ISRAEL-PALESTINE: WHAT FUTURE for the TWO PEOPLES? Confronting the Obstacles to a Viable Peace
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ISRAEL-PALESTINE: WHAT FUTURE FOR THE TWO PEOPLES? Confronting the Obstacles to a Viable Peace Report on the Roundtable at Charney Manor, Oxford 20th–22nd April 2005 Organised by the Middle East Policy Initiative Forum and Oxford Research Group The Oxford Roundtable on Obstacles to a Viable Peace in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict SUMMARY opportunity for drawing breath and institution-building but threatens to In late April 2005, the Middle East become a cage rather than a platform Policy Initiative Forum and the Oxford for their goals. This mini-state could Research Group convened a two-day prove to be one of the riskier scenarios roundtable of eminent Israelis, from the point of view of a lasting Palestinians and internationals at peace, precisely because it promises to Charney Manor, Oxford. Participants be more stable in the short term. included former negotiators, politicians, academics, journalists and The Palestinians are distracted and civil society figures. They took a fresh divided by the process of political look at the state of the conflict, transition after Arafat. They lack a analysed opportunities and obstacles, clear national strategy and a generally and shared ideas for making progress accepted representative who can go toward a viable peace. The meeting forth as interlocutor. They are took place at a time of apparent challenged to re-forge both their optimism around Palestinian elections, institutions and their movement under prospects of Israeli disengagement and conditions of occupation. The Islamic the fragile calm. But underlying resistance movement Hamas aims to realities revealed a different story. enter electoral politics and national institutions, opening possibilities for The roundtable began by analysing both reform and radicalisation, and trends, shocks and obstacles from the presenting challenges for the standpoint of the future rather than the international community. The more a past. Deep shifts in both societies and comprehensive peace disappears over in the regional and international the vague, rosy horizon, the stronger context are forming a new, post-Oslo extremism will become. Most agreed a picture. Many felt the logic of Israel third intifada is set to erupt, but its disengagement goes well beyond means and ends may not be fixed in short-term tactics. It is effectively stone. driving present events, and drawing other actors in toward a longer-term Meanwhile, the international worldview. Israel’s present leadership community has not taken up a may be prepared to permit Palestinian leadership role aimed at making contiguity and statehood, and to give progress toward a peace agreement. up the majority of territory on the West Instead, its recent work has focused on Bank. However, this will not satisfy consolidating the emerging reality of fundamental Palestinian national interim disengagement. The US is aspirations. enhancing its engagement within conflict management parameters. The In the absence of a compelling, well- Quartet is assisting on economic marshalled and widely supported issues. The more fundamental follow-up plan, the default will be an challenge they share with the Arab interim reality, the return of violence world and the broader international and growing divergence between the community is to formulate bold steps national goals of each side. that can be taken after disengagement Palestinians are conflicted over the to clarify the final status horizon and possibility of a Palestinian state with drive progress toward a lasting peace provisional borders, which offers an deal between two viable states. The Oxford Roundtable Report, 2005 2 The Oxford Roundtable on Obstacles to a Viable Peace in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict The roundtable did not seek to reach • Civil society – potentially consensus, but to provide a creative including large-scale forum for sharing perspectives. The coordinated non-violent action aim was not only to improve understanding of present trends and • Reframing permanent status dynamics, but to search out issues – creative approaches to opportunities and explore where fresh citizenship, phased agreement, ideas or political will could switch the the extent of land swaps and conflict onto a track more likely to lead broader regional dynamics to a viable peace. Six particularly promising areas emerged, described at the end of this report: • A fresh Palestinian national strategy – gathering strength and taking ownership of their destiny, drawing in the scattered national constituencies, deciding on how to confront the logic of disengagement and reviewing means and ends • Developing Israeli alternatives – post-disengagement conversations among Israeli leaders interested in making progress on a more comprehensive front • Fostering multi-party dialogue in the Palestinian territories – both in the near-term around the monitoring of elections, and thereafter in a wider context • Campaigning international diplomacy – preparing dramatic steps toward comprehensive peace to be taken by Arab, US, EU and other international and communal leaders after the first disengagement The Oxford Roundtable Report, 2005 3 The Oxford Roundtable on Obstacles to a Viable Peace in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict OBSTACLES AND DYNAMICS bypass roads on the West Bank may be reconfigured, but the West Bank The official story of the Israeli- barrier and the closing of the Jerusalem Palestinian conflict prevailing since envelope join other solid barriers to a 1993 is ceasing to be adequate to its lasting peace. Roundtable participants realities, as the logic of disengagement began by sharing questions about the takes hold on the ground and elections future, which were brought together in herald changes in the Palestinian body this map of obstacles, trends and politic. The physical obstacle presented possibilities. by the matrix of settlements and TRENDS & Escalation Sharon Knesset elections around assassinated? OBSTACLES disengagement? New alignments? “450K settlers” “450K Regional shocks: US/Iran/Syria/Iraq/ 50-90% disengagement, consolidate blocs Lebanon? Long-term interim tactics, regional ideas? NEW “MAPAI” CONSENSUS? Arab-Israeli choices? WEST BANK BARRIERS State with Third intifada NEW “PLO” provisional borders CONSENSUS? Fatah split or renewal? “4.5m refugees” All-party liberation struggle Change Nation & institution-building Goodbye of goal? No end of conflict? Abu Mazen? ATTITUDES OF ALL PARTIES OF ATTITUDES Hamas shooting / ruling Shocks PLC elections – Hamas successes? Trends Prisoner release? Attack on Israel stops Haram al-Sharif? talking to PLO? OBSTACLES It is clear that the centres of gravity are reveal fresh or long-ignored shifting in each society, and new opportunities. The roundtable focused possibilities are emerging. The new in particular on developments in Israeli Israeli consensus around and Palestinian politics and on the disengagement and the post-Arafat implications of a Palestinian state with Palestinian landscape suggest the provisional borders, before considering worldviews of the parties may be how a different dynamic could be diverging from the well-known generated. principles of negotiated peace. In its present alignment, the “new deck of cards” above contains a gloomy picture in which a viable peace is nowhere to be seen. But creative thinking can The Oxford Roundtable Report, 2005 4 The Oxford Roundtable on Obstacles to a Viable Peace in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict NEW ISRAELI DOCTRINE? One of its premises is the historic right-wing assumption that in the The disengagement plan of Prime foreseeable future, there will be no Minister Ariel Sharon, together with Palestinian partner for a other Israeli moves, is having a deep comprehensive peace deal that is impact on the landscape of the Israeli- acceptable to Israel. The view is taken Palestinian conflict. By seizing the that the will of the Palestinian initiative, the Israeli government has leadership to compromise is for the moment derailed or co-opted questionable, and that its capacity to do approaches designed to bring final so – in terms of political institutions, status talks back onto the agenda. security capabilities and public legitimacy – in any case lacking. That Commentators have often painted view is compounded by the lack of a Sharon as more of a tactician than a single Palestinian interlocutor, given strategist. Some Palestinian and actual and latent divisions between the international leaders suggest that the Palestinian president, elements of the disengagement plan is a short-term cabinet, legislature and security tactic, and that the new dynamics services, the wider PLO leadership, the following will lead to a comprehensive factions of Fatah, an increasingly peace. But this disengagement sits at powerful Hamas and other fractions. In the heart of a broader strategic the foreseeable future everything is framework around which a new Israeli viewed as interim, nothing is consensus could be emerging, permanent. powerful enough to draw in other actors. Participants suggested this This view is tacitly determined by the worldview is spreading across the lack of political will on the part of the Israeli political landscape and bedding Israeli leadership to contemplate itself down in the military and compromise on Jerusalem, refugee professional echelons. At its heart is a return and other basic Palestinian redefinition of Palestinian statehood demands. Thanks to its own that separates that aspiration from end fragmentation, volatility, and reliance of conflict, independence, Jerusalem