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Großdeutschland '42 ©2009 The Gamers, Inc. Tactical Combat Series: Großdeutschland '42 ©2009. Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. GD'42 Olenino-Bely-Smolensk Road). The 22nd not yet been destroyed. Mark it using one Army (including the 3rd Mech Corps) was of the bridge markers provided. A player Battle in the Luchessa given the initial task of breaking through the can control a bridge by occupying both Valley, 29 November – isolated Luchessa River Valley. The result of hexes with a unit. It remains in his control 4 December, 1942 this order was a head-on confrontation with until the opposing player fulfills the same the Großdeutschland Division, which was conditions. sent to reinforce the beleaguered German 2) The Soviet player may repair bridges, Game Design: Wig Graves infantry. but may only accumulate "Bridge Repair Series Design: Dean Essig Time" (BRT) on one bridge at a time. To Development: Lee Forester 1.0 General Special repair a bridge, the Soviet player must Graphics: Niko Eskubi occupy both hexes connecting the bridge Playtesting and Proofing: Perry Andrus, Rules with Infantry units. To accumulate BRT. Larry Brien, Larry Davidson, Jim Dun- the units must spend their entire Action nam, Nadir El-Farra, Mike Forte, Bill 1.1 Snow Phase in their respective bridge hexes, Garman, Scott Johnstone, Mike Kroona, and may not be attacked on the Fire Table During the Command Phase of each Jim Lauffenburger, Phil Lauffenburger, on the 1 column or greater. At the end full hour turn the Soviet player rolls two John Loy, Hans Mielants, Mark Olson, of a Soviet Action Phase, if 8 hours have dice and compares the result to the snow Francisco Ronco, Dan Tietz, Dan Treasure, accumulated, the bridge is repaired. If the number shown on the Day Record Track. Greg Ullrich. Soviet player begins accumulating BRT on If the number rolled is equal to or greater Research Assistance: David M. Glantz another bridge, or if a German Infantry unit than the snow number, the weather is snow. occupies either bridge hex, the BRT on that On snow turns, apply the following: bridge is reset to zero, and the Soviets will Introduction •Use the snow movement cost (in paren- have to start all over again. During the Soviet Winter Offensive of theses) on the Terrain Effects Chart. 1941/1942 the Germans maintained their •Maximum visibility is 3 hexes. positions at Rzhev and Demyansk at the •Apply a -2 column shift on the Artillery 1.3 Consolidation shoulders of the Soviet breakthrough. Adjustment Table. During the Command Phase of any night During the spring and summer of 1942 the turn, both players may consolidate the breach was contained but attempts to close 1.2 Terrain Notes losses of any platoons, MG units or multi- the gap were never successful. The Germans step Vehicle units that are stacked with or 1.2a Steep Slope Steep Slopes can affect ultimately withdrew from the Demyansk adjacent to each other. Such units must be lines of sight between non-adjacent units. Pocket but the 9th Army continued (at from the same battalion, be the same type A Steep Slope symbol (shown on the Ter- Hitler’s insistence) to occupy the Rzhev and may not be Suppressed or Paralyzed. rain Effects Chart) blocks LOS to and from salient only 200 km from Moscow. Units not assigned to a battalion may not units which are down hill of, and adjacent For the 1942/1943 Winter Offensive, the consolidate. Simply remove any number of to, this symbol. Soviet High Command planned two opera- steps desired from from one unit and add Steep Slopes also affect movement, as tions that held the potential for battles of them to another. Any units eliminated in shown on the Terrain Effects Chart. encirclement; one against the German 9th this fashion do NOT count towards Bat- 1.2b Intermediate Contours Contour lines Army at Rzhev and the other against the talion Morale. German 6th Army at Stalingrad. Results of are marked on the map every 10 meters. Dashed lines do not affect movement but the two operations would be significantly 1.4 Command and different. are used to determine elevation. 1.2c Bridges/Fords The Soviet operation against the Rzhev Non-Infantry units Control Salient (codenamed Mars) began on 25 may only cross the Luchessa at bridges 1.4a German Command Prep The German November 1942. The main thrusts would and fords. For bridges the following rules Command Prep Rating is 2 for the entire be by the 20th Army from the east (to cut apply: game. the Rzhev-Vyazma Road) and by the 22nd 1) Each Action Phase, the German player 1.4b Soviet Command Prep The Soviet and 41st Armies from the west (to cut the may destroy one bridge that he has held Command Prep Rating is 7 or 5 for Attack since the beginning of the game and has Multi-Man Publishing, LLC 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108 © 2009 All Rights Reserved. Page 1 Großdeutschland '42, TCS and Movement Op Sheets (based on the Units from 39 Tk and 35 AT Regiment may per their respective Order of Arrival Table. formation as shown in 1.4g) and 3 for any be freely attached to any Op Sheet. Once received, units may enter on that or type of defensive mission. The Soviets 2) Soviet Op Sheets may not use Pre- any subsequent turn through the entry area always use a rating of 5 for Reserve activa- liminary Instructions or Alternates (TCS indicated on the map (this supersedes TCS tion. Ignore all “Size” and “Staff” modifiers 6.14a and 6.14c) though they may use rule 27.2b). Thus, reinforcements can be for Soviet Op Sheets. Reserves. delayed, but they cannot shift to a different 1.4c German Higher Intent The Germans 3) The Soviet player may not accumulate entry area. Note: Soviet units entering at are to stop the Soviet attack in the Luchessa any weighted turns for an Attack Op Sheet, entry area SW enter with only 1/3 of their Valley. nor roll to implement it if any unit on that Movement Points (or 1 Vehicle impulse) 1.4d Soviet Higher Intent The Soviets are Op Sheet is currently on an implemented remaining. to break through the German lines and cut Attack Op Sheet. Additionally, in order to 1.5d Artillery Ammunition Each scenario the main Olenino-Smolensk road. gain weighted turns or roll for implementa- lists the artillery ammunition available at 1.4e Initial Orders In all scenarios, play- tion, all units on an unimplemented Attack start. Both sides receive ammunition at the ers may draw up Op Sheets of their choice Op Sheet must be off map or be able to trace start of the 0300 turn each day. before play begins. Such Op Sheets can also a line no longer than 5 hexes to a primary or 1.5e Minefields Minefields may only be be drawn up for reinforcements. All such Op secondary road that leads to the west map utilized by the German player and may not Sheets are implemented before play begins. edge and is free of enemy units on or within be placed in a bridge hex. During any point If the player waits until the game begins to 1 hex of the line and road at all points. in his Action Phase, the Soviet player may issue Op Sheets to reinforcements, those 4) At the time they are implemented, remove any minefields that are not within reinforcements are handled according to Soviet Attack Op Sheets must entail the 10 hexes of a German unit. Some mine- series rule 6.13e. capture of ONE (and only one) German fields may be available at the beginning of 1.4f Night Attack Restrictions Both sides controlled VP Village. Any reserves imple- a scenario: if so, they will be indicated in suffered from the rigors of the winter mented must be used within this goal. the scenario set-up instructions. Minefields weather and found it necessary to halt given in a scenario must be placed w/i 3 operations at night. The following rule, Design Note: The Soviet Command was hexes of a unit to which they are assigned however, also reflects the uncertainty of not capable of conducting and planning and must adhere to all normal set-up restric- when operations would cease. successive operations at this time and tions (i.e. they may not be set up in hexes Starting with the 1700 turn, each side Field Commanders were not rewarded for where German units may not set-up). A rolls one die during the Command Phase their initiative and were content to report maximum of 15 minefield markers can be and compares it to their halt number shown the taking of any assigned objectives and on the map at one time. The German player on the Turn Record Chart. If the result is then wait for new orders. may, during the Command Phase, remove equal to or less than their halt number, any minefield markers he wishes. all of that side's active Attack Op Sheets 1.5 Set Up and immediately fail. Vehicle units become Reinforcement Notes 2.0 German Special unassigned and must execute their failure Order of Set Up instructions normally. All other units must 1.5a The Soviet player Rules either immediately implement a Hasty always sets up first. He must draw up his Defense, creating one if necessary, or Op Sheets and any pre-planned Barrages execute failure instructions, at the owner's before the German player sets up. The 2.1 Artillery option.
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