MASTER'S THESIS M-1182 MATHURIN, Victor George A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF VIETNAM WAR NEWS IN THE TIMES OF LONDON, USING THE NEW YORK TIMES CONTENT AS A BASIS FOR COMPARISON. The American University, M.A., 1967 Journalism University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan A COiiTBU AUALISIS OF VIETNAM WAR NEWS IN THE TIKES OF LOimON. USING Tffilfatf IQRK TIMES CONTBiT ^ A BASIS~g^ COMPARISON Victor G. Mathurin Submitted to the Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of the American Univeraity in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Kaster of Arts Signature of Committee: Chairman : Dean of the College Date; / Z / Date;, AMERICAN u:;;vt!;3iiY 1967 m y : s mi The American University Washington, D. C. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. THE PROBLa<........................................... 1 II. 3ACK}R0U:{D ......................................... 4 The Vietnam War .............. 4 The London Times ................. 9 The Hev York Times .......... 10 III. M E T H O D ............................................... 12 S a m p l i n g ........................ 12 Measurement......................................... 13 War Direction.............. .. .. 18 Opinion Direction ............ ......... ..... 22 IV. MEASURED DATA ....................................... 25 Total Number and S p a c e ............................ 26 Locations .......... 30 Headlines ............. 33 Mews Sources ............ 3& Datelines.................. 37 V. DIRECTIOMAL D A T A ..................................... 39 S t r e n g t h ................ 39 M o r a l i t y ........................................... 41 Sources and S t r e n g t h ............ 43 Sources and Mtorality .......... 44 Datelines and Strength ............................. 45 Datelines and M o r a l i t y ............ 46 ill CHAPTER PAGE Letters . 4? Other C-plnion.............. ^ VI. coNCiasicNS.......................................... 51 BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................. 56 LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE I. Mmaber :f Items snd Total Space 26 II. Lccations ................. 32 III. Mews Be.adlin.a S i t e s ..................... 34 IV. Total Mews S o u r c e s ............... 36 V. Datelines ................................... 38 VI. Favorable;^ StreTigth ................. 40 vn, ritfa'Tcracle/yiorality ................ 42 Vni. So’oroes— Fare rable/strength 44 IX, So'zroe-s— Itf arorable/Morality .... ....... 45 X. Dateli.-. es— F ai^r&ble/Strength............. 46 XI. Dateli-T.es— TcifsTorable/Morality......... 4? XII. Let tars t: tr.e Editor— London............... 48 X m . aditori.5l s.— L o n d o n ................................ 49 CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM The war in Vietnam is asserting a strong influence upon world leaderships and peoples. Significant changes in inter­ relationships between governments have occurred during, and in no small part because of, this growing war. The decisions of freely- elected governments should represent the opinions of the governed. The newspaper holds a unique position in this relationship: It in part forms and in part reflects these opinions. Traditionally, our closest ally has been Great Britain. On the limited scale allowed by a study of this kind, data was assimi­ lated to help answer the following questions about that country. How are its people forming their opinions about the role of the United States in Vietnam? What are they reading about the progress of the war? What are newspapers telling them about the means— fair or foul--by which each side is progressing? Which faction is being presented as the aggressor and which the defender? How much are they being told? Is the significance of the conflict being presented in proper perspective? The questions were considered with relation to a single British newspaper and its readership. Selection of The Times of London was not an arbitrary one. Wilbur Schramm summarizes the reasons. The Times is not large, but "it is still the prestige paper of Great Britain.”^ And it has, through the years, "over 2 and over again spoken as the voice of the British Government," It has a "disregard of the popular news writing and feature content 3 which are supposed to build circulation," "The national culture 4 always shines through the day’s news," Denis notes that "editor­ ially, it is generally reckoned to support the government of the day."^ The same source says that it is "the record . • . straight, complete, unaidoiguous."^ With such credits, it would be difficult to choose another British newspaper. Its relationship with the government gives added meaning to the findings. Its motto, "For Top People," suggests that its readership is more influential (if not politi­ cally, at least socially) than its number implies. And this readership— more than the government or the newspaper— is the primary concern of the study, A basis for comparison was needed in this study, and the characteristics of the New York Times were found to be similar to those of London's Times. The two newspapers play similar roles in their societies, and enjoy conçarable national and international ^Wilbur L. Sohramn, One Day in the World's Press (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959% p. 12§, 2 3 4 Ibid. Ibid, Ibid., p. 130. 5 Thomas Denis, Challenge in Fleet Street (London: Truth Publishing Conç>any Limited, 1957TT p. 49. 6 Ibid. 3 reputations. The New York Times holds itself above the popular press in America, as the London Times does in Britain. And since comparably intelligent readerships are presumably involved, there should be no great problem of different meanings being derived from newspaper content— a situation which might exist if a reader­ ship were diversified in education, background, etc. To give meaning to London's coverage of the Vietnam war, knowledge of the coverage given by a second newspaper was necessary. Without such a basis for comparison, there would be no means of determining whether London's coverage was representative of fact or idiether a great deal of news selectivity was involved, A prob­ lem, of course, is the possibility that the newspaper being used for the comparison would itself show partiality, and therefore distort the results of the analysis. If partialities were in the same direction, one might decide that both newspapers were accurately presenting the situation to the public— particularly since both papers pride themselves on their reputations for fair­ ness. However, no such judgment need be made on the basis of this study, and a totally different question has to be answered. Find­ ings have shown the London and New York Times to be in substantial disagreement about all aspects of the war. CHAPTER II BACKGROUND The Vietnam War. One of the fundamental resources of the Ohited States in all its wars— from the Revolution to Korea— has been the rightness of its cause, fortified by the determination of its people. Bernard Fall, considered to be one of the few real authorities on the war in Vietnam during the period of this study, considers this latest American entanglement "second only to the mishandling of the whole China problem as one of the single most 7 incredible failures of American foreign policy." Though most Americans probably do not go to this extreme, this war is not one ^djich can rely on a strong sense of nationalism to see it through. The war is unique in other ways— also detrimental to the possibil­ ity of U. S. success. It is being fought in thick jungles, marshes, swanks, and rice fields; and the enemy cannot be readily identified. In fact, he looks like a farmer when he's not fighting, and like the allied South Vietnamese vhen he is. His weapons are spikes in the brush, mines along the jun^e trails, fire bombs in the city, and fear in the countryside. Into this atmosphere, American soldiers are sent— from a country idiere young men are burning draft cards, picketing the White House, and calling for an end to the "unjust" war. ^Bernard B. Fall, Viêt-Nam Witoess. 1953-66 (New York* Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, I9 66), p. ±37. 5 Today's Vietnam conflict evolved from the Prench-Indo China war which began December 19» 1946, By 1949» the conflict involved 150,000 French and allied Vietnamese, and nearly 250,000 Viet Minh guerrillas and their Vietnamese allies. The United States main­ tained an interest in this war as part of its overall policy of Communist containment in Asia, and contributed materially to the French offensive. However, fighting the eneny on its own unusual terms, with inadequate forces and weapons, the French were losing the battle, and the massive retaliation sought from the Ohited States never came, America became occupied with its own war in Korea, and idien the decisive battle at Diwi Bien Phu (begun with a French paratroop landing on November 20, 1953) made the end of French hopes obvious, U. S. reluctance to engage in a second offensive— particularly one involving a colonial power— settled the outcome. The First Indo China War cost the French ten billion dollars (and the U. S. 1.1 billion) and 172,000 dead or missing. The French disaster was to become a constant source of camparlson for America's fight against the same enemy. Hostilities ended July 21» 1954’» with the French and the South in a poor position for negotiations; North Vietnam was given control above the seventeenth parallel» though South Vietnam vigorously fou^t partition. Hovjever, South Vietnam retained at least half the population, and its 65,000 square miles exceeded the 62,000 square miles taken by the North. Moreover, the South is Vietnam's rice botdL; and while the North began to rebuild. 6 the South, having suffered little war damage, had no such task ahead. The Geneva agreement had been a military one, banning rein­ forcements (increases above replacement of equipment already in the country), the establishment of military bases, and the use of blockades. A provision for general elections was included. How­ ever, South Vietnam's Premier Diem took the position that a foreign power (the French) had spoken for his government at Geneva, and that he was not bound to such an agreement, (it has been estimated that if elections had been held in 1956, as scheduled, the result would have been a peaceful takeover by Ho Chi Minh and 8, Communism.