DOCSLIB.ORG

Can UNCAC Address Grand Corruption? a Political Economy Analysis of the UN Convention Against Corruption and Its Implementation in Three Countries

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Can UNCAC Address Grand Corruption? a Political Economy Analysis of the UN Convention Against Corruption and Its Implementation in Three Countries U4 REPORT October 2011: 2 Can UNCAC address grand corruption? A political economy analysis of the UN Convention against Corruption and its implementation in three countries Hannes Hechler Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel Lucy Koechlin Dominic Morris U4 is a web-based resource centre for development practitioners who wish to effectively address corruption challenges in their work. U4 is operated by the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) – an independent centre for research on international development and policy – and is funded by AusAID (Australia), BTC (Belgium), CIDA (Canada), DFID (UK), GIZ (Germany), Norad (Norway), Sida (Sweden) and The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All views expressed in this Issue are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the U4 Partner Agencies or CMI/ U4. Copyright 2011 - CMI/U4 Can UNCAC address grand corruption? A political economy analysis of the UN Convention against Corruption and its implementation in three countries Hannes Hechler, Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel, Lucy Koechlin, Dominic Morris U4 Report 2011:2 Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................................... iv Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................................... v Introduction: Rationale for the study ............................................................................................................... 2 Part 1: A political economy analysis of UNCAC ................................................................................................. 4 1. The role of corruption in political economy ............................................................................................. 5 1.1 Political economy patterns at the domestic level....................................................................................................... 6 1.2 Political economy patterns at the international level ................................................................................................ 7 2. UNCAC and political economy .................................................................................................................. 9 2.1 The evolution and content of UNCAC ......................................................................................................................... 9 2.2 Looking at the Convention from a political economy perspective ........................................................................... 11 3. UNCAC at the country level: Lessons learned ......................................................................................... 18 3.1 What are the political dynamics of corruption in the three countries studied? ....................................................... 18 3.2 How do UNCAC-related assessments and reforms relate to these political dynamics? ........................................... 20 4. Opportunities and constraints of UNCAC as a driver and catalyst of political change ............................ 22 4.1 The Convention’s potential to address elite capture................................................................................................ 22 4.2 The Convention’s potential to inform national-level reform .................................................................................... 23 5. What role for donors? ............................................................................................................................ 27 6. References ............................................................................................................................................. 29 Part 2: Country case studies of Bangladesh, Indonesia and Kenya.................................................................. 32 7. Bangladesh ............................................................................................................................................ 33 7.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................. 33 7.2 Key findings of political economy analyses in Bangladesh ....................................................................................... 34 7.3 Politicisation of the bureaucracy .............................................................................................................................. 35 7.4 Executive dominance over the legislature ................................................................................................................ 35 7.5 Executive influence over electoral processes ........................................................................................................... 36 7.6 Politicisation of the judiciary .................................................................................................................................... 37 7.7 Blurred lines between politics and business (conflicts of interest) .......................................................................... 38 7.8 Reform areas relevant to corruption emerging from political economy analysis .................................................... 38 7.9 The status of reform at the time of the UNCAC gap analysis ................................................................................... 40 7.10 Key findings of the UNCAC gap analysis in light of the political economy analyses .............................................. 42 7.11 Putting the gap analysis in perspective ................................................................................................................. 45 7.12 The wider reform context ..................................................................................................................................... 46 7.13 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................. 47 7.14 References ............................................................................................................................................................ 48 8. Indonesia ............................................................................................................................................... 50 8.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................. 50 8.2 Political dimensions of corruption in Indonesia ....................................................................................................... 50 8.3 Separation and balance of power ............................................................................................................................. 51 8.4 Weakened leadership ............................................................................................................................................... 52 8.5 Conflicts of interest .................................................................................................................................................. 54 8.6 Political and civil service reform ............................................................................................................................... 55 8.7 The role of civil society ............................................................................................................................................. 56 8.8 Reform needs ........................................................................................................................................................... 57 8.9 UNCAC in Indonesia .................................................................................................................................................. 58 8.10 References ............................................................................................................................................................ 61 9. Kenya ..................................................................................................................................................... 63 9.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................. 63 9.2 Key findings of political economy analyses in Kenya ................................................................................................ 63 9.3 The justice system .................................................................................................................................................... 66 9.4 Civil society ............................................................................................................................................................... 67 9.5 Reform areas relevant to corruption emerging from PEA ........................................................................................ 68 9.6 Key findings of the UNCAC gap analysis in light of the political economy analyses ................................................. 69 9.7 Global Integrity Report 2009: Kenya Integrity Indicators Scorecard .......................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • “Not Worth the Risk” Threats to Free Expression Ahead of Kenya’S 2017 Elections
    “Not Worth the Risk” Threats to Free Expression Ahead of Kenya’s 2017 Elections HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH “Not Worth the Risk” Threats to Free Expression Ahead of Kenya’s 2017 Elections Copyright © 2017 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-6231-34761 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org ARTICLE 19 Eastern Africa is an independent not-for profit organization that promotes freedom of expression and access to information as a fundamental human right as well as an empowerment right. ARTICLE 19 Eastern Africa was registered in Kenya in 2007 as an affiliate of ARTICLE 19 international. ARTICLE 19 Eastern African has over the past 10 years implemented projects that included policy and legislative advocacy on media and access to information laws and review of public service media policies and regulations. The organization has also implemented capacity building programmes for journalists on safety and protection and for a select civil society organisation to engage with United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) mechanisms in 14 countries in Eastern Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • Elite Capture and Co-Optation in Participatory Budgeting in Mexico City Rebecca Rumbul, Alex Parsons, Jen Bramley
    Elite Capture and Co-optation in Participatory Budgeting in Mexico City Rebecca Rumbul, Alex Parsons, Jen Bramley To cite this version: Rebecca Rumbul, Alex Parsons, Jen Bramley. Elite Capture and Co-optation in Participatory Bud- geting in Mexico City. 10th International Conference on Electronic Participation (ePart), Sep 2018, Krems, Austria. pp.89-99, 10.1007/978-3-319-98578-7_8. hal-01985598 HAL Id: hal-01985598 https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01985598 Submitted on 18 Jan 2019 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution| 4.0 International License Elite Capture and Co-optation in Participatory Budgeting in Mexico City Rebecca Rumbul,[0000-0001-6946-9147], Alex Parsons1 [0000-0002-5893-3060], Jen Bramley[0000- 0001-7703-4119] 1 mySociety, 483 Green Lanes, London, N13 4BS, United Kingdom [email protected] Abstract. Participatory Budgeting opens up the allocation of public funds to the pub- lic with the intention of developing civic engagement and finding efficient uses for the budget. This openness means participatory budgeting processes are vulnerable to capture, where through subtle or unsubtle means authorities reassert control over the PB budget.
    [Show full text]
  • (KTDA) – Corruption – Kikuyu Ethnic Group
    Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: KEN34521 Country: Kenya Date: 16 March 2009 Keywords: Kenya – Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA) – Corruption – Kikuyu ethnic group This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Questions 1. Please provide any information regarding the directorship of the Kenya Tea Agency. 2. Please provide information on the structure and activities of the Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA). 3. Are there any reports of fraud charges against the management of the KTDA? 4. Is there anything to indicate that managers of tea cartels or figures prominent in the tea industry have been elected to parliament in Kenya? 5. Please provide any information on corruption in the tea industry in Kenya. 6. Please provide any information on government involvement in corruption in the tea industry. 7. To what extent is the KTDA involved in combating corruption? 8. Are there any reports of people being killed or otherwise seriously harmed as a result of advocating reform in the tea industry? 9. What steps have the Kenyan authorities taken to address corruption in the tea industry or other industries? 10.
    [Show full text]
  • Sudan's Deep State
    Violent Kleptocracy Series: East and Central Africa Sudan’s Deep State How Insiders Violently Privatized Sudan’s Wealth, and How to Respond By The Enough Project April 2017 REUTERS / Alamy Stock Photo Sudan’s Deep State Violent Kleptocracy Series: East & Central Africa Executive Summary Sudan’s government is a violent kleptocracy, a system of misrule characterized by state capture and co-opted institutions, where a small ruling group maintains power indefinitely through various forms of corruption and violence. Throughout his reign, President Omar al-Bashir has overseen the entrenchment of systemic looting, widespread impunity, political repression, and state violence so that he and his inner circle can maintain absolute authority and continue looting the state. The result of this process, on the one hand, has been the amassment of fortunes for the president and a number of elites, enablers, and facilitators, and on the other hand crushing poverty and underdevelopment for most Sudanese people.* A Failed State? For nearly three decades, President al-Bashir has maintained his position at the pinnacle of Sudan’s political order after seizing power through a military coup in 1989. During his rule, the government of Sudan has perhaps been best known for providing safe haven to Osama bin Laden and other Islamic militants in the 1990s, for committing genocide1 and mass atrocities against its citizens in Darfur, for the secession of South Sudan in 2011, and for ongoing armed conflict—marked by the regime’s aerial bombardment of civilian targets and humanitarian aid blockade—in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Often portrayed as a country wracked by intractable violence and hampered by racial, religious, ethnic and social cleavages, Sudan ranks consistently among the most fragile or failed states.2 At the same time, Sudan has considerable natural resource wealth and significant economic potential.
    [Show full text]
  • U4 Helpdesk Answer
    U4 Helpdesk Answer U4 Helpdesk Answer 2020 11 December 2020 AUTHOR Corruption and anti- Jennifer Schoeberlein corruption in Iraq [email protected] Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in a US-led military operation in REVIEWED BY 2003, Iraq has struggled to build and maintain political stability, Saul Mullard (U4) safety and the rule of law. Deeply entrenched corruption [email protected] continues to be a significant problem in the country and a core grievance among citizens. Among the country’s key challenges, Matthew Jenkins (TI) and at the root of its struggle with corruption is its [email protected] consociationalist governance system, known as muhasasa, which many observers contend has cemented sectarianism, nepotism and state capture. Consecutive governments since 2003 have promised to tackle RELATED U4 MATERIAL corruption through economic and political reform. But, as yet, these promises have not been followed by sufficient action. This is Influencing governments on anti- partly due to an unwillingness to tackle the systemic nature of corruption using non-aid means corruption, weak institutions ill-equipped to implement reform Iraq: 2015 Overview of corruption efforts and strong opposition from vested interests looking to and anti-corruption maintain the status quo. As a result, Iraq is left with an inadequate legal framework to fight corruption and with insufficiently equipped and independent anti-corruption institutions. Trust in government and the political process has been eroded, erupting in ongoing country-wide protests against corruption, inadequate service delivery and high unemployment. This leaves the new government of Prime Minister Kadhimi, who has once more promised to tackle the country’s massive corruption challenges, with a formidable task at hand.
    [Show full text]
  • Decolonising Accidental Kenya Or How to Transition to a Gameb Society,The Anatomy of Kenya Inc: How the Colonial State Sustains
    Pandora Papers: The Kenyatta’s Secret Companies By Africa Uncensored Published by the good folks at The Elephant. The Elephant is a platform for engaging citizens to reflect, re-member and re-envision their society by interrogating the past, the present, to fashion a future. Follow us on Twitter. Pandora Papers: The Kenyatta’s Secret Companies By Africa Uncensored President Uhuru Kenyatta’s family, the political dynasty that has dominated Kenyan politics since independence, for many years secretly owned a web of offshore companies in Panama and the British Virgin Islands, according to a new leak of documents known as the Pandora Papers. The Kenyattas’ offshore secrets were discovered among almost 12 million documents, largely made up of administrative paperwork from the archives of 14 law firms and agencies that specialise in offshore company formations. Other world leaders found in the files include the King of Jordan, the prime minister of the Czech Republic Andrej Babiš and Gabon’s President Ali Bongo Ondimba. The documents were obtained by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and seen by more than 600 journalists, including reporters at Finance Uncovered and Africa Uncensored, as part of an investigation that took many months and spanned 117 countries. Though no reliable estimates of their net worth have been published, the Kenyattas are regularly reported to be one of the richest families in the country. The Kenyattas’ offshore secrets were discovered among almost 12 million documents, largely made up of administrative paperwork from the archives of 14 law firms and agencies that specialise in offshore company formations.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter One Introduction
    Chapter One Introduction Imagine trying to cover Northern Ireland‟s troubles without using the words „Protestant‟ or „Catholic‟. Or reporting Iraq without referring to „Shias‟ and „Sunnis‟. The attempt would be absurd, the result unfathomable. And yet, in Kenya‟s post-electoral crisis, that is exactly what much of the local media doggedly tried to do. When we read an account in a British newspaper of shack-dwellers being evicted from a Nairobi slum, or see on the BBC gangs attacking inhabitants in the Rift Valley, we are usually told whether these are Kikuyus fleeing Luos, or Kalenjins attacking Kikuyus. But, in Kenya, this particular spade is almost never called a spade. No, it‟s "a certain metal implement". The "problem of tribalism" may be obsessively debated, the gibe of "tribalist" thrown with reckless abandon at politicians and community leaders, but it is just not done to identify a person‟s tribe in the media. The results, given a crisis in which the expression of long-running grievances has taken the most explicit ethnic form, can be opaque. When Mr Maina Kiai, chairman of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, addressed displaced people in Eldoret earlier this year, he was booed and heckled. Kenyan media reported the incident without explaining why. The answer was that the displaced he met were mostly Kikuyus, and Kiai, a vocal Kikuyu critic of a Kikuyu-led Government, is regarded by many as a traitor to his tribe. Sometimes, the outcome is simply bizarre. When one newspaper ran a vox pop in January, one entry was meant to capture vividly the predicament of a 15-year-old girl of mixed parentage.
    [Show full text]
  • Read Full Event Transcript (Pdf)
    BEYOND THE HEADLINES Featuring Michela Wrong Author of It's Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower Tuesday, August 11, 2009 International Peace Institute’s Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security & Development 777 UN Plaza, 12th Floor Transcript edited by IPI Warren Hoge: Good evening and welcome. I’m Warren Hoge, IPI’s Vice President and Director of External Relations, and I’m pleased to welcome you here tonight to this “Beyond the Headlines” event devoted to the book It's Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower, and to its author, Michela Wrong. Now a couple of housekeeping points at the outset, please cut off cell phones or anything that murmurs or trembles. Secondly, we have a brand new brochure about IPI. You should have found one on your seat, and those who don’t have seats, you will find them on the credenzas on the side, and you will also find, on your seat and on the credenzas, a flyer about a September event here featuring Ade Adebajo, head of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, and his new book, which has the provocative and alluring title of From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations. So I hope we’ll see you all back here then. Michela Wrong, our speaker tonight, has established herself as a trusted observer of Africa, having written two well-received books about the continent, one about Eritrea, the other about the Democratic Republic of Congo. Both of them are noted on your invitation.
    [Show full text]
  • The Non-Democratic Roots of Elite Capture: Evidence from Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia
    http://www.econometricsociety.org/ Econometrica, Vol. 85, No. 6 (November, 2017), 1991–2010 THE NON-DEMOCRATIC ROOTS OF ELITE CAPTURE: EVIDENCE FROM SOEHARTO MAYORS IN INDONESIA MONICA MARTINEZ-BRAVO CEMFI PRIYA MUKHERJEE Department of Economics, College of William & Mary ANDREAS STEGMANN CEMFI The copyright to this Article is held by the Econometric Society. It may be downloaded, printed and re- produced only for educational or research purposes, including use in course packs. No downloading or copying may be done for any commercial purpose without the explicit permission of the Econometric So- ciety. For such commercial purposes contact the Office of the Econometric Society (contact information may be found at the website http://www.econometricsociety.org or in the back cover of Econometrica). This statement must be included on all copies of this Article that are made available electronically or in any other format. Econometrica, Vol. 85, No. 6 (November, 2017), 1991–2010 THE NON-DEMOCRATIC ROOTS OF ELITE CAPTURE: EVIDENCE FROM SOEHARTO MAYORS IN INDONESIA MONICA MARTINEZ-BRAVO CEMFI PRIYA MUKHERJEE Department of Economics, College of William & Mary ANDREAS STEGMANN CEMFI Democracies widely differ in the extent to which powerful elites and interest groups retain influence over politics. While a large literature argues that elite capture is rooted in a country’s history, our understanding of the determinants of elite persistence is lim- ited. In this paper, we show that allowing old-regime agents to remain in office during democratic transitions is a key determinant of the extent of elite capture. We exploit quasi-random from Indonesia: Soeharto-regime mayors were allowed to finish their terms before being replaced by new leaders.
    [Show full text]
  • Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Strategic Assessment
    DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK SEPTEMBER 2014 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Tetra Tech ARD. This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development by Tetra Tech ARD, through a Task Order under the Analytical Services III Indefinite Quantity Contract Task Order No. AID-OAA-TO-12-00016. This report was prepared by: Tetra Tech ARD Tetra Tech ARD Contact: 159 Bank Street, Suite 300 Kelly Kimball, Project Manager Burlington, Vermont 05401 USA Tel: (802) 495-0599 Telephone: (802) 495-0282 Email: [email protected] Fax: (802) 658-4247 DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK SEPTEMBER 2014 DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................... i ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ iii I.0 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Purpose of a Democracy,
    [Show full text]
  • Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique*
    Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique* Alex Armand Alexander Coutts Pedro C. Vicente Inesˆ Vilela May 2018 Abstract The political resource curse is the idea that natural resources can lead to the deterioration of public policies through corruption and rent-seeking of those closest to political power. One prominent consequence is the emergence of conflict. In this paper, we take this theory to the data for the case of Mozambique, where a substantial discovery of natural gas recently took place. We focus on the anticipation of a resource boom and the behavior of local political structures and communities. For this purpose, we designed and implemented a large-scale field experiment to follow the dissemination of information about the newly-discovered re- sources. We designed two types of treatments, one with information for local leaders, the other with information and deliberation activities targeting communities at large. We measure a variety of theory-inspired outcomes through surveys, behavioral activities, and lab-in-the- field experiments. Our measures of actual conflict come from geo-referenced international datasets. We find that information given to leaders increases elite capture and rent-seeking, while information/deliberation given to citizens increases mobilization/accountability-related outcomes and decreases conflict. We conclude that while the political resource curse is likely to be in place, the dissemination of information to communities is a force in the opposite direction.
    [Show full text]
  • Sanctions As a Tool for Asset Recovery: Kenya
    SANCTIONS AS A TOOL FOR ASSET RECOVERY: KENYA CIFAR RESEARCH PAPER CIFAR.EU KEY MESSAGES • Kenya has been relatively successful in recent years in concluding modest asset recovery agreements and has shifted its strategy from purely pursuing corruption prosecutions and convictions to also tracing and locating the proceeds of corruption. • The UK, the EU and the US have sanctioned several Kenyan nationals and residents of Kenya on the grounds of support for terrorism and corrupt conduct. • Sanctions imposed by other countries have though been portrayed within Kenya as politically motivated and designed to preserve geopolitical or business advantage. • The use of Magnitsky-style, ‘smart’ sanctions may present some advantages and opportunities in Kenya, especially in tackling past cases. • Care needs to be taken when imposing these international sanctions that they address primarily cases where national progress is stalled. Extensive communication with a wide range of Kenyan stakeholders during the process is recommended. Paper prepared by Mr. Vaclav Prusa for the Civil Forum for Asset Recovery e.V. (CiFAR). The author has made reasonable steps to ensure that the content is accurate. The views, opinions and evidence presented in this paper are the sole responsibility of the author. Published: 2020, CiFAR – Civil Forum for Asset Recovery e.V. CiFAR – Civil Forum for Asset Recovery e.V. Köpenicker Str. 147, Berlin, Germany, cifar.eu Cover picture: provided by Pixabay through a Pixabay Licence for free commercial usage without attribution.. 1 ASSET RECOVERY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK decisively contributed to the effectivity and CORRUPTION OVERVIEW effectiveness of the institution.4 Kenya remains a high-risk country for THE KENYAN PUBLIC IS IN GENERAL HIGHLY corruption at all levels.
    [Show full text]