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Women and Emiratisation in the UAE Workforce

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Women and Emiratisation in the UAE Workforce Women and Emiratisation in the UAE Workforce Mona Hamade Wolfson College University of Cambridge July 2015 Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Cambridge 2 I, MONA HAMADE, confirm that this dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. I also confirm that this thesis is below 80,000 words, in fulfilment of the re- quirements set by the degree committee for the Department of Geography at the University of Cambridge. © 2015, MONA HAMADE Abstract The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) which was adopted in 1979, and the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action have generated global and regional momentum in the advance of equal gender opportunities. This research explores the increased presence of women in higher education and their subsequent entry into the workforce in the United Arab Emirates. The government has attempted to reduce its citizens’ dependency on public sector employment and promote opportunities in the private sector. Governmental efforts have included improving the education system, granting women access to education and introducing funding schemes to encourage employment initiatives. Yet, despite these efforts, unemployment across the UAE remains at a high level, with public sector favoured by Emirati nationals. The country’s drive to nationalise the labour force reflects the necessity of utilising the capabilities of Emirati nationals, both men and women, to diversify the rentier state economy. Emiratisation is a national government strategy in the United Arab Emirates that aims to reduce the country’s reliance on expatriate labour and increase the participation of nationals in the labour market, both in the public and private sectors. The research for this thesis begins by exploring the inadequacy of classical rentier state theory and examining Mathew Gray’s theory of late rentierism within the context of the United Arab Emirates. It further builds on the late rentierism model with a particular focus on the role of women, education and youth participation. The methodological approach used in this research is primarily qualitative, including interviews with final year university students, and professionals in the banking sector of both sexes. These groups were chosen to highlight the practical implications of governmental Emiratisation policies aiming to increase job opportunities across the United Arab Emirates. To date, very little research has been conducted on the issues of gender, work life balance policies and new workforce trends in the UAE. 2 Acknowledgements I would like to thank the University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies for giving me the opportunity to write this thesis. To Dr. Jude Browne, this would not have been possible without guidance over the past 5 years. To all my friends, this has been a wonderful journey; my gratitude goes out to all of you for not letting me give up. I am extremely grateful to my mother, father and sister for their constant support and encouragement throughout the years. You will always be my rock. Contents Front matter Abstract......................................... 1 Acknowledgements.................................. 2 Contents ........................................ 3 List of Figures..................................... 8 List of Tables...................................... 9 1 Introduction 10 1.1 Definition of Emiratisation........................... 12 1.1.1 Women and Economic Participation................. 15 1.1.2 Women and Education......................... 17 1.2 United Arab Emirates Profile......................... 20 1.2.1 Division of Powers........................... 21 1.2.1.1 Tribal Ecosystem....................... 22 1.2.1.2 Political System ....................... 22 1.3 UAE’s Labour Law (1980)........................... 25 1.4 The Economic Structure of the UAE..................... 27 1.4.1 UAE and the Global Gender Gap Report.............. 28 1.4.2 Overview of Family and Work in the Middle East......... 29 1.4.3 Direct and Indirect Strategies..................... 35 1.4.4 Emiratisation Context ......................... 38 1.4.5 The Impact of Emiratisation...................... 40 1.4.6 Employment Challenges in the UAE................. 41 1.4.7 Challenges to the Employment of Nationals............ 43 2 Critical Approach to Late Rentierism and Gender 49 4 CONTENTS 2.1 Economic Diversification............................ 51 2.1.1 National Employment Initiatives................... 52 2.2 Rentier State Theory (RST)........................... 53 2.2.1 Threats to Rentierism ......................... 55 2.2.2 Limits of RST.............................. 57 2.2.3 Corporatism and RST ......................... 60 2.3 Theory of Late Rentierism........................... 62 2.3.1 Social Development of Women.................... 65 2.3.2 Status of Social Rights for Women.................. 68 2.4 Gender Framing in the UAE.......................... 69 2.5 Gender Socialisation and Neopatriarchy................... 70 2.5.1 Social Attitudes towards Female Employment........... 72 2.6 Women and Civil Society in the UAE .................... 74 2.7 Emiratisation and Neo-patriarchy ...................... 76 2.7.1 Corporatism and Women in the UAE................ 80 2.8 A Shift in Female Labour Force Participation................ 81 2.9 Concluding Points ............................... 83 3 Methodology 85 3.1 Primary Research Questions.......................... 86 3.2 Overview of Qualitative and Quantitative Methodology ......... 87 3.2.1 Research Positionality......................... 88 3.3 Gender Gap Indexes .............................. 92 3.4 Describing a Method.............................. 93 3.4.1 Research Aims ............................. 93 3.4.2 Potential Impact of Emiratisation .................. 93 3.4.3 Secondary Data and Defining the Sectors.............. 94 3.5 Defining the Sectors .............................. 94 3.6 Data Collection ................................. 95 3.7 Description of Universities........................... 96 3.7.1 American University of Sharjah (AUS) ............... 96 3.7.1.1 Student life at AUS ..................... 97 CONTENTS 5 3.7.2 Zayed University in Abu Dhabi (ZU) ................ 98 3.7.2.1 Dress code at ZU ...................... 99 3.8 Sample Selection ................................ 99 3.8.1 Language and Interpretation.....................101 3.8.2 Limitations of the Scope of Interviews . 102 3.8.3 The Limitations of University Gatekeepers . 103 3.9 Bankers......................................104 3.9.1 FGB....................................105 3.9.2 ENBD ..................................105 3.10 Scope of Interviews with Bankers ......................106 3.10.1 Criteria for Sample Selection.....................106 3.11 Elite Sampling..................................107 3.11.1 Informed Consent and Ethical Approval . 108 3.11.2 Ethical Approval at AUS .......................109 3.11.3 Ethical Approval at ZU ........................109 3.11.4 Pilot Aide Memoire ..........................110 3.11.5 Aide Memoire..............................110 3.12 Conclusion....................................111 4 Qualitative Interviews and Discussion 113 4.1 Emerging Themes................................114 4.1.1 Job Sector Preference..........................114 4.2 Work Aspirations................................116 4.2.1 Glass Ceiling for Women in the Workplace . 122 4.3 Meeting the Gender Gap Challenge .....................123 4.3.1 Challenges facing Nationals in the Workforce . 128 4.3.2 Effectiveness of Tanmia and Tawteen . 131 4.3.3 Salary Expectation in the Private Sector . 133 4.3.4 Gender Gap and Economic Participation . 134 4.3.5 The Gender Gap and Educational Attainment for Women . 135 4.4 Generational shift in Social Attitudes ....................141 4.4.1 Impact of Expatriates in the Workforce . 142 6 CONTENTS 4.4.2 Change in Bias Attitudes towards Women . 144 4.4.2.1 Family Support and Women in the Workforce . 147 4.5 Women’s Organisations: Possible Activism? . 147 4.6 Role Models and Mentors in the Workplace . 152 4.7 Career Plans or Children............................157 4.7.1 Work-Life Balance Policies ......................161 4.8 Possible Solutions................................162 4.8.0.1 Emiratisation: Success or Failure? . 164 4.9 Structural Challenges to Emiratisation....................166 4.9.1 The Viability of Emiratisation ....................169 4.9.1.1 Lack of Knowledge of Emiratisation . 170 4.9.2 Accessibility of Emiratisation Programmes . 172 4.10 Conclusion....................................174 5 Conclusion and Recommendations 177 5.0.1 UAE’s Labour Law ..........................178 5.1 Theoretical Contribution to LRS.......................179 5.1.1 Possible Emiratisation Strategies ..................181 5.2 Women as Economic Drivers of Change...................189 5.3 Future Research.................................193 A Profile of the American University of Sharjah (AUS) 195 A.1 Degrees Offered.................................195 B Profile of Zayed University (ZU) 198 B.1 The Zayed University Mission Statement ..................198 B.2 Colleges .....................................199 B.3 Degrees Offered.................................199 B.4 Student Quotes from the ZU official website . 200 C
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