Rex vaincra! LBon Degrelle and the Failure of the Rexist

Movement

by

Mark Esposito '05

A Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the Degree with Honors

in History

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

Williamstown, Massachusetts

April, 2005 Many thanks to Professor Alexandra Garbarini for her invaluable insights and editorial coritributions. Chapter 1-Introduction

"l'homme a la fois le plus aime et le plus hai, le plus celebre et le plus calomnik de la

Be1gique."-Pierre ~a~e'

In 1937, it could be said of Leon Degrelle that he was, in the words of Pierre

Daye, one of his supporters, "the man at once the most loved and the most hated, the most famous and the most infamous in all of ." Degrelle's fame, however, proved to be fleeting. Outside of Belgium, Degrelle, a Catholic nationalist politician turned Nazi-collaborator, is a largely unknown figure. Besides rare translations of works by Degrelle himself, there are only a small number of books in English on Degrelle and

Rexism, and none of them have attracted wide scholarly interest. There are sources on the internet about Degrelle, but they are not exactly characterized by rigorous scholarship. Judging by internet searches, virtually the only people in the English speaking world who care about Degrelle are Holocaust deniers, neo-Nazis, and white supremacists of various and sundry types. To this small segment of the population, Lkon

Degrelle is a hero. Their admiration for Degrelle seems to be founded mainly on

Degrelle9s wartime exploits and his admiration for Hitler, rather than on an analysis of

Degrelle's political philosophy. .

Beyond the socially marginal individuals who are interested in Degrelle, a small number of scholars have written studies on Degrelle and on the political party he founded, the Rex party. Many historians have focused on Degrelle's links with , viewing Rex largely through the prism of other interwar European movements.

1 , Lion Degrelle et le Rexisme (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 19371,247. Others have approached Rex as a more discrete entity, focusing on the Belgian context

rather than broader European trends. The most valuable studies are by two historians:

Jean-Michel ~tienne'sLe Mouvement Rexiste Jusqu 'en 1940 [The Rexist Movement

Until 19401, and Martin Conway's Collaboration in Belgium: Lion Degrelle and the

Rexist Movement, 1940-1944. Both of these works focus more on Rex itself than on

events outside of Belgium, an approach I find to be more helpful. ~tiennefocuses mainly

on the beginning of Rex, while Conway deals mainly with its wartime manifestation. I

hope to bridge that gap.

This thesis is not intended as a biography of Lkon Degrelle. Rather, I seek to provide a coherent narrative of the Rexist political movement throughout much of its existence, treating Degrelle's wartime behavior as having evolved from his prewar experiences. The aim of this study is to explore the reasons behind Rex's increasing radicalization throughout its existence, and Degrelle's decision to collaborate with Nazi

Germany. Most Belgian sympathizers toward the Germans were Flemings, not Walloons like Degrelle, and Belgium's most openly fascist party-also a Walloon party-resisted the Nazi occupation. That a nationalist Walloon would aid his country's occupiers is rather curious, though Degrelle did meet with Hitler as early as the summer of 1936. As the Rex party lost electoral support after its height in May 1936, Degrelle seemed to turn more and more to fascism, introducing elements such as heightened anti-Semitism. I explore this connection between electoral failure and political radicalization. To do this,

I trace the evolution of the political ideology of Lkon Degrelle and the Rex party, focusing mainly on the years 1932-194 1. I argue that Degrelle ultimately rejected parliamentary democracy and embraced

fascism as a result of Rex's electoral failure. Though Degrelle may well have had an

ideological affinity with all along, this would not have manifested itself

without the Rexist marginalization, which began in 1937. In the 1930s and early war

years Degrelle was above all an opportunist, strategically couching his public rhetoric in

a way that he believed would be most beneficial to Rex. This trend would likely have

continued had Degrelle and Rex remained popular.

In this chapter, I set out a framework for my treatment in subsequent chapters of

~ebelleand the Rexist movement. First, I explore the intellectual and political antecedents to Rex. Next, I consider the debates surrounding fascism generally and Rex specifically. In so doing, I attempt to show that examining Rex through the prism of fascism is not necessarily the most illuminating approach. Rather, Rex should be discussed on its own terms, while still remaining mindful of the larger political contexts of interwar and wartime Belgium and Europe.

Overview

At the outset of his career as a political journalist, JRon Degrelle was an avowed

Catholic and supporter. As head of the Rex publishing house in Louvain in the early 1930s, Degrelle sought to reform the Belgian Catholic Party from within.

Degrelle proved to be more of an annoyance than an aid to the party, and as a result he and his followers were expelled in 1935 for their increasingly critical attacks on party leadership and its alleged corruption. With its expulsion from the Catholic Party's ranks,

Rex became a political party in its own right, rather than only a publishing house. The Rex party entered the Belgian political scene in 193511 936, as an energetic, youthful

movement with a strange amalgam of different political ideologies. In this respect, Rex

was by no means unique in Europe; many groups in this time period had syncretic ideologies.

Degrelle grabbed the public spotlight as a reformer who would clean up what he cast as the corruption of Belgian politics, while also making himself known for his superb oratory (in this time period, Degrelle and Rex were interchangeable; the party was indisputably Degrelle's, and he was its sole driving force). Degrelle's mastery of oratory, however, was not the only source of his appeal. During the height of his political career,

Degrelle was charismatic and handsome, a dashing young renegade reinvigorating

Belgian politics. Degrelle's supporters joked of his "Rex-Appeal" as the source of his great popularity with women2

Rex was strongly Catholic, monarchist, and Belgian nationalist, in addition to being vehemently anti-socialist. Like a number of other nationalist parties from the

1930s, Rex simultaneously took a strongly anti-socialist stance, while adopting the rhetoric of social change and aid to the poor. It called for a non-violent revolution of the soul and society, rather than the class warfare of communism. Yet at the same time that there were elements of fascism in Rexist thought and rhetoric, Rex self-consciously distanced itself from identification with fascism, at least initially. Degrelle and other

Rexist writers stated explicitly that Rex was an entirely different phenomenon. The link between Rex and fascism is a highly contentious subject, and will be explored more fully below.

Robert Brasillach, Histoire de la Guerre d'Espagne: Mdmoires, suivi de Lkon Degrelle et L 'avenir de "Rex " ([Paris]: Plon, 1969), 475. In a period of months after its founding as an independent party in November

1935, Rex garnered significant support in much of Belgium. The charismatic young

Degrelle led Rex to win more than 270,000 votes, 11.49% of all votes cast, in the national

parliamentary elections of May 1936.3 In the stable political climate of Belgium, such a strong showing by a relatively unknown party represented a significant shakeup. With the success of May 1936 in hand, the future of Rex seemed bright indeed. The first election that Rex competed in, though, proved to be the movement's apex.

After electoral disappointment in 1937, Rex became more and more radicalized, losing much of its Catholic component and replacing it with a newfound cynicism and outspoken scorn for democracy, in addition to increasing xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and

' a neutralist foreign policy. Degrelle's relations with the Catholic Church had long been strained. Early on, before the electoral drubbing of 1937, the Belgian Catholic Church denounced Rexism generally and Degrelle specifically, before finally excommunicating

Degrelle in 1943 .5 By 1941, with Belgium occupied by , Rex had undergone a dramatic evolution, with little resemblance to its original form. By this time,

Degrelle was ready to publicly heil Hitler and emulate Nazi racial thinking. Degrelle emulated the Nazis to the extent that after the German invasion of the ,

Degrelle worked to raise a Walloon collaborationist military unit, spending much of the

Jean-Michel ~tienne,Le Mouvement Rexiste Jusqu'en 1940 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1968), 53. Rex was a political party, but to Degrelle the designation of "party" sounded too mundane, too much like politics as usual. As someone who cast himself as a reformer, as a non-politician, he preferred to use a new term. Rather than the term party, Degrelle "preferred that of a rally or a movement or even a 'mystique. "' Luc Schepens, "Fascists and Nationalists in Belgium 1919-1940," in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (ed.), Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots ofEuropean Fascism (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 507. In Rex in February 1933, Degrelle referred to Rex as "avant tout un mouvement, un organisme de combat." ~tienne,Mouvement, 18. In referring to Rex, the terms party and movement both seem appropriate, and both can be used more or less interchangeably. The use of the word "movement" rather than "party" is paralleled in the Nazis' portrayal of themselves. Martin Conway, Collaboration in Belgium: Lkon Degrelle and the Rexist Mov~rneat1940 -1944 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 208. next four years fighting on the Eastern front, first with the Wehrmacht and later with the

Waffen-SS. In 1944, Adolf Hitler personally rewarded Degrelle with the Knight's Cross, the highest German military decoration, allegedly remarking "If I had had a son, I would have liked him to be like you."6 Thus, I trace the evolution of Degrelle fi-om Catholic political reformer to Nazi collaborator, arguing that his later overt fascism stemmed largely from Rex's electoral failures.

At the conclusion of the war, Degrelle escaped into exile in Spain, where he lived peacefully for nearly fifty years, despite a Belgian death sentence in absentia and attempts at extradition. He finally died of natural causes in 1994, at the age of 87. Had it not been for his wartime actions, Degrelle likely would have been little more than a historical footnote as a young, dynamic politician whose movement seemingly sprang out of nothingness before dissolving back into it. Degrelle's collaborationist activities, though, led him to acquire a significant degree of well-deserved notoriety. It was a long journey from nationalist Catholic monarchist to whole-hearted Hitler supporter, certainly not an obvious progression. One could attempt to impose a teleological framework on

Degrelle's life, but it would be an insupportable assumption to claim that his war-time politics and behavior were the only logical outcome of his politics and behavior in the mid-1 930s. I argue that Degrelle's public political pronouncements became increasingly radicalized as Rex's fortunes declined, but that had Rex remained politically viable

Degrelle would have continued to support relatively moderate positions.

To explain the evolution of Degrelle's political thinking, it is necessary to begin with events well before the founding of the Rexist movement. Degrelle's later thinking

"Si j'avais un fils, je l'aurais aime tel que vous." Hitler quoted in ~tienne,Mouvement, 171. was a reaction against principles associated with the French Revolution and reinvigorated

by the pro-Republican Dreyfusards during the late nineteenth century in . These

principles included individual liberty, equality, and parliamentary democracy

I unhampered by monarchy, all of which were anathema to Degrelle and his followers. To

Degrelle, individualism was responsible for the malaise of the 2othcentury, and notions

of equality were the culprit behind the widespread failure to acknowledge the natural

hierarchy of human society. Thus, he argued, everyone has an appropriate role to play,

and much strife is caused by the lack of recognition of this fact. To Degrelle the

ovdrthrow of the monarchy was perhaps the greatest insult of all.

Degrelle found much of his philosophical inspiration in the works of Charles

Maurras, a leading French proto-fascist of the early twentieth century and the intellectual heavyweight of the Action franqaise m~vement.~Maurras hated the French Revolution because, among other things, it overthrew France's monarchy and replaced it with what he viewed as a chaotic, unpredictable system.8 For thinkers like Maurras and Degrelle, democracy in place of monarchy was abhorrent.

Maurras's philosophy was that of "integral nationalism," which according to

Stanley Payne was "a set of doctrines based not merely on monarchism but on an exclusive and ideologically sophisticated nati~nalism."~Maurras exalted the concept of the , and monarchism was logical to him because he "believed that democracy

Degrelle explained in an interview conducted in the late 1930s with Brasillach, a fascist journalist: "Naturellement, nous avons tous lu Maurras. Sans Maurras, la Belgique aurait des rois, par hazard. Elle n'aurait pas idCe de ce qu'est le monarchie." Degrelle quoted in Brasillach, Histoire, 517. Elsewhere, Degrelle said of Maurras that "Maurras, qui fut le plus grand penseus politique de notre siecle ..." Degrelle quoted in Jean-Michel Charlier, Le'on Degrelle: Persiste et Signe (Paris: Editions Jean Picollec, 19851, 33. Despite these strong acclamations, it is important to note that Degrelle believed Maurras to be lacking in social passion. F.L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 14. stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1995), 40. brought the nation to the verge of extinction."1° According to Maurras, the people,

lacking a higher authority, could not be trusted to govern themselves and would produce

chaos. Maurras's emphasis on a strong monarchy for the proper functioning of a nation

was coupled with other, not particularly subtle beliefs; he was strongly anti-Jewish, anti-

German, anti-Protestant, anti-Freemason, pro-army, pro-tradition, and pro-Catholicism."

Despite Maurras9s strong feelings in favor of the Catholic Church, the church hierarchy was uncomfortable with much of his thinking, and he was excommunicated in 1927.12

This split between the Catholic Church and someone who cast himself as its ardent defender would be repeated in the case of Degrelle.

Maurras's Action franqaise was founded in 1899 in the midst of the Dreyfus

Affair. l3 The Dreyfus Affair began with the wrongful conviction for treason of a Jewish army officer and grew into a battle between forces of the left and the right in France, dividing the country into these opposing factions. Many of the issues at the heart of the conflict, such as clericalism versus anticlericalism, monarchism versus democracy, and debates over the character of the nation, were central to Rexism over thirty years later.

The debates emerging out of the Dreyfus Affair were especially relevant to the Belgian

Walloons who shared much of France's cultural heritage. The profound influence of the

Dreyfus Affair on Degrelle would later be seen in Degrelle's publication of the pamphlet

J'accuse M. Segers (evoking Zola) following the so-called Coup de Courtrai, discussed in chapter three.

lo Zeev Sternhell, David Maisel (translator), Neither Right Nor Left (Berkeley: University of California, 1986), 19. " Carsten, Rise ofFascism, 13. l2 Payne, A History ofFascism, 48. 13 Carsten, Rise of Fascism, 12. In Belgium, battles over national identity and the ideal system of government took

place within the context of a nation composed of two large ethnicities with often competing interests.14 The Flemings, Flemish speakers closely related to the Dutch and comprising a majority of the Belgian population, often felt themselves to be treated as second-class citizens by the French speaking Walloon elite. After Belgium's independence from the Netherlands in 1830, French was the sole official language for decades, even though Flemish speakers significantly outnumbered French speakers. l5

The language difference was a real barrier to Flemish social advancement, because few

Flemings could understand ~rench.'~Understandably, this and other similar issues were the source of considerable resentment among the Flemings against the Walloons. As a

Walloon who sought to appeal to both Walloon and Flemish Belgians, Degrelle always had to tread carefully on questions of ethnic identity within the larger national context.

Belgium's geographical location only exacerbated these tensions. Belgium is a small country, with a 1930 population of 8 million, situated between great European powers, and much of its modern history has been defined by conflicts between France and Germany. l7 During , despite its desire for neutrality, Belgium was promptly invaded and harshly occupied by Germany. The Germans intentionally played on Flemish resentment of the Walloons, giving the Flemings preferential treatment in an attempt to curry their favor. After Germany's defeat in WWI, many bitter memories of

l4 There is also a small (well under 100,000) ethnically German minority. In the 1930s, the balance was about 4.5 million Flemings to 3.5 million Walloons. Brasillach, Histoire, 506. IS Bernard A. Cook, Belgium: A History (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), 80-81. l6 88% of Flemings in 1930 were unable to speak French. E.H. Kossman, The Low Countries: 1780-1940 (Oxford: Oxford University, 1978), 630. l7 Herman van der Wusten, "The Low Countries," in Detlef Miihlberger (ed.), The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 216. '' Cook, Belgium, 104-105. Flemish collaboration persisted. Degrelle later proved that collaboration with the

Germans was by no means an exclusively Flemish phenomenon.

In the late 1930s, it became clear that there would be another great European war,

and it seemed likely that Belgium would once again find itself dragged into the conflict.

Belgium desperately wanted to avoid this eventuality, and clung to a policy of neutrality

in the hope that this would spare the country from another period of occupation. Despite

its best efforts, though, Belgium was unable to avoid being dragged into the war and in

1940 again found itself under German occupation. Belgian resistance fighters waged a

fierce campaign of assassinations against collaborators, significantly targeting many

Rexists, but were unable to liberate their country without outside help.

There was one common thread running through both the Flemish and Walloon

communities: Catholicism. In 1940, 98% of Belgium's population was baptized

Catholic.19 Nevertheless, there were differences among Catholics. Degrees of belief and

practice varied dramatically, and Flemings tended to be significantly more observant

believers than the ~alloons." Socioeconomic status also varied along lines of ethnicity,

as the Walloons tended to be better off financially than the Flemings. There also existed

in Belgium a tiny Jewish minority. Even after a large influx of Eastern European Jewish

refugees following the First World War, Jews constituted slightly less than 1% of the

Belgian population.21 Belgium's Jews would receive attention fiom Degrelle disproportionate to their numbers. Degrelle became extremely anti-Semitic over the

l9 Martin Conway, "Building the Christian City: Catholics and Politics in Inter-War Francophone Belgium," Past and Present, No. 128 (Aug., 1990), 1 18. 20 Cook, Belgium, 83. 21 Rudi Van Doorslaer, "Jewish Immigration and Communism in Belgium, 1925-1939," in Dan Michian (ed.), Belgium and the Holocaust: Jews, Belgians, Germans (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1998), 63-64. course of the 1930s, placing the blame for Belgium's woes at the feet of the Jewish population.

The system of government dating from Belgium's independence from the

Netherlands in 1830 was that of a parliamentary democracy, with a constitutional monarch. The Catholic, Socialist and Liberal parties were the only major parties with a cross-ethnic appeal on the national level during the era of mass politics. Before the mid-

1930s, the political balance between the parties in Belgium was largely static and slow- changing. The Catholic Party dominated from 1884 to 1917, and competed with the

Socialists for power for the next twenty years.22 The Liberals ran a perennial third in national elections. The voting system in Belgium was similar to those in much of the rest of Europe. In response to social pressures and changes, universal (but "weighted according to age, income, education, and marital status") manhood suffrage was granted in 1893, and in 1899 proportional representation was enacted for parliamentary elections.23 In 1919, the one man, one vote principle was instituted, and women from families whose men had been killed in World War One were also granted suffrage.24

In sum, Belgium in the first half of the twentieth century was divided between two uneasy, occasionally hostile ethnicities. It was overwhelmingly homogeneous in religion, although levels of observance varied. The country was powerless to avoid being swept up in the grand affairs of its neighbors, and suffered under two wars fought on its soil and two periods of German occupation. Before the outbreak of the Second World

War the chaotic 1930s were already rife with political change, with competing currents of communism, fascism, and authoritarian Catholicism, all of which also made an impact on

22 Cook, Belgium, 79. 23 Cook, Belgium, 88. 24 Cook, Belgium, 88. public consciousness throughout Europe. Into this mix Lkon Degrelle introduced his formula of Rexism, his vision for the political future of Belgium.

The 66F"~6rd

Any discussion of the politics of Lkon Degrelle and Rex must necessarily consider the question of fascism. Much of the current scholarship on Rex is concerned with the movement's fascistic characteristics. Scholars disagree on when, whether, and to what extent Rex could be considered a fascist movement. Some scholars hold that the group wasfascist from its very beginnings, while to others Rex's fascism emerged only in the context of National Socialist domination of Europe. This debate cannot be easily resolved, and before I attempt to answer these questions a consideration of fascism is in order.

More than almost any other political ideology, scholars disagree on what exactly fascism means, and what constitutes fascism.25 The topic is the subject of fierce historiographical debate, and at times the debate seems to take on more significance than the phenomenon itself. Many historians feel that there are key moral issues at stake, and that for that reason the debate is absolutely essential. I would argue that while the moral issues involved should certainly be considered, they are not of tantamount importance for understanding Degrelle and Rexism.

Part of what complicates the debate about the nature of fascism is the fact that there was no one model for fascism; Mussolini and represented only one possible manifestation of the fascist phenomenon. Hitler's National Socialism falls under

25 For reasons why fascism is difficult to define, see Robert 0.Paxton, "The Five Stages of Fascism," The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 70, No. 1 (March 1998), 1-23. the fascist rubric, but so too does the Franco regime in Spain. In this respect, there were

numerous variants of fascist parties and regimes. Labeling a movement as "fascist" does

not necessarily convey a great deal of insight about a movement in and of itself.

Although there were fascist movements of various kinds throughout Europe, there is not

always agreement among historians on the question of what characteristics are necessary

for a movement to be considered fascist. As the scholar Robert 0.Paxton rightly notes,

the concept of fascism is also plagued by "overuse: the word 'fascist' has become the most banal of epithets. Everyone is someone's fas~ist.'"~Paxton, though, is unwilling to

give up on using the term.

In an attempt to define fascism, a natural starting point would be Benito

Mussolini's explanation of the "Fundamental Ideas" of fascism in the Enciclopedia

Italiana of 1932.~~As Mussolini founded the Italian Fascist party, the first true fascist movement, his definition of fascism helps get to the heart of the issue even though this piece was written a decade after his Fascist party came to power in Italy. Mussolini offered the following: "Like all sound political conceptions, Fascism is action and it is thought; action in which doctrine is immanent, and doctrine arising from a given system of historical forces in which it is inserted, and working on them from within... There can be no conception of the State which is not fundamentally a conception of life."28 Fascism was predisposed to action: "Inactivity is death."29 Stagnancy was the enemy, and actions driven by could and would overcome it. According to Mussolini, fascism offered a formula for the state which was all-encompassing, "a conception of

26 Paxton, "Five Stages," 8. 27 It is not certain that Mussolini actually wrote this article, but he is still listed as the author. 28 , Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions (New York: Howard Fertig, 1968), 7. 29 ~ussolini,Fascism, 13. life." His doctrine invested great power in the individual man of action; "by the exercise

of his free will, man can and must create his own Mussolini suggested that

people could control their own destinies, rather than passively accepting whatever fate

awaited them.

Men of action were essential to fascism, but there was a quasi-religious

component as well. "The Fascist conception of life is a religious one," Mussolini

contended, because "Fascism is not only a system of government but also and above all a

system of thought."3' The fascist state would become so prominent in people's lives and in the way they saw the world that it would take on religious qualities. The state would become religious because the state would regulate all aspects of the human condition.

"The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing;" wrote Mussolini, "outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value... Fascism is t~talitarian."~~

Fascism was totalitarian in that it was all-encompassing. Everything human existed only within the state.

Significantly, to Mussolini, "Fascism is... opposed to all individualistic abstractions based on eighteenth century materialism; and it is opposed to all Jacobinistic utopias and innovation^."^^ This was a direct renunciation of the currents of the

Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The Fascist state had to be held above the individual man, so "individualistic abstractions" were wholly inappropriate. The intellectual backlash against the French Revolution and the Enlightenment dating back to the late nineteenth century was essential for the spread of fascism; without these

30 Mussolini, Fascism, 8. 3' Mussolini, Fascism, 9. 32 Mussoli~ii,Fascism, 11. 33 Mussolini, Fascism, 10. historical trends toward individualism, an overcorrection into likely would

not have had the same appeal. 34 Mussolini was clear in his denunciation of

individualism: "Anti-individualistic, the Fascist conception of life stresses the importance

of the State and accepts the individual only in so far as his interests coincide with those of

the State, which stands for the conscience and the universal will of man as a historic

entity."35 The interests of the state superseded the interests of the individual, but

Mussolini claimed that this was actually what would allow individuals to flourish.

"Liberalism denied the State in the name of the individual; Fascism reasserts the rights of

the State as expressing the real essence of the individ~al."~~It was only in and through

the state that an individual could find his true expression. Mussolini did not permit any

expression outside the realm of the state.

His view on the supremacy of the state led Mussolini to denigrate democracy, for

democracy "which equates a nation to the majority, lowering it to the level of the largest number" was actually a degradation of the noble. 37 Fascism, he wrote, "is the purest

form of democracy if the nation be considered... from the point of view of quality rather than quantity."38 Other doctrines may have recognized the importance of the nation, but their conception of its relationship with the state was backwards. "It is not the nation which generates the State... Rather is it the State which creates the nation, conferring volition and therefore real life on a people made aware of their moral unity."39 For

Mussolini, the nation, a grouping of people with essential common characteristics, could

34 Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder and Maia Asheri, David Maisel (translator), The Birth of Fascist Ideology (Princeton: Princeton University, 1994), 3. 35 Mussolini, Fascism, 10. 36 Mussolini, Fascism, 10-11. 37 Mussolini, Fascism, 11. 38 Mussolini, Fascism, 12. '9 Mussolini, Fascism, 12. not predate the state. Only the state would allow an awareness of these characteristics to

come into being, and thus with them the existence of the nation.

Mussolini offered his doctrine of fascism as a "totalitarian" solution to the

problems of modernity. At least in theory, the philosophical beliefs contained in

Mussolini's definition were the driving force behind the Italian Fascists. Italy, though,

was not the only state where fascism played a significant role in public life. In those other countries, fascism often looked different than Mussolini's ideal model.

Fascism took on different forms in different parts of Europe (and the rest of the world), but many scholars contend that it is necessary to devise an over-arching definition of fascism which encompasses the various fascist movements. This approach may have to do with the moral opprobrium connoted by the word fascist, an opprobrium which most of these movements wholeheartedly deserve. Robert 0.Paxton defends the use of the concept of fascism for other reasons:

A real phenomenon exists. Indeed, fascism is the most original political novelty of the twentieth century... We must be able to examine this phenomenon as a system. It is not enough to treat each national case individually, as if each one constitutes a category in itself. If we cannot examine fascism synthetically, we risk being unable to understand this century, or the next4' The concept of fascism, then, can be analytically helpful if it is used carefully and judiciously. Which movements, however, should be considered fascist? The scholar

Stanley Payne has put forth a set of criteria for "generic" fascism. These criteria include the group being anti-communist, anti-liberal, and anti-conservative, while seeking an authoritarian state, an integrated economic structure, greater national standing, mass- mobilization, and heightened militarization. These traits are also accompanied by a

40 Paxton, "Five Stages," 9. strong sense of aesthetics, the importance of youth, charismatic leadership, and a positive

view toward ~iolence.~'These characteristics were certainly present in Mussolini's

Fascist party, the prototypical fascist movement, but did not all apply to Rex at all times.

' Payne's concept of generic fascism seems useful, but it may also lead to unwarranted assumptions about any movement commonly perceived as fascist. Rex in its early years certainly had some characteristics in common with Italian Fascism, for example, but there were perhaps even more areas where it differed. I argue that such attempts at over-arching definition are not necessarily helpful, and that applying judgment-laden labels to Rex throughout its existence does little to help explain the ideology and activity of the movement.

Stanley Payne glibly classifies "early Rex" as a movement of the "conservative right" and "late Rex" as a fascist group.42 How useful, though, are these labels? In the

1930s, Rex called for broad-reaching social changes and the amelioration of the condition of the poor, while railing against the financial system. Degrelle was many things, but

"conservative" in the traditional sense of the word was not one of them. In terms reminiscent of Mussolini, Degrelle claimed outright that he wanted a revolution of the soul, a regeneration of the Belgian spirit. Rex was never a "conservative" group, yet neither was it necessarily completely fascist.

From its inception as an independent political movement, Rex had numerous characteristics in common with other European fascist movements. It fulfilled all of

Payne's criteria for generic fascism at one time or another, but it is difficult to pinpoint when exactly Rex could first be rightly considered a fascist movement. To Martin

41 Stanley G. Payne, "Introduction," in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (ed.), JVho Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980),419. 42 Payne, A History of Fascism, 15. Conway, perhaps the foremost English language scholar studying Degrelle, "At different stages in their political evolution, the Rexists were Catholic authoritarians, Poujadist populists, and National ~ocialists."~Most would agree that during the war, when Rex espoused a philosophy of Nazi-style National Socialism, it fit into any reasonable definition of fascism, but the issue is less clear cut at the other stages of Rex's career.44

Some scholars refer to Rex as a fascist party when describing events as early as 1935, but it would be hard to make this case convincingly without the benefit of knowledge of what came later.45 11 may be more useful to describe and attempt to explain the philosophy of

Rex at various points in time than to attempt to determine when Rex should be considered fascist.

Before the electoral disappointment of 1937, Rex was not an openly fascist movement. Degrelle and some of his followers may well have had fascist inclinations with respect to the value of democracy, but they tried to keep them out of public discourse. Once it became clear that Rex was no longer politically viable, Rex publicly committed itself more and more to fascist tenets. Certainly at the very latest by the beginning of collaboration with the Germans in 1940, Rex could rightly be considered fascist.

Rex was not even the first "fascist" party in Belgium. A description of the Legion

Nationale, a very different political grouping from Rex, can be helpful in illustrating the wide range of possibilities that fall under the umbrella of fascism. The Legion Nationale,

43 Conway, Collaboration, 4. The Poujadists were a group of 1950s French populists inspired by Pierre Poujade. 44 Though National Socialism has a strong racial component that is not necessarily prominent in other variants of fascism, the other essential characteristics of fascism are present in National Socialism. 45 See, for example: Kossman, The Low Countries, 599. founded in 1922 by ex-servicemen, was "totally fascist, without ever growing into a true mass movement." 46 The group was led by M.P. Hoornaert, a World War One veteran.47

In a 1927 sample issue of La Lkgion Nationale Belge, the group's newspaper, the

Legion laid out its political philosophy. "Object: Prepare the coming of a regime of order, authority, discipline, hierarchy and , by the fight against the elements of the dissociation of the Nation and by the suppression of the government of parties.""8 The LBgion sought order above all things, a highly authoritarian desire. In this piece, it was not made explicit what "social democracy" would have entailed, but it certainly would not have consisted of a government of elected officials. The group was highly distrustful of parliamentary democracy and had no pretense of electoral aspirations, but believed that it would win over the bourgeoisie by protecting them from anarchy stemming from the left.49 Against the forces of anarchy were arrayed the

Legion's paramilitary black shirts, forceful "men of tomorrow" who defended "our traditions and our work against anarchy from wherever it ~ornes.''~~

A significant portion of the Legion's newspaper was devoted to a discussion of its various enemies. The paper featured an article brimming with anti-Flemish ~entiment,~' possibly stemming from Flemish collaborationism in the First World War, but the strongest criticisms were reserved for Germany and Germans. One story referred to

46 Wusten, "The Low Countries," 214,225,223. Wusten's use of the word "fascism" to describe the Legion seems justified, given its political beliefs and ideology. 47 Hoornaert is certainly not a Walloon name, but the Legion was a Walloon party. 48 "Objet: Preparer l'avbnement d'un regime d'ordre, d'autoritk, de discipline, de hierarchie et de democratie sociale, par la lutte contre les elements de dissociation de la Nation et par la suppression du gouvernement des partis." La Lkgion Nationale Belge (7 August 1927), 1. 49 Victor Lagae, "Les chemises noires," in La Lkgion Nationale Belge (7 August 1927), 2. "Hommes de demain, vous defendez nos traditions et nos travaux contre I'anarchie d'ou qu'elle vienne." Lagae, "Les chemises noires," in La Lkgion Nationale Belge (7 August 1927), 2. Again, compare this to the Italian model. 5' "Gare a l'offensive des demagogues et des flamingants" in La Lkgion Nutionale Belge (7 August 1927), 0 Germans as "boches," a traditional French anti-German epithet.52 Throughout, the paper

was distrustful of Germany's aims. Future events, of course, would prove this distrust to

be justified. In the article "Belges, ouvrez les Yeux" [Belgians, open your eyes], one lkgionnaire made a prophetic prediction. "The peace, the precarious peace of Versailles, is threatened: because the German mentality has not changed; because Germany is preparing materially for war; because the German-Soviet collusion threatens Poland,

Belgium and

Though the Lkgion Nationale was "fascist," it was also extremely patriotic and had no loyiilties to Hitler's National Socialism. When the Germans invaded Belgium in

1940, the Legionnaires put up armed resistance, in stark contrast to many of the other right-wing extremist parties. The Legion's chief, Hoornaert, was captured by the

Germans and died in a concentration camp.54 It is important to recognize, though, that this opposition to Hitler was by no means anti-fascist, as nationalism is one of the characteristics of fascism. By contrast, Degrelle showed no such nationalistic qualms about collaborating with Hitler. Was Degrelle, then, less fascist? He was certainly less of a Belgian nationalist. Particularly given the differences in their wartime behavior, it does not seem very useful to categorize both the Legion Nationale and Rex as falling under the same political and philosophical framework. Perhaps Rex was fascist, but so too was the Lkgion. Using the word in the case of these two Belgian political movements can have the effect of concealing more than it reveals.

52 "La controverse belgo-allemande," in La Ldgion Nationale Belge (7 August 1927), 2. 53 "Le paix, le precaire paix de Versailles, est menacte: Parce que la mentaliti allernand n'a pas chang6; Parce que l'hllemagne se prdpare matiriellement a la guerre; Parce que la collusion germano-soviitique menace la Pologne, la Belgique et la France [emphasis in the original]." Victor Lagae, "Belges, ouvrez les Yeux," in La Ligion Nationale Belge (7 August 1927), 2. 54 Wusten, "The Low Countries," 225. A Note on Sources

During his life, Degrelle wrote voluminously on a plethora of topics in books, magazines, and newspapers. He also wrote poetry and gave incredibly extensive interviews to multiple journalists. The transcript of his interviews with French journalist

Jean-Michel Charlier in the 1970s, for example, runs to over 400 pages, while a series of interviews with Wim Dannau published in 1973 take up thirteen volumes. Degrelle never ran out of things to say, but his favorite topic later in life seemed to be himself.

When reading different pieces by Degrelle, the one commonality that shows through most strongly is Degrelle's incredibly high estimation of his own worth.

Unfortunately, Degrelle also had a penchant for taking liberties with numerous facts, making it impossible to take his words at face value. Degrelle always seemed to say what he thought would place him in the best light, rather than feeling bound by what actually happened during a given event. For this reason, despite the fact that the massive amount of written material by Degrelle would seem to be the most obvious source of information about his life and political beliefs, one must be circumspect about relying on such material since it is difficult to determine whether or not he was telling the truth about any particular topic.

Degrelle's works, though, are still invaluable. Though they may not be trustworthy as far as accuracy is concerned, they do reveal how Degrelle wished to be perceived at certain moments of his life, and what issues he believed to be important. In addition, Rexist journals are a valuable source of information on the party's philosophy and political ideology. Also helpful in this respect are books written by high-ranking Rexists, like Jean Denis, or Rexist sympathizers, like . These works are

certainly not even-handed in their approaches, but they are nonetheless excellent indicators of Rexist strategies and priorities. I have used sources from throughout the

1930s and early 1940s to chart the progression of Rex's beliefs.

Chapter Outline

Chapter two traces the early years of Degrelle and Christus Rex, and the beginning of Degrelle9sreign at the head of the Christus Rex publishing house, continuing until Rex's split with the Association catholique de la jeunesse belge. I argue that this period informed the later development of Rex in profound ways, as could be seen in Rex's evolving relationship with the Catholic Church and the political mainstream, and that for this reason understanding this period is essential to understanding the history of Rex as a whole.

In chapter three I examine Degrelle9spush for political independence and the highpoint of the Rexist movement. Degrelle consciously worked to separate Rex from the Catholic Party in the public mind, before finally making the split official during an incident that became known as the Coup de Courtrai. Rex rode this momentum to its surprising performance in its first parliamentary contest. There seemed to be no limit on

Rex's future, and Degrelle was careful to use relatively moderate rhetoric in order to maintain his popularity.

The confidence that Degrelle drew from Rex's electoral success in 1936, though, led him to make a series of disastrous missteps, which I investigate in chapter four. After his electoral humiliation in 1937, Degrelle turned Rex in an increasingly fascist direction and became openly scornful of electoral democracy. The idealism of Rex's early days was gone, replaced with a newfound cynicism. When Germany invaded Belgium in

1940, the evolution of Degrelle's ideology had made him ready to do business with the

Nazis.

In chapter five I touch briefly on Degrelle's wartime activities. I also consider the increasingly anti-Semitic character of Rex after 1937, an anti-Semitism which Degrelle may always have felt but was careful to keep relatively veiled when he sought electoral legitimacy. I conclude with brief reflections on Degrelle's political career and the sighificance of Rex. Chapter %-The Birth of Rex

Degrelle: Early Life and Background

Lkon Degrelle would become an infamous figure in Belgium, notorious for his

whole-hearted collaboration with the Nazis. Degrelle the collaborationist, though, did not

spring forth out of whole cloth. An examination of his early life can, and hopefully will,

prove quite instructive, as certain of Degrelle's themes and patterns, such as political

opportunism and an often uneasy relationship with the Catholic Church and the Belgian

political elite, were established early on and then repeated again and again. The political

and strategic choices that Degrelle made during the Nazi occupation were linked to

choices he had made and experiences he had lived earlier in life. In this chapter, I begin

by outlining Degrelle's early years, and go on to consider the Christus Rex publishing

house and Degrelle's assumption of leadership, continuing through Rex's split with the

Association catholique de la jeunesse belge.

Degrelle was born in 1906 in the rural Ardennes countryside in the Belgian

province of Luxembourg into a comfortably middle class family.' Degrelle's father was of French origin, though this never made Degrelle particularly (or at all) pro-French in his politics. LPon was one of eight children, which, according to Degrelle, was the average number of children in all of the Degrelle families since 1590.~He himself would

1 F.L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism (Berkeley: University of California, 1969), 160. 2 Jean-Michel ~tienne,Le Mouvement Rexiste Jusqu 'en 1940 (Paris: Eibrairie Armand Colin, 1968), 108. "can-Michel Charlier, Lion Degrelle: Prrsiste et Signe (Paris: Editions Jean Picollec, 1985), 26. later go on to father six children with his wife.4 The large size of the Degrelle family

probably stemmed from a devout Catholicism.

Degrelle9s family was deeply Catholic. So many Degrelles joined religious orders

that a bishopfriend of the family remarked that "they are Jesuits from father to son."5 In

an interview with French journalist Jean-Michel Charlier in the 1970s' Degrelle himself

described his family's religious beliefs: "All of the Degrelles have always been

profoundly Christian. We are believers down to the marrow... I am penetrated by the God

who lives inside me."6 ~ivenDegrelle's professed religious beliefs and his family

background, it is not surprising that he started his political life in the Catholic Party.

Catholicism had a deep and lasting influence on Degrelle's life, but in his telling, at least, he never considered becoming a Jesuit. When his father asked him as a boy what he would be when he grew up, the ever ambitious Degrelle is purported to have answered

"prime mini~ter."~Despite Degrelle's high hopes, the post of prime minister was one that would always elude him.

Lkon was by no means the first politician in the Degrelle family. His father was the permanent deputy of the province of Belgian Luxembourg, and Leon's maternal grandfather was "one of the leaders of the ~i~ht."~From childhood, then, Degrelle was exposed to Belgian politics. He would chart his own course, though, choosing to support a politics different fiom that of both his father and grandfather.

Charlier, Degrelle, 26. "Chez les Degrelle, on est Jesuite de pbre en fils." ~tienne,Mouvement, 9. "TOUSles Degrelles ont toujours ete profondement chretiens. Nous sommes croyants jusqu'a la moelle... Je suis p6nCtre par ce Dieu qui vit en moi." Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 27-28. Robert Brasillach, Histoire de la Guerre d 'Espagne: Mkmoires, suivi de Lkon Degrelle et L 'avenir de "Rex" ([Paris]: Plon, 1969), 480. "un des leaders de la Droite." Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 27. In various interviews he gave as an adult, Degrelle was highly conscious of the

history of his family and his home, and of that history's effect on his political career. In a

1930s interview with Robert Brasillach, a French journalist later executed for

colladoration with the Nazis, Degrelle traced his family history for four hundred years,

painting an idealized portrait of the decency and moral values of the countryside where

he was born. "It was of that that Rex was born, there is no doubt. It is that which I want

to rebuild and re~reate."~Degrelle's positive feelings about his own childhood likely had

a significant effect on his politics. At the same time, the way that Degrelle portrayed his

childhood in the 1930s was likely also an attempt to cast himself and Rex in a favorable light.

Degrelle's love of the countryside surely influenced his politics. According to

Alan Cassels, a scholar of fascism, in his political ideology in the 1930s Degrelle

yearned to return to a pastoral, idyllic utopia... Thepourris [rotten ones] were abominated because their wealth came from commerce and manufacturing, but Rexist propaganda made no comparable attack on landed property, for in the countryside and its traditional patterns lay the best hope of national regeneration.I0 It seems reasonable to assume that the "pastoral, idyllic utopia" that Degrelle envisioned would have been remarkably similar to the one that he waxed nostalgic about from his childhood experiences in his home region. A pure countryside could also be presented in opposition to the corruption of modem cities and twentieth century urban life. If modern urbanization was the problem, then a return to the values of the countryside could be the solution.

"CC'estde la que Rex est nk, il ne faut pas en douter. C'est cela que je veux refaire et recrier." Degrelle quoted in Brasillach, Histoire, 477. 10 Alan Cassels, Fascism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975), 247. The Ardennes did not remain peaceful throughout Degrelle's childhood, as war intruded upon the countryside in 1914. Degrelle was still a child when World War One began, and, during the war, he experienced first-hand Germany's occupation of Belgium.

Many Belgians were understandably embittered by the harsh German treatment of their country, and had no great love for Germany either during or after the war. Germany had remorselessly plundered Belgium, and Belgium had found itself the site of many of the war's most ferocious battles. Degrelle9sfather was decorated with the Lkgion of Honor for his surveillance work on behalf of French forces during the war." Degrelle recognized that the war was incredibly destructive for Belgium, but, unlike many other nationalist Belgians, he never expressed particularly anti-German sentiments. Degrelle seemed to draw different lessons from the experience of German occupation than did most of his compatriots. In his discussions with Robert Brasillach in the 1930s, he was relatively neutral on the subject of Germany and the effects of the war on his home region. While he was not harshly critical, he was also careful not to say anything overly positive about Germany.12 As with many of Degrelle's political opinions, though, as time went on he either changed his viewpoint on this subject or he was simply more willing to voice what he had really thought all along.

In his 1970s interviews with Charlier from exile, Degrelle struck a much different note about WWI and the fate of Belgium under the Germans. WWI, according to

Degrelle,

had... considerable repercussions on my development because we all learned, during those years, to hate the Germans... that was the case... in all of the West. That was a horrifying

11 Charlier, Degrelle, 29. l2 Brasillach, Histoire, 479. thing because it was that blind, unreasoning, almost savage hatred which threw Europe in 1939 into a second civil war.13 To the Degrelle of the 1970s, hatred of Germany based on the experience of WWI had

been foolish and shortsighted, and had helped to bring about the next war with Germany.

This was a German apologist account of the war; Germany had been an incredibly harsh

occupying power, and a hatred of it by Belgians was not necessarily "unreasoning." For

this reason, Degrelle's sentiment would certainly not have been popular in 1930s

Belgium, and he was careful not to appear pro-German or pro-Hitler while he still cared

about his electoral viability.

In the years after WWI, Degrelle became politically active for the first time as a

university student. For a time, he attended the college of Namur, run by ~esuits'~and

considered to be "one of the bastions of the Action Fran~aisein Belgium," and he started

but did not complete his studies at the University of ~0uvain.l~His intellectual affinity

for Charles Mamas emerged while Degrelle was studying at Namur. The periodical

Cahiers de la Jeunesse catholique organized a poll to determine who Belgium's young people most looked up to as a philosophical inspiration. Degrelle successfully campaigned for , who ended up with 66% of the votes. Degrelle, of course, credited Maurras's strong performance to his own efforts at getting out the vote.16

He would later claim that the fact that Mamas won the vote so infuriated the Catholic hierarchy that it led, through a complex series of events, to the Church's condemnation of

l3 "WWI "a eu... une repercussion considerable sur mon dkveloppement parce que nous avons tous appris, pendant des annees, A haTr les Allemands... ce fut le cas... de tout ]'Occident. Ce fut une chose effroyable parce que c'est cette haine aveugle, irraisonnee, sauvage presque, qui a prtcipitk l'Europe, en 1939, dans une deuxi6me guerre civile." Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 28. " Charlier, Degrelle, 27. l5 Luc Schepens, "Fascists and Nationalists in Belgium 1919- 1940," in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bemt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (ed.), Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 506. l6 Charlier, Degrelle, 39. Actionfian~aiseand Maurras in 1927.17 After the Church exommunicated Maurras,

Degrelle and his friends believed that it was their responsibility to save Belgium by

taking up Maurras's torch. l8

After moving from Namur to the University of Louvain, Degrelle emerged on the

national stage for the first time. He reveled in being the center of attention, and there

were few boundaries to what he would do to publicize himself. Degrelle's first real claim to fame was as a practical joker on a grand scale. While at university, he orchestrated a large, incredibly elaborate prank. He published a piece in the school paper using the family nanie Dumas, and then made up a group of fictional descendants of Alexandre

Dumas to be offended by this unjust appropriation of the name. He hired a made-up lawyer on their behalf, and proceeded to sue himself. When the case went to trial,

Degrelle took the opportunity to speak in open court before revealing that it was all an elaborate hoax.19 The charade seems largely to have been an attempt to increase the circulation of the student newspaper by drawing attention to it.20 Perhaps surprisingly, no one was particularly annoyed by Degrelle's stunt and it was laughed off, which may have had to do with the European tradition of elaborate school pranks.

l7 Charlier, Degrelle, 40. This story is related by Degrelle, so it should be taken with a considerable grain of salt. Degrelle's role in the vote calling Maurras the foremost philosopher for Belgium's youth seems entirely plausible, though the claim that Degrelle himself caused the pope to take action seems rather fanciful. l8 "Maurras condamne, les jeunes gens de Louvain et Leon Degrelle penshrent qu'ils devaient d'abord essayer eux-m&mesde sauver leur pays et leur propre humanite." Brasillach, Histoire, 485. One of Degrelle's "jeunes collaborateurs" at this time was Jose Streel, later one of Rex's top theoreticians, who would break with Rex in 1943 over Degrelle's abject collaboration with the Nazis. Martin Conway, Collaboration in Belgium: Ldon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement, 1940-1944 (New Haven: Yale University, 1993), 176. After the Maurras episode, Degrelle flunked his end of year examination in philosophy and letters, a fact which he blamed on a Jesuit professor who had been offended by Degrelle's support of Maurras. He left Namur and continued his studies at the University of Louvain. Charlier, Degrelle, 41. l9 ~tienne,Mouvement, 11-12; Charlier, Degrelle, 44-47. 20 Charlier, Degrelle, 46-47. This entire episode may seem more pointlessly bizarre than particularly noteworthy. A consideration of the prank, however, may help to provide some insights into Degrelle's character. Degrelle had an insatiable need for attention, and such a stunt was ohe way to gain the attention that Degrelle so ardently desired. It is hard for a university student to do something extraordinary and become well known, and perhaps this prank offered a kind of shortcut. Degrelle's self-promotion was a success in so far as he was able to parlay his newfound notoriety into an offer to write for a prominent

Catholic newspaper.21

I At the age of twenty and still a student, Degrelle accepted the newspaper's offer, eventually leaving the university, and he embarked upon a multi-part expose of life in the slums in order to educate the Belgian public about how the poor lived.22 Looking back on this period of his life, he later contended that he and his like-minded friends were

"much more socially conscious than the 'mamamouchis' of the , who had become a bureaucratized part of the bourgeoisie, no longer having guts, almost all of whom are corrupt, having lost faith in their cause."23 Though Degrelle was a fierce opponent of Marxism and bolshevism, he was by no means unconscious of social issues.

The problem with socialism to Degrelle was that the Socialist Party had become stagnant and corrupt, not that it had started out with bad intentions. Degrelle would later hammer home these themes of stagnation and corruption in his political campaigns of the 1930s.

Degrelle's concern for the socio-economically marginalized extended from the

Belgian poor to Mexican Catholics. Not long after he left Louvain, Degrelle traveled to

21 Charlier, Degrelle, 47. 22 Charlier, Degrelle, 47-48. Thus, this must have occurred in 1926 or 1927. 23 "bien plus sociaux que les mamamouchis du Parti Socialiste, embourgeois6s, bureaucratises depuis longtemps, n'ayant plus la tripe populaire, presque tous cormnipus, ayant perdu la foi dans leur cause." Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 48. Mexico to investigate the mistreatment of Catholics by the revolutionary regime there.

Degrelle had already established himself as an enemy of the Mexican regime with his

comments about the assassination of the anticlerical Mexican president Obreg6n by

Torral. About the killing, Degrelle wrote "To each new Torral, we will cry with all of our heart: bravo!"24 Because of this, Degrelle traveled on false papers to avoid trouble with the Mexican a~thorities.~~He spent three months touring in Mexico, and eventually sold the series of articles that resulted from his travels for a substantial sum of money to an American newspaper.26~fter his stay in Mexico, Degrelle attempted to enter the

United States but had problems because of his false documentation. With the intercession of a California bishop, Degrelle was eventually able to cross the border into the Unfortunately, details about the links between the American bishop and

Degrelle, and about his travels within the US, are not readily available.

Even with limited information, Degrelle's Mexican exploits are quite significant for understanding how he saw himself and the world. Clearly, Degrelle was concerned with events outside of his home in Belgium. He would right wrongs the world over, protecting Catholics from a godless, anticlerical revolutionary regime. Degrelle made a link between Catholics at home and Catholics abroad, seeing the need for religious solidarity. To him, a threat to Catholics anywhere was an affront to Catholics everywhere.

24 "A chaque nouveau Torral, nous nous Ccrierons de tout notre coeur: bravo!" Degrelle quoted in ~tienne, Mouvement, 13. 25 Brasillach, Histoire, 487. This inference of a causal link is my own. Degrelle definitely traveled under false papers because he had criticized the Mexican regime, and he definitely made such comments about Torral. Because of this, it seems a reasonable assumption that these were the particular comments that would not have endeared him to the regime had it known of his presence. 26 Degrelle was paid 18,000 francs for his work, after making his first contact with a representative of the newspaper by chance. Brasillach, Histoire, 490. Unfortunately, I do not know to what newspaper Degrelle sold his articles. 27 Brasillach, Histoire, 491. This incident also shows that Degrelle was a risk taker, traveling through Mexico on false papers with little or no care for what would happen to him if he were caught by the regime. Degrelle was equally unconcerned about crossing into the United States under false identification. For the entire Mexican episode, it is not clear where the line between a genuine care for fellow Catholics in need and the desire for the excitement of something new was drawn.

It is difficult not to see a parallel between Degrelle's rather cavalier attitude toward his Mexican adventure and the way he later enthusiastically spoke of the war in the Soviet Union as a crusade. Historically, a crusade is not only a religious conflict, but also an opportunity to escape the ordinary, to visit exotic locations while killing the locals. In an interview in the 1970s, Degrelle himself likened his participation in the fighting in the USSR during WWII to the Crusades.

Our house... was across fi-om the enormous feudal castle of Godefroid of Bouillon, the leader of the first Crusade. Thus, from my earliest consciousness, I was immersed in the Crusades! I left for the conquest of Soviet Russia in 1941 like my Bouillonais predecessor assaulted Jerusalem in 1099!'~ Whether or not Degrelle was actually thinking about Godefroid of Bouillon in 1941, which seems highly doubtful, in hindsight the connection was clear to him. For Degrelle, the fight against bolshevism was morally equivalent to a religious war, a defense of

Chstianity. The war against the Soviet Union was fought in order to protect Europe kom the expansion of godless communism, with Nazi Germany as the West's savior. It may provide insi&t into Degrelle's priorities to observe that he cast the war in religious terms and himself as a defender of the faith. In 1930 the great Crusade of Degrelle's life

-- -

28 "Notre maison... face a l'tnorme chgteau fkodal de Godefroid de Bouillon, celui-la yui fut le chef de la Premiere Croisade. Ainsi, des mes premiers regards, j'ai Cte en plein dans les Croisades! Je suis parti a la conqu8te de la Russie sovietique en 1941 comme mon devancier bouillonnais avait Ctt prendre d'assaut Jerusalem en 1099!" Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 25. still lay in the distant future, but he had already embarked on a crusade to defend oppressed Catholics around the world in traveling to Mexico.

The concept of a crusade was by no means the only significant aspect of

Degrelle9stime in North America. Degrelle's tour of the United States occurred in the midst of the Great Depression, and although Belgium was never as badly affected by the

Depression as was the US, witnessing such a devastating failure of capitalism must have influenced Degrelle's thinking. In 1930, Degrelle saw first hand the results of the

Depression, and the lessons he took from it about the fallibility of capitalism seem to have stuck with him.

Degrelle returned to Belgium from his American tour in 1930 at the age of 24.29

Degrelle had already learned how to grab the spotlight and had traveled abroad in support of oppressed Catholics. As a young man, Degrelle was also occupied with more artistic endeavors. In 1930, Degrelle published a poem entitled "My country does me wrong," containing the line "I like to crush the hits and trample on the roses."30 Whatever the artistic merits of the piece, it is clear that Degrelle was fond of violent, forceful imagery, perhaps in an attempt to shock the reader's sensibilities. This can also be seen as foreshadowing things to come. Degrelle's life as a public figure was about to truly begin.

Ghristus Rex

Degrelle's rise to prominence in Belgian politics stemmed from his energetic leadership of the ~ditionsRex (fiom "Christus Rex") publishing house. Before discussing Degrelle's work as a publisher, it is first necessary to consider the scope of

29 Brasillach, Histoire, 493,491. 30 "Mon pays me fait ma1... J'aime Ccraser les hits et pietiner les roses." Degrelle quoted in ~tienne, ~Wouvement,12. Catholic political action in Belgium. More generally, it is also essential to examine the

phenomenon of Christus Rex itself

The term Christus Rex, Latin for "Chst the King," refers to a religious edict by

Pope Pius XI in 1925. Pius wanted to encourage "devotion to the earthly majesty of

Christ" in an attempt to produce a "more vibrant Catholicism," a regeneration of faith and

morality. 31 At this time, the Church wanted to become more active in public life, and the

effects of this were felt across Europe. According to the historian Martin Conway,

"during the inter-war years, almost all of the countries of Catholic Europe witnessed the

emergence of a strong intellectual and political current which in the name of the Catholic

faith rejected the principles and values of parliamentary liberal democracy."32 This

dissatisfaction with the current political system in many European countries seemed to

correspond with the Church's relative loss of influence in those same countries.

To many Europeans in this period, democracy seemed moribund and decaying.

They turned to the revolutionary doctrines of fascism and communism in droves for these

dynamic political movements appeared as alternatives to the perceived banality and mundane nature of democratic politics. Christus Rex thus proposed Catholicism as a

third alternative to parliamentary liberal democracy, one that was separate from both fascism and communism. In so doing, the Church offered a blueprint for a political life

guided by the teachings of the Church.

The tension between Catholicism and parliamentary democracy was felt in

Belgium as well. King Albert's decision to move to a system of equal, universal manhood suffrage post-World War One had been spurred by heavy pressure from the

" Martin Conway, "Building the Christian City: Catholics and Politics in Inter-War Francophone Belgium," Past and Present, No. 128 (Aug., 1990), 124. 32 Conway, "Building the Christian City," 117. , "le Parti ouvrier belge" [Belgian Workers' This move to

true universal suffrage

had been opposed by the primate of Belgium, Cardinal Mercier, and by much of the traditional Catholic political elite, and there were many-especially among the &ancophone Catholic bourgeoisie-who bitterly regretted the era of mass politics and power-sharing which it had inaugurated.34 The Catholic Party had previously been completely dominant in Belgian politics, but the

one man, one vote principle ended its overwhelming preponderance, and the Church could no longer count on the Catholic Party necessarily being able to protect its interests.

This transformation of Belgian politics helped augment the popularity of the ideology of Maurras's Action frangaise. Many Belgian Catholics believed that a more authoritarian system of government would be more effective than parliamentary democracy. Despite the fact that the Catholic Party was usually the strongest in Belgium, many Catholics were frustrated with modernity and the perceived decay of Catholic values.35 Alienated Catholics' critique of politics included the belief that "Behind the fagade of parliamentary rule, real power was exercised by the Freemasons, the industrial elite and the political parties who subjected the country to the 'absurdities, falsehoods, deceptions and other perversions of the mind'. ..of election campaigns."36 Despite the popularity of Action frangaise among Belgian Catholics, though, the movement proved to be a cause of concern to the Catholic Church. Possibly in part because of its growing popularity in Belgium, the pope condemned Action frangaise in 1926, and this

33 Jean-Marie Delaunois, De I 'Action catholique ti la collaboration: Jose' Streel (Bourtembourg: editions Legrain, 1993), 17-18. 34 Conway, "Building the Christian City," 120. 35 Pierre-Henri Laurent, "Belgian Rexisnl and Leon Degrelle," in George L. Mosse, International Fascism: New Thoughts and New Approaches (London: Institute of Contemporary History, 1979), 296. 36 Conway, "Building the Christian City," 121. These ideas will seem highly familiar when discussing Degrelle's political philosophy. It is probably no coincidence that Degrelle hated Freemasons and excoriated political parties and the "hypercapitalists." condemnation "appears to have been widely respected in ~el~ium."'~Though most

Belgians now moved away from Actionfranqaise, Degrelle would prove to be less easily dissuaded than many Belgians from this kind of AF-style authoritarian thinking.38

~egrLllealso had like-minded pro-authoritarian allies within the Belgian church hierarchy, including, most importantly, Monsignor Louis Picard.

Franciscan Monsignor Louis Picard proved to be highly influential in Degrelle's life, an assessment with which Degrelle surely agreed. In a 1982 interview, Degrelle stated that

I of all my memories of Belgium, the one that moves me the most, to the bottom of my soul and heart together, is that of Monsignor Picard. For me, he was the man who was both the most modest and the most saintly that I ever knew... we became close friends, with relations that were like those between father and son.39 The two men met in 1927, and "Picard, like many ecclesiastics, found himself seduced by the words and the pen of the student Leon ~egrelle."~~Degrelle had great charisma, and was a highly effective speaker and writer, even at a young age. Nevertheless, in the estimation of scholar Charles d'ydewalle, "without the Franciscan priest who was incapable of lying, Leon Degrelle would not have existed" in the way that he did." To

Ydewalle, Picard created Degrelle as a political force. Through his relationship with

Monsignor Picard, Degrelle gained his greatest opportunity yet.

37 Conway, "Building the Christian City," 122. 38 Though many other Belgians may still have privately supported the ideas ofdction fmn~aise,I have seen nothing regarding any public acknowledgement of such a fact. 39 "de tous mes souvenirs de la Belgique, celui qui m'tmeut le plus, mais jusqu'au fond de l'brne et du coeur, les deux ensemble, c'est monseigneur Picard. Pour moi, c'est l'homme ?ila fois le plus modeste et le plus saint que j'ai connu... nous sommes devenus des amis intimes, avec presque des relations de pere a fils." Degrelle quoted in Jean-Marie Frtrotte, Lbon Degrelle, le dernierfasciste (Bruxelles: Paul Eegrain, 1987), 40. 40 "Picard, comme beaucoup d'ecclBsiastiques, se laissa s6duire par le verbe et la plume de cet etudiant qui s'appelait Leon Degrelle." Charles d7Ydewalle,Degrelle ou la triple imposture (Bmxelles: Pierre Be Meykre, 1968), 49. " "sans ce prEtre de moeurs franciscaines et incapable de mentir, Lton Degrelle a'ht pas existe." Ydewalle, Degrelle ou la triple imposture, 39. Picard7s cordial feelings for Degrelle alone would not have been particularly

significant without Picard's connections. In 1921, Picard had founded the Association

catholique de la jeunesse belge, the Catholic Association of Belgian Youth [ACJB].~~

Following the lead of Pope Pius XI, in the mid-1 920s Picard placed the principles of

Christus Rex in the forefront of the ACJB.~~Traditional youth organizations of the

Catholic Party had been prominent before World War One, "but they virtually disappeared after the war as the young preferred to devote themselves to the spiritual crusades of the A.c.J.B."" Post-war Catholic youth in Belgium sought to change the country's political system, to bring about something new and fi-esh, which is what the

ACJB promoted. As Conway described,

Individual liberty, Picard and others declared, was an outmoded value and the need was for a 'strong power, capable of imposing on selfish interests the stern commands of the common good.' Order, discipline and authority were seen as essential components of the harmoniously constructed state.45 In this instance, this kind of anti-liberal thinking was not mandated by the church hierarchy, but rather arose from common-minded Belgian Catholic intellectuals who were displeased with their country's course.

Degrelle became a prominent member in the ACJB movement after forming a relationship with Picard. According to Conway, Degrelle's "irrepressible socjability and exuberance went hand in hand with an enthusiasm for the spiritual ideals of the

A.C.J.B.," and the ACJB was highly influential in Degrelle's life." The platform of the

42 Conway, "Building the Christi 43 Conway, "Building the Christian City," 124. 44 Conway, "Building the Christian City," 128. 45 Conway, "Building the Christian City," 132-133. 46 Conway, "Building the Christian City," 141. ACJB gave Degrelle a chance to get his start in activism, and it was through his work

with the ACJB that Degrelle7s relationship with Picard deepened.

The ACJB was not controlled by the Catholic Party. It took up causes that were not dictated by the party, but rather were of the ACJB's own choosing. In general,

"Catholic Action groups were not intended to act as the adjuncts of Catholic political parties, but to operate in the spiritual sphere where their mission was.. .to strengthen and to deepen the Catholic faith."47 One way that the ACJB sought to accomplish this goal was by gaining influence in the publishing world. According to one historian's rendition, the Editions Rex religious publishing house was established in Louvain in 1926 by the

ACJB which, in October 1930, appointed Degrelle to head Editions ex.^^ Rex published weekly magazines like Rex, a literary journal, and Vlan, with commentary on politics and current events.49 Pierre Daye, a close ally of Degrelle, described the aims of

Rex, as "a journal which has as its goal the renovation of Christian life."50 Never having graduated from university, Degrelle was nonetheless talented enough that he had been appointed to take on the highly significant task of leading the charge of promoting

Catholic action for the ACJB.~'Though Rex was a small publishing house, and its

47 Conway, "Building the Christian City," 123. 48 ~tienne,Mouvement, 14. Ydewalle, though, presents a different timeline of events. According to him, the Editions Rex religious publishing house, affiliated with the ACJB, had been established in 1929, and became a cooperative society in 1931. Ydewalle, Degrelle ou la triple imposture, 50. 49 he fbll titles of the journals were REX Toute la Vie des Lettres and VLAN: Toute la Vie Politique. In March of 1934, the two journals were amalgamated and Erom that point on were published together. ~tienne,Mouvement, 22. 50 "Rex est un journal qui se donne pour objet de rCnover la vie chr6tienne." Pierre Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Rexisme (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1937), 61. 51 Degrelle would buy Rex in 1933. ~tienne,Mouvement, 1. Laurent reports that Degrelle bought and then named the publishing house, but other sources present the name as predating Degrelle's ownership. It is reasonable to believe that the name probably came first, as Editions Rex was closely connected to the ACJB and Mgr. Picard was a strong proponent of the Christus Rex movement. I do not know why there is so much confbsion in the secondary sources over the chronology of events concerning the founding of Rex Laurent, "Belgian Rexism," 303. financial future was often in jeopardy, this would mark the beginning of Degrelle's grand entrance onto the Belgian political stage.52

During this time, the Catholic Party saw potential in Degrelle and put him in charge of election propaganda ahead of the 1932 electoral contest.53 Degrelle was a rising star, and it seemed highly possible, and perhaps even likely, that he would have a bright future within the Catholic Party. Degrelle represented the youth, and he sought to shift the balance of power within the party away from the entrenched elite. Unlike the leaders of European non-democratic movements such as the Nazi and Fascist parties, had

Degrelle simply stayed within the mainstream party he likely would have gone on to have quite a successful career in Belgian politics (albeit a career interrupted by World War 11).

It is important to recognize that Degrelle and the other leaders of Rex were not "like the

Italian or Nazi leaders, a 'gang7 of social failures and unemployed intellectual^."^^

Much of Degrelle's potential for success stemmed from his incredible charisma.

Raphael Sindic, after dropping out of the Rexist movement in the late 1930s, reflected back on Degrelle's ability to keep people loyal to the cause even in times of hardship. It is important to keep in mind that this quote came from a pamphlet meant to discourage support for Rex among the Belgian public after Sindic had become disillusioned with

Rex and disgusted with Degrelle's leadership. Sindic's superlative-laden sentiments about Degrelle are worth quoting at length:

LCon Degrelle appeared to me, around 1932-1933, like a hero from legends and dreams, powerful and magnificent, very handsome and very pure and my great desire was to be at his side to aid him in his task and to fight alongside him... I devoted myself body and soul

52 By 1934 Rex suffered from heavy debts, and was at times on the verge of bankruptcy. ~tienne, Mouvement, 22-23. 53 Schepens, 'Tascists and Nationalists," 507. 54 Leaders of Rex "ne sont, commes les dirigeants italiens ou nazis, un 'gang' de rat& sociaux et d'intellectuels en ch6mage." ~tienne,Mouvement, 75. to an ideal in which I believed and which impassioned me, and when, after the second or third bankruptcy of Rex, I again found myself almost without a cent on the pavement of , my nourishment bread and water and wallung for kilometers on foot to save the price of a tram, I did not have a sole word of reproach for him.55 Degrelle7s energy was infectious, and he was able to keep others motivated even when the future of their endeavor looked bleak. Such was Degrelle7s promise at the beginning of the 1930s as a rising star within a leading Belgian political party and as a prominent

Catholic journalist who was seen as speaking for Belgian Catholic youth.

The Early Years of Rex

The Christus Rex movement provided the context in which Degrelle got his start in politics. Degrelle may or may not have had a heartfelt belief in the principles of

Christus Rex, but, either way, he attempted to use those principles to further his own career. Gaining control of a publishing house was an important first step, but Degrelle was far too ambitious to be satisfied with such a minor prize. Degrelle quickly transformed the ~ditionsRex publishing house into the Rexist movement, cementing its place as an independent actor long before it became a political party.

Degrelle was a propagandist for the Catholic Party, but what he wanted was to change the party and take it over from within. Degrelle used the platform provided for him by the journals of the Rex publishing house to make this fact abundantly clear, and throughout the early 1930s it became increasingly difficult for his elders and superiors in the party to keep Degrelle in line. Party leadership always had to weigh the benefits that

55 "Leon Degrelle m'est apparu, vers 1932-1933, comme un heros de ligende et de reve, puissant et magnifique, tres beau et tres pur et mon grand desir Ctait d7&trea ses c6tCs pour l'aider dans sa tbche et combattre avec lui... Je me dCvouais corps et bme pour un ideal dont je le croyais lui-m&meenflame et quand, apres la deuxieme ou la troisieme faillite de Rex, je me retrouvai presque sans le sou sur le pave de Bruxelles, me nourrissant de pain et d'eau et faisant des kilomktres a pied pour faire 1'Cconomie d'un tram, je n9euspas pour lui un seul mot de reproche." Sindic quoted in Ydewalle, Degrelle ou la triple imposture, 68. Degrelle provided with his youthful appeal against the trouble which he delighted in

stirring up.

Degrelle was prominently featured in all of the journals that he published, serving

as the director of both Rex and Vlan, and writing many of the most prominent articles.

This was a pattern that would continue with the daily newspaper Le Bays Rkel, which will be discussed later, up until the German invasion in 1940, when Degrelle became preoccupied with other matters. Degrelle's refusal to share the spotlight may be indicative of his narcissism and need for the most attention possible. His constant activity and prominence also demonstrates his incredible energy and enthusiasm for his work.

To understand Degrelle's politics during the first years that he was an editor, it is most helpful to analyze articles that Degrelle wrote or approved for publication in his journals. Whatever Degrelle may have believed privately, these journals were his public face and therefore reveal the substance of his political campaigns, if not necessarily his deeply felt political convictions. These campaigns included an emphasis on Catholicism in public life and a series of attacks on the perceived corruption of Belgian politics.

One strategy Degrelle employed in the Rexist journals in his effort to win away support fi-om the Catholic Party was to appear more Catholic than the Catholic Party itself on certain points where the party appeared vulnerable. Degrelle often relied on such tactics, portraying "himself as more Catholic than the Pope and more royalist than the in^."^^ The trick to such a strategy was to define the terns of the debate. After all, if one side could lay claim to representing the only true Catholic position, then the other side logically had to be less Catholic. Degrelle took pains to cast all of Rex's actions in a

56 Laurent, "Belgian Rexism," 307. Catholic light, implying that those who did not agree with Rex were not acting in the way that Catholics should act.

Making use of this strategy, Degrelle pinpointed or fabricated weaknesses in the

Catholic Party platform. One such perceived weakness was the question of alcohol.

After a socialist move to curb alcohol consumption in 1934, a front page unsigned article in Vlan praised the socialists' courage, and, in so doing, insinuated that the Catholic

Party's position on this issue left much to be desired. The piece had a strongly moralist tone, with quotes like "The enemy is In the article, the author criticized liberals and the Catholic party for not going along with socialists on this question. "We were very surprised to see the parliamentary Catholics lined up amongst the 'alcoholics.'

They cannot possibly be unaware that drunkenness is forbidden by the fifth commandment. This was a neat rhetorical trick. By the author's logic, parliamentary groups who voted against strictures on alcohol were themselves immoral alcoholics. The author also used his own interpretation of the fifth commandment to create a religious imperative where none existed before. This Vlan editorial implied that the Catholic Party was not being true to the dictates of Catholicism, and thereby not living up to its name. New leadership, then, would not be unjustified, and Degrelle, of course, already had the perfect candidate in mind for the position. The editorial also implied that it was more important to stand up for issues that mattered, even if that meant allying with traditional opponents like the socialists, than it was to play petty party politics, as the Catholic Party was accused of doing,

57 "L'ennemi, c'est l'alcoolisme," in Vlan (13 June 1934), 1. 5s "Nous nous sommes fort Btonn6s de voir des parlementaires catholiques se ranger parmi les 'alcooliques.' 11s ne peuvent cependant ignorer que l'ivrognerie est defendue par le cinqilierne com~aridement.Alors? " "L'e~memi,c'est l'alcoolisme," in Vlan (13 June 1934), I. A Degrelle article entitled "Les socialistes allemands et les nBtres9'[German

socialists and ours] appeared in the April 15, 1933 issue of Vlan, and is noteworthy in a

number of respects, including for Degrelle's assessments of domestic and international politics, and his treatment of religion. Historians have frequently characterized Rex as having largely avoided anti-Semitism until after its electoral decline in 1937, but, as this article indicates, this was not the case.59 In part historians' perceptions of Rexist anti-

Semitism may depend on how they define differing degrees of anti-Semitism. Degrelle and Rex certainly became much more pervasively anti-Semitic later in the 1930s, but anti-Semitism was not entirely absent in the earlier period, as can be seen in this article.

In "Les socialistes allemands et les ndtres," Degrelle taunted German socialists for having given up so easily by not opposing Hitler. He wrote that socialists had shown themselves to be cowards in Germany, and that the same was true of socialists in

Belgium.

One can no longer speak of the power of socialism. That force has nothing at its base besides our own weakness. The day when the real patriots, when all the Catholics have the courage to unite, to organize themselves, socialism will be nothing more than a word. It will collapse miserably.60 Degrelle9scharacterization of Belgian socialists as cowards raises the question of whether or not Degrelle fancied himself at this juncture as a Belgian Hitler who would one day be able to cow the socialists." Degrelle's desire for such a position seems entirely likely. At the same time, this quote is significant because in it Degrelle equated

"real patriots" with Catholics, raising the question of whether or not it was possible for a

59 See, for example: E.H. Kossman, The Low Countries: 1780-1940 (Oxford: Oxford University, 1978), 629. 60 "Qu'on ne vienne plus nous parler de la force du socialisme. Cette force n'a de base que notre propre faiblesse. Le jour oh les vrais patriotes, oh tous les catholiques auront le courage de s'unir, de s'organiser, le socialisme ne sera plus qu'un mot. I1 s'ecroulera lamentablement." Leon Degrelle, "Les socialistes allemands et les n6tres," in Vlan (15 April 1933), 3. 6 1 A EIitler in the context of 1933, not knowing what came later. non-Catholic to be a Belgian patriot. One thing is clear fiom this piece: to Degrelle, it certainly was not possible for a socialist to be a patriot.

To Degrelle, it was a combination of the socialists' cowardice and their highly flawed political views which rendered them unfit to be considered patriotic. Degrelle viewed the Belgian socialists as having turned away from their German "confrkres" by not trying to help them against Hitler. Instead, Degrelle accused Belgian socialists of opportunism in the face of Hitler's taking over the German state. According to Degrelle, their primary goal was to score political points off of Hitler in order to raise their popularity at home, a strategy which led them to exploit the German National Socialists' handling of the "Jewish question." He contended that Belgian socialists did not actually care about Jews in the least. In railing against Belgian socialists on this issue, Degrelle, revealed his own feelings about Jews:

Le Peuple [a prominent socialist newspaper] has spoken very gravely of thousands and millions of threatened lives in Germany. It lets out the cries of a polecat to defend Israelites who, evidently, are somewhat sympathetic because they are persecuted, but who nevertheless have in Germany, and elsewhere throughout the entire world, an influence which is frequently very harmful. This is the most intelligent, insidious, and morbid race in the universe. For the past fifty years, everything bad which has sprouted in politics comes to us fiom Jews. Germany, like Poland, is infested by an extremely numerous population of Semites who have a preponderant influence in intellectual and political life. It was time to put a brake on them. Hitler did that with violence. We understand the protests which have gone up around the world, but it appears that goes a bit overboard when it portrays Germany as a country inundated with the blood of massacred ~ews.~~

62 "Trks gravement Le Peuple a parlt de milliers et de millions de vies menactes en Allemagne. I1 a pousst des cris de putois pour defendre des isratlites qui, tvidemment, sont assez sympathiques puisqu'ils sont persecutts, mais qui neanrnoins ont en Allemagne, et d'ailleurs dans le monde entier, une influence souvent trks nefaste. C'est la race la plus intelligente, la plus insidieuse et la plus morbide de 1'Univers. Depuis cinquante ans tout ce qui a germ6 de mauvais dans la politique nous est venu des Juifs. L'Allemagne comme la Pologne est infestee par une population de Stmites extrzmement nombreuse qui avait une influence preponderante dans la vie intellectuelle et politique. I1 etait temps d'y mettre un frein. Hitler l'a fait avec violence. Nous comprenons les protestations qui se sont tlevtes dans le monde entier, mais il Clearly, Degrelle had very negative feelings towards ~ews.~~Thus as early as 1933 he expressed his anti-Semitism explicitly, going so far as to say that Germany and Poland

were infested with Jews. To Degrelle, all of the problems of modernity could be placed squarely at t6e doorstep of the Jews; they were to blame for any economic or political problems. He regarded Jews as highly intelligent, but also insidious, and believed they would undermine any society where they were allowed to live. Moreover, he suggested that Jews constituted a distinct race, and therefore it would be foolish to expect any kind of assimilation from them. Further, Degrelle seemed to imply that even though Hitler was a bit rbugh with the Jews, he was justified because of the danger they presented. Yet despite Degrelle's reprehensible opinions, he did seem mildly disapproving of Hitler's persecution of Jews during his first months in power. Rexist anti-Semitism in general, and Degrelle's in particular, would later become much more virulent, though it is impossible to say whether this represented a change in Degrelle's thinking or merely that he felt more fiee to express what he had believed all along.

Degrelle's anti-Semitic rant was but a diversion fkom the main thrust of his article in this issue of Vlan: his criticisms of socialists. If socialists truly cared about liberty and the lives of individuals, then, he contended, they should be talking about the thousands of

Mexican Catholics tortured and murdered by the cruel regime: "Since Nero, never in the world have such abominable spectacles been seen.""" Degrelle asked by what right the socialists could defend Jews, liberties, and the persecuted, when they did nothing for the

semble cependant que Le Peuple va un peu fort, quand il represente l7Allemagnecome un pays inondk par le sang des Juifs massacres." Degrelle, "kes socialistes allemands et les n8ti-es" in Vlan (15 April 1933), 3. 63 His equation of the Jewish population in Germany with that in Poland is highly flawed. Relative to the sizes of the populations, Germany had about a tenth the number of Jews as Poland. 64 "Depuis Neron, jamais on n'avait vu dans le monde des spectacles aussi aborninables." Degrelle, "Les socialistes allemands et les n8tres," in Vlan (15 April 1933), 3. "thousands of victims who merit all of the pity and love of human hearts."65 Here,

Degrelle suggested that German Jews did not merit pity and the love of human hearts any more than did Mexican Catholics, and that the socialists were privileging one group of victims over another with no ju~tification.~~The message of this piece was that socialism was a completely bankrupt ideology, which in times of trouble would take the cowardly course.

Degrelle's critical perspective was hardly reserved for rival political parties. He subjected the Catholic Party to harsh scrutiny as well in a series of Vlan articles from the same period, the last of which appeared in April 1933. These articles were likely an attempt to establish Degrelle as an attractive alternative to the current Catholic Party leadership and as a new source of guidance to the party. His criticisms were that the party was too disorganized, too inactive, too undisciplined, and suffered from weak leadership. Degrelle concluded that in order to survive, the party would need to enact the reforms he suggested. These included better financial organization, the use of specialists, the institution of a tribune system, and one strong leader-"There must be one above

Degrelle's authoritarian tendencies were evident in his proposed set of reforms, especially with his insistence on the need for a single strong leader. Nevertheless, what is essential to note is the fact that despite his criticisms, Degrelle still envisioned these reforms as taking place within the framework of the Catholic Party. "In place of fighting

65 "NOUSdemandons, aujourd'hui a [les socialistes] de quel droit ils viennent prendre la dCfense des Juifs, la defense des libertes, la defense des persecutCs, eux, qui pendant des annkes ont souill6 des milliers de victimes qui meritaient toute la pitie et tout l'amour des coeurs humains." Degrelle, "Les socialistes allemands et les n6tres," in VZun (15 April 1933), 3. 66 This issue of Vlan also contains an article written by Mgr. Picard, Degrelle's mentor, about anti- clericalism in Mexico. Much like any other Catholic political journal, Vlan was highly aware of religion, but it was much more concerned with real-world politics than with theological debates or the like. 67 "il en faut un partout." ~tienne,Mouvement, 16-17. Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear to me what exactly the tribune system would entail. the Catholic Party, let us serve it, change it, take it: in order to save it."68 At this point,

Degrelle still had no immediate plans to break away from the Catholic Party, seeking

instead to reform it from within. The bitter split between Degrelle and the party would

only come two and a half years later. When it occurred, it was not without warning.

Rather, over time Degrelle's verbal attacks on party leadership became more and more outspoken and severe.

Along with the heightened attacks on party leadership, Degrelle also sought to establish Rex with its own identity, independent of both the Catholic Party and the ACJB.

In the July 1, 1933 issue of Rex, the "Dkfinition de Rex" appeared.69 This is a highly important document, as it states the principles and goals of Degrelle and his followers.

Rex is 1). A movement of young people. 2). A movement of Catholic action. Rex wants 1). To give back to Catholics the sense ofpride, of optimism, of intrepidity, of discipline, of organized action. 2). To project into all of modern life an ardent, intelligent, and integral Catholicism... Rex is characterized 1). By its vigor, its dynamism, its faith, its sense of action. 2). By its apostolic spirit, its intransigence, its mystique, its unity. 3). By its commercial and financial organization, strictly managed like that of a factory. 4). By its audacious objective: all of modern life, the screen, the radio, letters, the souls of today. Rex devotes itself 1). To Belgium, to invigorate its blood thanks to a rejuvenated Catholicism.

"Au lieu de combattre le Parti catholique, servons-le, changeons-le, prenons-le: pour le sauver." Degrelle %uoted in ~tienne,Mouvement, 17. A form of this document may also be found in the July 5, 1933 issue of Vlan in ~tienne,Mouvement, 177. 2). To Christ, Christus-Rex, in Him are consecrated all of the efforts of his soldiers, of his apostles.70 This document was not individually signed, but Degrelle must have been involved in its creation. It described Rex as a movement of young Catholics, bursting with energy and seeking to reinvigorate the nation. Catholicism was presented as the most important aspect of Rex, superceding any trivial political concerns.

Though Rex constantly described itself as Catholic, there was actually very little in its doctrine that was strictly religious. Many of Rex's members came from the ACJB youth movement, but Rex was much more political than religious in nature. The rhetoric of Catholicism in this document seems to have been more of a pretense than a reflection of reality. Rexists probably did see themselves as devout Catholics, but there was no mention of serving the Church, for example. Rex devoted itself to Christ, but there was no discussion of what exactly that entailed.

Emphasizing Catholicism may have been an indirect way to imply a sense of

Belgian nationalism. Belgium was overwhelmingly Catholic, unlike the Netherlands and much of Germany. For a country with Protestant neighbors, and which historically derived its independence in the nineteenth century as a result of its religious difference,

Catholicism could be used as a unifylng characteristic. Rex made extensive use of religious rhetoric, but it is not always clear what that rhetoric was meant to signify.

Equally unclear is the intent behind Rex's goal "to invigorate [Belgium's] blood thanks

70 "Rex est 1). Un mouvement de jeunes. 2). Un mouvement d'action catholique. Rex veut 1). Rendre aux catholiques le sens de la fie&, de l'optimisme, de l7intrCpidite,de la discipline, de 19action organis&.2). Projeter dans toute la vie moderne un catholicisme ardent, intelligent et integral... Rex se caractkrise 1). Par son elan, son dynamisme, sa foi, son sens de l'action. 2). Par son esprit apostolique, par son intransigeance, sa mystique, son unite. 3). Par son organisation commerciale et financikre, strictement montee cornme celle d'une usine. 4). Par son objectif audacieux: toute la vie moderne, l'ecran, la radio, les lettres, les lmes d'aujourd'hui. Rex se donne 1). A la Belgique, pour revigorer son sang grlce a un catholicisme rajeuni. 2). Au Christ, Christus-Rex, en Lui consacrent tous les efforts de ses soldats, de ses ap6tres." 'mefinition de Rex," in Re.x (1 July 1933), 5. to a rejuvenated Catholicism." Speaking of the blood of a nation was a highly fascistic

style of rhetoric, but Rex claimed that this invigoration would come about through a

rejuvenated Catholicism.

Despite the strongly religious language of the "Dkfinition de Rex," the

Association catholique de la jeunesse belge, with which Degrelle was still formally

linked, became more and more fmstrated with the political direction that Degrelle was

traveling with the Rex publishing house, whatever the definition claimed to the contrary.

The ACJB did not like the overtly political nature of Vlan, and wanted Degrelle to give the journal a more religious emphasis. Degrelle chose not to do so, and the ACJB broke

with him in January 1934, though this did not result in a significant drop in Rex's membership.71 This choice between the dictates of his religion and his own political desires was one with which Degrelle would be confronted time and again in the future, and he usually made the same decision, opting to further his political career to the detriment of his religious conformity.

Sometimes, though, at least the appearance of religious propriety won out for

Degrelle in the years before he split with the Catholic Party (possibly because he thought it would be politically expedient). Degrelle planned a major banquet for the "Congr&sde presse des jeunes catholiques" [Congress of the young Catholic press] in 1934, with an expected 5,000 to 7,000 in attendance. According to ~tienne,this would have been a perfect opportunity for Degrelle to represent himself as the head of young Belgian

Catholics, but the bishop of Tournai fi-owned upon such a move. The bishop believed it to be "inopportune," though he did not formally forbid the banquet. In October 1934,

Degrelle issued his response in Rex and Soirkes, under the title "Au service de 1'Eglise" [In service of the Church]. "A Rexist is a soldier," he declared, "a desire of a bishop is for him an order... We are here to serve Catholicism. To serve usefully, one most obey... For

Christ! With the pope! With our bishops! Rex will win!"72 At that point in time, with a devoted Catholic following, it would not have been prudent to go against the bishop's wishes. Instead, Degrelle made a very public, grandiloquent display of obeisance.

In his highly visible acquiescence to the bishop's wishes, Degrelle likely had his own political future in mind. After Degrelle's split with the ACJB, he continued to develop and refine the Rexist ideology, even though he was still a member of the

Catholic Party. In its issue of March 30, 1934, Rex published "Ce que nous voulons pour le pays" [That which we want for the country]. This piece outlined Rex's goals, but remained rather vague about the proper methods to achieve those goals.

That which we want for the country I. A strong, stable, directed, and responsible power: direct, frequent and peacehl contact with the masses; aided by a parliamentary consultative organism, strictly and radically modified in its recruitment and in the specialization of its work. 11. A new state of the soul: youthful ideas, courage, audacity, passion for action, sense of responsibilities 111. Radical reforms: of our industrial organization; of our commercial organization; bank decentralization; reorganization and reinvigoration of the administration... V. New orientation: on the problem of workers; of our foreign

72 "Un rexiste est un soldat...un dksir d'un kveque est pour lui un ordre... Nous sommes ici-bas pour servir le catholicisme. Pour servir utilement, il faut obeir... Pour le Christ! Avec le pape! Avec nos Cveques! Rex vaincra!" Degrelle quoted in ~tienne,Mouvement, 24-25. 73 "Ce que nous voulons pour le pays I. Unpouvoir fort, stable, re'alisateur et responsable: en contact direct, frequent et pacifique avec la masse; aide par un organisme parlementaire consultatif, strictement et radicalement modifie dans son recrutement et dans la specialisation de son travail. 11. Un &tatd'dme nouveau: jeunesse d'idees, courage, audace, passion de l'action, sens des responsabilites. 111. Des riformes radicales: de notre organisation industrielle; de notre organisation commesciale; dkcentralisation bancaire; rkorganisation et rajeunissement de l'administration ... V. Orientation nouvelle: du probleme ouvrier; de notre politique internationale."" Ce que nous voulons pour le pays," in Rex (30 March 19341, 9. A call for a unifed central state power of a somewhat vague democratic nature appeared

again and again in Rexist thinking. This power was to be in contact with the masses, but

the masses would not necessarily make important decisions. Instead, representing them

would be some kind of parliament, but it would be consultative rather than legislative.

Overall, this seemed to be a call for a benign, consensual .

Beyond a change in the system of government, Rex was also highly concerned

with economic and social problems, and so it is not surprising that the statement called

for a dramatic restructuring of the organization of Belgium's financial system. What is

clear is that Belgium's current policies with respect to workers and international relations

were unsatisfactory to Rex and needed to be reformed. What remains unclear, however,

is what form this proposed restructuring would take, be it corporatist, socialist,

nationalist, or something else. This vagueness may well have been intentional. By only

criticizing, rather than offering a constructive solution, Rex could appeal to anyone

dissatisfied with the current order without alienating any potential recruits who might not

agree with their proposed solution.

Interestingly, the rhetoric of Catholicism, ever present in the "Definition de Rex,"

was absent here. Though Rex still sought a regeneration of the soul, the word "Catholic"

was not mentioned once in this piece. This perhaps had to do with Rex's split away from

the ACJB. The "Definition de Rex" was published while Rex still operated under the

auspices of the ACJB, and despite Degrelle's political inclinations the emphasis had to be on Catholicism. The Christus Rex movement sought to present Catholicisni as a third- way in politics, but with the emphasis still on Catholicism. No longer bound by the wishes of the ACJB, Degrelle could turn Rex in a more purely political direction. This is not to say that Degrelle was not actually religious to begin with, or that his own religious

beliefs underwent a change. Rather, Degrelle was simply freer to concentrate on politics

with less emphasis on the propriety of appearances.

In this piece and in others, Rex was calIing for radical (if unspecified) change in a

number of areas. For this reason, it does not seem to make sense to label the movement

in this period as a product of the conservative right, at least by any conventional

definition of conservative. The Rexists themselves rejected the label "conservative" as it

was normally used, calling themselves "CONSERVATIVES AND MEN OF ORDER,

BUT IN OUR MANNER, WHICH IS THE RIGHT MANNER."^^ For Rex, someone who was a true conservative was someone who instilled and upheld "order," rather than someone who slavishly served the current system of "hypercapitalism." If anything, then, Degrelle and his followers were revolutionary conservatives. Rex and Degrelle cast themselves as opponents of both socialism (the goal of the left) and hypercapitalism (that of the right), which in their analysis was the malicious force of high finance. The historian Stanley Payne classifies Rex in this period as a conservative movement. Lkon

Degrelle would agree with him, but they would not be using the same word to mean the same thing.

A sampling of other newspaper articles from this time period can help to give a sense of the political and philosophical directions then being taken by Degrelle and Rex.

During this time period, Degrelle was the unquestioned leader of Rex, and he was largely responsible for the movement's ideological choices. Because of this, it is reasonable to assume that anything printed in one of Degrelle's papers would have Seen in line with his

74 "NOUS SOMMES, PLUS QUE N'IMPORTE QUI, DES CONSERVATEURS ET DES HOMMES D'ORDRE MAIS A NOTRE MANIERE QUI EST LA BONNE MANIEKE" [emphasis in the original] "Qu'est-ce que l'ordre?" in Rex (30 March 1934), 10. own thinking. More prominent and more common than the anti-Semitism seen in articles like "Les socialistes allemands et les n8tresmwere broad ranging anti-socialist and anti-

Masonic themes. For Degrelle and other Rexists, most of Belgium's problems could be blamed on the two malignant trends of socialism and freemasonry. Later, both socialism and freemasonry would be portrayed as stemming from Judaism, but at this time Degrelle referred to them without reference to Judaism.

In a fi-ont page, unsigned article from April 1934, hysterical and rather violent anti-Masonic sentiment was prominently displayed (in bold capitals, presumably for greater dra'matic effect):

THE IDEAL POLITICAL SYSTEM FOR MASONRY IS PARLIAMENTARIANISM, AND PARLIAMENTARIANISM IS DECOMPOSING. It is the only regime which easily allows them to attain power, and, by that power, to poison the country with the virus of anticlericali~rn.~~ The problem with freemasonry, then, was the threat that it posed to the Catholic Church.

The condemnation of freemasonry was also, of course, part of a larger critique of parliamentary democracy. According to this Rex piece, a different system of government would be better able to prevent this insidious anticlericalism. This distrust of anticlericalism was in line with a fervent sense of Catholicism. Even after the split with the ACJB, then, Rex continued to use religious language when it suited Rex's purposes.

Despite Degrelle's professed Catholicism, at moments he claimed to want Rex to be an all-inclusive movement, not discriminatory on the basis of religious beliefs. In

"Les Catholiques et la Politique" from January 1934, Degrelle explained his opinions on the interactions between religion and politics: "Our political activity... draws an absolute

75 "L'IDEAL POLITIQUE DE LA MACONNERIE C'EST LE PARLEMENTARISME, E.T LE PARLEMENTARISME DECOMPOSE. Ce regime seul leur permet d'atteindre au pouvoir facilement, et, par le pouvoir, d'empoisonner le pays du virus anticlerical" [emphasis in the original]. "Que les fiancs- rnagons ne fassent pas les malins chez nous-Sinon ce sera la bataille au couteau," in Rex (7 April 1934), 1. distinction between national interests and apostolic preoccupations. A country is the

country of all, believers and others."76 Rex was strongly Catholic, but Degrelle still

recognized that not everyone in Belgium was a believer. Surprisingly, he insisted that

Belgium was for everyone. In a rare departure from the norm, this was actually a

somewhat tolerant piece, calling for an end to religious conflicts. Degrelle left unsaid

that he was also trying to drum up new, more secular supporters for his movement.

In addition to religious harmony, Degrelle also called for new leadership in

Belgium. He described the country as needing "surgeons with strong souls."77

Belgium's problems would be fixed with a new regime (of course consisting of Degrelle

and his followers) and a new soul. "These men and these leaders will come from Rex," he promised, "Our great red flags, marked with the crown of Christ, will preside not only over the conquests of hearts and souls, but also over the righting of the country, the duties of charity and of the nation."78 Nowhere in this is there a mention of the Catholic Party, which Degrelle was still supposed to be serving.

A month later, in February 1934, Degrelle published an open letter to the Catholic

Party stating his thoughts on the relationship between him, his followers, and the party superiors. Published in Degrelle's journal Vlan, the letter directly addressed the party leadership about conflicts between Degrelle and the party. "Do not trouble yourselves at all. You are our fathers. That gives you the right to [make decisions] without detours,

76 "Notre activitd politique... aura une tactique absolument distincte, degageant nettement les inter& nationaux des preoccupations apostoliques. Un pays est le pays de tous, des croyants et des autres." Leon Degrelle, "Les Catholiques et la Politique," in Vlan (18 January 1934), 3. 77 "des chirurgiens a l'lme forte." Degrelle, "Les Catholiques et la Politique," in Vlan (18 January 1934), 3. 78 "Ces hommes et ces chefs [needed to save the country] viendront de Rex. Nos grands drapeaux rouges, marques de la couronne du Christ, abriteront non seulement les conqu6tes des coeurs et des lmes, mais aussi le redressement du pays, devoir de charit6 et devoir national." Degrelle, "Les Catholiques et la Politique," in VZun (18 January 1934), 3. and that gives us the duty to receive them with serenity and even with optimism."79

Though Degrelle in this passage bowed to the authority of his elders, the letter seemed to be Degrelle's way of saying that even though his outspokenness was an annoyance for the party, he $till felt that he was doing what was best for the party. Because of this belief, he would continue to speak his mind. Despite Degrelle's claim to serenely accept decisions, serenity was never one of Degrelle's traits. The tone of the letter was rather mocking and condescending, with Degrelle advising that those offended by his verbal attacks should "Take your handkerchief and wipe off your sweat, if not your tears."80

Degrelle cbncluded by warning the party that he and Rex were prepared to move ahead with their plans, with or without official party support.

From comfortable beginnings in the Ardennes countryside, Degrelle had shown his intellectual precocity by the prominence he achieved during his university years.

After becoming involved with Mgr. Picard's ACJB, Degrelle had been thrust into heading the ~ditionsRex publishing house. In this position, Degrelle soon charted an independent course, using religious rhetoric when convenient to set Rex up as an entity distinct fi-om the Catholic Party. Degrelle had split with the Association catholique de la jeunesse belge in January 1934, and his relations with the Catholic Party became more and more adversarial thereafter. What was becoming clear was that Degrelle had the highest ambitions. He portrayed himself as the true defender of the Church, Belgium, and the monarchy in an effort to situate himself as the true representative of Catholics in

Belgium. Degrelle worked hard to cultivate an image as an outsider to the status quo of

79 "Ne vous g8nez point. Vous 8tes nos pbres. Ca vous donne le droit d'y aller sans dCtours, qa nous donne le devoir d'encaisser avec serCnitC et meme avec optimisme." LCon Degrelle, "Lettre Ouverte au Parti Catholique," in VZun (15 February 1934), 1. "Prenez votre mouchoir et recueillez votre sueur, sinon vos lames." Degrelle, "Lettre Ouverte au Parti Catholique," in Vlan (15 February 1934), 1. the pal-ty system, and would soon be ready to position himself to enter Belgium's political contests in his own right. Chapter 3-The Sueeess of 1936

Severing of Ties

After assuming control of the gditions Rex publishing house, Leon Degrelle had worked to fashion Rex into a popular political grouping. Degrelle became increasingly difficult for his elders to control, and had had a falling out with his sponsors in the ACJB.

Degrelle had not yet fulfilled his ambitions, and showed no signs of slowing down in his efforts to publicize both himself and Rex, launching an anti-corruption campaign to highlight the misdeeds of the Catholic Party. Degrelle charted his own course, incorporating elements of nationalism, socialism, and Catholicism into his rhetoric in an attempt to gain a large base of support for Rex in the Belgian population. Soon he would decide that Rex no longer needed to operate within the auspices of the Catholic Party, and would finally launch Rex as a political party in its own right. This chapter traces this stage of Degrelle's career, picking up on the theme from the previous chapter of

Degrelle's shift away from political Catholicism and toward a more independent policy.

Throughout 1935, Degrelle continued to raise public awareness of himself and of his Rexist movement through speeches and publications, despite the fact that the group still technically fell under the umbrella of the Catholic Party. Rex's slogan, coined at a time when Rex was in dire financial straits, was "Rex vaincra," or "Rex will win."' The slogan was irrepressibly optimistic, even when the situation did not seem to justify such a high level of confidence. As Robert Brasillach put it, "One would need a lot of good will

' Brasillach, Histoire de la Guerre d'Espagne: Mimoires, suivi de Lion Degrelle et L'avenir de "Rex'" ([Paris]: Plon, 1969), 495. [toward Rex] to believe that."2 Degrelle and his followers, though, were never ones to be

hampered by realistic expectations.

In 1934 and 1935, Degrelle's Rex movement became more active in Belgian

political life. ' After severing ties with the Association catholique de la jeunesse belge, the

~ditionsRex publishing house stepped up its rhetorical attacks on the Catholic Party,

becoming an even bigger thorn in the side of the party. Degrelle began to believe that he

would soon be able to take on Belgium's entrenched political parties and win.

The Rex journals were not profitable, and as a result the publishing house needed

to raise furids above and beyond subscription fees. Degrelle's wife's family was wealthy, but could not or would not subsidize the entire Rexist endeavore3committed Rexists made up more of the difference with voluntary donations, but this still was not sufficient to keep the publishing house afl~at.~Nevertheless, this financial quagmire proved no problem for the ever resourceful Degrelle. He discovered new sources of revenue in

1936 and 1937, but before then he raised money in other ways. Opponents accused

Degrelle of smuggling alcohol in 1934, but there is no real evidence for this accusation, and the accusation seems as outlandish as many of Degrelle's own spurious ~laims.~One moneymaking strategy that Degrelle definitely did pursue was to give public lectures for money, which also allowed him to hone his rhetorical skills, providing valuable experience which would serve him well in the years to come.

In his 1970s Charlier interviews, Degrelle claimed that in the 1930s he went to socialist speeches and stood in the crowd among the common laborers, listening to what

"I1 fallait beaucoup de bonne volontk pour y croire." Brasillach, Histoire, 495. Pierre Daye, Leon Degrelle et le Rexisme (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1937), 60; Jean-Michel ~tienne,Le Mouvement Rexiste Jusqu 'en 1940 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1968), 84. ~tienne,Mouvement, 83-84. Pierre Daye, Leon Degrelle et le Rexisme, 65. the speaker had to say. At the conclusion of a speech, Degrelle would then deliver an impromptu speech of his own. This was very popular with the socialist crowds

(according to Degrelle), and he often won over converts to the Rexist cause.6 Degrelle's tale of success at winning new converts does not seem very likely, as Degrelle was never particularly popular among laborers, but if he did actually give such speeches they at least gave him a chance to practice his oratory and to publicize himself.

After following this strategy for a time, Degrelle moved onto scheduling his own meetings, featuring himself as the main speaker. These speeches proved quite lucrative, as bany people proved willing to pay the admission fee (a minimum of 5 francs, 40 times the price of a daily newspaper) to hear Degrelle speak.7 Once inside, there were further appeals for donation^.^ The description of the atmosphere inside these meetings seems reminiscent of a church tent revival, with Degrelle as the preacher-entertainer. He explained the fees this way: "One pays well to go to the cinema... one can pay well to listen to me."9 Degrelle liked to believe that his speeches were as much of a spectacle as any movie.

Many accounts attest to the fact that Degrelle was a master orator. lo He explained his strategy for winning over crowds in a rather unusual way: "A conqueror of people must be an enchanter. One must enchant crowds like one enchants a woman. It is

Jean-Michel Charlier, Le'on Degrelle: Persiste et Signe (Paris: Editions Jean Picollec, 1985), 87-93. Charlier, Degrelle, 87-93. ~tienne,Mouvement, 82-83. "On paye bien pour aller au cinema.. .On peut bien payer pour m'entendre." Rrasillach, Histoire, 496. 'O See, for example, the discussion of in Charlier, Degrelle, 6. Poulet "avait eu l'occasion d'entendre les plus grands tribuns du XXe sikcle... mais qu'aucun ne lui avait fait autant d'impression que Degrelle, qu'aucun ne l'egalait en magnetisme, en pouvoir de conviction, et de seduction sur les foules, a l'exception peut-&tred'Hitler." of the same order. It is like a great act of seduction."" Degrelle used his Rex-Appeal to

great effect, seducing crowds with his charisma as much as with the power of his words.

As Degrelle became more confident in his oratory, his public appearances

expanded in scope. Rex held its first mass meeting on May 1, 1935 in ~russels.'~This

date, surely not coincidentally, was also the day of the annual May Day celebration,

symbolically important to socialists. Degrelle had always cast himself as a defender of all Belgians, including the lower classes, and as evidence for this he could point to his

expos6 of slum life, written while he was still a student. In this respect, the choice of such an evocative day seems to suggest his refusal to concede to the left a monopoly on representing the interests of labor. For Rex to be a truly successfil party, which Degrelle already seemed to have in mind, it would need to appeal to a wide segment of the Belgian population.

The Rexist flag, which predated Degrelle's association with the publishing house, also signaled concern with social issues along with Rex's other aims. l3 The flag consisted of an intertwined cross and crown with a red background. The cross and crown represented Christ the King, but it could also be taken to represent Rex's support for the earthly Catholic Church and the Belgian monarchy. The red field behind the insignia could have conceivably meant any number of things, though it was certainly a provocative choice of color. The color could have been chosen simply because it was one of the colors of the Belgian national flag. Other meanings, however, could be ascribed to red as well. Red is the color of blood, perhaps signifying the blood of the

11 "Un conqudrant de peuples doit &re un enchanteur. I1 faut enchanter les foules conlme on enchante une femme. C'est du m&meordre. C'est une espece d'immense acte de ~Cduction."Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 82. 12 Charlier, Degrelle, 93. l3 ~tienne,Mouvement, 14.

62 nation. Red, though, is also the traditional color of the left, an association of which the

Rexists were certainly not unaware.

At this time, Degrelle presented himself as an ardent nationalist, but he also

attempted to reach out and appeal to the socialist base. This was all a part of Degrelle's

effort to establish Rex as a viable political party with a platform attractive to a wide-

ranging constituency. In 1935, though, Degrelle and Rex were not National Socialists in

the Nazi mold. At that point in time Rexists were publicly hostile to , both

because of Nazi anti-Catholicism and the widespread prevalence of Belgian anti-German

sentiment.14 Degrelle may well have felt some private admiration for Hitler, but any

admission of such publicly would have ruined Degrelle, as it would have been completely unacceptable both to other Rexists and to the Belgian public at large. Degrelle was still on his way up, and he had to take care not to offend his potential bases of support.

Degrelle had no such fear as far as the entrenched political and financial elites were concerned. Perceived corruption among the Belgian elite was a tempting target for

Degrelle's criticisms. In 1933 in the Vlan journal, Degrelle had initiated his "campagne des pourris."15 here is no exact translation for "pourris," but it means roughly "the rotten ones," or "the corrupt." The campaign of the rotten ones was intended to sweep the Belgian political and financial systems free of corruption, in order to allow for moral regeneration. In 1935, Degrelle made it abundantly clear that the first people he intended to sweep away were the leaders of the Catholic Party. Rather than targeting

"hypercapitalists" and socialists, Degrelle was now targeting the Catholic Party itself as he prepared to launch Rex as an independent political party.

l4 ~tienne,Mouvement, 40-41. l5 Brasillach, Histoire, 494-495. As Degrelle sharpened his rhetorical campaign, his criticisms soon became

intolerable to the Catholic Party. Minister Paul Segers was a successful businessman,

active on any number of boards and a member of the Catholic Party government. To

Degrelle, segers was the number onepourri, and the first target. Segers was also the

head of a Catholic business group, and at a November 1935 meeting of these political and business elites in the city of Courtrai, Degrelle launched a carefully planned rhetorical ambush. Degrelle had loyal Rexists block the exits of the building where the meeting was being held as he prepared to begin his verbal assault.16 During Segers' speech,

Degrelle iriterrupted, allegedly exclaiming

You are too old! Away with you! Do not speak of discipline and authority. You do not know what that is... You always speak of your heart. This is the moment to show it. Show that you have a heart by going away from here. Leave! Yes, leave! That is the best which one can hope for Gom you.17 This harangue continued in the same vein for quite some time, and when one senator tried to interrupt, Degrelle shouted him down in no uncertain terms: "I have the floor. I am keeping it. Shut up, you living piece of e~crernent!"'~Degrelle no longer showed even a modicum of respect to the party leadership, and unsurprisingly the party soon thereafter broke all remaining relations with Degrelle and the rest of ex.^

This incident was highly significant in that it marked the beginning of Degrelle's independent political career. It is not clear why, if Degrelle had simply wanted to leave

l6 ~tienne,Mouvement, 28. l7 "VOUSetes trop vieux! Allez-vous-en! Ne parlez pas de discipline et d'autorite. Vous ne savez pas ce que c'est ...Vous parlez toujours de votre coeur. C'est le moment de le montrer. Montrez que vous avez du coeur en vous en allant. Partez! Oui, partez! C'est ce qu'on peut le mieux attendre de vous." Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Rexisme, 72; F.L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 213. 18 '6 J 9 ai la parole. Je la garde. Taisez-vous!" Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Rexisme, 72; "Taisez-vous, excrement !" ~tienne,Mouvement, 28. Interestingly, Daye, a prominent Rexist, left out the "excrement vivant" remark in his telling. l9 Carsten, Rise ofFascism, 213. the Catholic Party, he did not just quit. Perhaps he had wanted to exit with a flourish. In any event, the Rexists referred to Degrelle's performance that day as the "Coup de

Courtrai," and saw it as a great victory, taking joy in the humiliation of the alleged pourrjs. No longer bound by any form of party authority, Degrelle embarked on a campaign of grandly absurd, and attention-grabbing, political theater, In keeping with

Degrelle's promise to sweep away corruption, Rexists would show up outside of conferences or offices of the allegedpourris and start sweeping the sidewalks- literally-in a humorous display, eliciting laughter from the crowd that would inevitably forh20 Obviously this was not a way to effect change directly, but Degrelle was not yet in any kind of position to do so, and this campaign did have the benefit of drawing attention to Rex. Degrelle had a showman's sense of what would entertain crowds.

Additionally, and equally significant, the sweeping campaign also ensured that thoughts of corruption stayed prominent in the public's consciousness.

In 1937, Pierre Daye wrote knowingly of the significance of the street sweeping campaign. "Our boys would be arrested, but the laughing onlookers, would time and again find themselves on [Rex's] side, and laughter-isn't it, Degrelle?-is a terrible weapon."21 Because the street sweeping seemed so silly and innocent, if the police arrested those doing the sweeping it would look like an overreaction and people would be more likely to sympathize with Rex. If, on the other hand, the police did nothing, Rexists could harrass and humiliate thepourris to their hearts' content. For Rex, this was a win- win strategy.

20 Carsten, Rise of Fascism, 213. 21 "NOS garqons hrent arretCs, mais les rieurs, encore une fois, se trouvaient de leur cGtC, et le rire, n'est-ce pas, Degrelle? est une arme terrible." Daye, Lkon Degrelle et le Rexisme, 76-77. This use of laughter as a weapon could also be seen in the withering political cartoons of Paul Jamin, also known as "Jam," a Rexist and perhaps the most talented cartoonist of 1930s Belgium. This campaign was not the extent of Rexist activities after Degrelle's

denunciation of Segers and expulsion from the Catholic Party. Following his Courtrai

outburst in November 1935, Degrelle published a pamphlet enumerating his accusations

against Minister Segers, "the great vizier of the old party called ~atholic."~~Degrelle

called his tract, published under the auspices of Editions Rex, Jkccuse M Segers [I

accuse Mr. Segers]. This title was clearly inspired by mile Zola's 1898 pamphlet

J'accuse, written at the height of the Dreyfus Affair in France. Zola's J'accuse had been

a liberal indictment of the anti-Dreyfusards, accusing them of unjustly railroading an

innocent man. While Degrelle would certainly not have been in agreement with Zola's

Republican politics, he nevertheless borrowed the mantle of moral crusader from Zola.

Whether Degrelle was trying to suggest that here finally was the anti-liberal response to

Zola or whether he merely sought to capitalize on the association of the title J'accuse

with a strong moral voice against governmental corruption is unclear.

Whatever the motivations underlying the provocative title, J'accuse M. Segers offered a scathing critique of both Segers personally and the political and financial

culture in which he operated. To Degrelle, Segers was only a symptom of much greater problems, and being rid of him would only be a first step toward reform. The tone of this piece was strident and sensationalist, as Degrelle used hyperbole about Segers's alleged misdeeds and the violent language of physical struggle to rouse readers about Belgium's current condition. The core of Rexist beliefs about modernity, ecorlomics and politics was represented in this one short piece, allowing it to serve not only as an indictmerit of one man but also as a statement of the newly independent Rex's purpose.

22 "le grand vizir du vieux parti dit catholique." Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 99. Even 40 years after the fact, Degrelle was still scomfbl of M. Segers. Degrelle9s critique of Segers was by no means subtle. J'accuse M. Segers was subtitled, rou&ly, "of being a corrupt, criminal, plundering coward."23 This subtitle is far more vituperative than one would expect on the basis of reading the text's introduction, in which Degrelle claimed that it was incredibly difficult to make the decision to publish the pamphlet, having to weigh his duty to his country versus his pity for a fellow man.24 The decision was difficult because "it is normal to hesitate before crushing a man."25 Characteristically, Degrelle was fully confident that his one small text would be enough to completely destroy Segers.

Degrelle's charges against Segers were numerous but most had to do with alleged financial malfeasance. Degrelle took issue with the fact that as President of the Catholic

Federation, over the years Segers had collected "a series of mandates as disparate as they are remunerative," heading up numerous councils and business groups for which he had no real qualifications.26 ~e~rellesaw these financial interests as necessarily compromising Segers's leadership within the Catholic Party, and asked rhetorically:

"How can you give a doctrine, a discipline, a plan of action to the party when you are wrestling with yourself' over competing financial interests?27 It is surely noteworthy that

Degrelle saw the goals of leadership to be the instilling in the party of "a doctrine, a discipline, a plan of action."

23 Lton Degrelle, J'accuse M. Segers (Bruxelles: [Rex, 19351). 24 rc J avais a choisir entre la charitt envers le pays et la pitie envers un homme." Degrelle, J'accuse, 3. 25 "il est normal d'htsiter avant d'kcraser un homme." Degrelle, J'accuse, 3. 26 "une strie de mandats aussi disparates que rtmuntrateurs." Degrelle, J'accuse, 5. 27 -<' Comment auriez-vous pu donner au parti une doctrine, une discipline, un plan d'action quand vous ttiez a vsus dtbattre." Degrelle, J'accuse, 6. To Degrelle, politics should be completely separate from financial concerns.

"From the day you sank into [business] affairs, the Catholic Party was 10~1.'"~Degrelle

believed that business had no place in politics, as it was sure to wield a corrupting

influence.29 The implications of such a belief were that politicians should not be

involved with the running of businesses, and that businessmen should not attempt to use

their money to influence politicians. The corrupting influence of money could be seen

particularly strongly in the case of Segers. Most of Segers' wrongdoings stemmed from simple greed, an overriding personal flaw which Degrelle believed to be endemic among much of Bklgium's elite.

In criticizing Segers, Degrelle was also delivering a slightly veiled criticism of the entire Belgian political system. Degrelle accused Segers of raking in hundreds of thousands of francs per year from his various board positions rather than retaining his impartiality as head of the Catholic Federation, even though he was already quite comfortable fiom his career as a senator and a lawyer.30 He suggested that Segers had acquired his various positions through corruption and political connections, but had no competence for his required duties: "You are so possessed by that passion for money, which for ten years has corrupted so many Catholics, that you dive headfirst in all of the

Greed was not necessarily a Catholic characteristic. Combined with Degrelle's critique of corruption was a rhetorical barb aimed at Belgium's small Jewish population.

28 "D&sce jour-la oh vous avez sombrC dans les affaires, le parti catholique Ctait perdu." Degrelle, J'accuse, 7. 29 Degrelle, of course, would show no such qualms about later accepting political donations fiom large industries. 30 Degrelle, J'accuse, 8. 3' "VOUS etes tellement possCdC par cette passion de I'argent, qui depuis dix ans a corrompu tant de catholiques, que vous plongiez t&tebaisske dans tous les fromages." Degrelle, J'accuse, 8. With no clear basis in fact, Degrelle in an off-handed way referred to Segers as a Jew:

"Despite the Jewish blood you have in your veins, you were about as fit to be a banker as you were to be a ta~i-girl!"~~Degrelle suggested that not only was Segers involved in corrupt financial practices, but that he was not even adept at them, a fact which was especially surprising given that he was a "Jew." Clearly, Degrelle's thoughts on Jews were not particularly flattering. Saying that someone had Jewish blood was a shorthand way for Degrelle to describe that person's personality negatively. In addition to his alleged Jewishness, Segers was also characterized by a "diabolic rapaciousness;" he was

"rapacious like vermin."33 The Jewish remark, though, only appears once in the text, and is a one-liner rather than an overriding theme.

While Degrelle was clearly anti-Semitic in 1935, it is important to note the relatively limited nature of his anti-Semitic public statements, at least in this one document.34 Making one isolated insulting remark about Jews and money is a far cry from speaking of Germany and Poland being infested by insidious Jews, as Degrelle did in 1933. Though anti-Semitism was fairly widespread in 1930s Europe, Degrelle may have believed that too vocal a display of it would have impeded his electoral hopes. In

1933, writing solely for other Rexists, Degrelle could say whatever he wanted to say. In late 1935, however, he had to concern himself with the opinions of the greater Belgian public who may not have been open to overt anti-Semitism. It seems more likely that

Degrelle made a conscious choice to moderate his public tone than that he actually moderated his feelings about Jews. Instead of focusing his rhetoric around an attack on

32 "Malgrb le sang juif que vous avez dans les veines, vous Ctiez aussi peu fait pour &trebanquier que pour &re taxi-girl!" Degrelle, J'accuse, 10. 33 "une rapacite diabolique" ; "rapace comme un pou." Degrelle, J'accuse, 7, 12. 34 There are many publications by Degrelle from 1935 that I have not read, but I have never seen Degrelle referred to as particularly anti-Semitic in this period. Jews, Degrelle focused on corruption, as few members of the Belgian public would be

offended by an anti-comption stance.

To Degrelle, the cleaning up of corruption was akin to a surgical procedure: "It is

necessary to strike today. And to strike hard. Because the corruption of our political

regime is such that without a vigorous blow of the lancet the entire country will be

infected."j5 Corruption was by no means limited to Segers; rather, Degrelle claimed, it

was endemic to all of Belgium's political parties, which would only reform in the face of

strong outside pressure fi-om "independent and vigorous corn bat ant^.^' "The parties... will

not cleanse themselves: they are too profoundly enmeshed in the political/financial

scandals."36 If the parties were too hopelessly corrupt to change on their own, Degrelle

reasoned, the people should look to Degrelle and his Rexist followers, relative political

newcomers, for reform.

Segers was only the immediate target of Degrelle's accusations. Beyond Segers

and Belgium's political parties, it was the politicaVfinancia1 system as a whole with

which Degrelle took issue. Degrelle claimed, "in unmasking the veritable political

banking mafias which exercise a dictatorship as abominable as it is anonymous over all the forces of the country" that he would prove Segers was only a symptom of much wider problems.37 Degrelle seemed to be writing from a conspiratorial worldview, believing that some malignant syndicate acted as the power behind the scenes in Belgium, and perhaps in Europe more generally.

35 "il faut aujourd'hui frapper. Et kapper avec force. Car la corruption de notre regime politique est telle que sans de vigoureux coups de bistouri tout le pays finira par &re infect&."Degrelle, J'accuse, 3. 36 "lutteurs indkpendants et vigoureux" ; "Les Partis... ne se purifieront pas eux-msmes: ils sont trop profondement enlises dans les scandales politico-bancaires." Degrelle, J'accuse, 3. 37 "en demasquant les veritables maffias politico-bancaires qui exercent une dictature aussi abominable qu'anonyme sure toutes les forces du pays." Degrelle, J'accuse, 4. Claims about "political banking mafias" may themselves have had covertly anti-Semitic undertones. In J'accuse M. Segers, Degrelle used imagery that came up again and again in

Rexist rhetoric. The most obvious example of this was the recurring use of the metaphor

of cleaning or sweeping away corruption, an idea which Rexists had physically acted out

in their street demonstrations. While using this imagery, Degrelle also explained why he

first attacked the Catholic Party, of which he was still a member, rather than the socialists

or some other opponent. "We are tracking down Catholics first because we are Catholics

ourselves. We do not want to be hypocrites. We clean our doorstep before crossing over

to our neighbors' doorstep."38 According to Degrelle, after ridding the Catholic Party of

cohption, Rex could and would turn to the liberals and socialists. "They don 't have the

courage to use the broom on themselves, like we are doing. We will do the sweeping in

their place."39 The goal of Rex was not confined to the reform of one political party;

rather, it was to bring about the overhaul of Belgian society in general.

Degrelle used populist rhetoric to describe a world in which honest common men

were ground down by the malignant forces of high finance. His critique of high finance,

though, by no means stemmed from leftist or socialist thinking. He described a bank as

"the hypercapitalist monster of the bourgeois socialists,"40but his populism seemed to be

firmly in the rightist camp. Degrelle lambasted Segers for indulging in decadent

corruption while so many other Belgians were suffering economically. After recounting

an episode in which Segers secured yet another 10 million francs in a dubious way,

Degrelle launched a stinging rebuke: "Ten million thrown in the fire when our

38 -

department, when hundreds of manufacturers cannot find even 50,000 francs of credit!"41

According to Degrelle, the money that Minister Segers misappropriated could have been

put to much better use improving the lot of the unemployed, small merchants, and

productive manufacturers. In singling out these latter constituencies for sympathetic

mention, Degrelle was clearly identifying himself with a form of populism that sought to

improve the lot of the "little man" in Belgian society without overthrowing the entire

capitalist order.

Degrelle represented the Rexists as a purifying force in Belgian society. To

Degrelle, Belgium's problems were not exclusively financial, but also had a strong moral

component. "The wholesome forces have been crushed by the crisis. Banksters, on the

other hand, like politicians in the mode of Segers, take and plunder at their leisure."42

"Elankster" was Degrelle7s word, fusing what he saw as the worst aspects of bankers and

gangsters. High finance, then, was downright criminal. The implication was clear that

when Rex came to power, there would be a reckoning. Regarding money Degrelle claimed that Segers had hidden away in an account, Degrelle's language became more threatening: "on the day when we will be the masters, we will make you, your head in a bucket, vomit all that you have swallowed at the expense of the people!"43 With violent imagery, Degrelle made clear that people like Segers would not be able to continue their unscrupulous practices with the Rexists in charge, and would be (literally) purged.

41 "Dix millions jet& au feu quand nos ch6meurs crevaient de faim, quand des centaines de petits commerCants Ctaient traques par le fisc, quand des centaines d'industriels ne trouvaient point 50,000 francs de credit!" Degrelle, J'accuse, 29. 42 Les forces saines etaient ecrasees par la crise. Des banksters, par contre, comme les politiciens a la Segers, puisaient et razziaient a leur aise." Degrelle, J'accuse, 29. 43 "11s y sont rest&, Segers, c'est bien le moins, en attendant qu'au jsur ou nous serons les maitres, nous vous fassions, la tEte sur un baquet, vomir tout ce que vous avez avalC aux depens du peuple!" Degrelle, J'accuse, 30. The results of the Coup de Courtrai, Degrelle's initial outburst against Segers and the subsequent publication of the pamphlet J'accuse M. Segers, were twofold. First, Rex was catapulted into public consciousness by its highly public split with the Catholic

Party. In the aftermath of this incident, for instance, the circulation of Rex quadrupled.44

The other effect of Degrelle's Courtrai assault was to strain to the breaking point Rex's relationship with the Catholic Church. Though Degrelle had earlier broken away from the ACJB, the Church had refrained from passing judgment on him. The events at

Courtrai, however, were too much to ignore, and on November 20, 1935, Cardinal Van

Roey made his feelings about Lkon Degrelle quite clear in an episcopal decree:

Considering that Rex has become a purely political grouping; considering that this grouping pursues its goals by means which cannot be justified; considering finally that it spreads its activity outside of the cadres of the Catholic Party while unaware of all discipline, we order the following: 1. It is forbidden to priests and religious orders to attend meetings or any other Rexist assemblies, or to collaborate with Rexist journals. 2. We demand that the journal Rex not be sold at the doors of churches... 3. Heads of establishments for the instruction of young boys and young girls will use all necessary means to ensure that their students remain apart from the Rexist agitation.45 This denunciation of Rexism by a Belgian Roman Catholic Cardinal was highly significant. Degrelle could no longer realistically claim to be a spokesman for the

Church, and priests could no longer contribute to Rexist journals. Degrelle had increased his visibility and attained political independence, but he did so at the cost of his relationship with the Catholic Church.

44 Brasillach, Histoire, 497. 45 "Considerant que Rex est devenu un groupement purement politique; considtrant que ce groupement poursuit son but par des procBd6s qui ne peuvent se justifier; considerant enfin qu'il dtploie son activitk en dehors des cadres du Parti catholique et en meconnaissant toute discipline, nous ordonnons ce que suit: 1. I1 est interdit aux prgtres et religieux d'assister a des meetings ou a toutes autres assemblBes rexistes et de collaborer aux journaux rexistes. 2. Nous demandons que le journal Rex ne sort vendu aux portes des eglises... 3. Les supkrieurs des etablissements d'enseignement de jeunes gens et de jeunes filles, emploieront tous les moyens necessaires pour que leurs eleves restent etrangers a l'agitation rexiste." Cardinal Van Roey quoted in Gtienne, Mouvement, 28-29. The Rise of Rex

Many people in Belgium were soon ready to accept what Rex appeared to be

offering. ~h&preexisting Belgian political parties seemed to devote more time to fighting

one another than to solving the country's problems. Relations between the Flemish and

Walloon communities were strained, and the middle classes feared mounting economic

insecurity.46 Rex promised that it would bring unity and stability to Belgium, and it

found a receptive audience for its message.

The rebuke from the Church was not enough to dissuade Degrelle from his grand

ambitions. Parliamentary elections were upcoming in May 1936, and Rex was

determined to have an impact. If Rex was to be a serious political party, however, it

would need an explicit, well-developed party platform, something lacking heretofore.

This platform was provided by Jean Denis, who, according to the Rexists themselves,

"became, along with [Josk] Streel, the principal theoretician of Rexist doctrine."47 In early 1936, Rex published Denis's book-length Principes Rexistes [Rexist Principles], which comprehensively outlined Rex's ideology, including wide-ranging critiques of socialism, liberalism, and "hypercapitalism." Even in this work, though, there is a substantial amount of ambiguity as to Rex's stated principles.

The central themes of Denis's book were highly varied. These themes included the Rexist conceptions of leadership, revolution, the Belgian people, liberalism, and the proper nature of the state. The first section of Principes Rexistes was largely theoretical,

46 Pierre-Henri Laurent, "Belgian Rexism and Leon Degrelle," in George L. Mosse, International Fascism: New Thoughts and New Approaches (London: Institute of Contemporary History, 1979), 299-300. 47 "Jean Denis... deviendra, avec Streel, le principal theoricien de la doctrine rexiste." Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Re-xisme, 64. concerned more with philosophical questions than with specific policy prescriptions. An

examination of this theory is central to gaining insight into the motivations of the Rex

movement.

I The dedication of Principes Rexistes provided insight into the Rexist conceptions

of leadership and membership. Denis devoted his work to "Lkon Degrelle, our leader.

That is to say, the depository of our collective TO Rex, Degrelle was his

supporters' wishes made flesh. The relationship between leader and followers was a

metaphysical one. "Revolutionary dynamism always has a mystical character, which

alniost always takes on a messianic all~re."~Despite the sacrilege of such thinking,

Denis saw Degrelle as a nearly messianic figure.50 It was not for Degrelle himself,

though, that Denis and his fellows struggled. Denis dedicated the book ''to our mothers,

to our wives. If we want a more beautiful country, it is to make them happier and so that

in the tenderness of their looks we will find more joy. It is so that the children, our

children, will never know the hardship that we have known."51 To Denis, supporting Rex was a completely selfless act, done not for oneself but for Belgium's defenseless women

and children. The intended audience of Rex's message was the population of Belgian

men.52 Rex cast itself as a masculine protector, whereas the role of women was to nurture. Rex, then, was not a movement interested in breaking down traditional gender roles, though it did support expanded women's suffrage.

48 "A Leon Degrelle notre chef. C'est-&dire le depositaire de notre volonte collective." Jean Denis, Principes Rexistes: Tome Premier (Bruxelles: Editions Rex, 1936), 6. 49 ''Le dynamisme revolutionnaire a toujours un caractkre mystique qui lui-m&meprend presque toujours une allure messianique." Denis, Principes, 18. 50 Such a figure was a far cry fiom the relatively bland technocrats running the Catholic Party. 51 "Ce livre, de tout moll 2me, je le dedie aux femmes de chtz nous, a nos mhes. A nos epouses. Si nous voulons un pays plus beau, c'est pour qu'elles soient plus heureuses et que dans la tendresse de leurs regards nous lisions plus de joie. C'est pour que les enfants, nos enfants, ne comaissent point la durete que nous avons connue." Denis, Principes, 10. 52 At this time, Belgian women did not have full suffrage. In order to meet Rex's goal of protecting Belgian women and children, a

"necessary revolution" had to take place. It is essential to note that the "revolution

cannot be violent."53 This was Denis's first remark about the nature of the revolution:

violence would not solve Belgium's problems. This rejection of violence, though, was

not necessarily a moral imperative.54 ath her, it was a sensible strategy.

Belgium cannot live by hersel f...Thus one must not contemplate violent movements in Belgium, which would isolate, even if it were for a few weeks, the country fi-om the rest of the world. Anarchy, even of a short duration, would offer to outside powers a pretext for intervention, irremediably destroying the prestige of the country and provohng an immediate catastrophe.55 Violent revolution would invite intervention by Belgium's powerful neighbors, who were

presumably eager to curb Belgium's independence. For Denis, avoiding violence was

necessitated by Belgian nationalist concerns. Denis feared that Belgium would be

overrun and subjugated by its more powerful neighbors if it provided them any pretext to

do so.

Fear of outside intervention was not Denis's only reason to avoid violence in the

coming revolution. To Denis, violence would be counter-productive also because the

privileged classes would simply respond with even greater violence, rendering the

success of the revolution unlikely. Even a successful violent revolution would completely devastate the country, causing damage which would not be easily

ameliorated. "It is fooling the people to say to them that one will destroy everything in

53 "La rkvolution nCcessaireW; "La rkvolution ne peut pas Btre violente." Denis, Principes, 11. 54 Controlled violence can still be useful; Denis calls for the death penalty for the worst criminals. Denis, Principes, 6 1. 55 "La Belgique ne peut vivre par elle-m6me... I1 ne faut donc pas soriger en Belgique a des mouvements violents qui isoleraient, ne Et-ce que pendant quelques semaines, le pays du reste du monde. Utae anarchie, mBme de courte durke, offrirait aux puissances un prktexte d'intervention, dktruirait irremkdiablement le prestige du pays et provoquerait une catastrophe immkdiate." Denis, Principes, 11. order to rebuild it along a better plan."56 That is not to say, though, that the revolution would not produce winners and losers. "The Revolution must proceed first by cleaning, next by development, and finally by expansion."57 This "cleaning" would be in line with

Degrelle's repeated promises to clean out or wash away the dirty, corrupt old system, and replace it with the new Rexist order.

Because the revolution would be nonviolent, it would need to have popular support in order to succeed. "For the Revolution to succeed, the idea which we pursue must achieve among the mass of citizens a suficient Denis did not define, however, what exactly would constitute a "sufficient" unanimity.59 In any event, what is clear is that "that sufficient unanimity cannot be achieved with the current leaders and the current spirit of the parties."60 Because of this fact, a new leader and a new group would be necessary to achieve the revolution. For Denis, of course, this opened the door for

Degrelle and Rexism. If the parties were not unifying the people, the people should turn to Degrelle for solutions. The Rexists consistently presented themselves as a unified front in opposition to the petty rivalries and in-fighting of the established parties. The

Rexists claimed that they would transcend politics, providing stability and security to the

Belgian people.

56 "C'est tromper le peuple que de lui dire qu'on va tout detmire pour reconstmire sur un plan meilleur." Denis, Principes, 12. 57 "La Rtvolution doit proceder d'abord par nettoyage, ensuite par amknagement et enfin par agrandissement." Denis, Principes, 13. 58 "Pour rtussir la Revolution... il faut realiser autour de l'idee que l'on poursuit et parmi la masse des citoyens une unanimite' suffisante" [emphasis in the original]. Denis, Principes, 13-14. 59 Pierre Daye later offered his own definition of sufficient unanimity: "Un gouvernement ne sera vraiment populaire que s'il s'appuie sur le consentement, non seulement legal mais complet, affectueux et confiant de tout le peuple; ou au moins de la plus grande part de ce peuple, d'une unanimitk suffisante" Daye, Lkon Degiaelle et le Rexisme, 90. 60 "Cette unanimite suffisante ne peut se realiser avec les dirigeants actuels et I'esprit actuel des partis." Denis, Piincipes, 14. The concept of "the people" was central to the Rexist ideology. Denis continued:

"it is with the people, by the people and for the people that the Revolution will come

about."" He never defined what constituted "the people," i.e., whether "the people"

would includk all Rexists, all Belgians, or some other grouping. Denis would probably

not have included Belgium's Jews as members of "the" people. Denis was clear, though,

that the concept of the people was completely divorced from that of social classes.

"These concepts [of social class] themselves must disappear."" This was a major

distinction between the Rexist and socialist visions of revolution.

Fot' Denis, the rhetoric of social class was completely unproductive and should be

discarded. Thus, the revolution would not benefit one class at the expense of another.

Some of Rex's rhetoric sounded similar to utopian socialism, but without the initial

component of class warfare. Denis saw the difference as being that socialism was an

inherently destructive phenomenon, while Rex was supposedly con~tructive.~~Unlike

Rex, socialism "finds its supporters in Judeo-Masonry," and was thus presumably immoral and tainted by asso~iation.~~Rex's anti-Semitism may have been toned down fi-om the early days, but it still existed.

Rex's feelings on Jews and Judaism were relatively transparent, but the group's relationship with Christianity came across as much more conflicted. Because of the alleged decay of the liberal system, Denis believed revolution to be inevitable. Yet, there were two revolutionary options: "The Revolution will have a bolshevist inspiration, or it

61 "c r est avec le peuple, par le peuple et pour le peuple que doit se faire la Revolution." Denis, Principes, i m 1 I. 62 "Ces concepts meme devient disparaitre." Denis, Principes, 17. 63 Denis, Principes, 17-20. 64 "trouve ses tenants dans la JudBo-Maqonnerie." Denis, Principes, 19 will have a Christian inspiration."65 Because Rex wholeheartedly rejected bolshevism,

the Rexist revolution logically had to have a Christian inspiration. Nevertheless, Denis

failed to describe what made Rex Christian, a vagueness that was also apparent in much

of Degrelle's writing.

On the other hand, Denis was quite clear on what he saw as Rex's enemies. To

Denis, the problems of modernity were outgrowths of liberalism. Hypercapitalism and

socialism were "wo monsters and two brother^."^^ Although the two appeared to be

diametrically opposed, Denis believed them to be fundamentally linked. Hypercapitalism

"is a secondary form of socialism," and both were about nothing more than the

accumulation of power.67 These soulless ideologies could only flourish under the amoral

system of liberalism. Denis claimed that under liberalism, "the very notion of right and

wrong disappears."" The Rexists saw liberalism as a chaotic set of ideas and institutions

with no overriding moral force to guide them. Because of this, "the Liberal State is

absolutely incapable of maintaining ~ocial~eace.~~The implication was that, unlike

liberalism, Rex would be more than capable of maintaining the social peace, and if

Belgians wanted social harmony, they should vote for Rex. "Only a moral and spiritual

revolution, based on the old Christian principles, can bring the State real peace and real

prosperity," presumably as opposed to the false peace and false prosperity of the current

65 "La Rkvolution sera d'inspiration bolcheviste ou elle sera d'inspiration chretienne." Denis, Principes, 20. 66 "Deux monstres et deux fibres." Denis, frincipes, 28. 67 "est en quelque sorte une forme secondaire du socialisme." Denis, Principes, 30. This rhetorical move parallels the argument made by one of the primary Italian Fascist theoreticians. See, from 1925: Alfiedo Rocco, "The Political Doctrine of Fascism," in Carl Cohen (ed.), Communism, Fascism, and Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations "La notion mbme du bien et du ma1 disparait." Denis, Principes, 38. 69 "L 'Etat Libbra1 est absolurnent incapuble de maintenir la paix sociale" [emphasis in the original]. Denis, Principes, 4 1. regime.70 Compared to many other European countries, Belgian public life in this period

was never particularly violent or chaotic. Lingering uncertainties about economic

stability, though, may have created a real need in the Belgian public for a sense of

1 security.

Along with a sense of security, Rex saw "dignity" in all aspects of life as

essential. Denis continued by outlining what Rex would do to restore dignity to Belgium

in the realms of the state, the family, the aristocracy, professions, and individual^.^' The

order was not incidental: individuals came last. Rexism was a highly anti-individualist

philosophy, so it makes sense that the dignity of the individual was low on the list of

priorities. Mention of the aristocracy implied a certain elitism, while concern with

professions as such may have stemmed from a corporatist mindset. To Denis, the most important goal was the restoration of the dignity of the state. "To recover its dignity, the

State must... respect elementary moral principals," a task in which it was currently

remiss." Denis believed that the state was not living up to its promises to the people.

This was not, though, the fault of the king, the practical and moral head of state. For reasons of philosophy and convenience Rex was strongly monarchist, but Denis stated that they also had a deep respect for the king, as an individual man in addition to as an institution, founded on love.73

70 "seule une r4volution morale et spirituelle, bade sur les vieux principes chretiens, pouvait ramener dans 1'Etat la vraie paix, la vraie prosperite." Denis, Principes, 46. As Pierre Daye phrased it, "Ce que Rex veut, c'est la paix d'abord, la prosperit6 ensuite." Daye, Lion Deg-relle et le Rexisme, 100. 71 Denis, Principes, 49. 72 "Pour retrouver sa dignit6 1'Etat doit... respecter les principes de morales ClCmentaire." Denis, Principes, 50. 73 "Royalistes par Cconomie et par esprit pratiques, nous le somnles devenus egalement pour amour." Denis, Principes, 50-51. Unfortunately, though the king was above reproach, Denis regarded the ministers and members ofparliament as wholly unfit for their duties (53-60). Denis saw the civil service ministries as being particularly stangnant and ineffective. "11 y a I'odeur de ministere, odeur d'ennui, melange de musee et de morgue" (75). Most offensive to Denis was the system of advancement based on seniority, The state also played a role in molding the Belgian people, a function which could properly be fulfilled by the army. Though Degrelle and most of the other Rexist leaders had performed no military service, they were quite enthusiastic about the army's merits.

To Denis, the beauty of the army was that, in addition to defending Belgium's borders, it could also be used to break down the sense of individualism in its soldiers, and to instill in them a sense of discipline, hierarchy, the responsibilities of rank, human solidarity, and an esprit de corps.74 The army was the "novitiate of citi~ens,~'akin to a religious order.75

Because the army formed citizens, Denis called for a mandatory year of service for all young people.76

Over half of Les Principes Rexistes was devoted to the section "La dignite de la farnille" [The dignity of the family], which had a highly moralistic, judgmental tone in favor of traditional family values.77 On cultural and social matters, at least, Rex could be construed as a movement of Catholic conservatives. Denis wrote, for example, that a high birth rate led to a high level of prosperity, and thus that large families should be encouraged.78 Birth control and abortion were unthinkable. Because parents of large

rather than solely on merit, which he saw as promoting the mediocre in place of the young and energetic (212). Given that Rex was largely a movement of the young, this is certainly an understandable complaint. 74 Denis, Principes, 69-72. 75 "L'armee, c'est le noviciat du citoyen." Denis, Principes, 70. 76 Denis, Principes, 72. 77 Rex called for the restriction of prostitution, pornography, immoral movies, etc. None of these concerns seem particularly unique to Belgium in the 1930~~as much of the same debate is still ongoing worldwide today. Denis, Principes, 1 11. 78 In order to pay for this, wages would be based on the worker's age and the size of his family--Those with more children would be paid more, and as a worker neared retirement his pay would scale down, as his children would be grown and no longer in need of support. Interestingly, Denis believed that the state had a responsibility to ensure a minimum standard of living for all families. Denis, Principes, 89, 85, 93. families had more responsibilities than others, Rex believed that a man or woman with at

least four children should cohnt for two votes in any election.79

Jean Denis's Principes Rexistes represented the most complete published

statement of Rex's political beliefs. It did not constitute, however, the extent of Rex's

pre-election publicity campaign. On May 3, 1936, Degrelle launched the new daily

newspaper Le Pays Rkel [The Real ~ountry].~~The newspaper was named after the

Maurrassian idea of the "real country", which existed in opposition to the "pays lkgal," or

the "legal country."81 Le Pays Rkel, then, was meant to appeal to '"real" Belgians,

members of what Rex perceived as the nation.82 The paper was an immediate success,

with twenty thousand people signing up for two month subscriptions.83By this time, the

French language edition of Rex had also grown to a circulation of over 150,000.~~

Election day was May 24, 1936. As one of Rex's organs, Le Pays Rkel exhorted

the population to support Rex. "Chase out the thieves. Against all of the rotten ones

bourris]. Against all of the parties. Vote for Degrelle did not himself stand for election, a fact which will be discussed later, but he staged the contest in the starkest of terms.

Ifyou want to see new scandals foul the country, if you want to be crushed by the dictatorship of the banksters, if you want to see reborn the hysterical battles of the parties

79 en is, Principes, 103-104. Pro-natalist policies were not an exclusively Catholic phenomenon, and were quite common among the former combatants of WWI. Such a policy prescription was fairly mainstream in Europe at the time. ~tienne,Mouvement, 1. Daye, Lkon Degrelle et le Rexisme, 132. 82 This strikes me as a highly fascistic concept. 83 Luc Schepens, "Fascists and Nationalists in Belgium 1919- 1940," in Stein lJgelvik Larsen, Rernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (ed.), Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 507-508. s4 ~tienne,Mouvement, 67. 85 "Chassez les voleurs. Contre tous les pourris. Contre tous les partis. Votez pour Rex." ~tienne, Mouvement, 49. which have brought the country agony, then follow, like sheep, the profiteering politicians! You will have signed your own death warrant.86 The struggle between Rex and the traditional parties was hmed by Degrelle as a matter of life and death.

Rex's campaign slogans were highly combative. These slogans included

"Socialism is disorder," "The fight of the parties prepares the revolution," and "Against the bloody dictatorship of the left." All ended with the exhortation to vote for ex.^?

The message was that the Rexist revolution was coming, and that it would end petty party strife and the misdeeds of the treacherous socialist left. Rex would bring order to

Belgium. The irony is that, though Rex promised to unify the country, it devoted much of its energy to divisive, combative campaign tactics.

The results of the elections were more favorable to Rex than anyone had imagined they would be. Nationwide, Rex polled 271,491 votes, 11.49% of all votes cast, entitling

Rex to 21 out of 202 seats in the lower chamber of parliament.88 Moreover, Rex showed that it had appeal on a national level: it received 7% of the vote in , 15.1% in

Wallonia, and 18.5% in ~russels.~~Rex was most successful in non-industrialized areas of and in industrialized areas in ~landers.~'Despite the fact that Degrelle and most of the other Rexists leaders were Walloons, and that Degrelle could not speak

86 "Si vous voulez voir des scandales nouveaux empester le pays, sl vous voulez etre CcrasCs par la dictature des banksters, si vous voulez voir renaitre ces luttes hysteriques des partis qui ont mis le pays a l'agonie, suivez alors, comrne des moutons, les politiciens profiteurs! Vous aurez, vous-m&mes,cignk votre condamnation u mort." ~tienne,Mouvement, 49. X7" Le socialisme c'est le desordre. Votez REX ;" La lutte des partis prepare la revolution. Votez IEX; "Contre la dictature sanglante des gauches. Votez REX." Robert Pfeiffer and Jean Ladriere, L'Aventure rexiste (Bruxelles: Pierre De Meyere, 1966), 59-60. " ~tienne,Mouvement, 53. ~tienne,Mouvement, 57. Schepens, "Fascists and Nationalists," 508. Flemish very well, Rex received a total of 72,000 votes in ~landers.~'Rex had achieved

a national profile. For a political party which had only existed for half of a year, this was

an astonishing achievement.

The elections of 1936 were highly unfavorable to the traditional established

parties, but why? It may be tempting to write Rex off as merely a response to the

econolnic uncertainties of the worldwide depression of the 1930s, perhaps drawing

parallels to Hitler's rise to power, but there was much more involved in Rex's rise than

that (as there was in Hitler's case as well). Though much of the Belgian middle class had

suffered frbm the economic downturn, this was not the source of Rex's popularity. On

the contrary, according to historian Pierre-Henri Laurent, "The real bourgeois partisans of

Rex were... those who had not been hurt by these events... the movement thrived not only

when the depression conditions were vastly ameliorated, but also among those who were

not excessively injured by the economic crisis of 1930-35."92 In 1936, there were

numerous pressures on the Belgian political system beyond the economy; it "was

weakened by intense party factionalism, intensified and upgraded language-culture

warfare, the strains of social change as reflected in legislative issues and even the trauma associated with economic reform in response to the depression."93

Degrelle's charisma surely played a role in Rex's rise to national prominence, but charisma alone cannot be the answer, since Rex was not the only extremist party to gain votes in the election. Other extremist parties, the Flemish nationalist VNV and the

Communists, fared well enough electorally that, combined with Kex, nearly 25% of all of

9 1 Herman van der Wusten, "The Low Countries," in Detlef Muhlberger (ed.), The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements (London: Croom Helm, 19871,234; ~tienne,Mouvement, 58. 92 Laurent, "Belgian Rexism," 300. " Laurent, "Belgian Rexism," 299-300. the seats in the chamber went to their deputies.94 Arrayed against the 21 Rexist seats were 70 Socialists (down from 73 in 1932), 61 Catholics (down from 79), 23 Liberals

(down from 24), 16 Flemish nationalists in the VNV (up fiom 8), 9 Communists (up fiom

3) and 2 Christian ~emocrats.~~Because of the heavy losses of the Catholic Party and the strong gains by Rex, it is clear that Rex appealed to the Catholic Party's former constituents and that that party was the biggest loser in the elections of 1936. In some ways, Rex's and the other extremist parties' appeal was simply that they were not politics as usual. People were sick of the established parties, and Rex represented something new and different. Rexism was a

way of registering anger and cultural despair about the major changes in Belgian life in the previous generation... At first, [Rex] was a protest by the self-proclaimed upright and virtuous young against the 'established disorder' (in Degrelle's words) of their dissolute and feeble fathers.96 The Belgian people were receptive to political change, and they showed this by punishing the mainstream political parties.

Unlike the other extremist parties, Rex had the added distinction of being perceived as a splinter of the Catholic Party, no longer the most dominant party in the

Belgian parliament, having polled only 27.67% of the vote, down from 38.55% in the previous election.97 Rex scholar Martin Conway helps to explain Degrelle and Rex's particular appeal to the Belgian electorate.

A vote for Rex in 1936 was, as many Rexists subsequently admitted, essentially a protest vote against the political elite and, more especially, against the perceived failure of the

94 ~tienne,Mouvernent, 53. 95 ~tienne,Mouvernent, 53. 96 Laurent, "Belgian Rexism," 296, 295. 97 ~tienne,Mouvernent, 53. Catholic Party to protect the interests of its middle-class and rural fiancophone constituency.98 Rexist journalist Pierre Daye expressed similar sentiments: "It is because Rex responded

to the aspirations of the popular soul that its call produced such a strong echo. It

succeeded at expressing the anger, the will, and the hope of the masses and it acted as the

popular conscience emb~died."~~Even in the conception of a Rexist, the public's anger

at the status quo was the foremost reason for Rex's success.

The Catholic Party was the largest loser in the elections of 1936, and Rex was the

largest winner. These gains, though, would prove fleeting. Until the Coup de Courtrai in

November 1935, Lkon Degrelle was little more than a troublesome Catholic Party operative with oversized ambitions. In a period of months, his Rex party had come into existence and stormed onto the national stage, making a surprisingly successful showing in the parliamentary elections of May 1936. Degrelle had supporters in all areas of the country, and the possibilities for his future seemed limitless. During the heady days after the election, though, Rex began to collapse. It would never again match its first showing, and Rex began to seem more and more a party of the lunatic fringe.

Martin Conway, Collaboration in Belgium: Lkon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement 1940-1944 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 12. 99 '"'est parce que Rex repondait a des aspirations de l'lme populaire que son appel a suscite un aussi formidable echo. I1 a reussi a exprimer la colGre, la volonte et l'esptrance des masses et il s'est fait comme la conscience populaire en action." Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Rexisme, 8 1-82. Chapter 4-The Failure of 1937

Precipitous Decline

In May of 1936, Leon Degrelle had every reason to hold high hopes for the future

of his Rexist movement in Belgium. Rex had demonstrated its appeal to the electorate by

winning over ten percent of the entire national vote and was poised to play an influential

role in parliament. It seemed as though Rex's fbture would be bright. As it turned out,

though, Rex's initial electoral success was the beginning of the end of its political

viability. Degrelle miscalculated the level of potential support for Rex, and made a series

of disastrous decisions which doomed the movement to political impotence. Ironically, it

was this very political impotence of Rex which led Degrelle to the actions which would cement Rex's reputation as a dangerous fascist movement.

Rex was greatly harmed by its disastrous performance in Parliament. In order to be elected to serve in the Belgian Parliament, one needed to be at least 25 years old. Rex, though, was a movement of the young, and many of the most talented Rexists were too young to stand for election.' Men like Jose Streel, a top Rex theoretician at age 24, were automatically di~~ualified.~As a result, the group had to put as candidates people from outside of Rex who the Rexists hoped would advance the Rexist agenda.3

The process of selecting candidates was highly rushed, and many of the candidates turned out to be singularly ineffective, with the end result being that an unsatisfactory and incoherent group represented Rex in Parliament. In the words of Jean-Michel ~tienne,

' Jean-Michel Charlier, Lkon Degrelle: Persiste et Signe (Paris: Editions Jean Picollec, 1985), 110. Pierre Daye, Iion Degrelle et le Rexisme (Paris: Arthbme Fayard, 1937), 80-81. Jean-Michel ~tienne,Le Mouvement Rexiste Jusqu 'en 1940 (Paris: Librairie handColin, 19681, 123.

87 "The result was a parliamentary contingent which was mediocre, disparate, without any

experience, and composed of men who had not known each other days bef~re."~

This was not an auspicious start for Rex as a legitimate political party. Even other

Rexists were'disheartened by the group's performance in Parliament. Pierre Daye, a

prominent Rexist journalist, later described the group of representatives: "in truth there

was neither order, nor discipline, nor unity of thought."5 This must have been

particularly galling to Degrelle, with his emphasis on order, discipline, and unity behind a

strong leader.

Evkn with such a disastrous group of deputies, things may have turned out better

for Rex had Degrelle been in Parliament to lead them. However, Degrelle had opted not

to run for a seat at the time of the 1936 elections despite being 29 years old. Unsure of

how Rex would fare in the contest, Degrelle likely feared that he would be humiliated if

he were unsuccessful in his bid. After all, if even the head of a party could not be

elected, people would probably not hold that party in particularly high regard. Whether

for this or some other reason, Degrelle did not stand in the election, and it cost Rex

dearly.

Rex's parliamentary incompetence was immediately apparent. The party's first

major act in Parliament was supposed to be the reading of a scathing speech on corruption written by Degrelle. Rex widely publicized this event, which was to occur on

July 10, 1936. When the day arrived, Raphael Sindic, the deputy entrusted with reading

Degrelle's speech, simply was not there, inexplicably arriving too late to perform his

"Le rksultat fut une kquipe parlementaire mkdiocre, disparate, sans aucune expkrience, composke de gens qui ne se connaissaient pas quelques jours auparavant." ~tienne,Mouvement, 123. "il n'y a avait en veritC ni ordre, ni discipline, ni unit6 de penske." Daye quoted in ~tienne,Mouvement, 123. f~nction.~This was a huge embarrassment for Rex, and there was no convincing way to spin the story to cast the movement in a good light. The "Sindic Affair" was surely not the glorious start of Rex's stint in Parliament that Degrelle had envisioned.

I Things never got much better for the Rexist deputies. Rexist lawmakers did not accomplish much of anything in Parliament. Belgium was facing serious issues, and the mainstream political parties seemed to be moving beyond petty in-fighting, whereas Rex continued to play its games. The atmosphere in Parliament was highly chaotic, with

Communists and Rexists shouting insults at each other across the aisles. The Rexists wohld chant "To Moscow," meaning that the Communists, and other leftists, sought to bring Belgium under the dominion of Stalin. The Communists would respond with the damning chant "To ~erlin."~The obvious implication of such a charge was that the

Rexists were little more than Belgian Nazis.

Associating Degrelle and Rex with the Nazis was a common strategy among

Rex's opponents as a means of challenging the party's legitimacy. In pre-election anti-

Degrelle propaganda, one group had produced a poster which showed a picture of

Degrelle above the Rexist insignia transforming into a picture of Hitler above the

~wastika.~Although in this period Degrelle was always carefbl to avoid making overtly fascistic public statements, this suspicion of his intentions and motives was not unjustified. To start with, in 1936 Degrelle paid a visit to Fascist Italy. Rex almost certainly received monetary support fi-om Mussolini and the Italian Fascists starting in

~tienne,Mouvement, 124-125. Robert P feiffer and Jean Ladriere, L 'Aventure rexiste (Bmxelles: Pierre De hleyere, 1966), 81. Jean-Marie Frerotte, L4on Degr-elle, le dernier fasciste (Bmxelles: Paul Legrain, 1987), 95. 1936, although Degrelle would always deny this.9 What is more, later in the same year

Degrelle had a secret meeting in Germany with Hitler, though financial aid from the

Nazis was much less forthcoming than it had been from the ~ascists.'~When the public soon learned of this meeting, the perception of a link between Degrelle and fascism was understandably cemented.

Despite the association of Rex with fascism, one key difference between Rex in this period and most fascist movements was that Rex lacked any kind of organized militia. Until 193 7, Rex was strictly non-violent, by direct order of ~egrelle.''

Beginning in 1936, however, Rex's opponents did not hold themselves to the same standard. There were numerous attacks on individual Rexists, from attempted shootings to beatings and thrown rocks, but at this point Rexists did not respond in kind.12 Their nonviolence was much more likely cynical than principled; Degrelle and the Rexists could portray themselves as martyrs, attacked by vicious bolshevists for seeking to defend Belgium. Nevertheless, the fact that Rex pursued a non-violent stance until 1938 set it apart from other fascist movements in both doctrine and tactics.

It may be tempting to believe that the Rexists themselves staged these attacks, but that does not seem to have been the case. Even so, it certainly sought to take full advantage of their propaganda potential. In a 1937 issue of Le Pays R&el,Degrelle published an article about Rexists being beaten up: "Our crime is to love our country, to

Schepens, "Fascists and Nationalists in Belgium 1919-1940," in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (ed.), Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 508; Martin Conway, Collaboration in Belgium: Lkon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement 1940-1944 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 13. For Degrelle's denial, see Charlier, Degrelle, 1 1 1. lo Conway, Collaboration, 13; ~tienne,Mouvement, 111. " ~tienne,Mouvement, 127. l2 ~tienne,Mouvement, 129. Rex would not always show this restraint; during the war, after an intense partisan campaign of assassinations against Rex, Rex responded with reprisal killings of hostages. It was for one such massacre that many top Rexists were executed post-war. want to save our people peacefully, by a work of unflagging belief. Do we deliver

blows? ever."" his avowal of "never" being violent, though, was not the whole truth.

Oddly, the one place in which the Rexists were willing to fight back was in Parliament;

on at least one occasion, the Rexists and their opponents had an outright brawl.14 The

simple act of getting in a fight in Parliament did not exactly evince a professional

approach to parliamentary democracy by Rexist deputies.

Getting into a brawl on the parliamentary floor was consistent with Rex's earlier tactics, like sweeping the sidewalks in front of the offices of allegedpourris. Legitimate political parties, though, are expected to behave with at least some degree of decorum. ,

Rexist stunts that had been funny and attention-grabbing before now appeared as childish for a group of legislative deputies. Rex was unable to adapt and behave in a more mature, adult manner. Paul Jamin, Rex's brilliant political cartoonist, later recognized this problem. According to historian Pierre-Henri Laurent, Jamin realized that

the original band of Rexists were dilettantes who enjoyed out-maneuvering the establishment by improvisations. He speculated that the same experimentation and superficiality did not succeed with the larger populace after 1936, since they had a more serious set of concerns that defied simplistic clich~s.'~ While Rex was flailing in its attempts to establish itself as a serious force in the

Belgian parliament, it felt itself to be newly vulnerable as a result of political changes then occurring in France. Degrelle was highly alarmed by Lkon Blum7s Popular Front government in France, and decided that Rex too should seek allies.16 This led Degrelle,

l3 "Notre crime est d'aimer notre pays, de vouloir sauver notre peuple pacifiquement, par un travail inlassable de persuasion. Donnons-nous des coups? Jamais." Degrelle writing in Le Pays Rdel, 24 March 1937, quoted in Pfeiffer and Ladriere, L 'Aventure, 108. I4 Pfeiffer and Ladriere, L 'Aventure, 92-93. l5 Pierre-Henri Laurent, "Belgian Rexism and LCon Degrelle," in George L. Mosse, International Fascism: New Thoughts and New Approaches (London: Institute of Contemporary History, 1979), 305. l6 In the Charlier interviews, Degrelle described the Popular Front as led by "un israelite marxsste, Ikon Blum, qui, comme tous ses coreligionnaires, eprouvait une haine presqae viscCrale a l'egard tlu regime in the fall of 1936, to make a costly mistep. Degrelle believed that with socialists and

communists aligned in France, the only choice for Belgium was "Rex ou Moscou" [Rex

or ~oscow].'~In Le Pays Riel, Degrelle explained his thinking: "Facing Moscow, one

can never be too numer~us.'"~In other words, one could never have too many allies

against the bolshevist threat.

In his quest for political allies, Degrelle turned to the Vlaamsch Nationaal

Verbond, or VNV [Flemish National League], a Flemish (not Belgian) nationalist party.19

The VNV sought a greater Flemish state encompassing Flanders, the Netherlands, and the

Flemings df Northern ~rance.~'The VNV's goals were clearly antithetical to Rex's

Belgian nationalism, as under the VNV's plan Belgium would quite simply cease to exist.

Despite this clear incompatibility of goals, Degrelle chose to align Rex with the VNV in

October 1936. If Degrelle had been true to his stated principles, he never would have allied with a Flemish nationalist group. Degrelle proved, though, that his principles were quite flexible when he saw a chance for personal political gain. In the long run, however, this choice was politically inexpedient.

Degrelle tried to broaden Rex's appeal among the Flemish by allying with the

VNV, but this proved to be unacceptable for much of the party's Walloon base. The

VNV supported Flemish autonomy and was perceived (rightly) as pro-~erman.21Many

Walloons felt threatened by the VNV, and "feared the consequences of the recent hitlhrien," implicitly blaming Jews for their treatment at Hitler's hands. Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 162. l7 Robert Brasillach, Histoire de la Guerre d'Espagne: Mhnoires, suivi de Le'on Degrelle et L 'avenir de "Rex" ([Paris]: Plon, 1969), 499. Is "Face A Moscou, on ne sera jamais trop nombreux." Degrelle in Le Pays Re'el, 15 October 1936, quoted in ~tienne,Mouvement, 10 1. '%.H. Kossman, The Low Countries: 1780-1940 (Oxford: Oxford University, 1978), 640-641. 20 Jane Kathryn Miller, Belgian Foreign Policy Between Two Wars, 1919-1940 (New York: Bookrnan Associates, 195 l), 49. 2 1 ~tienne,Mouvement, 135. demographic and economic expansion of the Flemish community.'"2 Thus, Rex paid too

high a price for the VNV alliance; few new supporters were drawn in, many previously

loyal party members were alienated by Degrelle's extremely flexible ideology, and the

leader repudiated the alliance in June of 1937.~~

The Belgian centrist government did not stand idly by as Degrelle maneuvered for

greater political gains in 1936. In autumn, Degrelle and other Rexists were banned from

speaking on the radio because they were feared as a threat to democracy.24 The ever

resourceful Degrelle responded to this ban by broadcasting over Italian radio, which

codld still be received in The government also sought to curb Le Pays Rdel,

jailing three editors for two months on rather vague charges. This gave Degrelle the

opportunity to portray Rex as a movement of persecuted martyrs, writing that "The

banksters are free, and my innocent journalists are in Forty years later, Degrelle

still complained about the undemocratic measures the Belgian government pursued

against him in 1936.~"The government had judged that Degrelle left unchecked was

more of a threat to democracy than Degrelle subject to sanctions, and had acted

accordingly.

Despite government steps against Rex, Degrelle continued to ensure that he and

the movement maintained a high profile. Soon after formalizing the Rex-VNV alliance,

Degrelle called for a march on Brussels of 250,000 Rexists to be held on October 25,

1936. This was an incredibly bold move on Degrelle's part, as Rex had only received a

22 Laurent, "Belgian Rexism," 3 12. 23 F.L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 215. 24 Conway, Colluboration, 13- 14. 25 Pfeiffer and Ladriere, L 'Aventure, 84. 26 "Les banksters sont libres, et mes innocents journalistes sont en prison!" Degrelle quoted in ~tienne, Mouvement, 130. 27 Charlier, Degrelle, 135-137. total of 270,000 votes in all of Belgium a few months earlier.28 Nevertheless, Degrelle

retained his characteristic confidence, assuming that his monster rally would be a success.

This planned gathering was likely a conscious imitation, at least superficially, of

Mussolini's , and the government understandably feared that it would result in an attempted coup d'~tat.~~

Because of the fear of a coup d'ktat, the government forbade the demonstration.

Only 3,000-5,000 showed up in defiance of the ban, 2% of the promised attendance. The government declared a state of martial law and the gathering came to an ignominious end when Degrelle was arrested and briefly held by the police.30 The entire affair was a major embarrassment for ex.^' It had been an act of sheer hubris for Degrelle to make such grandiose attendance predictions, and to go ahead with his plans despite the I government ban.

Though the government had feared Degrelle would launch a coup d7etat, he made no such attempt. There is no real evidence to suggest that if the rally had had a greater turnout, he would have acted any differently. Still flush from the success of the parliamentary elections, Degrelle had little incentive to gamble everything on a violent attempt to seize the government which would have had a high possibility of failure. It still appeared entirely possible that Degrelle and Rex would be able to enter into power democratically and legally, and it would have been highly risky (and I believe foolish) to throw that chance away. Post-war, Degrelle claimed that had he wanted to overthrow the

28 ~tienne,Mouvement, 121. 29 conway, Collaboration, 12; ~tienne,Mouvement, 119. 30 Bernard A. Cook, Belgium: A History Belgium: A History (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), 119; Brasillach, Histoire, 500. 31 ~tienne,Mouvement, 119-121. government he could have, as elements of the military had pledged their support to him.32

I have not been able to verify that claim. Even so, in 1936 Degrelle wanted to gain power

legally and legitimately, not violently. When someone pointed out that both Hitler and

Mussolini had used violent tactics to achieve power, Degrelle responded that "I am

neither the one nor the other, and have no intention of imitating them."33

This decision not to attempt a coup was entirely consistent with the nonviolent

tactics which Rex chose to pursue. Just as the Rexists did not fight back against their

physical assailants, neither did they attempt to institute their own government by force.

Furthermore, in marked contrast to the Rexist party line in later years, Degrelle7s editorial rhetoric in Le Pays Riel in this period remained consistently democratic. During the

Nazi occupation in 1941, ~ditionsRex published a pamphlet entitled Degrelle await raison! [Degrelle was right!]. This pamphlet was composed of articles from Le Pays

Rkel written between 1936 and 1940, and purported to show that Degrelle had known all along that the Western democracies would be powerless to stand up against Hitler7s expansion. Despite this claim, articles written before the electoral collapse of 1937 have a much different tone and message than those written later, which were much more explicitly anti-democratic.

In the period before Rex's electoral failure in 1937, Degrelle railed against what he saw as the problems of the parliamentary system but was always careful not to imply that democracy itself was the source of the problem. Rather, the parties or corrupt officials could be blamed for anything unsatisfactory. Degrelle was quite explicit that any Rexist state would still be democratic, writing on November 2, 1936 that "The

32 Charlier, Degrelle, 138. 33 Degrelle quoted in Carsten, Rise of Fascism, 214-215. formula of action of Rex today, and of the Rexist state tomorrow, is and will always be

the popular community, where everyone collaborates for the common good, in order and

dignity."34 In a piece from January 2, 1937, Degrelle even called for an expansion of

suffrage and more popular participation in the government. According to Degrelle, Rex

sought to establish "a popular and strong State... which will establish, thanks to the

suffrage of the entire nation-men, women, family-and thanks to the popular

referendum, a constant and direct collaboration between the people and thepower."35

As long as Degrelle believed that Rex could come to power legally and democratically,

there was rho reason to employ anti-democratic rhetoric. Though he had great disdain for

political parties and ultimately desired a one-party state, as of early 1937 there is nothing

to suggest that he sought to achieve this end through the use of force. A Rexist state

founded on the will of the national community would presumably be a popular regime.

Once Rex had convinced the people of Belgium of Rex's merits, went the thinking, the

people would respond by voting Rex into power. It seems telling that the sections of

Degrelle avait raison! under the subheadings of "Discipline,"" Unite," and

"Responsabilitk" all consist exclusively of articles from 1939, while the section on the

"Communaute populaire" is drawn only from 1936 and early 1937.

Rex had been humiliated by the spectacular failure of the planned rally of

250,000, but Degrelle did not believe that Rex had been defeated yet. In an effort to show Rex's continued relevance, in January 1937 DegrelXe planned the Six Days of Rex.

34 "La formule d'action de Rex aujourd'hui, de 1'Etat rexiste demain, c'est et ce sera toujours la communautk populaire, ou tous collaborent en vue du bien commun, dans l'ordre et la dignitk." Degrelle, Degrelle avait raison!, 17. 35 "un Etat populaire et fort ...qui etablira, grcice au suffrage de la nation entikre---hommes,femrnes, famille, -et grdce au referendum populaire, une collaboration constante et directe entre le peuple et le pouvoir" [emphasis in the original]. Degrelle, Degrelle avait raison!, 17. For six consecutive nights, Degrelle gave a speech in front of 12,000-15,000 people in a major meeting hall in ~russels.'~With these large gatherings, Degrelle seemed to have

proven that Rex was not defeated yet. Perhaps gaining confidence from the Six Days of

Rex, Degrelle decided once again to challenge the other Belgian parties.

Degrelle proceeded to launch his last major parliamentary campaign, which resulted in the end of Rex's parliamentary viability. Though Degrelle had opted not to stand for election in 1936, he decided that it was time for him to enter the lower house of parliament. In order to force a by-election to the parliament, Degrelle ordered a Rexist deputy from Brussels to resign his seat on March 5, 1937.~~Ever confident, Degrelle was certain that he would emerge victorious in a contest against the candidates of each of the other parties, once again proving the appeal of Rex to the Belgian people. In 1936 Rex ' had polled only 18.5% in Brussels, but Degrelle still believed that he would win.

Degrelle may well have been able to win in a race between him and separate candidates of the Catholics, the Liberals, the Socialists, and the ~ommunists.~~The other parties, though, did not sit idly by and allow Degrelle to enter the parliament.

This plan of Degrelle's was never a particularly good one. If the plan had succeeded, the Rexists would have retained one seat that they already held; if it failed,

Rex would lose one representative in parliament, There was no possibility for gain, other than the fact that Degrelle would become a parliamentary deputy.39 This was a major miscalculation by Degrelle, perhaps overcome by his desire to raise his own personal

36 Carsten, Rise of Fascism, 21 6; etienne, Mouvement, 122-123. 37 ~tienne,Mouvement, 2. 38 ~tienne,Mouvement, 134. 39 ~tienne,Mouvement, 133. standing. Whatever the reason, Degrelle went ahead with his plan with the expectation of

a five way race.

The race that Degrelle anticipated was not to be. In a move reminiscent of the formation of khe Popular Front in France, the parties put aside their differences and presented only one candidate, Prime Minister , for the election. Van

Zeeland was "a professional economist, former vice-governor of the National Bank and

Catholic party leader," but the Socialists, Liberals, and Communists all agreed to support his candidacy.40 Against such a formidable alliance, the Rexists had no realistic hope of victory, but nevertheless Degrelle forged ahead with his plans.

Much of the pre-election campaign of 1937, fiercely contested by both sides, focused on questions of patriotism.41 Degrelle charged that Van Zeeland was leading

Belgium to communism and dubbed him "Van eela and-~erensk~."~~ Van Zeeland responded in kind, accusing "Rex-Hitler" of leading Belgium to fascism.43 Degrelle put his mastery of political theater to good use in the campaign. When accused of being a

German sympathizer, he would bring out a Rexist decorated combat veteran and ask "Is he also a b~che?"~~Unfortunately for Degrelle, though, winning the election would take significantly more than clever one-liners.

In its time in parliament, the Rexist delegation had done nothing to convince the

Belgian public that Rex could run the country better than could the traditional parties.

Equally damaging to Degrelle's electoral aspirations, Rex had done nothing to repair its

40 Laurent, "Belgian Rexism," 3 12. 41 ~tienne,Mouvement, 135. 42 Kerensky was the head of the Russian government after the overthrow of the czar and before the bolshevik seizure of power. 43 ~tienne,Mouvement. 135. As things turned out, of course, Van Zeeland was right. 44 "Lui aussi, c'est un Boche?" ~tienne,Mouvement, 135. relationship with the Catholic Church. Though Rex no longer presented itself as an exclusively Catholic organization, almost all of its supporters were still ~atholics.~~As long as the Church was silent on the question of Rexism, Rex could claim that the Church impli&itlysupported Rex's goals. On April 9, 1937, however, Cardinal Van Roey put a decisive end to any such ambiguity in the Church's position.

In a public statement, Van Roey announced that Rex "constitutes a danger for the country and the Church," and told Catholics that not only must they not vote for Degrelle, but that they could not abstain from voting, either.46 As there were only two candidates in the election, this was an unequivocal endorsement of Prime Minister Van Zeeland. At this point, Degrelle's defeat was a "foregone concl~sion."~~Despite this devastating blow, Degrelle vowed to remain a candidate in the election. This stance was a far cry from the days of 1934, when Degrelle cancelled a major banquet because of a bishop's objections. The days of Rex catering to the wishes of the Church were long past.

Despite all evidence to the contrary, Degrelle was still confident that he would poll 100,000 votes.48 This would not have been anywhere near enough to defeat Van

Zeeland, but at least it would have shown that Rex remained relevant in national politics.

Thus, even at the moment when he recognized his imminent defeat, Degrelle still maintained an unrealistic belief in the level of his own popularity. In the elections, held two days after Van Roey's denunciation of Degrelle and Rex, Degrelle received only

69,242 votes, 19% of the total, versus 275,840 votes for Van Zeeland, 75.8% of the total.

5% of the ballots cast were blank or invalid, which may actually have been a passive

45 ~tienne,Mouvement, 136. 46 "constitue un danger pour le pays et 17Eglise."~tienne, Mouvement, 137. 47 Miller, Belgian Foreign Policy, 53. 48 Miller, Belgian Foreign Policy, 53. show of support for Degrelle by obedient Catholics who did not feel that they could defy

Cardinal Van Roey's wishes. In any case, Degrelle's vote total represented a drop of five

thousand votes from the number that Rex had received in Brussels in the 1936

parliamentary elections.49

The fact that Degrelle polled 19% would not in and of itself have been disastrous

for Rex, as having the support of one out of every five Brussels residents certainly

indicated the continued existence of a significant number of Rex sympathizers. Yet

Degrelle, with his unflagging and unjustified self-confidence, had loudly predicted a

resounding success. The fact that he then received such a drubbing by Van Zeeland was

a great humiliation. After the 1937 by-election, Rex was no longer a viable democratic

political party, although Degrelle himself retained some of his popularity.

Even decades after the fact, Degrelle was unwilling (or unable) to recognize the

many mistakes that he had made in pursuing a parliamentary seat in 1937. In his

interviews with Jean-Michel Charlier in the 1970s, Degrelle gave a number of

explanations for his electoral defeat, none of them plausible. In those interviews,

Degrelle claimed that he had lost the election because the "hypercapitalists" had

supported Van Zeeland, and Degrelle himself had not had sufficient funds to compete.50

In Degrelle7swords, Wewere crushed by money."51 Degrelle7s contention that

"hypercapitalists" had only supported the establishment candidate, however, was simply

not true.

49 Miller, Belgian Foreign Policy, 53; ~tienne,Mouvement, 137; Associated Press, "Crushing Defeat Handed Fascism in Belgian Vote," in Chicago Daily Tribune (12 April 1937), 6. Charlier, Degrelle, 145-146. 51 "NOUSCtions 6crasCs par l'argent." Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 148. In 1936 and 1937, Rex received financial support from various industrialists. On

the surface, one would not have expected representatives of industry to support a group

like Rex, because Rex and Degrelle represented turbulence for a relatively stable

economy which had already largely recovered from the effects of the Great Depression.

Many Catholic Party leaders had close ties to business, so the industrialists' decision to

support Rex, the Catholic Party's enemy, seems even more curious. The decision to

support Rex, though, was a question of hedging bets. During the height of Rex's

popularity, several industrialists supported the party simply to prepare for any

eventuality. Had Rex gained power, the industrialists would have wanted to be known as

loyal Degrelle supporters. After the electoral disaster in 1937, when it was clear that Rex

would never win elections, this financial support evaporated.52 It is certainly true that

Belgium's financial elite had not particularly wanted Degrelle to defeat Van Zeeland, but

it is not true that Degrelle had not received any monetary support from the

"hypercapitalists."

Flush with confidence fi-om Rex's unexpected electoral success in 1936, Degrelle

and his followers believed that Rex would continue to make enormous strides in

recruiting the Belgian populace to its cause. This optimism proved to be groundless.

Rex was an embarrassment in parliament, and Belgians grew ever more unco~nfortable

with what they saw as Degrelle's fascist affinities. They also grew uncomfortable with

his lack of commitment to his principles, as was evident with his alliance with the VNV.

Determined to forge ahead, Degrelle rashly challenged the established parties to face him

in a contest for a Brussels seat. The party alliance against Degrelle likely made his defeat

inevitable, while Cardinal Van Roey7scondemnation of Rex served to further cement Van Zeeland's victory. May 1936 marked Rex's high water mark, while April 1937 was

the time of Rex's indisputable collapse.

The struggle for Relevance

After the April 1937 electoral defeat, Rex was left to muddle forward. Degrelle

had challenged the traditional parties and had been utterly humiliated. Any momentum

the movement had had was stopped dead, and it was clear that Rex was not in a position to achieve power freely and democratically. Despite this disheartening turn of events, the

Rexists trikd to make the best of a bad situation and ensure that Rex remained relevant in the coming years. Degrelle likely continued to have at least some level of genuine concern for Belgium's future, but such concern was probably less of a factor in

Degrelle's efforts than was his own desire for prominence and power.

Degrelle and the other Rexlsts continued to hold out hope that they would be able to recover from the disastrous setback of the 1937 elections. In its aftermath, Pieme Daye published his work Lkon Degrelle et le Rexisme [Leon Degrelle and Rexism] to continue reinforcing the Rexist message. Much of the book simply rehashed previous writings by

Degrelle or Jean Denis, but it also brought new topics into the Rexist discourse. Daye dealt openly with Rex's defeat and what he saw as its strengths, and, perhaps even more importantly, Daye wrote explicitly on Rex's conceptions of political power.

No one. but the most deluded could have seen Degrelle's performance in the April election as anything other than a disaster. Daye recognized this fact, calling the loss an "incontestable fai1~1-e."~~At the same time, he was also determined to portray this failure in a relatively positive light:

Rexism, that day [of the election], was subjected to the attack of all of the allied forces:

I the old parties grouped without exception into a single bloc, the government, all the financial powers, the great majority of the national press and the foreign press, the episcopate and even, it seems, the royal Court. All of the strongest means were used, with a force never before seen.54 In Daye's telling, only such an overwhelming coalition could possibly have hoped to defeat Rex. Of course, he did not mention the fact that Rex was simply nowhere near popular enough to win in a two candidate election. Daye also argued that the votes Rex received in 1937 were more significant than those it had received in 1936, because they came in the face of heavy pressure against Rex. Those who voted for Rex in 1937, according to Daye, must have been true believer^.'^ Daye's analysis of the political situation in Belgium was of dubious merit.

Much more valuable was Daye's discussion of fascism and communism.

Degrelle and the other Rexists had been hounded for years by accusations of fascism.

These criticisms were by no means limited to Belgium; when mentioned in the American press, Degrelle was regularly excoriated as an anti-democratic Degrelle had always denied connections with Hitler or Nazism when pressed, but had not been able (or willing) to give straight answers about his views on fascism. In 1937, Daye finally approached the question explicitly, though perhaps not particularly clearly.

53 "incontestable Cchec." Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Rexisrne, 14. 54 "Le rexisme, ce jour-la, a subi l'attaque de toutes les forces coalisees: les anciens partis groupes sans exception en un seul bloc, le gouvemement, toutes les puissances financikres, la grade majorite de la presse nationale et de la presse Ctrangi.re, l'episcopat et meme, semble-t-il, !a CGUT.TOUS les moyens les plus puissants furent employes, avec une force jarnais we." Daye, Lion Dcgrelle et le Rexisme, 14. 55 Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Rexisme, 15. 56 See, for example: Lena Reid, "Belgian Election Adds to Confusion," The New York Times (31 May 1936), E5. Daye portrayed Rex as being entirely distinct from both fascism and communism,

in addition to being antithetical to liberalism. Though Rex had always been a sworn

enemy of communism, while seeming to share certain characteristics with fascism, Rexist

thinkers equated communism and fascism and portrayed them as equally distant from the

Rexist ideal. Quoting Josk Streel, Daye attempted to explain what made Rexism unique:

Values less epic, less Nietzschean than those that are at the base of fascism, for example. Real Christian values, values of health and healthy blossoming. [Rex] does not rely on, as in Russia, man losing himself in the community: he must be in his proper place at the breast of the popular community and thanks to the moral order instituted by that community, he can completely and fieely develop in his being that which is most noble.

We are as far from the anarchic ideal of liberalism as fiorn the dynamism of fascism or I communism.57 This quote, while fascinating, does not provide much insight into what exactly the

Rexists saw as distinguishing their movement from fascism. Rexism may have had less

epic, Nietzschean values than fascism, but it is not clear what that would mean in practice. Daye also weakened any implied critique of fascism and communism by

writing that "Here there can be no question of fascism, nor of bolshevism, nor of

Hitlerism, foreign formulas, inapplicable in our country."" In this passage, Daye seemed to accept that any of the totalitarian ideologies could well be appropriate for other countries.

Elsewhere in the book, Daye was quite explicit on this point. After labeling both fascism and communism as totalitarian states with similar institutional structures, Daye

57 "Valeurs moins &piques,rnoins nietzschkennes que celles qui sont a la bast? du fascisme par exemple. Valeurs chrktiennes et reelles, valeurs de sante et de sain epanouissement. I1 ne s'agit pas, comme en Russie, que I'hornme se perde dans la communaute: il faut qu'a sa juste place au sein de la communautC populaire et griice a I'ordre moral institue par cette communautC, il puisse dtvelopper complBtement et librement son &tredans ce qu'il a de plus noble. Nous sommes aussi loin de l'idCal anarchique du liberalisme que du dynamisme fasciste ou du communisme." Streel, quoted in Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Rexisme, 83-84. 58 'Voila qui est dire qu'il ne peut Etre question ici ni de fascisme, ni de bolchevisme, ni de hitlerisme, fonnulas Ctrangeres, inapplicables chez nous." Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Rexisme, 141. concluded: '"That [totalitarian] political conception can be morally defended."59 This was a very bizarre statement for a Rexist to make, given Rex's previous positions. From the very beginning, Rex had been a sworn enemy of Soviet bolshevism, and had accused competing politicians of leading Belgium into Moscow's hands. Perhaps this newfound acceptance of totalitarian dictatorship stemmed from disillusionment with the democratic process. Rex had competed for political power legally and fairly, and it had been humiliated in the process. After April 1937, the Rex movement seemed to lose much of its idealism and adopted a much more cynical ideology. If the people did not know what was best for them, as they had shown by failing to vote for Degrelle, then perhaps it was not essential to gain the people's approval ahead of Rexist rule.

Daye portrayed Rexism as opposed to both fascism and communism, but nor was it necessarily devoted to purely democratic ideals. "When a similar sympathy exists

[between the leaders and the people], political formulas have little importance: it doesn't matter if it is a dictatorship or a democracy... All can be acceptable with their own qualities and faults, because all are equally popular."60 To Daye, then, any form of government was acceptable, so long as the people agreed to it. Daye argued that the principles themselves did not matter and that traditional parliamentary democracy in and of itself was not inherently any better than dictatorship. In Daye's thinking, dictatorships could be "popular" in a fashion equivalent to democracy; dictatorship, he suggested, could be based on a similar sentiment between ruler and ruled as that found in a democra

59 "Cette conception politique peut &re moralement defendable." Daye, Lion Degvelle et le Rexisme, 90. 60 "Lorsqu'une pareille sympathie existe, les formules politiques ont peu d'impcrtance: il ne s'agit plus de dictature ou de dernocratie ou de n'importe quel r6gime. Tous peuvent &tseacceptes avec leurs qualites et leurs defauts propres, parce que tous sont Cgalement populaire." Daye, Ikon Degrelle et le Rexisme, 86.

105 In contrast to his justification of dictatorship, Daye rejected liberalism outright as

being corrupted by materialism: "In place of the reigning ways of thinking and feeling,

imprinted by liberalism and materialism, Rex substitutes ideas and sentiments which are

attached to tde dignity of man and to spiritual value^."^' Rather than imposing the

"constructivist mystique" found in Soviet communism or in fascism, Rex would instead

reintroduce "the old Christian, humanist sentiments, which made our civilization and

which can again give it life."62 Daye believed that Rex would defeat the corrupt system

of liberalism not with the new doctrines of communism or fascism, which could be

acceptable'in other national contexts, but with a return to the traditional roots of

civilization.

After his humiliating defeat in 1937, Lkon Degrelle did not hold as nuanced a

view on fascism as did Pierre Daye. Rather, when it seemed clear that Rex would no

longer be a viable democratic political party, Degrelle began to openly praise Hiller in

1938. Speaking favorably of Hitler earlier probably would have effectively ended his

political career. After the crash of Rexism, though, there was no more reason for

Degrelle to hold his tongue. In this period, Degrelle also became more and more

virulently anti-Semitic, an issue which will be discussed in the next chapter. It is hard to

say whether Degrelle's new rhetoric about Hitler stemmed from this newfound lack of

restriction on his speech, or if it represented a true change of heart. Either way, once

Degrelle began praising Hitler, he would never stop for the rest of his life.

"AUXfaqons de penser et de sentir regnantes, empreintes de libkralisme el de mattrialisme, Rex substitue des idees et des sentiments qui s'attachent a la dignit6 de l'homme et aux valeurs spirituelles." Daye, LLon Degrelle et le Rexisme, 86. 62 "Ce ne sont pas, a vrai dire, des conceptions inkdites, ni cette esp2ce de mystique constru~tivistequ'on retrouve sous des formes differentes chez les Soviets et dans le Fascisme: ce sont les antiques sentiments chretiens et humanistes, qui ont fait notre civilisation et qui peuvent encore lui rendre vie." Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Rexisme, 86-87. In the years after 1937, Degrelle repeatedly praised Hitler while also employing

increasingly extreme anti-democratic rhetoric. His praise of Hitler and of his ability to

mobilize the German population was anything but subtle. Two articles, of April 23 and

April 25, 1938, stand out in this respect. In the April 23 article, Degrelle seemed envious

of the adulation which he believed Hitler received in Germany: "No politician in any

democratic country enjoys one hundredth of the affection of the people that Hitler

does."63 Degrelle7s prose became more and grandiose and romantic as he considered the relationship between Hitler and the German people. "The German people, the German crowd, those who demand nothing and give everything, provide Hitler with a burning, unlimited faith. One must see their faces light up when they speak of him. He is the object of a constant plebiscite of their hearts."64 In 1937, Pierre Daye had rejected the

"constructivist mystique" of fascist regimes, but Degrelle felt no such compulsion. He suggested, admiringly, "It is the mystique of Hitler which gives the Third Reich its most solid base. Even more than guns and planes, Hitler7s Germany is strong from the overflowing gift of millions of hearts."65 Degrelle seemed to believe that Belgian hearts should be similarly overflowing with love of him.

Degrelle9spraise was directed, not at the Nazis in general, but at Hitler in particular. This is a telling point: Degrelle had always wanted Rex to succeed, but only as an avenue so that he himself could take power. There had never been any suggestion

63 "Aucun politicien d'aucun pays democratique ne jouit d'une affection du peuple qui atteigne le centikme de celle dont Hitler est l'objet." Degrelle on 23 April 1938, quoted in Leon Degrelle, Degrelle avait raison! (Bruxelles: Les Editions REX, [I 941]), 35. 64 "Le peuple allemand, la masse allemande, ceux qui ne demandent rien et qui donnent tout, apportent a Hitler une foi bdlante, illimitee. I1 faut voir leurs visages s'illuminer quand ils en parlent. I1 est l'objet d'un constant plebiscite des coeurs." Degrelle on 23 April 1938, quoted in Degrelle, Degrelle avait raisan!, 35. 65 "C'est la mystique hitlerienne qui donne au Troisieme Reich sa base la plus solide. Plus encore que de canons et d'avions, 1'Allemagne d'Hitler est forte de ce don debordant de millions de coeurs." Degrelle on 23 April 1938, quoted in Degrelle, Degrelle avait raison!, 35. that, if Rex had achieved power democratically, anyone other than Degrelle would have

headed the new regime. Degrelle's remarks on Hitler often sounded like an official Nazi

hagiography.

1 It is thepeople above all who love Hitler... The Hitler movement was, and remains, above all a movement of workers... In the days of the conquest, he traversed all of Austria, even though millions of Jews and Marxists were still there, standing in the front of his car, for dozens of hours, exposed to all attacks. Simplicity and courage: the people love that.66 Degrelle's account of the personal courage it took Hitler to tour Austria was fanciful, to say the least, but it revealed the esteem Degrelle felt for Hitler's accomplishments while also revealing his own political fantasies.

In contrast to the energy and vitality of Hitler, Degrelle scorned democracy as decaying and futile. After the people of Belgium rejected Degrelle in 1937, he became increasingly cynical about the value and effectiveness of democracy. As long as Degrelle had retained hopes of electoral victory, he had not expressed such negative sentiments.

Degrelle had always advocated for political reform, for a stronger executive and curbed parties, but his anti-democratic rhetoric had never approached the level that it did in

1939, after war in Europe began once again. Degrelle believed that only a strong leader would be able to save Belgium from the conflagration of World War Two and that such a leader would not be elected democratically.

Interestingly, despite his disgust with the democratic process, Degrelle still decided to run for parliament, along with a slate of other Rexist candidates, in 1939. On

66 "CJestlepeuple avant tout qui aime Hitler... Le mouvement hitlerien a Bte, et est restk, avant tout, un mouvement ouvrier... Aux jours de la conquete, il traversa toute I'Autriche, alors que des milliers de Juifs et de marxistes y etaient encore, debout A l'avant de sa voiture, pendant des dizaines d911eures,expos6 a tous les attentats. Simplicit6 et courage: le peuple aime cela" [emphasis in the original]. Degrelle on 23 April 1938, quoted in Degrelle, Degrelle avuit raison!, 35. March 31, in the run-up to the election, Le Pays Rkel ran a front page that revealed Rexist

thinking:

To show your will for change To hasten the recovery of the country For the unity of Belgium AGAINST the divisive parties and their professional agitators AGAINST the three parties of profit and powerlessness AGAINST the vain quarrels, the intrigue, the routine VOTE REx~~ This in and of itself would not have been so noteworthy, except for what came

immediately after it. The first article, written by Josk Streel, bore the headline "And now,

I think of serious things."" Streel's article implied that even though everyone should vote

for Rex, voting was not the most serious or important subject. Streel believed that the

elections would not change anything, because the system would remain the same: "the

electoral comedy will be succeeded by the parliamentary comedy."69 Though they still

entered elections, the Rexists were disgusted by democracy.

Degrelle's condemnation of democracy attracted a small minority of Belgians in

1939. However, those who were Rexists in 1939 were a largely dissimilar group to the

original band of young Catholic idealists. While the original Rexists were dropping out of the movement, they were being replaced by a smaller number of older members who were more comfortable with Degrelle's increasingly explicit fascism.70 In the legislative

elections of April 2, 1939, this new-look Rexism polled 103,821 votes, 4.43% of all votes

67 "Pour manifester votre volontk de changement Pour hiiter le redressement du pays Pour l'unite de la Belgique CONTRE les partis diviseurs et leurs agitateurs professionnels CONTRE les tripartites du profitariat et de l'impuissance CONTRE les vaines querellas, la gabegie, la routine VOTEZ REX [emphasis in the original]. REX (3 1 March 1939), 1. Jose Streel, "Et maintenant, pensons aux choses serieuses," in REX (3 1 March 1939), 1. 69 "la comedie Blectorale succkdera a la comedie parlementaire." Jose Streel, "Et maintenant, pensons aux choses serieuses," in REX (31 March 1939), 1. 70 ~tienne,Mouvernent, 147- 148. cast. Degrelle himself stood for election in Brussels, and this time he received more

preferential votes than any other candidate. In all, Rex received four seats in the

Chamber and four in the Senate. Rex received a limited level of support in Flanders,

polling under 4% in most districts, but was still marginally more popular in Wallonia,

polling more than 5% in most district^.^' This performance was a far cry from the

11.49% of votes Rex had polled nationwide in 1936.

Though Degrelle had finally entered Parliament, a goal in pursuit of which he had ruined the Rexist movement in 1937, he held no hope of a healthy democracy in

Belgium's future. In December 1939, six months before the German invasion of

Belgium, Degrelle predicted that democracy was dying: "Democracy is wearing out the last resources of the country. When they disappear, it will disappear with them. That is why it is worth it to watch the parliamentary debates: they will not last much longer."72

Degrelle believed that not only would democracy in Belgium fall, but also that its fall would be good for the country, claiming that "a fruit touched by democracy is a corrupted fruit."73 In Degrelle's thinking, in order to survive the European crisis, Belgium would need a single strong leader.

In this period preceding the German invasion, Degrelle steered Rex in what he portrayed as a neutralist direction. It was clear that there would be a war between the

Western allies and Germany, and Degrelle, like many Belgians, wanted no part of it.74

Belgium tried everything it could to stay out of the war, pursuing an independent foreign

71 ~tienne,Mouvement, 160-162. 72 "La Democratie use les dernikres ressources du pays. Quand celles-ci disparaitront, elle disparaitra avec elles. C'est pour cela que les debats du Parlement valent d'&treobserves: ils ne durerontplus longtemps" [emphasis in the original]. Degrelle on 8 December 1939, quoted in Degrelle, Degrelle avait raison!, 14. 73 "un fruit touch6 par la dtmocratie est un hitpourri. " Degrelle on 29 December 1939, quoted in Degrelle, Degrelle avait raison!, 49. 74 ktienne, Mouvement, 144. policy not tied to either of the two sides.75 ~t the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis of

1938, Belgium mobilized troops on both its German and French borders in an attempt to

keep the country free from all foreign armies.76 Degrelle and the Rexists approved of this

strategy, and hoped that it would keep Belgium out of the war. Though the war would be

positive in Degrelle's perspective in that it would precipitate the downfall of Belgian

democracy, he still retained some measure of Belgian nationalism and had no desire to

see his country occupied by a foreign power.

Despite his pretensions of neutrality, Degrelle was hardly a disinterested observer.

He wanted Belgium to stay unharmed, but he also seemed to take glee in the plight of the

other democracies. Once the war finally began in 1939, Degrelle accepted that Hitler had

started the conflict but still blamed "the origins of the war on France and Britain and,

more especially, on the occult forces of freemasonry and Jewish finance which.. .had

orchestrated their bellicose beha~iour."~~Hitler, according to Degrelle, had only lashed

out because of the wrong-doings of the democracies, the masons, and the Jews. In this

respect, Degrelle fully echoed Hitler's own account of the causes of World War TWO.^'

Degrelle publicly claimed that the efforts of Britain and France were completely futile

and that it was foolish to try to restore the previous order in Central ~uro~e.~'Many

Rexists were disgusted by Degrelle's pro-Gennan faux-neutrality and dropped out of the

75 Conway, Collaboration, 16- 17. 76 Miller, Belgian Foreign Policy, 263-264. 77 Conway, Collaboration, 17. 78 See, for example: Adolf Hitler, "Extract fi-om the Speech by Hitler, January 30, 1939," in Yitzhak Arad, Israel Gutman and Abraham Margaliot (ed.), Lea Ben Dor (trans.), Documents on the Holocaust (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska in association with Yad Vashem, 1999), 132-135. 79 See, for example: Degrelle on 21 November 1939, quoted in Degrelle, Degrelle avuit raison!, 48. 80 Conway, Collaboration, 17. Oddly, as Rex pursued a "neutral" foreign policy in the hopes of avoiding the war,

the movement dropped its non-violence in domestic affair^.^' In the early years, when a

Rexist had been attacked, he was supposed to refrain from responding in kind. Starting

in 1938, however, Rex began to respond to violence with violence, a cycle which would

spiral out of control during the war under the condition of a repressive German

occupation and an active Belgian resistance movement.82 The new Rexist avoidance of

belligerence in foreign policy, coupled with more violent behavior domestically,

produced a new dichotomy between Rex's positions on national and international affairs.

Rex's newfound willingness to fight back when attacked may well have stemmed from

the movement's electoral collapse. Before April 1937, if a Rexist were beaten up he

could be a martyr for the democratic cause; after Rex had been humiliated in the election, there was no more incentive to passively accept beatings. As Degrelle became more fascistic in his rhetoric, the Rex movement became more violent within Belgium while also preaching non-involvement in the wider affairs of Europe.

Rex had taken on more fascistic characteristics within Belgium, and Degrelle had grown more and more critical of democracy as a concept, while growing more vocal in his praise of Hitler. Despite this, Degrelle was not a traitor before Belgium's occupation by Germany. Upon learning of a Rexist attempting to gather information on British and

French troop movements on the Belgian frontier, Degrelle reported him to the SQretC

8 1 I believe that this position often went beyond mere neutrality and approached pacifism. See, for example: Lion Degrelle, Rdvolution des Ames, (Paris: Les ~ditionsde France, 1938), 77-86. '* ~tienne,Mouvement, 146-147. d'Etat and expelled him from the party.83 Despite his repeated harsh criticisms of almost every aspect of Belgium, Degrelle was still loyal to the state in 1939.

When Germany invaded Belgium with no provocation on May 10,1940,

Degrelle, along with various other extremists, was arrested by the Belgian authorities out of fear that he would play the role of a Belgian ~uislin~.'~As Belgian forces retreated in the face of the German onslaught, Degrelle and the other prisoners were transferred into

French custody and shuffled between various prison camps. Degrelle later claimed that he was tortured in France, an assertion that does not seem at all unlikely.85 On May 20,

Frdnch guards summarily executed 21 of Degrelle's fellow prisoners, and it was widely believed both within Belgium and abroad that Degrelle had been among those killed.86

Soon after this, Belgium capitulated to Germany. Belgium, which had only 600,000 troops to oppose the might of the German armed forces, surrendered on May 28.'"

At the time of Belgium's defeat, Rex was in shambles. Its leader was feared dead, and many Rexists who had been mobilized to serve in the Belgian army had been captured by Germany and put in prisoner of war camps.'' The history of Rex afier the electoral successes of 1936 and before the German invasion of 1940 had been one of unremitting failure. The movement had squandered its popularity, and Degrelle became more and more fascistic, disgusted with the democratic system which had denied him power. During the German occupation, Rex would be reborn as a hated collaborationist organization, as Degrelle and his cronies tried to curry favor with the Nazis. There was

83 ~tienne,Mouvement, 165; "Rexist Leader Denounced" in The New York Times (27 January 1940), 5. s4 Conway, Collaboration, 27-28. Quisling had already gained notoriety as having aided in the Nazi invasion of Norway. " Charlier, Degrelle, 218 -220. 86 Conway, Collaboration, 28; see, for example: Associated Press, "Nazis Say French Killed Degrelle," in The New York Times (7 June 1940), 6. 87 Conway, Collaboration, 21. Conway, Collaboration, 27. no longer any pretense of Rex's legitimacy as a popular Belgian movement, as the

Rexists, in addition to being inurdered whenever possible by the Belgian Resistance, were nearly universally reviled by their fellow citizens. Chapter §-me Death of Rex

Collaboration

Throughout the 1930s, LCon Degrelle was consistent in his desire to attain

political power. During this time, however, his conceptions of how he would or should

attain that power underwent a fundamental transformation. Until the fiasco of April

1937, Degrelle wanted to secure power democratically, both because elections seemed

like a viable route to power and because Degrelle on some level truly did care about the

Belgian people and wanted them to hold him in high regard. With the collapse of Rex's

electoral fortunes, Degrelle became increasingly disenchanted and seemed to become more focused on attaining power by any means, believing that he knew what was best for

Belgium, and that it did not matter whether or not the people agreed with him. Along with Degrelle's more authoritarian conception of power came nem7shifts in Rex's policy prescriptions. These shifts eventually led Degrelle to seek to remold Rex as an effective collaborationist group, serving Germany in whatever way possible in order to curry favor with Belgium's occupiers. Degrelle's newly promulgated beliefs also led to the further splintering of the Rexists, a process which had begun with Degrelle's unpopular fascist rhetoric after the by-election in 1937.

After its parliamentary success of 1936, Rex had experienced an unremitting process of decline. As Rex became more and more marginalized politically, Degelle increasingly turned in a fascist direction in his rhetoric. Now, Rex responded to violence against its members with violence in return. At the same time, though, it exhibited a newfound isolationism in its foreign policy, hoping to stay out of the Second World War

that most people in Europe in the late 1930s feared would soon break out. The Rexists at

this point were not traitors; Degrelle denounced a Rexist spy to the security services, and

many Rexists served honorably in the armed forces. Nevertheless, because Degrelle

appeared to be a potential threat, when the Germans invaded Belgium he was imprisoned

by the Belgian authorities and transported to France, where he was tortured and narrowly

avoided execution.

France was not able to hold out for long against the German army, and soon gave

up any military resistance. When word reached the Rexists that their leader was still

alive in a French prison camp, Pierre Daye worked through the German authorities to

secure Degrelle's release, which was achieved in late July 1940.' Degrelle had been

imprisoned for over two months. In his absence, Belgium's political landscape had

changed dramatically. Belgium was now under the politically unchallenged rule of a

German military administration, as the king had surrendered and much of the government

had fled into exile. As soon as he returned to Belgium, Degrelle was determined to

involve himself once again with Belgian politics, though this would now require close

cooperation with the German occupation authorities. To this end, Degrelle

unsuccess~llysought a meeting with ~itler.~His political machinations also led

Degrelle to form an alliance with the head of the Belgian socialist party brokered by the

German ambassador to Paris. He met with representatives of the king, and with Cardinal

Van Roey, his erstwhile neme~is.~Those meetings were exploratory talks aimed toward

1 Martin Conway, Collaboi~ationin Belgium: Ldon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement 1940-1944 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 32. 2 Conway, Collaboration, 34. 3 Conway, Collaboratzon, 34-39. the setting up of a collaborationist government in Belgium, but they did not amount to anything. The meeting with Henri De Man, the head of the Belgian Workers' Party, ran completely counter to all of Degrelle's professed principles. He had been railing against sociaiism for his entire political career, but was nevertheless once again willing to go against his own professed beliefs in an effort to increase his own chances of gaining power.

In order to promote Rex's visibility in public life, Degrelle applied to relaunch Le

Pays Rkel, the Rexist daily newspaper. The Germans approved this move, and the PR waS relaunched on August 25, 1940 with a circulation of 65,000. Interest in Rex among much of the Belgian population was fleeting, though, as by autumn the circulation had dropped to around 23,000.~In the context of German occupation, Rex did not seem to have anything to offer the Belgian people. Additionally, despite Degrelle's hopes for

German support, the German occupation authorities largely ignored him. In response to this, Degrelle stepped up his collaborationist rhetoric and actions, a move which did nothing to endear him to the Belgian population or even to many Rexists who were growing disgusted by Degrelle's abject collaboration. Such slavish support for

Belgium's occupiers ensured once and for all that Degrelle and the Rexists would never be popular in Belgium, but it appeared as though it could be Degrelle's ticket to power.

Degrelle then hit upon a new strategy of zealously supporting German edicts.

When Germany instituted anti-Jewish legislation in Belgium in October 1940, Rexist militants launched attacks on non-collaborationist politicians and Jewish b~sinesses.~

This, however, had the unintended effect of annoying the Germans, who warned Rex not

Conway, Collaboration, 41,46. Conway, Collabomtion, 53-54. to disturb the public order.6 Rex's wartime efforts up to that point had attracted little

favor from the Germany autliorities and only resulted in further alienating Rex and

Degrelle from the mainstream of the Belgian population while attracting little favor from

Germany. Degrelle nevertheless decided to forge ahead, and his collaboration sank to new depths.

In a New Year's editorial in 1941, and in speeches around the same time,

Degrelle's collaboration became complete as he was willing to publicly heil Hitler for the first time.7 Degrelle portrayed Hitler as the savior of Germany, writing that "In ten years... all of Europe will recognize that Hitler saved it: we recognize that today and have the courage to say: Heil ~itler!"' For the rest of the war and of his life, Degrelle would not deviate from praising Hitler and adhering to Nazi ideology. His change fi-om Belgian nationalism to a willingness to adopt wholesale the principles of Belgium's invaders could not have been more profound. Degrelle showed that, after all, he cared more about himself and his own standing than about the future of his country.

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, several months after his infamous heil-ing of Hitler, Degrelle finally had his chance to fight bolshevism directly and back up his career of anti-communist rhetoric. The fight against bolshevism at this point, though, was for Degrelle less an ideological struggle than an indirect avenue to political power. In a further attempt to secure the patronage of his Nazi masters, he successfully petitioned for the creation of a Rex combat unit, the Lkgion "Wallonie."

6 Conway, Collaboration, 54. Daniele Wallef, "The Composition of Christus Rex," in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (ed.), Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 522. "Dans dix ans... 17Europeentibre reconnaitra que Hitler I'a sauvee: nous le voyons dbs aujourd'hui et nous avons le courage de dire: Heil Hitler!" Degrelle on 5 January 1941, quoted in Jacques de Launay, La Belgique a 1'heure allemande (Bruxelles: Marabout, 1977), 109. Few Belgians had any desire to wear Wehrmacht uniforms and fight for Germany, but by

August 8 Degrelle had been able to secure the services of 850 volunteers, 730 of whom

(including himself) were from ex.^ In a speech to the LCgion on that date, Degrelle

explained his reasoning behind joining the German army in the campaign in the East:

"one day we will return. Having given everything, we will then be able to take

everything."10 In other words, after having proven their loyalty to the Nazi cause, the

Nazis would reward Rex in the wake of military success. The war in the East, though,

defied all expectations for a quick, easy victory. The Lkgion "Wallonie" was involved in

years of savage combat, first as a unit of the Wehrrnacht and later as the SS-Sturmbrigade

Wallonien, a unit of the ~affen-SS." With his involvement in the war, Degrelle drifted

away fiom Rex and refocused his energies elsewhere. He was active in the German

military until the crumbling of the Third Reich, at which time he wisely Red into exile in

order to escape execution by his fellow Belgians. The Rexist movement was officially

dissolved on March 30, 1945, by Degrelle and two of his top lieutenants, Victor Matthys

and Louis collard.12

One wartime incident stands out above all others as a representation of the degree of change that Degrelle and Rex had undergone since the movement's idealistic days in

the early 1930s as an organization of loyal young Catholics. In July 1943, Degrelle showed up at a mass in Belgium in his SS uniform. The priest refused to serve him communion, to which Degrelle responded by kidnapping the priest, an act which would have been abhorrent to the original group of Rexists in the early 1930s. The Belgian

conway, Collaboration, 96-99. lo "un jour nous reviendrons. Ayant tout donn6, nous pourrons alors tout prendre." Deglelle, quoted in Conway, Collaboration, 106. " Conway, Collaboration, 191-192. l2 Collard and Matthys were both executed post-war, Conway, Collabo~~ation,280,277. church hierarchy excommunicated Degrelle for this crime.13 Any pretense of obedience

to the Church had long since evaporated, but this was still a startling reminder of the gulf

that had formed between Degrelle and the Church.

Anti-Semitism

On many levels, Degrelle's collaboration with the Nazis seemed to contradict his

earlier pronouncements. A Catholic, monarchist, and nationalist should not have been willing to play the toady to Hitler's occupation regime in Belgium. One area in which there was little rhetorical conflict between Degrelle and Belgium's new masters, however, was that of anti-Semitism.

Degrelle was an anti-semite.14 He was vocal about this at least as early as April

1933. Anti-Semitism, though, was not a major element of the Rexist platform during the height of Rex's popularity in 1935-1937. Degrelle most likely held the same negative opinions about Jews and Judaism all along, but he refi-ained from voicing them publicly when overt anti-Semitism did not appear to be politically expedient. After the disappointment of the 1937 by-election, Degrelle's increasingly fascist public rhetoric dovetailed with an increasing openness about his anti-Semitic views. Examples of

Degrelle's anti-Semitic sentiments are myriad, but a small sampling of such statements will serve to provide a summary of Degrelle7s views.

l3 Conway, Collaboration, 208. l4 It is important to note, though, that Degrelle, having been thoroughly investigated postwar by the Western Allies, the Germans, the Israelis, the Soviets, and , was never charged with any war crimes and that there is no evidence linking him to any of the German atrocities committed in the Soviet Union or elsewhere. Jean-Michel Charlier, Lkon Degrelle: Bersisle et Signe (Paris: Editions Jean Picollec, 1985),13. The pamphlet Degrelle avait raison!, published in 1941, was replete with

Degrelle7s anti-Semitic newspaper articles from 1938 and 1939. Degrelle9santi -

Semitism was not particularly original or unique; the themes he touched on as alleged faults'of Jews and Judaism were typical of racial anti-Semitic thinking of the time.

Degrelle claimed that "All of the great blemishes of our time are Jewish or Jewish influenced. The Jew is above all a corrupting element. He corrupts philosophy. He corrupts art. He corrupts the b10od."'~ ~egrellealso claimed that freemasonry and

Marxism, Belgium's so-called antagonists, were Jewish phenomena.16 This criticism of thel"Jewish influence" on Europe could just as well have been written by Hitler.

Because of both the alleged corrupting influence of "the Jew" and the economic competition that new Jewish residents would pose to Belgians, Degrelle warned that no

Jewish refugees should be accepted into Belgium. Whether they were sent "to Palestine or to the North Pole or to the South Pole, on foot, on horseback, or by swimming," the important thing was that Belgians "put on all of our borders solid signs: entry forbidden to ~ews!"'~The desire to block Jews from entering Belgium in an alleged effort at economic protectionism was actually relatively mainstream at the time.18 Degrelle,

l5 Toutes les grandes souillures de notre 6poque sont juives ou enjuivies Le Juifestpartout un iliment corrupteur. I1 corrompt la pens6e. I1 corrompt l'art. I1 corrompt le sang" [emphasis in the original]. Degrelle on 25 March 1939, quoted in Leon Degrelle, Leon Degrelle, Degrelle avait raison! (Bruxelles: Les Editions REX, [1941]), 44. 16 "I1 est frappant de constater que chaque fois que le judai'sme avance, souille, conquiert, les mimes allib avancent u c6tk de lui, couverts d'une mgme boue: la Ma~onnerieet le Marxisme. La Ma~onnerieest juive. Le Marxisme est juif" [emphasis in the original]. Degrelle on 25 March 1939, quoted in Degrelle, Degrelle avait raison!, 44. l7 "Plus un Juif ne doit entrer en Belgique. Qu'on les envoie en Palestine ou au P61e Nord ou au P61e Sud, a pied, a cheval ou Q la nage. Mais qu'on ne nous colle plus ces individus-18...Q u'on mette a toutes nos frontieres de solides poteaux: entrCe interdite aux Juifs!" Degrelle on 22 March 1938, quoted in Degrelle, Degrelle avait raison!, 44. Jean-Michel ktienne, Le Mouvement Rexiste Jusqu 'en 1940 (Paris:tihairi-e-hanKoIin, 1968);-143- - 144. For French responses to Jewish refugees in the 1930s, see Vicki Caron, Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933-1 942 (Stanford: Stanford University, 1999). Carson argues here and in her article "The Antisemitic Revival in France in the 1930s: The Socioeconcrmic Dimension Recons~dered," though, went much hrther in his views than mere protectionism. The Jews, to Degrelle,

were warmongers who would ruin the nation in pursuit of their own devious ends: "War,

for the Jews, is the possibility to regain, over our dead bodies, the countries from which

they were chased out, and where they would like to resume their banditry."19 Degrelle

drove this point home again and again: "All of the Jewish rabble want war in order to

reconquer, in the blood of Christians, their l~st~ositions."~~Historians have argued that

Rexist anti-Semitism pre-WWII was mostly socioeconomic, rather than racial, but for

Degrelle, at least, that was not always the case.*l

The tension between socioeconomic anti-Semitism and Nazi-style racial thinking could be seen in a special issue of Rex fiom August 27, 1939, "devoted exclusively to the

Jewish The very fact that an entire issue was devoted to the "Jewish

Problem" on the eve of another catastrophic European war speaks volumes about

Degrelle's priorities and public thinking in this period. Degrelle's anti-Semitism was relatively straightforward, despite his protestations to the contrary. Inflating the number of Jews actually living in Belgium, he claimed that while other ethnicities could be assimilated in two or three generations, "1 00,000 Jews, in three generations, will be

300,000 Jews, MORE JEWS THAN EVER, occupying all of the important posts of

- -- -p- The Journal ofModern Histovy 70 (March 1998), 24-73, that many French groups cloaked anti-Semitism in the garb of economic protectionism. l9 "La guerre, pour les Juifs, c'est la possibilitk de remonter, par-dessus nos cadavres, vers les pays dont on les a chasses, et oh ils veulent recomrriencer leurs brigandages." Degrelle on 16 September 1938, quoted in Degrelle, Degrelle avait raison!, 45. 20 "Toute la racaille juive veut la guerre pour reconqukrir, duns le sang des chrktiens, ses positions perdues" [emphasis in the original]. Degrelle on 12 May 1939, quoted in Degrelle, Degrelle avait mison!, 45. For a discussion of the accusation against Jews as warmongers in France, see: Eugen Weber, The Hollo~vYears France in the 1930s (Xew York: W.W. Norton, 1994), 108. For a discussion of Rexist anti-Semitism as socioeconomicaily motivated, see ~tienne,Mouvement, 143. 22 "consacre exclusivement au Probleme Juif." EX:Hebdomadaire du Mouvement Rexiste (27 August 1939), 1. ~el~ium.'"~Degrelle believed that for Jews, assimilation was both unwanted and impossible. To him, Jews were a permanent other.

The Jews who live on our soil know that their race and their homeland are elsewhere. They only live for themselves. THE COUNTRY WHERE THEY "TRANSIT" IS NO MORE THAN AN INSTRUMENT IN THEIR CONCEPTION AND IN THEIR HANDS. They will not hesitate to sacrifice Belgium, if they must, to international ~udaism.'~ Despite Degrelle's overwhelmingly negative characterizations of Jews, he still claimed in this same article that he was not an anti-Semite. Degrelle called for an ordinance regulating the role of Jews in Belgium, not out of hatred for Jews, he claimed, but because they were not loyal to Belgium: "We want this statute without attaching to it the least hatred... It is not about hounding Jews, nor about preventing them from living. But one absolutely must recognize that the Jews are inassimilable-a second nation within , the nation." For this reason, according to Degrelle, they must be prevented from occupying high positions affecting the "spirit, the integrity, and even the soul of

Belgium... Only a humane, firm statute, which does not persecute the Jews, but instead treats them like strangers... can avoid a rapid surge of anti-~emitism."~"uch was

Degrelle's audacity that he could claim that these measures had to be taken in order to protect Jews from anti-Semitism.

23 "cent mille Juifs, dans trois generations, cela fera trois cent mille Juifs, PLUS JUIFS QUE JAMAIS, installCs, visses, rives, A tous les postes importants de la Belgique" [emphasis in the original]. Degrelle in "Les juifs et la Belgique," Rex (27 August 1939), 1. 24 "Les Juifs qui habitent notre sol savent que leur race et leur patrie sont ailleurs. 11s ne vivront que pour elles. LE PAYS OU ILS 'TRANSITENT' NE SERA DANS LEUR CONCEPTION ET DANS LEURS MAINS QU'UN INSTRUMENT. 11s n'hesiteront pas a sacrifier, s'il le faut, la Belgique au judai'sme international" [emphasis in the original]. Degrelle in "Les juifs et la Belgique," Rex (27 August 1939), 1. 25 "Seul un statut des Juifs, limitant le terrain de leurs invasions, peut encore enrayer le danger. Nous voulons ce statut sans y attacher la moindre haine... 11s ne s'agit pas de traquer les Israelites, ni de les emp6cher de vivre. Mais il faut, il faut absolument, sachant que les Juifs sont inass~milables--seconde nation dans la nation-les emp6cher de s'emparer des postes de csmmande oh se maintient l'esprit, l'iime et m&mel'integritk de la Belgique... Seul un statut, humain et ferme ne persecutant pas les Juifs, mais les traitant comme des Ctrangers ...peut Cviter im deferlement rapide d'antisemitisme." Degrelle in "Les juifs et la Belgique," Rex (27 August 1939), 1. Degrelle characterized himself and the Rexist movement as having no hatred for

the Jews, but his sentiments, along with those of some of his Rexist underlings, did not

stem from sober socioeconomic calculations. Victor Matthys, one of Degrelle's top

lieutenants ddlater the wartime leader of Rex, rejected the label of racism but claimed

"The following is essential: a Jew is not, cannot, and can never be a ~el~ian."~~Another

Rexist author went so far as to exult in Eastern European pogroms, characterizing them

as "spontaneous movements of justice that are the result of the impotence of government

power."27 Such rhetoric went beyond Degrelle's purportedly non-anti-Semitic solution of

treating Jehrs as foreigners. Another Rexist included in the title of his article the notion

that "Marxism, Freemasonry, and high finance, monopolized by the Jews are nothing

more than instruments of conquest in their hand^.'"^ Rex's anti-Semitic sentiments were

not confined to newspaper articles; this issue of Rex also contained six extremely anti-

Semitic cartoons by Paul Jamin under the sarcastic heading "Le Peuple ~lu"[The Chosen

~eo~le].'~Much Rexist rhetoric and public discourse contained a coarse style of anti-

Semitism.

At least one prominent Rexist, however, publicly disagreed with Degrelle on the question of anti-Semitism. Rex was directed by Degrelle, but its editor-in-chief was the

Rexist theoretician Jose Streel, and the two men had different views on anti- emiti ism.^'

26 "Ceci est essentiel: un Juif n'est pas, ne peut pas, ne peut jamais &Weun Belge." Matthys in "Pour que les Belges restent maitres chez eux ...," Rex (27 August 1939), 1. 27 "Les pogrornes: mouvements spontanes de justice sont le resultat de la carence des pouvoirs publics." Me. Colmet-Daage in Rex (27 August 1939), 7. 28 "Toutes les forces du ma1 convergent: Marxisme, franc-ma~onnerie,ha~te finance accapares par les juifs ne sont dans leurs mains que des instruments de conqu&te." Jacques Royan in Rex (27 August 1939), 4. 29 Jamin in Rex (27 August 1939), 10. Other "Jam" cartoons from this period outside of this special issue of Re.x were strongly anti-Semitic. See, for example: REX Hebdomadaire a'u Mouvernent Rexiste (19 May 1939), 1. 30 Streel was a relatively "moderate" collaborationist who would later drop out of the Rexist move~nentin protest against Degrelle's claims that the Walloons were a lost Germanic people and that the Streel was opposed to the coarse anti-Semitism of Degrelle and many other Rexists.

Streel's article "Limites de I'Antiskmitisme" [Limits of anti-Semitism] exemplified his

more sophisticated views. It also illustrated the degree to which Degrelle's increasingly

extreme views clashed with the beliefs of his original followers, many of whom had

already dropped out of the Rexist movement. Streel dismissed the vulgar anti-Semitism

of crude conspiracy theories like the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, ritual

murder, and blood libel. He believed that such forms of anti-semitism produced not "a

rational solution to the Jewish problem but rather an imbecilic hatred of ~ews."~'While

many Rexists seemed more than willing to lay the blame for all of the wrongs of the

twentieth century at the feet of Jews and Judaism, Streel rejected this notion: "We refuse

to believe that all of our woes come from ~ews."~~Streel asserted that even though there

was a "Jewish invasion in Belgium," hatred against Jews either individually or

collectively was not acceptable.33 Streel seemed to be calling for a more refined anti-

Semitism than that of other Rexists. He rejected biological racism outright, stating that

"For us, the Jewish problem is not and never will be anything other than an immigration

problem, not a problem of race or religion."34 Streel's comparatively moderate viewpoint

stood in stark contrast to those of the other Rexist leaders.

dismemberment of Belgium would be acceptable. Streel was an anti-Semite, but he actually "protected individual Jews from the German police" during the war. Conway, Collaboration, 130, 133, 172, 176. This break with Degrelle and protection of individual Jews, though, was not enough to save Streel from execution after the war. 31 "une solution rationelle du problbme juif mais a une haine imbecile des juifs." Streel, "Limites de l'Antisemitisme," in Rex (27 August 1939), 2. 32 "NOUSrehsons de croire que tous nos maux viennent des juifs." Streel, "Limites de 17AntisCmitisme,"in Rex (27 August 1939), 1. 33 "invasion juive en Belgique." Streel, "Limites de I'Antisemitisme," in Rex (27 August 1939), 1. 34 "Pour nous, le probleme juif n'est et ne sera jamais qu'un problbme d'immigration, non un problkme de race ou de religion." Streel, "Limites de 17AntisCmitisme,"in Rex (27 August 1939), 2. Men like Degrelle and Matthys claimed to reject racism, but this claim was later

belied by their wartime rhetoric and actions." Over the course of the 1930s and 1940s,

Rexist anti-Semitism evolved from the traditional anti-Semitism prevalent during the

Dreyfus ~ffakrto Nazi style biological, pseudo-scientific anti- emiti ism.^^ This was

another example of Rex's increasing radicalization, which occurred alongside its

declining electoral fortunes. Degrelle had consistently held anti-Semitic views, making

this quite clear as early as 1933. As long as Rex was a politically viable force, from

1935-1937, Degrelle had been careful not to go beyond the bounds of what was socially

acceptable'to the mainstream in his rhetoric concerning Jews. After the disaster of the

April 1937 election, with Rex's marginalization, Degrelle felt free to speak his mind and

his rhetoric became increasingly extreme.

Conclusion

Degrelle's political career was notable for his opportunism. He cooperated with the Church and the Catholic Party when it was expedient early in his career, but was willing to break with them when it appeared that doing so would bring greater benefits.

As Degrelle steered Rex to independence, he built a platform based on criticisms of the

Belgian moral climate and political elite. Careful not to delve too far into specifics for fear of alienating potential supporters, Degrelle railed against issues like corruption, stances which were sure to be popular with the Belgian public, He was always willing to abruptly change his positions in his effort to increase his popular support.

35 Matthys in particular was a wholehearted adoptor of Nazi-style biological racism and a radical collaborationist during the war, despite Streel's protests. Conway, Collaboration, 130-133. 36 Conway, Collnbnration, 132. Former Rexist party member and parliamentary deputy Raphael Sindic summed up Degrelle's opportunism in a pamphlet he published after dropping out of the Rexist movement in the late 1930s. Among a myriad of other complaints about Degrelle's unsatisfactory leadership, Sindic was scornful of Degrelle's highly malleable political beliefs. Addressing him directly, Sindic chastised Degrelle: "You never knew how to see a procession or a shift of opinion without having the pressing desire to put yourself at the head of it, and that without the least concern for your own political positions, from which came the long list of your successive contradiction^."'^ Sindic had seen enough of

Degrelle to make this damning critique of his opportunism, even before Degrelle made his two greatest reversals. As a young man, Degrelle portrayed himself as an ardent nationalist and a staunch defender of the Catholic Church. During the war, he collaborated with Germany and was excommunicated from the Church for kidnapping a priest.

After the war, it would have been expedient for Degrelle to repudiate his allegiance to Hitler. Though it probably would not have been enough to save Degrelle from execution had he returned to Belgium, it could at least have dampened enthusiasm for efforts toward his extradition. For a political opportunist, this would have been an easy choice to make. Degrelle, though, continued to extol Hitler's virtues throughout his fifty-year exile. This suggests that Degrelle was finally a true believer in something.

After a political career marked by rhetorical flexibility, Degrelle had at last found his ideological home in Hitler's New Order.

37 "VOUSn'avez jamais su voir un cortege ou un mouvement d'opinion sans avoir le desir pressant de vous mettre a la tgte, et cela sans le moindre souci de votre programme, d'ou la longue liste de vos contradictions successives." Sindic in Pourquoi je quitte Rex, quoted in Robert Pfeiffer and Jean Ladriere, L 'Aventure vexiste (Bruxelles: Pierre de Meyere, 1966), 138. For the rest of his life, Degrelle refused to blame Hitler for instigating the Second

World War, and denied that the Holocaust had taken place.38 Degrelle also continued to

hold Hitler in extremely high esteem, stating that, despite the threat Hitler had posed to

Belgium's territorial integrity, he was "the universal genius who well understood how to

create a new world and a new type of man."39 Degrelle believed that Hitler's critics

could never hope to match his greatness: "These anti-Hitler penpushers, with their rancid ink, what are they next to a genius like Hitler? In ten years, no one will know that they ever existed. But they will still know the name of Hitler in a hundred cent~ries."~'

Unlike Hitler, Degrelle himself has been largely forgotten. Degrelle and Rexism were a political flash in the pan. Emerging seemingly from nowhere, Rex stormed to an unexpectedly strong electoral showing in 1936 and seemed to have a bright future ahead of it. The young, idealistic Rexists who followed Degrelle thought that they could accomplish anything. This optimism, though, lasted no longer than Rex's electoral successes. When Degrelle was humiliated by the established political parties in the by- election of April 1937, the movement became increasingly cynical and openly fascistic.

In the pre-war years Degrelle still had not completely betrayed Belgium, but during the

German occupation he was ready to hitch his and Rex's fortunes to the Nazi cause.

In some sense, Rex was an aberration. It was widely perceived in 1936, both in

Belgium and abroad, as a fascist group. However, Rex did not fit the patterns established by other fascist groups either within Belgium or in other European states. Rex in the

38 See, for example: Leon Degrelle, Lettre aupape upropos d 'Auschwitz (Bruxelles: L'Europe RCelle, 1979). 39 "Hitler... ttait le gCnie universe1 qui entendait bien creer un monde nouveau et un type d'homme nouveau." Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 179. 40 '< Ces7 scribouillards antihitleriens, a l'encre rance, que sont-ils, eux, A cGtC d'un genie comne Witler? Dans dix ans, nu1 ne saura plus qu'ils ont existe. Mais on connaitra encore le nom d7Hitlerdans cent si8cles." Degrelle, quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 183. early years had no paramilitary wing, and its members were expected to uphold strict standards of non-violence. Degrelle was influenced by the philosophy of Charles

Maurras, an early proto-fascist, but always charted his own course. He had relations with

~ussolini'sFascist regime in 1936, but did not adopt Mussolini's ideology wholesale.

Only during the war did Degrelle unambiguously reorient himself toward National

Socialism, a philosophy he would never abandon.

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