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3/2013 Security and Protection in Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia

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3/2013 Security and Protection in Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia 3/2013 ENG Security and protection in Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia Joint report from the Danish Immigration Service’s and the Norwegian Landinfo’s fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia 16 April to 7 May 2013 Copenhagen, May 2013 LANDINFO Danish Immigration Service Storgata 33a, PB 8108 Dep. Ryesgade 53 0032 Oslo 2100 Copenhagen Ø Phone: +47 23 30 94 70 Phone: 00 45 35 36 66 00 Web: www.landinfo.no Web: www.newtodenmark.dk E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Overview of Danish fact finding reports published in 2012 and 2013 Update (2) On Entry Procedures At Kurdistan Regional Government Checkpoints (Krg); Residence Procedures In Kurdistan Region Of Iraq (Kri) And Arrival Procedures At Erbil And Suleimaniyah Airports (For Iraqis Travelling From Non-Kri Areas Of Iraq), Joint Report of the Danish Immigration Service/UK Border Agency Fact Finding Mission to Erbil and Dahuk, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), conducted 11 to 22 November 2011 2012: 1 Security and human rights issues in South-Central Somalia, including Mogadishu, Report from Danish Immigration Service’s fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia, 30 January to 19 February 2012 2012: 2 Afghanistan, Country of Origin Information for Use in the Asylum Determination Process, Rapport from Danish Immigration Service’s fact finding mission to Kabul, Afghanistan, 25 February to 4 March 2012 2012: 3 Chechens in the Russian Federation – residence registration, racially motivated violence and fabricated criminal cases, Joint report from the Danish Immigration Service’s and Danish Refugee Council’s fact finding mission to Moscow and St Petersburg, the Russian Federation from 23 May to 5 June 2012 2012: 4 Update on security and human rights issues in South- and Central Somalia, including Mogadishu, Joint report from the Danish Immigration Service’s and the Norwegian Landinfo’s fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia, 17 to 28 October 2012 2013: 1 Iran - On Conversion to Christianity, Issues concerning Kurds and Post-2009 Election Protestors as well as Legal Issues and Exit Procedures, Joint report from the Danish Immigration Service, the Norwegian LANDINFO and Danish Refugee Council’s fact-finding mission to Tehran, Iran, Ankara, Turkey and London, United Kingdom, 9 November to 20 November 2012 and 8 January to 9 January 2013 2013: 2 Contents Introduction and disclaimer ................................................................................................................. 3 1 Security issues in Mogadishu ............................................................................................................ 5 1.1 Influence of and support to al-Shabaab ...................................................................................... 5 1.2 Al-Shabaab’s capacity to undertake attacks ............................................................................... 9 1.3 Targeted killings/attacks by al-Shabaab .................................................................................. 11 1.4 Activities by the SNAF, police forces, District Commissioners (DCs) and criminal gangs ... 14 1.5 Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) ........................................................................... 17 1.6 Security improvements in Mogadishu ..................................................................................... 18 1.7 Recent attacks by al-Shabaab ................................................................................................... 23 1.8 UNDSS’ recent security alert concerning a possible al-Shabaab attack .................................. 25 1.8.1 The attack on 5 May 2013 in Mogadishu ......................................................................... 26 1.9 Presence of United Nations and Turkey in S/C Somalia ......................................................... 27 1.9.1 United Nations presence ................................................................................................... 27 1.9.2 Turkish presence ............................................................................................................... 29 2 Protection and livelihood issues in Mogadishu............................................................................... 31 2.1 Clan protection ......................................................................................................................... 31 2.2 Protection against targeted attacks ........................................................................................... 34 2.3 Protection of al-Shabaab defectors .......................................................................................... 34 3 Military and security developments in South/Central Somalia ...................................................... 35 3.1 AMISON, SNAF and Ethiopian presence, public support for al-Shabaab .............................. 35 3.2 Kismayo, Lower Juba and Gedo regions and the ‘Jubbaland’ issue ........................................ 38 3.3 Merka and Brava, Lower Shabelle region, and Jowhar, Middle Shabelle region .................... 40 3.4 Bay, Bakool and Hiraan regions (Baidoa, Hoddur and Belet Weyne) .................................... 42 3.4.1 Baidoa, Bay region ............................................................................................................ 42 3.4.2 Hoddur, Bakool region ...................................................................................................... 42 3.5 Visions for the local administrations in S/C Somalia .............................................................. 43 Security and protection in Mogadishu and S/C Somalia 4 The formal justice system, customary law and property issues ...................................................... 44 4.1 Justice system ........................................................................................................................... 44 4.2 Customary law ......................................................................................................................... 44 4.3 Property issues ......................................................................................................................... 44 5 Issues related to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Mogadishu ............................................. 46 5.1 Conditions for IDPs ................................................................................................................. 46 5.2 Sexual violence against IDPs ................................................................................................... 47 6 Freedom of movement, security and checkpoints ........................................................................... 48 6.1 Freedom of movement in Mogadishu ...................................................................................... 48 6.2 Freedom of movement in S/C Somalia .................................................................................... 49 6.2.1 Mogadishu – Kismayo road .............................................................................................. 50 6.2.2 Mogadishu – Afgoye – Baidoa road ................................................................................. 50 7 Return to Mogadishu and S/C Somalia ........................................................................................... 51 7.2 Diaspora returning from abroad ............................................................................................... 51 7.3 Returning refugees and IDPs ................................................................................................... 54 8 Security issues at Mogadishu airport .............................................................................................. 56 8.1 Security at Mogadishu’s international airport .......................................................................... 56 9 Issuance of documents by Somali authorities ................................................................................. 57 Organizations, agencies and individuals consulted ............................................................................ 58 Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................................... 59 Annexes .............................................................................................................................................. 61 Annex 1: Map of Somalia .............................................................................................................. 61 Annex 2: Map of Mogadishu ......................................................................................................... 62 Annex 3: The area of control – Hiraan Region .............................................................................. 63 Annex 4: The area of control – Bay&Bakool Regions .................................................................. 64 Annex 5: The area of control – Gedo Region ................................................................................ 65 Annex 6: The area of control – Lower Juba ................................................................................... 66 2 Danish-Norwegian fact finding mission to Nairobi and Mogadishu, April-May 2013 Security and protection in Mogadishu and S/C Somalia Introduction and disclaimer In January-February 2012 the Country of Origin Information (COI) unit of the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) as well
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