ISRAEL-PALESTINE: WHAT FUTURE FOR THE TWO PEOPLES? Confronting the Obstacles to a Viable Peace

Report on the Roundtable at Charney Manor, Oxford 20th–22nd April 2005

Organised by the Policy Initiative Forum and Oxford Research Group

The Oxford Roundtable on Obstacles to a Viable Peace in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

SUMMARY opportunity for drawing breath and institution-building but threatens to In late April 2005, the Middle East become a cage rather than a platform Policy Initiative Forum and the Oxford for their goals. This mini-state could Research Group convened a two-day prove to be one of the riskier scenarios roundtable of eminent , from the point of view of a lasting and internationals at peace, precisely because it promises to Charney Manor, Oxford. Participants be more stable in the short term. included former negotiators, politicians, academics, journalists and The Palestinians are distracted and civil society figures. They took a fresh divided by the process of political look at the state of the conflict, transition after Arafat. They lack a analysed opportunities and obstacles, clear national strategy and a generally and shared ideas for making progress accepted representative who can go toward a viable peace. The meeting forth as interlocutor. They are took place at a time of apparent challenged to re-forge both their optimism around Palestinian elections, institutions and their movement under prospects of Israeli disengagement and conditions of occupation. The Islamic the fragile calm. But underlying resistance movement aims to realities revealed a different story. enter electoral politics and national institutions, opening possibilities for The roundtable began by analysing both reform and radicalisation, and trends, shocks and obstacles from the presenting challenges for the standpoint of the future rather than the international community. The more a past. Deep shifts in both societies and comprehensive peace disappears over in the regional and international the vague, rosy horizon, the stronger context are forming a new, post-Oslo extremism will become. Most agreed a picture. Many felt the logic of third intifada is set to erupt, but its disengagement goes well beyond means and ends may not be fixed in short-term tactics. It is effectively stone. driving present events, and drawing other actors in toward a longer-term Meanwhile, the international worldview. Israel’s present leadership community has not taken up a may be prepared to permit Palestinian leadership role aimed at making contiguity and statehood, and to give progress toward a peace agreement. up the majority of territory on the West Instead, its recent work has focused on Bank. However, this will not satisfy consolidating the emerging reality of fundamental Palestinian national interim disengagement. The US is aspirations. enhancing its engagement within conflict management parameters. The In the absence of a compelling, well- Quartet is assisting on economic marshalled and widely supported issues. The more fundamental follow-up plan, the default will be an challenge they share with the Arab interim reality, the return of violence world and the broader international and growing divergence between the community is to formulate bold steps national goals of each side. that can be taken after disengagement Palestinians are conflicted over the to clarify the final status horizon and possibility of a Palestinian state with drive progress toward a lasting peace provisional borders, which offers an deal between two viable states.

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The roundtable did not seek to reach • Civil society – potentially consensus, but to provide a creative including large-scale forum for sharing perspectives. The coordinated non-violent action aim was not only to improve understanding of present trends and • Reframing permanent status dynamics, but to search out issues – creative approaches to opportunities and explore where fresh citizenship, phased agreement, ideas or political will could switch the the extent of land swaps and conflict onto a track more likely to lead broader regional dynamics to a viable peace. Six particularly promising areas emerged, described at the end of this report:

• A fresh Palestinian national strategy – gathering strength and taking ownership of their destiny, drawing in the scattered national constituencies, deciding on how to confront the logic of disengagement and reviewing means and ends

• Developing Israeli alternatives – post-disengagement conversations among Israeli leaders interested in making progress on a more comprehensive front

• Fostering multi-party dialogue in the Palestinian territories – both in the near-term around the monitoring of elections, and thereafter in a wider context

• Campaigning international diplomacy – preparing dramatic steps toward comprehensive peace to be taken by Arab, US, EU and other international and communal leaders after the first disengagement

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OBSTACLES AND DYNAMICS bypass roads on the may be reconfigured, but the West Bank The official story of the Israeli- barrier and the closing of the Palestinian conflict prevailing since envelope join other solid barriers to a 1993 is ceasing to be adequate to its lasting peace. Roundtable participants realities, as the logic of disengagement began by sharing questions about the takes hold on the ground and elections future, which were brought together in herald changes in the Palestinian body this map of obstacles, trends and politic. The physical obstacle presented possibilities. by the matrix of settlements and

TRENDS & Escalation Sharon Knesset elections around assassinated? OBSTACLES disengagement? New alignments?

“450K settlers” Regional shocks: US///Iraq/ 50-90% disengagement, consolidate blocs Lebanon? Long-term interim tactics, regional ideas?

NEW “MAPAI” CONSENSUS? Arab-Israeli choices?

WEST BANK BARRIERS

State with Third intifada NEW “PLO” provisional borders

CONSENSUS? split or renewal? refugees”“4.5m

All-party liberation struggle Goodbye Change Nation & institution-building of goal? No end of conflict? Abu Mazen?

ATTITUDES OF ALL PARTIES OF ATTITUDES Hamas shooting / ruling Shocks

PLC elections – Hamas successes? Trends Prisoner release? Attack on Israel stops Haram al-Sharif? talking to PLO? OBSTACLES

It is clear that the centres of gravity are reveal fresh or long-ignored shifting in each society, and new opportunities. The roundtable focused possibilities are emerging. The new in particular on developments in Israeli Israeli consensus around and Palestinian politics and on the disengagement and the post-Arafat implications of a Palestinian state with Palestinian landscape suggest the provisional borders, before considering worldviews of the parties may be how a different dynamic could be diverging from the well-known generated. principles of negotiated peace. In its present alignment, the “new deck of cards” above contains a gloomy picture in which a viable peace is nowhere to be seen. But creative thinking can

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NEW ISRAELI DOCTRINE? One of its premises is the historic right-wing assumption that in the The disengagement plan of Prime foreseeable future, there will be no Minister Ariel Sharon, together with Palestinian partner for a other Israeli moves, is having a deep comprehensive peace deal that is impact on the landscape of the Israeli- acceptable to Israel. The view is taken Palestinian conflict. By seizing the that the will of the Palestinian initiative, the Israeli government has leadership to compromise is for the moment derailed or co-opted questionable, and that its capacity to do approaches designed to bring final so – in terms of political institutions, status talks back onto the agenda. security capabilities and public legitimacy – in any case lacking. That Commentators have often painted view is compounded by the lack of a Sharon as more of a tactician than a single Palestinian interlocutor, given strategist. Some Palestinian and actual and latent divisions between the international leaders suggest that the Palestinian president, elements of the disengagement plan is a short-term cabinet, legislature and security tactic, and that the new dynamics services, the wider PLO leadership, the following will lead to a comprehensive factions of Fatah, an increasingly peace. But this disengagement sits at powerful Hamas and other fractions. In the heart of a broader strategic the foreseeable future everything is framework around which a new Israeli viewed as interim, nothing is consensus could be emerging, permanent. powerful enough to draw in other actors. Participants suggested this This view is tacitly determined by the worldview is spreading across the lack of political will on the part of the Israeli political landscape and bedding Israeli leadership to contemplate itself down in the military and compromise on Jerusalem, refugee professional echelons. At its heart is a return and other basic Palestinian redefinition of Palestinian statehood demands. Thanks to its own that separates that aspiration from end fragmentation, volatility, and reliance of conflict, independence, Jerusalem of executive on legislature, the Israeli and other national demands. A limited political system may be institutionally Palestinian state, de-linked from final constrained from delivering real status, is coming to be seen in certain compromise absent a fresh approach. It quarters as an Israeli interest. is not yet clear from what quarter leadership for renewal might come, We are in a period of change and re- despite forthcoming primaries and evaluation where many new elections. Present opposition and civil possibilities have opened up, and this society alignments appear to lack the viewpoint may not yet have reached requisite energy or momentum. the level of doctrine. But alternatives will need to be well founded and There is an intimate relationship powerfully championed if they are to between the state with provisional challenge it. Through analysis and borders now on the agenda and the role-play, roundtable participants spent extended interim agreement long considerable time working through the contemplated in Israel. Some implications of this thinking. participants proposed that all parties

The Oxford Roundtable Report, 2005 5 The Oxford Roundtable on Obstacles to a Viable Peace in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict accept the de-linking of Palestinian contemplating considerably larger statehood from final status agreement, withdrawals from the West Bank over and that negotiations can then be time, involving the evacuation of more pursued on a state-to-state basis, isolated settlements and potentially concluding separate chapters on the extending to 80% or more of the outstanding issues. Most Palestinian territory, but excluding Jerusalem and participants saw this phased approach the settlement blocs, where Israel is as a recipe for stasis and further consolidating its control through the violence. Other Israeli participants E1 corridor and other actions. The expressed concerns that unless interim present route of the security barrier is steps are reconnected to the horizon of compatible with this prospect. a comprehensive agreement, the state Dependent upon regional of Israel and its social cohesion will developments, even the Jordan Valley continue a long descent. is clearly viewed as less essential.

During the Oslo years, the default The territories to be given up will not posture was negotiations between the approach the deal already rejected by parties. The Israeli government the Palestinians at Camp David, and preference today is to act unilaterally under current concepts will not end the or in coordination with international territorial conflict. However, such actors such as the US and the World steps could significantly exceed Bank. The strategy has internal Palestinian and international weaknesses – it does not deliver expectations, throwing other parties off international legitimacy or an end to balance for years, distracting from conflict, and it will reinforce consolidation in the “seam-line” and Palestinian radicals, giving the sense of Jerusalem, and maintaining Israeli a victory to violence. It will lead to control over the process. The larger the pressure to negotiate again. Israeli and unilateral withdrawal, the more the Palestinian public opinion were and diplomatic leverage of the Palestinians remain united in their support for a may shrink, and the more they may be peace deal. But presently polls show drawn toward the pressing they are divided on how to get there: responsibilities of governing their the Israeli public prefers a phased territories. One participant suggested approach, while Palestinians still that Israel may stop talking to the PLO demand a comprehensive peace. in favour of the “democratically elected leadership” of the Palestinian The extent of Palestinian control over territories. This distinction may acquire the West Bank is a central bone of a difference after Abu Mazen. contention. For over two decades, figures of 42% to 52% have been The prospect of further disengagement attributed to the “Sharon Plan” from the West Bank, even a series of (presented most recently in his unilateral steps stretched out over a Herzliya speeches). The expectation long period of time, must therefore be has been that contiguity will be taken seriously. Some participants severely curtailed by the remaining thought a “second disengagement” will network of Israeli roads and be part of the platform Sharon takes to settlements, as was Area A. However, early elections in spring 2006. Others a view emerged that Likud leaders are suggested he may have an interest in

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ensuring that each withdrawal is Israel withdraws, and that the priority messy, traumatic and extended. is therefore to maximise the extent of Assembling a coalition in the Knesset that withdrawal, the attributes of for bold moves will in any case be no sovereignty and independence, and the simple task. viability of this state. They emphasised in particular contiguity of territories Present US policy appears aligned with and openness to the world through an this phased Israeli approach. Under the airport, seaport and a border regime roadmap timetable, the third phase of guaranteed by third parties, without the roadmap was planned for 2005, which such a state is unlikely to be with final status negotiations and a economically or politically viable. second international conference. They stressed that Israel will share the President George Bush currently says provisionality of Palestine’s borders. he wants to see a Palestinian state by They also viewed state-building as an 2009: that need only mean the second opportunity to address the democratic phase of the roadmap, the Palestinian shortcomings of the regime under state with provisional borders. occupation.

Others judged the PSPB on balance to be a poisoned pill, a limited mini-state that will separate statehood from core Palestinian national aspirations of independence, a capital in , an end to the occupation of 1967 and an agreed solution to the problem of the refugees. They argued the PSPB will serve an Israeli strategy to contain these larger goals, to defuse A PALESTINIAN STATE international pressure by converting WITH PROVISIONAL BORDERS? the Palestinian independence struggle into an extended border dispute In Hebrew the “roadmap” translates as between two states, and to drive a a “map of roads”. Despite outlining a wedge between Palestinians inside and timetable straight through to a final outside the territories. They warned status agreement, this diplomatic that it could make a viable two-state structure contains less hopeful paths. deal harder, if not impossible, thereby The Palestinian state with provisional also damaging Israel’s long-term borders (PSPB) outlined in the second interests. phase of the roadmap looks set to come onto the horizon after disengagement. It is on such grounds that President Though presented as an optional way Mahmoud Abbas has sought pre- station, it could become a mandatory emptively to reject a PSPB – a stance cul-de-sac. that may however prove difficult to sustain, in particular if the US and Some Palestinian participants argued Arab states such as Jordan, , strongly that the time has come for Qatar or Morocco come behind it. One them to build their state and national Palestinian participant, initially a institutions on territories from which strong advocate of a state with

The Oxford Roundtable Report, 2005 7 The Oxford Roundtable on Obstacles to a Viable Peace in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict provisional borders provided it reached a threshold of viability, became increasingly worried and began to re- evaluate its implications. Participants agreed that Palestinians face the pressing challenge to develop a positive national strategy that either reshapes the statehood dynamic to their own ends, or rejects it in favour of an alternative programme that is credible, They are looking for new leadership carefully planned and marshals power based more on collective systems than effectively. Hope will not be enough. on any one individual. This year’s elections and deals will determine the Israeli government figures expect shape of those systems, and look set to disengagement will relieve daily bring Hamas and Tanzim leaders into friction and international pressure. national politics. But the ground rules Close monitoring of developments in and aims of future cooperation are yet the territories can continue and strong to be formulated. Powerfully military responses to acts of terror will entrenched interests are resisting be easier. They are considering the change. There is no consensus as to value of a recognised end of who really speaks for Palestine, no occupation over territories from which structure that gathers the range of they withdraw, and of liberating constituencies and can claim a themselves from the occupier’s legitimate mandate. President Abbas responsibilities. Some see that the must broker deal after multifaceted more they concede, the more viable a deal. PSPB will appear, and the less leverage the Palestinians will retain. With limited freedom of action, Others hope Palestinians will look east Palestinians are challenged and south, to regional “solutions” simultaneously to improve their involving neighbouring Arab states. strangled daily life, to fight for linkages to the outside world, to take But as one Palestinian participant responsibility for territories that will be asked, “Who is on the other side of vacated, re-establish public order and Israel’s wall?” The future political ensure that funds are put to good use. dynamics of Palestinian society have While in the throes of this internal been insufficiently addressed, beyond transition, they have to formulate a the bogeyman of a “Hamas-stan” in response to disengagement without Gaza. accepting its logic. The steadfast demand for swift negotiations on a DILEMMAS OF permanent status agreement is in PALESTINIAN TRANSITION danger of being overtaken by events. Every source of opportunity – the The Palestinians find themselves on roadmap, disengagement, statehood – the horns of several dilemmas also presents a threat. The appearance simultaneously. After Arafat’s death of paralysis is no accident. and four years of intifada, their national institutions are in tatters.

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Abu Mazen’s internal strategy has two interim, not least on Fatah renewing its wings. On the one hand, he has candidate list; the ruling faction may negotiated a “calm”, is consolidating split if it fails to hold primaries or its control of the security services and long-overdue conference. Should Fatah reintegrating militants. On the other and the Islamists differ, independents hand, he has rejected demands that he may hold the balance. dismantle Hamas in favour of drawing the Islamists into a political process, Palestinian participants made it clear hoping this will accelerate their that an interim arrangement cannot end pragmatic evolution and limit their the conflict, and that under such growth. Meanwhile they may provide circumstances a “third intifada” is leverage over sclerotic elements in inevitable. When it comes to its Fatah. Abu Mazen’s wager is that character, there are however several “new dynamics” after disengagement possibilities. Some argued the will lead to changes in Israel and the likelihood of renewed and intensified US and unfreeze the political process. guerrilla and terrorist actions in the Yet there is as yet little sign of this, wake of disengagement, led by a and principals have not begun the chaotic constellation of militants. choreography that would make it Others suggested that the next intifada possible. His declaration that a final may involve the Israeli Arab status deal will be submitted to constituency, or even draw on the referendum provides a firm basis for largely non-violent strategies of the legitimacy, and protects him from the Lebanese and Ukrainian uprisings and suspicion of secret deals. But to the work of local committees along the survive more than a few months path of the security barrier. While beyond the legislative elections, he focusing on inter-factional agreements, needs to construct a broad coalition of state-building and a horizon for support, to improve daily life and to negotiations, Abu Mazen has clearly lay new foundations for hope. failed thus far to develop an effective programme of actions that can engage Hamas, like Islamists elsewhere in the the Palestinian street and draw region, has taken a strategic decision to adherents away from the path of convert its popularity into electoral violence. Keeping quiet is no support, securing the protections of alternative. political legitimacy and reaping its rewards. It aims to earn the respect of Indefinite postponement of elections its enemy and combine paramilitary would certainly lead to a collapse of capacity with a political role. This shift the calm. A new Palestinian legislature challenges the international community will provide a vital anchor of to strike a balance between opening legitimacy, requiring broader channels of engagement and setting complements. “Who represents us and conditions for recognition. Participants what are our borders?” are two basic agreed it opens the possibility of questions. In the coming months, further evolution. They expressed Palestinian society risks further different views on whether Fatah or the fragmentation unless its leaders start to Islamic factions will emerge with more formulate a new consensus on national legislators. This will depend strategy and win concrete substantially on what happens in the achievements. International parties

The Oxford Roundtable Report, 2005 9 The Oxford Roundtable on Obstacles to a Viable Peace in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict could help with diplomatic and far only to declarations and a few extra practical assistance. Time is pressing, management tools. The transformative and not only because the calm is effect on the wider regional challenge fragile. As facts on the ground are of a serious approach to resolving this consolidated in the West Bank, the conflict has not yet been recognised. logic of disengagement may foreclose Attempts to deliver a settlement freeze rather than foster a viable Palestinian have themselves been frozen. state. The possibility grows that Coordinating missions such as that of Palestinians will exchange the goal of General Ward need to go beyond two states for the dream of one – facilitating disengagement and challenging Israel’s Jewish and adjusting Palestinian security democratic foundations, and perhaps structures to help drive progress after moving a peace settlement forever out disengagement. Financial support is of reach. vital, but will have transitory impact without movement on the diplomatic front.

While the US holds this circumscribed lead, the Quartet is left on the sidelines, risking irrelevance. James Wolfensohn’s mission is focused narrowly on the social and economic agenda, and while this includes vital issues such as borders (which could be run with international guarantees), it is

precisely here that Israel is dragging its

feet. Some participants even thought INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES the Quartet should be dissolved,

freeing the EU and others to take a Participants cast a pessimistic eye over more independent stance; others that it the role of the international community should be strengthened with a political in recent times. Third party role on the ground, gathering in the involvement is presently limited to Ward and Wolfensohn missions. near-term conflict management and conducted on the level of declarations, Europe has many more tools at its tactics and palliatives. A co-ordinated disposal than it is currently using, and strategy to help the parties move could use human rights and other toward final status is notable by its conditionality in existing EU absence. The roadmap remains a dead agreements as a lever with Israel. letter. The implications of a Palestinian Multilateral frameworks, in particular mini-state have received insufficient closer association with and ultimately attention from the international membership of NATO, could be community. offered as carrots. The EU could start

unilaterally to deepen linkages with The US continues to monopolise the and support for the Palestinians. lead, and according to some has begun Likewise, there is very little in the way to recognise the strategic importance of of strategic and sustained Palestinian- the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Arab coordination at present. Despite broader region. But that translates so

The Oxford Roundtable Report, 2005 10 The Oxford Roundtable on Obstacles to a Viable Peace in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict concerns about street radicalisation, the dialogues with decision-makers and Arab League could follow through on policy-shapers. its Saudi Initiative with a bold public diplomacy campaign. 1 A fresh Palestinian national strategy

International involvement on “day If the Palestinians are to make progress after disengagement” issues, such as toward their national aspirations, they the clarification of parameters for final need to take the initiative with a bold status, have been constrained partly by strategy of their own – something US concerns that disengagement which in recent years has seldom been would be derailed. But to regain the apparent. Political re-alignments will initiative after this interregnum, shape its direction, and a national international parties need to develop dialogue could help root it in society. It packages of significant political and may throw up a need for new diplomatic steps to be implemented in institutions, inside and outside the a wave after disengagement, deciding territories. where to accelerate unilateral steps, and where to enforce a return to Palestinians are yet to explore the diplomacy. The latter course might be advantages they themselves could pursued through an international draw from unilateral actions or those conference, or by establishing final coordinated with members of the status parameters and inviting the international community (including the peoples on both sides to decide. EU, the US, the Arab League and the UN General Assembly). Could they reframe the dynamics of the “state with CREATIVE IDEAS provisional borders” concept in their TOWARD VIABLE PEACE own interest? A fresh declaration of independence, better coordinated with Confronting these realities, “What can General Assembly allies and based on we do?” is the question every party 1967 lines including East Jerusalem, should be asking themselves. The was mooted as one possible approach. roundtable focused not on the narrow It may be that Fatah and Hamas could question of making disengagement find consensus on a short to medium- work, but on making progress toward a term programme aimed at achieving viable peace. Given the immediate the goal of the 1967 lines, and context, the best response to the parameters for an end to this territorial parallel dynamics emerging may be a dimension of the conflict. Another suite of distinct actions by Israelis, strategy might be to contain Palestinians, Arabs, the EU, the US disengagement by defining it as just a and the wider international community, “third Israeli redeployment”, or to each contributing a positive shock to coordinate to reject an unviable state the system. Actions could be calibrated just as the internal settlement in to lay the ground for one another, with Rhodesia was rejected by the UN, and a broader transformative effect. The accelerate a comprehensive agreement. roundtable did no more than begin to More radical options include reframing explore how they might coalesce. the national goals. Participants agreed to develop ideas further, and to carry them into

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A review of means is now essential. To parties could help facilitate multi- the old binary of shooting and/or factional Palestinian dialogue to negotiating, strategies of nation- develop internal and external building, non-violent conflict and coordination, maintain security and public diplomacy must be added. The establish common agreements. street and Palestinians at large will not go back to being quiet. Now is the time Ideas were also exchanged about to construct practical alternatives to an broadening the range and armed third intifada. representativeness of Palestinians and Israelis participating in back-channel 2 Developing Israeli alternatives talks. This could in the longer term set a template for a more inclusive peace Beyond old divisions between doves process, both at the level of Israeli and and hawks or left and right, Israelis Palestinian civil society and between who want to make more leaders of all the parties concerned. comprehensive progress beyond disengagement face a core dilemma 4 Campaigning international diplomacy and twin challenges of organisation and leadership. The dilemma is Rather than remaining paralysed in the whether they should work to accelerate wake of any disengagement, and maximise steps taken unilaterally, international actors could take and what alternatives they might advantage of the moment to campaign frame. Chairmanship primaries in the for further steps. A “Mega-Sadat” Labour party and disengagement may strategy could involve several Arab establish a context in which such leaders visiting Jerusalem and conversations can be created in a way Ramallah simultaneously. Those which relates more to the landscape of concerned could reach out a hand of the future than that of the past. Arab peace to the Israeli people and make a and Palestinian public diplomacy could time-limited offer of a comprehensive help provide openings, but this is first peace, establishing costs for delay and foremost a task for Israelis. while making clear that the alternative Questions were aired about involving is ongoing conflict. They could be Israeli Arabs more closely, opening reinforced by a US presidential visit or channels to Hamas (about which the civilian diplomacy, and by signals that Israeli public remains largely a Lebanese “Martyrs’ Square” strategy uninformed, beyond its fear of terror will pay dividends. The Quartet could acts), strengthening Palestinian convene an international conference authorities as partners, and tackling moving onto final status issues, rather settlements in the West Bank. than a PSPB. Some participants talked about imposing parameters for a 3 Fostering multi-party dialogue solution and demanding a referendum on each side. The EU and other parties The period up to and beyond the could apply conditionality to demand Palestinian elections is likely to be further progress on the West Bank, as volatile, a situation only made more well as providing practical help to tense by expected power shifts. In the build Palestinian capacity and apolitical context of election formulating a package of incentives monitoring missions, international including closer association with or

The Oxford Roundtable Report, 2005 12 The Oxford Roundtable on Obstacles to a Viable Peace in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict membership in multilateral institutions status to be creatively reframed. They such as NATO. pointed to a variety of reasons: demographics, solidifying facts on the A nuanced international response to ground, public opinion and the rise of Hamas is important. institutional capacity, and fresh ideas. Incentives and norms (for instance It was observed that increasing the around the charter and the use of territory contemplated for land swaps violence) could be established around might broaden the constituencies for a its turn to politics. Assisting the deal. One participant proposed that the renewal of Fatah and other camps, for Palestinian Authority openly invite instance through support for primaries settlers to remain behind with full and grassroots leadership as well as for rights as citizens under Palestinian law. Abu Mazen, will be better than Another suggested residency but not bolstering an exhausted system. It citizenship rights both for refugees would help if many more Palestinian (enabling many to return to Israel prisoners were to be released, in without threatening its Jewish particular Marwan Barghouti and other majority) and for settlers in Palestine. Fatah cadres, and international Ideas of a phased process were pressure could give Israel an alibi for controversial. such a step. One participant suggested international policy could support Palestinian unity, rather than demanding internecine strife.

5 Civil society and public diplomacy

A range of ideas were shared in this area, from Palestinians speaking directly to the Israeli people on primetime television to a large-scale programme of non-violent civilian action on the part of Palestinians, Israelis and internationals, potentially focused around the security barrier, The most radical idea here was for the Jerusalem and the E1 corridor, the UN Security Council or the US to settlements and other “final status” propose a settlement based on the 1967 flashpoints. A web of civil society lines with one-to-one swaps, enabling networks might help mobilise such the end of the territorial dimension of action, even send forth a thousand joint the conflict to be recognised. It was Israeli-Palestinian speaking teams. suggested that a territorial settlement might help build broader regional 6 Reframing permanent status issues dynamics, for instance through agreements on water or energy, While most participants viewed the making other issues easier to resolve. concepts developed up to and beyond Questions remained about the Taba as the benchmark for a final conditions of viable peace, and status agreement, a number suggested whether a total end of conflict is that it may be time for permanent possible or essential.

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PARTICIPANTS

Ahmed Badawi was born 1967, Cairo, Egypt. Since 2001, Research Associate, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, within the project “Elite Change in the Arab World”, particular focus, elite change in Palestine. Project expired in April 2004, but Badawi continues to be hosted by SWP while writing his PhD thesis.

Naomi Chazan is professor of political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Head of the School of Society and Politics at the Academic College of Tel-Aviv-Yaffo. Served three terms as member of the Knesset (1992-2003). She was Deputy Speaker of the Knesset and a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defence committee of the Knesset.

Alistair Crooke is Director of Conflicts Forum; formerly adviser to European Union High Representative, Javier Solana. Staff member of the Mitchell fact finding committee; facilitated the various ceasefires in the Palestinian ambit 2001-3; mediator in the Church of Nativity negotiations leading to the ending of the siege; facilitated the “Hudna” of June 2003 declared by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and representatives of Marwan Barghouti.

Bassem Eid is currently Director of PHRMG. Previously, Senior Field Researcher at B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories; Journalist with Kol Ha’ir, a Jerusalem weekly newspaper; and Consultant with Tira Social Aid Centre. Recent publications include, Intra'fada " The Chaos of the Weapons" in the Palestinian Autonomies Areas.

Gidi Grinstein is founder and President of The Re'ut Institute – a policy team working to provide real-time strategic insights to the Government of Israel. He served in the Office and then in the Bureau of PM Barak as the Secretary and coordinator of the Negotiation Team of the Government of Israel to the Permanent Status negotiations between Israel and the PLO (1999-2001).

Shawki Khatib is currently the Head of the National Committee for Arab Local Councils, and Head of High Committee for Arab Citizens in Israel. He is also Mayor of the Yafa Council since 1990. He practiced as a civil engineer from 1979 to 1990.

Shira Herzog is a writer and commentator on Middle East affairs with a particular emphasis on Israeli politics and society. She is a columnist with the Canadian national daily, The Globe and Mail, and an analyst on radio and television. She co-hosts the weekly television program, Israel Today. Shira is currently writing a book on civil-society-based relations among Israelis and Palestinians in the years 1994-2004.

Ahmad Samih Khalidi has written widely in English and Arabic on Mideast political and strategic developments over the last three decades, and has served as formal and informal advisor to the PA/PLO since the Madrid peace process. He is currently Senior Associate Member of St Antony's College, Oxford. His latest publication is A Framework for a Palestinian National Security Doctrine (Chatham House 2005) co-authored with Hussein Agha

Tony Klug is an international relations specialist and Middle East commentator for past 30 years. Has served as member of the ‘New Outlook’ Editorial Board, co-chair of the Council for Jewish-Palestinian Dialogue, trustee of the International Centre for Peace in the Middle East and Head of International Development at Amnesty International. Currently, is vice chair of the Arab-Jewish Forum (UK).

Stephanie Koury served as a legal adviser with the Negotiations Support Unit for the Palestinian negotiation team, where she was responsible for the files on settlements, the wall, and international humanitarian law. She also served as part of Palestine’s delegation to the ICJ on the

The Oxford Roundtable Report, 2005 14 The Oxford Roundtable on Obstacles to a Viable Peace in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict legal consequences of Israel’s construction of a wall in occupied territory. Her areas of focus include the role of third states and actors in the peace process and international humanitarian law.

Hanna Siniora was PNC Member nominated by the PLO in 1985 to represent Palestine, met George Schultz U.S. Secretary of State. The Process of Recognition of the PLO. Member of the Palestinian Delegation to the Madrid Conference. Peace Activist, Journalist by trade, at the moment Co-Director of Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI).

Jonathan Steele has worked on The Guardian for forty years. He was Washington Bureau Chief, Foreign News Editor, Chief Foreign Correspondent, and Moscow Bureau Chief at the height of perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union. He has covered wars and crises in Central America, southern , Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East.

Nadim Shehadi is Director of the Centre for Lebanese Studies, an independent academic research institution affiliated to the Middle East Centre at St Antony’s College, Oxford. He is also Acting Head of the Middle East Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House).

Paul Rogers is professor of Peace Studies since 1992; International Security Consultant to the Oxford Research Group since 2002; International Security correspondent for OpenDemocracy.net; author and editor of 19 books, including Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto, 2002).

Avi Shlaim is a Fellow of St Antony's College and a Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford. His books include Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (1988); The Politics of Partition (1990 and 1998); War and Peace in the Middle East: A Concise History (1995); and The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (2000).

Ofer Zalzberg is the co-founder and co-chairman of the Young Israeli Forum for Cooperation, an Israeli NGO that promotes dialogue and understanding between Israelis and Palestinians. He also works as the Israeli representative of the American think-tank/lobby group the Jewish Peace Lobby. He was the editor of the historic academic journal Hayo Haya. He lives in Jerusalem

John Sloboda is Executive Director of Oxford Research Group. He is also Professor of Psychology at the University of Keele. He has been active in human security initiatives for two decades. He co-founded the website www.iraqbodycount.net which quickly became a key source of information about civilian casualties for the media and NGOs worldwide during the Iraq war and its aftermath. .

Gabrielle Rifkind is the founder and Process Director of the Middle East Policy Initiative Forum (MEPIF), and the Human Security Consultant to Oxford Research Group. She has initiated and facilitated a number of Track II initiatives, including a recent Human Security meeting in Amman with Prince Hassan bin Talal, and is currently working with NATO on organizing a roundtable on links between the military and the human security agenda.

Paul Hilder is policy director of the Middle East Policy Initiative Forum, a project director at the Young Foundation and a campaign director with Waging Peace. A founding director of the global debate network openDemocracy.net, he edited The Democratic Papers (2004) and co-edited Peace Fire (2002).

The Oxford Roundtable Report, 2005 15 The Oxford Roundtable on Obstacles to a Viable Peace in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Oxford Research Group (ORG) combines rigorous research into international security and nuclear decisions with an understanding of the people who make those decisions. Since ORG's foundation in 1982, we have contacted key decision-makers worldwide and developed a personal dialogue with them on global security issues. We bring together government officials, senior military officers and diplomats with nuclear physicists, independent defence analysts and non-governmental organisation representatives to debate steps towards building a more secure world.

The Middle East Policy Initiative Forum initially came together in June 2002 to discuss the deteriorating situation in the Middle East and the contribution third parties could offer. The Forum includes several prominent and highly respected figures, and a range of professional expertise: Middle East experts, conflict resolution specialists, strategic thinkers, policy experts, politicians, academics and those with psychological knowledge, all of whom have a special interest in the region. In early 2003, it promoted a proposal for an international administration – a “protectorate” based on Palestinian consent – for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. MEPIF advocates for more active and constructive international engagement to bring about a fair and viable peace.

Contact: Gabrielle Rifkind Tel: +44 (0) 207 794 4414 Email: [email protected]

Paul Hilder Tel: +44 (0) 787 942 4547 Email: [email protected]

The Oxford Roundtable Report, 2005 16