former Yugoslavian republics unrealised in the wars of the ‘90s, the idea of an all-Serb state is maintained by other means in peace perpetuating past wars 49

that have rounded themselves out as nation the prosecution and the defence were his- states; the deepened mistrust that work torians. Of course, the trial was of Slobodan against reconciliation; public speech suf- Milošević as an individual, due to command fused with nationalism and racism; the responsibility, but in Serbia it was received illusiveness of political pluralism (all the as if it was the Serbian people that was put political parties in Serbia offer variations on trial. It was precisely the reconstruction on the same national programme) and a of the historical context that showed that de facto party monism with the unavoid- between 1987 and 2000 – since his appoint- able party state; absence of reforms and the ment as the leader of the Serbian people real question marks on the western Euro- to his defeat in the multiparty elections of pean orientation of the political establish- 2000 – Serbia is much less explainable by ment, as well as the Serbian society; the the personality of Slobodan Milošević and unconvincing nature of the foreign policy; the nature of his rule, than he by it – Serbia. the “hollowed out” nature of institutions; The ideas of unifying the Serb people into a academically “questionable” elite in insti- unitary state, much older than the phenom- tutions and the “unquestionable” one on enon of Slobodan Milošević, and the frus- the streets; in a word – the state between trations over the large number of victims anarchy and autocracy – all this leads to the (“the victimised people”, “the celestial peo- question, first, whether Serbia is returning ple”) in the First and Second World War for to the nineties, and second, has Serbia ever Yugoslavia. By all means – centralised and left the nineties, and was the removal of Slo- unitary, which the confederal constitution bodan Milošević as a consensual autocrat of 1974 rendered senseless. enough for this to happen? More precise answers to these ques- *** tions cannot be given without an insight The idea of a state in which all Serbs, without into the history of the consensus created exception, would live together, is essentially in Serbia in the latter half of the 80s. That totalitarian. (The French foreign affairs min- was when the state, the society, the elites ister told the Serbian scientist Jovan Žujović, (through the institutions) and citizens (the one of the intellectuals sent by Nikola Pašić people attending the mass rallies of the to allied countries to lobby for the creation anti-bureaucratic revolution) expressed of a Yugoslavian state: “Where did you ever their agreement on the existence of the Serb see a head which can fit every last strand question in the Yugoslavian state, as well of its hair under a cap?”) Paradoxically, the as that the solution can only be attained idea of an all-Serb state reemerged as the through the all Serbs in one state paradigm. Communist totalitarianism was being top- The outcome is known. But has the pled. But Slobodan Milošević articulates, or paradigm, although defeated in the wars of more precisely, anticipates events, perhaps the ‘90s, survived during peacetime, only by unconsciously. As did, besides, the SANU other means? When did Serbia embark upon memorandum before him. It is not the rul- this path of no return? Is the all-Serb state, ing political and economic system that is in whose creation all means are permitted being called into question, but the position (“extra-institutional”, “extra-statutary”, mili- of the Serb people in Yugoslavia. The latter tary), merely a revolutionary improvisation, would serve as the main motive for mobi- or an idea with deep historic roots? Recon- lising Serb masses. A home-made variant structing the historical context has proven of Nazism looms (in his book, Philosophy key to understanding what had been hap- of Parochialism, published in 1969 – at the pening in Serbia and Yugoslavia since the time when the historical debate on Nazism mid-80s, and what is happening in Serbia began to take place in Germany, and the today. The idea of the liberation and unifica- Warsaw Pact troops ended the illusion of tion of the Serb people totalised the Serbian real socialism with a human face by enter- agrarian society and established its priori- ing Prague – Radomir Konstantinović writes ties. It is no coincidence that at the Slobodan that Serbian nationalism is not an import Milošević trial, the International Criminal from the German National Socialism, but Tribunal in the Hague focused a great deal the result of the parochial spirit. The spirit of attention precisely on the reconstruction characterised by: collectivism, closedness, of the historical context (beginning with Ilija ignoring everything Other, historicity, the Garašanin’s Načertanije of 1844, kept secret cult of death). all the way until 1906, to the 1986 SANU The attempt to solidify the unity of memorandum). Or that witnesses for both Yugoslavia with a new economic policy (the 50 perpetuating past wars unrealised in the wars of the ‘90s, the idea of an all-Serb state is maintained by other means in peace

economic reform of 1965) constituted a true Cooperative and the Serbian Academy of revolution. (The Slovenian politician Boris the Sciences and the Arts. He espoused the Kraigher, an advocate of modernising the cultural unity of the Serb people, although land, used to say: “Reform is war”.) This was in practice, he thought that it was already also how foreign historians of the Yugosla- too late, and that more radical political vian state saw the economic reform. Within solutions were needed. He organisation- the country, the economic reform met great ally and financially helped the creation of resistance. It came from the supporters of an all-Serb movement in Yugoslavia. He the ideological dogma of equality, from the became the go-to address for Kosovo Serbs. protected state economy, from the great He found people to politically engage Serbs differences in development that overlapped in Croatia (psychiatrist Jovan Rašković) and with national differences in Yugoslavia. The Bosnia and Herzegovina (historian Milorad party and state leadership also took fright at Ekmečić, shakespearologist Nikola Koljević, the consequences that might have ensued psychiatrist Radovan Karadžić). He debated from the economic reform, and so it was Slovenian intellectuals about the differ- abandoned. ences between the Slovenian and Serbian Aleksandar Ranković was removed from understanding of Yugoslavianism. He wrote political life with the implausible expla- and spoke about the de-Christianisation nation of eavesdropping; he was saddled of Montenegro and the division of Mac- with responsibility for “placing the secu- edonia. However, it was important to make rity service above society,” even though it an incursion into the Party that had ruled was known that Aleksandar Ranković, the without rival for 40 years, and was histori- head of the security service, did not decide cally grounded in Serbia. This happened at without the party leadership, and especially the Eighth session of the CCLCS (1987) – the Josip Broz Tito. There was hope that there authorship of the SANU memorandum was would be a “thawing” in the society, that ascribed to him. But this was unnecessary: there would be more freedoms. In reality, the memorandum was based on his well- there was a strengthening of the military known theses. Party leaderships were most intelligence service, while simultaneously forbearing with Dobrica Ćosić, for a sim- there were indisputable signs of liberalisa- ple reason: he frequently spoke what many tion. The League of Communists underwent thought, but found inopportune to say. democratisation, a change of generations and an attempt to reorganise it and aban- *** don the cell-based mode of organising. After the death of Josip Broz Tito, in an The removal of Aleksandar Ranković atmosphere of expectation, the informal was received in Serbia with a muffled resist- opposition became more open in its actions. ance. Sympathy for him suddenly grew, Dobrica Ćosić was active in several ways. seeing him as Tito’s successor. That is when Through his literary narrative (the novel, A an informal opposition emerged in Serbia. Time of Death), he emotionally captivated Ideologically and politically, it was very people, amplifying their frustration due to heterogeneous. Internally, the opponent the position of the Serb people, the wartime of Josip Broz Tito, it publicly took no steps winner and peacetime loser. The public’s against him. It prepared itself for the period unease at the position of the Serb people that would follow him, believing that period was condensed by the cultural, scholarly to be near, if at least for reasons of biology. institutions (the Serbian Literary Coopera- The key figure of the Serbian informal tive, the SANU). But what served as a deto- opposition was writer Dobrica Ćosić. A pop- nator for such mood were the forums “on ular writer, garlanded with many awards, Kosovo – for Kosovo” held at the Association enjoying a good reputation in the Party as of Writers of Serbia in 1987. well, he gradually focused public interest It was not, therefore, Slobodan Milošević on the Serb question in Yugoslavia. At the who “offered” the national programme: he May 1968 session of the Central Commit- merely took over the programme crystal- tee of the League of Communists of Serbia, lised by the opposition intelligentsia in Ser- he came out with a demand to change the bia. For its part, this intelligentsia believed governing national politics. Previously, he that the planetary crisis of Communism had acquired the consent of the leading and its breakdown offer an historic chance personalities of the Serbian intelligentsia. to make an all-Serb state reality. This essen- The theses he came out with represented tially totalitarian idea did not leave either an the basis of his work in the Serbian Literary individual, or a social group or institution unrealised in the wars of the ‘90s, the idea of an all-Serb state is maintained by other means in peace perpetuating past wars 51

the option of a different viewpoint, without the internal borders. The Serbian Radical marking them as “treacherous”. Party rejected any Yugoslavia and saw the solution to the Serb question in the creation *** of a Greater Serbia. From 1987 to 1989, the The explosion of the national programme opposition parties operated in synchrony formulated by the opposition intelligentsia with Slobodan Milošević. After the fall of and accepted by the ruling elite after the Communism, a competition developed; Eighth session of the CCLC of Serbia was the question arose: who will get whom? not the result of “brilliant” coordination The opposition has sought to “put the knife and “good” organisation. It stemmed from under the throat” of Slobodan Milošević the established idea of an all-Serb state. once he had done the “dirty” work. However, The toppling of “bureaucratic”, “opportun- he holds the power, the military and security ist” leaderships, “cut off from the people”, in structures, propaganda and masses crying the provinces and other republics (Kosovo, “Slobo, freedom!”* The March 1991 demon- Vojvodina, Montenegro) was only halted on strations in Belgrade, when tanks came out the border of the Republic of Slovenia. The onto the streets, showed the real balance of Yugoslavian party and state leadership was power. unsure. Thinking that Serbia’s campaign against Yugoslavia would be halted by the *** centralisation of Serbia, it not only gave the After the Dayton agreement (1995), the go-ahead to abolish the autonomies of the international community also began to provinces, but – as shown by the most recent see Slobodan Milošević as a peacemaker. research – actually created pressure for this However, he intensified the repression in to happen. Other republics also gave their his country (legislation on universities, the consent for the same reason. They treated media; selective killings) and prepared for the position of the provinces as an internal the war in Kosovo. The country was iso- Serbian question, even though the 1974 lated and under sanctions. It was then that Constitution had granted them the status of the opposition united in the intention of constitutive units in the Federation. removing Slobodan Milošević. Not even the Although carried out with ease, the cen- October 2000 changes went further than tralisation of Serbia was not however the that. The notion that it was an error that only goal of the national policy followed by “the 6th of October was absent” was one of Slobodan Milošević since 1987. It turned the legends: there had been no programme out that it was a precondition for the cen- to reconsider the recent past, nor was there tralisation of Yugoslavia. The 1990 change time for a real turnabout. The western Euro- to the Constitution of SR Serbia, the right pean integration served as another pseudo- to reject provisions in the Federal Constitu- metamorphosis to preserve the programme tion that are not in line with provisions in of an all-Serb state. Zoran Đinđić’s govern- the Constitution of SR Serbia; the incursion ment was an exception – he himself more into the monetary fond – all this was an than anything perhaps. Using the historical expression of Serbia’s new position, a posi- opportunity brought by the breakdown of tion established regardless of the interests Communism in eastern Europe, he sought and rights of other republics. This position to make internal reforms a priority (above was laden with conflict. In his Gazimestan all, systemic reforms), while, he reckoned, speech (1989) on the 600th anniversary of the the ideological changes would take time. Kosovo battle, Milošević indicated the pos- Aware that this was impossible without sibility of war, but even before that speech, international help, especially after wars, he relations between Albanians and Serbs had showed willingness on the part of his gov- been discussed at Writers’ Association of ernment to fulfill the conditions it had been Serbia forums as if this had been a matter set in this aim. Above all, the cooperation of war. with the International Criminal Court in For political parties, which were, after the Hague and the extradition of Slobodan all, also established in Serbia - the priority Milošević to the Court. lay in solving the Serb question as a ques- Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was mur- tion of state. The Serbian Renewal Move- dered on 12 March 2003. The Belgrade press ment and the Democratic Party rejected considered his murder an imperative: “If the confederal solution, anachronous and fraught with civil war. For both these parties, * Play on words, as the Serbo-Croatian word for free- the survival of Yugoslavia implied changing dom is sloboda. tn 52 perpetuating past wars unrealised in the wars of the ‘90s, the idea of an all-Serb state is maintained by other means in peace

Zoran Đinđić survives, Serbia won’t”. But In the seven years it has ruled, with an which Serbia, what kind of Serbia? It was opposition that does not oppose it with again Zoran Đinđić himself who under- any substantially alternative programme, stood. Just before his murder, he wrote the Serbian Progressive Party has shown about the different experiences of east Euro- itself to be the inheritor of the idea of an pean countries following 1989. Commu- all-Serb state. It has done so in two ways: nism, or state socialism and the monopoly first, by denying Serbia’s responsibility for of the Communist party, wasn’t the same the wars of the ‘90s, and by ignoring the thing in the case of Serbia and in the case of international institutions that reacted to those east European countries (for instance, the consequences of these wars – primarily, Czechoslovakia) which prior to 1945 had the Srebrenica genocide. A dramatic rela- been industrially developed, had parlia- tivisation of war crimes is afoot in Serbia. mentary democracy and a civil society. In Those convicted, once they see out their fact, each east European country returned sentences, return to public life as reputa- to what it had prior to Communism. For ble citizens. However, there are sources on some countries, it was imposed and rep- everything, books have been written, films resented an aberration, a discontinuity. made. Serbia is therefore retreating into its For others, in turn, the agrarian ones, that own “truth”. This deepens others’ mistrust, lacked a civil society, Communism, along and creates dangerous confusion in Serbia with a pattern in property relations and law, itself. came “from within”, relying on the institu- At the same time, the Serbian Progres- tions of a a patriarchal society (“finding the sive Party maintains the idea of the state of newest in the oldest”). Serbia as the central point of the Serb peo- After the Slovenian and Croatian dec- ple. Ideas that had been used to prepare the larations of independence, the process of war of the ‘90s are seeing a renewal among fragmentation continued in the rest of Yugo- the intelligentsia. There had not been so slavia (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; much as an attempt at self-reflection when the sovereignist movement in Montenegro; certain important occasions have been the Montenegrin independence referen- marked, such as the 30th anniversary of the dum; the Kosovo declaration of independ- SANU memorandum. ence). There is a strong tendency for the socie- All the presidents of the “truncated” ties in the countries in the region to identify Yugoslavia and the independent Serbia with extreme nationalist tendencies. For obstructed the cooperation with the Hague this reason, the western European orienta- tribunal, which meant also with European tion of Serbia is questionable, in the sense of integration. But the Serbian society did not values. Remaining prisoner to the dogmatic desire much more, and, with its calls for an idea of an all-Serb state, Serbia cannot liber- electoral boycott with “empty ballots” in ate itself from the frustration with the, truly order to remove the then-Prime Minister enormous, sacrifice it has underwent for a so that development could be unfreezed, cause that cannot be accomplished. the Serbian intelligentsia paved the way for the domination of a single party. The international circles also found that the change of the name of the Serbian Radical Party to Serbian Progressive Party allowed change by simulation. revisionism in Croatia 1989-2019 perpetuating past wars 53 revisionism in Croatia 1989-2019

Ivo Goldstein

Croatian revisionists keep comparing the Partisans’ and Communists’ mass killings and crimes of 1945 with Ustasha crimes. The Croatian public is persistently and aggressively being served the insupportable proposition that “all totalitarianisms are the same”, a logic from which then follows that Ustasha crimes and Partisan-Communist crimes are in fact equivalent. Advocates of the thesis of the “equivalence of all totalitarianisms” often invoke the 2 April 2009 resolution of the European Parliament on European conscience and totalitarianism, but its point G clearly states that “whereas millions of victims were deported, imprisoned, tortured and murdered by totalitarian and authoritarian regimes during the 20th century in Europe”, but that “the uniqueness of the Holocaust must nevertheless be acknowledged”.

Since the late eighties, an endeavour to weaknesses or guilts uncritically overblown. deny, or at least downplay and cover up Such revisionist inclinations, going in both some incontrovertible facts about the Usta- directions, do not stop at suppressing and sha Independent State of Croatia (ISC) and obfuscating facts, which sometimes goes so the period of World War Two has been pre- far as to spill over into direct falsifications sent in Croatian politics, historiography, and lies. In this context, the Ustasha ISC opinion journalism, media, school text- suddenly emerges in a relatively positive books and public life in general. It is a spe- light, regardless of its Nazi-Fascist essence, cifically Croatian kind of revisionism. its total political an military siding with the In 1989-90, revisionism emerged in historical Evil, of the genocidal and other Croatia as a historiographic retardation crimes it had committed. Conversely, the and a socio-political anomaly. Unlike the weaknesses and guilts of both the Yugosla- Western countries, in Croatia since 1990, vian states (both the monarchy of 1918-1941 the new political authorities tolerated and and the Socialist state of 1945-1991), and encouraged it, and partly included it in especially the crimes committed in their their policies. Its general feature and basic names, are absolutised and generalised to starting point – the fetishism of the state the extent that they become arguments in and fetishising the Croatian nation-build- a rigid nationalist politics, and, where pos- ing idea. Anything throughout history that sible, justification for Ustasha crimes, or at had worked towards Croatian national least for their relativisation. independence is valued most positively The causes of Croatian revisionism are and is uncritically overemphasised, while manifold, but can be reduced to three basic weaknesses or guilts are forgiven or at least ones. First, during the 45 years of Socialist Ivo Goldstein Full Professor at the History minimised. Opposite historic tendencies Yugoslavia, the phenomenon of Ustash- Department of the Faculty of are generally negatively valued, and their ism and the ISC was rarely approached in Philosophy, Zagreb University 54 perpetuating past wars revisionism in Croatia 1989-2019

crimes and crimes against the civilian pop- Efforts to downplay and deny ulation during World War Two. This would ISC crimes produced the oppo- earn Ustashism at least a modicum of legiti- site effect in the nineties. They macy to participate in building the Croatian society surrounded as it is with the domi- drew the attention of the global nant European democracy. This has proven scientific community to the geno- to be impossible without radical historical cide in the ISC, which had previ- revisionism, accompanied by an unavoid- ously attracted relatively limited able denial or falsification of facts. attention from Western histori- And third, Croatian historical revisionism was partly a reaction to the swelling of ography. By around 2010, a new Serb nationalism and historical revisionism. generation of historians came of The first shoots of such tendencies in Serbia age abroad, beginning to address could be seen as far back as the late 60s, in Ustashism and the ISC. They are literary texts, and later also in texts by poli- more or less unanimous in their tician Dobrica Ćosić (1921-2014), reaching assessment of the nature of the their climax in the latter half of the 80s, with the overexaggeration of the number of vic- Ustasha regime as criminal. tims of the Ustasha camp Jasenovac (a number of 700,000 or more victims was thrown a sober, analytical way, but rather, most around, while in reality those killed num- often, with blanket a priori evaluations, bered between 80 and 100,000). This also often also exaggerations, underpinned by led to accusations of “genocidality” of the boring propagandist phraseology. At the entire Croatian people. This was a psycho- same time, discussing Partisan and Com- logical and media preparation for the 1991 munist war and postwar crimes was most war and aggression against Croatia. At the strictly prohibited. When democratisation time, some prominent Serbian politicians in the late eighties made this possible, an stated that the 1991 war was not truly a war, explosion ensued on the other extreme. Dis- but a “revenge” for Ustasha crimes commit- coveries of Partisan and Communist crimes ted between 1941-1945. became media sensations, and were used as The key person in the development of propaganda material for xenophobic and Croatian historical revisionism was Franjo political agitation, while Ustasha crimes Tuđman (1922-1999), especially as the were covered over with the artificial fog of author of a book, The Wastelands of Histori- relativisation, justification and disavowal. cal Reality (1989). In the better part of Waste- Second, the authors in Croatia dealing lands, Tuđman successfully refutes the tall with historical revisionism are most often tale about the 700,000 victims of Jasenovac not motivated by the scientific study of the and the genocidality of the Croats, but from recent past, but by certain political aims. time to time he falls for the other extreme. At the very least, it can be said that they Using a one-sided selection of data, he inap- approach the work with political prejudice. propriately minimises the total number of These are right-wing, or extreme right polit- victims, especially Serbs, claiming that ical orientations one of whose fundamental “between 30 and 40,000 prisoners really characteristics is an unwillingness to appro- died in the Jasenovac camp, mostly Gypsies, priately confront the crimes committed by followed by Jews and Serbs, as well as Cro- the Ustasha authorities during the ISC. Also ats”. Moreover, he indirectly downplays the active was the influence of the extremist responsibility of the Ustasha by means of segment of Croatian political emigration an odd “distribution of guilt”. Thus Jews, in that never broke with Ustashism. The Croa- addition to being the victims of Jasenovac, tian Democratic Union (CDU), the party suddenly also become complicit in it. that came into power in 1990, announced Tuđman’s responsibility as a promoter a “reconciliation between the Ustashe and of Croatian historical revisionism is all the the Partisans”, with the aim of overcoming greater for the fact that he was its main the divisions in the Croatian body politic as patron in politics and public life. Tuđman one of the basic tenets of its political pro- opened these paths with a declaration made gramme. In order to do so, it was essential at the First General Congress of the CSU in to remove from Ustashism the ignominy of February 1990, that “the ISC was not only a having been a faithful Nazi-Fascist ally and Fascist creation, but also an expression of perpetrator of the most brutal genocidal the Croatian people’s centuries-old desire revisionism in Croatia 1989-2019 perpetuating past wars 55

Ministers Ivica Račan and Ivo Sanader) gave out clear statements about the unaccept- ability of promoting the tradition of the ISC and the Ustasha movement. However, the radical-nationalist public’s interest in revisionist views remained. One of the theses of revisionism in Cro- atia and its earlier roots is the myth of the supposed rebellion of the Serb people as the cause of Ustasha crimes. After the downfall of the ISC in 1945, this remained a rare argument that the Ustasha emigration could use to try to justify their acts when faced with the clear evidence of the criminal nature of the Ustasha regime. In addition, it was sought to shift part of the responsibility to “wild Ustashe” and “nastaše”*, over whom Pavelić and the Usta- sha movement allegedly had no control, and who “on occasion responded to Chet- nik excesses in kind, what’s more, who did Photo by "oranges and lemons", flickr, so in their own country as the defenders of CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 their nation state”. Naturally, that too is a for an independent state”. This statement lie – there were individual Ustasha crimes set in motion a furious public debate about that took place without the regime’s knowl- the character of the ISC. Having grasped the edge, but displacements of people into dangers that stemmed from the ambiguity Serbia, deportations into camps and mass of his statement, in later denials, Tuđman crimes against Serbs, which included the disavowed any connections to Nazism and killing of women and children, were carried Ustashism, but he never publicly distanced out by Ustasha units under direct control himself from the broad ambition to design of the Ustasha leadership, headed by the the identity of the Croatian state precisely Poglavnik Ante Pavelić. in the spirit of his declaration. Instead of impartial analysis of the Usta- President Tuđman, motivated by the sha ideology, Croatian revisionists uncondi- Spanish example of Caudillo Franco, also tionally accepted the Ustasha regime’s value advanced the idea of the “reconciliation system, denying its Nazi-Fascist character. of all the Croats”, that is, a reconciliation Conversely, they used the crimes commit- between the Ustashe and the Partisans, ted by the Chetniks to justify Ustasha terror or their sons and grandsons. The idea of against the Serbs. Such views became com- reconciliation, as attractive as it may have monplace in texts by Croatian revisionists, appeared in principle, actually boosted the even though many of them were careful to revisionist historiography, allowing extreme distance themselves from a full justification nationalism and pro-Ustasha excesses to be of the Ustasha regime, satisfying themselves tolerated in public. “merely” with equating the culpability of the Thus, in the nineties, Josip Jurčević, Ustasha movement and that of its victims Josip Pečarić, Ljubica Štefan, Mladen Ivezić, for the terror carried out in the ISC from Rikard Gumzej and others burst through 1941 on. into the public arena as revisionist authors. As far as the genocide against Jews in The death of Franjo Tuđman in 1999 the ISC goes, the revisionists accept the and the moderate left and centre coalition responsibility of the Ustashe to various taking office after the 2000 election marked degrees, but seek to mitigate it by pointing the beginning of the deconstruction of the out examples of many Croats who had saved authoritarian political system established in Jews, falsely claiming that Pavelić’s wife was Croatia during the nineties. Consequently, a a Jew, and by pointing out that senior regime new stage in the activities of Croatian revi- officials had Jewish relatives or had them- sionists also arrived. They lost a great deal of their room for manoeuvre in the wider pub- * Those accused by Ustasha sympathisers of being dishonest recent converts, etymologically, “nasta- lic. In those years, the Croatian state lead- ti” means “to come into existence”, “to become”. ership (President Stjepan Mesić and Prime Translator’s Note 56 perpetuating past wars revisionism in Croatia 1989-2019

selves been Jews (which is only true to a very more or less unanimous in their assessment small degree). Finally, they shifted responsi- of the nature of the Ustasha regime as crim- bilities for the genocide on to the Nazis, who inal. Among others, they include Andrej were said to have exerted pressure on the Angrick, Nevenko Bartulin, Max Bergholz, Ustashe to carry out anti-Jewish measures Carl Bethke, Mark Biondich, Martina Bitun- and kill Jews en masse. All this of course is a jac, Tomislav Dulić, Alexander Korb, Rob lie, since by summer 1942, the Ustashe per- McCormick, Goran Miljan, Tea Sindbæk, fectly autonomously dispatched more than Rory Yeomans. 70% of the Jewish community in ISC terri- In the years following the publication tory into camps. of Jurčević’s book, Croatian revisionists’ In order to create some sort of balance interest turned to the Jasenovac camp – in the public debate, the revisionists high- seeking on the one hand to relativise the light the Partisan and Communist killings horrors that took place in the camp during in 1945, equating them with Ustasha kill- the ISC, while, on the other, promoting the ings. The worst recent example of this is absurd thesis that the camp continued to Josip Jurčević’s book, Bleiburg – Yugosla- exist after 1945, even until as late as 1951. vian Postwar Crimes against the Croats, The modestly-sized volume by Vladimir published in 2005. On top of the numerous Mrkoci and Vladimir Horvat, The Bare Lie terminological and factual errors, the book of the Jasenovac Camp, issued in 2008, lies remains silent on the criminal nature of the at the beginning of this new wave. The only Ustasha government, only recognising the documents the two authors used from a repressive nature of ISC authorities in a sin- huge amount of source material were those gle sentence in a book over 400 pages long, that portrayed the camp solely as a punitive seeking at once to blunt this assessment and labour camp, while consistently pass- by categorising this repressiveness under a ing over documents (including Ustasha and denominator common also to other totali- German documents) that clearly testified to tarian regimes, primarily the Yugoslavian the mass genocidal killing and a death camp Socialist government established in 1945. as the dominant character of the camp. Jurčević cites numerous examples of war- The thesis that the Ustasha camp Jasen- time and postwar eliminations and death ovac continued to operate after 1945 began sentences carried out by the Partisans, the to be advanced since the late eighties. Until Yugoslavian Army and Yugoslavian secret then, the alleged Communist camp Jaseno- services, but fails to mention anywhere vac had never been so much as mentioned that a significant portion of those Croats by any of the revisionist authors. In his and Muslim Bosniaks killed or sentenced Wastelands, Franjo Tuđman was the first to to death at the time were also responsible propose the thesis that there existed wit- for, and guilty of, a series of Ustasha crimes nesses and archival material on the exist- (as well as Serbs for Chetnik crimes). On the ence of the Jasenovac camp after 1945, but contrary, Jurčević portrays Ustasha crimes failed to mention any details. Here he – as a construct of Communist propaganda intentionally or unintentionally – confuses aimed at smearing the Ustasha movement Jasenovac with the Stara Gradiška prison and fostering hatred against its members. (which had existed since Austro-Hungar- By selectively quoting sources, he seeks on ian times and was in operation up until several occasions to construct a claim that the eighties). After Tuđman, other authors the Yugoslavian Communist government appeared, expanding on this thesis of his, hated the Croatian state so much that even but without any real arguments. in postwar lists of victims of war, it denied In 2014, the Society for Research of the such status to those killed on the ISC side, Threefold Jasenovac Camp was established. even though documents contained in his Its founders claimed that the first Jasenovac, own book refute this. until May 1945, was an Ustasha camp, the Efforts to downplay and deny ISC crimes second, from 1945-1948, Communist, and produced the opposite effect in the nineties. the third, from 1948-1951, used against the They drew the attention of the global scien- Cominformists. tific community to the genocide in the ISC, The assumed postwar Communist which had previously attracted relatively camp in Jasenovac was invented in order to limited attention from Western historiog- create a kind of “balance of memory” in rela- raphy. By around 2010, a new generation of tion to the horrors of the Ustasha camp. In historians came of age abroad, beginning point of fact, during the prisoner breakout to address Ustashism and the ISC. They are and the subsequent retreat of the Ustashe revisionism in Croatia 1989-2019 perpetuating past wars 57

on 22 April 1945, the Jasenovac camp was pers, but changed his views entirely over the torn down. After liberation, inmates of the past ten years or so. After his first revisionist Viktorovac-Sisak Forced Labour Institution texts about Jasenovac, which he published were brought to the area to clear the ruins. as a feuilleton in the Catholic weekly, Glas Despite a great deal of effort in recent years, koncila, he co-authored the aforementioned advocates of the thesis of the continued book, The Jasenovac Camp – Investigations. existence of the Jasenovac camp after 1945 Finally, in 2018, he published a book, The have so far not found a single living witness Jasenovac Labour Camp, which can only be who might speak about the horrors of the described as disgraceful. For example, Vukić camp, do not have a single written account, selectively quotes sources from Jasenovac nor a single name of a person to have per- inmate Milko Riffer’s book about theatri- ished in this imaginary camp. cal performances in Jasenovac and similar, In 2015, the Society published a book by while “forgetting” to mention that Riffer Vladimir Horvat, Igor Vukić, Stipe Pilić and also describes the most savage extermina- Blanka Matković called The Jasenovac Camp tion of thousands upon thousands people. – Investigations, in which the authors have Vukić accepts Jasenovac doctors’ reports on claimed that between 1941-1945, Jasenovac inmate deaths (e.g. heart failure), and takes wasn’t a death camp in which the Ustashe them at face value. However, he passes over committed genocidal mass murder of the witness statements asserting that such diag- Roma, Jews and Serbs, and political mass noses were fabricated, that the doctors used murder of Croats. It was supposedly merely to write them after the fact, under pressure an ordinary detention, penal and labour to keep up appearances. For instance, camp camp, where the odd individual killing survivor dr. Nikola Nikolić has described would occur. how some adults were registered as having In 2015, the president of the Society for died of childhood diseases or conjunctivitis, Research of the Threefold Jasenovac Camp, one man as having died of ovarian tumour. Stjepan Razum, who is also head of the Furthermore, Vukić describes an interna- Archdiocesan Archive in Zagreb, went even tional commission entering the camp in further than the four authors in his public February 1942, quoting only those reports statements, claiming that the Jasenovac that describe the camp as a tidy and well- camp was a “myth” planted on the Croats, managed place, where all necessary care that “an incommensurably larger number was taken of the inmates, but entirely omits of people perished in the postwar Jaseno- the report by German captain Arthur Haef- vac camp than did in the wartime camp”. fner, who saw through the Ustasha attempt Moreover, that the wartime Jasenovac camp to disguise the true state of affairs, calling was a “labour and transit camp”, that “kill- Jasenovac “a camp of the worst kind, com- ings were not carried out there”, that “the list parable to Dante’s hell.” of victims of Jasenovac was entirely fake and Finally, Vukić didn’t ask himself the most fabricated”, that “the ISC did not kill Serbs” banal of questions – why were men, women in Jasenovac, “but that after the war, Parti- and children in the camps at all, why were zans and Communists killed Croat patriots”. they taken away and imprisoned (were they Razum claims that in his public statements all sentenced as offenders? Why imprison in recent years, the prominent opinion jour- people in a labour camp at all?). nalist and publisher Slavko Goldstein (1928- Slavko Goldstein’s book, Jasenovac – 2017) sought “to ascribe the darkest features Tragedy, Mythomania, Truth, published to the ISC”, calling it the “Goldsteinisation in 2016, is a polemical and argumented of the ISC”. response to this, as well as any, attempt to At the same time, these same authors minimise or deny the criminal and geno- will highlight that the Archbishop of Zagreb, cidal character of the Jasenovac camp, as Alojzije Stepinac, saved Jews and others well as to seek to establish in scientific who were persecuted. As they are denying and scholarly circles a new historical truth the Ustasha genocide, the question logi- of the postwar Communist camp in Jase- cally arises: who was it from that Stepinac novac. Over the past three years, Đorđe was saving the Jews and others who were Mihovilović, Nataša Mataušić, Goran Huti- prosecuted? nec, Mirjana Kasapović, Ivo Goldstein and In recent years, Igor Vukić has been others have joined Goldstein with their writ- gaining prominence among the revisionists. ings. By around 2000, Vukić was a very good jour- Croatian revisionists keep comparing nalist and editor for liberal and left newspa- the Partisans’ and Communists’ mass kill- 58 perpetuating past wars revisionism in Croatia 1989-2019

ings and crimes of 1945 with Ustasha crimes. However, Croatian revisionists have The Croatian public is persistently and strong support in right-wing circles, the aggressively being served the insupportable Catholic church, even some segments of the proposition that “all totalitarianisms are the authorities, especially at regional and local same”, a logic from which then follows that level. And so, there is no end on the horizon Ustasha crimes and Partisan-Communist to the debate on the criminal character of crimes are in fact equivalent. Advocates of the Ustasha regime. Croatia’s dealing with the thesis of the “equivalence of all totali- its own past is still nowhere near its conclu- tarianisms” often invoke the 2 April 2009 sion. resolution of the European Parliament on From many aspects, this problem is European conscience and totalitarianism, absurd, especially since after the summer/ but its point G clearly states that “whereas autumn of 1943, certainly the majority of millions of victims were deported, impris- the Croatian people supported the Antifas- oned, tortured and murdered by totalitarian cist Partisan movement, led by a Croat, mar- and authoritarian regimes during the 20th shall Josip Broz Tito. century in Europe”, but that “the uniqueness of the Holocaust must nevertheless be acknowledged”. By setting the text of the resolution into the context of Croatian history, we unambiguously reach the conclusion that Partisan and Communist crimes cannot be equated with Ustasha crimes, as these are “unique”. the different faces of fascism perpetuating past wars 59 the different faces of fascism

Erich Rathfelder

It was the late 1960ies. The student move- Adorno’s sentence that national- ment in West Germany had abated. But the social problems it had confronted were not ism leads to fascism is still key overcome. There were still old Nazis in the for the discussion about right- institutions, in the legal system, among wing extremist terror systems, the doctors, in schools and universities, in because it highlights the danger the big parties of the so-called “bourgeois” of social movements that are camp. Although the Nazi ideology was con- mobilised by nationalism. The so- cealed by liberal democratic institutions, cial discussions in the democratic the ideology of the nationalist “commu- societies established after the nity” (Volksgemeinschaft) lived on in the Second World War had at least background, especially in the bourgeoi- one thing in common throughout sie, but also in the sub-proletariat, and it manifested itself in the aggressions of the the West: the fascist, National “perfectly normal” people towards all those Socialist and other forms of who were “different”, who loved both the right-wing totalitarian rule were Rolling Stones and jazz (“Negro music”), analysed by liberal and left-wing who broke out of the excruciatingly heavy minds as social phenomena, as conversations at the coffee table and asked questions. “What did you in fact do during phenomena that continue to the Nazi era?” These questions and the emo- exist in the societies and con- tions they triggered broke entire families. tinue to pose a danger to the The unspoken, but then still existing democratic-liberal order, even ideology of the “Volksgemeinschaft” was like though at times their mass basis a stronghold. But at least it was broken in had collapsed. How quickly this 1969 by the election of the resistance fighter and social democrat Willy Brandt as Chan- can change can be seen today cellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. with the emergence of national- Brandt was elected to power both by the ist right-wing populism and even social democrat trade unions, which had neo-Nazism. regained their strength, and by the enlight- ened sections of the middle class, which were on the verge of change.

Erich Rathfelder Journalist, correspondent of Tageszeitung 60 perpetuating past wars the different faces of fascism

The discussion at the Frankfurt School, burden of history among the philosophers Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and later Jürgen Haber- The atmosphere changed and there was mas, to name but a few, took us further. This scope for public discussion about the bur- discussion revolved around the manipula- den of history. Not only did information tion of people in totalitarianism – but also about Auschwitz and the crimes of the Nazis democratic-capitalist forms of rule. The ter- become available, but in this discussion, the minology adopted from Sigmund Freud, the question of guilt was tackled, as well as the relationship between the “ego” and the “id”, questions of the complicity of broad strata of ultimately led to the realisation that the “little people”, of racism and anti-Semitism, ego-strengthened individual could best but also the role of “us”, the next generation, resist manipulation. This means that in a “our” responsibility towards this German society of free and self-confident people, a history and society. How could it happen “discourse free of domination” can be pro- that a society once regarded as a cultured duced in which totalitarian ideologies no nation had allowed itself to be drawn into longer have a chance to dominate society. such unfathomable crimes? In the course of the following decades, A parallel critical society emerged, but West German society developed with its one that was contradictory in itself. There contradictions into an open and liberal soci- were also many on the left who wanted to ety capable of admitting the crimes com- flee from this differentiated discussion and mitted by the Nazis and the associated guilt. who characterised the German society of The memorial to the victims of the Shoah the time generally as “fascist”. Those who directly next to the Reichstag in Berlin is adopted the communists’ definition of perceived with astonishment by visitors anti-fascism ignored the problem of totali- from all over the world. The open discussion tarianism, which also applied to the rule about National Socialism is also the key to of Stalin or Mao Zedong. Some leftists no understanding why right-wing radical and longer thought it possible to change society nationalist authoritarian positions in (West) by the long route of discussion and through Germany have so far remained politically the institutions, but adopted the general irrelevant – in contrast to East Germany or accusation of fascism against society to other parts of Europe. fight the old Nazis and the representatives With such a nationalist, inhuman ideol- of the “pig system” with terror. For Red Army ogy, with its claims to world domination, its Faction militants, ultimately all those who racism and anti-Semitism, with its organ- would not join their group were “fascists”. ized will to destroy, National Socialism is a Their struggle was therefore hopeless and unique. Hitler was therefore not a “fascist” their social analysis wrong. in the usual sense, he was a National Social-

Photo by Blogdroed, Macedonia 2013, flickr CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 the different faces of fascism perpetuating past wars 61

ist. Benito Mussolini was a fascist. Fascism, the democratic-liberal order, even though like National Socialism, had imperialist at times their mass basis had collapsed. aspirations, wanted to renew the Roman How quickly this can change can be seen Empire and conquer all countries around today with the emergence of nationalist the Mediterranean. Mussolini developed right-wing populism and even neo-Nazism around himself a leader cult as “Duce” and in Germany, the strengthening of the fas- built a totalitarian state. But he did not build cists and right-wing populism in Italy and extermination camps, he was not an anti- nationalism in Spain. Semite. Other than Mussolini and Hitler, “Caudillo“ Franco in Spain did rely on the the partisans state party “Falange Española Tradicional- ista“ after the devastating Civil War 1936-39, It was only in the countries of the east of the which emulated the Italian fascists, but his continent occupied by German troops that true power base remained the Army and the there was significant armed resistance dur- Catholic Church. ing the Second World War. After the occupa- The three examples show that each tion by German troops, a resistance formed country has its own character, including in France as well, but the intensity of the when it comes to right-wing nationalist resistance in the West could not be com- dictatorships. National Socialism, fascism pared to that of the East. In Russia, Ukraine and Francoism have in common the leader and likewise Poland, armed partisan troops principle and totalitarian structures that were formed which sabotaged the occupy- were directed against all liberal organisa- ing forces. But none of these movements tions and social movements. They differed reached the importance of the partisans in in other areas of politics. Germany, organ- Yugoslavia. ized by the Nazis, broke any broader resist- Of course, the partisan victories can also ance with brutal force by the Gestapo and be attributed to the organisational skills and an unprecedented security system, leav- military genius of Josip Broz, nicknamed ing only individual attacks on Hitler and Tito. But more importantly, the partisan attempts such as Count Stauffenberg’s 1944 movement succeeded in mobilising mil- plot as acts of resistance. In Italy, despite 20 lions of people for cosmopolitan human years of Mussolini’s rule, popular resistance values in the face of the crimes of the occu- was never completely extinguished and pying powers and their allies, especially the immediately became manifest in 1943 when Croatian Ustasha, with the slogan “bratstvo the dictator was overthrown. Despite the and jedinstvo” (“brotherhood and unity”). developing mass movement against his rule, They fought not only against the occupying Franco died peacefully in his bed in 1975 forces and their allies, but essentially also and even appointed King Juan Carlos as for a peaceful perspective bringing together his successor. Despite all differences, what the nations of the Balkans within the frame- those “fascisms“ have in common is that the work of a socialist society. More importantly, antidemocratic, totalitarian rule established they won, and re-founded Yugoslavia. by them was able to win over broad social In contrast to the developments in the classes (national community). Large parts West, however, in the East in general and of the petty bourgeoisie, the middle classes, more importantly still in Yugoslavia, the and especially the wealthy class, formed the term fascism was used as a battle cry espe- mass foundation of these systems of rule. cially against the occupying powers. The Adorno’s sentence that nationalism German Wehrmacht, the SS, and the Ital- leads to fascism is still key for the discussion ian troops, were considered fascists. But about right-wing extremist terror systems, were Chetniks and Ustashe understood as because it highlights the danger of social fascists? Were the Serbian Nedić or Croa- movements that are mobilised by nation- tian Pavelić regimes merely pro-fascist alism. The social discussions in the demo- collaborators? How are the Serbian Ljotić cratic societies established after the Second troops and the Chetniks to be classified? World War had at least one thing in common The Mitläufer (fellow travellers) in the NDH throughout the West: the fascist, National state, the Domobrani in Croatia and Slove- Socialist and other forms of right-wing nia, the Handzhar troops in Bosnia and Her- totalitarian rule were analysed by liberal zegovina? and left-wing minds as social phenomena, If one takes the Western discussion as phenomena that continue to exist in the about fascism as a yardstick, the ideologies societies and continue to pose a danger to of the “pro-fascist” nationalist extremists 62 perpetuating past wars the different faces of fascism

Only in limited intellectual and urban circles of Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the other republics has there been a deeper discussion about the guilt of their own national societies for the crimes of the Second World War. A “domination-free” dialogue of responsible citizens with lasting effects on the individual societies did not take place either under socialism or after the devastating wars of the 1990s and the establishment of new “democratic” regimes.

like those of the Ustashe, who even set up state not already implicitly contain an exon- extermination camps on their own initia- eration? tive, should have resulted in strict criticism Only in limited intellectual and urban in Croatia itself. Because a large portion of circles of Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the the society supported the NDH state of the other republics has there been a deeper dis- “Poglavnik“ Ante Pavelić. The varieties of cussion about the guilt of their own national fascism and right-wing nationalist extrem- societies for the crimes of the Second World ism should also have been covered by a War. A “domination-free” dialogue of controversial debate among the population responsible citizens with lasting effects on itself – especially in Serbia. the individual societies did not take place After 1945, Tito was concerned with either under socialism or after the devastat- once again bringing the societies of the ing wars of the 1990s and the establishment Yugoslav nations together after the catas- of new “democratic” regimes. The current trophe and the civil war that took place establishment of the victim myth in Serbia under the occupation regime. Nationalist and the aggressive historical revisionism positions were suppressed; the trenches in all societies of former Yugoslavia, the were supposed to be filled up “from above“. fundamentals of anti-anti-fascism, were “Family traditions“ were juxtaposed with described by Todor Kuljić in his book Dis- “state ideology“ (Žarko Puhovski). However, puted Pasts. The glorification of the NDH the old ideologies continued to live in large present nowadays in Croatia and the reha- portions of the society through oral history. bilitation of the Chetniks in Serbia, as well Given the limitations of freedom of speech, as the simultaneous silence on the existence the Tito regime was unable to allow a criti- of the pro-Hitler Nedić regime and Ljotić’s cal processing of history in the greater part troops are an expression of that process. of the population, with its celebration of the In any case, it is certain that the process- heroism of the Partisans in the fight against ing of “fascism“ in its social dimensions has “fascism“. Thus, does the definition of pro- not yet succeeded in any of Yugoslavia’s suc- fascist collaboration used by the Yugoslav cessor states. the ‘stability’ of Albanian democracy without rule of law radicalisation and maintenance of power 63 radicalisation and maintenance of power the ‘stability’ of Albanian democracy without rule of law: political polarization, captured institutions and periodical crisis

Arolda Elbasani

To the external observer, Albanian politi- The dilemmas about the immedi- cal developments in the last two years may suggest an exceptional, almost dramatic, ate ‘dramatic’ crisis then, are political crisis. The February 2019 decision more of a question of a ‘sta- of the opposition to relinquish en bloc its ble’ and persistent problem of parliamentary seats is probably the culmi- democracy without RoL, which is nation of this ongoing crisis.1 The radical apt to radicalization and disrup- act followed the opposition’s systematic boycotts of the parliament after the 2017 tions. The explanatory factors, general election. This time around, how- therefore, should be sought in ever, the boycott came with an ultimatum what shapes and maintains this – resignation of the elected government and vicious circle of hybrid democ- holding fresh elections under a transitional racy that suffers from poor RoL government chosen by the opposition – as the only way to negotiate the crisis.2 The and periodic disruptions. We rationale for the ultimatum to the elected argue that this kind of democ- government appears to draw on a similar racy without RoL builds on two radical political discourse where the current interrelated phenomena – 1) po- PM and members of the executive are daily larization cum radicalization of branded as ‘gangs’, ‘bandits’ and ‘criminals’ allegedly involved, among other things, in the political spectrum; 2) weak voter fraud, organized crime, smuggling and and captured institutions unable cannabization of the country. to serve as trusted mechanisms Few or none of those accusations have of peaceful resolution of conflict. been proven by the courts or other institutions in charge. International indices of democratization, moreover, don’t corrobo- scores (2013-18) with those of the previous rate any theory about the radical deteriora- one, that was led by the parties that are now tion of democracy, nor are there any state of in opposition (2009-13) (Table 1). As for the the rule of law (RoL) indicators that would state of RoL, in general, RoL indicators show justify the need for government to resign. some improvement during the period 2004- The state of democracy has remained pretty 2008 and then decline again during the sub- similar over time and has slightly improved sequent 2009-13 government as much as when comparing the current government’s the current one (Table 2)3.

1 Euroactiv. Albania’s opposition MPs to resign in protest. February 19, 2019. Available at: https://www. Arolda Elbasani euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/albanias-oppo- Visiting Scholar at the Center sition-mps-to-resign-in-protest/ for European and Mediterranean 2 Semini, Llazar. EU, US urge non-violence as Albanian Studies at NYU, USA, and opposition protests. Daily Herald, May 25, 2019. 3 We have used data from Nations in Transit and BTI Academic Supervisor of a project Available at: https://www.dailyherald.com/ar- in order to trace the trends of different indicators, but on new statehood, Kosovo ticle/20190525/news/305259948 also to triangulate data from different sources. Foundation for Open Society 64 radicalisation and maintenance of power the ‘stability’ of Albanian democracy without rule of law

Yet, having relinquished its parliamen- presidential decree was overturned by the tary seats, the opposition also took its revo- Venice commission for overstepping the lutionary battle onto the streets by leading president’s constitutional rights, and the a series of protests marked by violence, president himself became the subject of a attacks on state institutions and outright parliamentary investigation into abuse of threats of escalation of conflict.4 The cri- power. The country has, thus, resumed its sis took a new turn with the approach of eventful path to democracy, punctuated the local elections of June 30th, which the by a radical political discourse, revolution- opposition not only boycotted, but also ary political behaviour including threats tried to prevent by vandalizing polling sta- and acts of violence, periodic boycotts of tions and threatening voters and officials in elected institutions as well as quasi-regular charge. Only a nominal warning by the US moments of institutional crisis. The inter- to opposition leaders that “if there are acts national indices of democratization, on the of violence in future protests, we will con- other hand, confirm a general stagnation of sider them responsible” put a hold on acts of democracy scores, which places the country violence. However, it didn’t stop the political squarely and persistently in the category of tensions or institutional strife, which esca- hybrid democratic regimes (Table 1). They lated after a June 8th decree by the Albanian also indicate how sticky the problem of RoL president cancelling the upcoming elec- is in all its dimensions – corruption, inde- tions.5 The decree was another controversial pendence of the judiciary and separation of act of intra-institutional strife to the extent powers (Table 2). that it came after the start of the campaign The dilemmas about the immediate and without consultation with any parties, ‘dramatic’ crisis then, are more of a ques- or setting a new date for the elections. tion of a ‘stable’ and persistent problem of Since then, the protests have abated, democracy without RoL, which is prone to violent protests were abandoned, interna- radicalization and disruptions. The explan- tional actors backed holding the elections atory factors, therefore, should be sought on the set date, elections were peacefully in what shapes and maintains this vicious held and supervised by the ODIHR, the circle of hybrid democracy that suffers from poor RoL and periodic disruptions. We 4 Reuters. Albanian protesters hurl petrol bombs, seek snap poll. May 11, 2019. Available at: shttps://www. argue that this kind of democracy without reuters.com/article/us-albania-protests-protests/al- RoL builds on two interrelated phenom- banian-protesters-hurl-petrol-bombs-seek-snap-polls- idUSKCN1SH0MN ena – 1) polarization cum radicalization of 5 Perry, Maja. Albanian Party Accused of Graft Calls the political spectrum; 2) weak and cap- for President’s Removal. OCCCRP, June 10, 2019. tured institutions unable to serve as trusted https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/9906-albanian-party- accused-of-graft-calls-for-president-s-removal mechanisms of peaceful resolution of con-

Table 1: Democratic Governance Scores, Albania 2005-2018

05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Democratic 4.25 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.75 4.75 5.00 4.75 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 Governance

Source: Nations in Transit, compiled by the author. Ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress.

Table 2: Dimensions of Rule of Law Scores, Albania 2006-18

06 08 10 12 14 16 18

Separation of 5 7 7 6 4 4 4 powers

Independent 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 Justice

Prosecution of 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 corruption

Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), compiled by the author. Ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 representing the highest value. Note that BTI reports evaluate a period spanning the 2 years leading up to the year of the report. Example, the evaluation of 2018 refers to the period 2015-2016 and so on. the ‘stability’ of Albanian democracy without rule of law radicalisation and maintenance of power 65

Photo by Doug Kaye, flickr CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 flict. Both those factors reinforce a vicious This type of polarization, when cycle where the polarized political class sees unruly conflict as a means to take over coupled with politically con- institutions, while evolving institutions are trolled institutions, tends to de- incapable of withstanding such pressure grade into periods of bitter crisis, and commonly become a political weapon even institutional disruption and in the evolving political struggles. Periodic violence. As a recent study on but somehow regular crises and disruptions are an expected outcome of this type polarization notes, potential of democracy. consequences of polarization for democracy include ‚gridlock polarization and winner- and paralysis, careening and take-all style of governance instability, democratic erosion, and democratic collapse.‘ In the The Albanian mode of chaotic and at times case of Albania, the corollary violent transition from the communist phenomena of weak institutions regime has shaped a ferocious long-term and the extensive patronage conflict between two antagonistic political- networks they build on, have ideological camps, the former communists and the anti-communists, which has come deprived the system from peace- to haunt post-communist democratization. ful institutional mechanism of This type of polarization,6 often empow- conflict resolution. Instead, this ered by political groups’ efforts to distin- type of institutions captured by guish and maintain their power bases, has political patronage networks brought the country to the verge of collapse enable and reinforce the pattern more than once.7 It has also facilitated a system of winner takes all forms of govern- of a polarised democracy apt to ance, which thrives on dominant leaders, crisis and collapse. hierarchical parties and patronage-tainted institutions.8

6 Here defined as mutually antagonistic “us” vs. “them” camps, which collapse normal cross-cutting interests and identities into two mutually exclusive identities. Somer, Murat and McCoy, Jennifer. 2018. Transfor- mations through Polarization and Global threats to Democracy. Annals x. 7 BTI. 2016. Albania Country Report. Available at: https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/ Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Albania.pdf 8 BTI. 2018. Albania Country Report. Available at: https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/ALB/ 66 radicalisation and maintenance of power the ‘stability’ of Albanian democracy without rule of law

Specifically, since the fall of commu- Due to this type of polarization embed- nism, Albania has consolidated a bipolar ded in regional patronage networks, both party system dominated by the Democratic parties have alternated in power and main- Party (DP) and the Socialist Party (SP). The tained effective control over the government two parties have positioned themselves at for prolonged periods – the DP as the ruling the opposite ends of the ideological spec- majority in the period 1992-7 and again in trum, which has shaped an aggressive, 2005-13; the SP in 1997-2005 and 2013 until even unruly competition between the two the present. The main “third” party, the blocks.9 The DP, the umbrella party that Socialist Movement for Integration (SMI), brought together different anti-communist has split off from the SP, arguably follow- sections of society after the introduction ing bickering over the party leadership after of pluralism in 1990, represents and has in 2001 elections. Since then, the SMI’s “prag- a way monopolized the idea of the center- matic” shifts to ally with any governing right – a fierce anti-communist, free market majority despite its ideological orientation and non-interventionist democratic state – the PD in 2009 and the SP in 2013 – shows allied with the West. The SP, also created in that fierce ideological polarization serves to 1991, is the descendant of the former com- mobilize voters and build up a party’s voter munist party and has inherited some of its base, but it does not mean much when structures, its leadership and voter base, it comes to holding on to and exercising although it has reformed itself in the line power. Ideological divisions aside, the major with the European central-left and reor- political parties have proven similar in their ganised its central organs with leaders hail- tactics of packing state institutions with mil- ing from the anticommunist movement. itants and loyalists once in power.11 Such a To some extent, this major political cleav- system serves as a means for the parties to age overlaps with regional divisions. The feed the loyalist base, but also hierarchically DP’s anti-communist ideology appeals to control the spoils of widespread corrup- Northern parts of the country, which have tion. This “winner-takes-all” model of gov- particularly suffered during the communist ernance rooted in the patronage networks repression and tend to vote en masse for the thrived especially when governing parties DP, despite its record in government. That enjoyed ample parliamentary majority and key DP leaders hail from the Northern areas little political competition. helps to enshrine their ideological message The closed list proportional electoral into a system of patronage/regional rela- system adopted in 2008 has reinforced the tionships. Similarly, the SP typically appeals traits of a bipolar system and strengthened to southern areas of the country, which have the role of party leaders in personally con- traditionally been the power base of com- trolling who enters, survives and thrives in munist party and tend to feed the SP’s rank the system, and thus also the network of a and file, including major SP leaders. Moreo- system of loyalty and service to the leader.12 ver, the parties’ leaderships have persis- All parties are similarly marked by central- tently used existing divisions as an effective ized hierarchical structures that evolve strategy to define and strengthen their basis around a single leader as the linchpin of of supporters, a strategy that works particu- the party and its style of governance. In larly well in the context of winner take all this context, reshuffling of party leadership style of governance and patronage networks usually means a cleansing of party ranks in that characterize the system.10 favour of those close to the leader, a process which has turned party organs but also its lower ranks into close-knit networks of personal loyalty and obedience to the leader.

11 Elbasani. Arolda. 2011. ‘EU administrative conditionality and domestic downloading: the limits of Europe- anization in challenging contexts.’ KFG Working Paper Series, No. 2. Available at: http://userpage.fu-berlin. de/~kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG_2.pdf 12 BTI. 2014. Albania Country Report. Available at: https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/ 9 Ibid. Downloads/Reports/2014/pdf/BTI_2014_Albania.pdf; 10 Ibid. BTI. 2016. Albania country Report. the ‘stability’ of Albanian democracy without rule of law radicalisation and maintenance of power 67

After the 1997 crisis, which required international intervention to bring the patched system together, the country had to start anew, this time amidst acrimonious political conflict, vacuum of state institutions, and a deeply distrustful society. Consecutive majorities, led by DP or SP, continued to pray on the traits of polarization and control of state institutions for personal and political interest. Despite heavy international presence and investment in institution-building, the governance system continued to suffer from antagonistic politics, centralization of power, politically controlled institutions and periodic moments of crisis and disruption.

the oppressed opposition, developed into dysfunctional institutions an armed movement once the govern- and periodical crisis ing majority choose to mobilize their own supporters, thus leading the country to a This type of polarization, when coupled dangerous civil conflict along the North- with politically controlled institutions, South division. After the 1997 crisis, which tends to degrade into periods of bitter crisis, required international intervention to bring even institutional disruption and violence. the patched-up system together, the coun- As a recent study on polarization notes, try had to start anew, this time amidst acri- potential consequences of polarization for monious political conflict, vacuum of state democracy include‚ gridlock and paraly- institutions, and a deeply distrustful society. sis, careening and instability, democratic Consecutive majorities, led by the DP erosion, and democratic collapse.‘�13 In the and the SP, continued to prey on the facts case of Albania, the corollary phenomena of polarization and control of state insti- of weak institutions and extensive patron- tutions for personal and political inter- age networks they build on, have deprived est. Despite heavy international presence the system of a peaceful institutional mech- and investment in institution-building, anism of conflict resolution. Instead, this the governance system continued to suffer type of institution captured by political from antagonistic politics, centralization of patronage networks enables and reinforces power, politically controlled institutions and the pattern of a polarised democracy prone periodic moments of crisis and disruption. to crisis and collapse. In 2012, for example, an international report The notorious crisis of 1997, which concluded: “Albania has experienced a shift degenerated into an armed movement to almost complete control by the ruling against state institutions, is perhaps the elite and extensive use of non-democratic most vivid example of the potential disrup- proceduralism where laws [and institution of the radical polarization and weak tions] are used for exerting control by elites institutions siding with specific political in power.”15 Not surprisingly, the opposition groups. Harsh polarization between major challenged the evolving ‚undemocratic pro- political parties during the first stages of ceduralism‘ in the streets as much as inside transition facilitated the building of a one- the unresponsive institutions, thus creating man rule capitalizing on security forces, an another moment of crisis and disruption. extensive patronage system and single party Once in power, the reshuffled SP major- control over state institutions, much remi- ity (2013 to the present) pledged to go niscent of the previous communist-party beyond the usual political game – polari- rule.14 The economy, too, degraded into a zation and politically captured institutions fraudulent transition and mushrooming – that hollowed out the legitimacy of democ- of pyramid schemes, which destroyed the racy.16 A range of long delayed reforms – savings of 3/4 of the Albanian popula- from the judiciary to illegal construction tion. Massive protests by people unhappy – were positively assessed by international with the direction of change, including reporting.17� Most notably, the 2017 elections

13 Somer and McCoy. 2018. ‘Transformations through 15 Primatarova, A., and Deimel, J. (2012) ‘Bridge over Polarization’. troubled waters? The role of the internationals in 14 Elbasani, Arolda. 2004. ‘Albania in transition: Ma- Albania’, Centre for Liberal Strategies. nipulation or appropriation of international norms?’ 16 BTI. 2016. Albania Country Report. Southeast European Politics 5 (1), 24-44 17 Ibid. 68 radicalisation and maintenance of power the ‘stability’ of Albanian democracy without rule of law

were held under an exceptional political Subsequently, opposition’s boycott and agreement which gave the opposition con- later resignation of its parliamentary seats trol over key institutions in charge of elec- deprived the country of the necessary par- tions – the Chairman of Central Electoral liamentary scrutiny over an increasingly Commission, the position of deputy prime overpowerful executive. It also obstructed minister, and 6 related ministers including the functioning of the democratic institu- the Minister of the Interior. For the first time tions instead of capitalizing on those insti- during those elections, the government also tutions – parliamentary investigations, established a task force chaired by a dep- parliamentary committees, judicial pro- uty prime minister from the opposition, in ceedings etc. – to keep those in power in order to monitor and coordinate the public check. Political and institutional obstruc- administration’s conduct during elections. tion took various forms: public denigration The agreement resulted in a comparatively of elected officials, boycott of legislative smooth, less politicized and closely moni- reforms, including ongoing reform of the tored electoral process. Yet, the arrangement judiciary, and frequent popular mobiliza- didn’t quell the usual radicalization or the tion to bring down the government. The bitter political conflict between the parties, Albanian public, unsurprisingly, tends to including contestation of results, boycott of distrust their own institutions. The results the elected institutions, and revolutionary of a 2016 IDRA survey on judicial reform, calls to bring down the elected government. for example, show that 92% of the inter- Even the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations viewees support it. However, 66% believe to improve the electoral process ahead of that there will be blockages in Parliament, the next elections were stalled because of only 17% trust judges and 30-42% the main the boycott of the Parliamentary Commis- parties to conduct the reform, as com- sion on Electoral Reform. pared to the 76% that trust the EU and 78% the American embassy. Additionally, 60% believe that reforms will not be efficient because people within the system will work against them.18

18 IDRA. 2016. Judicial Reform in Albania: General Public Survey. Available at: https://www.idrainstitute. org/en/projects/reforma-n-drejt-si-sondazhi-i-opinio- nit-publik ‘fool’s gold’: the Macedonian journey from stabilitocracy to radicalization and back radicalisation and maintenance of power 69

‘fool’s gold’: the Macedonian journey from stabilitocracy to radicalization and back

Biljana Vankovska

The investigation is ongoing and the final outcome will be known in a few months, but the Macedonian public has a déjà vu feeling: going back to square one, where one regime is only replaced by another, and apart from the switch between Gruevski and Zaev (and their respective parties) literally nothing has changed. In sum, it is how stabilitocracy has survived despite the democratic ‘radicalization’. Many less informed or biased observers wonder: How was it possible for the protest movement (dubbed the Colourful revolution), including the then-opposition and now ruling SDSM, to fail so miserably in almost all aspects of democratic consolidation?

It looks like а bizarre destiny for a country to the version presented to the Macedonian be doomed to repeatedly be central to vari- citizens not only by the new ‘pro-European’ ous ‘success stories’ made up by the inter- government led by Zaev, but also by a range national community – and yet to remain of high-ranking foreign officials and states- as weak and poor as ever. Few remember men, including the NATO Secretary Gen- that once, in the early 90s, the Republic of eral and the German Chancellor Merkel, Macedonia was a so-called ‘oasis of peace’. who took the pain of visiting the European The myth ended ten years later during the superperiphery on the eve of the September short-lived 2001 internal conflict, but it referendum to secure the outcome. Lobby- became a miracle of the EU post-conflict ing and taking (albeit a disguised) part in management soon after. Here we go again: an internal process of direct democracy by reborn as North Macedonia, it figures in foreign dignitaries would have been seen as another amazing fairy-tale of dispute/con- highly inappropriate in any other case – but flict resolution in the troublesome Balkans. this is the Balkans, after all. The Empire in In a Jesus-like manner, ‘vinegar turned into denial (to quote David Chandler) takes good wine’ under the touch of two (potential) care of the incompetent locals and helps Nobel peace prize holders (prime minis- them in the process of state-building. The ters Zaev and Tsipras), discretely led by the Macedonian society had already witnessed divine hand of the ‘international commu- a similar tour and dosage of propaganda nity’. The so-called Prespa process (i.e. the on the eve of yet another referendum (in route from signing the Prespa Agreement 2004), but much more instructive was the between Athens and Skopje in June 2018 to case of the 2015 (bailout) referendum in the amending of the Macedonian Constitu- Greece, when the European powers openly tion in January 2019) was supposed to open displayed their resoluteness in disciplining the heavens’ gate of NATO and the EU to the government and people in the Balkan the small state whose path to accession had periphery. Zaev’s government badly needed Biljana Vankovska been blocked for years due to the ‘absurd an immediate boost as early as June 2018: Professor of political science, problem’ with its name. At least, this was anything to ingratiate itself with the discon- Skopje 70 radicalisation and maintenance of power ‘fool’s gold’: the Macedonian journey from stabilitocracy to radicalization and back

tented and shocked public. A government to get rid of Gruevski’s stabilitocracy, shook assisted production of fake news, spread by it up through the process of radicalization the mainstream media (and not opposed through a popular protest movement, and by the European power centres), delivered second, the pro-European government of the happy announcement that Macedonia Zaev quickly resolved all bilateral disputes had got a date for the start of the EU nego- with the neighbours. With regard to the first tiation process along with the invitation to premise, a state that was generally (and join NATO. Celebrations (both ill-attended rightly) defined as a ‘captured state’ and and half-hearted) took place in 14 cities in an illiberal/hybrid regime (under the rule mid-July 2018. However, a lie has no legs, of Gruevski and the conservative VMRO- so the bitter truth became fully obvious in DPMNE along with the Albanian part- June 2019: the name change has not been ner DUI) has transformed into a “shining enough to gain the opening of the so desired example”, not only for the other regional negotiation process! The anti-climax has actors (apparently, Serbia and Kosovo), but again been managed by PR services and has the potential to serve as a model on a diplomatic phrases by numerous European global scale. The most interesting, and least politicians (mostly by putting the blame on noticed ‘detail’ of this miraculous trans- the lack of progress in neighbouring Albania formation is the following fact: a classical and emphasizing the transition in EU insti- regime change through a colour revolution tutions after the parliamentary elections). (2015/2016) materialised only partially! Despite all the previous tantalizing pains, Namely, Gruevski had always been pre- the Macedonian citizens are being asked sented as an archetypal dictator and the to be more patient and wait until October, main culprit for the antidemocratic devel- November or December - the only unknown opments. His twin-brother in the governing variable is: of which year! coalition, Ali Ahmeti, the leader of the DUI Many European analysts find this out- (the Albanian partner), has so far remained come unfair and damaging both for the EU untarnished and innocent as a child. During and the country that (allegedly) delivered the so-called Colourful Revolution (indeed, so much and unjustifiably remained out even prior to it, since the 2015 Protest in the cold. The basic premise of this posi- movement) it looked as if Macedonia had tion is twofold: first, Macedonian citizens gone through an inspiring and all so neces- displayed amazing will and determination sary process of radicalization: the citizenry, regardless of ethnic, religious or other origin, got fed up with the corrupt and inept Up until recently, the government’s excuse government, so the stabilitocracy was supposed to come to a glorious end, through for all scandals involving cronyism, conflict of a bottom-up democratic upheaval and interest at the highest government level, nepo- radical political transformation. The Euro- tism, filling the public administration with party pean partners mediated the political crisis members, control of the media, etc. has been through the so-called Pržino agreement, that “within the last two years we had external which not only provided the way to the next priorities, we achieved the unimaginable, we re- elections but also, more importantly, introduced the office of the Special Prosecutor solved all bilateral disputes, we opened the path (apparently unconstitutional, it was seen to NATO and the EU. Soon we will start with as a ray of hope in reaching the ‘revolution’s the internal reforms.” The gross disappointment goal’ that read “No justice, no peace”). with the Zaev government was due to a funda- Seen through the EU association prism, mental ‘misunderstanding’ over the priorities: one should not disregard a few significant facts about the stabilitocracy-radicalization while the majority of citizens expected internal nexus. First of all, under Gruevski’s rule the reforms (especially in the economic sphere, country progress reports were satisfactory particularly as regards unemployment, and in enough to get (nine) unanimous positive the judiciary and health care), the entire govern- recommendations for starting the nego- ment (including ministries not responsible for tiation process, both from the EU Parlia- ment and the European Commission (the foreign policy and EU integration) put all their failure to obtain the recommendation at efforts into its ‘external achievements’, as well Council level was always due to the Greek as basing its propaganda around them. veto – at least the Macedonian public was led to believe so). Gruevski (as well as the ‘fool’s gold’: the Macedonian journey from stabilitocracy to radicalization and back radicalisation and maintenance of power 71

president, Ivanov) may have been seen as a with the victorious VMRO-DPMNE after the ‘son of a bitch’ behind the scenes – yet he 2016 parliamentary elections), Gruevski was was ‘our son of a bitch’ (to use Franklin D. able to deliver on the internal front as well: Roosevelt’s famous expression) as long as he the inter-ethnic (so-called tender or deal- compliantly followed all the demands from oriented) coalition worked perfectly well, at Brussels (and Washington). This especially least on a political and security level (hon- proved to be true during the 2015 migrant estly, ever since 2001 nobody really cared crisis, when the Macedonian security forces about the societal level and genuine peace- were expected to do the dirty job of pro- building, so the artificial and negative peace tecting the core EU countries on the bor- had always had priority over the more dif- der. (One could surely discuss the lack of ficult aspects of transformation of ethnic professionalism and coordination of, and conflict). He ran a particularly friendly pol- among, the security services of a generally icy towards the neoliberal business centers. weak and inept state, but that is another Finally, having ruled a very weak, and politi- story). Furthermore, as Zaev’s ‘bombshells’ cally and economically dependent state, showed, Gruevski had also been negotiating Gruevski had always been a paper tiger a name change with his Greek counterparts (which was obvious during the 2015/2016 and was not such a staunch ‘national- political crisis, when not a single opposition ist’ and defender of Macedonia’s name as figure, not even Zaev himself, was arrested he wanted everyone to believe. In spite of or seriously intimidated). At the end of the widespread (media) accusations of his the day, the gross irony of fate is the fact alleged anti-NATO and pro-Russian orien- that Gruevski was allowed to go scot-free tation, the facts show that during his rule, (presumably by Zaev’s government), and the Lilliputian state had no foreign policy currently enjoys the status of asylee in Hun- of its own whatsoever, which is a constant gary. The country he led may have a long of Macedonian state-building. The gov- road ahead to the EU, but he personally has ernment followed all the instructions from joined the Union despite everything. Brussels (and especially Berlin), even when Zaev’s rise to power was not an easy one: the demands were going against national the Colourful Revolution (vastly assisted by interests (for instance, Macedonia gave up foreign funds and agencies) greatly helped on possible cooperation with Russia in the the foot-dragging and impotent Social energy sector, i.e. the South Stream project, Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) to at the same time that Germany was working regain some political legitimacy and popu- on the North Stream deal). In the spirit of larity. Yet it was not enough to earn him a Photo by SUXSIEQ, stabilitocracy, until the very end (i.e. when clear electoral victory. Actually, despite the Democracy, flickr Ahmeti was told not to enter a coalition fact that a significant number of Albanian CC-BY-NC 2.0 72 radicalisation and maintenance of power ‘fool’s gold’: the Macedonian journey from stabilitocracy to radicalization and back

still being lamented, the ‘shining example’ in a country which is almost a had already started to fall apart. The latest protectorate, it would be legiti- scandal over the misuse of the ‘telephone mate to look beyond the local bombshells’ for racketeering and obstruc- tion of justice involves the Special Prosecu- incapacities and traditional tor, Katica Janeva, and TV channel owner Balkan backwardness. The rare Bojan Jovanovski. The investigation is ongo- analysts who have dared criticize ing and the final outcome will be known in the ‘medicine’ given to the sick a few months, but the Macedonian public patient have been repeatedly has a déjà vu feeling: going back to square one, where one regime is only replaced by vilified as anti-Western (and another, and apart from the switch between therefore pro-Russian) elements Gruevski and Zaev (and their respective par- who are against the country’s ties) literally nothing has changed. In sum, membership in NATO and the it is how stabilitocracy has survived despite EU. Zaev’s government thus got the democratic ‘radicalization’. Many less a carte blanche to do whatever informed or biased observers wonder: How was it possible for the protest movement it wanted, as long as it followed (dubbed the Colourful revolution), includ- the all-important Prespa path. ing the then-opposition and now ruling The key misunderstanding be- SDSM, to fail so miserably in almost all tween the European (or better, aspects of democratic consolidation? Up the Euro-Atlantic) partners and until recently, the government’s excuse for all scandals involving cronyism, conflict of the local public lay in the raison interest at the highest government level, d’etre of the Prespa agreement: nepotism, filling the public administration it had less to do with EU en- with party members, control of the media, largement (and Macron was the etc. has been that “within the last two years only European politician honest we had external priorities, we achieved the unimaginable, we resolved all bilateral dis- enough to put it bluntly prior putes, we opened the path to NATO and to the 2018 September refer- the EU. Soon we will start with the internal endum) but rather with joining reforms.” The gross disappointment with NATO as soon as possible. In the Zaev government was due to a funda- other words, the removal of the mental ‘misunderstanding’ over the priorities: while the majority of citizens expected Greek blockade was inspired by internal reforms (especially in the economic geopolitical reasons and not by sphere, particularly as regards unemploy- the idea of European enlargement, and in the judiciary and health care), ment. the entire government (including ministries not responsible for foreign policy and EU integration) put all their efforts into its voters placed their confidence in a Macedo- ‘external achievements’, as well as basing its nian party in the hope that it would provide propaganda around them. a real alternative to the corrupt DUI and It seems that for most of the Western DPA (a unique achievement in an otherwise partners and foreign observers, what Zaev deeply divided country), Zaev effectively achieved abroad is practically the only owes his premiership to Ahmeti, i.e. the matter where the state showed (alleged) powerful pillar of the previous ‘regime’ that progress and should be rewarded. On the had allegedly been overthrown. In reality, it contrary, a public opinion survey (con- took three smaller Albanian parties to make ducted in mid-July 2019) shows a different a workable governing coalition (albeit one picture of the ‘progress’: more than half of with feet of clay). The horrifying events and citizens think that the country is moving in scenes of 27 April opened the way for the the wrong direction, and the spheres that are government to be formed; as a side-effect, the worst off are the health sector and the it gave Zaev an image of a martyr, on top of judiciary. The same percentage of respond- that of a hero. ents are not only disillusioned by the Special While the bad fortune and missed Prosecutor’s work, but also believe that the opportunity to start negotiations were institution should be abolished (interest- ‘fool’s gold’: the Macedonian journey from stabilitocracy to radicalization and back radicalisation and maintenance of power 73

ingly, despite the huge scandal, the official referendum, suggesting a “combination of EU view is that the SP deserves full support the Balkan and rational approach” in secur- and should carry on). If the elections were ing the 2/3 majority necessary to change the held tomorrow, the winner would be VMRO- Constitution and ratify the Prespa agree- DPMNE (again). ment. Apart from turning a blind eye to the Why did the international communi- scandalous breaches of all the norms of the ty’s effort fail despite the huge amount of Venice Code of Good Practice on Referen- money invested and the direct and indirect dums and the national constitution, the support for the reform government? This is European partners did not see or hear the not to say that the ‘locals’ should not take biased propaganda, not even Zaev’s calls for any blame, but in a country which is almost bribery and racketeering during the cam- a protectorate, it would be legitimate to paign. The process was completed in such look beyond the local incapacities and tra- a way that the whole idea of the rule of law ditional Balkan backwardness. The rare ana- was burnt on the altar of (geo)political effi- lysts who have dared criticize the ‘medicine’ ciency: by means of intimidation and ‘rec- given to the sick patient have been repeat- onciliation’ with eight opposition MPs who edly vilified as anti-Western (and therefore had been charged by the Special Prosecu- pro-Russian) elements who are against the tor’s office or by the regular state prosecu- country’s membership in NATO and the EU. tor (over the events of 27 April), including a Zaev’s government thus got a carte blanche quick change of the Criminal Code to pro- to do whatever it wanted, as long as it fol- vide them guarantees that they won’t be lowed the all-important Prespa path. The charged in the future. Zaev has obviously key misunderstanding between the Euro- started to believe that he was untouchable pean (or better, the Euro-Atlantic) partners and above the law, due to the unreserved and the local public lay in the raison d’etre of support he received from Brussels and Ber- the Prespa agreement: it had less to do with lin. It remains to be seen for how long he will EU enlargement (and Macron was the only be tolerated by his external mentors. European politician honest enough to put it There is a popular saying that “The bluntly prior to the 2018 September referen- candidate countries pretend they want to dum) but rather with joining NATO as soon reform and we pretend we want them to as possible. In other words, the removal of join the EU”. Unlike the other Balkan lead- the Greek blockade was inspired by geopo- ers, during the last couple of years Zaev did litical reasons and not by the idea of Euro- not even need to pretend to make reforms. pean enlargement. He was chosen to deliver ‘peace and stability The entire process of resolving the in the region’ – and maybe get a Nobel Peace political crisis through European involve- Prize (as he surely believes he deserves). ment was led by the heavy hand of power On the eve of the June EU summit he even and politics, rather than by respect for inter- offered to exchange two Nobel Prizes for a national and internal (particularly, constitu- green light for opening the negotiation pro- tional) law. That was the case with the gentle cess. As soon as the government became removal of Gruevski from office, the Pržino aware that no prize was forthcoming, they 1 and 2 agreements that envisaged unusual turned to the old and well-practiced tactics: and unconstitutional institutional arrange- using stability as a bargaining chip! The ments (such as the Special Prosecutor’s message spelled out mostly by the Prime office and the so-called Pržino government, Minister and the minister of foreign affairs inter-party deals in the appointment of offi- was interesting per se: if you do not open the cials, such as members of the State Electoral process, the country will relapse back into Commission or the Anti-Corruption Com- instability and nationalism! Not so long ago, mission, etc.). In a statement for the media foreign minister Dimitrov believed in mira- in 2013, Žarko Puhovski said that Macedonia cles (i.e. the Prespa agreement), but now is not quite a state - and he was/is right: this warns that the region is a “theatre of geopo- is a protectorate sui generis (as practically litical competition”, including the involve- any protectorate is). For the external statement of Moscow and Beijing, and that builders, the goal is more important than the lack of an appropriate response from the means. No wonder that, in a statement Brussels “will boost the ‘shallow national- to the Austrian Kurier (10 October 2018), EU ists’ opposed to EU”. Zaev and Rama sent a Commissioner Hahn encouraged the Mac- similar message, referring to anti-EU forces, edonian Prime Minister to go on with the populism and other bogeymen from the Prespa deal regardless of the failure of the same repertoire. This kind of self-presenta- 74 radicalisation and maintenance of power ‘fool’s gold’: the Macedonian journey from stabilitocracy to radicalization and back

For the external state-builders, the goal is more important than the means. No wonder that, in a statement to the Austrian Kurier (10 October 2018), EU Commissioner Hahn encouraged the Macedonian Prime Minis- ter to go on with the Prespa deal regardless of the failure of the referendum, suggesting a “combination of the Balkan and rational approach” in securing the 2/3 majority necessary to change the Constitution and ratify the Prespa agreement. Apart from turning a blind eye to the scandalous breaches of all the norms of the Venice Code of Good Practice on Refer- endums and the national constitution, the European partners did not see or hear the biased propaganda, not even Zaev’s calls for bribery and racketeering during the campaign. The process was completed in such a way that the whole idea of the rule of law was burnt on the altar of (geo)political efficiency

tion as the best and the one and only “right” Stabilitocracy, as the author of this term political option opens the dilemma about Srđa Pavlović rightly points out, is a two the essence of political pluralism, political way street: “The parties involved in this competition, and the role of the opposition. bargaining nightmare bear responsibility The other aspect refers to getting away with for the final outcome.” Furthermore, the one’s political responsibility for a complete concept of stabilitocracy is deeply prob- lack of reforms because ‘the alternative to lematic because it contains certain colonial us is much worse for you’. Zoran Zaev sent and emancipatory impulses on the part of another interesting message from the Lon- the West towards the “not-quite-Western don meeting : “We don’t need a new radi- Other”. Hakan Wiberg used to remind of the calism, nationalism and populism in our iatrogenic effects of ‘external medicines’, but country”. He has obviously forgotten that Chandler has deconstructed the game in he owes his position to a ‘new form of radi- which the external state-builders manage to calism’, a grass-roots movement that ousted rid themselves of any responsibility for their his predecessor. As things stand right now, deeds and put the blame on the incompe- he should not feel threatened by any ‘new tent locals. The ‘radicalization process’ once radicalism’ because the main part of the glorified during the Colourful revolution is leadership of the ‘coloured revolutionaries’ now discarded as a dangerous development is well-situated in the establishment, while that may lead the country away from the the general public is drowning in apathy path to the EU. Stability is ‘the only game in and has lost hope that anything will change the town’, and that’s what Zaev offers. In the for the better. eyes of the Macedonian citizens it means One of Macedonia’s most respected “more of the same”, a devastating status quo public intellectuals, Arsim Zekolli, recently in a rebranded state with a new label on the drew attention to a very important issue. In old container. his words, if the EU and Germany are unreli- able, then what about Zaev’s pledges: “Has Zaev ever kept his word about anything he promised to his own citizens? Threats with cataclysmic scenarios, and generally speak- ing emphasizing Gruevski and Berisha as negative examples vis-à-vis his current successes as a substitute for reforms, serve as an excuse for not meeting EU criteria.” Zekolli reminds that he once compared Macedonia’s path to the EU to the fish from Hemingway’s novel. I have used another metaphor for the same issue in an earlier article for Perspectives: the curious case of Benjamin Button. Europe’s longest-standing leader survives with Western support, while oppressively ruling the country radicalisation and maintenance of power 75

Europe’s longest-standing leader survives with Western support, while oppressively ruling the country

Milka Tadić

Montenegro is the only country in Europe The judiciary did not prosecute even overt abus- (not counting Russia) in which there has never been a change of government in an es and electoral manipulations. After the “Re- election. Since 1945, it has been governed cordings” and “Envelope” affairs, which clearly invariably by one and the same party - the demonstrated that the ruling party was buying Communist Party, which in 1990 changed votes and offering state jobs ahead of elections, its name to the Democratic Party of Social- no high-ranking officials were held accountable, ists (DPS). Although the multiparty system was introduced at the time, the Berlin Wall despite convincing evidence and appeals by the has not been demolished here, because the EU, which regularly demands in its reports that entire system is tightly controlled by the DPS, these affairs be resolved. Crimes and violence more precisely by its leader, the longterm against investigative reporters in recent years president Milo Đukanović and his family and have also gone unpunished. One reporter was friends, who seized power with support from Slobodan Milošević and have not released it murdered, another journalist was shot in the since. On two occasions, he briefly withdrew leg, explosive devices have been planted in their from government functions, but remained in yards and several were brutally beaten, while full control as DPS Chairman. a bomb shook the offices of the daily Vijesti, Thus, real democratic elections in which several of whose cars were set on fire. the free will of the citizens would prevail have never been conducted in this country. The shortcomings of the electoral process are Russia has been introduced into this detailed in several international documents, narrative in recent years, especially since including the OSCE / ODIHR report from the the 2016 elections, as allegedly trying to last presidential elections, which emphasizes destabilize Montenegro, the youngest NATO the so-called institutional advantage enjoyed member. This has been claimed even by by the ruling party candidate. If one has an some politicians from influential Western institutional advantage in elections, how can countries. The fact that Đukanović devel- the opponents challenge him or her? oped close relations with Moscow in the Despite the monopolies, the Podgorica recent past and gave Putin’s oligarchs some government is persistently supported in the strategic companies and the most beautiful West. On several occasions, when Europe’s real estate by the sea has been forgotten. longest-serving leader Đukanović was on The opposition in Montenegro has weak- the cliff-edge, his friends from Europe and nesses. It is not well organized and is bitterly the United States reached out to him to stop divided, but most opposition parties cannot him falling. They usually justified this sup- be defined as predominantly pro-Russian port for an essentially deeply authoritarian and anti-Western. On the contrary, none of politician by pointing to a weak, disunited the parliamentary opposition parties calls anti-Western alternative that would divert into question the country’s accession to the Milka Tadić Journalist, international media the country from its European path and to European Union, and only parts of the Dem- correspondent and anti-war the threats coming from Russia. ocratic Front are openly pro-Russian. activist, Podgorica 76 radicalisation and maintenance of power Europe’s longest-standing leader survives with Western support, while oppressively ruling the country

Photo by NATO, The Prime Minister of Montenegro visits NATO, flickr CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0

While the country is suffocating in cor- in pro-government media outlets. Critical ruption and crime, many offences remain media have been accused of various crimes unpunished, especially those whose per- and their representatives of betraying the petrators hold the highest positions. Two country and national interests, as during the decades ago, the President himself was peak years of Communism. This campaign charged in Italy as a member of a criminal against the media was often led personally group that smuggled cigarettes between the by Đukanović, who depicted investigative two coasts of the Adriatic but his case was journalists as “mice to be exterminated” and archived due to his sovereign immunity and openly called for the arrest of the owners of thus never prosecuted. Narco-bosses, such the daily Vijesti and weekly Monitor. Because as the infamous Šarić brothers, who have of all this, over the last decade Montenegro been tried in the neighbouring and several has fallen by more than 50 places on the EU countries for smuggling huge amounts Reporters Without Borders’ Media Freedom of hard drugs, are protected here and are Index. In 2018, it was ranked a disastrous freely doing business with the state and 104th, among the lowest in Europe. state officials, including the family of Milo In the last 30 years, the middle class in Đukanović and the family’s bank in which Montenegro has been almost completely they hold millions. wiped out. According to UNDP research in The judiciary did not prosecute even Southeast Europe, the biggest gap between overt abuses and electoral manipulations. the rich and poor is to be found in Monte- After the “Recordings” and “Envelope” negro. About 30 percent of the country’s affairs, which clearly demonstrated that the citizens are on or below the poverty line. ruling party was buying votes and offering At the same time, a small group associated state jobs ahead of elections, no high-rank- with the authorities is enormously wealthy, ing officials were held accountable, despite and has taken over the wealth of the country convincing evidence and appeals by the EU, in an untransparent privatization: factories, which regularly demands in its reports that land, banks, hotels, real estate and so on. these affairs be resolved. In this process, Đukanović and his fam- Crimes and violence against investiga- ily and closest friends turned out to be the tive reporters in recent years have also gone most successful ‘entrepreneurs’. A few years unpunished. One reporter was murdered, ago, the distinguished British daily the another journalist was shot in the leg, explo- Independent ranked him among the twenty sive devices have been planted in their yards richest politicians in the world, while Forbes and several were brutally beaten, while a estimated the wealth of the Đukanović fam- bomb shook the offices of the daily Vijesti, ily at over $ 160 million, marking the Mon- several of whose cars were set on fire. tenegrin president as one of the richest Not only were the perpetrators of these persons in the country. This could be just crimes never held accountable, but the dirty part of his visible fortune, as some estimated campaign against the free media which dared that it could be worth more than $ 1 billion. to report on the links between business, The average monthly salary in Monte- crime and politics, has become a constant negro is only 500 euros. According to unof- Europe’s longest-standing leader survives with Western support, while oppressively ruling the country radicalisation and maintenance of power 77

ficial estimates, from 1991 to 2015, some tional limit of two terms for performing this 140,000 people left the country of only important judicial function. The same thing 620,000 inhabitants, fleeing unemployment, happened earlier with former Montenegrin poverty and unequal chances. Most of them President Filip Vujanović, who was elected emigrated to Germany. When that country as president three times in a row, despite a further liberalizes its labour market next restriction in the Constitution that clearly January, it is feared that emigration from stipulates a maximum of two terms. Both Montenegro will further intensify. Vujanović and Medenica are considered Montenegro’s economy is quite devas- loyal party cadres close to Đukanović. tated by corruption and shady privatiza- Montenegro has been in the negotiation. External debt has grown from about tion process with the European Union for 28 percent of GDP in 2006 to an enormous seven years, but its prospects for member- 70 percent of GDP in 2018. According to ship are still hazy due to disrespect for the independent economists, the loans were rule of law, although 2025 has been floated used mainly to stimulate consumption and informally by some Brussels officials as the for unreasonable projects. An example is year of possible entry. If indeed this smallest the construction of a 40km motorway sec- of all former Yugoslav countries were then tion from Podgorica to Kolašin financed by to be accepted in the Union, it would mean China that will cost more than one billion that the negotiation process took longer euros. According to international experts, than it did for any new EU member to date. this loan could make Montenegro depend- Clearly, the main barrier to joining the ent on Beijing because it is unclear how the Union is the whole range of internal factors, weak Montenegrin economy can service the many of which we have mentioned here. increasing debt. Therefore, it is hard to believe that negotia- When he came to power at the age of 27, tions on Chapters 23 and 24 on the rule of Đukanović possessed nothing but a bach- law could be closed in the near future. Or, elor’s degree in economics, with rather poor say, Chapter 27, on the issue of sustainable average grades, but an excellent CV of a party development and ecology, since nature and soldier. He had been a member of the League biodiversity, including in areas protected of Communists since high school, climbing by UNESCO, such as the Tara Canyon, have the power ladder with incredible speed. His been aggressively assaulted, while waste, brother Alexander (Aco) owns hundreds of toxic emissions and pollution have still not thousands of square meters in the country’s been addressed. best locations, along with office buildings, It is well known that the EU is tired of apartments and one of the largest banks in enlargement, that it is uncertain about the country. Milo Đukanović’s government its own future and that Brexit is making it has extensively supported this bank, not look increasingly like Yugoslavia before the only by depositing state funds in it, but also breakup. It is thus quite normal that in such by bailing it out with tens of millions of euros a situation there is no particular enthusiasm during the financial crisis. His sister Ana, a for negotiations with Montenegro, as well as lawyer, has become the exclusive attorney with other candidate and potential candi- for foreign investors doing deals with the date countries. state. Đukanović’s family and its cronies and But despite all this, under the Asso- closest friends have taken over the state’s ciation and Accession Agreement, Brussels most valuable resources. should at this stage play a more proactive The rest of the DPS party nomenklatura role in transforming Montenegro into a also enjoys the benefits. This summer, it was functioning democracy, especially when it reported that millions of euros were spent comes to the rule of law, economic reforms exclusively on high-level officials’ apart- and nature protection. Instead, Brussels ments, many of whom have obtained grant treats with considerable tolerance the bru- funding for their purchase or renovation, tal violations of law by official Podgorica, which is in collision with the law. including its gross infringements of the This retrograde system is maintained by country’s constitutional order, as in the appointing to key positions ‘reliable’ indi- case of the unlawful election of the Supreme viduals, who frequently do not meet either Court president. legal or professional requirements. Only There was no adequate response from recently, Vesna Medenica was elected as Brussels to a number of other breaches of President of the Supreme Court of Montene- the law. Last year, the management of Radio gro for the third time, despite the constitu- Television of Montenegro (RTCG), which 78 radicalisation and maintenance of power Europe’s longest-standing leader survives with Western support, while oppressively ruling the country

raised financial misconduct charges against It is well known that the EU is him. He has directly accused Đukanović of tired of enlargement, that it is numerous illegal acts and has handed out to uncertain about its own future the media documents on Đukanović’s secret offshore and financial dealings. and that Brexit is making it look In the European Union governments increasingly like Yugoslavia be- would resign and fall for much less. In fore the breakup. It is thus quite Montenegro, European officials have con- normal that in such a situation tinued to cooperate with Đukanović, and there is no particular enthusiasm many to openly support him, even though Đukanović in person and his nomenklatura for negotiations with Montene- are the main obstacles, not only to joining gro, as well as with other can- the EU, but to establishing a basic rule of law didate and potential candidate in the smallest of the post-Yugoslav states. countries. But despite all this, Why does the West support such a under the Association and Acces- regime, more specifically why do the EU countries do it? sion Agreement, Brussels should Đukanović immediately recognized at this stage play a more proac- Kosovo, when requested by Brussels and tive role in transforming Monte- Washington. He quickly implemented the negro into a functioning democ- necessary reforms in the military, and in 2017 Montenegro joined the NATO alliance. racy, especially when it comes In addition, he established good relations to the rule of law, economic with neighbours, primarily with Croatia and reforms and nature protection. Bosnia and Herzegovina, against whom he Instead, Brussels treats with had fought in the 1990s. He apologized to considerable tolerance the brutal Zagreb and Sarajevo for his acts during the breakup of Yugoslavia and the love affair violations of law by official with Milošević, but at the same time, no war Podgorica, including its gross crimes committed by Montenegrins have infringements of the country’s been fully prosecuted. constitutional order, as in the Đukanović has also established good case of the unlawful election of ties with Serbia, whose rulers he had opposed when Montenegro was heading the Supreme Court president. towards independence in 2006. Today the Montenegrin president, despite his con- sought to reform the broadcaster and make frontation with the local pro-Serbian parties it a truly public service rather than a mere and the Serbian Orthodox Church, main- service of the DPS – was unlawfully dis- tains an exceptional relationship with Ser- missed. In that case too, the EU voiced only bian President Vučić, with whom he shares moderate criticism of this act in its regular many similarities in the way they govern report, and Montenegro continued to drop their respective countries. Đukanović also down the charts of media freedoms. imposed himself on the regional scene, There was no decisive reaction from with some experts even suggesting him as a Brussels even when an insider, the business- mediator in the Prishtinë-Belgrade talks. He man Duško Knežević, posted a video in Jan- also has an intense and friendly communi- uary of this year, showing him handing over cation with the Kosovo leadership. an envelope of about € 100,000 to the former At the same time, the Montenegrin Mayor of Podgorica and present member of ruler imposed sanctions on Russia when DPS presidency Slavoljub Stijepović for the the European Union did and began accus- ruling party’s 2016 parliamentary election ing Moscow of interfering in the country’s campaign – which would have constituted domestic affairs. illegal campaign financing. Knežević, one Thus, all that Đukanović did was to align of richest Montenegrins, has launched an the country’s foreign policy priorities with entire campaign to release large amounts the interests of Brussels and Washington. In of compromising evidence against local return, he got a free hand to do whatever he authorities from London, where he took wants at home, to oppress and consolidate refuge from the Montenegrin public pros- his own power, instead of reforming Monte- ecution service, which has meanwhile negro and preparing it for EU accession. stabilitocracy and political stability – a view from Serbia radicalisation and maintenance of power 79 stabilitocracy and political stability – a view from Serbia

Vladimir Veljković

In recent years, when politicians talked, and journalists and analysts wrote about the stability of the western Balkans region, it wasn't a stable democracy they had in mind, but, above all, security conditions on the ground and control over international and interstate disputes so that they would not escalate towards mutual conflict. The displacement of stability into the sphere of security pushed the question of democracy into the background, thus setting off processes that in some of the countries of the region led to the phenomenon of captured states.

Stabilitocracy is a new concept, created Another aspect of stabilitocratic regimes in order to denote certain western Balkan presupposes that regional political stability countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and security are on the side of stabilitocracy, Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania and North while radicalisation is seen as its opposite, Macedonia) that are roughly and formally that is, as a potential worsening of regional at different stages of the European path – disputes and their uncontrolled escalation expressing in principle the desire to become into possible regional conflicts. Such a polit- members of the European Union or the ical view was expressed precisely in 2017 by NATO alliance – but where there is a defi- the former director of the European External cit of democratic liberties. Stabilitocratic Action Service for Russia, the Eastern neigh- regimes are in effect a product – it would bourhood and the Western Balkans Miroslav seem – of real-political assessments on the Lajčak, who said: "Relations in the Balkans part of European political elites that would are tense. But I hope that political leaders – perfectly legitimately – prefer to keep the won't allow new conflicts to arise."1 The region within the sphere of EU states' politi- inner stability of the region is hence one of cal and economic influence during a period the key components when we speak about of enlargement fatigue and accumulated the stabilitocracies in the Western Balkans. internal and external problems. Keeping the Stabilitocracy is also a term derived Western Balkans in the sphere of EU influ- from the previously defined EU policy on ence may be considered the first aspect of expansion and accession of new members, stability, considering that the countries of but with a modification that substantially the region have officially continued the pol- changes the implications of the entire pro- icy pursued previously by those European cess of European integration. With the Euro- states that aspired to join the EU, and by the pean Council's 1993 Copenhagen criteria, end of this journey fulfilled the conditions the political, economic and legal conditions and attained full membership in the organi- that future full member states had to fulfill Vladimir Veljković sation: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Repub- Vladimir Veljković teaches 1 https://www.vecernji.hr/premium/odnosi-su-na-balka- history, and is a political and lic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, nu-napeti-ali-nadam-se-da-politicki-vo-e-nece-dopusti- religious commentator. He Croatia etc. ti-nove-sukobe-1171453 lives and works in Niš. 80 radicalisation and maintenance of power stabilitocracy and political stability – a view from Serbia

bility and security without democracy) lies As opposed to democratic rule, which implies the in that they, despite working on regional legitimacy of the existence of political pluralism stability and security in principle, are not and accepts the activities of the opposition as a in fact able to provide a successful model for stabilising the security situation in the constituent part of a democratic political system, region through clearing up the unresolved in stabilitocracies, the ruling majority declares interstate issues and disputes. the minority in opposition a security problem, The example of North Macedonia (here- inciter of civic conflict and a destructive element. inafter: Macedonia) during Prime Minister The Serbian stabilitocracy neither recognises nor Nikola Gruevski (2006-2016) and the VMRO- DPMNE party's (which he headed) rule in acknowledges political opposition; it sees oppo- coalition with the Albanian Democratic sitional activity as a hostile act directed against Union for Integration eloquently supports the state and society. We might therefore call this thesis. As the Macedonian prime min- the current Serbian stabilitocracy an authoritar- ister, Gruevski enjoyed international sup- ian regime of electoral autocracy. port in the aim of reforming his country and remaking his party as a "modern, right-wing, conservative party". However, Gruevski's rule through the "stabilisation and association" did not contribute to the democratisation process and agreement were adopted. At the of the political situation in Macedonia, but time, for east European, and later also Bal- was characterised by right-wing populism, kan countries (excepting Greece and Tur- settling of accounts with political oppo- key), former socialist states with single-party nents, megalomaniac construction projects systems, stabilisation implied the internal and high levels of corruption. By the end, stabilisation of liberal democracy (establish- Gruevski's policies had undermined inter- ing the rule of law and separation of powers, national relations, as well as relations with political pluralism and the possibility of western partners. After the VMRO-DPMNE's removing citizens' political representatives fall from power, the Special Prosecutor's and appointing others in free elections). In Office in Skopje has had its hands full with recent years, when politicians talked, and proceedings initiated against erstwhile party journalists and analysts wrote about the sta- and state officials. Gruevski did not wait to be bility of the western Balkans region, it wasn't imprisoned in Macedonia, but fled in 2018 a stable democracy they had in mind, but, to Viktor Orban's Hungary, tracing a trail above all, security conditions on the ground through the neighbouring stabilitocracies – and control over international and interstate Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. In terms of disputes so that they would not escalate regional security and stability, Gruevski did towards mutual conflict. The displacement nothing to achieve a compromise solution of stability into the sphere of security pushed with the neighbouring Greece about the new the question of democracy into the back- constitutional name of Macedonia.2 ground, thus setting off processes that in During Nikola Gruevski's decade- some of the countries of the region led to the long rule, the contentious issue between phenomenon of captured states. The policy Macedonia and Greece, significant to the of stabilitocracy thus technically achieved its regional stability and security of the West- basic goals – keeping the region within the ern Balkans, has not been resolved. This EU's sphere of influence – but, especially was only achieved after political changes in the Republic of Serbia, indirectly created in Macedonia – the parliamentary elec- a tense internal political situation whose tions of 2016 and the formation of Zoran denouement is as yet uncertain. Zaev's government in May 2017 – with the Stabilitocracy may perhaps achieve June 2018 signing of the international and some minimal goals that are in the interest interstate Prespa treaty between Macedo- of the Western Balkans region, in the sense of nia and Greece, mediated by the UN. Later freezing and controlling interstate and inter- on, Gruevski would remind the public that national disputes, but internal political pro- before PM Alexis Tsipras took office, he led cesses in individual countries have shown discussions with PM Papandreu, but that in practice that without democratisation of "we couldn't arrive at a solution due to the political circumstances, such disputes can- well-known Greek positions, or red lines." not be successfully resolved and brought to 2 https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1643382& a peaceful end. In other words, the paradox fbclid=IwAR0AbKfUe5RxXawceBZ2VDmJZuMmyJ- of the project of stabilitocratic regimes (sta- LYMaMkcVV_0OB35AhcotUf8IvoFc stabilitocracy and political stability – a view from Serbia radicalisation and maintenance of power 81

When Tsipras took office in 2015, Greece the context of regional relations can also was in an economic crisis, but that same be found in assertions by certain minis- year a political crisis broke out in Macedo- ters from the Serbian Government. "Every nia too, so Tsipras "judged that if he were to military exercise is always also a message wait, he'd get a much better interlocutor, both to friends and enemies," Aleksandar willing to make much larger concessions Vulin stated recently, adding that relations over national issues such as the name, iden- between Serbia and Croatia have "tensed" tity, history," Gruevski said.3 The incum- exclusively because "it is an extension of bent president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, Croatian policy, where everything is blamed mainly accuses the former government of on Serbia."7 In the tabloids, writing about making concessions to the Kosovar side, as western countries also often takes the form it did not "so much as issue a communica- of conspiracy theory, describing their intel- tion when Kosovo declared independence," ligence services as working tirelessly to while during his rule, "13 states withdrew depose Vučić. their recognition of Kosovo."4 But to the Serbian president, enemies Serbia is today in a similar situation as are also to be found inside the country. neighbouring Macedonia during Gruevski's At a rally during the presidential election rule. Parallel to the unresolved regional issue campaign in March 2017, Aleksandar Vučić, between Serbia and Kosovo, there are also then-Prime Minister and a candidate in the ongoing political tensions within the coun- election, said this to his supporters, refer- try, caused by the undemocratic conduct ring to the opposition: "I am concerned by of the ruling clique. The opinion that Alek- their desire to provoke disorder and unrest sandar Vučić, the current Serbian president, in Serbia. They remain intent on provoking and the Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) the Macedonian scenario in Serbia. [italics received the support of western countries by V.V.] This is not a success for Serbia, a suc- in 2012 in order to solve the issue of Kosovo cess would be peace and stability, to think has become commonplace in the critical about successes and victories, not about our segment of the Serbian public: "He is ideal conflicts. Whatever they do, I will not allow for the western political structures, as he has them to endanger your children's peace and been blackmailed with his warmongering quiet."8 To then-candidate, and current Ser- past and criminogenic present. (...) Vučić bian president Alexandar Vučić, the "Mace- did not come into power, he was brought donian scenario" did not indicate a peaceful there. And he was brought because he gave change of government in Macedonia, which certain promises regarding Kosovo. The West would ultimately lead to the resolution of a expects him to deliver on these promises."5 decades-long dispute with the neighbour- However, seven years of SPP government have passed, and a successful solution to the 7 https://www.danas.rs/drustvo/vulin-vojna-vezba-je- uvek-poruka-prijateljima-i-neprijateljima/ contentious issues between Serbia and Kos- 8 https://www.alo.rs/vesti/politika/opozicija-zeli-make- ovo is still not in sight – nor have the citizens donski-scenario/98777/vest of Serbia been acquainted with president Vučić's plan to resolve the dispute. While official Belgrade has professedly worked on a peaceful solution to the regional dispute with Kosovo, research by Stefan Janjić and Stefani Šovanec from the Philosophy Faculty in Novi Sad has shown that portents of war with the neighbouring Croatia, Kosovo, Albania or Bosnia and Herzegovina could be found every day in (pro)regime tabloids.6 Wartime rhetoric in

3 https://www.blic.rs/vesti/svet/gruevski-o-izjavi-grckog- premijera-nikada-nisam-odbio-susret-sa-ciprasom-na- protiv/fz85mkl 4 http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a535594/Vucic-Trova- nje-izmisljeno-jer-kosovski-politicari-ne-znaju-sta- ce-sa-sobom.html?fbclid=IwAR2HdEBG8Ph5Kq_ T9I23kbGs6lizrAEMk-MOrJJdPAwZGE- dhPuWrRsVSgU 5 https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1713224 Photo by Nina Zeljkovic, 6 https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/2466- flickr, 541X/2018/2466-541X1843049J.pdf CC-BY-NC 2.0 82 radicalisation and maintenance of power stabilitocracy and political stability – a view from Serbia

cal opposition; it sees oppositional activity The additional involvement of the as a hostile act directed against the state EU on putting the internal politi- and society. We might therefore call the cur- cal situation in Serbia in order, rent Serbian stabilitocracy an authoritarian regime of electoral autocracy. on top of constant mediation The main trump card of stabilitocracy in negotiations between Serbia is the supposed internal political stability, and Kosovo, has shown that the but is stabilitocracy truly a stable political seven-year-long trust the west- system? In a text he wrote for the Serbian ern partners have shown in the Sunday magazine Vreme (no. 1445, 13 Sep- tember 2018) the president of the opposi- Serbian stabilitocracy comes at a tion Democratic Party, dr. Zoran Lutovac, political price. Instead of a single marked stabilitocracy with the phrase labi- regional problem, with its au- locracy. "In fact, it would be more accurate thoritarian style of government, to term such a system a labilocracy: a sys- official Belgrade has created an- tem of undeveloped freedoms and rule of other one, this time inside Serbia laws, with a façade of democracy devoid of true substance. This system has unsta- itself, thus indirectly threaten- ble foundations, as it depends on ratings ing the process of resolving the and the authoritarian's good will and the relations between Belgrade and support he receives from the great powers, Prishtina. Because an electoral rather than on independent institutions and boycott by the strongest op- a balance of liberal and democratic principles and practice. This is a system that rests position grouping may put into on the phenomenon of a captured state (a question the political legitimacy term used by the World Bank), where laws of the parliament that would be are tailored to the needs of powerful indi- elected in 2020 – thus creat- viduals, counter to the interest of the citi- ing a potential situation where zens and the state. The state is captured with the assistance of the political and busi- another assembly might revoke ness elite that is well networked with pow- its decisions related to Kosovo, erful individuals."9 Can a political system declaring them undemocratic that does not take into account all social and illegitimate. interests and political differences in a society, and does not resolve them within the framework of the representative body and ing Greece. In this kind of political process, independent state institutions, be stable? Or which could play out in Serbia as well, he does it in fact represent an unstable (labile) saw conflict, disorder and unrest, and a system within which citizens will air their threat to the peace and quiet of citizens and dissatisfaction exclusively on the street? their children. Contrary to the chaos the In the autumn of 2018, mass but peace- opposition was allegedly planning to cause, ful antiregime citizens' protests under in his electoral campaign, Vučić offered the the name "Stop the bloody shirts" began citizens of Serbia peace and stability. We can throughout Serbia, provoked by the beat- find similar statements by Aleksandar Vučić ing up of opposition politician Borko before and after 2017, since when he has Stefanović, increasing political violence and been in office as president of Serbia, but this overall negative trends in the country. The statement itself is enough to give an insight citizens cited unfree media, corrupt govern- into political life within the framework of ment, unemployment, poverty and a large stabilitocracy. As opposed to democratic number of youth leaving the country as the rule, which implies the legitimacy of the main motives for participating in the pro- existence of political pluralism and accepts tests. Their expectations centred on restor- the activities of the opposition as a constitu- ing democracy and media liberties, and a ent part of a democratic political system, in change of government.10 The protests were stabilitocracies, the ruling majority declares to last until 13 April 2019, when they ended the minority in opposition a security prob- with a large citizens' gathering outside the lem, inciter of civic conflict and a destruc- 9 https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1624817 tive element. The Serbian stabilitocracy 10 http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a468449/Istrazivanje-o- neither recognises nor acknowledges politi- protestima-1-od-5-miliona.html stabilitocracy and political stability – a view from Serbia radicalisation and maintenance of power 83

National Assembly in Belgrade. (The pro- reported on the protests, trying to diminish test walks have continued to take place in their political significance and the number a reduced form, and are held every Satur- of citizens gathered, when they did not sim- day in Belgrade.) These were the third anti- ply ignore them.12 regime protests in Serbia since the Serbian Over the course of this year, political life Progressive Party came into power in 2012 in Serbia has completely abandoned the – after the "Protest against Dictatorship" framework of representative institutions, (2017) and the protest organised by the even though regular parliamentary and Let's Not Drown Belgrade citizens' initiative local elections are set to be held in 2020. (NDM BGD) against the illegal demolition of In solidarity with the demands of the buildings in Belgrade's Hercegovačka street "1 out of 5 Million" protest, delegates and in order to clear the ground for the construc- councillors from parties gathered under the tion of the "Belgrade Waterfront", a luxury umbrella of the Alliance for Serbia (AfS) – residential and commercial complex (2016). the strongest opposition grouping – have This was one of the central construction since January embarked on a boycott of projects of the Government of the Republic both the Republic-level and local parlia- of Serbia, which is carried out jointly with a ments. The investigative site Istinomer (a United Arab Emirates company. (Construc- project of the CRTA NGO from Belgrade) tion began in 2015 and is still ongoing.) has characterised the previous situation in The 2018-2019 protests would later the Parliament thus: "Circumstances in the become known for the slogan, "1 out of 5 parliament have significantly deteriorated Million". The Serbian president Aleksandar over the past few years. The ruling majority Vučić himself deserves the most credit for has monopolised the legislative process... it, as in December 2018, he said the follow- However, even more ruinous for relations ing concerning the citizens' protest: "Walk with the opposition delegates is the fact to your hearts' desires, I will never fulfill a that abuse of procedure has squeezed the single one of your demands. Not if five mil- room for control over the work of the gov- lion of you were to gather. [italics by V.V.] You ernment and for debate on bills. Preventing can only win an election, and when you win the opposition to critique the work of the an election, go ahead and fulfill what was government and draft legislation from the promised to the people, I will not bow under parliamentary benches is part of a wider pressure and that's what makes me differ- process of tearing down all the mechanisms ent from all the rest."11 According to the 2006 of control over the executive. The Assembly Constitution, now in force, the President of used to represent one of the last remaining the Republic is elected in direct elections institutions where criticism of the govern- and represents all the citizens of Serbia. ment could still be heard. With the gradual However, president Aleksandar Vučić has closing of this space, a boycott of the work of informed the disgruntled citizens that he is the Assembly was becoming more and more not the president of all the citizens. That he likely."13 In early August, several roundtables will not consider their requests and that – if with representatives of the government and they are dissatisfied with him, the behaviour the opposition, organised by the Open Soci- of the current government and the over- ety Fund on the subject of electoral condi- all atmosphere in the society – they may tions were held at the Philosophy Faculty try to beat him in an election. Otherwise, in Belgrade with no visible results. Conse- they may walk "to their hearts' desires". In quently, by mid-September, all the parties February 2019, in response to the protests, gathered under the AfS declared a boycott Vučić began a personal promotional cam- of the 2020 election. The citizens' initia- paign in Serbian cities, called "The Future tive NDM BGD also decided to boycott the of Serbia", gathering his supporters at ral- forthcoming election, calling on all public lies. The campaign ended on 19 April, with a personalities to support their "Declaration large gathering outside the National Assem- to boycott the election" and form a broad bly in Belgrade. While the months-long "1 front in the struggle for a democratic and out of 5 Million" protests were going on, free Serbia.14 national TV broadcasters and government- controlled print media – a large majority 12 https://www.raskrikavanje.rs/page.php?id=355 13 https://www.istinomer.rs/analize/bojkot-parlamenta-i- of the media in the country – negatively sta-posle/ 14 https://nedavimobeograd.rs/javni-poziv-za-podrsku- deklaraciji-o-bojkotu-izbora-borba-za-slobodnu-srbiju 11 http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a442570/Vucic-o-protestu- /?fbclid=IwAR1ztcJohfZXvZFwOJAQJxIOmiyOF2Y4 u-Beogradu.html mvj_LcpyttmQjip5U7c9GBv4Qsw 84 radicalisation and maintenance of power stabilitocracy and political stability – a view from Serbia

As of the time of writing this text, the and Prishtina. Because an electoral boycott media have announced a meeting between by the strongest opposition grouping may the representatives of majority and opposi- put into question the political legitimacy tion parliament factions on 9 and 10 Octo- of the parliament that would be elected in ber to discuss the electoral conditions, 2020 – thus creating a potential situation to be mediated by a representative of the where another assembly might revoke its European Parliament. Statements have decisions related to Kosovo, declaring them come from the opposition parties that had undemocratic and illegitimate. declared the boycott that their possible Only a politics that does not feed on involvement in the meeting will not mean inventing enemies can lead to peace and abandoning the boycott of the 2020 elec- resolution of regional issues. It is therefore tion. The additional involvement of the naive to believe that a political phenom- EU on putting the internal political situa- enon such as stabilitocracy, with its mecha- tion in Serbia in order, on top of constant nism of producing internal and external mediation in negotiations between Serbia enemies, can lead to permanent peace and Kosovo, has shown that the seven-year- and reconciliation in the Western Balkans long trust the western partners have shown region. The North Macedonian example in the Serbian stabilitocracy comes at a shows that a long-term solution for the sta- political price. Instead of a single regional bility of this region does not lie in authori- problem, with its authoritarian style of tarian politicians ruling over unstable government, official Belgrade has created stabilitocracies, but in democratic changes. another one, this time inside Serbia itself, Stabilitocracies are not a part of the solu- thus indirectly threatening the process of tion; they survive on promises, keeping the resolving the relations between Belgrade problems ever open. non-implementation of ECtHR and BH Constitutional Court decisions radicalisation and maintenance of power 85 non-implementation of ECtHR and BH Constitutional Court decisions in the rule of law and policy context

Dženana Karup Druško

There are as many as four decisions by the obstruct the implementation of the deci- European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) sions of the European Court in Strasbourg, concerning the BH Elections Act, and their which shall be further discussed later, and implementation requires not only changes who hide behind the Dayton agreement to certain provisions of the BH Elections when refusing any changes to the BH Con- Act, but also amending the BH Constitution, stitution (although they never answered which is a component of the Dayton Peace for not implementing some of its articles, Agreement. What these decisions have in including the annex 7 – return of refugees common is that citizens of Bosnia and Her- and displaced persons, which further affects zegovina are discriminated against. In the the electoral process, as well as some other Sejdić and Finci case it is because members substantial issues), are doing all they can to of the Roma and Jewish minorities cannot keep the country in the 1990ies, with clear run for office as members of the BH Presi- ethno-national divisions. dency, nor can they be elected members of Under the BH Criminal Code, non- the House of Peoples of the BH Parliamen- implementation of decisions of the Euro- tary Assembly; in the Pilav case, it is because pean Court of Hunan Rights is a criminal citizens living in the Republika Srpska entity offence which carries a penalty of between cannot run for BH Praesidium unless they six months and five years of imprisonment. are Serbs; in the Zornić and Šlaku cases The Council of Ministers of BH entrusted because citizens who do not wish to iden- the implementation of these decisions to tify as members of one of the constitutional the BH Ministry of Justice, which initiated peoples – Serbs, Bosniaks, Croats – cannot certain activities, but in actual fact, the deci- run either for Praesidium or for the House of sions have not been implemented nor has Peoples of the BH Parliamentary Assembly. anybody been punished for that failure. There is no doubt that implementing Not implementing BH Constitutional Court these decisions would help Bosnia and Her- decisions is likewise a criminal offence, yet zegovina to make a step forward beyond no-one has ever been penalized for it. the Dayton agreement, which above all It is important to say that in both cases, stopped the armed conflict in BH, but and when discussing the non-implemen- which also, apart from the rights of the con- tation of European Court of Human Rights stitutional peoples, foresaw strengthening and BH Constitutional Court decisions, the the state, state institutions, and the posi- decisions in question are mostly such that tion of citizens; Bosnia and Herzegovina affect constitutional issues of significance consented to that, among other things by to the state, as well as to citizens and their subsequently accepting international com- rights, which means that, in addition to mitments, including those stemming from constituting a blow to the country’s consti- joining the Council of Europe. For that mat- tutional order, also creates legal insecurity Dženana Karup Druško ter, equal rights of all citizens, not only the for the citizens, and seriously undermines Journalist and Director of constitutional peoples, are guaranteed in the rule of law. And the greatest responsibil- the Transitional Justice, Accountability and Remembrance the preamble of the Constitution of Bos- ity for such a state of affairs is borne, along in Bosnia and Herzegovina nia and Herzegovina. However, those who with politicians’ irresponsibility, by the BH association, Sarajevo 86 radicalisation and maintenance of power non-implementation of ECtHR and BH Constitutional Court decisions

Apart from the rights of the constitutional peoples, Dayton agreement also foresaw strengthening the state, state institutions, and the position of citizens; Bosnia and Herzegovina consented to that, among other things by subsequently accepting international commitments, including those stemming from joining the Council of Europe. However, those who obstruct the implementation of the decisions of the European Court in Strasbourg, and who hide behind the Dayton agreement when refusing any changes to the BH Constitution, are doing all they can to keep the country in the 1990ies, with clear ethno-national divisions.

judiciary, whose non-prosecuting of those in both the federation- and state-level gov- who violate the Constitution is itself a viola- ernments, but also by the Croatian ambas- tion of BH laws. And no-one has ever been sador to Bosnia and Herzegovina. sanctioned for this. Citizens can punish It is precisely the CDU representatives politicians in elections, but the judiciary is who tried to instrumentalise the BH Consti- untouchable and protects itself, as no judge tutional Court in order to introduce changes or prosecutor was ever held responsible to the BH Election Act pertaining to the elec- for never having penalised anyone for not tion of members of the BH Praesidium and implementing decisions by the BH Consti- the House of Peoples of the BH Parliamen- tutional Court and the European Court of tary Assembly. Such changes would seek to Human Rights. And thus, the circle closes increase the constitutiveness, in this case, of when it comes to those responsible for pro- the Croats, in the areas where they comprise tecting the Constitution and laws of Bosnia the majority of the population and where the and Herzegovina. CDU is most in control, which would in turn At the same time, the failure to respect reduce the rights of the Croats living in areas the decisions by these two courts engen- where they are in the minority. The CDU-BH, ders a political crisis and seriously under- with great support from the Croatian CDU, mines security, as, for instance, in the case has for more than a year been on a serious of declaring and celebrating 9 January as diplomatic offensive in Brussels, the seat the Republika Srpska Day, on which the of the European Union, as well as in other BH Constitutional Court gave as many as countries – France, the USA, Germany... three rulings, declaring it an unconstitu- even though its demands are entirely con- tional holiday, while in the meantime, the trary to the decisions of the European Court Bosnian-Herzegovinian Republika Srpska of Human Rights in Strasbourg. In addition, entity continues to celebrate it, invoking the the Venice Commission’s recommendation decision (law) by the National Assembly of is clear: if the BH Election Act is amended, Republika Srpska and a referendum on the it should be in line with the guidelines and issue conducted at entity level – in Repub- standards of the European Union. lika Srpska. The most recent celebration was It should be noted here that Bosnia also attended by senior officials of the CDU and Herzegovina is among those countries (Croatian Democratic Union), a party that is that have unreservedly accepted all the commitments embedded in the European Convention on Human Rights, which the BH Constitution makes directly applica- ble, and that European Court of Human Rights decisions take precedence over BH Constitutional Court decisions, so that implementing the rulings of the Strasbourg court would automatically dismiss all of the CDU’s demands that it has sought to real- ise through the BH Constitutional Court. The CDU’s demands enjoy the support of Republika Srpska officials, led by Milorad Dodig, leader of the Alliance of Independ- Photo by "duncan c", EU stencil, flickr ent Social Democrats (AISD) and current CC-BY-NC 2.0 member of the BH Presidency for the Serb non-implementation of ECtHR and BH Constitutional Court decisions radicalisation and maintenance of power 87

people. In addition, Dodik has supported that in other spheres too there are insur- implementing the Sejdić-Finci ruling, but mountable differences between the largest in his interpretation, the ruling only per- (national) political parties, that have direct tains to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Fed- repercussions on BH’s constitutional posi- eration of BH entity, and should under no tion, and even on its future. circumstances apply to the Republika Srp- Answers to the European Commission’s ska, something he stated a number of times, Questionnaire submitted by Bosnia and including in meetings with Brussels offi- Herzegovina late last year, as well as answers cials. This has no grounds, as the decision to the additional questions provided to pertains to the state of Bosnia and Herzego- Brussels early this year, contain a series of vina, as confirmed by the European Court important facts and give the most illustra- decisions in the Zornić and Pilav cases. tive representation of the state of relations Nevertheless, it is precisely all this that has and institutions in BH, especially when it lead to a serious political crisis in the coun- comes to rule of law, the BH’s path towards try, one which has lasted years, and which the European Union and NATO, but also further complicated the situation following regarding respect for the decisions of the the latest general election of October 2018. BH Constitutional Court and the European The situation being that it will soon be Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. two years since the General election in Bos- In its answers, BH has established that nia and Herzegovina without a possibility in it has not carried out 13 BH Constitutional sight of a government being formed at state Court decisions. Asked why, BH responded level and in the Federation of BH. At state that it had no answers. But when asked how level, the so-called coalition parties, the many criminal proceedings were instituted AISD, the DAP (Democratic Action Party) as a result, the answer stated that the BH and the CDU cannot agree on continu- Prosecutor’s Office did not manage to pros- ing the country’s NATO path (even though ecute all those who wittingly or unwittingly in recent years their leaders have adopted blocked or obstructed Constitutional Court decisions to put the country on the path of decisions, as it was “democratic procedures” Atlantic integration in parallel to European what led to the failure to implement, which integration, embedding them in the Law on is absolutely unacceptable, even ridiculous. the Armed Forces of BH), that is, on consent- Non-implementation of Constitutional ing to submit Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first Court decisions, even just a single one, is an Annual National Programme to NATO after attack on the legal system and legal security receiving from NATO its Membership Action of a state. Amendments to the BH Election Plan, which, after all, BH has itself requested. Act pursuant to the ruling of the BH Con- The reason the Federation of BH gov- stitutional Court on the appeal of Božo ernment hasn’t yet been formed lies in the Ljubić (submitted on behalf of the CDU), changes to the BH Elections Ac t that the but also to the ruling on the city of Mostar, CDU insists on, as mentioned above. The may be (politically) the most sensitive, but CDU enjoys the support of Milorad Dodik alongside European Court of Human Rights for its demands, while CDU leader Dra- decisions, they are crucial to resolving the gan Čović, although professedly in favour country’s electoral system, and as such rep- of Atlantic integration, supports Milorad resent a system of communicating vessels, Dodig in the process of forming the state- for which reason they need to be resolved level government as he believes that BH’s en bloc and together. NATO path should not be an obstacle to When the answers to the European appointing Milorad Dodik’s candidate for Commission Questionnaire are analysed, the Cnair of the Council of Ministers of BH. especially those parts that concern secu- For his part, Milorad Dodik does not hide rity, defence and the related issue of rule that he only seeks to strengthen the Repub- of law, and compared to the information lika Srpska, which he publicly calls a Serbian in the Annual National Report for NATO, it state, while doing everything to undermine is unclear whence such resistance on the the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its part of Milorad Dodik and other Republika institutions, all the while the CDU’s desired Srpska politicians, as the answers to the electoral changes give new wind to the idea Questionnaire and the ANP information of Herzeg-Bosnia, that is, a third entity. barely differ. However, Republika Srpska Naturally, the aforementioned condi- acceded, supplied its answers and gave its tions are challenges directly related to the consent for them to be sent to the European future of BH, but one needs to remember Commission even though certain parts of 88 radicalisation and maintenance of power non-implementation of ECtHR and BH Constitutional Court decisions

the answers to the European Commission Intelligence-Security Agency) and security Questionnaire are more detailed and sub- affairs (the State Investigation and Protec- stantive than the “debatable” ANP. tion Agency), to the judiciary (the Court Why does the ruling establishment and Prosecutor’s Office of BH) etc., claiming of RS not wish to give their consent to the that most of the institutions that had been ANP, when they gave it for the answers to established at state level were illegal and the European Commission is clear for all to illegitimate, going as far as claiming that the see. What is unclear is how will the sudden Office of the High Representative needs to change of the Republika Srpska authorities’ be abolished. and Serb politicans’ decision, that they do The view of the RS representative as not want to join NATO, be resolved. It is well seen in the report on the structural dia- known that for nearly a decade, RS authori- logue is that the OHR has imposed the Law ties have supported the overall legislation on the Court and the Prosecutor’s Office related to BH’s accession to NATO. When of BH, while according to them, judicial Serbia decided to take a firmer position and institutions “are under the jurisdiction of declare so-called military neutrality (which the entities, with the exception of the BH no-one ever recognised in international Constitutional Court,” stating that “in view relations), Republika Srpska too adopted of the fact that the justice system in RS is a declaration on neutrality, of which even a rounded whole, in addition to the High the RS Constitutional Court wrote that it is Judicial and Prosecutorial Council or two a “non-binding act” (in order to protect the discrete councils at state level, a High Judi- authors and instigators of the declaration cial Council of RS and a RS body to appoint from possible criminal prosecution). prosecutors also need to be established.”1 Of course, after a series of communi- Before, after this and in the meantime, qués by the Russian Federation and its for- there has been such a “flood” of various eign affairs minister Sergei Lavrov that they declarations, views, announcements and “supported” the military neutrality of Ser- ideas by political parties that someone bia and BH, preceded by that of Macedonia whose focus of interest doesn’t lie on BH and Montenegro, it is clear that it is precisely would legitimately ask themselves whether the Russian Federation that is behind this there were a way out of this situation? “neutrality” plan, having even, in order to Because unfortunately, everything points accomplish the plan, attempted to stage a to the rule of law being undermined in a coup in Montenegro through members of way that is planned, witting and organised, its military intelligence service GRU, as well beginning with European Court of Human as to cause problems in North Macedonia Rights decisions, through BH Constitutional – which both these countries managed to Court decisions, to the violations and non- resist. On the other hand, it is evident that compliance with the laws of Bosnia and it is the Republika Srpska politicians that Herzegovina, and what is behind this are are now at a loss how to exit the vicious various political concepts, various political circle they drew themselves into. All the coalitions, disrespect or abuse of BH laws, NATO-related legal procedures in BH have obstructions of the work of legislative and gone through Parliament with the support other levels of government. of Republika Srpska, and it would appear And finally, a question: what do the that they have “no time” in the RS to try to creators of the Dayton and Washington change or redefine the BH security policy agreements think of all this? Decades of when it comes to NATO within the frame- assistance extended and work of the inter- work of democratic procedures. Why are national community have slowly but surely they in such a “hurry” and why do they one- unravelled. What is the solution? It seems sidedly reject and fail to respect the adopted that there are only two possible solutions in legislation on defence are questions for the the BH: either to continue the support of the relevant prosecutors’ offices, not only and international community, but with a strong exclusively political questions. policy of conditionality, or the further cav- In all the reports the RS authorities have been submitting for years on their own ini- 1 Incidentally, in its report “BH – SPP STRUCTURAL tiative to the UN General Secretary, as well DIALOGUE ON THE JUDICIARY, which has been delivered to the EU Commission, the RS has clearly as in other reports and appearances by RS emphasised that foreign judges need to be cast out of officials, nearly all state institutions are dis- the Constitutional Court, the existing rules abolished and a law on the constitutional court adopted, defining puted, from the issue of defence (the BH – of course – the election of local judges (under the Armed Forces), through intelligence (the mantle of politics) non-implementation of ECtHR and BH Constitutional Court decisions radicalisation and maintenance of power 89

And finally, a question: what do the creators of the Dayton and Washing- ton agreements think of all this? Decades of assistance extended and work of the international community have slowly but surely unravelled. What is the solution? It seems that there are only two possible solutions in the BH: either to continue the support of the international community, but with a strong policy of conditionality, or the further caving in of BH will be allowed while messaging about internal agreements, all the way to catastrophic consequences including a three-way division of BH, as well as notions of creating several states. ing in of BH will be allowed while messag- towards politics in BH has long extended ing about internal agreements, all the way beyond the state borders of BH, and in to catastrophic consequences including a recent years the borders of Europe as well, three-way division of BH, as well as notions especially towards the east. For this reason, of creating several states. There is no doubt political relations in BH never were, and are that it is clear to those in The Hague (but especially not today, local political moves, whether also to the majority in the interna- and this should be clear to all. Bosnia and tional community and in Bosnia and Herze- Herzegovina’s path is clear: European and govina?) that such a partition would entail Atlantic integration, both underpinned by new joint criminal enterprises, new crimes, the rule of law. With the aid of the creators of new genocide. Can the European Union face the international agreements, both Dayton a new conflict in the Balkans and a possible and Washington, this path has also become escalation of wars on European territory? a legal obligation, and there is still a chance The European Union’s latest messages, that it may be continued along this path refusing to grant North Macedonia and regardless of changes in international poli- Albania status as candidates, have cre- tics globally and the strengthening of the ated additional political pressure in the BH Russian Federation. The European Union and further opened real geopolitical and and NATO represent security for Bosnia and geostrategic challenges in the BH as well. Herzegovina, but for the European Union as The responsibility of local political actors well. 90 civil society vs establishment another view – in the eye of the political storm

civil society vs establishment another view – in the eye of the political storm stabilo-radical rhapsody in Montenegro

Damir Nikočević Daliborka Uljarević

What do Montenegro, Benin, Fiji, Mali, When one has been in power Uganda and Honduras have in common? Not the number of sunny days in a year, for almost thirty years and does the number of visitors, or GDP growth but, not understand the concept of unfortunately, a flawed electoral process, change of government, it is hard attacks on the media, pressure on civil soci- to remain responsive to the ety, endemic corruption and weak rule of needs of the citizens. Hence, the law, with a judiciary subservient to politics. This is not the authors’ private opinion but ruling Democratic Party of So- the result of a global study by the Economist cialists’ (DPS) connection to the Intelligence Unit on the state of democracy citizens has become perfunctory, in 2018, which listed countries with these enough to maintain the system 1 characteristics among “hybrid” regimes. but not to imbue it with neces- Since the 1990s, Montenegro has been in a state of permanent political tension, sary vitality. Such a system rests more or less intense, but with visible long- on the paternalism of its leader term consequences. From being closely and clientelism of those around tied up with Milošević’s catastrophic poli- him, but during the elections it cies, to inflation, wars, bombing, the split continues to pose as the anchor with Milošević, the forced state union with Serbia, to again becoming an independent of the country’s independence. state which, since 2006, has continued to fail The false equivalence between the expectations of a considerable number the authorities and the state is a of its citizens. crime against the public. Seven years of accession negotiations for EU membership, and Montenegro as the best pupil in this process among the of those who protest the irrationalities and laggards and the unruly, have still not led to failures of governance in Montenegro is also a strengthening of dialogue and tolerance a way to pre-emptively shut up everyone in its internal affairs. Montenegrin politi- else who sees trouble on the home front but cal elites have little patience for those of a may still be gathering the courage to speak different mind and character and are quick up. Those who dared to air the dirty laun- to reach for scathing words (and sometimes dry were denounced by the authorities as violence). the enemies and traitors of the state – even Critical thinking or readiness for dia- if they were among those who had built Damir Nikočević logue is viewed in this atmosphere as a the state. The verbal lashing of the critics, Development Coordinator, Centre for Civic Education (CCE), form of derangement on the part of those brought to a fever pitch during the electoral Podgorica calling for it. Excommunicating such indi- race, cools down after victory is secured, to viduals and pinning targets onto the backs mollify the international public and score Daliborka Uljarević Executive Director, Centre for points in Brussels. But the consequence of Civic Education (CCE), Podgorica 1 https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index these periodic witch hunts and suppression another view – in the eye of the political storm civil society vs establishment 91

of freedom of speech is reflected in the gen- in the worst position, buffeted by the two eral decline of the still undeveloped civic extremes. Division into “us” and “them” and political culture. leaves no space to question individual and When one has been in power for almost collective responsibility vis-à-vis the state. thirty years and does not understand the Everyday problems, social issues, economic concept of change of government, it is hard hardship, environmental degradation are all to remain responsive to the needs of the citi- relegated to the margins of public discourse. zens. Hence, the ruling Democratic Party of And instead of citizens becoming part of the Socialists’ (DPS) connection to the citizens solution and being the focus of the system, has become perfunctory, enough to main- they are treated as décor or mere executors tain the system but not to imbue it with of party objectives within election cycles. necessary vitality. Such a system rests on the In parallel, we are witnessing the regress- paternalism of its leader and clientelism of ing of the reforms that were launched and those around him, but during the elections a decline of key political institutions and of it continues to pose as the anchor of the representative democracy as such, with the country’s independence. The false equiva- rise of informal centres of power. lence between the authorities and the state High profile political clashes are also is a crime against the public. The state ought taking over public opinion at large. A CCE to be above any party, above any leader, any study from March 2019 indicates a grow- part of the society and not be misused as ing degree of radicalization, with a third part of the mechanisms for maintaining the of the respondents saying that violence in power of one party. pursuit of political, social or religious objec- It would be wrong to say that the ruling tives could be justified, which represents a party is the only one to suffer from intoler- potential for further radicalization. Moreo- ance. The opposition, or at least some of it, ver, the study also showed that Montene- is not immune either. Namely, close ties to grin citizens are most likely to discriminate the Serbian Orthodox Church turned a part against others on grounds of political belief of the opposition (Democratic Front) into and income, and that over two fifths assess prophets of backwardness. They too see the that discrimination on grounds of ethnic non-governmental sector as a necessary and religious affiliation is rather or very evil, and a lack of tolerance towards differ- widespread.2 ence is visible, regardless of whether those Meanwhile, the media in Montenegro who are different are national minorities, are in a crisis of their own. Except for a hand- the LGBTIQ community, or even the major- ful of private outlets fighting for survival in a ity ethnic group – the Montenegrins. crumbling media market, most of the media Between the deep trenches of these two sides of the public scene, the civic 2 http://media.cgo-cce.org/2019/03/CGO_Stavovi-pre- and progressive part of the society remain ma-nasilnom-ekstremizmu-i-radikalizmu.pdf (MNE)

Photo by Centre for Civic Education 92 civil society vs establishment another view – in the eye of the political storm

accept to be in the service of the ruling party and linked para-political power and eco- High profile political clashes are nomic centres, often leading smear cam- also taking over public opinion at paigns against critics of the government. large. A CCE study from March The CCE was also a frequent target of these 2019 indicates a growing degree proxy campaigns, one of the most intense of which was conducted during spring 2018, of radicalization, with a third of with hundreds of mostly negative pieces. the respondents saying that vio- By way of illustration, in May 2018, journal- lence in pursuit of political, so- ist Olivera Lakić was brutally attacked and cial or religious objectives could shot in the leg in front of her building. The be justified, which represents a daily “Pobjeda” found this event worthy of just two front-page headlines, while dedi- potential for further radicaliza- cating seven front pages to negative report- tion. Moreover, the study also ing about the CCE in the same period. The showed that Montenegrin citi- lack of dialogue is especially prominent in zens are most likely to discrimi- Radio-Television Montenegro (RTCG), a nate against others on grounds public service broadcaster, which despite being funded by taxpayers, marginalises of political belief and income, public interest and pluralism of opinions, and that over two fifths assess opting for mercenary reporting. that discrimination on grounds of Treading through these minefields of ethnic and religious affiliation is complex political and social relations are rather or very widespread. the human rights defenders who in their everyday work fight for freedom of expression, de-radicalization of public discourse, and opening of society to necessary democratisation. They bravely resist the stabilo- radicalism that is dragging us back into the discourse of the dark 1990s. It remains to be seen if that will be enough of a base for the strength needed to truly Europeanise Mon- tenegrin society. on the margins of political discourse civil society vs establishment 93 on the margins of political discourse

Gresa Hasa

What this is about is the attempt to shift the focus, from those responsible for the economic, natural, human and social crisis in the society, to those who criticize and fight against these dark forces in power – thus dividing the massive majority that would otherwise stick together against the only culprit: a state not working for the 99%. In this way, “the enemy” can no longer be identified with corrupt politicians or lawmakers creating and passing discriminatory or anti-human-rights laws and policies, but with those fighting this obscenity.

“She’s a communist!”, he shouted right at my The reason could be that “crazy”, “left- face, with the content air of someone who ist” or “radical” do not go far enough in had just delivered a knockout punch to a dismissiveness and defamation. None of debating opponent. those terms denotes extremism, nor does it He, a man in his sixties, introduced with provide the immediate strategic amplifica- some pomp by the show host as an “intellec- tion that the term “communist” does. None tual” and a celebrity, and I, a student activ- of those terms can trigger outrage more ist, were invited as commentators in a live quickly and effectively in the wider popu- TV broadcast dedicated that evening to the lation; none can engender the bias neces- massive student protests that had brought sary to drown an opposing voice. None can the country’s public universities to a stand- burn more quickly any bridge that had been still. painstakingly built between opposing sides, “She’s a communist!”, he said, in and none can more irreversibly kill the hope response to the points I was trying to make, for future bridges. while I was just thinking that his sole con- The term “communist” remains toxic tribution to the debate of that evening was in Albania, and poisonous to any pub- to confuse and distract the audience from lic discourse, as it shifts the debate from understanding the issues surrounding a arguments to personal attacks. The term very impactful piece of legislation: the Law remains charged and derogatory, and it is on Higher Education, and the corollary used, mostly in the absence of arguments, issues such as high tuition fees, the factors to smear and discredit an opponent, or as a that foster corrupt practices in academia, way to spin facts and manipulate a situation such as selling of grades, lack of adequate in the service of other political interests. public funding, rampant sexism, and so on.

Why did he call me a “communist”? Gresa Hasa Why not a “leftist”, a “radical”, or just plain Activist of the student movement “crazy” for that matter? “For The University” and “Organizata Politike”, Tirana. Publishes regularly in the Albanian media and abroad. 94 civil society vs establishment on the margins of political discourse

the seeds of terror in their respective coun- What is really extreme at the end of the day? A tries all across Eastern Europe. government taking money from students, forc- Any intellectually mature person, with ing them nevertheless to pay more while public no more than a modicum of knowledge of political theory, would be aware of the cor- universities in Albania lack basic conditions like rect meaning and use of the term(s). They libraries, books, computers, heating systems, would also be aware of how that meaning while big businesses never pay their fair share of has been perverted, modified and trans- taxes? Who is extremist – a government work- formed into a powerful discursive weapon, ing for big corporations and businesses, mak- most notably in post-socialist societies. The term “communist” as a label of ing deals with them and partially selling public humiliation will stick better, however, to universities to “big guys with money and power” exponents of the left side of the political and intimidating activists, citizens and students; spectrum. Grassroot activists, for example, or a grassroot attempt to stop such policies and are routinely subjected to such name-call- laws, to hold such a government accountable ing whenever they challenge those in power, and demand from it transparency, proper invest- or when they question the status quo, or demand responsibility from the decision- ment, better conditions, books, pencils, comput- makers. The latter will use their privileged ers and the most important: the possibility to ac- status (i.e., possession of financial means, cess university regardless of one’s class, gender, control over public institutions, and – to a sexual orientation, religious belief or ethnicity? great degree – the media), to fully shut down such opposing voices. And this is not just an Albanian phe- A “communist” in such matters means nomenon but a worldwide political tactic. a person who should not be trusted, some- In the United States of America, presum- body trying to manipulate people and cause ably (still) under some McCarthyist influ- harm. The “harm” involved is never speci- ence in the contemporary public discourse, fied because that would be unnecessary. especially lately, after the 2016 elections, Those who label others as “communists” in such weaponized terms are frequently public today count on the collective mem- used against certain politicians, activists or ory of a people who lived through the hor- public figures. Bernie Sanders is constantly rors of Enver Hoxha’s dictatorship to almost attacked by opponents on both sides, Dem- instantly produce outrage, fear, and resent- ocrats and Republicans alike, as “a socialist” ment. For a “communist” is a “persona non (which over there means more or less the grata”. Those who engage in such name- same as “communist” does on this conti- calling have weaponized the term so that it nent) for his ideas, especially the ones con- can devalue someone completely; it reduces cerning education and healthcare. all their critical, independent, ideological In Europe, young activist Greta Thun- and political thinking into some perversion berg is occasionally attacked as working for no one should listen to; and finally, it aims a “communist agenda” for her activism and to elicit immediate hatred on the part of the ideas of a Green New Deal; for being so vocal audience. and critical of those in power while at the On rare occasions, especially amongst same time mobilizing people worldwide in academics or intellectuals, the term “com- a common struggle for our future and that munist” or “communism” is used to denote of the planet. In such cases as well, “com- exactly what the terms meant when they munism” is not meant as some naive and first came into existence: i.e., communism idealistic idea of society but as the worst as a modern political and economic doc- system people are placed under through the trine the theoretical foundation of which mechanics of dogma. was developed by German sociologist, What this is about is the attempt to economist and philosopher Karl Marx, the shift the focus, from those responsible for father of a political idea that has yet to be the economic, natural, human and social entirely comprehended as it was never fully crisis in the society, to those who criticize explained. Marx’s idea was, however, highly and fight against these dark forces in power misused during the 20th century by political – thus dividing the massive majority that profiteers and later criminal dictators such would otherwise stick together against the as Joseph Stalin, Enver Hoxha, Ceausescu only culprit: a state not working for the 99%. and the like, who gained power and sowed In this way, “the enemy” can no longer be on the margins of political discourse civil society vs establishment 95

identified with corrupt politicians or law- computers, heating systems, while big busi- makers creating and passing discriminatory nesses never pay their fair share of taxes? or anti-human-rights laws and policies, but Who is extremist – a government working with those fighting this obscenity. for big corporations and businesses, mak- A Machiavellian tactic. ing deals with them and partially selling When the undeserved wealth of the priv- public universities to “big guys with money ileged 1% and all their other interests are put and power” and intimidating activists, citi- into question or placed under threat, they zens and students; or a grassroot attempt will not remain silent. They will fight back, at to stop such policies and laws, to hold such the cost of destroying the entire educational a government accountable and demand or healthcare system or even our common from it transparency, proper investment, house: planet Earth; while loading public better conditions, books, pencils, comput- discourse in such a way that people, activ- ers and the most important: the possibility ists or not, feel intimidated, their ability to to access university regardless of one’s class, act stifled. During the broadcast that even- gender, sexual orientation, religious belief ing, that man, my opponent, did not simply or ethnicity? call me a communist: he interrupted and Extremism is not to be found in an shouted at me while using that specific term. attempt to make a society equal, just and What could the audience possibly have felt inclusive for all by using the most powerful in those moments? Anxiety? Intimidation? weapon there is: critical thinking. Extrem- Stress? An infantile desire for the spectacle ism however can be found at the margins to go on because that is what this man’s aim of public discourse, where privileged men was: to turn a rigorous political debate or patronize, interrupt and shout at your face any attempt at such a debate, into an enter- every time you try to fight back against a taining show. That is typically what can be discriminating system that concentrates the expected from such “intellectuals”. The elites money in the hands of the few, usually the – clowns – working closely with the govern- same powerful men thriving in such patri- ment and fed by it, using solely emotions in archal and capitalist structures. the public sphere, to produce fear instead of Demanding free public education, free arguments; to provide a banal show instead healthcare, a complete dismantling of patri- of understanding and clarification of certain archy and immediate action on the climate topics of public interest. crisis and policies that make life better for all The ultimate resistance is to not fall for is an effort happening on the international such vocabulary and into political traps scale that will sooner rather than later bring but to fight back by holding on to logic. The about the change we all need. Such an effort fight is necessary and vital, not just to social does not need labels, especially derogatory causes but to democracy itself, because extremist ones. a government that works to exclude the majority of the people from basic rights, such as education in this case, is not a government of the people. This is exactly what the Albanian government has been doing by violently passing a discriminating law that makes it harder for young people, and any other citizens who live below the median wage, to access higher education. And this law specifically harms girls and women in Albania, for whom university is a means of liberation. For a young woman on the out- skirts of Tirana who can’t access education will be forced to either work in some shoe factory for only 100 Euros per month, or married of by her family , to a man usually older than her. What is really extreme at the end of the day? A government taking money from students, forcing them nevertheless to pay Photo by "outtacontext", We Are Our Own Worst more while public universities in Albania Enemy, flickr lack basic conditions like libraries, books, CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0

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Publisher Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Office Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Albania) On behalf of the publisher Marion Kraske Project coordination Alma Sukić Editor-in-chief Srđan Dvornik Language editor Hana Dvornik Translations Hana Dvornik Blažena Radaš Ivana Nevesinjac Cover Design Filip Andronik Layout Triptih d.o.o. Sarajevo Print Amos graf, Sarajevo, 2019 Edition 300 copies

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