The Dabhol Power Project Settlement What Happened? and How?

Kenneth Hansen, Robert C. O’Sullivan and W. Geoffrey Anderson

y late 2001, the $2.9 billion Dabhol Execution of the PPA followed in assumed that these payments consisted of Bpower project had become, for the December 1993. MSEB’s payment little more than bribes to procure official second time, a leading international obligations were guaranteed by both the support for the project. investment disaster. government of Maharashtra (GOM) and, The controversies blew up shortly Six months earlier, cash flow from the subject to a roughly $300 million cap, the after ground was broken, when, in 1995, a Maharashtra State Electricity Board Central Government. change in political control led state of (MSEDB), the sole offtaker, had stopped. Based largely on that PPA and those Maharashtra authorities to cancel the After a year or so of smooth operations guaranties, Enron raised $1.9 billion in project. That dispute was resolved with a followed by months of slow and defaulted project debt. It was raise from a coalition of renegotiation of the tariff, a reduction of payments, Dabhol Power Company (DPC) Indian government-owned banks, export project costs and by the sale by Enron to an sent MSEB a notice of arbitration in May credit agencies, a syndicate of offshore, MSEB affiliate of a 30 per cent equity interest 2001. MSEB responded by, among other commercial lenders and the Overseas in the project for $137 million, reducing things, seeking an injunction to block that Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Enron’s interest in DPC to 50 per cent. arbitration and by repudiating the power US government’s development-though- MSEB’s 30 per cent interest was subsequently purchase agreement (PPA). Lacking income, foreign-investment-promotion agency. diluted to roughly 15 per cent upon its failure the 740 MW Phase I power station was shut OPIC supplied, at $160 million, the single to contribute to further equity investments. in June 2001, with all employees terminated. largest offshore loan commitment. It also Nonetheless, there was an expectation Phase II, which would have trebled provided $200 million in political risk creation of a shared interest in the success of the plant’s capacity to 2184 MW, was then insurance for the investments by Enron, GE the project would, going forward, reduce its roughly 5 per cent shy of completion. With and Bechtel as well as roughly $32 million vulnerability to political attack. the shutdown of Phase I, refusals of state in coverage of one of the commercial banks. Construction recommenced. There agencies to approve permits to test the Phase Not everyone was clamoring to get was some cause to hope that the rough II turbines, and the purported repudiation involved, however. The World Bank was times were past. Indeed, Enron’s 1998 of the PPA, lenders suspended funding for approached by India for support. In April annual report noted: “The Dabhol power completion of Phase II. Construction 1993, however, the bank’s manager for project in the state of Maharashtra is the stopped, and the contractors left the site. India concluded that the Dabhol plant was cornerstone of Enron’s activities in India In 1992 the government of India “not economically viable.” and is expected to be a strong contributor announced an invitation to private, Within India, the project was the to Enron’s earnings in 1999 and beyond.” including foreign, project developers and target of political and policy attacks. Critics In early 1999, Phase I achieved lenders to participate in the expansion of noted that there had been no competitive commercial operation and began supplying the Indian power sector through a “fast bidding. Project costs and power tariffs power to the Indian grid. It supplied power track” program. New laws were passed to were higher than other power projects in in a volume, and at a price, that might have assure protection of those investments. India, and the concern arose that the cost of been supportable given the demand Enron responded by quickly signing a Dabhol power could inflate power prices projections taken seriously by both Enron memorandum of understanding with the elsewhere. The cost of fulfilling its take-or- and Indian officials in 1993. That demand government of the state of Maharashtra for pay purchase promise would constitute half did not, however, develop until after the a project that would have included not only of the MSEB’s entire budget. Concerns were subsidence of the Asian economic crisis and the largest independent power generation raised that commitments were made to the until roughly, ironically, the time that the facility in the world but also its own LNG project before an environmental impact project had collapsed. regasification plant, a related gas pipeline, assessment had been undertaken. Finally, it The predictions that the project an LNG tanker to access gas supplies in became known that Enron had allocated a consisted of too much, too soon proved, Qatar and a port at the site to $20 million “education fund” to prepare however, to be prescient. It was clear by 2001 accommodate it. the way for the project in India. Critics that MSEB neither needed, nor could afford,

www.infrastructurejournal.com 1 the energy it had committed to buy from the somewhat shocked when OPIC acted to banks, GE and Bechtel, and the GOI could project. The October 2000 payment due block steps being considered to foreclose on agree was that the continued presence of from MSEB went unpaid until January 2001 the project assets and to expel the equity Enron made a difficult situation worse. It when the state Government stepped in to bail holders from further involvement. While would be better for everyone if Enron were out the cash-strapped MSEB. Months of slow the documents provided the lenders such to go quietly, but at what price? No one payments, and non-payments followed. By rights, the technical expertise of, at least, was willing, or expected anyone else to be June, the project had collapsed. GE and Bechtel appeared to be critical to willing, to advance the sorts of funding that Though the allocation of restart the Phase I turbines and put the Lay had sought during his summer 2001 responsibility for the allegedly finishing touches on Phase II, much less to sales tour in India. expropriatory actions taken by Indian undertake the rehabilitation necessitated by In an internal meeting at OPIC during officialdom remains controversial and to the months of abandonment of the project the summer of 2002 the suggestion was some degree uncertain, it was clear that at site and facilities. raised that, notwithstanding the offer price the time Phase II was threatening to achieve of the previous summer, the continued commercial operation (which would treble deterioration of both the project and of the MSEB’s already taxing offtake obligations). apparent prospects for early resolution of the Officialdom came to the rescue with: various claims and disputes might well have refusals to permit the testing, and thus the led Enron’s creditors’ committee to ascribe a operation, of Phase II turbines; repudiation minimal value to Enron’s investment. of Phase I and Phase II payment Quote Perhaps Enron might be bought out for what obligations; and injunctions blocking previously would have been considered a arbitration of the payment dispute and small number. The further idea arose to against taking the steps that would have propose that OPIC might return to Enron triggered MSEB’s obligation to buy-out the the roughly $16 million that had been paid project. With no alternative customers, the over the years by Enron to OPIC for political project was brought to its knees. risk insurance coverage of a portion of Enron, at 65 per cent the controlling Enron investment. Rather than simply project sponsor, might have been expected A key stakeholder whose interests rescinding the contract and thereby resolving to have mounted an aggressive defense of and position were a source of constant the pending claim, the proposal would be the project. That is what had happened in guessing throughout meetings of the project that Enron would turn over to OPIC, or its 1995. Instead, Enron CEO Ken Lay led a lenders was the Government of India designee, its full interest in the project. delegation to India during the summer of (GOI). The GOI was a party not only Enron countered with the request 2001 to seek to close a sale of Enron’s because of its defaulted counter-guaranty of that it also receive interest on the returned equity interest to Indian government the PPA and its inherent interest in seeing premium and also be compensated for interests. The price was rumored at $600 the power needs of the country satisfied, certain outstanding claims which it held million to $1 billion. But India was not but also because of its risk of being held against the project company. It was fairly buying. By December 2001, Enron was no responsible under various international quickly agreed, however, that, in exchange longer capable of maintaining its core agreements to the extent arguments might for the rough equivalent of a return by operations, much less prepared to invest in be successfully advanced that Indian OPIC of the insurance premiums paid by the defense of a large, troubled project. agencies had engaged in behavior that was, Enron, Enron would walk away not only Thus, by late 2001, the fate of the as least in effect, expropriatory. In fact, from its pending $142 million claim against world’s largest independent power project responsibility for Dabhol was passed OPIC but also from its full interest in the and the largest foreign investment in India rapidly through a series of officials, none of project, assigning the Enron-owned shares was put in the hands of creditors, minority whom seemed charged with the issues long to OPIC or its designee. investors, defaulting governmental enough to take a position or, in the rare A key issue was who would be that stakeholders and lawyers. occasion when a position was taken long designee? DPC was an unlimited liability enough to follow through on it. company embroiled in litigation and The Workout When the project was first conceived potential claims, so taking over a The initial months of attempts to Enron’s role was obviously key. By early controlling interest in such an operation restructure the project were characterized 2002, Enron was variously termed would carry risks. Two parties that were by stalemate. Lenders sought to “radioactive,” “contaminated,” and not interested in increasing their exposure subordinate the claims of the equity “obstructionist”. Perhaps the only issue on were GE and Bechtel. So, for some weeks investors. Indeed, the offshore lenders were which the offshore lenders, the Indian the search was on for someone who would

2 www.infrastructurejournal.com accept the shares and control of DPC. In efforts underway since 2001. There were a Most developments were litigious. In due course, however, GE and Bechtel series of proposals regarding the buy-out of September 2003, an arbitral panel found decided that the liabilities could be the project company and/or its assets. But against OPIC’s posiiton that certain managed and that control of DPC was the lack of cooperation by one or another of the protective provisions of the GE and Bechtel best way to assure that the claims and necessary participants stood in the way of political risk insurance policies should be potential claims that DPC held against progress. Efforts to clarify the completion applied and ordered OPIC to pay their Indian authorities would be retained. So, and offtake support that a restarted and respective expropriation claims. In January the Enron-buyout was structured so that complete project would enjoy from Indian 2004, at OPIC’s instigation in order to Enron’s control of DPC passed to GE and officialdom reached a dead end at the doors recover these payments as well as payments Bechtel in exchange, in effect, for a return of the relevant ministries. Deposits proffered made to an insured bank and, as described to Enron of insurance premiums previously by prospective buyers were returned. above, to Enron, the United States paid to OPIC. Indeed, a primary consequence of Government called for an arbitration Though there was unanimous months of intermittent meetings and rebuffed against the GOI alleging expropriation of support for Enron’s departure, an ironic proposals appeared to be deteriorating the Dabhol Power Project. This was the impediment arose to closing the relationships and an ever-increasingly first time in OPIC’s history that an transaction – the GOI. One term of the likelihood that the workout would ultimately arbitration was initiated against a host GOI’s counter-guaranty of the PPA was consist of little more than pressing and government under the bilateral agreements that Enron’s ownership should not be less settling lawsuits. That risk was enhanced pursuant to which OPIC conducts its than 26 per cent. While discussions with when, in 2002, the Indian banks, in violation political risk insurance program. GE and the finance ministry had led to concurrence of their intercreditor agreement with the Bechtel each initiated arbitrations under the that Enron should go, and that the GOI offshore lenders, appealed to the Bombay India-Mauritius bilateral investment treaty, would waive the requirement of at least 26 High Court for appointment of a receiver to taking advantage of the structuring of their per cent Enron participation, as the assume control of DPC’s assets. What from respective investments in DPC though transaction was being structured and Mauritian subsidiaries. Several offshore approaching implementation, the GOI commercial lenders were exploring their failed to provide consent. The GOI options at following suit by filing bilateral position was simply that they no longer investment treaty arbitrations. cared whether Enron was in or out. Things were looking quite bleak OPIC was not, however, willing to when, in March 2005, the situation support a transaction that could have cost Quote changed dramatically. In meetings in offshore lenders a $300 million asset. Thus Washington among the Indian banks, the evolved the transaction that came to be offshore commercial lenders and OPIC, the known as “Enron Lite.” The decision was to Indian banks tabled terms that were structure the Enron buy-out in two phases. significantly better and, as it turned out, The first would reduce Enron’s interest to well within the range of what most just over the required 26 per cent. – enough commercial lenders had already decided to give GE and Bechtel control of DPC and one perspective was merely the predictable would be acceptable. Within 48 hours, a to assure their ability to continue action of lenders taking reasonable steps to deal had been initialed that included enforcement of DPC’s claims against MSEB, preserve their collateral appeared from settlement of OPIC’s pending claims against the GOI, the GOM and other defendants. another to confirm that GOI-controlled the GOI for reimbursement of what it had Enron would be fully compensated upon interests were committed to expropriate this paid in claims to insured investors. closure of the first phase, but would transfer previously foreign-owned asset. It led to yet Separately, if not independently, talks the balance of its interest only when further litigation, as the offshore lenders were underway between the same Indian directed, which would occur after GOI had collectively filed for arbitration against the banks and GE and Bechtel seeking both an consented or the other parties had decided Indian banks, claiming violation of their assignment of their equity interests in the to go forward notwithstanding the absence intercreditor agreement. project and their commitment to cooperate of GOI consent. Workout discussions evolved from with the restart and completion of the Enron Lite was approved by the New debates over the best way to sell the plant to project. There too, the prospect for York Bankruptcy Court on April 8, 2004, third parties and allocate the proceeds – and progress appeared better. and closed by the end of that month. losses – from that sale, into a focus on the While the precise terms evolved, and Not much else that ultimately proved offshore interests being bought out by the additional time was required to come to dispositive seemed to occur in workout Indian banks already exposed to the project. terms with the equity investors, by late

www.infrastructurejournal.com 3 June, the settlements were falling into place. the looming $6 billion Bechtel and GE ultimately, unreliable. To the extent that the On July 8, the GE settlement closed. On arbitrations, the USG arbitration, the failure can be blamed on governmental July 12, the offshore lender position was offshore banks’ threatened arbitrations under deference to unrealistic claims proffered by acquired by a special purpose vehicle acting bilateral investment treaties, the shortage of an energy superpower, the likelihood of the for the Indian banks. On July 16, OPIC and power in Maharashtra, and even general mistake repeating itself, at least on a similar Bechtel settled, leaving the project, for the frustration and the size of mounting expenses scale, would seem to be slight, if only for first time, fully owned and controlled by may all have contributed to the sudden the absence of any industry player that Government of India interests. Part of the change in the Indians’ negotiating position in carries such weight. settlement is the expectation that Phase I March 2005, and all therefore contributed to Neither investors nor their official will, within the coming year, be restarted the comprehensive commercial settlement hosts want a repeat of Dabhol. The and Phase II will be completed. that was achieved. government surely concluded, as would other government-investors who view the OPIC’s Role Helped. Dabhol – Past or Prologue? Dabhol model, that the project’s failure OPIC played a pre-eminent role in both the Investment failures of the magnitude of carried a high price, measured in some 30 creation of the Dabhol power project and the Dabhol are not common. Boasting a arbitrations and lawsuits, the first workout. On the creation side, OPIC’s complexity and longevity that prompted government-to-government arbitration participation was crucial, as it agreed to four case studies by Harvard business with the United States under an investment provide $160 million in investment school, the project and subsequent workout incentive agreement, an international black guaranties, in addition to providing roughly brought together a cast of international eye for alleged serious expropriatory acts, $225 million in political risk insurance on actors, enormous financial resources, and and reduced foreign investment as a both the debt and equity sides. Wearing its powerful global political entities that defy consequence of the impaired investment governmental hat in the deal, OPIC brought quick replication. As future sponsors, climate. Investors’ preferences are bound to the full faith and credit of the USG to the bankers, government entities and policy tend toward environments where host table, if ever needed. This nascent role proved analysts assess Dabhol and its meaning for government undertakings, if made, can be pivotal at various stages of the workout. potential projects, they will conclude that taken seriously. From the time of the shutdown of Dabhol’s executed agreements contained It is difficult to measure the cost to the plant in 2001, OPIC’s vision was attractive financial, legal, and political India of Dabhol, particularly with the unwavering: to conclude a comprehensive overlay of the economic boom that is now commercial settlement, with fair being enjoyed. There can be little doubt, treatment of all stakeholders’ claims. however, that, all else equal, the experience OPIC’s strong opposition surprise the of Dabhol makes investors wiser and other lenders but kept alive the prospect slower, in committing their resources to of salvaging the project. India. The attraction is still there, but the In pursuit of OPIC’s vision, and to Quote calculation today has to compensate for simplify the complex array of stakeholders, risks that, before Dabhol, would not have OPIC devised and executed a plan to buy been given as much weight. out Enron’s interest in the project, increase Dispute that share many the equity shares of GE and Bechtel, and characteristics of Dabhol, though smaller, settle Enron’s $142 million claim against are likely. The root causes of Dabhol’s OPIC under its insurance policy. By downfall are not grounded in any particular negotiating an acceptable price for Enron to protections for all the stakeholders, yet the corporate culture, the politics of one nation relinquish its interests in Dabhol, and project failed. This fact must give all pause. or the economics of one business sector. funding the cost of the transaction whereby As a potential stakeholder in Rather, a Dabhol-like controversy could Enron’s equity shifted to GE and Bechtel, potential power projects, Enron must be arise in any privatization anywhere, and OPIC removed an onerous presence from regarded as unique and its bankruptcy even if the investor were a model the workout and settled a large claim on thereby diminishes the likelihood of corporation. Such a dispute might be extremely favorable terms. It also advanced another Dabhol. Wielding a weight which especially likely to arise in connection with OPIC’s goal of a fair settlement. its subsequent collapse revealed as a new private “greenfield” project in a OPIC’s position eventually prevailed, deception, Enron achieved, through sheer sector that was previously the exclusive for many reasons. The change in the GOI’s tenacity and negotiating skill, a set of domain of state-owned enterprises. political leadership, the authority and resolve Indian government-backed guaranties that Fifteen years ago, infrastructure firms demonstrated by the new Indian negotiators, were as remarkable as they were, saw enormous business opportunities in

4 www.infrastructurejournal.com developing countries and the newly emerging 1970’s, where host governments overtly country officials and, as investment market economies of Central and Eastern asserted control over natural resources, or promotion agencies, can create incentives Europe and the former Soviet republics. the fairly obvious claims that arose in for resolving disputes. Host country Their expectation was that the combination Vietnam and Iran. Recent expropriation governments perceive such agencies as of pent-up demand, projected economic claims arise from various sorts of development institutions implementing growth, the need to modernize and upgrade public/private partnerships that have gone mutually advantageous investment existing infrastructure, and the realization wrong, privatizations that have been encouragement programs, notwithstanding that bilateral and multilateral assistance reconsidered, economic crises that have their own financial interest in achieving a would not be provided on anything like the been mishandled, and even economic resolution that avoids a claim against them, scale required to accomplish all of this, reform efforts that have unintended and so they can play the role of honest would create unprecedented new private consequences. They are difficult to resolve broker while protecting their own investment opportunities. as “all or nothing” liability claims, but the economic interests. Whether enthusiastic about rejoining As in any other advocacy situation, the Western world or resigned to the it helps to have the facts and the law on passing of a statist world order of one sort your side, and the investor is in a position or another, host governments entered into to help in both respects. Project investment agreements for privatizations or agreements that create rights and new projects to modernize and expand their enforceable remedies are a good starting infrastructure: power, water, Quote point. The ability to invoke foreign telecommunications, highways, sea ports, investment laws and investment airports, etc. Some policymakers in the protection treaties enhances the investor’s West took pride in the newly dominant role position. Awareness of “pressure points” that private capital was playing in the such as the visit of a head of state, the economic development process, viewing periodic meeting of a joint economic this as yet another triumph over Marxism. commission, and the opportunity to It did not take long for the very presence of valid competing interests challenge a country’s eligibility for trade contradictions between the assumptions of that makes a finding of liability difficult or investment benefits or economic foreign private investors and the mentality of should offer grounds for settlement. assistance contributes to a successful public officials and the general population of advocacy campaign. host countries to assert themselves. What To Do When the Situation Suddenly, running water is available Sours? Sources of Information that is safe to drink, it is possible to have a When OPIC receives notice of a potential Governments may prefer diplomacy and telephone installed within days instead of expropriation claim, or just an investment confidentiality, but pressure on years, calls and faxes reliably go through, dispute involving an insured investor, OPIC governments and international electric power functions 24/7, and better consults with the insured investor and may organizations for greater “transparency” transportation infrastructure supports the intervene with the foreign government in an makes a great deal of information about growth of tourism, manufacturing, etc. But, attempt to resolve the dispute or avert the investment disputes publicly available, and utility rates rise, there are tolls to pay, claims. These so-called “advocacy” efforts the Internet makes at least recent privatized utility companies trim payrolls are nothing new, but OPIC has recently information transparent. An investor who and expect the remaining workers to show attempted to formalize them by creating an has become involved in an investment up for work, and the profits from these Advocacy Center through which such dispute with a country may wonder impositions go to foreigners. What more requests for intervention can be managed. whether others are having, or have had, does an opposition party need for a Counterpart agencies of other governments similar problems. Better yet, an investor domestic campaign issue, to be followed by may provide similar assistance, and the contemplating an investment in a country an international investment dispute, no World Bank’s Multilateral Investment may wonder whether that would be a matter which party wins the election? Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”) has achieved wise move given the experience of Indian politicians were criticized for making some success in resolving disputes between predecessor investors. Dabhol a political issue at the state and investors from member countries and If a country has signed investment national level, but few politicians anywhere governments of other member countries. protection treaties or the ICSID could have resisted such a temptation. Government and multilateral Convention, investment disputes may have Recent potential expropriation cases insurers have well-established, open been submitted to ICSID arbitration. A visit are unlike the Latin American claims of the avenues of communication with host to ICSID’s website will reveal whether there

www.infrastructurejournal.com 5 are any pending or decided cases involving the website lists 97 pending cases. at OPIC’s “electronic reading room” that country. If the case is still pending, one Argentine claims predominate, with an (www.opic.gov/FOIA/Electronic FOIA can learn the investor involved and the otherwise wide geographical distribution. Reading Room). The annual reports of procedural history of the case. If the case is OPIC has always published its OPIC, MIGA and other investment decided, the decision will be available, if claims determinations and cumulative insurers often contain information about not through the website, then from the claims history. Recent claim recent claims and investment disputes. At a ICSID Journal. As of September 10, 2005, determinations (since 1996) are available level of generality, one can obtain information about the investment climate of any country, including investment Enron vs, Others Failures disputes, from State Department background notes on that country Why Was the Workout So Difficult? (www.state.gov). Armed with this information, an 1. Poor economic assumptions. It is an unenviable fact that all the stakeholders in Dabhol, investor may be able to form alliances, whether debt, equity, or government guarantor, miscalculated, perhaps badly, share information, demonstrate that its concerning the assumptions and financial model they believed would produce enough difficulties are not unique, and contribute revenue under the power purchase agreement to run the plant, service and repay the to the public pressure on the foreign debt, provide a sufficient return on equity, and provide for future capitalization. The government to face up to the problem and financial agreements called for the $2.9 billion project to be funded by $1 billion in resolve it fairly. equity from Enron (80 per cent), Bechtel (10 per cent), and GE (10 per cent); There are multiple stakeholders in $1.2 billion of project debt was to come from the Indian Banks, $160 million from any project, and all can be enlisted in OPIC, and the remainder from a syndicate of offshore lenders and export credit resolving an investment dispute. The agencies. Had any stakeholder opted out, as the World Bank did based on their study project sponsors and investors are the most that concluded the project was likely to fail, that stakeholder would have saved time, obvious, but suppliers and customers are money, and economic opportunity lost by those stakeholders who stayed in the project. also stakeholders, along with their governments and specific agencies of those 2. Failure of the GOI. When Enron, Bechtel, and GE secured the impressive guaranties and governments with divergent and even economic concessions from the GOI, it’s hard to imagine that they foresaw the conflicting interests. upcoming failure of the GOI to honor its financial and contractual obligations, much Finally, unless there is something less the GOI’s course of conduct that was deemed expropriatory by an American fundamentally wrong with the project or arbitration panel. In addition to failing to honor its counter-guaranty, the GOI also, the host government has totally reversed its through its judiciary, improperly thwarted international arbitration panels from position on foreign investment, it too will proceeding. Most importantly, however, the GOI refused to commit the resources to wish to put the problem behind it and solve the problems raised through the project’s failure. For four years, the GOI presence move on. So, the host government may be consisted of representatives without sufficient negotiating authority who frequently part of the problem, but, pursuing its own were replaced by new representatives, who similarly lacked negotiating authority. interests for its own reasons, the host government often proves to be, as in the 3. Failure of the GOM. The government of Maharashtra was the sole purchaser of power settlement of the Dabhol claims, a key under the PPA, and was also, ultimately, a 15 per cent equity holder in the project. element in the solution. Through its subsidiary, MSEB, the GOM was a prime mover in every aspect of the Kenneth Hansen is a project finance deal’s completion, and was the chief beneficiary of the PPA due to the state’s energy partner in the Washington DC office of starvation. When it refused to honor its financial obligations, including a direct, Chadbourne & Parke LLP and is reachable unlimited financial guaranty, the GOM threw a massive obstacle in the path to a fair at [email protected]; workout. This unforeseen contractual breach was followed by the GOM’s participation Robert C. O’Sullivan is Associate General in important arbitrations and lawsuits, sometimes willingly, sometimes not. The GOM Counsel for Insurance Claims and also utterly failed to participate or assist the long workout efforts. Their absence was as W. Geoffrey Anderson is Deputy General confounding as it was difficult to work around. Counsel, both at the Overseas Private Investment Corp. and are reachable at 4. The positions of GE and Bechtel. The differing negotiating positions of the sponsors 202-336-8400. Views expressed in this during the workout cut both ways on this issue. They took an aggressive stance in article are those of the authors and not litigation and arbitration, pursuing claims against the GOI, GOM, MSEB, and MPDCL necessarily those of OPIC or Chadbourne through a variety of causes of action and venues. & Parke.

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