MASTER'S THESIS M-1182
MATHURIN, Victor George A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF VIETNAM WAR NEWS IN THE TIMES OF LONDON, USING THE NEW YORK TIMES CONTENT AS A BASIS FOR COMPARISON.
The American University, M.A., 1967 Journalism
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan A COiiTBU AUALISIS OF VIETNAM WAR NEWS IN THE TIKES OF LOimON. USING Tffilfatf IQRK TIMES CONTBiT ^ A BASIS~g^ COMPARISON
Victor G. Mathurin
Submitted to the
Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
of the American Univeraity
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
Kaster of Arts
Signature of Committee:
Chairman :
Dean of the College
Date; / Z / Date;,
AMERICAN u:;;vt!;3iiY 1967 m y : s mi The American University Washington, D. C. TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. THE PROBLa<...... 1
II. 3ACK}R0U:{D ...... 4
The Vietnam War ...... 4
The London Times ...... 9
The Hev York Times ...... 10
III. M E T H O D ...... 12
S a m p l i n g ...... 12
Measurement...... 13
War Direction...... 18
Opinion Direction ...... 22
IV. MEASURED DATA ...... 25
Total Number and S p a c e ...... 26
Locations ...... 30
Headlines ...... 33
Mews Sources ...... 3&
Datelines...... 37
V. DIRECTIOMAL D A T A ...... 39
S t r e n g t h ...... 39
M o r a l i t y ...... 41
Sources and S t r e n g t h ...... 43
Sources and Mtorality ...... 44
Datelines and Strength ...... 45
Datelines and M o r a l i t y ...... 46 ill
CHAPTER PAGE
Letters . 4?
Other C-plnion...... ^
VI. coNCiasicNS...... 51
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 56 LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
I. Mmaber :f Items snd Total Space 26
II. Lccations ...... 32
III. Mews Be.adlin.a S i t e s ...... 34
IV. Total Mews S o u r c e s ...... 36
V. Datelines ...... 38
VI. Favorable;^ StreTigth ...... 40
vn, ritfa'Tcracle/yiorality ...... 42
Vni. So’oroes— Fare rable/strength 44
IX, So'zroe-s— Itf arorable/Morality ...... 45
X. Dateli.-. es— F ai^r&ble/Strength...... 46
XI. Dateli-T.es— TcifsTorable/Morality...... 4?
XII. Let tars t: tr.e Editor— London...... 48
X m . aditori.5l s.— L o n d o n ...... 49 CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
The war in Vietnam is asserting a strong influence upon world leaderships and peoples. Significant changes in inter relationships between governments have occurred during, and in no small part because of, this growing war. The decisions of freely- elected governments should represent the opinions of the governed.
The newspaper holds a unique position in this relationship: It in part forms and in part reflects these opinions.
Traditionally, our closest ally has been Great Britain. On the limited scale allowed by a study of this kind, data was assimi lated to help answer the following questions about that country.
How are its people forming their opinions about the role of the
United States in Vietnam? What are they reading about the progress of the war? What are newspapers telling them about the means— fair or foul--by which each side is progressing? Which faction is being presented as the aggressor and which the defender? How much are they being told? Is the significance of the conflict being presented in proper perspective?
The questions were considered with relation to a single
British newspaper and its readership. Selection of The Times of
London was not an arbitrary one. Wilbur Schramm summarizes the reasons. The Times is not large, but "it is still the prestige paper of Great Britain.”^ And it has, through the years, "over 2 and over again spoken as the voice of the British Government,"
It has a "disregard of the popular news writing and feature content 3 which are supposed to build circulation," "The national culture 4 always shines through the day’s news," Denis notes that "editor
ially, it is generally reckoned to support the government of the
day."^ The same source says that it is "the record . • . straight,
complete, unaidoiguous."^
With such credits, it would be difficult to choose another
British newspaper. Its relationship with the government gives
added meaning to the findings. Its motto, "For Top People,"
suggests that its readership is more influential (if not politi cally, at least socially) than its number implies. And this
readership— more than the government or the newspaper— is the
primary concern of the study,
A basis for comparison was needed in this study, and the
characteristics of the New York Times were found to be similar to
those of London's Times. The two newspapers play similar roles in
their societies, and enjoy conçarable national and international
^Wilbur L. Sohramn, One Day in the World's Press (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959% p. 12§, 2 3 4 Ibid. Ibid, Ibid., p. 130. 5 Thomas Denis, Challenge in Fleet Street (London: Truth Publishing Conç>any Limited, 1957TT p. 49. 6 Ibid. 3 reputations. The New York Times holds itself above the popular press in America, as the London Times does in Britain. And since comparably intelligent readerships are presumably involved, there should be no great problem of different meanings being derived from newspaper content— a situation which might exist if a reader ship were diversified in education, background, etc.
To give meaning to London's coverage of the Vietnam war, knowledge of the coverage given by a second newspaper was necessary.
Without such a basis for comparison, there would be no means of determining whether London's coverage was representative of fact or idiether a great deal of news selectivity was involved, A prob lem, of course, is the possibility that the newspaper being used for the comparison would itself show partiality, and therefore distort the results of the analysis. If partialities were in the same direction, one might decide that both newspapers were accurately presenting the situation to the public— particularly since both papers pride themselves on their reputations for fair ness. However, no such judgment need be made on the basis of this study, and a totally different question has to be answered. Find ings have shown the London and New York Times to be in substantial disagreement about all aspects of the war. CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
The Vietnam War. One of the fundamental resources of the
Ohited States in all its wars— from the Revolution to Korea— has been the rightness of its cause, fortified by the determination of its people. Bernard Fall, considered to be one of the few real authorities on the war in Vietnam during the period of this study, considers this latest American entanglement "second only to the mishandling of the whole China problem as one of the single most 7 incredible failures of American foreign policy." Though most
Americans probably do not go to this extreme, this war is not one
^djich can rely on a strong sense of nationalism to see it through.
The war is unique in other ways— also detrimental to the possibil ity of U. S. success. It is being fought in thick jungles, marshes, swanks, and rice fields; and the enemy cannot be readily identified. In fact, he looks like a farmer when he's not fighting, and like the allied South Vietnamese vhen he is. His weapons are spikes in the brush, mines along the jun^e trails, fire bombs in the city, and fear in the countryside. Into this atmosphere, American soldiers are sent— from a country idiere young men are burning draft cards, picketing the White House, and calling
for an end to the "unjust" war.
^Bernard B. Fall, Viêt-Nam Witoess. 1953-66 (New York* Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, I9 66), p. ±37. 5
Today's Vietnam conflict evolved from the Prench-Indo China war which began December 19» 1946, By 1949» the conflict involved
150,000 French and allied Vietnamese, and nearly 250,000 Viet Minh guerrillas and their Vietnamese allies. The United States main tained an interest in this war as part of its overall policy of
Communist containment in Asia, and contributed materially to the
French offensive. However, fighting the eneny on its own unusual terms, with inadequate forces and weapons, the French were losing the battle, and the massive retaliation sought from the Ohited
States never came, America became occupied with its own war in
Korea, and idien the decisive battle at Diwi Bien Phu (begun with a
French paratroop landing on November 20, 1953) made the end of
French hopes obvious, U. S. reluctance to engage in a second offensive— particularly one involving a colonial power— settled the outcome. The First Indo China War cost the French ten billion dollars (and the U. S. 1.1 billion) and 172,000 dead or missing.
The French disaster was to become a constant source of camparlson for America's fight against the same enemy.
Hostilities ended July 21» 1954’» with the French and the
South in a poor position for negotiations; North Vietnam was given control above the seventeenth parallel» though South Vietnam vigorously fou^t partition. Hovjever, South Vietnam retained at least half the population, and its 65,000 square miles exceeded the 62,000 square miles taken by the North. Moreover, the South is Vietnam's rice botdL; and while the North began to rebuild. 6 the South, having suffered little war damage, had no such task ahead.
The Geneva agreement had been a military one, banning rein forcements (increases above replacement of equipment already in the country), the establishment of military bases, and the use of blockades. A provision for general elections was included. How ever, South Vietnam's Premier Diem took the position that a foreign power (the French) had spoken for his government at Geneva, and that he was not bound to such an agreement, (it has been estimated that if elections had been held in 1956, as scheduled, the result would have been a peaceful takeover by Ho Chi Minh and 8, Communism. )
At the war's end, 5-6,000 elite Viet Minh guerrillas went underground in the South rather than moving to the North, and with the passing of the election deadline, assassinations began in the villages.
The U. S. backed South Vietnam's claims that the North had breached treaty provisions by increasing troops and equipment
(from seven to twenty divisions by April, 1956), and closely watched Communist violence grow. In 1959-60, the State Department called the killings "outside" aggression. Fall disagrees, claim ing that the aggressors were internal— the stay-behind Communist 9 guerrillas. When the conflict became a military challenge to the
8 Ibid., p. 77. ^Ibld., p. 78. 7
U. s. in 1961, the Second Indo China War had been underway five years.
In November, 1962, Ho Chi Minh conceded that Ü. S. strength was superior to that of the French, euid estimated that it would take ten years to defeat these Westerners. At that time his con fidence might have seemed justified. The solidarity of his nation was based on its being the second oldest "people's democracy," with 18.2 million people giving him nearly unanimous support. By contrast, the South was infested with dissent; Diem promised reforms and never provided them; powerful factions (e.g., religious groups) were being allowed no political power.
The loss of village officials through assassination reached
4,000 a year in 196O-61, and the U. S. sent advisors to help improve South Vietnam's military efforts. As violence increased, so did U. S. commitments. Premier Diem was assassinated on
November 2 , 1963, and U. S. support of that overthrow has now been 10 clearly established. All successive regimes suffered from the taint of the Diem r e g i m e , a n d the stability of South Vietnamese politics remains second only to the fight against the Communists among America's Vietnam goals.
Fall was convinced that there could be no military solution to this war. Only recently (perhaps late 1966), in his frequent
^°Ibid., p. 285. ^^Ibid., p. 286. 8 front line research, did he become so impressed with American military resources that he changed his mind on this point. How ever, his description of the enemy msikes one feel that there could be little chance of success for the young American soldier or
Marine î
The VC is almost never seen close up; he leads a shadowy existence in deep forests and grottos, displays no unit insignia even when he wears a uniform, carries no dog tags by which to identify him, manages to bury his weapons before he is found dead on the battle field . . . .12
However, the United States is applying power that this enemy has never known. In 1965 the U. S. and South Vietnam held a 5:1 manpower lead over the Viet Cong; and B-52s capable of carrying
500 tons of bombs per 30-plane assault delivered more bomb tonnage
in one day— September 24, 1965--than did the whole French Air Force during the fifty-six days of battle at Dien Bien Phu. Still, the enemy fights on and refuses to negotiate on other than its own
rigid conditions. Howard K. Smith perhaps correctly evaluated the
situation when he said that the war "in the long perspective of future time will prove to have been one of America's greatest II l4 experiences.
During the course of this study, the following statistics were announced by the U. S. Government. In August, 1966, there
^^Ibid., p. 296. ^^Ibid., p. 304.
^^Howard K. Smith, ABC Scope: The Vietnam War (Video Tele cast, July 16, 1966). 9 were 282,000 enemy in the South, 286,000 U. S. troops, and 29,000 allies (mostly Korean). And Fall noted that back in I965, "what the Secretary of State has recently called a 'dirty little war' may already have teiken close to a half-million victims. Since that time this number has grown rapidly, and the victims of the war have not all been soldiers. One recent epitaph read this way:
"Died. Bernard B. Fall, 40, historian and Viet Nam specialist, when he stepped on a Viet Cong booby trap, l4 miles northwest of
Hue, South Vietnam.
The London Times. Great Britain claims one of the world's highest newspaper readerships, and with a population of 52,383,000
(1964) had a circulation of 26,700,000. Each year, 752,700 metric tons of newsprint are produced in Britain. Reuter's, one of the largest, and the second oldest of the world's news agencies, is headquartered in London.
Britain's "quality" newspapers are considered to be the
Times, the Daily Telegraph, and the Manchester Guardian.
Merrill, too, refers to the Times as a "prestige" p a p e r , a n d describes it as the "journal of Britain's governing circles; it is
cit., p. 312.
^^"Milestones," Time, 89:96, March 3; 1967» 17 John C. Merrill, A Handbook of Foreign Press (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1959T, p. ?2 .
^^Ibid., p. 75. 10 written and edited for thinkers and opinion leaders--for such people as civil ser/ants, teachers, scientists, journalists, economists, clergymen and labor officials.
The Times was fcanied in 1785 by John Walter as the Daily
Universal Register, and three years later became the Times. It reached a peak in the aid-lyth Century when it was known as the
"Thunderer" under the editorship of John Delane. Since that time it has seen economic si-umps and has reached other prestigeous peaks.
The last circulation figure given before the start of the sample period for this study vas 257,722; at the end of the sample period, circulation had risen to approximately 206,000. This ten percent rise was due in no small part to the fact that the news paper began "putting news instead of agony ads on page one."^*^
The New York Times. When a panel of twenty-six inter national communications professors made their choices of the top ten "quality" dailies in the world, the Times of London was second pi to only one--the New York Times■
The first copy of New York’s Times was published on
September I8, I851, and required that the purchaser be willing to
^^Ibid., p. 78. pQ "The Press," Time, 58:6l, October 7, 1966.
^^John C. Merrill, "U. S. Panel Names World’s Ten Leading 'Quality' Dailies," Journalism Quarterly, 41 :568-572, Autumn, 1964. 11 pay a penny for its conter, :s. Since that day this newspaper has built a reputation for rel .a'cility, honesty, and integrity which, as the aforementioned stui • tcinted out, is unsurpassed throughout the world.
The New York Times Lees net rank among America’s largest newspapers, but latest cir :niation figures--635,619 daily (1966)— show it to be consideraiiy than London's Times, even in proportion to popularicn.
U. S. circulation ( .965 ) totals 60,357,563, and has not kept pace with the grcving tctdation in the past several years.
In 1964, there were l.'^oô Ladies in the United States, and the trend during and since tha ; tericd has been toward fewer and larger papers. Two of the VC rid's largest news agencies--the
Associated Press and 'Jnite L Press International--are headquartered in New York City. CHAPTER III
i-iEIHOD
To establish the m'ethds through which this evaluation could best be made, t.tree questions had to be answered: (l) What issues of the two r.evstaters should be used? (2) What should be measured in each issue? ':) By what means should directional information be determitei? Most answers are given in this chapter; a few of the ::cir..g rules are noted with the findings, where they may be mere use: d .
Sampling. Choi :e :: the sample period was simplified by the fact that on Mcniay. >i=y 1 , 1966, newsprint replaced advertis ing on the front page of the London Times. To avoid a sample which would include both : omets, the issue of that date was considered to he the earliest vnich could be used. It was, in fact, 'ultimately oho se n a.s one first sample issue. Timeliness and the lower intensity of the war were seen as adequate reasons for eliminating the period before .Wiay 2 . A period of approximately six months from which to oh on se the sample remained. In view of the single news category 'the Vietnam conflict), the number and types of coding categories to be used, and the frequency with which relevant material atO'earei in the London Times, sixty issues of each newspaper were 0 on si de red to be adequate. (Studies of content analysis techticue have found as few as nine issues sufficient. However, research in greater depth involving subject 13 matter which does not appear in each sampled issue requires larger numbers.) Given the available period, issues required, and types of sampling methods eliminated by these limitations, the choice was between alternate days and a continuous period.
Since the study does not meet the basic criterion recommended by pp Budd, a need to follow the flow of events, the alternate days method was chosen. The validity of this method was proven by
L a s s w e l l . I n the case of a six-day weekly, alternate days become Monday, Wednesday, Friday of the first week; Tuesday,
Thursday, Saturday of the next. Since the sampling period consumes nearly five months (roughly twelve issues per month), the first available issue--that of Monday, May 2 , 1966--was used as the first issue of the sample. The last issue was that of
Saturday, September 17, 1966. The Late London Edition of the
London Times and the Late City Edition of the New York Times were used.
Measurement. All news, opinion, headlines and illustra tions dealing directly or indirectly with the conflict in Vietnam were evaluated. Included were items concerning social, economic, diplomatic, and political activities directed toward or resulting from the war.
22 Richard W. Budd and Robert K. Thorp. ^ Introduction to Content Analysis (lowa City: State University of Iowa, 1963), P* 9»
^^Harold D. Lassvell, Nathan Leites, and Associates. Language of Politics (New York: George W. Stewart Publisher, Inc., 1949), Chapter 7 , PP- 127-152. l4
A good deal of one early research vas performed under the guideline that the internal etnflicts of South Vietnam (Buddhist uprisings, pre-election ctntroversies, etc.) should be coded only if some aspect of the war, the presence of the U. S. in Vietnam, or the Viet Cong vas rentioneô in the item. The error in this system became clearer as tore news vas read. Without the war and the United States, vithoot the conflict between North and South
Vietnamese Governments, tnere vonld probably be few such incidents--and those that occurred would not likely receive cover age by either of these tvo newspapers. The issues evaluated up to that point were re-eval,..atel, and internal conflicts were coded.
Another point arose dccring the early reading. The kinds of
Vietnam news--that vhicn was net actual war news--were not being indicated. Categories of war and not-war were not enou^. There were pleas from the "nited Fations, accusations came from Moscow and Peking, and Washington issued rebuttals. Content categories were formulated to add .tore precise meaning to the listings of number of articles, space, ar.d location. Categorization was based on the headline content unless ambiguous, in which case the text was used to clarify the ne ad. Categories are described below.
In the "War" oatesor-y is the conflict itself. It is from this group that the prit.a.r"y directional material was derived.
Battle reports from Saigon, bombing and casualty reports from
Washington, assassinations in tne villages and all such items were coded here. 15
Under "United States" were placed all non-war reports originating from the people or government of the country. Most came from Washington. War protests and anti-protest protests are in this group. The speeches of congressmen (even if made outside the country) are in this group. Items concerning the draft in general were not coded; those in which the war was mentioned were coded. Information generated by the U. S. (even the military) about the war, for example, the reorganization of its command structure, is "U. S." rather than "War." The New York Times frequently listed the names of area casualties; this text was coded under U. S. rather than war, since obviously hometown casualty listings do not impress the reader as military accomplish ments by the Communists.
The "South Vietnam" category contains the local uprisings, all material concerning Premier Ky, war-weariness in the villages, black-marketing in the streets of Saigon, etc.
Material originating from or concerning North Vietnam, China or Russia is in the "Communists" group. (Material related to other
Communist countries is under "Other." This does not mean "other"
Communists but other than the categories listed.) The Viet Cong are also included here, but it seems that the only mention of these mysterious fighters involves their role in a battle, and is listed under war.
"Prisoners" was made a separate category because consider able copy concerned the subject and it could not be logically coded l6 elsewhere. Most material discussed what would or would not, and could or could not, be done with U. S. pilots held prisoner in the
North.
Korea, Australia, and the Philippines play a role in this war. If the amount of material devoted to them in these two news papers is an indication, the role is not a significant one. In any case, "Allies" had to be mad.e a separate heading.
The "Local" category involves only the London newspapers.
It primarily concerns parliamental involvement in America's
Vietnam policy.
News from Bucharest, the United Nations, Cambodia, etc., was listed as "Other," as was any Vietnam material that could not be clearly coded elsewhere.
"Letters" were those to the editors of the London paper, and carried much of the opinion material coded. These, of course, reflect the opinions of the readers rather than those of the news paper.
"Columns, Features" is a combined coding. Whenever doubt existed in an article which might have had what was considered a news foundation, the news category rather than the opinion category was used.
"Photographs," "Maps," and "Editorial Cartoons" are separate codings. Only one editorial cartoon related to Vietnam appeared in the 120 issues.
Since London's Vietnam coverage was the main concern of the 17 study, all references to the conflict were searched out and coded,
(in the New York Times, small, isolated references were not sought.) When these references were a minor part (less than one- half) of the article, only the Vietnam paragraphs (the whole para graph, even though it might contain only one mention of Vietnam) were measured, and the total in any one article was counted as one item of Vietnam copy, placed in the "Short, Non-War News References" category. Headlines of these partial items were not measured unless they mentioned Vietnam. Many of these items involved only a single isolated reference to Vietnam. If Vietnam was the primary topic (over half the text) the whole article was measured.
Exceptions to the rule were made for coding opinion articles in the London paper; only Vietnam paragraphs were measured regard less of percentages. This was necessary because only the paragraphs relevant to Vietnam could be coded for direction, otherwise a misleading impression might result ("favorable--U. S.," might be referring to civil rights); therefore, space measurement was made only of the paragraphs in which there was direction coding. In any case, a separate accounting of the partial reference items was kept.
Where a paragraph beginning "in the war" (or something similar) was found within another type (usually U. S.) of Vietnam article, the war paragraph was coded separately, and the headline was, of course, listed only once, with the main item. However, in such an instance, sources and datelines were attached to both, so that in later war direction tables these could be compared. The 18 following were measured in all issues.
1. Total number of items (by types).
2. Total space consumed by these items (by types).
3. Locations of these items.
4. Headline data (number of columns and lines, heights, upper or lower case).
5. News sources.
6. Datelines.
War Direction. The primary objectives of direction coding were to determine what the London Times readership was being told about who was winning the war (strength) and by what means
(morality). To these ends, two lists of symbols which could be clearly coded were compiled. These were composed of terms frequently used to describe the type of war being fought in
Vietnam. Intensity of direction is indicated by the frequency of occurrence of these symbols. All news of the war per se was reviewed for the presence of these symbols. List A was used to derive favorable/strength information, and list B gave unfavorable/ morality information.
A . Favorable/Strength.
1. Bomb--verb (bombed, bombing)— By ....
2. Capture (etc.)--By ....
3. Casualty— Inflicted by . . . .
4. Damage— By ....
5. Defeat— By .... 19
6. Destroy--By ....
7 . Down (i.e., planes)— By ....
8. Kill (military)— By ....
9 . Loss— By ....
10. Overrun--By ....
11. Sink— By ....
12. Victory— By ....
13. Victorious--Who?
14. Wound (military)--verb--By ....
B. Unfavorable/Morality
1. Aggression— By ....
2. Assassination--By ....
3. Atrocity— By ....
4. Execute--By ....
5. Kill (civilians)--By ....
6. Murder--By ....
7 . Terrorism--By ....
8. Terrorist--Who?
9 . Wound (civilian)— verb--By ....
There is no neutral category. When a symbol could not be coded in accordance with this list (e.g., "no 'casualties* were recorded"), no coding was made. Also, when coding according to the list would convey an erroneous meaning (e.g., "the Viet Cong
'destroyed' voter registration cards"), no coding was made. 20
Since it is recognized that a reader is more impressed by a symbol in a headline or figure caption than by one of smaller type size in the text, an arbitrary weighting of four was assigned to symbols in headlines, three to caption symbols, and one to each text symbol.
It was originally planned that a breakdown of two-week intervals would be used to compare London and New York versions of how the war was going; however, the small amount of war news in the London Times proved inadequate for a further distribution into ten groups.
Another problem to resolve before war coding began was the treatment of comparative casualty figures. When comparative data were given, a single coding was made, based on the overriding figures. For example, "U. S. casualties heavy. Communist casual ties moderate," was coded only once, as favorable/strength--North.
"Light" casualties, when not used comparatively, were not coded, since the term could not be clearly called favorable or unfavorable in most cases.
Repetitions of the same accomplishment were not repeatedly coded. (To do so would result in meaningless figures, since the reader would know only of the one accomplishment, while symbols describing it might be used several times.) The symbol was coded only the first time it was used, whether in headline or text. For example, a headline such as "Two U. S. Plsuies Lost in North," m i ^ t be followed in the text by a repeated "Two U. S. Planes were 21
brou^t down . . . , " and later, "The two downed planes were on a mission . . . and so on. All but the first mention was ignored.
Illustration captions were made independent of news.
Although the illustrations usually supported news items, it was not assumed that the reader saw news and illustrations as being
united. An illustration often receives attention that a news
story does not. Therefore, any symbol (e.g., "X indicates the
location where two U. S. planes were lost") in a caption was coded
(only once, of course).
In coding the subject of a symbol reference, four groups were considered: (l) The United States, (2) North Vietnam and
the Viet Cong, (3) South Vietnam, and (4) the Allies. It is
suspected that most readers, consciously or otherwise, look at all material in terms of U. S. vs. Communists. However, the question
of what part the South was being given credit (or criticism) for was considered significant. Also, coverage given the allied powers was of interest, and it was thought that Great Britain's close ties with Australia mi^t have affected the London paper's coverage in
this area. In each group, specific reference titles were not
considered necessary; if "Cong" or "the Aussies" (these are hypo
thetical) were the subjects of symbols, coding in the appropriate
category was made.
Often, the newspapers give total figures (e.g., casualties)
independently or as a supplement to a single figure. For example,
"Seventeen Communists were killed yesterday; this brings the total 22
killed to 108 in this operation," or "Seventy-six Communist troops were killed last week." Although it is not indicated by whom the
killings were made, coding was given to U. S., and a tabulation of the number of totals incorporated innc one overall figures was made.
Other qualifications were necessary. Grammatically, a
single symbol could be used to describe multiple accomplishments.
For example, "U. S. planes destroyed owo oil fields and three
railroad bridges." In such a case, two "favorable— U. S." codings were made even though only one symbol was used.
A claim of victory by the North was coded equally with a
claim from Washington. Denials were not considered.
Opinion Direction. Altho-ugh London's concept of the war's progress was the primary objective of direction coding, opinion could not be overlooked. Conceivably, the opinion expressed in
editorials, columns, and letters could change the impressions the
reader had received from a reading of the news. If the U. S. was
nobly and courageously overpowering the Communists on page one, and the editorial page explained that America was engaged in a war
of aggression which it could net possibly win, the war coding would not have told us what vs wanted to know. To be sure that
such a situation did not exist, an evaluation of opinion direction
in the London Times was made. It was correctly suspected that
little editorial space would 'oe given over to Vietnam. Public
feedback, through letters to the editor, outweighed the opinion 23 of the editors, and was evaluated separately.
Although New York's comparative data was needed to give meaning to London's war coding, opinion can stand alone. Favorable or unfavorable United States coding needs no comparison. There fore, no effort was made to establish the course of opinion in the
New York Times.
The evaluation of opinion cannot produce conclusions that are as firm as those which show who wounded whom, but for the purpose stated here it should be adequate. Three categories proved 24 valid by Lasswell were used. These are, simply, basically favorable, basically unfavorable, and neutral (balanced favorable/ unfavorable or no direction) . Lasswell established the validity of these categories after working with qualified and unqualified positives and negatives, and balanced and nondirectional symbols, in various combinations. Key symbols were North Vietnamese and
Viet Cong (with all symbols clearly conveying the same meaning, such as Hanoi, Communists, etc.); United States and its related symbols (e.g., Washington, LBj); South Vietnam (i.e., the govern ment and its policies, the troops, not the people) and its associated symbols; and the Allies. Pronouns, if abundantly clear and not merely incidental to the statement, were also coded. 25 In a later study Lasswell provided rules for direction
pii Ibid., p. 106.
^^Harold D. Lasswell and Associates, "The Politically Significant Content of the Press: Coding Procedures," Journalism 24 coding. The use of pronouns (above) vas one of these. Others were also used in this study, "in sentences where pure question ing is done, the sentence is codable only in terms of neutral references."Where both parts of an either-or sentence represent pure conditional, or pure contingency, code neutral.
Regarding irony, sarcasm, ridicule: "Where the literal phrasing of such sentences manifestly indicates opposite meaning, negate pQ the literal structure in coding."
It was also through Lasswell that the categories of favor able/strength and unfavorable/morality were found.The list of war symbols, however, was created through a perusal of Vietnam war news.
This discussion of method, and particularly of specific direction coding rules, is admittedly uninspiring and may seem to be a maze within which one might never expect to find the results of this content analysis. However, without clear and adequate rules and qualifications, the findings would have no claim to validity. It was at times feared, in fact, that the rules were not adequate. A few situations arose where further guidelines might have been needed. However, questionable items were put in the least harmful (usually neutral) category.
Quarterly, 19:12-22, March, 1942.
^^Ibid.. p. 20. ^^Ibid., pp. 20-21.
^^Ibld.. p. 22. cib., p, 111. CHAPT2?, r,'
MEASURED DAIA
There was no doubt t h a t considerably more Vietnam copy was going to be found in the New York Times t h a n in the London Times.
The war, of course, is being fought by people from New York, not
London. However, the difference vas n e t expected to be in appre ciable multiples. A London newspaper is not one that should be reflecting the feelings of a disinterested or unaffected nation.
The foreign policies and international problems of the one nation have always been of vital concern t: the other. As a close ally, it would not have been surprising if Britain had offered aid in the struggle to contain world Go mm ur. ism. T h a t this offer never
came, from Britain or from many other friendly nations who would
expect U. S. help in a similar situation, was a disappointment.
But the close relationship still exists, and the war is one which
could at any time force Great Britain to become a part. A rough
estimate was that Britain's ooncerr.--and the related allocation of
space by the London Times--would be about 1:3 or 1 : 4 in relation
to the amount of New York Times coverage. The London newspaper, of
course, does not necessarily represent the newspapers of Great
Britain; but neither could New York's Times claim to be a typical
American paper. The point is, the two are similar to each other,
and through this fact one would expect validity in a content
comparison. 26
A few more comments about the coding rules: The subject of the news item was used to determine its category. If "Thant
Disputed by U. S.," coding is U. S.; if "Thant Disputes U. S.," coding is Other (the category into which Thant and the United
Nations are placed). ^Similarly, if "u. S. Confident in South
Vietnam Elections," coding is U. S., not Vietnam.
As the tables are studied, it may appear that inconsisten cies exist in figure totals. For several reasons, totals in related categories may not match. For one, headlines above partial Vietnam news references were not coded unless Vietnam was mentioned in these headlines, but sources and datelines for these articles were recorded. In some cases no sources were indicated; some items were without datelines. London Times photographs carry no indication of source. When a head split into two different news stories with subordinate heads, all three heads were coded, and the main head was not related to either of the two items; sources and datelines were listed with the two stories, and separate space measurements were made. Opinion heads were not coded. The object of studying headlines is to establish the amount of importance the paper places on the news; opinion heads in each group were virtually the same size and gave little indica tion of what was beneath them.
Total Number and Space. Table I lists item totals, in number and space, and groups the items into categories as described in Chapter III. The London Times uses a seven-column page; the 27
New York Times uses eight columns. So that direct comparisons
could be made, the London column inch figures were converted to
New York-size column inches. All figures are given to the nearest inch, and headline space is not included in space measurements.
Of the twenty-four London war articles listed, five were partiale (minor references); one letter and five of the ei^t editorials in the London paper were also partiale (in these cases, not necessarily minor references but not conç>lete Vietnam references).
Someidiat surprisingly, the war itself was of no great
concern to London, In the four and one-half months of bitter
fighting between representatives of the world's two great ideo logies, just over one column inch (almost exactly one London
column inch) per issue was allowed for describing the war. The
figure was 17.8 inches per issue for the New York Times. The
London paper ^ smaller, but it does not seem that this should
account for such a difference.
The issues of June 13, for example, were not untypical.
New York carried war news concerning "Battle in Highlands,"
"Encircled Enemy Pounded by B-52's," "Battle 50 Miles from Saigon,"
and "U. S. Jet Down, Hanoi Says." London's only war news was a
short paragraph (less than a colum inch) within an item about
America's denial of plans to withdraw troops from Europe.
The war appeared to be of far less interest to London than
was the U. S. reaction to it. New Yoric also supported a healthy 28
TABLE I
NUMBER OF ITMS AND TOTAL SPACE
Total Space Type Nuatoer of Items (Column Inches*) London New York London New York
War 24 122 78 1,068
United States 22 197 215 2,293
South Vietnam 22 @7 200 1,243
Communists 9 56 51 563
Prisoners 10 15 36 163
Allies 3 13 17 77
Local (London) 10 154
Other News 17 67 62 587
Short, Non-War News References (London) 45 96
Letters 14 52 83 287
Editorials 8 14 57 186
Columns, Features 1 24 39 550
Photographs 7 91 92 953
Maps 1 52 1 192
Editorial Cartoons 1 21
TOTALS 194 790 1,202 8,162
*The London Times column is 29.6 percent larger than that of the New York Times. Figures are given in terms of the New York paper' s^ ^ u m n width. (London figures have been multiplied by 1.296.) 29 leaning in this direction, but this nust be attributed in part to its policy of publishing complete texts of president and cabinet meaber speeches— many of tbieh were primarily concerned with
Vietnam.
South Vietnam’s internal disturbances were particularly appealing to London. A Buddist fast was considered more attractive than the violence of battle. U, S. interest in this area is a bit more understandable.
Local news (mostly parliamaatary controversy) was given twice the space allowed for the war. Even the letters from its readers were given more space. The total colunn inch allocation to combat was roughly that of three of London’s front page columns; one ;diale of a battle might seem to warrant that much coverage.
The London paper showed considerable concern for the welfare of war prisoners. Two thirds the number of such stories printed by New Yoi4c were found in the London Times. The activi ties of the nations allied with the United States were virtually ignored.
In overall coverage of the Vietnam situation. New York out- printed London by about 7:1; this might have been er^ected.
However, the nearly 14:1 difference in war coverage was unexpected.
The two newspapers did, however, agree on what two-week segment of the sanple period was the most violent. In the August
8-20 samples (six issues for each newspaper), London printed six 30 war Items and New York had seventeen, the highest total for each.
However, from June 13 to August 6 (twenty-four issues each), Wien
New York described the war in forty-eight news items, London found only four episodes worth printing.
Locations. Before studying Table II, Locations (page 32), one should have some knowledge of some other format differences between the two newspapers. As one again might expect, the London
Times has a place for everything and puts everything in its place.
However, Vietnam news oould conceivably be found on page one; on its "Overseas" page (the most likely place), usually located some where between pages six and eleven; parliamentary involvement might be in the "Home News" section which often follows overseas news; partial references may be found under "Labor," "Business," etc. Letters, editorials and c o l u m s are, of course, on the editorial page, usually somewhere beyond page nine. For these reasons, headings of "Page 1," "Overseas Page," "Editorial Page," and "Other Page" were used. London’s page one has approximately
127 (7-coluitn) column inches of news space, I6 inches of ad space, and a 4-inch index. No jumps are made from page one to inside pages. For the issues studied, the indexes listed Overseas News on 113 pages. Total Overseas space for the 60 issues was 11,688 inches— 194.8 inches per issue. A maximum of 308 and a minimum of 99 inches were measured. The average length of an issue was
20.8 pages.
The New Yoric Times is much larger (and contains much more 31
ad space). Sampled Issues averaged 76.2 pages. Since news is usually only begun on page one and is continued on inside pages,
a larger number of news stories nay be found on Now York’s first
page than on London’s. A New York item was considered page one if
it was headlined there.
American journalism considers pages two and three the most
significant inside pages. In the case of the Hew York Times,
pages four to eight also contain considerable international news,
and less significant foreign items are usually printed beyond
these pages. The editorial page, of course, is also beyond page
eight. New York Times location categories, therefore, were made
"Page I," "Pages 2-3," "Pages 4-8," and "Pages 9- •" It was
roughly estimated that an 800 column inch area was available for
Vietnam news (to give some indication of the percentage of
relevant space each of the two newspapers used for Vietnam).
As in Table I, Table II also divides its items into signif
icant categories.
Only information originating in the Conmunist countries
received more front page than inside coverage in the London Times.
Although the numbers are small and the difference ^ight, this is
the first sign in an emerging pattern which remains consistent
throughout this study.
A good portion of the war news ;ras apparently considered
inçortant enough for London’s front page, when it was to be printed
at all. Much more of New York’s coverage was on inside pages. 32
TABLE II
LOCATIONS
Type London New York Over Bii- Page seas torial Other Page Pages Pages Pages 1 Page Page Page 1 2-3 4-8 9- War 10 14 2? 54 33 8
United States 8 14 41 86 56 14
South Viet nam 6 16 27 40 17 3
Camnunists 5 4 15 23 11 7
Prisoners 2 7 1 5 6 2 2
Allies 1 2 1 7 4 1
Letters 14 52
Editorials 8 14
Columns, Features 1 24
Other 4 13 12 34 19 2
Short, Non- War, News References (London) 14 23 8
Local (London) 2 8
Photographs 3 5 19 40 23 11
Maps 1 1 25 21 5
Editorial Cartoons 1
TOTALS 56 98 23 18 148 315 186 143 33
(In fact, usually more of an Item begun on New York’s page one is printed on an inside page.) Vietnam news in all categories received heaviest coverage on New Yoz4c's pages two and three. The heaviest percentage of news to be dropped into the late pages was in the Communist category. This is the opposite treatment from that given by London. (If such partiality had to exist, it would be expected of an American newspaper, since this country is directly involved in the conflict; however, London’s attitude was expected to be somevdiere between impartial and inclined toward showing the U. S. favorably.)
Headlines. In Table IH, the format differences must again be kept in mind--London’ s three-column head is longer than New
York’s three-column head, and so on. Still, the relative news worthiness attached to Vietnam articles by each paper can be seen in this table. Again, these heads are those of consiste Vietnam news stories or short references above which the headline specifically mentions Vietnam. New York’s junç) heads were not measured; London had no juBç heads. And, as noted earlier, opinion headlines, since they were similar in each category, were not charted.
Another format difference to be considered is the fact that London uses a lower case (except for proper nouns and the first character of the head) headline quite often, and a total upper case headline very seldom. The lo%rer case head seems to be called for to indicate roughly the same significance as New York’s 34
Initial capitals head; therefore, these were considered compar
able groupings.
TABLE III
NEWS HEADLINE SIZES
Co Iu d h s Lines Height To 13- Over 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 2 12ot 20nt 20nt
London 59 45 4 1 23 78 8 50 45 14
New York 401 61 46 25 7 5 3 229 263 56 305 177 66
London’s upper case headlines and initial capitals,
grouped together, numbered 54; 55 lower case heads were counted.
This balance was not shown by New York. Upper case heads
numbered 224; 324 initial cap heads were found.
Subordinate headlines (banks, decks, crosslines) were
more numerous in the New York Times. These were found beneath
267 of the 548 major heads— nearly one for every two headlines.
The London Times contained only 32 subordinate heads— roughly
one for every 3.4 major headlines. This, however, can be more
fairly attributed to the newspaper styles than differences in
treatment of Vietnam news.
London saw fit to extend only one Vietnam headline the
full length of the page— seven columns. This was a September 9,
page nine head over an item contributed by "Our Labor Staff"
concerning the Trade Union Congress (TUG). "TUG: End of the
Vietnam Bombing Demanded." 35
New York did not present a front page Vietnam banner either. Its three fuU-page ( eight-column) heads covered full or excerpted accounts of speeches b y Secretary Rusk, President
Johnson in Omaha, and President Johnson in Washington.
Most letters carried one-column, one- or two-line, seven point heads. One of the few three-line, sleven-point headlines was the only opinion item codable in other than the Neutral direction category. This head expressed "Doubts on U. S. Policy in Vietnam." London editorials were mostly two-column (sometimes extending just beyond the first column), one-line, nine to eleven point, and said something like "British and American Policy. "
Nearly half of London's Vietnam heads were in the two- column and thirteen to twenty point categories. Two-line heads outnumbered others about 2.5:1. New York heavily favored the one-column head, and kept the height of most at levels more conservative than those of London. Whether New York's heads really contributed to the reader's knowledge of the Vietnam situation is not certain vdien one reads on August 12, that
"Nixon Says Vietnam War Could End in Two Years," and on
September 1, "Nixon Tells Legion Convention War May Last 5 Years."
London's largest page one "War" headline was the two- oolumn (columns six and seven), two-line, twenty-two point exclamation, "Americans lose six planes in one day," followed by a two-column, one-line, twelve point, "Heaviest Vietnam reversal for nearly a year." No U.S. victory received this kind of play. 36
News Sources. In Table IV, New York's staff news is shown as "special to the New York Times." London also has "specials,” but these are separate from "Our Washington Correspondent," etc., listed under Staff.
TABLE IV
TOTAL NEWS SOURCES
London New York
Special 18 337
AP 1 95
UPI 52
Reuter 4l 32
By-line Only 11
New York Times News Service 8
Monitor 7
Staff 68
Of the i43 London sources listed, 46 are for partial news items. These partials break down to twelve from Reuter, twenty- five Staff, five Monitor, three fecial, and one AP.
London relied heavily on Reuter and even accepted eight items from the New York Times. The Associated Press was New
York's most productive outside news source. It also contributed the largest number of photographs— fifty-eight; other New York
sources were UPI eighteen. Staff four. Camera Pres-Pix two, 37
Pravda two, and one each Ü, S. Air Force, Eastphoto, and an independent (presumably staff) photographer.
Datelines. Only datelines associated with three or more news items wore listed independently in Table V. Nothing mean ingful could be accomplished by listing those locations from lAich only one or two items came. For example, London received single items from Kuala Lanpur and Manchester, New Haspshire;
Individual news sources ranged from Lusaka, Zambia to Falsbburg,
New York, in the New York Times. A total of remaining datelines
(i.e., remaining number of different locations from \dvich items came) is given at the end of the Table.
The greatest number of New York's news items came from
Saigon— where the action was. London placed more emphasis on tdiat was being done or thought about the war— particularly in
Washington. Moscow was also fairly well represented in the
London paper, and only in news items from Peking did the London total outnumber that of Mew York. The United Nations and
Sydney were not represented at all in the London paper.
The absence of New York datelines in the New York Times
and London datelines in the London Times indicates only that none are listed when the news is local. 38
TABLE V
DATELINES (3 or more)
- London New York
Saigon 30 196
Washington 43 121
Tokyo 4 25
Moscow 12 23
Hong Kong 3 16
New York 8
Paris 4 8
Pnom Penh, Caznbodia 2 7
Peking 5 2
&ie 4 6
United Nations 4
Danang 5 6
Geneva 3 3
Canberra 3 3
Rome 3 7
London 5
Port Dix, New Jersey 3
Sydney 5
Other Vietnam 3 10
TOTAL Other Locations— 1 or 2 Datelines 8 58 CHAPTER V
DIRECTIONAL DATA
The objectives of the search for directional data have
already been e3q>lalned} To determine the war's progress and means of progress as described in the London Times, and to see if the opinion in that newspaper favors or opposes the nations it
claims are winning. New York* s war data are being used to give
a basis of coiqparison; opinion data do not require con^arison and opinion direction for Now York was not coded.
During the period under study, the Labor government of
Prime Minister Wilson esqpressed a general agreement with
America's Vietnam policy, but disassociated itself from the
policy of bombing the North. If the London Times is assumed to
reflect to some degree the govexnmoit's policies, its reports
mi^t be an indication of Aether the areas of agreement or
disagreement with Ü. S. policies are the stronger.
It has already been shown that war news is not abundant
in the London paper. This perhaps limits the significance of
the findings related in this chapter. However, the limited
coverage of as internationally important a war as is being fought
in Vietnam is itself a supplement to the direction conclusions.
In addition, the fact that all data seem to point to the same
conclusions gives added significance to each tabulation.
Strength. The symbols given in List A, Chapter III, 40
(pages 18 and 19), is by no means perfect. Some vital ayxdools may have been overlooked. However, it is hoped that any omission would have the same effect on both newspapers, and that the overall results would retain approximately the same degree of accuracy. The list was assimilated primarily through a reading of newspapers other-than the two being studied, so that terms favored by one or the other would not give an advantage to either paper. Table VI shows the number of these strength symbols found in the two newspapers, and lists the factions to whom the symbols referred.
TABLE VI
FAVORABLE/ STRE'IGTH
1 London New York
Symbols Weighted* Symbols Weighted*
United States 18 24 238 317
North Vietnam and Viet Cong 25 36 155 217
South Vietnam 5 5 23 38
Allies 1 4 2 5
^Headline symbols equal 4, captions 3, text syntols 1.
In these two newspapers, which pride themselves on objec tive reporting, there appears to be a disagreement on who is winning the war. Only forty-nine strength symbols were found in the London Times; however, these certainly do not indicate the 41
same trend that New York's Times develops with a great deal more material. Although the public probably looks at war news with a
U. S. vs. Communism orientation, even grouping America and its
allies together leaves then slightly behind, according to London.
New York, on the other hand, leaves no doubt about the military
superiority of the United States.
Among the U. S. strength figures are two given in London
and thirty-four in New York as totals— that is, figures such as
124 Viet Cong killed in a week or in a military operation, which
were coded "by U. S.," although no specific reference to the
U. 8. was given. Since the North and Viet Cong are grouped
together, there was no need for separate accounting of strength
totals in that category.
The allies were the subject of a strength symbol only once
in the London Times (a headline ) and twice in New York. The two
newspapers were in general agreement with regard to South
Vietnam's and ütie Communists' relative accomplishments, but
disagreed on the relative strength of the South and the U. S.—
London showed roughly a 4:1 U. S. advantage, New York showed
about 9 :1.
Morality. For this category, the list of symbols
(List B, Chapter III, page 19) was compiled in the same way as
those of strength, and may also have its limitations. However,
only one case of their inability to convey morality information
was observed for the London Times. The report of an escaped 42
U. S. prisoner tdxo claimed he was hung upside-down and that ants were put in his face could not be coded.
Most of the morality coding shown in Table VII involved the killing of civilians; no distinction between the purposeful and the accidental was made. However, most purposeful immorality was referred to as other than killing (e.g., assassination).
TABLE VII
UNFAVORABLE/MORALITY
London New York
Symbols Wei^ted* Symbols Weighted*
United States 6 6 17 27
North Vietnam and Viet Cong 5 8 37 75
South Vietnam
Allies
Two of London's six morality symbols were given as totals; three of New York's seventeaa were totals.
Here also the amount of material in the London newspaper was small; however, the same conclusion exists— the United States comes out on the unfavorable side. Tne New York Times indicates that incidents of immorality committed by the Connunists by far exceed those of the U. S. No symbols pointed to South Vietnam or the Allies. 43
One reason for the differences was New York's use of
"terrorism*" London made no mention of terrorism or terrorists, nor was another word substituted for the actions New Yoz4c considered to be terrorism. This oould be construed as London's favorable treatment of the Communists or as New York's choice of words, as Americans tend to describe "victory" for the cavalry and "massacre" by the Indians. Throwing bombs in the streets of a city, however, does not seem to be the kind of activity one would describe exclusively in military terms.
Nine symbols describing the killing of Americans by
Americans were found in the New York newspaper; there was no mention of these accidents in the London Times. These incidents were not coded in either the morality or strength table.
Sources and Stx^gth. The sources of strength symbols are shown in Table VIII. All London's strength symbols were contributed by four sources; New York received its war news from five sources.
London's special correspondents and the New York Times
News Service appear to think the U. S. is winning, the home staff sees it as pretty dose, and Reuter indicates that a Communist victory is near. All New York's sources except Reuter see an
American advantage. The thirteen symbols listed under Staff are those found in the captions of New York Times maps.
London's reliance upon Reuter for war news may be a prime factor in the overall strength advantage attributed to the 44
Communists; on the other hand, it may be that London finds
Reuter's items more to its liking.
TABLE Yin
SOURCES— FAVORABLE/ STRSTGTE
London New York
U.S. North South Allies U.S. North South Allies
Special 5 2 2 195 108 15 2
AP 33 27 4
Staff 2 3 c 5
UPI 2 4
Reuter 9 18 2 1 3
New York Times News Service 2 1
Sources and Morality. Table U. gives the sources of morality symbols. All the morality symbols in the London Times
(these showed an overall Conmunist advantage ) were contributed by Reuter. New York's selection from the Reuter offering showed
a slight U. S. advantage.
All but one news source distributed the blame for the
immorality of the war among both sides. The Associated Press,
however, saw no Ü. S. e v ü , but did not overlook the Communists*
indiscretions. One cannot, of course, know %mether this is due
to the AP contributions or the New York selections. 45
TABLE ZI
æmŒa--mi?AVGRABL2/KC3AlZrT
London New York
U.S. North South Allies U.S. North South Allies
Special 1; 15
AP 10
Staff
DPI 2 1
Reuter 6 5 2 3
In this unique category of self-ces^raction (accidental
killings among II. S. troops), five syuccls were from New Toric*s
special correspondents, two were fron nar capuions, and one each
came from the AP and UPI.
Datelines and Strength. The rel ation ships between strength
symbols and datelines are given in Tahle The war raged around
Saigon and most strength symbols came from there.
Saigon reflected overall strength re salts pretty well:
The Communists had a slight lead in Lcndon, and were way behind
in New York. The same situation exist-s in the "Other South
Vietnam" category. Hong Kong, Tok]70, arc Peking are all favorable
North, and Washington's four symbols are fairly equally distributed.
The thirteen New York symbols are those fror. captions beneath New York Times maps. 46
TABLE X
DATELINES— FAVORABLE/ STRENGTH
London Now Yoric
U.S. North South Allies U.S. North South Allies
Saigon 15 17 220 111 24
Other South Vietnam 2 3 4 3
Washington 1 1 1
Hong Kong 1 6
Tokyo 2
Peking 1
Singapore 1
Melbourne
New York
Datelines and Morality. Table XI relates morality symbols to datelines. All London morality symbols were from Saigon. The
Communists were the villains in most of New York’s Saigon news* but in other South Vietnamese locations, Hong Kong* and Pnonqpenh* the opposite was true.
In accidental killing of D. S, troops, seven ^mibols were reported from Saigon and two were in captions below New York
Times maps. 47
TABLE XI
DATELINES—ÜNFAVORABLE/MORAUTÏ
London New York
U.S. North South Allies U.S. North South Allies
Saigon 6 5 7 23
Other South Vietnam 3 1
Hong Kong 3
Pnompenh, Cambodia 2
Letters. Whether the readership reacts to the newspaper or the newspaper reacts to the readership cannot be determined here. In terms of favorable/unfavorable comparisons with war data, Table XII shows news and letter content to be in general agreement about the unfavorable nature of the U. S. role in
Vietnam, but the readers seem considerably more adamant about it.
Another question might be, do these letters actually speak for London’s readers? Often only certain types of people will take the time to make their opinions known. In any case, the letters probably do reflect the opinions of those idio feel most strongly about the subject.
The data in Tables XII and XIII were conqpiled in accordance with the procedures described on pages 22-24 (Opinion Direction),
Chapter IH. 48
TABLE XII
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR — LONDON
Favorable Uhfavorable Neutral
IMited States 2 23 44
North Vietnam and Viet Cong 4 1 ■ 18
South Vietnam 3 7
Allies 1
Overall Letter With Respect to United~ States 9 4
Most symbols showing direction— favorable or unfavorable— were aimed at the TJ. S. ; it was not that the Communists were so good, but that America was so bad. One isolated unfavorable comment was directed toward the Conmunists. Not a single letter codable as overall favorable U. S. oould be found. Nine were unfavorable, four were neutral, and one was a partial Vietnam, for which no overall coding was given.
The South, perhaps guilty by association with the U. S.,
received no favorable comments. The Allies, again, were virtu
ally ignored. Only one headline (noted earlier)— an unfavorable
U. S.— oould be coded other than neutral.
Of the three favorable U. S. symbols, two were in an
overall unfavorable letter, and suggested only good intentions; 49 the third came from a neutral letter \dilch suggested that the road to peace was the stabilization of the South Vietnam Government.
Anti-American Britons were not the sources of all this derogatory comment. The letter vdiloh might be considered the most clearly anti-U. S. (six unfavorable and one neutral synfcol) was written by a group of Dartmouth, New Haxqpshire, students.
Other Opinion. As can be seen in Table XIII, little editorial and column space was devoted to Vietnam. Three full and five partial editorials discussed the subject, and only one of the regular columns was devoted to the war.
TABLE X n i
EDITORIALS—LONDON
Favorable Unfavorable Neutral
TMited States 10 11 28
North Vietnam and Viet Cong 1 4
South Vietnam
Allies
Overall (U. S.) 1 2
The editors, as the readers, directed most of their praise
and criticism toward the U. S. ; however, in this case praise and
criticism were nearly equal. The South and Allies were not
mentioned at all. Of the three complete editorials, one was
unfavorable U. S. and, as with letters, no overall support was 50 given this country.
The final codable direction item— the single regular column— did nothing to reverse the clear trend contributed to by each of the previous categories. The column was overall unfavor able (U. S.). Of the twenty-three tJ. S. symbols, three were favorable, ten unfavorable, and twenty-five neutral. The
Conmunists received one unfavorable and seven neutral references, and the two South symbols were neutral. This final item added strong unfavorable U. S. punctuation to sixty issues of the same. CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
It was originally thought that this chapter would require a conqplicated analysis of varying findings among the categories, and that some average would indicate that the London Times showed slight leanings in one direction or another. However, no averag ing was necessary. From the standpoint of the London Timest No table considered alone indicates that this war, claimed by the
United States to be one through idiich Communism is attespting to take a major step in a program for world domination, should be of any great concern to Great Britain; no table shows that the United
States, with its unprecedented military power, is doing any better than the French did in Southeast Asia; nothing suggests that the
U, S. is treating the innocent victims of war with any more care than are the Viet Cong; in discussing reasons for U. S. involve ment in this conflict, no London Times writer is prepared to suggest that this is a war being fought for world freedom; and sympathetic Times readers are noidaere to be found. (On the contrary, the war, an unjust one at that, is not going well for
America at all, the London Times shows.)
Here is a summary of the most significant data in the preceding tablesi
Table I (page 28)— The London Times allowed slightly more than one column inch of "War" news to be printed in each issue 52
(average); the New York Times averaged 17.8 inches per issue.
Table II (page 32)— Only information in the "Communists" category (a category usually showing the Communists favorably) received more front page coverage than inside coverage in the
London paper; the New York Times chose this category more than any other to fill its back pages.
Table I H (paige 34)— The table of headline sizes does not indicate contents of the heads. However, the only fuU-page
London headline called for an end to the bombing; the largest of
London’s page one "War" heads concerned a major Ü. S. loss; and one of the few outsized headlines above a reader’s letter ejqjressed a lack of confidence in America’s Vietnam policies.
Table IV (page 36)— London relied heavily on Reuter for its news— and a later table shows most of Reuter’s news to be unfavor able to the U. S.
Table V (page 38)— the table of datelines, only in number of news items from Poking does the London tally exceed that of New York.
Table VI (page 40)— In the table of strength symbols,
London gives the Communists a clear military superiority; New York figures indicate that this group is far behind.
Table VII (page 42)— Again, London gave the U. S. a dear majority of the unfavorable (here immorality) symbols, and
New York showed a strong opposite situation.
Table VUI (page 44)— In the table giving sources of 53 strength symbols, only Reuter indicates that the Ü. S. is the weaker of the two major powers. London used Reuter news more than any other listed; New York used it less than any other in the table.
Table IX (page 45)— All London’s immorality symbols came from Reuter, with the U. S. on the bottom again. New York’s second most utilized source, the Associated Press, attributed all immorality (ten symbols) to the Communists.
Tables X and XI (pages 46 and 4?)— In tables relating datelines to strength and immorality symbols, the overall distri bution of symbols shown in other tables is reflected in Saigon news; only Hong Kong symbols are unanimous (of the anti-U. S. variety).
Table XII (page 48)— Letters to the London editors were overwhelmingly unfavorable to America. Those U. S. symbols not coded as neutral were 23:2 unfavorable.
Table XIII (page 49)— The London editors were not as harsh as their readers; America came out only slightly behind in this table of editorials.
The one London feature column concerning Vietnam contri buted twenty-three unfavorable and three favorable U. S. symbols to the totals.
In several instances, tabulation showed the Communists with a single symbol advantage. This is probably coincidence since the method used for making these determinations is not one 54
Tdiich is commonly used— or used at all perhaps. Another method might indicate that the balance is tipped in the other direction.
However, these calculations were made, as faithfully as possible, on the basis of predetermined criteria, and no observations were made until all the figures had been compiled. (The few coding changes made early in the research were aimed at obtaining greater meaning, and should not have affected the established rules.) Thereafter, working with one category at a time, the similarity of results became more and more surprising. If this had been some system of content analysis lAlch was universally used and accepted, one might guess that the London newspaper was making a point of keeping the United States a notch behind at all times, just on principle.
The reader of this research paper probably has his own ideas about the value of the comparisons with New York Times data. Perhaps it is the New York newspaper that is showing all
the partiality, and London is calling it as it sees it. If any bias exists. New York may well have its share of it. However,
a reader of American newspapers— particularly a reader with
respect for American journalism— would find it difficult to believe, after following the course of the waor and all the discussion surrounding it, that things could be as bad as the
London Times indicates that they are.
If each table were to be considered as representing the
conplete and accurate information (which, of course, it could 55 not), the conclusion drawn from every one -wo'zld hare to be against the United States, Now even with no claim to completeness and unquestionable validity, it seems unlikely that the overall results of this study could be erroneous. ”be readership of the
London Times is being told, and apparently is convinced, that the
United States is losing the war, that it is no* fighting with customary English respect for the rules, and tha* it probably doesn’t belong in Vietnam anyway. 56
BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. PRIMAHÏ S0ÜRCÎ5
1. Books
Editor and Publisher International Yearbook. .S'ew York; The Editor and Publisher Conçany, Inc-orcorated, 1966,
2, Newspapers
The Times of London. May 2, 1966 to Septeaher 17, 1966 (alternate issues).
The New York Times, May 2, 1966 to September 17, 1966 (alternate issues).
2,. Unpublished
Lee, John; Meredith, Kathie J. ; Graham, Robert P. ; Lewis, Tom; and Cavanaugh, Patricia A. "Studies of Sew York Wmes Coverage With Five Other Dailies: Los Angeles Times, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Buffalo Evening Hews, Washington Post. and Philadelphia Inquirer." Unpublished research paper, West Virginia University, 19^4.
B. SECONDARY XÎJP.CSS
1. Books
Berelson, Bernard, Content Analysis in Communication Research. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1952.
Berger, Meyer. The Story of the Hew York Times, 1851-1951, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951.
Britain. An Official Handbook. London: Central Office of ïmfàrmatïàn, 1 ^ 6 .
Budd, Richard W., and Thorp, Robert K. ^ Introduction to Content Analysis. Iowa City; State University of Iowa, 1963.
Deiis, Thomas. Challenge in Fleet Street. London: Truth Publications Company, Ltd., 1957. 58
Fall, Bernard B, Vlet-Nam Witness, 1953-66. New York; Praeger, 1966.
Las swell, Harold D., Lemer, Daniel, and Pool, Ithiel de Sola. The Comparative Study of Symbols. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952.
Las swell, Harold D . , Leites, Nathan, and Associates. Language of Politics. New York; George W, Stewart Publisher, Inc., 0 4 9 .
Merrill, John C. The Foreign Press. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 19w.
Merrill, John C. A Handbook of the Foreign Press. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959.
Nafziger, Ralph 0. Intemat^nal News and the Press. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1940.
Nafziger, Ralph 0., and White, David K. Introduction to Mass Communications Research. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 19^3^
Pool, Ithiel de Sola. The Prestige Papers. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952.
Report on the British Press. London: PEP (Political and Economic Planning), 191^8.
Schramm, Wilbur L. One Day in the World* s Press. Stanford, California: Stanford Uhiversity Press, 1959.
2. Periodicals
Bush, Chilton R. "A ^stem of Categories for General News Content," Journalism Quarterly. 37:206-210, Spring, I96O.
Day, John F. "The British Press and People," Meiman Reports. 20:17-20, March, 1966.
Kracauer, Siegfried. "The Challenge of Qualitative Analysis," Public Opinion Quarterly. 16:631-42, Winter, 1952.
Lasswell, Harold D., and Associates. "The Politically Significant Content of the Press: Coding Procedures," Journalism Quarterly. 19:12-23, March 1942. 59
Markham, James H, "Foreign News in the United States and South American Press," Public Opinion Quarterly. 23:249-62, Spring, 1961.
Merrill, John C. "Ü, S. Panel Names T«a Leading * Quality' Dailies," Joumalism Quarterly. 41:368-72, Autumn, 1964.
"Milestones," Time. 89:96, March 3, 1967.
"The Press," Time. 88:61, October 7, 1966.
Stençel, Guido. "Sample Size for Classifying Subject Matter in Dailies," Joumalism Quarterly. 29:333-34, 5utarter, 1952.
Tannenbauro, Percy H. "The Indexing Process in Communication, " Public Opinion Quarterly. 19:292-302, Fall, 1955.
2. Pamphlets
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Vietnam Conflict. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 19&6.
Why Vietnam? Washington: Ü. S. Government Printing Office, August 20, 1965.
Smith, Howard K. ABC Scope: The Vietnam War (Video Telecast). July 16, 1966.