Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

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Summer 2003 AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the ACT in ll)7x The main objectives of the Institute are: • to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and • to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession.

The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. Views and opinions expressed in the ./iiiirini/ of the Australian Naval Institute are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Institute or the Ro^al Australian Navy. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

PATRON Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie. AO RAN

COUNCIL MEMBERS President Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt. RAN Vice President Captain Richard Menhinick, CSC RAN Secretary Commander Craig Pritchard, RAN Treasurer Ms Kym Williams Journal Kditor Mr Andrew Forbes Councillor Commodore James Goldrick, CSC RAN Councillor Captain Ray Griggs. CSC RAN Councillor Dr David Stevens Councillor Commander Kevin C'orles, RNZN Councillor Commander Henry Pearce, RAN

Public Officer Lieutenant Patience Neal, RAN

AREA REPRESENTATIVES The following Institute members have agreed to act as points of contact on membership issues and for submitting articles, book reviews and correspondence for the Journal.

AC'SC, Canberra CMDR Craig Pritchard craig.pritchard(« defence.gov.au A I)I''A, Canberra Dr John Reeve [email protected] IIMAS Albatross CAPT Steve Pearson [email protected] IIMAS Cairns LEUT Darryn Mullins darryn.mullins(« defence.gov.au HMAS Cresvvell CMDR Henry Pearce [email protected] l);u \\ in LCDR Jo Bastian [email protected] HMAS Penguin CMDR John Shevlin [email protected] HMAS Stirling CAPT Ray Griggs [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 107

ISSN 0312-5807 The Australian Naval Institute PO Box 29, Red Hill ACT 2603 ABN 45 988 480 239 CONTENTS

AIM Friends and Supporters 2

From the Editorial Board 3

AIM Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defenee 4 and Trade Inquiry into a Maritime Strategy

Australia's Oceans Policy 7 Lieutenant Commander I'irginia Oborn, RAN

Reforming Naval Planning 1977-78 14 Commodore Alan Robertson, RAN (Ret 'd>

Legal Issues in Warship Design . Lieutenant Commander Chris Galloway, RAN and Lieutenant Commander Cameron Moore, RAN

Sail to Steam and its Impact on the Strategy of War at Sea 24 Commander Nick Youscman, RAN

The Continued Utility of the AIXZUS Treaty 31 Commander Jonathan Mead, RAN

SHIPHANDLING CORNER: Life in the Northern Arabian Gulf 38 Captain Ray Griggs, CSC RAN

BOOK REVIEWS: • Lost Subs: From the Hunley to the Kursk. The Greatest Submarines Ever Lost - and Found .? Reviewed b\- Lieutenant Matthew Hoffman, RAN • Don't Tell the Prime Minister Re\'ie\veil hv Dr Sam Bateman

Front Cover: Maritime Interception Force ships based in Bahrain. (RAN) Back Cover: A boarding party from HMAS Manoora prepares for action. (RAN)

The Journal of the Australian Naval Institute is printed by: New Millennium Print 1/38 Kcmbla Street, Fyshwick, ACT 2609

Slimmer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \uinhcr 10~ ANI FRIENDS AND SUPPORTERS

The companies listed below have demonstrated their support for the aims of the Australian \a\al Institute by becoming Friends or Supporters of the AN1. The Institute is grateful for their continued assistance. Raytheon Australia LOPAC and SAAB Systems Australia Thales Underwater Systems

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Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 107 FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Commodore Warick Gately, AM RAN tendered his resignation from the Navy at the end of 2002 and also as President of the Institute, we wish him well in his future endeavours and thank him for his efforts in expanding the membership of the AN I. The Deputy Chief of Navy, Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt, RAN has agreed to be the Institute's President.

The AN I Library has been repatriated from the Defence Library system and is now housed in the RAN Sea Power Centre. The Institute will gladly aecept book donations on naval and maritime matters (where they will either be added to the library or traded for difficult to obtain books). Could prospective donors please contact Dr David Stevens on (02) 62662423.

The Institute has never had a physical home, but from 2003 it will be housed in the RAN Sea Power Centre. We now seek the assistance of former Council members to locate ANI records and property, as well as the Institute's copies of Proceedings, Naval Review, Maritime Studies and other journals, which will be incorporated into the ANI Library. As ANI material has been found on a number of naval establishments, could all members also check their work locations for any items belonging to the Institute; please contact Mr Andrew Forbes on (02) 62655062 to arrange collection.

The Annual General Meeting is planned for March 2003. where a range of amendments to the Constitution will be proposed to ensure the continued viability of the Institute.

The third King-Hall Navy History Conference on The Navy and the Nation will be held in Canberra on 24-25 July 2003. The annual ANI dinner will be held in conjunction with the conference on 24 July and Professor Geoffrey Till will deliver the Vernon Parker Oration, discussing the Royal Navy in the Pacific.

Back copies of the Journal (where held) cost $5 for members and $15 for non-members. The Institute will take back old copies of the Journal if members no longer wish to hold them.

We hope you enjoy this issue.

EDITORIAL BOARD Editor Mr Andrew Forbes andrew.forbesl /_/.defence.go\ .an History articles Dr David Stevens david.Stevens 1 (a.defence.gov.au New Zealand articles CMDR Kevin Codes kevin.corlcsfr* nzdf.mil.nz Sliiphimdliii" Corner CAPT Ray Griggs ray.griggs(c/ defence.gov.au Book Reviews Dr John Reeve irccvetoadfa.cdii.au

Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number I07

The Australian Naval Institute PC) Box 29 RED HILL ACT 2603

25 October 2002

Secretary Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Parliament House Canberra. ACT 2600

INQURY INTO AUSTRALIA'S MARITIME STRATEGY

Dear Sir,

The Council of the Australian Naval Institute (ANI) has viewed with interest the Committee's intention to inquire into the role of maritime strategy in Australia's defence policy. The following general comments and a selection of articles from the Journal of the Australian \aval Institute are forwarded as this organisation's contribution to the debate.

NVhat is a maritime strategy? Although not specifically addressed in the Inquiry's terms of reference one of the more fundamental issues that might profitably be addressed by the Committee is the meaning and understanding of the term 'maritime strategy'. Unfortunately, there is no single accepted definition and. as in many other areas of Australian Defence doctrine, terminology remains a stumbling block to the creation of an effective joint force capability. As elaborated in a recent article: 'Doctrinally, the ADI- has a situation where joint, maritime lain! and aerospace concepts are expressed in Jour different languages, which are not necessarily well understood across the ADF'.1 This has led to a situation where policy papers, such as Defence 200(1. use the term 'maritime strategy' in a manner which imposes quite severe and unnecessary constraints on what, in practice, should be a far more flexible and broadly based aspect of national strategy.

According to Professor John Hattendorf of the US Naval War College, a maritime strategy incorporates "the direction of all aspects of national power that relate to a nation's interests at sea'.' In a similar manner, the Royal Australian Navy defines a maritime strategy as 'The comprehensive direction oj a/1 aspects oj national [lower to achieve national strategic goa/s hy exercising some degree of control at sea\ Clearly, a maritime strategy is closely related to national security, however, it should not be seen as a purely naval, nor even military preserve. Instead, the concept involves the integration of a far wider range of national

P.I). Leschen, 'The Integration of Joint and Single-Service Doctrine-Hnsuring Maritime, Land and Air Concepts are I'nderstood and Applied' Australian Defence Force Journal. No. 152. .lanuary/February 2002. pp. 5-14. J.B. Hattendort. 'What is a Maritime Strategy?' in I). Stevens (ed.l. //; Seiircli <>/

Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 107 institutions and interests. In addition to purely military concerns, these interests should at least include the economic, cultural, industrial and environmental dimensions of Australia's maritime environment. Hence a true maritime strategy must be a sub-set of national grand strategy and, from this perspective, Australia's military strategy should devolve from our maritime strategy rather than the other way around.

Does Australia have a maritime strategy? Because of its historic failure to harness the wealth of its surrounding oceans Australia has at times been described as an incomplete maritime power.4 Most Australians still regard their coastline as little more than a convenient playground, while the vast expanse of water beyond is of only peripheral importance. As the late Professor Frank Broeze pointed out in his far too rare survey of maritime Australia: 'Image* and perceptions of national ideality have largely revolved around inward-looking and often racist concepts of "continental" Australia in which the sea was seen as a fence shutting out intrusions from the surrounding region'. The perception that the sea is a highway, one which makes every other coastal state in the world a neighbour, has achieved far less national prominence. Yet, it is this last point that highlights the security implications of the nation's broader maritime setting. Any possible military movement of persons and materiel, either by or against Australia, must travel either on, over, or under the sea. Hence, no matter whether the security problem is local, regional or global, and no matter whether viewed from our own perspective or from that of an adversary, the critical factor underlying success will always be the ability offerees to make use of the sea.

Although portrayed as the product of an unprecedented developmental process Defence 2000 follows the pattern of previous White Papers in focusing only on a very limited range of Australia's national maritime affairs. There is little discussion of the vital role of maritime resources and communications, or even the problems of enforcing Australian jurisdiction over one of the largest combined maritime economic zones on the planet. There is certainly no attempt to integrate these aspects into a comprehensive national security strategy. Unsurprisingly, the maritime strategy portrayed in Defence 2000 is one limited to 'control of the sea and air approaches1. The prime mission assigned to the ADF's maritime assets centres on the prevention of any incursions in force while supporting the ADF's freedom of operation in our approaches. In effect, Australia has continued to focus on using the sea for the creation of a barrier rather than exploiting it as a highway. Consequently, our endorsed military strategy places a premium on the denial capabilities of our naval and air forces. The danger inherent in this policy is that it too often leaves the initiative with an adversary, while barely acknowledging that our national interests extend well off our coast and involve far more than the defence of territory. More fundamentally, and notwithstanding the underlying importance of protecting Australian soil from a foreign lodgment, current policy needs to acknowledge that our sovereignty can never be seriously threatened while we maintain supremacy offshore.

Rather than impose constraints a true maritime strategy should make use of the flexibility provided by maritime forces (including naval, air and land elements) to concentrate on strategic end states rather than the defence of a particular territory. Australia must continuously seek to impose our choice about where and when to fight and. equally importantly, our level of involvement. Intelligently directed, the capabilities for mobility, power projection and sustainment inherent in maritime forces allow Australia to fine tune our

4 D..I. Campbell, 'Maritime power and the Australian Defence Force' in D. Stevens (ed.), Maritime Power in tin- Twentieth Century: The Australian Experience (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998), p. 249. 5 F. Broeze, Island Nation: A Histoty of Australians and the Sea (Sydney: Allen & Unwin. 1998). p. 1.

Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute .\umber 10" defence obligations and shift focus with remarkable rapidity. Furthermore, and of vital importance in an era of instability and uncertainty, a nation's maritime power can act as a significant presence anywhere in the world, demonstrating commitment to an alliance or coalition, \\hile acting to both limit the development of problems and keep threats at a distance.

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of its existing Defence strategy, Australia has already begun attempts to better integrate its national maritime activities. Indeed, at the release of Australia's Oceans Policy in 1998 we probably led the world in this area. The Australian Na\al Institute believes that our nation must continue to proceed down this path. By moving closer to a truly national maritime strategy we can expect to make best use of all the attributes offered by our maritime forces and face the future with far greater confidence.

Relevant Articles Attached are a number of articles from recent editions of the Journal oj the Australian \a\\il Institute that might be of interest to the Committee. They cover some recent RAN operations, force structure issues and maritime/naval strategy.

Yours Sincerely,

.•t.K. I-'ORKKS D.M. STE \ E\S, PliD Jot/null Editor Councillor

Kclitor's Note The articles provided to the Committee were: Commodore Sam Bateman, AM RAN (Ret'd) 'Australia's Oceans Policy and the Maritime Community' January/March 2000. Commander Allan du Toil, RAN 'Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk's involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville' January March 1999. Captain Allan du Toil. RAN 'Tactical Warfare Command in the RAN' Winter 2002. Lieutenant Colonel Fawcett, 'Sea Control to Power Protection in the Littoral' Spring 2001. Lieutenant Commander Trevor Gibson. RAN 'The One That Didn't (jet Away' Autumn- Winter 2001. Captain .lames (ioldrick, RAN 'The Medium Power Navy in the 2P1 Century' Summer 2000- 2001. Lieutenant Brad Maekay, RAN 'Earthquake Relief in Turkey' Spring 2001. Mr John Mortimer 'Naval Force Structuring' Spring 2002. Lieutenants St John-Brown and Lobley. RANR 'A New RAN Focus for the Protection of Shipping" Spring 2001. Lieutenant Commander I) Schopen, RAN 'Has the Royal Australian Navy Achieved a Balanced Fleet'.'' April June 1999. Sutekh 'Funding the Frigates' Summer 2001-2002. Lieutenant Benjamin White. RAN "Maritime Operations in East Timor' April/June 2000.

'' Hnvironmcnt Australia. Austnilki's Oceans Po/icv, Canberra.

Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute .Yum her 107 Australia's Oceans Policy

By Lieutenant Commander Virginia Oborn, RAN

'JIV A'm>ir more about Mars than we do about culture in Australia. Another stimulus involved our oceans' in raising the profile of maritime affairs as elements of public policy in Australia were the 1 his statement from a National Oceans Office achievements of some sectors of Australia's representative encapsulates the limited marine industry, particularly fishing, marine knowledge about oceans and their management tourism, and offshore oil and gas.'1 in Australia. Around 97% of the volume of This article examines the factors 2 Australia's trade is moved by sea. Australia's involved in the development of Australia'* commercial fisheries production is estimated at Ocean Policy. The factors are representative of SI.8 billion pa.' Offshore petroleum is worth the multiple uses of the marine environment and approximately S8 billion pa and supplies 85% of their ability to influence a policy designed lo 4 the nation's petroleum demands. These manage Australia's large ocean environment. economic factors, in addition to ensuring the Managing the policy will be appraised with integrity of Australia's ocean ecosystems, specific reference to the role of the Offshore protecting marine biological diversity, and Constitutional Settlement and the Regional supporting a diverse and ecological sustainable Marine Planning approach. Finally, the issues marine tourism sector, are some of the diverse facing the future direction of Australia's Ocean challenges and responsibilities Australia faces in Policy will be examined and the prospects for an guaranteeing the long term health of our oceans. Australian maritime culture. The size of our maritime jurisdictions, our scant knowledge about their resources, and the Development of Australia's Oceans Policy perceived lack of a maritime culture pose Upon launching Australia's Oceans Policy, enormous problems for management/ Senator Hill stated the release of the policy Australia's ratification of the 1982 "positions Australia as a world leader in United Nations Convention of the Law of the implementing integrated oceans planning and Sea (UNCLOS) led to the declaration of an 1 1 management.'1 By observing the efforts of million square kilometre Exclusive Economic some overseas examples this statement may be /one (EEZ)." Nations who ratify UNCLOS not placed into context. The United Slates. Canada, only gain control over substantial living and Japan. Indonesia, and South Korea have all non-living resources in their EEZ, but also agree tackled the issue of developing ocean policy in to obligations to protect the marine environment quite different ways. These varied responses are thus gained. In terms of governmental the result of different drivers and diverse responsibility a massive area previously cultural, political and institutional factors." For classified as global commons, is now a national example, Indonesia is progressing with sectoral responsibility and of enormous potential policies while Japan is preoccupied with policy economic benefit, provided they are managed aspects surrounding international border issues 7 effectively. The responsibilities that accompany and mitigation of pollution effects. South Korea, this /one resulted in the Australian Government meanwhile, has addressed integration by an delivering an 'integrated and comprehensive' institutional path, establishing the Ministry of Oceans Policy in 1998. llerriman argued to Maritime Affairs and Fisheries to integrate the some extent, Australia already had a national ocean related functions from ten government oceans policy in the form of existing strategies, authorities and departments. The US, while policies, institutional arrangements, from State originally leading the way in coastal/marine and federal arrangements, groups and Non- policy, is no closer to developing a national s Government Organisations (NGOs). What policy. This is based on the reaction to the UNCLOS provided was the impetus to construct attitude of their Congress and the failure of a a coordinated, integrated and comprehensive non-sectoral based constituency for a unified approach to managing ocean policy and the Oceans Policy to emerge to combat sectoral opportunity to raise the profile for a maritime interests. The Canadian experience seems to

Sninnu'i- 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 10" have been more successful than the US exclusion of the user-groups, crucial issues and approach, uitli the creation in 1996 of a two part the community. Finally, there was the risk of the Oceans Act.': final policy being a series of platitudes with no Australia's development of ocean practical implementation elements included." management policy had a fragmented and multi- The Department of Environment. Sports pronged approach. Government interest in and Territories (DEST) was assigned the developing an Australian oceans policy responsibility to oversee the development of the commenced with the 1989 McKinnon Report, Oceans Policy. DEST established inter- Oceans o/' ll'etilth.^ This report evaluated departmental committees and a steering group to Australia's marine science and technologies and aid the development of the policy. On 3 March marine industries and made a strong case for a 1997. the Prime Minister of Australia launched a more coordinated approach to developing 'consultation paper' on Australia's Oceans Australia's ocean industries. There was also a Policy."1 Before the final policy was released, background scries of seminars, scoping papers, significant public comment and consultation was working groups, conservation plans, marine undertaken and a further two further reports networks and reports.14 In particular, ihc release were produced. of the major report in 1995, Stale oj .liistralui '.v The Ministerial Advisory Group on Marine Environment, (bund 'there \vns a luck of Ocean's Policy (MA(iOP) delivered the first strategic, inte^rateil planning in marine aiul report in March 1998. MAGOP was composed coastal environments.* ~~ Marine agencies, such of people from NGOs, reflecting the diversity of as Australian Marine Safety Authority, interest from groups and sectors involved in Australian Marine Sciences Association and Oceans Policy. The MAGOP report agreed with Australian Fisheries Management Authority, had the ESD principles and recommended the also begun to produce a range of draft plans and principle of multiple use management. The other strategies. Linkages across these plans were report was the public service driven process made bv their concern with 'aspects of the resulting in the delivery of a 'Australia '\ Oceans management of human use of the oceans.'" Policy - an Issues Paper'.~~ The Issues Paper Running parallel to these plans was the National was substantial, although it did not include any Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable recommended institutional arrangements for Development (LSI)), whose 1992 report implementing the policy. ' The adoption of the provided a conceptual framework for oceans ESD principles by all stakeholders, and the policy and was a 'compromise between institutional arrangements appear to be the two conservation and development.'1 major issues that will determine the successful With the I-.SI) strategy as the policy implementation of the oceans policy. framework, bipartisan political support and the planning efforts of the various marine agencies. Australia's Oceans Policy Australia had a strong foundation for the Australia's Oceans Policy was launched in creation of a comprehensive ocean policy.ls December 1998 as a whole of government However, there were some impediments to the initiative. The policy was developed under development and implementation of an oceans international obligations to manage waters under policy. This would involve the federal Commonwealth jurisdiction. Australia's ocean government working with state and local environments are as rich and as varied as any on governments to develop a "comprehensive and earth. They are linked to three of the world's integrated oceans policy' across all largest oceans basins, the Pacific, the Indian and jurisdictions.'" the Southern Oceans, and encompass all five of The Oceans Policy had to be a national, the major climate /ones, from tropical and as distinct from Commonwealth, policy to meet subtropical through to southern temperate, its aims of being comprehensive and integrated. subpolar and polar."4 The policy was driven by ()ne of the lirst barriers was the friction between an understanding that without a dedicated the various levels of government in Australia policy, Australia would continue to operate on a and the risk of the policy becoming a sectoral basis without the capacity to handle the bureaucratically controlled process based in increasing pressures on our oceans. Sakell from Canberra. Inter-agency rivalry and domination the National Oceans Office proposed the policy by one. or a few sectoral groups in the as a 'small, vet pro active investment lor the development of a policy could led to the future sustainability of our ocean

Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 10" environments.'' Australia 's Oceans Policy is an Commonwealth, State and Territories.'1 I he integrated, cross-sectoral plan for the sustainable legislative framework is an involved and development and management of national multifaceted system. It is one of the challenges maritime zones and their resources.2'1 The policy facing the management of Australia's marine provides a strategic framework for the environment. Australia's Oceans Policy Issue "planning, management and ecologically Paper 1 describes the Commonwealth's sustainable development of Australia's fisheries, legislative framework for regulating marine shipping, tourism, petroleum, gas and seabed sector activities as 'fragmented and complex' resources while ensuring the conservation of the and thus, not adequately addressing multiple use marine environment.^1 At the core of the policy management.12 It further concluded the is the concept of the Regional Marine Plans framework is overly complex and cumbersome (RMPs), based on large marine ecosystems and and generally, non-traditional economic connecting all Commonwealth agencies.:x activities such as tourism and recreational With the release of Australia's Oceans activities are not regulated." There is a need to Policy, new institutional arrangements were develop a better management framework. This established. The new National Oceans will require a review and rationalisation of all Ministerial Board drives the implementation of existing marine sector legislation to identify the policy. A National Oceans Office was disparities and areas of common ground. This established to undertake a range of functions to review could be incorporated in the iteration or support policymaking, including the phase of the policy. development of RVlPs and coordination across An appropriate operational framework and between government levels. RMPs are one would consist of several elements to cost- method adopted within the oceans policy to effectively support achieving the national enable decisions about ocean resource objectives across a wide range of interest groups management be transparent, sustainable and and numerous existing sectoral management provide equitable opportunities for the arrangements. This would involve consultative Australian community now and for future mechanisms, clear management strategies, and a generations. A National Oceans Advisory Group framework to allow evaluation and assessment was also formed as a key consultative of the management plan. mechanism. Regional Marine Plan Steering Committees, comprising key non-government Offshore Constitutional Settlement stakeholders, will be created for each ocean The federal nature of Australian government and region. In addition to these arrangements, one of the interrelationship between the the major intergovernmental frameworks is Commonwealth, the six states and local represented by the Offshore Constitutional governments means the management of marine Settlement (OCS). Both the OCS and the RMP areas in terms of jurisdiction is complex. management regimes will be covered in further Consistent with the provisions of international detail in this paper. law, Australia has declared a range of maritime zones under the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Managing Australia's Oceans Policy 1973. The outer limits of all these zones are The policy is neither solely an environment measured from the territorial sea baseline, protection policy nor solely an economic measured from the low-water line along the development policy. It is a policy for the coast. The /ones, measured form mainland ecologically sustainable development of our Australia and islands forming part of Australia, oceans designed to manage multiple uses."'' The are as follows: the territorial sea. the contiguous elements required for effective multiple use zone, the EEZ, and the continental shelf. management are: an appropriate legislative Around 97% of Australia's marine area framework; and an appropriate operational is under Commonwealth government framework.'" jurisdiction for environmental protection and The Commonwealth's existing resource management.'4 In 1973 the States legislative framework for the management of the challenged the Commonwealth's assertion of marine environment comprises international sovereignty under Seas and Submerged Lands treaties and related instruments, Australian Act 1973 over the then three nautical mile Commonwealth legislation. and inter- territorial sea. The High Court upheld the governmental agreements between the Commonwealth assertion of sovereignty and a

Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \iimhci-

scries of arrangements were reached with the balance between aiul among various uses of states known as the Offshore Constitutional ocean space\v> One of the main vehicles for Settlement (OC'S). The purpose of the DCS was implementing the Oceans Policy is the to give the States greater legal and development of the RMP concept. It divides administrative role in offshore areas. The OCS Australia's HEZ into 13 marine planning areas. is the primary arrangement between the One of the reasons for this approach to 'manage' Commonwealth and the States and Territories the large ecosystem was the positive experience concerning management of marine resources. and systems established for the management of The principle legislation implementing the OC'S the Great Barrier Reef. ((.'oastal Water Suites. Power anil Title Act RMP is ecosystems based and 19X2) entered into force in February 1983.36 incorporates multiple-use planning as a kev Within the OCS arrangements the States focus. Sustainable development is also a and Territories were given title to an area called fundamental part of environment and resource "coastal waters' consisting of all waters management and entails stakeholder landward of the three nautical mile limit but not involvement. In general, each RMP will including internal waters within the undertake regional resource assessments, constitutional limits of a State; for example. consideration of current and possible uses. Sydnev Harbour. The States and Territories development of proposals for broad cross- were also gi\en concurrent legislative power sectoral priorities and resource allocations over coastal waters, which translates to among the sectoral uses.4" Final approval for possessing the same power to legislate over each plan rests with the National Oceans coastal waters as they would over their land Ministerial Board. Arising from the RMP territory.' liven when the territorial sea was process, the National Oceans Office aims for extended to the 12 nautical miles limit in 1990, regional marine planning to integrate current the OCS remained at the three nautical mile sectoral management arrangements and limit. I he OC'S includes a number of streamline institutional arrangements. 'cooperative arrangements' governing the The South-east Regional Marine Plan management of specific industry sectors, (SERMP) is the first of the regional planning including oil and gas. sea bed minerals, fisheries areas and the planning process commenced in and The (ireat Harrier Reef Marine Park. The June 2000. The region extends from Kangaroo fisheries agreements, for example, assign Island in South Australia to around Fden in specified species or fishing activities to a NSW and includes Tasmania and Macquanc particular (io\eminent's jurisdiction throughout Island a total of approximately two million the .Australian marine environment. The square kilometres in area. : It is probahlv the arrangements under the b'isheries Management most complex RMP area, with four state .1(7 IWI enables a fishery both within and governments, numerous local governments, and outside State coastal waters to be managed by more than 50 per cent of the national population one authority under one law. The OCS in the adjacent coastal lands.4" Almost two years jurisdictional system highlights the necessity for have been spent on the scoping, assessment and cooperative governance arrangements. The consultation phases of the process incorporating Council of Australian Governments' remains an a range of socio-economic indicators, and the important component of the governance pressures on the uses of the region. ' In March arrangements in reviewing roles and 2002 the assessment phase was completed responsibilities for the environment between the producing seven reports, bringing together the Commonwealth, State and Territories. most comprehensive picture of Australia's waters including a detailed bioregionalisation Regional Marine Planning study. Bioregionalisation is a process of Regional Marine Planning (RMP) is one identifying areas (bioregions) based on approach available to protect and manage the ecological attributes (geology, ocean currents).44 ocean environment and resources. It is based on Developing operational boundaries for regional, large marine ecosystems which 'integrate marine planning based on ecosystem sectoral commercial interests and conservation characteristics will be a significant step towards requirements." Morrison cites 'ocean planning ecosystem-based management. The next phase i aid management should a//c/>i/>! to ameliorate is developing objectives and management conflict of use situations anil provide a directed options for the plan, including a performance

10 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Nil 111 her If)7 assessment to monitor the plan's outcomes. national approach is rather limited and KMPs could he considered the keystone departmental policy coordination is in its to the successful integration and implementation infancy. One of the objectives of the oceans ol" the ocean policy as they integrate many policy is to promote public awareness and smaller jurisdictions and planning /ones into a understanding. After examining Defence 2000: single planning and management regime. The Our /-'inure Defence Force, Defence's current process indicates a significant shift in the current White Paper, there is no acknowledgment of the aspects of the marine planning systems. It Oceans Policy and the role for Defence. This is provides a mechanism for addressing traditional surprising noting the maritime environment is boundary problems, a basis for prioritising one and a half times the size of the continental marine research needs, and identification of landmass. critical knowledge gaps. If implemented Surveillance and enforcement, as part of appropriately this approach should ensure full defence operations, in Australia's region is a public consultation and community involvement paramount importance and is retlected in in decision-making. It represents an 'exciting Australia's Oceans Policy. Australia is a challenge for people responsible for protection maritime nation in a maritime region, featuring and sustainable use of the marine maritime boundaries with five nations: ,45 Indonesia. Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands. Neu Zealand and the French sub- Future Direction of Australia's Oceans antarctic and tropical territories. x We also have Policy land boundaries in Antarctica with Norway, What might the regional maritime scene look New Zealand and France. Thus, there is a need like in 2020? Bateman forecasted increased for international cooperation. There is a pressures on resources, particularly energy and requirement to be able to operate freely in these fish, greater environmental pressures, stricter areas, have unconstrained access to accurate and environmental and safety controls on shipping, up-to-date information and. assist in sharing and an increase in seaborne trade. ' The policy information and extending enforcement and has a role in balancing national interests and surveillance cooperation with regional global ensuring internationally Australia does not lose agencies. The Royal Australian Navy's more than it gains by new measures. Australian Maritime Doctrine recognises Remaining proactive and progressive is Australia's vast area of strategic interest. one of the challenges facing Australia's Oceans Australia is dependent on the sea for transport Policy. From an internal perceptive, success and also, has a heavy reliance on the marine 4 could be gauged by the achievements of first environment for living and mineral resources. '' RMP. developed in the southeastern region of However, there is no acknowledgment of the Australia's F.HZ. This plan has the ability to corresponding Australia's Oceans Policy and influence, impact, and encourage recognition of the whole of nation approach to Commonwealth and State cooperation in the caring for and protecting our oceans now and for management of Australia's marine ecosystems. the future. This is a strategic disconnect between If successful, plans will be developed for other government agencies and should be addressed in marine regions around Australia. The future iterations of both documents. endorsement of Australia's Oceans Policy by //; the National Interest. Australia's State and Territory Governments as an agreed Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper published national approach is another factor that will in 1997 recognised '/'/; a globalised world, the influence its future direction. It also plays and importance oj integrating domestic and important part in ensuring its effective intei'national policies makes a whole-of-nation implementation. approach essential.^ This docs not mean more In 1994 Senator Schacht argued bureaucratic coordination and layers of Australia needed to develop a maritime 'clearance'. Rather it means. Government will culture. Other maritime commentators have continue to bring to the policy-making process a agreed with this sentiment. This article contends clear understanding of the linkages across 1 Australia's Oceans Policy provides Australia portfolios/ This requires better communication with its first real national coordinated approach among those working on related issues in the to maritime issues. Although examination of various portfolios. Australia's Oceans Policy recent government publications demonstrate this has departmental linkages between Defence,

II Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \umher HI'

Foreign Affairs and Trade, Fisheries, Transport. stakeholders and improved institutional Environment, Science and Industry. Developing arrangements. This will be portrayed bv a \\liole-of-nation approach to 'ocean Australia's ability to present itself in to the management issues' should reflect the reality region as a maritime nation with a developed that trade. industry. defence. tourism, maritime culture. Australia's Ocean Policv is a investment. resources, and science and positive step toward understanding ocean technology arc important elements of Australia's management and in that respect, the benchmark internal and external interests. They arc all of Mars is more achievable. closely connected uith a focus on advancing Australia's maritime interests. About the Author LCDR Ohorn completed a Bachelor of Arts Conclusion Degree at the University o/ Queensland before National and political awareness of the joining the RAN in 1989. A dual specialist increased rights and obligations under UNCLOS officer, she has served in a number of pan ided stimulus for the development of administrative and sea postings. Her sea Australia's Oceans Policy. This awareness was experience includes postings in HMA Ships teamed with the success and significance of Tarakan, Torre/is. Westralia. Adelaide and as some sectors of the marine industry the Executive Officer of Ipswich. She has (shipbuilding, petroleum, fishing, marine enjoyed two staff positions, the first in the tourism) and a strong interest in the marine Defence Personnel Executive and the second in environment and ecosystem management. the Defence Materiel Organisation. /.('DR Australia's ()cean Policv is an integrated Ohorn graduated from the ACSC in Decent her management and planning system with tiered 2002 and is now serving as the corporate responsihilitv for national coordination and communications officer for \'avy Systems consistency of the policy. It acknowledges Command. regional diversity and the range of backgrounds and interests involved in the managing our oceans and maritime interests. V Sakell, 'Australia's Oceans Policy', lecture to Australia's Oceans Policy created an Navy Single Service. Australian Command and Staff operational framework to retain the benefits and Course. 2 September 2002. Environment Australia, Australia's Ocean Policv. efficiencies of sectoral management and I '/>/ _ - Specific Sectoral Measures. Canberra. 1 99S. associated expertise. It will improve integration 'Shipping' and coordination across sectors and ' Environment Australia. Australia's Ocean Policv. jurisdictional interests while concurrently I'ol 2 - Specific Sectoral Measures. Canberra. 1998, engaging government. industry and the 'Fisheries' community throughout the planning process. Environment Australia. Australia's Ocean I'olicv. The policy aims to foster a sense of stewardship I'ol 2 - Specific Sectoral Measures. Canberra. 1998, for our oceans and involvement in ensuring the 'Offshore petroleum and Minerals' future of our oceans. The test remains in " S Bateman. 'Developing a Maritime Culture in challenging the current sectoral arrangements, Australia', Aii.sinarine '">-/ (.'on/erence Papers. 1944. p. 44. providing evidence to support the principles of 6 Ci Westeott. "The Development of Australia's integrated management approaches, and Integrated and Comprehensive Oceans Policy'. investing time and resources for the future of Preservation and Protection oj the Marine our oceans. Environment. Wollongong Papers on Maritime Australia's Oceans Policv provides a Policy, No 10, Centre for Maritime Policv. comprehensive and coordinated approach to University of Wollongong. Wollonuonu. 2000. p. 23. maritime issues. Analysts have commented the ' ibid. s policy signifies a new era of maritime awareness ibid. p. 24. for Australia."" Development of a maritime Centre for Maritime Policv. 'Topic 5 - Australia's culture requires inter-disciplinary approaches Oceans Policy'. Lectures Notes for Australian Command and Staff Course 2002. p. 3 1. from all areas of maritime interests to ensure 1(1 Environment Australia, Australia's Oceans Poliev strategic policy disconnects be addressed in (Voll). Canberra. 1998, p. 3. future policies. Measuring the successful " Westeott, pp. 25-30. implementation of policy will be the adoption of 12 ibid. economically sustainable development by all

12 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 107

A Bergin & M Haward "Australia's New Ocean cables and other sealloor infrastructure, yacht racing, Policy', The InternationalJournal of Marine unit minerals, aquaculture. tourism, petroleum, Coastal Law. Vol. 14, No. 3. 1999, p. 391. conservation, shipping, and fishing. Consultation 14 Conferences: Coast lo Const Conference 1W4. the occurred with Indigenous Communities in the Centre for Maritime Policy/RAN seminar of 1994. SERMP and through the community and cultural the Marine Environment Conference 1995. and the values assessment. Bureau of resource Sciences Workshop. 44 ibid. Programs: Ocean Rescue 2000 (OR2000) program 45 Morrison, p. 17. of the Department of Environment; Sports and 4h S Bateman, 'Regional Maritime Policy and Territories; National Marine Conservation Plan;. Security Issues'. Presentation Notes to Australian OR2000 established a Marine and Coastal Command and Staff C'ourse. Topic 7. 4 September Community Network (MC'CN); Australian Marine 2002, p. 9. Industries and Sciences Council released a strategy 47 S Bateman, 'Developing a Maritime Culture in for the development of marine industries; April 1997 Australia', p. 41. working group responsible to the Minister for 4K Royal Australian Navy. Australia's Maritime Science and technology prepared a 'scoping paper" Doctrine, RAN Sea Power Centre, Canberra, 2000. p. for an Australian Marine Science and Technology 12. Plan. Reports: Suite of the Marine Environment 49 ibid. p. 11. Report (SOMER). Ml Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, /// the '• Bergin & Haward. p. 391. National Interest - Australia 's l-'orei^n and Trade "' Westcott, p. 33. Policy. Canberra. 1997. p. 73. 17 ihid. 15 ibid. p. 34. ?: Centre for Maritime Policy, p. 32. '" ibid. p. 33. "" S Batcman, 'Australia's Oceans Policy', Presentation Notes to Australian Command and Staff C'ourse, Topic 5, 2 September 2002. p. 3. :i Westcott, p. 36. AEROSPACE r& SERVICES :: ibid, p. 43. 23 ibid, p. 45. " Bergin, & I laward. p. 3S8. The waters are safer where you find the Thales point 5 Sakell Bateman, 'Australia's Oceans Policy" p. 27 Centre for Maritime Policy, p. 32. From the ocean depths lo the shallows of the littoral. ThalM Underwater Systems provides solutions to the underwater -I - i ibid. threats posed by submarines mines, and other dartget* sonar systems and allied lechnologies (or submarines. surface ships mmehunters. helicopters, maritime patrol "'' Hnvironment Australia. Australia's Oceans I'olicy aircraft, and intrude! defence - in support of 50 Naval Forces (lo/ I), p. 3. world-wide THALES ™ Australia's Oceans Policy: Elements that make up a multiple use management framework. Issues Paper 1. 51 ihid. 12 ibid. p. 2. ",!..-ibid, . M Bergin & Haward. p. 3HX. Environment Australia. Australia 's Oceans Policy (loll), p. 41. 3(1 ibid, p. 42.

; ,b,d. Intrudi defence Surface *hip «y*t*m* ls Swimn -/intruder Hull mounted, and towed Environment Australia, Australia's Oceans Policy detection systems Variable depth-active & [>.' • i." • 11 - ., • (lo/ I), p. 11. obuoy processing. Obstacle avoidance I. ,,, , .1 ,,'.:,,,, RJ Morrison, 'Regional Marine Planning: some Mine warfare Hull mounted, general considerations and Australian experiences', variable depth, airborne & Maritime Studies, No I 10, January/February 2000. p. remotely operated sonar systems Submarine sonar* & 14. Command systems .,.••-., I i Degaussing Ranges. . '• -.. 411 ibid. p. U). 41 Sakell. 4 ~ Morrison, p 14. www thales-underwater com 4' Sakell. These uses include: Defence, biotechnology, emerging industries, submarine

13 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \iiinber 10' Reforming Naval Planning 1977- 78

By Commodore Alan Robertson, RAN (Ret'd)

Master Plan on which uv are running mi At the ciul of 1976 I took up my appointment organisation employing over 17,000 people anil as Director General Naval Operations and Plans. with an annual hiulgel of about S7f)0ni. a Year'.' At the time my predecessor, RADM Andrew But apparently it was. Clearly some urgent Robertson, was very busy getting briefed for his action was needed. forthcoming appointment as the Head of Joint I had already decided on a tour stage Services Staff in London, and did not have time planning cycle and that the long range plan to gi\e me a turnover. So it was that I was left would be called Plan Blue, with a shorter range with, in effect, a blank sheet of paper on which plan, say 10 years, would be Plan Green. To to \\rite my nun views on how the job should be cope with the current Defence funding cycle this tackled. I did. however, have the benefit of a would leave scope for a three year plan to be conversation with C'NS' Secretary. Ian called Plan Orange with the current year plan to Crawford, who had served in Washington, and a be called Plan Red. copy of Wvlic's Military Strategy, which had In view of the absence of a king range been lent to me by Ian Knox. plan it was important to me to get a ten year plan As a result of Ian Crawford's remarks written and 1 decided that for reasons of on the USN's planning cycle I began to form a consistency we needed to include what was view of a similar arrangement for the RAN. And already in existence. That was. statements made as a result of reading Wylie I came across his by CNS in the Chiefs of Staff Committee and elegant phrase that for officers in the armed any other high level committee in which he forces, the appropriate strategic theory should be indicated what he saw as the way ahead for the the intellectual aihl conceptual hasis of their Navy, views expressed by DCNS (that was profession. before the establishment of C'NORP) in the .Alter a \\hile I concluded that my most Force Structure Committee, and existing important planning task was the production of a approved Staff Requirements. As such it would long-range plan, looking, say. twenty or twenty not be a plan in the true sense of the word, but it five years ahead. And. having just completed an would provide the Navy with a hymn sheet to Australian Administrative Staff College course which we could all sing. which included a segment on strategic planning, Cictting the plan written was something it seemed to me that that concept provided a of a problem however, because to say that Plans model for dealing with the uncertainty which was understaffed was an understatement. Ian had bede\illed earlier attempts at providing an Richards, my Captain (Plans) had been assigned effective long-range plan for the Navy. That, in to the Aircraft Carrier Project, which the C'NS turn, provided the start point for my efforts; (Tony Synnot) had recently decided to establish. which was, to sec what we already had in place His intended Deputy, Commander John foster, as a long-range plan. Accordingly, I asked my was still on his way south from New Guinea, but Stall Officer. Glenn Lamperd to look for a copy had a spell in hospital to do. The incoming of the Navy's existing Long Range Plan. Captain (Plans). Mike Hudson, was not due in After several days Glenn came back to until mid year (1977) and in any ease was to be me and said that he could not find a long range sent over to Defence for a special Defence of plan, all he could find was a piece of graph Australia study when he arrived. So I was left paper with existing Fleet units listed in a column with my staff officer, Glenn Lamperd and DCS down the left hand side, and years marked out Owen. DCS was an ASW specialist who had across the top. Against each ship was a thick resigned, but was back in full time service in the line drawn out to the expected service life of RANEM. So it fell to DCS to do the essential each ship, and a dotted line onwards after that, spadework. It would take time. indicating, it seemed, a replacement. Written In the meantime I had spoken to the over this was "Ditch" and then Ditch was planner in Personnel and asked him how he crossed out and "Stet" written in its place. decided on the number he needed to recruit I was staggered, and remarked is this the when he did not know what operations had

14 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 107 planned for the size of the Fleet in say, ten years given the current funding levels and the time, lie replied mysteriously: we have our approved manning levels, the Navy was unlikely methods. So I found out that the planners in the to ever get the money or the men to implement other Divisions did not speak with my people, Plan Green's modest objectives. In forwarding and, indeed, did not speak to one another. So I the plan to CNS I pointed this out. and got his went and saw their respective Chiefs and got reply that it did not concern me, it was his job to their agreement that I could call their planners to get the resources needed. So Plan (ircen went to meetings on a fairly regular basis. I got an office CNSAC. where Mike Hudson presented it. allocated and had it furnished with desks, chairs, Subsequently the project priorities paper telephones, a conference table, and a number of was completed and I sent it off to CNSAC as notice boards on which we could put up well. As I saw it, if the list was approved, \\hcn information about the current Navy Office it came to saving $Xm off the Navy's budget, all projects, and information about the budget. That that would be needed would be to go to the list clone I called them to a meeting, in what I called and, working up from the bottom, work out the the Planning Office, and gave them a task. amount needed not to be spent. The task I gave them was to devise a 1 was not invited to attend the CNSAC' priority list of projects from 1 to about 180. And when it took my paper and had to rely on C'NS' my reason for giving them that task was that as Secretary for a description of what happened. Director of Communications it had always According to him, CNS took my sixteen pages bothered me that, when the Navy was directed of theology and said words to the effect of we/I by Defence to save say $6()m from its annual we ilon'/ want to discuss this do we? and put budget, it was done in a most peculiar way. It them in the waste paper basket. CNSAC then was done like this; the Assistant Secretary discussed the priority list and rearranged them to Finance was provided with a couple of their own satisfaction. It then directed that the uniformed officers to assist him, and they went list be attached to Plan Green. around Navy Office and spoke to all the various So. by the end of 1977 we had a 10-year Project Directors. This took a couple of days. At plan and a priority list of projects. In the the end of this period they came up with a list of meantime I was increasingly concerned about projects to be cancelled and, sure enough, it the way the aircraft carrier project was taking a saved the required amount. The reasons for beating in the FSC, and I decided that we selecting projects for cancellation was never needed a Public Relations plan to get some made public, nor was the decision open to support from the Australian public. To this end I appeal. So 1 asked the Planning Office to wrote a PR plan which 1 called Project Sea Dog establish the criteria for awarding priority to (give a dog a bad name). In those days I was projects, and then to sort the existing projects working to DCNS as no one had as yet been into a priority list according to their criteria. appointed as CNORP. DCNS was' RADM The Planning Office wrestled with this "Chick" Murray, and he had made it plain that problem for, as I remember it, about six to eight he did not like me. So I thought it unwise to weeks, and finally came up with list of projects send him the plan as my own work. Accordingly graded into priority order. But. as for the criteria I got my civilian journalist \\lio was responsible on which to base decisions to award a priority, for PR to submit the plan to me as his work. On they could not. they said, suggest them. So 1 sat this paper I put a minute suggesting that it was a down and wrote sixteen pages of theology as to splendid initiative and recommending it be taken why we had a Navy and went on to discuss the up for action. issues involved in awarding priorities. I then The trouble was that C'NS baulked at the went on to derive some criteria. That done I re- estimated $80,000 Sea Dog was likely to cost. sorted the projects according to my criteria. Although I noted that he had authorised some Meanwhile DCS had done a good job on $7m for the aircraft carrier project. C'NS the embryo Plan Green. And I forwarded this suggested that we do Sen Dog on the cheap. We first draft to C'NS who liked it, and he directed it would get the Defence psychologist, an Army to be fully developed. By now it was now about civilian, to frame the questions to be put to the June and Mike Hudson finally appeared, lie, public, and then get the Reserves to ask the too. liked what he saw of Plan (ircen. and made questions. Altogether these stipulations put the it his plan. So Plan (ireen was refined and end to Sea Dog, so the aircraft carrier project costed for men and money. And we saw that. was left to the attacks of the RAAF. a number of

15 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute .\iiinhcr

Defence ci\ili;ms who hud had their prejudices elements in each. These I called variously Blue continued In the NAP/TAWS Study, and some Water a sea assertion model, Jeiine ileole a Defence correspondents in the media. would-be sea assertion model without aircraft By January I97X I wanted to get on uith carriers but with more FFGs, and 1-Ortress a proper strategic long-range plan, and. to this Australia a sea denial force (a sort of glorified end, I called in Mike Hudson, briefed him on the coastguard). nature of strategic planning and told him to start The three force structures proposed developing it. Six months later it seemed to me were more or less as follows: that Mike should ha\e something to show me so I asked him how it \\as going. To my dismay he Option A Option B Option C told me he had not even started it, he had been Blue Water Jciine i'.cole Fortress too busy he said dealing with tasks given to him Australia by CNS and CNORP. But neither CNS nor 3 Sea Control 4 FFGs 12 FFGs CNORP had (old me that (hey were directly Ships tasking him: nor for that matter, had Mike seen 6 FFGs (4 6 Patrol Escorts 1 2 Patrol Escorts tit to tell me himself. There was neither the time, already on order) nor any profit, in raking oxer this matter. In any 6 Patrol Escorts 12PTFGs 12PTFGs case I was seriously considering resigning as I (270'CG) had been informed thai my next posting was to 6 Submarines 6 Submarines 12 Submarines be as NOR WA. a prospect that did not fill me uith unalloved joy So I decided to write Plan I had the civil staff cost each option for capital Blue myself in my spare time, that is, evenings costs and manning requirements. And the and weekends. It took me about eight weeks but, surprising thing was how small the difference at the end of it I produced a first draft of Plan was between the three of them. Option C was Blue. I gave it a covering minute explaining the costed at S3754m and required 3400 people at nature of strategic planning and asked the sea. Option B was costed at 54464m and needed members of C'N'SAC for their comments and 4044 at sea. while Option A was costed at advice as to whether it was a suitable approach S4424m and needed 4520 at sea. to a long-range plan. The really interesting point was that My approach to writing the plan was Option A was S40m cheaper than its supposedly based on a couple of ideas. One was the cheaper Option B. However Option A's running Stanslleld Turner's proposal for a hi-lo mix for costs would have been been higher because of (he I'SN but whereas the Sea Control Ship and the additional personnel it needed at sea. Option the I 1(1 \\ere the km end of the USN mix, they B would have reduced the wages bill from the would be the high end for the RAN. For the low existing Fleet's costs by SI2.5m annually The end RAN escorts, I selected the US Coastguard other interesting point was that the difference 270 foot cutter. These ships had a crew of 90. between the extremes of Option A and Option C cost about $90m a copy in 1978 dollars and was only S670M spread over twenty years. And. shared a lot of common elements with the FFGs, observing that Defence was liable to require same gun. same Fire Control System, same some $60,000m over the same period this only helicopter, but one. not two, helos, same HW represented a difference of just over l"o of the suite. Link I I etc. It did not have a hull mounted total Defence expenditure over the planning sonar but carried a towed array. It was a simple period. design and was suitable for building at any I laid out a proposed building program number of yards around the country. As such I for each of the three options, side b\ side, and sau it as a late 2()"' Century version of the AMS showed that, if strategic circumstances changed, \\hich had served us so well in WWII. The or, more likely, the Government jibbed at existing version of the ship was limited to 19.5 funding one of the ships types, it was possible to knots using diesel engines, but, if you wanted it immediately bring out an alternative proposal to go faster you could, for more money, put in a and so not lose momentum. gas turbine. So. off went my draft Plan Blue and I I he other main idea behind my draft awaited the reaction of the members of CNSAC. plan was to use the theory of maritime strategy One Admiral said he agreed with the approach to produce three different force structures while outlined. 1 heard that another .Admiral, having keeping as much as possible the same force read the plan, but obviously had not taken in mv

16 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 107 covering minute on the nature of strategic Century was issued in July 2001 and revised in planning, said to his Staff Officer it's not August 2002. definite enough. He, poor chap, was convinced In July 2000. Plan Green was also that we did not need strategic planning, but resurrected as an annual plan, initially with a wanted to return to the old style of Destroyer 09 five-year focus and then 10 years to mirror the will he launched on I July 1992 type of planning Defence Financial Management Plan. which had NEVKR worked in the past. It is assumed that the Navy Plan (which But I had submitted my resignation and became the Navy Resources Guide in 1996, and by December 1478 1 had not got the reactions of was discontinued in 199X) was based on the all the members of CNSAC. And, to tell you the proposed Plan Orange. truth I was losing interest. I was soon to become a civilian again after thirty nine years in the About the Author regiment. Commodore Alan Robertson served from 1940 to 1979 and saw extensive service in II IIII. He Epilogue later served on the staff Of the Commander in Over the course of the next year I heard that the Chief Far Fast Forces and commanded a new CNS established a working party of three to number of ships including HMAS Duchess and look into my proposed plan, and report. Ilobart. A communications specialist, his final Apparently they did. and increased the appointment was as Director General Naval alternative force structures from three to seven. Po/icv and Plans. He served as the National And when this came before CNSAC, that august President of the Australia Defence Association body decided to select one of the seven, and from November 1990 to June 2001. ditch the other six. So, that was the end of strategic planning. 1 also heard that they did not like my coastguard cutter because of its 19.5 knots, for the regular Navy in peacetime; not gang ho enough. The AMS could manage about 16 knots flat out as I recall. I do not know how true this latter part is; others may. All I can say is that the existing Plans Blue and Green owe nothing to me except their titles. And. of course, as we all know, we have ended up with Option B, which, as you will recall was to cost $40m more than the sea assertion force structure. It is, in fact, a sort of ulorified Coast Guard.

Editor's Note Commander Sam Bateman, RAN led the working party that examined the proposed plan. The last Plan Blue was published in 19X9. With the creation of Development Division in 1IQADF. and the move of single Service force structure Branches into that Division, it was never revised nor published. In 2000. the Minister for Defence John Moore directed Navy develop a costed 20 year plan to prove to him that Navy had adequate planning processes in place. Chief of Navy VADM David Shackleton directed this be extended by 10 years (work progressed through Navy 2020 and Navy 2030 to become Plan Blue). The classified version was promulgated in December 2002 (to be updated every three years), while the unclassified version Australia 's \avv tor the 2 T'

17 Summer 2003 The right solutions at the right time

ie Royal Australian Navy

\

Raytheon ^^ AUSTRALIA O T O A A

www.raytheon.com.au

ADELAIDE MELBOURNE • NOWRA • PERTH • SYDNEY Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 107 Legal Issues in the Design of Future Warships

By Lieutenant Commander Chris Galloway, RAN & Lieutenant Commander Cameron Moore RAN

is the product of compromise, is frequently 1 he Department of Defence is conducting a couched in vague and uncertain terms, and has range of studies to assist in the development of varying degrees of international support. The the operational concept and functional result is that in its application, the law is specification for the proposed Air Warfare invariably arguable to the extent that any given Destroyer under Project SEA 4000. One of the state may or may not accept it as binding on studies recently completed relates to the impact them or their activities. of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) over the In general terms, the international next 20-30 years on warship design. This article community has developed a set of working is an edited version of that study. principles which are drawn from the following general sources: Introduction • treaties between nations; In defining the legal implications for and • judicial decisions; and restrictions on the use of the weapon systems in • custom, as developed between nations over question under international law, a twofold a prolonged period. approach has been adopted. Firstly, it is relevant LOAC as a discrete classification of to state the current international law obligations international law has had its greatest and attendant limitations as they apply today, as development over the last 150 years. The this is the law with which putative designs must Geneva Conventions (various) and Additional accord. Secondly, in order to flag potential Protocols provide the main body of the la\\ impact on future design, a review of the which governs Australia in preparation for and historical development in these areas will execution of any military conflict. The result is provide some pointers to the future direction that that in any given conflict involving a number of LOAC might take. nations, each may be bound by the Law of It is impossible to discern with any Armed Conflict to varying degrees. This was the certainty the future development of the LOAC, case in Last Timor, where the policy decision except to say that if the last two centuries are was taken to follow the spirit of LOAC'. even any indication, this body of international law has though opposing forces were not signatories to the potential to grow exponentially. This has the Geneva Conventions. clear ramifications for future acquisitions, as it Towards the future, the only workable is probable that international law will approach therefore is to assume that LOAC will increasingly restrict options for future weapon apply, and structure new systems and methods systems. in compliance. Hence, it is the written content, The discussion of legal requirements spirit, and underpinning principles to which with regard to transporting people must also Australia must adhere when scoping the future begin with current requirements. These of weapons and systems. requirements are unlikely to change, and indeed, the trend is likely to be in the direction of Principles Which Apply in 2002 greater regulation with regard to transporting Part III of the San Rcnio Muium!" summarises people. the law as it stands with respect to war at sea. The guiding principles are: International I au Generally 1. There is no right to wage unrestricted It is not proposed to list the sources of warfare; international law in detail. In general terms, 2. There must be a clear distinction between international law derives its legitimacy from a combatants and non-combatants/civilians; wide range of sources, and can be said to be "the 3. Attacks must be limited to military law which the wicked do not obey and the objectives; righteous do not enforce".' It should also be 4. It is forbidden to employ methods of noted that much of the written international law

19 Slimmer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \ 11 in her

warfare which: tire and forget may potentially offend LOAC. • Cause superfluous injury or unnecessary This is because the target may move, or another suffering: target may be inadvertently acquired leading to • Are indiscriminate, in that : an indiscriminate effect. As has been postulated • They are not. or cannot he. directed against in the request for this advice. ASCMs with a a specific military target; or, range in excess of lOOOnm will invariably • I heir effects cannot he limited as required require mid course guidance or update to assure b\ international law (ie by the principles of their accuracy and to minimise collateral proportionality and military necessity). damage. That said, the l.OAC accuracy Methods and means of warfare should he requirement and the need to precisely attack and employed with due regard to the natural destroy targets is entirely consistent with the en\ ironment: accordingly, damage or military aim to be achieved by these systems. destruction of the natural environment, which Torpedoes. The API Article 3d exceed military necessity or carried out requirement above applies equally to torpedoes. wantonly are prohibited. In addition Article 1(3) of the 190" I Incite Convention I'll/ forbids the use of torpedoes Weapons which do not become harmless when thev have Article 36 of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I missed their mark. Additional lo the (ienevu Conventions <>/ 12 Sea Mines. Sea Mines are governed in August 1949 (Additional Protocol I or AP 1) some detail by the 190" I Incite Convention I III. places an obligation on parties to the protocol to The additional regulation arises by virtue of the determine whether or not new systems would historically indiscriminate use of sea mines in offend any rule of international lau. For this war. The convention itself is limited in its reason Australia is both legally and morally application, but by custom the approach bound to apply the rules as they stand in relation embodied in it has been expanded to cover the to new acquisitions. use of sea mines generally. The major tenet of draduak'd Force and Weapon Mix. the convention is that naval mines should be The requirements of proportionality and constructed so as to become harmless should graduated use of force should dictate the range they break loose from their moorings or of weapons fitted to a warship. The design of otherwise cease to be under the control of the ships with only missiles and no guns supposes belligerent that laid them. The rules also require that they \\ill be available only in conditions of that shipowners be warned of the mines as soon open \\arfare on the high seas. A gun is essential as military exigencies permit, or the conflict for warning, and then for minimal destruction in ends. Mines should be employed so as to avoid lau enforcement; and it must also be of the possibility of damage or injury to neutral sufficient range and calibre to constitute an third parties. Belligerents are also obliged to effective use of force to restrain an opponent's remove or otherwise make safe mines at the na\al vessels or clandestinely armed merchant completion of hostilities. Despite the age of the ships in a lou level warlike action.' (inns are the convention, it remains the guiding law and has most suitable weapon for firing warning shots as customary application to the use of all sea seen in law enforcement operations such as mines. Iran and Iraq were widely condemned for Operation Slipper (interception operations in the releasing free floating mines into the (iulf (iulf). Operation Relex (anti-illegal immigration during the 1980-8X war between the two operations) and Operation Cranberry (operations countries. In essence, it is the issue of against illegal fishing in northern waters). controllability under the convention that is Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles. The use of crucial when contemplating new sea mines and ASCMs is predominantly governed by the Law their use. of Targeting, which is guided by the principles set out above. This has seen the development of I- uture Developments so called smart weapons, which can be used to The history of LOAC is instructive. This bodv 1 1 discriminate between military and non-military of law emerged in the latter part of the I )' ' objectives. As current technology stands, those Century with the creation of the Red Cross. maritime missile systems which rely on high largely as the result of the particular horror and quality third party targeting information for their human suffering which attended war at that accuracy auainst moviim targets, and which are time. This basic need to limit sulVcrhm has

20 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 107 developed largely in response to methods and tight and win. The need to husband resources weapons used, usually after specific incidents or and achieve economy of effort as a military campaigns. The Geneva Conventions and imperative is arguably consistent with the thrust supporting Additional Protocols attempt to of the law. From a purely theoretical declare this law to a certain extent, but it is more perspective, ordinance expended on a non- the principles which underpin these documents mission target is wasted. which are the pointers to the legal framework It should be noted that the development governing future war. Based on the 20'h Century of technology has also resulted in two classes of experience, it is not an unreasonable proposition belligerent: the haves and the have nots. The that the growth of LOAC will invariably lead to haves are able to wage war with a relatively high a continued narrowing of the methods and level of accuracy and precision, by virtue of means of waging war. their ability to afford smart systems in large The development of a technologically numbers. This is in contrast with the have nots based approach to war in the late 20 Century who must resort to inexpensive dumb weapons has proved the worth of international laws that to wage war, placing them at a relative regulate these conflicts. While so called smart disadvantage. The corollary is that because the weapons have had their very public failures with haves possess the technology to strike large numbers of non-combat casualties, this surgically, the expected norm is that they will collateral damage is much reduced over the have to use it to comply with the law. campaigns of WWII and its immediate aftermath. This shift in focus from wholesale Weapons Summary indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations The following factors are possible formative to legitimate military targets using precision legal influences on the use of weapons in future guided munitions, particularly during the 1990- naval warfare: 91 (iulf War and the 1999 NATO action against • There would be little or no reading down or Serbia, is a clear example of the influence of the reduction in effect of the current body of the law. This shift now places the focus upon LOAC; on the contrary, it is likely that this intelligence and accurate information gathering, field will become more restrictive and distillation, dissemination and decision-making complex as it develops. to ensure improved performance of the weapons • The principles established under LOAC and themselves. Ultimately it is the quality of the outlined above will continue to apply. decision making process, as much as the • The need for protection of the environment weapons themselves that determine an and minimisation of collateral damage will appropriate, legally justifiable outcome. Failures increase in prominence. in this area lead to adverse public opinion, • As technology evolves, the use of weapons meaning that what is legally justifiable may not and systems which cannot be closely necessarily lead to a clearly identifiable or controlled will wane; conversely the defensible legal position. The most famous expectation will be that accuracy to a example of this is the destruction wrought upon perhaps infinitesimal degree will be Iraqi forces fleeing Kuwait City on the road to demanded and deny the haves the ability to Basra in 1991. While individual actions and use dumb weapons. their outcome may well fit within the LOAC • The clear demarcation of objectives as principles, it may also be that the result of a military or not will be essential, because prolonged campaign or the application of a technology can provide it and public opinion particular means of war over time may in fact will demand it. particularly of the haves. lead to a result that does not. The experience of The extent of the disadvantage imposed on the US-led air war in the Balkans campaign the have nots as a result remains to be seen. exemplifies this view. • The need for high level, accurate and quality In contrast to this overall orthodoxy, a information management and decision view espoused by some commentators is that making will be essential. international humanitarian law actually contributes by allowing the military to do their Transportation Issues jobs, rather than act as an absolute protection for non-combatants. Furthermore, LOAC is not A number of issues arise with regard to the necessarily at odds with the military concept of transportation of persons that should be taken

21 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \iini her 10' into account in the design of warships. The quite likely that a major licet unit would be requirements varv between law enforcement required to transport either crews of fishing operations, the duty to render assistance and vessels that have been apprehended or the situations of armed conflict. passengers and crew of vessels seeking to enter Australia unlawfully. In the latter case, it is Lau Knlorccmeiit likely that the numbers would he large and The ('rimes Act 1(>14 provides that: include a significant proportion of women and 23Q Treatment of persons under arrest - children. It would seem reasonable to expect A person who is itinler arrest or u that a warship could be called upon at short protected sii.sftect must he treated with notice to transport such people for periods of humanity and with respect for human days or weeks, until such time as they were dignity.

22 S u miner 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \ nmbcr 107 designed to cope with the requirement to to a limited extent on the past - however the transport people rescued at sea, because the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict and legal obligation to render assistance will be only their interpretation will provide the best guide to be relieved where it causes serious danger to the legal requirements of an uncertain future those rendering assistance. maritime warfare environment. Armed Conflict. The Laws of Armed Any requirement to transport persons, Conflict impose particular requirements with whether for law enforcement purposes, after a regard to the transportation of prisoners of war rescue or as prisoners of war. will also require and certain other categories of persons. There is minimum standards of human dignity to be considerable history of warships having to taken into account in the design of ships. The transport prisoners of war, captured either at sea best way to do so would be to design ships that or ashore. Again, any design that takes account are big enough to carry extra people in a degree of these issues could serve for other of austere comfort. accommodation purposes Prisoners of War. Prisoners of war About the Authors must be rapidly evacuated out of combat areas. LCDR Chris Cnillaway joined the \avy in 1982 This must be done humanely and in conditions a.s a seaman officer, serving in a variety of sea similar to those of the detaining forces. They postings including CnilJ war service in I/MAS must not be exposed unnecessarily to danger, Brisbane before completing the Principal and their safety must be ensured during the Warfare Officer Course in 1993 as an ASlt' snh- evacuation. They must be supplied with specialist. He subsequently served as a PWO in sufficient food, drinkable water, necessary HMA Ships Canberra and llobart he/ore clothing and medical attention. " They must also transferring to the Navv Ready Reserve in 1995. be protected against acts of violence or Chris studied law, specialising in maritime and intimidation and public curiosity and insults." international law before returning to the /',\7-' /;; Essentially, this would mean that a warship 2001 with a dual streaming into the Legal designed to be able to able to carry prisoners of Branch. LCDR Cameron Moore as a Navy legal war would need to be able to do so below decks, officer served in Naval Support Command HQ in spaces that would be considered acceptable Sydney. HMAS Stirling. HMAS Torrens. the for accommodation by members of the ADF. Defence Legal Service and recently in Navy This could be more austere than the Headquarters. He recently resigned from the accommodation for the ship's company but no Navv to go into private practice. worse than that which would be used for detachments of own forces embarked for short 1 periods. Speech by Abba Hbcn. Isrcali Ambassador to the US, 20 Wounded, sick, ship \\recked. Similar September 1957. ~ The San Rcmo Manual is a contemporary restatement of rules as above apply for prisoners of war that are the international law applicable to armed conflicts at sea. It wounded, sick or shipwrecked. An important is a secondary source of the highest standing, put together extra requirement to note is that such prisoners by a panel of the world's foremost legal and naval experts shall be afforded the same level of medical care between 1980-W4. ' This paragraph is a paraphrase of I).P. (I'C'oniieH's The as own forces and in order of medical priority. A Influence oj I.un on Sen l'o\vcr. Manchester. 1<)75, pp. warship may only demand that a hospital ship or 183-184. merchant ship hand such personnel over to the 4 A breach of human rights law may not be a DFDA warship if it can provide adequate facilities and offence in itself but it could be evidence of prejudicial care.'" The issue for warship design is that behaviour. This could ground a charge against a member under s.60 DFDA for prejudicial behaviour. warships that are capable of transporting ! Art 2. prisoners of war must also be capable of caring "Art IX. for those prisoners of war that arc wounded sick 7 Art 24. x or shipwrecked. Art '). "Art I1). '" Geneva Convention III Arts 14 & 20. Conclusion "Gill Art 13. The extant principles of the Law of Armed 12 G II Arts 14.15 &16. Conflict will continue to define, with increasing particularity, the way wars are fought. It is axiomatic that the future can only be predicated

23 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \iiinhcr 10' Sail to Steam and its Impact on the Strategy of War at Sea

By Commander Nick Youseman, RAN

A/I Lara's Commissioners /ell it tlicir hoimden subsequent analysis. It then defines strategy as it duty to discourage to the utmost of their ahility applies to the subject, before discussing the ///c employment of steam vessels, us they effects of the shift from sail to steam in live considered that the introduction of steam was main areas. Finally, it draws all elements calculated to strike ti fatal hlow Lit the Naval together in a conclusion. Supremacy <>/ the Empire. The scope of the article extends from Lord Melville the wooden galley and ship of the line, to the First Sea Lord, Royal Navy ironclad and steel battleship. The influence of 1X2X Britain's Royal Navy is given prominence, for two main reasons. Firstly. Britain was the 1 lie history and strategy of maritime powers dominant world power between 1X15 and 1X95. have been shaped not only by geography and The nation's leading role during the Industrial men but also by na\al technology." Navies Revolution of the late 19" Century also allowed incorporate sophisticated combinations of the RN to adapt to new ideas more readily.s machinery and weaponry, and require many Secondly, the quality of records describing the vcars to e\ol\e. Indeed, a nation's prosperity historical development of the RN make turning and technological development is often judged points in the subject area easier to identify." To by the complexity of its navy. Throughout set the scene, it is necessary to consider the history, maritime nations have been obliged to historical perspective of ship development and follow incremental changes in technology to war at sea. keep then" navies viable in conflict, avoid military defeat, and minimise the risk of Historical Perspective invasion.' Maritime power has played a key role in the The period 1X15 to 1X60 saw the end of relationships between nations for centuries.'" the age of wood and sail, and the transition to The sea provides the principal routes for iron and steam. This process was long and exploration, commerce and warfare, being the drawn out. although ultimately all navies cheapest and most efficient method of embraced the new technology.' Until the transporting large volumes of goods over long invention of the aeroplane in 1903, the warship distances. Maritime power has also been used as was the most complex piece of machinery in its a means of prevailing in conflict, allowing states day. capable of operating autonomously for 5 to acquire colonies, dominate trade and gain days, weeks or even months. The development prosperity. Citing the British example. of steam propulsion also coincided with rapid maritime strategist Captain Alfred I Mahan advances in the field of naval gunnery. stated in his 1S1)() work /'/k' Injhicncc of Sen Associated changes in hull design, and the use Power Lpon History 1660-1783: of iron and steel, transformed the warship It ean scarcely he denied that England's bevond all recognition. The shift from sail to uncontrolled dominion of the seas, steam was significant because it was not only during almost the whole period...[ 1660- the ships but also the way of sailing them that 1783 j...was hv lout; odds the chief changed." This combination of effects had a among militarv factors that determined profound influence on the way maritime warfare the final issue. was conducted. Understanding navies and maritime power This article will identify the major ways requires an understanding of the history of the in which the transition from sail to steam warship. Before the formation of organised transformed the strategy of war at sea. It first navies, armed merchantmen were used to protect provides an historical background to ship commercial shipping against pirates. Nations development from the Age of Sail to the Age of subsequently formed navies, building fleets of Steam, providing a contextual setting for specialised ships for war.''

24 Summer 2(103 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute !\ii HI her 107

The development of ships has generally broadside guns against the enemy's limited been described according to the means of forward guns. Melee tactics proved more propulsion. Development began with the Age of difficult to control, and the British fleet persisted (ialleys (2500 BC-1571 AD), passing through with formal linear tactics until the late IX'1' the Age of Sail (1200-1X50), and the Age of Century.Jl Thereafter, melee tactics were used Steam (1X15-1905), to the Modern Age 0906- by the RN to great effect, exemplified by Present).14 Technological change was often Nelson's victory over the combined French and rapid but the adoption of new technologies, and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar in 1X05. The era of their influence on the strategy of war at sea, the ship of the line came to a close at the end of were more gradual. Hence, the developmental the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, with the arrival of ages do not have exact boundaries. The relevant steam propulsion. A metamorphosis of the periods in this ease are the warship followed, during a prolonged period of relative peace under the Pax Britannica.21 A»e of Sail and the Age of Steam The Age of Steam saw changes in all The Age of Sail was a 'Golden Age' for the aspects of warship design, and can be divided influence of sea power, when empires were won into three broad periods. The period 1X15 to and lost at sea, sometimes in a single battle.1" 1X60 covered the introduction of the paddle- The standard fleet formation under sail was in wheel and the screw propeller. Between 1X60 line abreast, and battles generally consisted of a and 1X90. the warship was transformed from chase followed by boarding. In a departure from wooden sailing ship to steel battleship. Finally, this doctrine. Hngland's victory over the Spanish from 1X90 to 1906, came the progressive Armada in 158X was attributed to the smaller, refinement of the battleship in the pre- sleeker English galleons standing off using their dreadnought era."" guns, rather than closing for boarding action."' The origins of steam propulsion date Despite the lessons learned from this battle, back to James Watt's invention of the steam navies in the early 17"' Century continued to engine in 1765. Early versions of the steam build larger and larger ships, with up to three engine were large and uneconomical in terms of gun decks and 100 guns. Such majestic vessels fuel consumption, but design improvements were built as much for prestige as for their eventually allowed the machinery to be fitted to fighting ability, but the experimentation in ships. The new technology was first used for design led ultimately to the classic 'ship of the commercial fleets and the paddle-wheel \essel line'. Adjustments to fleet tactics inevitably was created." The principle of the screw followed. propeller was understood but the paddle-wheel During the first Anglo-Dutch war of was thought to be more adaptable/4 The first 1652-54, the 1-nglish changed their standard successful steam warship was the American ship fleet formation to a single line ahead.1 In this Demotogo.s. completed in 1915 and propelled by arrangement, opposing ships closed beam-to- a paddle-wheel between catamaran hulls. beam rather than bow-to-bow. The danger of France's building of steam driven smaller ships ending up opposite larger, more paddle warships led to fears in Britain that a powerful ships led to a gradual increase in the cross-Channel invasion could happen before the number of guns required for a ship to remain in RN had time to respond. Paddle-wheel vessels the line. Ships of the line had to be strong participated in a few wars of the period, but enough to withstand enemy fire and make an carried few guns and were not tested in a major effective reply.IN However, the tactic of coming battle. The main contribution of paddle-wheel together in two parallel lines produced few ships was in shore bombardment, blockade, and decisive battles. Within the basic system of river operations."" Otherwise, the paddle- tactics dictated by the nature of the technology, wheelers were mostly relegated to secondary there remained considerable scope for roles, including towing ships of the line, and variation. 'packet duty' carrying mail and messages. The Alternative manoeuvres known as situation changed significantly in 1X36 when 'melee' tactics were developed, aimed at British inventor Francis Pettit Smith and achieving positional or numerical advantage Swedish-American engineer John Ericsson over parts of an opposing fleet. One such tactic patented designs for a screw propeller/1' was 'crossing the T', whereby a fleet passed The screw enabled steam and sail to be through the enemy line and brought its combined in a single ship.: A disadvantage to

25 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \nmhcr both paddle and screw was the \•ihration of the existing ships of the RN became obsolete machinery, which tended to shake wooden ships overnight, and rapid action was taken to rectify apart.:s A turning point came in 1X45, when the the situation, .lust two years later, in 1X60. British screw-driven frigate Rentier pulled the Britain launched the iron-hulled, steam- paddle-driven frigate Alccto backwards in a propelled warship 11 MS llt/rrior, competition."' Screw ships became dominant by technologically the most advanced ship of its 1X50 and the RN's last paddle-wheel warship day.'" was launched in 1X52.'" Warships emerging The process of change was well over the next ten years were predominantly established and continued to the end of the conversions; old ships of the line with century. Having considered the historical machinery retro-fitted. Masts and yards were perspective, the effects of the shift from sail to retained, being more economical oxer long steam can now be examined. distances." Britain took the lead in conversions Kft'ects on Strategy of the War at Sea from 1X45. although the French were credited Strategy of war at sea during the technological with the first large steam battleship. Lc advances of the 19th Century centred mainly on Napoleon, launched in 1850.12 Despite this early the capabilities of the platform. Five separate progress there were problems. Early steam areas of platform capability and associated engines were large, and not all hulls were big thinking can be identified, representing the enough to carry the machinery. The engines major ways in which transition to steam were aKn inefficient, consuming large amounts influenced the strategy. These five areas are: of coal, and a paddle or screw impaired the speed and manoeuvrability, endurance and ship's sailing qualities. These drawbacks led to range, strength and armour, destructive power scepticism over the value of steam, confining its and weaponry, and tactical and analytical use for many years to an auxiliary power source thought. only. As each problem arose, however, Speed and manoeuvrability. Sailing ships advances in technology allowed solutions to be required ample sea room to manoeuvre safely. found. A subsequent round of development was Beating into wind strained equipment and sparked by the use of iron in shipbuilding. personnel and was not usually attempted over Iron was a comparatively precious long periods. Working close inshore put sailing material until the Industrial Revolution, when ships in danger of shipwreck. This meant battles improved smelting methods and machine tools were usually fought in open sea, limiting the made large-scale iron structures possible.'4 The tactical options open to the commander. Warfare RN had ordered its first iron warship in 1X40. in the days of sail was also relatively slow. The the paddle gunboat I IMS Albert.^ The iron wind would be chosen according to the shipbuilding industry uas subsequently advantage sought as vessels closed for mutual suspended, while trials were conducted on the bombardment, or raking with carronade at short resistance of iron hulls to shellfire. susceptibility range.4" Steam, on the other hand, allowed to bottom fouling, and effects on magnetic warships to manoeuvre independently of the compasses.'" By the mid-IX5()s. the problems of wind and take the fight to the enemy.41 the iron hull were largely resolved and iron Steam ships suffered few constraints in cladding was used to armour wooden ships, manoeuvring and generally were only limited by creating the ironclad. C'oincidentally. the water depth and engine serviceability. A paddle Crimean War of 1X54-56 signalled the demise of allowed ships to turn much faster than with a the wooden warship and an end to the exclusive screw, although this manoeuvrability was 17 use of sails. confined to calm conditions. The considerable Although no major sea battles occurred, drag created by the paddle eventually led to the C'rimean War involved the first large-scale dominance of the screw, which could he raised use of shell-firing guns. C'annonballs had the or lowered as required by the sea-state. The power to damage wooden ships but rarely sank strategic importance of anchorages offering safe them. I he exploding shell, in contrast, hail the entry and exit to sailing vessels waned as the power to destroy ships constructed of wood, or manoeuvrability and reliability of steam-driven restricted in manoeuvrability by sails.3" In 1858, ships increased.42 The ability of steam ships to the French Navy launched the wooden, armour manoeuvre in rivers and confined waters plated and steam-driven warship Ci/oire. The enhanced their application in amphibious style

26 Summer 20(13 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Anmbcr 107 warfare from the sea. The advance of one hand, and strategic command and control on technology also affected the traditional naval the other.51 This situation was eventually blockade.43 overcome, through a combination of Steam tended to favour the blockade- increasingly fuel-efficient engines and improved runner. An evading vessel with steam propulsion access to logistic stations through colonial was capable of similar speed to the blockading expansion. Nevertheless, distances to the nearest ships, and was less reliant on tides than a sailing sources of fuel had to be factored into any vessel. The Unionist navy of the American Civil planning for a war at sea involving steam ships. War found it took three times as many steam- Strength and armour. Despite the obvious and-sail ships to maintain a blockade compared vulnerability of sailing masts and spars, with pure sailing ships, owing to the need for the detractors of steam viewed engines and paddles former to transit to and from refuelling bases. as weaknesses in battle.52 As the use of iron In the Age of Sail, larger ships usually increased, so did the methods of protecting had a speed and fire-power advantage over machinery and armament. Stability became a smaller vessels. By the end of the 19th Century, major issue and complicated initial attempts at the same machinery capable of propelling large providing added protection. Steel was stronger ships at a certain speed was capable of driving and lighter than iron, but for many years was too smaller ships even faster. The use of stand-off expensive for shipbuilding. The period from weapons such as torpedoes from around 1860 1860 saw improvements in the design and made small, fast craft highly effective against effectiveness of armour, followed by increased larger, slower vessels. A new school of thought production of steel to replace iron.53 emerged from the Jen tie Ecole in France, The American Civil War (1861-65) was suggesting the days of the battleship were over. an important testing ground for the ironclads. In The expectations of the Jeitne Ecole were not March 1862, the Confederate ironclad CSS realised, however, as it was found that Virginia was attacked by the Unionist ironclad battleships could adequately defend themselves USS Monitor?4 Virginia had four guns per side, with quick-firing, small calibre secondary one pivoting gun in the bow, and a gun in the armament.4'1 Overall, the speed and stern able to fire through three ports. Virginia manoeuvrability produced by steam brought was also fitted with an iron beak for ramming. major tactical advantages over sail. Monitor's main armament consisted of twin I I- Endurance and range. Steam improved the inch guns in a revolving turret. In an indecisive manoeuvring capability of warships but robbed engagement, both ships suffered only superficial them of their limitless range capability.4 Thus, damage from a mutual bombardment heavy the tactical advantages steam were matched by a enough to sink a wooden vessel.56 loss of strategic freedom. Steam-powered Virginia's encounter with Monitor was vessels making long journeys needed bases with evidence of the mobility and strength provided coal, spare parts and engineering facilities. by a combination of steam propulsion and Being a first-class naval power increasingly armoured hull.57 Armour changed war at sea meant building the necessary logistic because hull penetration from gunfire was no infrastructure, and acquiring as many overseas longer guaranteed, although the real bases as possible.4** transformation occurred as a result of efforts to During the transition period, British defeat armour through improved weaponry. warships were not sent into battle under sail, but Destructive power and weaponry. The sail remained essential for covering the vast transition from sail to steam saw a distances involved in policing the Empire.49 Sail corresponding increase in the destructive power was retained in many ships until 1875. when of the warship. The period of development Captain Philip Colomb showed mathematically around the American Civil War and Britain's that more coal was burnt transporting masts and launching of Warrior was followed by a 30-year spars than was saved by the occasional use of period of experimentation in guns and sail. The development of reliable twin-engine armament, improvements in the former leading propulsion finally made sail redundant, the drag to a greater requirement for the latter. Ships of two screws under sail removing too much carried fewer guns yet achieved greater speed to make sail worthwhile. firepower. Longer weapon ranges allowed A significant mismatch occurred stand-off engagements and dispensed with the between the endurance and range of ships on the need for boarding. The American Civil War also

27 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number lit" saw the first appearance of torpedo boats and limiting factors. Ramming was the principle submarines, (inn turrets were developed, tactic at the Battle of l.issa in 1 S66 between the allowing ships to direct fire without turning the Austrian and Italian fleets.10 In 1X67. maritime ship."'"* Naval gunnery changed in a manner not strategist Sir John Colomb stated the ram was seen since the introduction of the cannon five 'the ultimate weapon'. Despite the occasional centuries earlier, although the new technology ramming and sinking of friendly vessels in fleet had its complications. manoeuvres, the ram-bow remained a feature of Problems with new weaponry included warship design until the arrival of I IMS excessive top-weight, and obstructions caused Dreadnought in 1906.'"' The impact on war at by the masts required for sail."' The RN's first sea was clear; ironclads were devastating against major seagoing turret ship, HMS Monarch. anything pre-dating them. carried four 12-inch guns, plus 7-inch guns fore Tactical and analytical thought. Despite the and aft to overcome the turret blind-arcs. advent of steam, naval thinking remained tied to Concerns o\er stability and the Monarch's the principles developed in the Age of Sail. In relatively high 15-foot freeboard resulted in her 1X59. Captain Alston stated in his introduction sister ship, 11MS ('aptain. ha\ing a freeboard of to the Royal Navy seamanship manual: onlv eight feet. The Captain capsi/ed in a gale Although itv are living in what may hi' in 1S70. drowning 472 sailors. As a termed the Steam era, and our \avy is a consequence, construction of the turret ship in steam \avv, I have in this work wholly the R\ was halted for several years. Other excluded the consideration o/ S/ciim variations in armour and battery configuration power, as, owing to the great cost of were tried to determine the optimum coal, and the impossibility of providing combination of firing arcs, armour and stability. stowage for it c.\ccpl to a limited extent. 'Central battery' and 'casemate' vessels the application of Steam power for were developed, comprising a smaller battery ordinary purposes must he strictly protected by a rectangular box in the centre of auxiliarv and subordinate, and its the ship."" 'Breastwork monitors' had a low employment on general service the freeboard main deck, but a raised armoured deck exception and not the rule.1' lor the mounting of armament. In 1873, the RN The biggest problem afflicting the RN during launched the I IMS Devastation, a breastwork the transition to steam was the lack of any monitor and the first seagoing warship propelled serious strategic thought amongst the officer entirely by steam. Devastation effectively corps. The development of naval strategv was became the template for subsequent left to flag-officers, and little analysis existed on battleships.'' As ship profiles and main how the navy might function in time of war. armament changed, so did the technology Steam made manoeuvres to bring ships into relating to ammunition. battle more precise, making it easier to achieve By 1X39. the exploding shell had been simultaneous engagements than under sail. adopted bv many nations and smoothbore, However, even fundamental questions, such as mu//le-loading guns were being replaced by the range at which the enemy should lie breech-loading weapons.''" Accuracy was engaged, were not addressed.'1" This left Britain improved bv the introduction of the rifled poorly placed to achieve tactical and strategic barrel.6 The French ironclad Gloire was fitted advantage in war. with breech-loading guns. Breech-loading rifled A good deal of strategic thought was cannon were also fitted in ll'tirrim; but misfires crystallised during the late 19th Century in the m I IMS l-'.nryaliis in 1X62 led the RN to revert to writings of Mahan. the Colomb Brothers and mux/le-loading for the next 20 years. This others. Many of the conclusions had their setback did not detract from the overall potency foundations in the days of sail, and the ol the new weaponry. publications offered few clues as to how a steam The combination of steam, armour and navy should operate. At the Battle of Jutland in long-range guns facilitated the capture of 1916. the Grand Fleet of the RN still cruised in previously impregnable forts.64 Hven the use of line ahead and relied on 'crossing the T' for the battering ram enhanced the ironclad's attack. In the absence of developed tactical and destructive power. Ramming had been analytical thought, the strategy of war at sea was impossible in the Age of Sail, where reliance on transformed progressively each time a steam the wind and the weakness of hulls were navy went into battle.

2S Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 107

Conclusion ami Staff Course. A I'WO (SW) hv suh- By the end ol the Napoleonic Wars, sailing ships specialisation, Nick has a hroatl career and men-ol'-vvar had reached a peak of background including DD/FF Navigator, MWV perfection. The revolution that transformed Command, /)/) /•"/•" Exeat tin- Officer, as well as naval warfare in the 14" Century was essentially NA TO and UK Defence staff appointments. the result of three major developments that occurred more or less simultaneously, namely John Winton, An Illustrated History a/ the Royal the invention of the steam engine, the Navy, Salamander Books, London, 2000, p. 104. improvements in weaponry, and the ability to " Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The build vessels from iron and steel. History and Strategy of Maritime Empires, William The transition from sail to steam Morrow & Company Inc. New York. 1974. p. 9. dominated military thinking for almost a century ' ibid. and totally re-developed the warship as a Winton. .•//; Illustrated History of the Royal \civy. p. lighting machine. Steam transformed the 104. strategic influence and tactical mobility of ' James L. George, History of Warships: l-'roni maritime power. At first, traditions started in the Ancient Times to the Twenty-First Century, Naval days of sail inhibited rather than encouraged Institute Press. Annapolis, Maryland, 1998, p. 4. modernisation. The change was ultimately ' Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: /•'nun embraced, resulting in strong competition 2000B.C. to the Present. The Free Press, New York, between the major maritime powers over several 1989. p. 125. decades. The dominant navy of the transition Richard .1. Hill and Bryan Ranft. eds.. The ()\ford period was the RN, but lesser navies were Illustrated History of the Royal \avv. ()xtbrd occasionally first to develop new ideas. Britain University Press, Oxford, 1995. p. 16]. was never far behind because of its industrial The Industrial Revolution was a series of technological, economic, social and cultural changes strength, and the RN succeeded in building in Britain during the late 18Ih and early 19'1' some of the best examples of vessels based on Centuries, which transformed the nation from an the emerging technologies. agrarian to an industrial society. Q Few decisive battles were available to George, History of Warships, p. 3. test the performance of early steam platforms. Maritime power is a nation's capacity to project, Lqually, there was barely time to trial new sustain and apply effective military force at or from concepts before fresh ideas emerged. Methods the sea. This capability may also be referred to as sea of fighting war at sea were, to a certain extent, power. in a constant state of tlux. Sailing masts were Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear initially removed for reasons relating more to Age (SecondEdition). Macmillan Press. London, armament than to propulsion. The final 1984. pp. 2-3. 12 disappearance of sails was only made possible ibid. by the increasing reliability of machinery, and George. History of Warships, p. 1. 14 the availability of remote logistic stations. ibid..p. 274. 15 Almost every aspect of naval warfare was ibid. changed in the process of this transition. ibid., p. 48. r Ultimately, the shift from sail to steam Van Creveld, Technology ami War, p. 134. transformed the strategy of war at sea in five George, History of Warships, p. 50. 19 major ways, which encompassed the key Van Creveld, Technology and War, p. 134. capabilities of warships and the tactics of their "° George, History of Warships, p. 53. !l commanders in battle. The linkages between The Pax Britanniea lasted from 1815 to the these milestones in the maritime dimension and outbreak of World War I in 1914 During this time. the technological changes of the Industrial British warships policed international maritime trade and acted to suppress slavery. Despite attempts to Revolution created a fascinating chapter in the control international order through diplomacy, the history of the world's navies. underlying requirement for armed force helped to maintain competition between navies. Commander Mick Youseman joined the RAN George, History of Warships, p. 60. from the R.\ in /y

29 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \iunhcr

Winton. .•(/; Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game. Naval p. 104. Institute Press, Maryland, 1996, p. 166. The first warship propelled by a screw was the Van Creveld. Technology and War. p. 204. USS Princeton in 1X42. designed by the Swedish- 52" Winton• , An Illustrated History of the Royal \avy. American inventor John Ericsson. p. 104. x Andrew Lambert. "The Organi/ation of Navies". Cieorge. History of Warships, p. 74. in John Keegan. ed.. War at Sea in the Age of Sail The Virginia was formerly USS Merrinuick, a Ifi.W-lNiO, Casscll. London. 2000. p. 213. Unionist hybrid steam ship w ith full sailing rig. Rattler and Alecto were of identical si/.e. Mcrriniack was scuttled in US Navy Yard, Norfolk, George, History of Warships, p. 64. to avoid her capture by the Confederates, but the Winton. An Illustrated History of the Royal \avv. Confederates raised the ship and coin erted her to an p. 104. ironclad. " Britain and France went on to develop the world's 55 Humble, Before the Dreadnought, pp. 109-1 10. largest steam battle fleets of the period, although Virginia received 22 hits from Monitor, and steam was still \ icwed as an auxiliary means of Monitor received 20 hits from Virginia. I 'irginia also propulsion and most steam warships carried sail into made unsuccessful attempts to ram Monitor as the the IXXOs. ships circled each other for two hours. R. Humble, Before the Dreadnought: the Royal Despite the inconclusive result, the Monitor name Navy from Nelson to Fisher. Macdonald & Janes. was later given to a class of warships based on the London, 1976. p. 189. original. ^jj Van Creveld, Technology and War. p. 200. The concept of a gun turret is credited to Swedish ° Winton. An Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, American John Ericsson and Royal Navy Captain p. 104. Cowper Coles, both of whom suggested the idea in 6 Iron proved brittle, especially when cold. The the Crimean War. effect of iron on the magnetic compass resulted in George, History of If 'arships. p. 71. iron ships being confined largely to rivers, lakes and Ml ibid.. . .. channel crossings. 61 •ibid, . Larry H. Addington, The Pa/ferns of War Since the '" The effectiveness o! breech-loading weapons, with Eighteenth Century (SecondEdition). Indiana armour-piercing explosive shells, was later I'nivcrsity Press. Bloomington and Indianapolis. demonstrated by the Russians in the del'eal of the 19'M. p. 54. Turkish fleet at Sinope, Black Sea, in 1X53. The exploding shell was a French idea, proposed " George. History of II arships. p. 75. by Major Henri Paixhan in 1819. Hill and Ranft. The Oxford Illustrated History oj Humble. Before the Dreadnought, p. 52. the Royal Navy. p. 189. The English were offensively minded and usually Van Creveld, Technology and War. p. 203. chose to enter battle taking the 'weather gauge', with '" Humble. Before the Dreadnought, p. I 12. the wind at their backs. The defensively minded '"ibid., p. 10X. French usually took the 'lee gauge' with the wind in Richard Hill. War at Sea in the Ironclad Age. their faces, providing the option of escape if Cassell, London, 2000. pp. 105-107. necessary. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, p. 54. " N.A.M. Rodger. "Weather, Geography and Naval Power in the Age of Sail", The Journal of Strategic Studies. Vol 22. Nos. 23. June/September 1999. pp. 178-179. Naval blockades served to cut off a country's maritime commerce. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, p. 54. Van Creveld, Technology and War, p. 204. Van C'reveld, Technology and War, p. 204. Addington. The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, p. 54. i- Van Creveld, Technology and War, p. 133. Humble, Before the Dreadnought, p. 5 1.

Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 107 The Continued Utility of the ANZUS Treaty

By Commander Jonathan Mead, RAN

'Without any inhibition if tiny kind. 1 nnikc it serious dangers to world peace existing in the quite clear that Australia looks to America, free situation in Asia, it is also true that a Pacific of any pang* as to our trailitional links of defence pact could not take shape until present kinship \\'ith the United Kingdom.' internal conflicts in Asia were resolved.4 Prime Minister John Curtin, 29 December 1941' Notwithstanding US ambivalence towards Asia-Pacific engagement, the fluidity of "The Treaty j ANZUS I remains today the the international arena quickly forced foundation of a relationship that is one of our Washington to reappraise its policy. In great national assets.' particular. Mao Zedong's victory over Defence 2000 White Paper Nationalist forces in 1949 and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in 1950 galvanised American sentiment towards 'containing' F rom Curtin's wartime Labour government communism within the Asia-Pacific theatre. through to Howard's conservative government Washington viewed Japan as the linchpin in any of 2000, both political factions have highlighted containment strategy. Ironically, Australia's the importance of the Australia-US alliance. interpretation of the regional security Indeed, whilst the geo-strategie environment has environment was inimical to Washington's undergone cataclysmic changes throughout the interpretation - in that Menzies and Spender past 50 years the ANZUS alliance has been the both saw a rearmed Japan as a direct threat to bedrock from which Australia could formulate Australia's interests. Indeed, even Labour's its security polices around. Evatt expressed concern over Japan's The aim of this article is to examine the rearmament. In 1950, he stated that: ANZUS Treaty and specifically its influence vis / think it is c/ui/c fallacious to a vis Australia's naval interests. This paper will concentrate on Russia as the only commence with a brief history of the ANZUS possible aggressor in the t'aci/ic or alliance. This will lead into an examination of South East Asia. 1 ilo not believe that how the Treaty has influenced Australia's Japan will always he content to remain strategic and naval interests. Finally, this essay allied to those nations that were its chief will conclude with an investigation into the enemies in WWII: future of ANZUS. Consequently, Canberra wanted lo drag America into the Asian morass in order to deter Japanese History of ANZUS expansionism, whilst conversely, Washington Military alliances have been a recurring feature wanted to extend its influence into Asia in order of international relations.' The defeat of the to defend Japan from the Soviet Union. Japanese in 1945 and the supremacy of United Thus, Japan was the nucleus (though for States military power irrevocably altered the significantly differing reasons) for both the Asian balance of power. The demise of United States and Australia to entertain a Pacific European colonialism within the Asia-Pacific pact. President Truman declared on 10 January sphere left the United States as the sole 1951 that: dominant power within the region. In 1949, the // is the policy of the US Government United States along with its European allies ilial the US will commit substantial formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation armed force to the defense of the island (NATO) in response to a burgeoning Soviet chain of Japan... and in order to threat. Within Canberra, key policy makers implement this policy the US including, the Minister for External Affairs, Dr Government is willing to make a mutual Evatt, advocated for a similar Pacific pact. assistance arrangement among the However, the US Secretary of State, Dean Pacific Island nations (Australia and Achcson, articulated the reluctance of the US to New Zealand)." enter into such an arrangement. Acheson stated, Thus, a convergence of interests and perceptions inter alia, that 'while it is true that there are between Australia and the United States acted as

31 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \umher K>~ the eatalyst tor negotiations over a security in point. treaty. Subsequently, the negotiating process, Despite the nuances of the Treaty its which involved a certain degree of quid pro quo, 'value has been less in countering specific culminated uith the signing of the ANZUS threats than as a hedge against many possible (Australia. New Zealand and the United States) threats - put simply the alliance has been threat Treaty in Washington on 12 July 1951. The insensitive.'" As Norman Harper noted, 'to the principal elements of the Treaty are contained in United States the Treaty was designed as part of articles II. III. IV and V. Article II calls upon all a network of alliances to contain communism'. states to 'maintain and develop their individual Notwithstanding. the disparity in and collective capacity to resist armed attack'.s interpreting ANZUS, the Treaty has spawned a Importantly, Article III details provisions for mosaic of political and security fora. Indeed. mutual consultation in the event that any of the Australia's military alliance with the US has parties 'is threatened in the Pacific'." Under been branded by a 'rapidly expanding program Article III. consultation includes such of strategic cooperation, exchange training, joint parameters as instability and subversion. Finally, military exercises, arms procurement and articles IV and V refer to the geographical intelligence sharing'.15 At the forefront of this limitations of the Treaty. The vexing question of military alliance has been collaboration in the the limitations of the 'Pacific arena' has been arena of naval interests. the subject of much debate and speculation. Indeed, the actual boundaries of where AN/L'S ANZUS and Australia's Naval Interests - applies ha\e ne\er been decisively defined - Positive Impact though this ambiguity allows both states to Spawning from the ANZUS Treaty has been a interpret the Trcatv to their own advantage. host of security consultative fora. Defence Until 2001. the ANZUS Treaty had programs. Defence arrangements and multi- ne\er been activated - and ironically it was lateral'bilateral treaties. One of the more 1 Australia who activated it in defence" of the significant of these treaties was the Radford- United States. However, throughout its history Collins Naval Control of Shipping Agreement. there has been considerable angst over ANZUS From February 26-March 2 1951. the Australian obligations. Indonesia's claim over Dutch New Chief of Naval Staff. Vice Admiral Collins, and (iuinea was to provide the first test of these the US Commander in Chief Pacific ANZUS obligations. Men/.ies sought to gain US (CINCPAC), Admiral Arthur Radford. attended commitment towards Australia's stance over a conference at Pearl Harbour aimed at Dutch New (iuinea. However, the US was establishing a service level arrangement between reluctant to enter into the foray and instead the two commands in the sphere of maritime adopted a neutral perspective. Further, the security."' The conference concluded with the precise meaning of ANZUS came under extra following recommendations: scrutiny during Indonesia's confrontation • A boundary line was formed in the Pacific toward Malaysia. Canberra sought to obtain a for allocation of duties between the US. commitment from the US for Australian troops Australian and New Zealand with respect to stationed along the Borneo border. Again the US naval escort, convoy routing, diversion of was reluctant to narrow the provisions of the traffic, reconnaissance, local defense. ASW ANZUS and instead left the vagueness of the and search and rescue. Treaty stand. • Liaison and coordination between President Nixon's celebrated Guam 11 CINCPAC and Australia and New Zealand Doctrine of 1969 further confused and indeed was to be developed this included disturbed Australia. No longer could Australia exchange of officers. accept the premise that the US would intervene • Coordination and information exchange in a conflict emanating in South Hast Asia - between CINCPAC and ANZAM though an attack on Australian soil would still (Australia-New Zealand-Malaya) over naval invoke the ANZUS Treaty. Thus, America's control of shipping was to be established. attitude towards its ANZUS obligations has • Reconnaissance, in particular ASW was to been characterised by ambiguity, generality and be a key objective of the parties. self-serving interests.12 Conversely. Australia • Search and Rescue responsibilities within has been quick to support US interests - the confines of the delineated area were Australia's commitment to Vietnam being a ease

Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 107

defined. benefits that flowed out of Radford-Collins, the • Synergy of communications was to be agreement itself is particularly vague. developed. 17 Specifically, no naval missions per se, were assigned to Australia.2* This accorded with the Importantly, the agreement allowed for direct fluid nature of ANZUS and allowed each Navy bilateral Naval planning under the ANZLJS the ability to respond to a diverse array of Treaty's. Whilst ANZLJS was unique in that it contingencies. established a military alliance between three In summary the positive aspects of both states without a common security threat, ANZUS and the Radford-Collins arrangement Radford-Collins was framed to delineate are: specific 'areas of maritime responsibility'.14 The • Australia's sense of security within the ANZLJS navies were directed to provide region has been enhanced. reconnaissance and surveillance of their • ANZUS acts as a deterrent to possible respective areas. Under Admiral GorshkovV" aggressors. reinvigoration of the Soviet Navy and in • The RAN has received preferential access to particular with the burgeoning rise of its naval intelligence. submarine arm, Australia and the United States • Interoperability between the two navies has focused their resources on Anti Submarine been enhanced. Warfare (ASW). To support Australia's ASW • Opportunities to train and exercise with the efforts the United States assisted the RAN's USN has been increased. development of the Ikara ASW weapons system. • The RAN has received access to USN Mulloka sonar, and Barra sonobuoy." Further, equipment and technology. both navies established an environmental data • The RAN's standing within the region has center in Guam." been improved. As an adjunct to Radford Collins, the • The Treaty has contributed to the stability of RAN formulated contingency plans for the the region. protection of Allied naval shipping in the Pacific • ANZUS and Radford Collins have kept a - primarily in response to the Soviet Union's permanent USN presence w the submarine threat. region. Cascading from Radford-Collins was the development of a series of maritime exercises aimed to increase naval ANZUS and Australia's Naval Interests - interoperability. In the 1970s, a series of Naval Negative Impact Control of Shipping (NC'S) exercises code- Notwithstanding the litany of positives arising named Ripcord"' and Roller Coaster4 were out of ANZUS and Radford Collins there remain established. These exercises subsequently lead some negatives. Fundamentally, critics of to the development of the Bell Buoy exercise ANZUS claim that Australia may become series."^ The jewel of naval cooperation is the embroiled in a conflict not of its choosing. RIMPAC exercise which is held biennially off However, this argument is political in nature and Hawaii."'1 has little relevance to the RAN per se. More In 1%6, Australia joined the AUS- subtly, there are some negative aspects that do CAN-UK.-US Naval communication affect the RAN. The RAN's dependence on US organisation. Further, the joint RAN-l'SN sourced material makes it a 'hostage of USN Harold H Holt naval communication base at logistics'. Resupply of vital naval equipment is North West Cape is another manifestation of reliant on American supply lines. Thus, the Radford Collins arrangements. Naval material RAN cannot support but any of the most minor standardisation through the Australia. Britain. of operations without US assistance. This dilemma is contradictory to the ADF's Policy of Canada, and United States (ABCA) 1 Quadripartite program has seen cooperative 'self-reliance' '. naval logistic programs aimed to support both Another criticism leveled at Radford- the RAN and the USN. In 1977, RAN officers Collins was Australia's disproportionate were appointed to the USN Pacific Intelligence Defence funding on ASW. to the detriment of Center in Hawaii as a forerunner for intelligence other force development areas. This funding had sharing arrangements." its genesis through a fear that Soviet submarines However, despite the multitude of would interdict Allied shipping in the South

Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \ 11 in her 10'

Pacific. However, as Professor Ball noted in testimony to the impact that ANZUS has made 19X2, the validity of this threat was dubious and to both the Australia and New Zealand Navies. problematic.0 During the 1970s the Whitlam government sought to reuddress this deficiency The l-utureof ANZUS by 'developing a well balanced licet which had This article has already concluded that ANZUS capabilities in all facets of naval operations'." has served Australia's naval interests well over Finally, the ever-increasing costs of the past 50 years. However, the question maintaining parity with the USN in order to remains - will it continue to do? achieve interoperability has had a detrimental impact toward RAN long term force structure. Strategic interests In summary, the negative aspects of During the early 1990s the decline of ideological both ANZUS and the Rndford-Collms bipolarity coupled with a more stable balance of arrangement are: power and an improvement in Australia's • The RAN is dependent on US sourced strategic environment led commentators to material. reappraise the value of ANZUS."' However, as • Australia's policy of sell reliance is the events of Fast Timor in 1999 and 1 1 problematic. September 2001 graphically highlighted, the • RAN force structure can become 'warped'. Asia Pacific region is characterised by volatility, • C'ost distortions arising out a desire to unpredictability and instability. source USN technology effectively squeezes Adding to the morass of regional the RAN's budget/4 ^ instability is Chinese ambiguity. Robyn Urn. of the Hiroshima Shudo University, commented AN/I S and Australia's Naval Interests that 'China is the great beneficiary of the wav Regardless of the virtues of the ANZUS Treaty the C'old War ended, it is pointing east and south two significant issues emerge. Firstly, the strategically.' alliance is threat insensitive and secondly the ANZUS offers Australia the same lh alliance has typically meant more for Canberra insurance policy as it did during the 20 century than it has for Washington, Appraising - protection against invasion by a belligerent whether the Treaty has been a useful power. Further, as the USA's new strategic arrangement for Australia's Naval interests over doctrine of pre-emptive attack"" illustrates, the last 50 years is subjective. Undoubtedly, the Australia can ill-afford to be complacent with RAN has benefited from the host of spin offs respect to rogue states. The proliferation of that the alliance has produced. Opponents Weapons of Mass Destruction within the region suggest that it has made the RAN less self poses considerable strategic risk to Australia. reliant and critically dependent on US supply Admiral Chris Barrie. the Chief of the arrangements. However, a more objective Australia Defence Force, commented in June method of assessing the value of ANZUS to the 2001. that 'the horizontal proliferation of RAN can he made by examining the missiles is a dangerous development, which is in ramifications to the Royal New Zealand Navy no country's interest and which needs to be (RNZN) since its de jure termination of the discouraged as much as possible'.''' agreement in August 19X6. Consequently, ANZUS provides Australia with After 19S6. the RNZN was effectively a formidable ally to deter and if need be combat 'fro/en" out of l;SN information sharing, a bellicose state or organisation through the 2P' intelligence exchange, weapon sales, Century. Whilst no security agreement can communications access and participation in provide absolute protection against all exercises. I he nel result to the RN/.N has been a eventualities, ANZUS nevertheless, endows linear decline in its interoperability not only Australia with an instrument to respond to crisis with the USN but also with other allied navies situations and indeed its mere existence may including the Royal Navy, the Canadian Navy stymie some adverse circumstances from and the RAN. Further. the RNZN's developing. technological parity with other regional navies, As the Joint Committee on Foreign its proficiency in general maritime operations Affairs and Trade concluded in 1982, breaking and its 'awareness' of regional activities have all up AN/US would 'be counter productive not been significantly affected. only to Australia's long term security but the 411 Thus, the RNZN experience is stability of the reuion as a whole'. Further.

34 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 107

Admiral Barrio noted in 2001 that 'the United 'maintain their capabilities'.4'1 The Tandem States must remain fully engaged in the region, Thrust series of exercise between the RAN and it is a stabilising and reassuring presence at a USN held bi annually in the Shoalwater Bay time of complexity and unpredicability'.41 In training area are the largest combined and joint 2001, the Australian Minister for Defence, Peter exercises held in Australia. These exercises Roith stated that 'I would argue that ANZUS has afford the RAN the opportunity to be always been more about the security of the interoperable with the USN. This region than about the direct defence of interoperability has best been achieved through Australia'.42 'commonality of equipment'."" In addition to Infidels of ANZUS often cite that the these training programs is the burden sharing of Treaty no longer reflects Australia's national intelligence which provides the RAN with interests, nor, that it is relevant in the prevailing regional strategic awareness. geo-strategie environment. Indeed, in 1980, If Australia were to cede from the Professor Joseph Camilleri stated that: alliance, its regional technical edge would be .1 policy of the status quo [ANZUS] quickly lost.51 Coral Bell noted that without the appears doomed to failure. There is US alliance Australia would have to quadruple certainly no prospect that in the years its defense spending in order to "maintain its ahead relations with the United Sates strategic environment.0 ir/// continue to o/)crnle in the same Notwithstanding the diverse benefits fashion as in the period of undisputed that ANZUS offers for Australia's future American dominance.^ maritime interests, there are some drawbacks in However, ANZUS is focused on shared interests rigidly adhering to the alliance. Firstly, ANZUS and not threats per so. in addition, as the events risks alienating regional states that have inimical post II September 2001 illustrated, ANZUS political, cultural, economic or security interests provides Australia and the region with a to that of the United States. For example, the strategic insurance policy. Gary Brown recent US hard-line stance against Islamic Iraq summarised this salient aspect when he threatens to undermine Australia's favourable concluded that 'a break up of the alliance would stance with its regional neighbours. As the Joint remove a vital piece of the regional security Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, framework'. Defence and Trade concluded in 1997. 'balance It is important to highlight that the and sensitivity are especially necessary with validity of ANZUS does not need to atrophy in respect to Australia's efforts to commit the US the absence of a clearly defined threat. Rather, it to the region.'" is the congruency of strategic interests between Secondly, adherence to the alliance can Australia and the United States, which validates be cost prohibitive. The 2Is1 Century will see the ANZUS.4" As Lini noted 'cross bracing the US Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) combine alliance system based on the maritime society new applications of technologies, new needs of all parties is the best way to encourage operational concepts and military doctrines in a the evolution of a peaceful and prosperous East way that will require substantial funding" . Thus, Asia'.4" aligning with the USN and attempting to maintain interoperability will be a costly Naval interests process. ANZUS affords the RAN access to technology, Finally, the rationale and legitimacy of which is critical lor its future commitments. the Radford Collins agreement is now Peter Reith underscored this sentiment in 2001 questionable. Indeed, tenets including ASW by stating that the RAN was 'dependant on the and reconnaissance56 focused toward the 'Soviet technology access and scientific cooperation threat' are now indisputably obsolete. Hence, provided by the US alliance.'47 Reith further from a maritime perspective persisting with concluded that alliance arrangements give ANZUS and Radford Collins could be viewed as 'Australia even better access to US military inimical to the prevailing strategic environment. technology which gives us a vital edge in However, Radford Collins represents far more capability and operations.'4' than the general edict of the agreement. In For the foreseeable future ANZUS will particular, it represents a commitment for provide the RAN the ability to conduct bilateral engagement by both navies. Consequently, exercise and training programs in order to assert iim that Radford Collins is archaic, is an

SHminer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number I0~ insufficient reason to dismiss the agreement. Treaty will continue to offer technological, In summary, the future of ANZUS is an economic, and operational remuneration. amalgam of strategic, economic, operational, technological and security issues. These issues About the' Author arc: Commander Jonathan Mead joined the RANC in • It offers Australia an insurance policy 1984 as a Seaman Officer. After graduating in against a rising China and a proliferation of 19X6 lie completed a number of sea postings threats from rogue states and organisations. he/ore undertaking I he Mine Warfare and • It ensures that the US remains committed to Clearance Diving Officer Course in 1990. the region thus maintaining regional CMDR Mead served as Executive Officer of stability. Clearance Diving Team One from 1991-92. • It \\ill continue to allow the RAN access to h'rom 1993-94. lie undertook the PWO Course. privileged technological information and specialising in ASW. CMDR Mead served as the intelligence. ASW officer onboard HMA Ships Melbourne • It allows the RAN to be interoperable with and Arunta, before fulfilling the duties as the the USN. Fleet ASW Officer in 201)0. In 2001. C.l//)/\' • ANZUS will provide the RAN a forum from Mead was posted as F. \ccuti\ e officer <>t. \runtii. uhich it can conduct bilateral exercises. he/ore undergoing staff and command training • Ceding from ANZUS could result in the at ACSC in 2002. CMDR Mead is currently Australian government having to commit serving as the Staff Officer to the ('hiefoj'Navy. substantial more funds for regional stability. • ANZUS has the potential of alienating J.H. Moore. The American Alliance: Australia. New regional states, primarily resulting from a Zealand and the L'nitcd States 1940-1970. Cassell. suspicion of US foreign policy. Melbourne. 1470. p. 44. • The RMA has the potential of 'blou ing out" ~ Department of Del'ence, Defence 2000: Our Future the RAN's budget. Defence Force, AGPS, Canberra, 2000, p. 34. J Camilleri, ANZUS Australia's Predicament in the Conclusion Nuclear Age, Westview Press, Colorado, 1987. p. xi. The longev ity of ANZUS is indicative of the ibid, p. 3. importance that both Australia and the US have Moore, The American Alliance: Australia, New placed on their bilateral relationship. The Zealand and the United States 1940-1970. p. 73. dynamics of the relationship have been diverse 6 Foreign Relations of the United States 1951. Yol and complex. Yet. the security treaty per se has VI: Asia and the Pacific. Washington US almost been overtaken by a host of other Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 137. economic, political, military and diplomatic Camilleri, ANZUS Australia's Predicament in the accords. Nuclear Age. p. 5. AN/I S has been a defining instrument ibid p. 7. for Australia's naval interests. Notwithstanding " ibid. the arguments cited against the validity of " The Military objectives of ANZUS were: to deter aggression and other threats to ANZUS interests by ANZUS there is no disputing the impact it has maintaining and exercising military forces: and if had on the development and proficiency of deterrence fails to conduct ANZUS operations to Australia's Navy. In particular, the alliance has secure the threatened area and contain the aggression facilitated the exchange of naval personnel, defeat the enemy liberate enemy occupied territory; intelligence sharing, technological and deter future aggression. advancements, maritime training and overall On 25 July 1969 President Nixon outlined a new military proficiency. US foreign policy in Guam, known as the 'New The future of ANZUS is often Strategy for Peace". It's premise was that US foreign questioned. Critics of the alliance contend that it priorities were to be focused around luirope rather is no longer relevant in the prevailing geo than Asia. N Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend. University of Queensland Press. 1987, p. 333. strategic environment. Yet. it is the very fluidity 12 and dynamism of the strategic environment that ibid. p. 13. entrenches its future. From a strategic Gary Brown and Laura Rayner, Upside. Downside: ANZUS After So Years, Current Issues Brief 3 2001- perspective it offers Australia security and 02, Parliamentary Library. Canberra. August 2001. regional stability. From a naval perspective the wvvvv.aph.uov.au/librarv/Pubs/CIB/2001-

36 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute A ii mher 107

02/()2eih()3.htm 3S Sydney Morning Herald. 28 September 2002, p.20. Harper, A Great and Power Friend, p. 346. C Barrie, 'Strategic Implications of New 13 ibid. p. 16. Technologies in the Asia Pacific' ANZUS I6T.D. Young. 'AN/US Naval Relations: 1951-85' Anniversarv Conference on the United Slates in an in Goldrick. Frame and Jones. Reflections on the East Asian Context, University of Sydney, 30 June Royal Australian Navy. Canberra, 1991, p. 298. 2001. 17 US Department of State, ANZUS Council ' Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, Preparations - Background Paper, Honolulu, August The ANZUS alliance: Australia United States 1952. Relations. AGPS, Canberra. 1982. p. 84. I X T.I). Young. The Radford-Collins Naval Control of Barrie, Strategic Implications of New Shipping Agreement. The Graduate Institute of Technologies in the Asia Pacific. International Relations University of Geneva, ~ wwAv.australianpolities.com.au/Toreign an/us 01 - Geneva. 1985. p. 3. 0630reith.shtml. dated 20 August 2002 '"ibid. p. 300. 43 Camilleri, Australian-American Relations: The " In 1955 USSR Premier Kruschev appointed web of dependence, p. 146. Admiral Gorshkov as Admiral of the Soviet Fleet. *4 ibid, p. 2 1 His charter was to match and surpass the US in Lim. maritime supremacy. As part of his modernisation 46 ibid., . program Gorshkov embarked upon a massive v\ ww.australianpolitics.com.au foreign an/us 0 1 - submarine construction agenda. For further details of 06-3()reith.shtml, dated 28 August 2002. Gorshkov's plan see: D Chipman, 'Admiral 48 ibid•, • ,. Gorshkov and the Soviet Navy' Air University 49 ., ibid. Review. July-August 1982. and H Germain. The Priestnall. ' ANZUS and the Radford Collins Evolution of the Soviet Navv, US Army Russian Agreement: Australia's naval mission' p. 50. Institute. Germany. 1979. M wwvv.aph.gov.au/library pubs C'lB 2001- '!".[). Young, The Radford-Collins Naval Control of 02/02cib03.htm dated 2 September 2002 Shipping Agreement, p. 302. "ibid, p. 21 :: ibid. Xl Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs " www.global seeurity.org/militray/ops/bell- Defence and Trade, September, ANZUS After 45 buoy.htm. 30 August 2002. Years Seminar Proceedings 11-12 August 1997, :4 ibid AGPS. Canberra, 1997. p. 245. "^ ibid M Barrie. Strategic Implications of New :" ibid :7 Technologies in the Asia Pacific. T.D. Young. 'AN/US Naval Relations: 1951-85'p. Gary Brown and Laura Rayner. Upside. Downside. 305. ANZUS After 5o Years. :s G Priestnall. ' ANZUS and the Radford Collins 56 ibid Agreement: Australia's naval mission' Journal of the Australian Naval Institute. January/March 1997, p. 51. " www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2001- 02/02cib03.htm. dated 25 August 2002. 30 Young, ' ANZUS Naval Relations: 1951-85' p. 310. " Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, p. 36. '" Young, The Radford-Collins Naval ('ontrol of Shipping Agreement, p. 3. " Department of Defence, Defence Report 1973. AGPS, Canberra, 1973. p. \(). www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/ClB/2001- 02/02cib03.htin. dated 25 August 2002. '5 ibid, p 20. ''' .1 C'amilleri. Australian-American Relations: The wch of dependence, Macmillan, Melbourne. 1980, p. 146. R Lim, WAV AV.gloeomnet.or.jp/okazaki- inst/robyn.ausmari.htmI, dated 30 August 2002.

37 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \iiin her 10'

Extended Operations in Estuarine Waters - Life in the North Arabian Gulf

By Captain Ray Griggs, CSC, RAN

icd vessels to ply their trade and the Irl anv thanks to phenomenon of coordinated mass dhou ,/errv Liilliii for breakouts has kept the MIO team extremely last edition \s busy. The main operating area is no more than article on the Fly River, it was great to get 100 square miles with much of this area unsafe some in/>i/l inn! I must in/mil it eased the for navigation given the plethora of wrecks and pressure on me producing another article mid- shoal water that exists. In these waters the deplovment. If there is anvone else out there conduct of safe navigation is the cornerstone with similar articles (long or short) I would for successful operations, every cable of sail- appreciate hearing from von. water is invaluable and one's navigational situational awareness simply has to be top In this edition I thought I might offer a short notch. piece on life in the Northern Arabian Gulf (or the NAG as it affectionately known). I ha\c T based this article on my own experiences from HMAS Anmta's Operation SLIPPER deployment in the second half of 2002. I have draun primarily on information that is available in the public domain so as not to compromise security gi\en that \\e ha\e ships still committed to the task.

An Anintu Hoarding Part) conducting an alongside query with the ship keeping a close eye on proceedings

The sanctions enforcement mission in the NAG is fairly straightforward: intercept, and board as required, inbound and outbound traffic from Iraq to ensure that United Nations sanctions are not being \iolated. This is triiiitd (in thi- prowl with IHT four Rigid effected with three types of boardings: the Mull lull.liable Boats (Kllllisi: Roy, IK. Compliant Boarding, where the crew obviously I also and ( cdric complies uith instructions to do so. a Resolution 986 boarding, a very structured and While conducting Maritime Interception detailed search of a vessel, and the often more Operations (MIO) in the NAG is nothing new complex Non-Compliant Hoarding (\CM). I'hc to the RAN (we have been doing it for over 11 RAN provides a unique capability, as it is the years), the past few months have seen some only navy whose ship's companies are trained subtle changes. Our ships ha\e been pushing and permitted to conduct all three types of further north, closer to the Iraqi coast and boardings. Boarding parties can he inserted essential!) operating for extended periods in either by RHIB or helicopter fast rope uith confined estuarine waters. The smugglers have boarding teams often operating at extended increasing!) used motor dhows as well as steel range from the ship. The bulk of the compliant

Slimmer 2001 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \nmher Iff and non-compliant boardings are conducted up have to handle: close to or inside Iraqi territorial sea while the Resolution 986 boardings arc normally a. running a patrol line with 3 minute fixing; conducted at the UN inspection point called b. launch, recover and maintain C'OMISKKY. Boardings arc conducted on a communications with multiple RIIIBS; range of vessels from 400-500 tonne dhows to c. conduct VHP radio queries with vessels to 300,000 tonne plus supertankers. ascertain whether they need to be boarded: d. launch and recover the aircraft: e. make constant course and speed alterations to avoid shipping and large numbers of fishing nets by the distances designated by command; f. routinely work with underkeel clearances of 2-3 metres; g. maintain stationary positions in up to 2.5- 3 knots of tidal stream; h. maintain constant tactical awareness The Boarding Party inspecting an oil particularly for potential surface, air and smuggler's tanks. Also visible is the missile threat; and pumping set up to transfer the oil. i. maintain appropriate engineering state dependent on tactical situation. While the mission may be straightforward, these sorts of operations demand an extremely While traditional in-company time was limited, high quality surface picture in what is a very this was more than compensated for by the busy patch of water. On any given day our requirement to manage at least 5-6 of these ships are operating in close proximity to 150- tasks simultaneously and often for the vast 200 tlshing dhows and trawlers (of varying majority or all of the watch. There is no doubt sizes), 20-30 inbound and outbound legitimate that the OOW certainly knew that he or she merchant vessels, 40-50 vessels plying the Iran had been 'working' by the end of the watch. to Kuwait trading route, 20 anchored merchant In Ariiiiln. with up to 4 RIIIBS 'feet vessels awaiting an alongside berth and wet' simultaneously, the tempo on the bridge anything up to 40 smugglers a day attempting was often hectic, particularly during the mass to run the blockade. Add in operating breakouts that were a feature of Aruntu's temperatures of up to 50°C, poor visibility due deployment. For the OOW. orchestrating the to heat ha/e or dust storms, some foreign simultaneous communications flow from four military vessels and the ever-present threat of boarding parties to the Operations Room added an asymmetric terrorist attack and you had all another layer of complexity. Because of the the ingredients for an interesting day at the sheer size of some of these breakouts (up to 30 office. vessels at a time) the ship itself often needed to While the focus was primarily on become part of the action and be manoeuvred illegal activity, one of the important aspects of our work was to ensure that our UN operations did not interfere with legitimate local traffic going about its business. As such it was important then for the bridge. Gun Direction Platform (GDP) and Operations Room teams to quickly come to understand what the patterns of normalcy were. One of the great advantages of the high traffic densities and the tight navigational constraints was that the Officers of the Watch (OOW) gained a wealth of experience in A typical cargo dhow that would carry 400- managing multiple activities. In a normal 700 tonnes of illegal oil. The larger dhows watch the OOW could reasonably expect to could carry in excess of 1000 tonnes.

39 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \umber 10' at close quarters into the path of recalcitrant ask a 300.000 tonne VLCC tanker inbound for vessels to ensure compliance. the Mina Al Bakr oil terminal with about eight Ship positioning was always a trade metres of underwater paint showing \\hat off between available safe water, traffic cargo they are carrying! liven knowledge of densities (particularly fishing fleets and nets) basic information regarding the key flags and and being able to best support deployed ports of registry proved useful. Melbourne and boarding teams. This often meant very small, Amniii conducted some 1400 \'I1I; or constrained areas for the OOW to work in and alongside (from the RHIB) queries during their required constant attention to detail with deployment and many a time, not quite truthful passing traffic and not insignificant tidal information was passed back. As the streams to contend with. information collected was often the basis upon The Navigating Officer was kept busy which boarding decisions were made, the investigating shoals and Position Approximate bridge teams needed to be alert to known Hag (PA) wrecks. Whenever he could get a RillII of convenience states and unusual flag and port he would conduct mini surveys around key of registry combinations. One enterprising areas of interest using hand-held GPS and the young officer taught himself enough Farsi and relatively new hand-held echo sounders. These Arabic to conduct queries in both languages, torch like echo sounders are a real boon and this made an enormous difference in the ship's certainly reduced the setup time compared to ability to effectively query passing traffic and, the old 'portable' boat echo sounders. I found of course, to the amount of time he spent on the clarification of the position of PA wrecks the bridge! of particular value as it significantly increased the amount of useable water. The spot checking of key shoals and banks also increased my confidence in the survey. That said, a deal of prudence still needed to be exercised particularly as we watched the Iraqi harbour authorities raise a large unchartered cement barge that had sunk a number of years ago. \a\igational buoys \\ere numerous in number but invariably unlit and posed a constant hazard for boat crews at night. The Endeavour navigator electronic Amnta and H.MS Argyll taking time out to raster chart system (installed on a laptop) was keep some core mariner skills current. another invaluable piece of kit. It was (Photo ABPH Barclay-Jeffs) generally used as a command tool as I was always keen that the OOW maintain terrestrial Working International Maritime Mobile VHP fixing as the primary method. To have the in the Gulf is notoriously difficult; with electronic chart and ship's position available Anomalous Propagation exaggerating what is on the bridge. Operations Room and CO's day an already crowded band. It was tough enough cabin meant I uasii't tied to one spot and that I getting the right vessel to answer on Channel could lead some semblance of a normal life. 16 let alone trying to establish a working Again one had to resist the temptation of channel, particularly when there was more than becoming overly reliant on the tool. I have no the odd incidence of anti-western sledging on doubt that the OOWs prayed regularly for a the circuit. The noise that the cluttered VI IF corrupt hard drive on the laptop to rob me of band induced on the bridge also took some what 1 am sure they considered to be 'far too getting used to; monitoring VHP was essential much information'. so turning down the volume was not an option. The bridge team's understanding of In company activity was limited due to merchant shipping increased exponentially. the high operational tempo but every Reports became far more specific than 'I have opportunity was seized with fellow RAN or a large merchant vessel at Red 30' as the coalition ships to maintain important mariner OOWs improved their merchant vessel and warfare skills. Arunta was able to interact recognition skills. This was useful as it is with a number of ships including a most always good for one's credibility if you don't valuable two day Passage Exercise with HMS

40 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Number 107

Argyll whilst enroutc to a port visit The unique combination of an intense tempo Replenishment ot" course provided set by a relentless and determined group of regular interaction with other units. The smugglers, a tense strategic and tactical particular challenge in the NAG was the depth overlay and difficult navigational and of water and close attention had to be paid to environmental conditions made the task an potential interaction effects. It was however a extremely challenging one. 1-ach rotation to the great opportunity to replenish from USN, RN, Gulf has been quite different, as the dynamics Canadian and Spanish tankers and to keep the of the situation have continued to evolve; we seamanship skills honed. were fortunate to be there during an extraordinary period of activity where the ship's boarding teams conducted 377 boardings and played a key role in all but shutting down the maritime smuggling into and out of Iraq. Much of our ability to do that however was due to the cumulative effect of the entire MIO operation and in particular the unrelenting pressure that coalition navies have applied in the last 1 X months.

The author keeps an eye on replenishment with USNS John Kricsson. Arunta's helo is about to collect another VERTREP load as USS Mobile Kay makes her approach.

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41 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute A ii in her 10"

BOOK REVIEWS

Lost Subs: From the Hunley to the Kursk. The Greatest Submarines Ever Lost - and Found by Spencer Dunmore (u ith an introduction by Robert Mallard) Allen and Unwin Hardcover, 171 pages, index. RRP $49.95

Spencer Dunmore has written previously on submarine history (/;; Great Waters) as well as co-operating with Robert Ballard on Exploring the Lusitania. Ballard's influence on this book is particularly evident: the style and format arc similar to his pictorial books on famous ships, which he has located, including Titanic, Bismarck and Lusitiinia.

For this book Dunmore joins with Ballard to produce a superbly illustrated volume which will enhance any naval collection, particularly if one has an interest in submarines or marine archaeology.

In Lost Sn/is Dunmore combines naval history with recent underwater photographs and diagrams of lost submarines to provide a valuable record of a fascinating subject. He does not draw on primary resources and many of his secondary authorities are similar pictorial-type publications, lie also utilises the internet, which is becoming more widely used as a source of information, particularly when researching recent events such as the sinking of the Kursk.

The first three chapters deal with the creation and early development of the submarine, looking at the Turtle and lesser-known examples of early submersibles. The Confederate submarine /fiin/ev is a focal point of this chapter. The reader is given an insight into the recent salvaging of the vessel, and illustrations, photographs and diagrams are well combined to tell a fascinating story. The story of the Hunley has been told before, but here we can follow the story of the salvage operation, which exposed the human aspect of a vessel lost for over 130 years. Other early submarines dealt with include Holland I. which represented the first class of submarine produced in significant numbers. Photographs of Holland I during and after salvage once again link past and present.

Chapter four covers the First World War, and Dunmore shifts focus towards victims of submarine warfare as well as the perpetrators of sinkings. He uses material from Ballard's Exploring the l.nsiiania. including some of Ken Marschall's excellent illustrations. Of particular interest is the account of the Australian submarine AE II. Although Fred and Elizabeth Brenchley's book Stoker's Submarine tells the story of its operation in the Dardanelles, the exploits are still not well known. Dunmore dedicates only four pages to AE II. but the photographs of the wreck prov ide a fascinating insight into one of Australia's first submarines.

Early examples of submarine rescue are the focus of chapter five. Dunmore looks at the successful rescue of 24 survivors from the USS Sana/us, and contrasts this with the tragic sinking of HMS Thetis u ith the loss of 99 men. These cases prov ide a useful introduction to the rescue attempt on the Kursk. cov ered in a later chapter.

No account of lost submarines would be complete without reference to at least one of the 780 German U-boats lost during the Second World War. Dunmore looks at several lesser-known U-boats lost off

42 S ii miner 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute lumber 107 the US coast, and poignant photographs of U352 provide a sobering reminder of the human cost of submarine disaster. Although several pages are dedicated to US submarines, it is unfortunate that Dunmore was not able to access official Japanese photographs of the famous USS Wahoo. The Japanese submarine 152, sunk by Allied aircraft off France in 1944, is also included. This submarine was found by an expedition in 1998, which was hoping to find gold. Hvidence of treasure being carried on this submarine is unreliable, however, and none was found, but the expedition's contribution to submarine history is significant.

The loss of two nuclear submarines of the US Navy has long fascinated modern submariners. The sudden and catastrophic nature of their loss with all hands highlights the significant risk associated with undersea operations. Robert Ballard undertook expeditions in the 1980s to photograph both the USS Thresher and the USS Scorpion while looking for Titanic. Some of the photographs taken are included in Dunmore's book and once again provide a sobering reminder of what can happen when things go wrong beneath great waters.

Chapter eight covers the loss of the Kursk. The recent book A Time to Die: The Kursk Disaster by Robert Moore is a more comprehensive study, but Dunmore's coverage of the salvage operation highlights what an impressive engineering feat it was to raise an I S.OOO ton submarine.

Lost Suits is a fascinating read and highly recommended. The strength of this book is not its historical content but the way it combines history with marine archeology, supported by superb illustrations, in telling compelling stories. The selection of case studies is excellent, covering early submarines right through to those of today. Readers wanting a comprehensive historical account of submarine operations and disasters may wish to supplement this book with others, but those seeking entertainment and information about historically significant lost submarines need look no further.

Reviewed hv Lieutenant Matthew Hoffman. RAN Don rt Tell the Prime Minister by Patrick Wei lei- Scribe Short Books Paperback, vii & 104pp. RRP SI4.95

This short book on the 'children overboard' affair should interest many readers, particularly members of the naval community who would like some analysis of what happened in Canberra during the episode, as well as £i serious students of Australian politics and public policy. Patrick Weller is well qualified to analyse Government handling of the affair. He is professor of polities and public policy at Griffith University and has published numerous books and articles on public administration in Australia. He was an expert witness at the Senate inquiry into 'A Certain Maritime IneideiA'.

Weller concludes that a lot went wrong in Canberra during the 'children overboard' affair. Political- military relations went astray and some normal conventions and traditions of Government accountability went 'out the window'. Most importantly, the public should not have been misled. The Prime Minister's own ministerial code stipulates that misleading statements should be corrected as soon as they are known to be wrong. Clearly this did not occur during the 'children overboard' affair and according to evidence now well established, the then Minister for Defence and his staff were particularly culpable. The ends appear to have justified the means.

The Prime Minister has claimed throughout that he did not know that reports of children being thrown overboard were incorrect. The title of this book suggests that he was protected from the truth. As

43 Summer 2003 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute \iiinbcr 10"

\Veller points out. there were people all around him who knew that the reports were incorrect. Senior Government officials recoiled from the truth to allow Ministers to maintain their political positions.

Weller draus attention to the 'ever-useful fiction' that 'formal advice' is required before Ministers will respond. Oral briefings, written comments and warnings at meetings do not constitute formal briefing. Officials may have protected the (iovernment during the affair, including by not offering formal advice, but in the case of the senior military officers involved, it dragged them into a politically partisan situation.

The current Minister for Defence has acknowledged problems of communication within his portfolio during the 'children overboard' affair. Emails and mobile phones have created unofficial and informal channels of communication, which can run ahead of formal channels. As Weller claims, the phone call between Commander Banks in I l\l AS . [delaide and Brigadier Silverstone in Darwin is the onl\ source of the myth that children were thrown overboard. As in a game of Chinese whispers, the story was passed on to Defence Headquarters in Canberra and then to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. It was sei/ed upon by political spin doctors and manipulated to unconscionable political advantage.

What can be done about this sort of situation? It is inevitable that in a highly charged atmosphere, bureaucrats and ministerial staff will seek information from the operational level on uhich to base ad\ ice to their Ministers. Mobile phones are readily at hand, but for officers at the coal face phone calls can be highly distracting. The same might be said within the Defence Force about phone calls from higher up the operational chain of command. Hopefully, protocols and procedures are no\\ in place to ensure that similar problems do not arise in the future.

Military officers seem to have been left behind in the heavily politicised environment of the 'children overboard' affair: an environment largely created by aggressive, 'shoot from the hip' bureaucrats and staffers. Subsequently such people were not held accountable and some have even been promoted. Weller argues strongly that reforms are needed to make ministerial staff accountable so as to restore confidence in the senior levels of the bureaucracy. The same might be said about the state of political- military relations. These have been the subject of an article by Hugh Smith dealing with the "children overboard" affair and the subsequent Senate inquiry ('A Certain Maritime Incident and Political- Military Relations'. Quadrant, June 2002. pp. 38-43). This article is highly recommended along vv ilh l~)on't Tell the Prime Minister.

At the end of his book. Weller makes reference to Winston Churchill. Although 'always partisan, blithely opportunistic, and often cynica\\ Churchill was prepared to take responsibility. When told of the loss of Singapore and the demonstrable weakness of its defences, he is said to have commented: 7 did not know. I was not tola. I should have asked.

Reviewed hv /)/• Sam Bateman. University of'Wollongong

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