A History of the Factors Involved in Decisions on the Adoption of Computers to the Queensland Government and the Subsequent Initial Problems: 1956-1984
Michael John Kelk
Bachelor of Arts in Humanities
Graduate Diploma of Arts (Library and Information Science)
Applied Ethics Research Concentration School of Humanities, Queensland University of Technology
Submitted in full requirement for the award of HH40 Master of Arts (Research)
August 2001 Keywords
1 . Politics and Government - Queensland - History
2. Public Administration - Queensland - History
3. Technological Innovation - Queensland - History
4. Computers - Queensland - History
5. Information Systems - Adoption
6. Decision-making
Abstract
This thesis examines the introduction of computers into Queensland Government from the late 1950s. It examines the extent to which there was an awareness of the problems of information technology that emerged over the next forty years and in particular the decision-making processes and arguments that determined major outcomes. It reveals that many Government Departments were overloaded with paper-work bottlenecks and the coming of decimal currency posed a significant problem due to the mammoth task of currency conversion. These pressures, when combined with the increasing costs of labour, became the justification for the introduction of computers. The decision to introduce computers was considered an inevitable business decision that stemmed from installing earlier punched card technologies. Some years later the problems of unemployment and privacy were realised but it was too late to turn back. Computers were here to stay. Thus, this thesis highlights some key issues relating to government decision-making processes surrounding significant new technology applications. It also provides an opportunity to examine Cabinet minutes, submissions and decisions in relation to technological innovation. In essence it is a study of decision-making, which aims to develop a better understanding of how governments deal with possible future ethical and policy dilemmas associated with major technological innovation. Table of Contents
1. Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review 1
2. Chapter Two: The Lead-up to Installation of Computers: 1956-1964 22
Introduction The Press Treatment of Early Computing The Education Department John Marshal The University of Queensland's Computer State Government Insurance Office's Dilemma Developments in the Queensland Government's Cabinet The Planning Officer Unemployment The Delay The Mines and Main Roads Department Conclusion
3. Chapter Three: The Acquisition of Computers: 1965-1971 84
Introduction Installation of Computers in Queensland Government - The Cost Decimal Currency Labour Cost Savings and Unemployment Federated Clerk's Union The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) The Press Privacy Conclusion
4. Chapter Four: The Problems Recognised: 1971-1984 103
Introduction The Privacy Debate The Concerns of the Australian Computer Society The Debate in Parliament Resumed The Reality of Privacy The Royal Commission Conclusion
5. Conclusion: An Assessment 117 Appendix Appendix: EDP Committee Circular Appendix: Tender and Specifications Appendix: Prices Quoted
List of Illustrations Cartoon: Progression of Technology ICL 80 Column Punched Card 26 Staff Involved Full-Time in QPS Computing 92 Staff Employed by Main Roads 93 Inflation 1950-1972 94 Cartoon: Technological Change 102 Sir Thomas Hiley (Appendix) Earnest Evans (Appendix) Ken Pope (Appendix) GE225 (Appendix) NCR315 (Appendix)
List of Abbreviations
ACS - Australian Computer Society ACSPA -The Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations ACTU - Australian Council of Trade Unions ADP - Automatic Data Processing BTM - British Tabulating Machines CEL - City Electric Light Company Limited CITEC - The Centre for Information Technology and Communications GREB - Capricornia Regional Electricity Board CSIRO - Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation EDP - Electronic Data Processing EMP - Electronic Multiplying Punch GE225 - General Electric 225 IBM - International Business Machines ICT - International Computers and Tabulators IT - Information Technology IT&C - Information Technology and Communications MIM - Mount Isa Mines NCR - National Cash Register PMG - Postmaster General QSA - Queensland State Archives SEAQ - Southern Electric Light Company SGCC - State Government Computer Centre SGIO - State Government Insurance Office TREB - Townsville Regional Electricity Board UQA - University of Queensland Archive The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree or diploma at any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.
Mictfael Kelk
(Date) Acknowledgements My thanks go to my first supervisors Cameron Hazlehurst and Glenn Stewart. My thanks also go to my new supervisor, upon Cameron Hazlehurst's retirement, Drew Hutton. My thanks go also to Robert Funnell. Thanks also to the staff of the Queensland State Archives, University of Queensland Archives and John Oxley Library. Finally, I would like to thank those who gave their time to contribute to this work. Booking System - Pencil and Paper
Accounting with r Punched Card .A.ccounting Data Processing Systems Queensland Roads. 1, ( 1 ), June 1962: 34. 1 Chapter One: Introduction For the Queensland Government a computer met a data processing need that had previously been fulfilled by people, accounting machines and punched card technology. Queensland Government departments had been using accounting machines and punched card machines since the early twentieth century. The introduction of computers was a logical step after punched card installation and the latter precluded the former. Norberg (1990) reinforces this when he argues that: The epoch of punched card machinery was essentially over by the early 1960s, by which time the virtues of two generations of electronic digital computers had been demonstrated in tabulator work ... when electronic computers finally proved sufficiently versatile for any sort of computation, business and government had been thoroughly primed for their use through fifty years experience with mechanical tabulators (Norberg 1990: 779). Similarly, Cliff Bosson (1993), a historian who chronicled the 'History of the ACS [Australian Computer Society] in Queensland' wrote: The first computers used in Queensland emerged from the earlier data processing technology of unit record or punched card machines (Bosson 1993: 18). Therefore, the punched card machine was similar to a computer. The difference between them was that a computer could be programmed for varied tasks and this programme, which was stored within the machine itself, could be altered as the machine carried out its tasks. Punched card machines failed on this count; thus the computer was a superior machine. Punched card machines were used for calculation at the City Electric Light Company Limited (CEL, later called the Southern Electricity Authority Queensland and now Queensland Electricity Commission). In 1959 they were using a Powers Samas Electronic Multiplying Punch (EMP). By the early 1960s there were numerous punched card data processing machines installed in Queensland as well as other States. International Business Machines (IBM) had machines in McPhersons Limited (Sydney), Parke Davis and Company (Sydney), Woolworths Limited (Sydney and Brisbane), General Motors-Holden Limited (Victoria) and Merchants Pty Limited (Sydney) (Australian Financial Review, 8 February 1962: 33). Importantly, in Queensland, the SGIO had been using a Powers-Samas punched card machine since 1937. Computers were also used in Australia and many were card based. Three university computers had been installed at the universities of Sydney, New South 2 Wales, and Melbourne since 1956. (The University of Melbourne's computer was the CSIRAC used by the CSIRO and transferred to the University in 1956 and retired in 1964.) Federal Cabinet agreed to the creation by the CSIRO of a system of electronic computers for the use of CSIRO, universities, and Commonwealth Government departments and authorities. Several other government departments were involved. They included: the Atomic Energy Commission; the Weapons Research Establishment; the Bureau of Meteorology; the Post-Master General's Department (PMG); and the Aeronautical Research Laboratory. The computer was employed in many Government functions, including taxation, armed services, census and statistics, supply, civil aviation, social services, customs and excise, finance and health. Automatic Data Processing (ADP) had begun in Australia in 1958 (Australian Financial Review, 29 May 1962: 4). The first computer used in Queensland was a General Electric 225 (GE225) which the University of Queensland had in place from March 1962. Early in 1963, the International Computers and Tabulators' (ICT) ICT 1301 was installed by Queensland United Foods Limited, Brisbane. In December 1963 Southern Cross, Toowoomba installed an ICT 1500 (Australian Financial Review, 29 May 1962: 4). The University of Queensland's GE225, was claimed to be 'the fastest digital computer available at any Australian university' (Australian Financial Review, 22 March 1962: 35). A digital computer was defined as a 'device capable of automatically carrying out a sequence of operations on data expressed in discrete or digital form' (Australian Financial Review, 22 March 1962: 35). These machines typically consisted of several units the size of wardrobes joined together which took a specially built air-conditioned room about the size of two houses to accommodate them (Australian Financial Review, 22 March 1962: 35). It is necessary to define the terms 'automatic digital computers', 'electronic calculator', 'electronic computers', 'electronic data processors' and 'automation', 'electronic data processing' (EDP) and 'automatic data processing' (ADP). The term EDP generally referred to computing of a technical nature and ADP computing of a commercial nature. The terms EDP and ADP, as described by Maxwel (Deputy Chairman of ICT Limited, London) in a discussion disseminated in The Australia Financial Review, denote: ... A multitude of operations needed to record transactions, prepare statements and analyses, calculate revenue and expenditure, and indeed to 3 satisfy all the accounting requirements of an organisation ... Electronic calculators and computers accept these basic data and process them with speed, accuracy and reliability (Australian Financial Review, 22 February 1962: 40). It is not surprising that someone interested in selling computers was concerned that they were understood and it was a useful definition. The terms electronic data processing (EDP) and automatic data processing (ADP) were used interchangeably. The terms automatic computers and electronic data processors were used interchangeably in the early 1960s in Australia to denote a computer as defined above. An electronic calculator and an electronic computer were different in that the latter had a memory store. The word 'computer' is worth considering here. A computer originally denoted someone who calculated. The word 'computist' was used in 1398 by Trevisa to denote 'one skilled in the computus or calendar, [or] ... in chronological reckoning' (The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Ed. Volume Ill 1989: 640-41 ). A 'computus is a computation or reckoning; an account'. Later the usage changed and computer was the utilised term. For instance, in 1646 Browne wrote the 'calendars of these computers' (ibid). In 1704 Swift wrote: 'very skilful computer' (ibid). In 17 44 Walpole wrote: 'told by some nice computers of national glory' (ibid). In 1855 Brewster wrote: 'to pay the expenses of a computer for reducing his observations' (ibid). In 1897 the term is used to denote a mechanical device. In Engineering, 22 January, it was written: 'this was ... a computer made by Cox (ibid). He described it as of the nature of a circular slide rule' (ibid). Later the terms computer and calculator were often confused. The electronic calculator was essentially a machine that calculated but could not carry out the more complex processes of the computer. A calculator needed manually set instructions for it to complete its tasks but a computer could change paths based on internal instructions. Burnett of the Australian Computer Museum Society stated in a personal communication that the term calculator is 'quite accurate, because the machine could calculate, but not compute, that is, "not make a decision, test it and branch" (Burnett 2000, pers. comm., 15 March 2000). Automation is a broader term that encompasses any mechanical process. Many conversions to automation in factories in the 1960s included a computer as the control mechanism. In addition, the computerisation of libraries became known as 4 library automation. In this instance, and in many others, the term computerisation and automation were used synonymously. In 1968, the word automation was defined in the British Dictionary of Modern English Usage as 'mechanisation enabling machines to do work formerly done by human muscles' or 'work formerly done by the human brain' (Fowler 1968: 43). In Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language automation is defined as the 'technique of making an apparatus, such as a calculating machine ... operate automatically' (Babcock 1971: 24 ). Thus, in practice the concept automation or computerisation was used interchangeably. Byrt wrote that: 'Automation is a rather loose term and is currently being used to cover three distinct developments': the assembly line where parts are transferred from one machine to another; the production and process control of mechanisms; the electronic digital computer used in the analysis of business data and in the control of machine tools (Byrt 1956: 333). The Queensland Public Service in the Queensland Public Service Commissioner's Annual Report of 1956 advocated automation or computerisation publicly. At that time very few individuals had seen computers. The computer was described as an object of science fiction and it was named a 'giant brain'. The State Government Insurance Office (SGIO), which was under Treasury control, launched a committee to investigate an extension to the punched installation in the SGIO in 1956. Finally it was decided that it would be beneficial to investigate the suitability of a computer for the SGIO. It was also considered prudent to examine what other department or departments could utilise computers. An Advisory Committee was established in January 1960 to investigate the uses that computers could be put. A Feasibility Team was established, supervised by a committee. Essentially, no one in the SGIO or in the wider Public Service knew enough about computers to make an informed decision about their suitability. A Planning Officer was hired and he became concerned with investigating the computing needs of a central computing department. The Main Roads Department was conducting independent investigations into the possible use of computers as was the Railways Department and Education Department. Finally, the Feasibility Team and Supervising Committee were left to manage the project. They were instructed by Cabinet to proceed without reporting further. Some two years later, Cabinet requested that evaluation committees once again report to Cabinet in view of the significance of the project. This suggests that the significance of the original decision failed to be realised initially. In the end, after Cabinet approval, most of the 5 decision-making power was placed in the hands of the public servants who, then, placed decision-making power in the hands of the computer professionals. A Recommendation Committee was formed of computer professionals to make a final recommendation. The Labor government was defeated at the polls in 1957 and replaced by a Country Liberal coalition under Frank Nicklin. The Treasurer and Minister for Housing in this government, Thomas Alfred Hiley, brought the need for computers to be installed into Queensland Government Departments to the attention of Cabinet. Grimley, Insurance Commissioner and then head of the SGIO, lobbied Hiley soon after Cabinet was inaugurated in 1957. Hiley was aware, or he was made aware, of computers being installed in New South Wales and in the Federal Government and he feared that Queensland might be behind. It is reasonable to postulate that Hiley, an accountant, had intimate knowledge of computers, as did many other accountants. Public servants had knowledge of the Federal Government's achievements in computing because Evan Fell of the Public Service Board was a representative for Queensland on a Committee formed by the Federal Government's Public Service Commission to investigate their use. Hiley was concerned with computers being underutilised or being unsuitable for their task. This was because punched card equipment in the SGIO suffered copious breakdowns. Hiley seemed unconcerned about unemployment and countered claims that unemployment would be a result of introduction. Few in the Public Service were concerned with unemployment; rather they were concerned with not having enough staff to do paper-work. There was perceived to be full employment and many senior and semi-senior staff were needed. The SGIO lobbied for more recruits and received juniors. Queensland, unlike New South Wales and Victoria, was not in a state of over-full employment. Moreover, it was caught in a credit squeeze in 1960 and at the end of October 1960 the number of people registered for employment with the Commonwealth Employment Service was 7,089 whereas the number of unfulfilled vacancies recorded at that date was 3,632. Employment was affected in the last half of 1960 by dry weather, which adversely affected primary production. Unemployment of around four percent in the 1960s was low compared to the late twentieth century (approximately eight percent) but youth unemployment was of some concern. Unemployment in Queensland fluctuated during the year, allowing seasonal changes such as sugar cane harvest and school leavers in December. When confronted with a question in Queensland Parliament that 6 addressed the social issue of unemployment, Hiley responded that youth unemployment would not be affected by the introduction of computers (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 18 November 1960: 1622). This was a brave assertion. Despite the computer being 'inevitable', progress towards its introduction seemed anything but at the time. In fact it stalled in 1963 and after many reports had been submitted, the State Planning Officer, Ken S. Pope, was frustrated by the delay. He threatened resignation and later resigned only to have his resignation refused. He maligned the Government to the press, which published an account. Clearly, the computing project met resistance from senior Queensland Public Service staff. Pope, recruited from the United Kingdom, remembers the situation in Brisbane well: I found the public service to be rigid and highly structured. This explains to some extent the delays I received in trying to get the computer going (Pope 1997: pers. comm., 4 November). Malcolm Grierson, EDP Officer appointed in 1965 by Pope, concurs. He stated that 'the Queensland Public Service was very rigid'. He added: 'Public Servants in 1965 started work to a bell, had lunch to a bell and finished work to a bell' (Grierson 1997: pers. comm., 6 November). The computer was unique and its introduction changed this pattern somewhat, but not without some struggle. Uniqueness was the very crux of the computer but this technology was not as pervasive as it is today. The Internet is launching new concerns about security, privacy, censorship and so on. So controversial are the computer's ramifications, it is instructive to investigate what those responsible for significant early decisions thought about the technology they were introducing. What did they believe to be its likely costs? What did they believe to be its likely benefits? What potential dangers did they see? Were safeguards envisaged? In the long run, the computer's uniqueness gave the computer its own momentum and its introduction might have been delayed but it could not have been prevented even if there was such a desire. Government officials, such as some department heads, other administrators and politicians, had difficulty in differentiating between one type of data processing machine and another. Pope stated that 'administrators in government knew little of computing' (Pope 1997: pers. comm., 4 November). Many of the Queensland Government's officials mentioned above did not plan for the offsetting of adverse effects because they did not realise what they were dealing with. Computer professionals understood a great deal more, but even they did not 7 grasp the full significance of the machines themselves and, as a result, the importance of the decision by the Cabinet to introduce them. The decision to introduce the computer was a business decision within a capitalist system and as such the Cabinet was concerned with, for example, how staff would greet the technology. They understood a social cost would be some displacement of staff, but the benefits would be a reduction in labour costs and increased productivity from Public Service staff. There were long queues at public counters and large bottlenecks existed in Queensland Government departmental paper-work. Decimal currency was soon to be introduced and this would add to workloads due to the enormous task of currency conversion. Cabinet hoped the computer would prevent paper-work bottlenecks and assist in the introduction of decimal currency. They recognised the need to tell unions of their plans to use computers, as they dearly wanted to avoid sabotage and other forms of resistance. The Supervising Committee submitted a report to Hiley on 27 January 1961 recommending: A meeting of departmental heads and responsible union officials be called by The Treasurer to announce the appointment of the Committee, the purpose of same and to seek full co-operation and commitment (Report to Treasurer from Supervising Committee, QSA, A/58386, Z2363, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, 2 February 1961: 2). Sabotage proved to be an unnecessary anxiety and staff retraining was to be a safeguard against job losses. The Queensland Government did not consider other issues, such as privacy. This notion in relation to computing did not exist. Legal issues emerged during the period. Records were no longer solely kept in hard copy; they were also stored electronically on magnetic tape or other storage medium. Prior to this, records, such as taxation records, had to be produced in print. Under the Uniform Companies Act records on paper were required for presentation, not electronic records. In the same way, there was some questioning of electronic records' admissibility as evidence. Legal debates continued well past the period of concern of this thesis and will receive no more attention (Horrocks 1966: 421-423). The policy of centralisation was of primary concern. Computing centralisation forced some integration of departmental activities and fears of loss of departmental integrity or, more candidly, departmental autonomy and a loss of personal status and authority eventuated. 8 Computer professionals, such as Pope, were concerned with data security. They were eager to keep information in computers sensibly and they ensured that the professional standards of the Australian Computer Society (ACS) were adhered to. The promulgations of the ACS provided the only guide, as there was no history of policy to rely on. Often, as it was widely known in the Public Service in the 1960s, an action was performed before it was considered safe. If an action had not been performed, it was not tried (Hielscher 2000, pers. comm., 30 March). Bennett reinforced this when he posited that: The computer was certainly not readily accepted in those early days. Nobody likes doing something different tomorrow to what they are doing today, particularly if what they are doing today is successful Computerworld, 15th Anniversary Edition, July 1993: 2. The difficulty for the Government was that current work practices were not successful. Once purchased by businesses, governments and other organisations, the growth of computing applications - that is, new uses and tasks for the machines when coupled with hardware and software development - was faster than anyone predicted. Gordon Chalk wrote to Cabinet on 15 February 1968 that: 'the fact is that the use of computer techniques and the consequent heavy demand for computer processing has increased much more rapidly than one would have dared to forecast four years ago' (QSA, 24834, Cabinet Minutes, Decisions and Submissions, Chalk 20 February 1968). The number of new machines installed each year and the number of computer upgrades were more than predicted. For instance, an additional 16,384 words of core memory and an additional printer for the Treasury ICT 1904 in use in 1968 cost $126,240 (QSA, 24834, Cabinet Minutes, Decisions and Submissions, Chalk, 20 February 1968). In 1971, some MPs were becoming concerned about the computers the Government had decided to install. . For instance, Opposition Member for South Brisbane, Collin Bennett, suggested that: 'we are fast entering a computerised world, and in some ways computers are becoming monsters [my emphasis] that cannot be controlled' (Collin Bennett Hon. Member for South Brisbane, Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 21 October 1971 : 1334). By then it was difficult to ignore what might be thought of as the ethical dimension associated with job losses and threats to privacy. 9 Why then were the effects of this technology on society so difficult to judge at the time? Cherry (1985), (an electronic engineer and former Professor of Telecommunications), argued that the difficulty of knowing the future dilemmas associated with new inventions results from our lack of knowledge of the 'social conditions, new institutions, and political and economic changes of the future' (Cherry 1985: 58-59). An invention's significance may vary in the future when there will be a different context (Cherry 1985: 58-59). Similarly, many authors have written in hindsight of a so called 'computer revolution'. Kizza ( 1996), an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at the University of Tennessee, states that the computer revolution, like its predecessor the industrial revolution, has three stages: 'amazement, prosperity, and social upheaval' (Kizza 1996: 1). These divisions are more evident today looking back on the event. Cherry ( 1985) stated in connection to the industrial revolution: They saw it rather as evolution and spoke of it as 'progress in the industrial arts' or as the 'spread of manufacture' so it would appear that the historical period so often called the Industrial Revolution today was recognised as being revolutionary only in hindsight (Cherry 1985: 33). So then at the time of change the dramatic nature of the change was not so clearly evident. This thesis focuses on the public arena and examines the decision to place computers into the Public Service of the Queensland Government. It will examine developments in computing by examining the Mines and Main Roads Department, the Treasury Department, and the SGIO, three early major government computer installations inaugurated by the Queensland Government. The story of the introduction of computers into Queensland Government will be unfolded and the efforts of interested groups such as the Federated Clerks Union, the Australian Computer Society (ACS), the press and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) will be described. The thesis will then look at the effects of the computer on unemployment. As privacy became an issue in the early 1970s, discussions in the Queensland Parliament revealed that the Government had begun to understand the problems associated with computing and these debates will be highlighted. This thesis examines the introduction of computers first proposed in 1956 through to the privacy debates of 1971. It will highlight further developments relating to privacy up to 1984. First, it will examine other literature on the issues raised. 10 literature Review A survey of international literature indicates that there have been two key types of research undertaken concerning the introduction of computers. Firstly, studies have been completed on the impact of computers on society, including the economy, government, and the technology industry. Secondly, a narrower focus has been adopted and this investigates the impact of computers on public administration. This thesis aims to complement both of these strands of inquiry in the context of the introduction of computing into the Queensland Government's Public Administration. One study completed on the introduction of computing into public administration is a work by Syedur Rahman and Anthony Cahill (1991) entitled 'The Growth of Information Systems Technology in the Public Sector of Developing Nations'. This article reports on a survey conducted in 1988 of thirty-eight public sector agencies and finds many social effects that appeared after the introduction, including unemployment. The work provides a base for further research which hitherto has not been conducted on the introduction of computing technology or its impact on the public sector in Queensland. Van Den Ende entitled completed another study entitled The Turn Of The Tide: Computerization In Dutch Society, 1900-1965. Van Den Ende's work highlights some useful studies of computing and punched card technology introduction, which hitherto has been given scant attention. Van Den Ende's work describes contextual factors (societal, economic and other technological advances) external to the organisation as the impetus for computer adoption by the organisation. In the same way, there have been numerous well-documented theories explaining the adoption of information systems. Simply put, they focus on either internal or external factors. Some of the work of the key theorists needs to be highlighted. Feller and Menzel (1978) argue that factors external to the public sector organisation influence the decision to adopt technology. By filtering through all levels of the organisation, external influences (for example marketing campaigns) led to decisions to adopt technology. This is not to say, claimed Feller and Menzel, that organisations did not develop a need for technology before external factors 11 came into play, but these were exceptions. They argued that their 'formulation describes the situation in most agencies' (Feller and Menzel 1978: 53). Bugler and Bretschneider (1993) disclose a relevant theory for this thesis, one that is confirmed by its findings, that a user's need to solve pressing problems was the drive for computer adoption. This thesis focuses on Feller and Menzel's exceptions. Caudle (1990) posits that the drive for technology came from middle management rather than from the computer professionals. Moreover, Caudle argues that technology push is not sufficient to explain adoption, as technologists tend to explain benefits in technical terms rather than in practical uses for the technology. While this theory may be of some value today, in the case of 1960s Queensland the computer professionals mostly kept descriptions simple. They solved practical problems with non-technical advice and delivered and applied it in terms that could be understood by clients. They focused on clients' needs and not on the technicalities of the machines. They would not have sold or purchased information systems otherwise. Northrop (et al.) ( 1994) argue that training, useability of software and computer knowledge affect computer adoption. In this thesis it is clear that initially all staff were untrained; training had to be completed especially for adoption. Software required many technical skills in its use and was beyond the capabilities of most end users. Rather, the computer professional ran the installations on behalf of the end user. Computer knowledge shortfalls by bureaucrats were a significant barrier to adoption, compliance and acceptance in this case. Kraemer (et al.) ( 1989) outlines the theory that, despite external factors existing, managerial action or decision-making (internal factors) is the crucial factor in the adoption decision. Management can act, or not act, based on their own volition, independent of external influences. Management is the most important factor and management may go against the current trends. A more recent paper published in 1997 by Kraemer and Dedrick advocates that Stevens, Cahill and Overman's (1990) approach, which has a rounded view that both internal and external factors contribute, was best to explain adoption. Stevens, Cahill and Overman argue that there must be an overall consideration of both internal factors and external factors. Any argument that outlines either internal or 12 external factors is too easy to refute. Moreover, 'study of information systems technology which does not claim the primacy of any one set of factors, but rather attempts to determine the relative importance of either type of factor under varying condition and contexts' is needed (Stevens, Cahill and Anthony 1990: 20). Stevens, Cahill and Anthony argue that 'despite the longevity of diffusion and adoption research and the great variety found in these and other theoretical models, there is a paucity of empirical research which can be used to draw even tentative conclusions' (Stevens, Cahill and Anthony 1990: 17). This thesis attempts to correct that shortfall. Rogers and Kincaid (1981) outline some research on innovations that reveals that a person's decision to adopt information systems will be influenced, not only by the features of the innovation itself but also the attitudes of their peers towards the innovation, especially if they have already been using it. Rogers and Kincaid state that 'a variety of diffusion investigations have found ... variables, especially individual connectedness, related to innovativeness' (Rogers and Kincaid 1981: 228). Naturally, if communication between peers discloses a negative outcome from the adoption of an innovation and its consequences, then this will most likely result in a final decision not to adopt (Rogers and Kincaid 1981: 229). This thesis, through the disclosure of original empirical research, seeks to test the theory that it is both factors external and internal to the organisation, in this case a state government, that led to the adoption decision. It also questions the effect of individuals (internal factors) on the process of adoption in the case of Queensland. In the end it was factors internal and external that led to the adoption of computers, but one key individual, Ken Pope, threatened resignation, evoked the power of the press and forced a decision. Much was known of computer adoption overseas and the computer was viewed in the United Kingdom as another piece of office equipment, declared Lamb (1972). Lamb ( 1972) stated that: 'it will be clear by now that the computer is no longer to be regarded as another office tool, like a desk calculator or an envelope-sealing machine - a device to take its place with others in the apparatus of an organisation' (Lamb 1972: 18). Lamb's work focuses on information technology policy in relation to the purchasing of the equipment. 13 Writing specifically about 'the challenge of man-machine digital systems' in the United States, Sackman ( 1967) concludes: Neglect of human and social factors continues as a chronic and persistent failing in governmental and industrial cost-effectiveness studies concerned with extending automation to new areas (Sackman 1967: 559). Yet there is evidence that in the public mind there were significant apprehensions about computers. Issues like 'are people becoming obsolete' and statements like 'a machine may check up on your income tax' appeared in early newsreels of the forties and fifties in the United States (Holmes 1991 ). Commentators raised many questions at this early stage after witnessing the appearance in the world of the computer. Who would want to use them and what would they use them for? How easy would they be to operate? These questions led to expressions of alarm in the United States as experts calculated that a computer could do the work of 10,000 people and could do any logical task a human could do (Holmes 1991 ). With global depression still a vivid memory for many in the workforce, the spectre of unemployment was an understandable fear. In his work entitled Automation: Friend or Foe, MacMillan (1956), a mathematical engineer from Cambridge, asked the question why are 'men' [sic] being replaced by machines. The answer, he claimed, fell into two groups. Firstly, the machine may be doing a job that could not be done by a human being. Secondly, a machine may do a job that can be done by a person, but more efficiently because of its 'superior efficiency, precision, economy or reliability' (MacMillan 1956: 51 ). This ability, argues MacMillan, was particularly important at a time when the costs of labour were increasing. Factories he claims were becoming safer and more interesting places for workers. The level of skill demanded to use the machines resulted in the living standard decrease for the person who had not acquired appropriate skills. The chief problem was labour relations. The person whose skills were obsolete with the introduction of the new machines had to be retrained for alternative work that was more interesting and better paid, posited MacMillan (MacMillan 1956: 51-2). In the United States, noted MacMillan, there was much automation in offices. 'It seems certain that the routine clerical worker will finally disappear long before his [sic] opposite number in the workshop vanishes' (MacMillan 1956: 51-2). This note came with a warning from MacMillan. MacMillan quoted Hooper (Chief Organisation Accountant of the National Coal Board) as stating: The electronic computer is the finest tool in the field of management that has yet been devised; let us not hesitate to use it, but let us at the same time 14 make sure we do not misuse it' (Quoted in MacMillan 1956: 77). For Hooper, 'misuse' of the computer occurred when it was used to replace workers. There were others who argued for automation despite its effects on employment. Lord Halsbury, an engineer, speaks of the benefits of automation and the resulting increases in production being good for Britain. MacMillan quotes Lord Halsbury as stating: 'We cannot afford not to exploit it [automation] as intensively as we can' (Quoted in MacMillan 1956: 92). Yet, commentators argued that promises of better more interesting jobs did not eventuate. In an American study by Mann and Williams, it was reported that in an accounting office for a large plant, 450 people performed 140 different tasks. They estimated that fifty percent of the tasks were eliminated by automation and thirty percent were more substantially changed. Ninety percent of workers were directly affected yet, even with all this considered, there was still no significant upgrading in the skills required. Out of a range between three and thirteen (the score for the classification of jobs) skills rose from 8.0 to 8.1 and 8.2, a very small difference (Cited in Buckingham 1961: 91 ). The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics made several studies of the effects of automation on jobs. In the study of an insurance firm, it was found that most workers moved from one task to another without increasing skills. Only twenty five percent of workers experienced an upgrade of task when transferred to computing and none of the workers who were retained in other jobs were upgrading although several new workers from outside sources with higher skills were employed. Auken of the Bureau of Labour Statistics stated that: 'the computer installations have opened avenues of upgrading for a select group of people' (Quoted in Buckingham 1961: 92). Thus, automation did result in more interesting jobs for the odd worker, but it did not deliver on the promise to replace drudgery with more stimulating work. Automation was widely used by United States' governments. Two years before Anthony's paper, in the Wall Street Journal on 17 February 1956 a staff reporter wrote: The new process represents a long forward step in reducing the drudgery and expense of the world's bigger bookkeeping operations. Beyond that, it symbolises the fact that Uncle Sam, like private industry, is plunging deep 15 into automation - the replacement of human brains and hands with machines - in an effort to trim payrolls and cut operating costs. The mountainous paper-work generated by big government, some experts say, offers as great a potential for automation as do industry's clerical tasks ... Officials agree automation is the greatest potential brake on the chronic growth of bureaucracy. At least, they say it enables the government to take on expanding responsibilities without increasing the federal work force at the same time. And they point to dramatic savings, present and prospective, in some government operations (Wall Street Journal, 17 February 1956 ). Writers were increasingly focusing on the way in which the computer was used for its perceived benefits, principally economic benefits. Looking fifteen years ahead, Martin and Norman (1970) described it: 'as a new and powerful technique [automatic computing] becomes economic, it is used because it is economic', lamenting that: 'the social implications [unemployment] are worked out afterwards, but this may be too late' (Martin and Norman 1970: vi). Martin and Norman asked: Will we anticipate and plan for the new machines or will we let information technology race ahead undirected, leaving us to sort out the mess afterwards. If we permit the latter, then we have reason to be apprehensive (Martin and Norman 1970: vi). Authors in the United Stated, in the early 1960s, such as Isaac L. Arravark (1962) had recognised the need for planning. In The Impact of Information Processing on Society, Arravark urges that 'the entire world will have to plan carefully in order to avoid the dangers of progress' (Arravark [Sound Recording], 1962). It is now a commonplace to say, as Williams (1997) has recently said, that 'to maximise benefits and minimise the harms, those making decisions about the introduction of computer systems must be sensitive to the potential problems as well as to the potential advantages of computers' (Williams 1997: 4 ). But forty years ago we find different preoccupations and priorities. Social costs were sometimes glossed over in favour of savings and workflow improvements. Rogers (1984), professor of history at James Cook University, argues that what was wrong with the changes associated with industrialisation during the 1820s and 1830s was not the changes as such, but the way they were allowed to happen. The lesson from history was that 'people were made to and allowed to suffer' (Rogers 1984: 286). Change seems to be inevitable even though there is no good reason why technological change cannot be resisted. Also, in hindsight technological change has been in the end beneficial. What Rogers was alluding to here was that the ethical dimension was not considered when computer technology was 16 introduced. The social costs to the individual and the community were glossed over. It would be anachronistic to find fault with early nineteenth century governments for a lack of sophisticated technology and manpower policies. But it is impossible to ignore the more recent evidence that the ability of policy makers to differentiate between technologies when they are increased incrementally and sometimes imperceptibly is impaired. In 1970, the costs and benefits of technology introductions were discussed by Groenewegen, then a thirty-year-old senior lecturer in economics at the University of Sydney. He highlighted the tradition of the introduction of labour saving devices in his article entitled 'Employment and Machinery: Two Classical Debates on the Effects of Automation'. Groenewegen noted that when technology, such as automation, is introduced there are, on the one hand, savings to be made and on the other there is a social cost. Groenewegen argued that: 'the introduction of labour-saving devices has generally produced a dilemma for the policy-maker' (Groenewegen 1970: 348). Byrt mentions similar arguments presented earlier such as a short working week may lead to more interesting work. Byrt, writing in Australia's Twentieth Century journal draws attention the work of Lord Halsbury and his thesis outlining the possibility of three types of labour: clerical which will be replaced by machines; manual which will still occupy 'tough young men'; and dirty isolated occupations such as mining. This Australian journal brought the issue to the attention of Australians (Byrt 1956: 338). There were numerous articles on shortening the working week and the nature of work written in Australia and abroad but this thesis will not attempt to list them all. Turning to historical works on public administration computing, a study by Grierson ( 1979) entitled Aspects of the Administration of Commercial Computer Resources within the Queensland Public Service completed a section that contained a brief history of computing introduction in the Queensland Public Service. Grierson's study of the history of computing in Queensland Government comprised a small section of a larger work on manpower [sic] analysis. His work focuses on policy issues and departmental personnel responsibilities and it examines the role of the computing administrator and considers social issues such as privacy in the Queensland context. My treatment focuses more on the early history of computing from the first mention of computing introduction to the first realisation of the 17 problems. Also since Grierson completed his study, Cabinet Minutes have been opened for public access which cast substantial light on the period in question. The Centre for Information Technology and Communications' (CITEC), Annual Report of 1989 outlines a brief one-page history of computing in the Queensland Government. It explained that centralised computing was under the control of Treasury - EDP Branch and in May 1977 SGCC was formed. In 1987 the SGCC was transferred from the Treasury Department to the Department of Industrial Development and became CITEC. 'Computers and Government: The Commonwealth Public Service Story' written by Pridmore (1966), Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra was published in Data Trend. This article highlights the introduction of punched card technology for the Census of 1921 and the introduction of a computer into weapons research in 1955. Early in 1960, the Prime Minister approved the establishment of an Interdepartmental Committee of ADP about the same time as Queensland formed the EDP Committee. The article acknowledges overseas reports on ADP by the General Service Administration and the Office of the Bureau of the Budget in the United States Government. From these reports Pridmore states that: The probable impact was even then seen to be so far reaching that it was considered desirable in a Public Service of the size of the Commonwealth's to proceed carefully with the acquisition of computers' (Pridmore 1966: 17). Another treatment of the Commonwealth Public Service story can also be found in J.M. Bennett (ed.) Computing in Australia: The Development of a Profession, 1994. This work also discusses the work of the former Telecom (currently Telstra) and it mentions developments in the Australian Post Office (currently Australia Post). Outside the public sector, McKenney, Mason and Copeland completed a history of introduction of computing in the Bank of America. This article outlines the bottlenecks in the processing of cheques and the developments in computing technology adopted by the Bank. Computing solved the bank's clerical problems while at the same creating expansion that made the bank a leader in its industry for over a decade and a half. The need for planning at the time of introduction to lessen the adverse effects of computing was recognised by many. The ACTU clearly stated in its policy on automation that planning for introduction was necessary in Government, as did The 18 Federated Clerks Union. A history of the Federated Clerks Union's involvement in automation is documented by Terry Sullivan (1986) 'New Technology: Thirty years On' in Technological Change: Impact of Information Technology 1986. Deery (1987) completed a work entitled Trade Union Involvement in the Process of Technological Change. These works bestow a valuable history of unions and technological change, particularly the work done by the Federated Clerks Union. This thesis does not repeat that history but rather it focuses on key interactions in relation to unions, unemployment and government. What is explored in this thesis is the nature of the planning process in relation to early Queensland Government computing. What did the decision-makers think they were undertaking? What were the most significant influences on their decisions? What kinds of problems did they foresee? In retrospect, how do they explain what they did not see? Historical studies of this type focusing on the twentieth century have been completed on other technologies such as television and satellites. An example of a study of this type is Cameron Hazlehurst's (1988) article entitled: 'The Clem Lack Oration: The Dawn of the Satellite Era in Australia'. Hazlehurst examined the 'political decision-making process which led to the introduction of Australia's domestic satellite system' (Hazlehurst 1988: 270). This work explains that more light can be shed on an issue when the records for the period become open, usually after thirty years. Naturally, it also explains that more occurs behind the scenes than meets the public eye. Hazlehurst highlights the Australian political system's difficulty in coping with technological change, especially when pressured by business individuals, such as Kerry Packer. Relevant to this thesis is that, in the end, technocrats behind closed doors made decisions. Also, the Satellite introduction had 'consequences exceeding those that were contemplated by the people who decided that we should have them (Hazlehurst 1988: 271 ). Hazlehurst questions 'how was it that certain fundamental choices came to be made' (Hazlehurst 1988: 272). The decision in the end was made to satisfy both social benefit and commercial gain. Was the decision to adopt computers made to meet similar ends? These questions need to be asked about the introduction of computers. In an essay, M.J. Anthony (1958), a member of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand , argued that it was clear that the quill and pen had gone and that devices such as book-keeping, calculating and adding machines and typewriters 19 and photo-copying units had changed offices. However, what was to come was far more significant. Anthony states: For even at to-day's [sic] early stage of development, one can visualise electronic data-processing machines producing fundamental changes in our whole concept of accepted administrative procedure (Anthony 1958: 1). He went on to argue that: 'most commonly they will be savings in labour costs and savings in time' (Anthony 1958: 2). Anthony's evidence was drawn from the American experience of computing which disclosed that: 'it is likely that with the growth of EDP and the consequent reduction in routine clerical jobs, a smaller percentage of females will be employed in offices' (Anthony 1958: 6). If unemployment was a well documented, predictable and quickly visible consequence of investment in computers, what of more diffuse consequences with less immediately identifiable 'victims'? By the early 1970s the issue that seemed to arouse the most passion was the threat to individual privacy. The issue of privacy became predominant when it was realised how much information was being held by 'data banks' and how easy it was for that information to be shared. 'It is the introduction of the electronic computer and the rapid growth in technology in this field that has prompted the fears of 'big brother' (Grierson 1979: 139). Part of the social cost of gathering large amounts of information was that the individual was said to be reduced to a mere number and as a result individuals were said to be thought of as less than human. Another fear was that an individual was unable to control the spread of information about them and they had no recourse to correct wrong information. To prevent such abuses was the main thrust of the initial Invasion of Privacy Bill brought to the Queensland Parliament in 1971. Through the 1970s there was much legislation developed in many countries to regulate and minimise threats to privacy. The United States had the Privacy Act of 197 4; the Swedish Government developed the Data Bank Law of 1973; The Federal Republic of Germany developed the Federal Data Protection Act of 1976; and the French, Norwegian, and Austrian legislation was passed from 1977 onwards. The legislation that was developed in Queensland was the first in the Australian States. There is a very large volume of material on privacy written in Australia and it is not appropriate to review it here. With this background in mind, what follows is an examination of the history of the introduction of computing in Queensland Government from 1956 to 1971, with some 20 consideration of developments up to 1984. This study investigates the history of the introduction of computers in Queensland Government with particular focus on three departments: the Treasury - EDP Branch, the Main Roads Department and the SGIO. It seeks to explore in particular the decision-making processes and arguments, which determined major outcomes. This study will examine the issues at the time by looking at records from the period including published materials (newspapers, monographs, journals, reports and so on); unpublished materials (thesis, tender documents and the like) and archival material (reports, questionnaires, letters, minutes, and so on). Interviews with individuals involved in the decision-making processes have also been undertaken and collated with other sources. There are many ethical issues concerning the use of and the content of, information technology such as the Internet in Queensland at present. Issues include matters relating to privacy, copyright, censorship and so on. This study investigates the history of the introduction and early introduction of information technology in Queensland Government from the 1950s. It seeks to investigate the issues as they were perceived by various interested groups at the time; to examine the extent to which there was an awareness of the problems of information technology which emerged over the next thirty five years and to explore in particular the decision making processes and arguments that determined major outcomes. It is proposed that the work will highlight some key issues involving government decision-making processes relating to significant new technology applications. In essence this will be a study of decision-making which aims to develop a better understanding of how governments deal with major technological innovation. After this introduction (chapter one), chapter two will examine the events leading up to the installation of computers in 1965. In chapter three the period from tendering, ordering and installation, up to the realisation of the problems of computing in 1971 is highlighted. In chapter four the 1971 debates surrounding computer difficulties, including privacy, will be focused on. Finally, in chapter five a conclusion and assessment is conducted in order to highlight what can be learned from the experience. The thesis will conclude that computers were a logical extension of punched card technology. Where manual methods were still being utilised or where accounting machines were being used, computers were seen as an escape from the maze of 21 paper-work. Paper-work was costing time and money and the coming of decimal currency was going to add to the cost. Accounting machines had to be converted. Unemployment was perceived to be of little concern because Queensland was expanding and it was supposed that there was close to full employment. The data that could be collected, stored and shared was considered marvellous or miraculous and the term privacy in relation to computing was not in use. In this thesis the workings of public administration will be highlighted. What was a crucial technological innovation was delegated, much like other public service work, by the senior public servants to the computer professionals. This was because no one in the public service had sufficient knowledge of computers. Fortunately, they made a sound decision in the choice of their planning officer. Senior public servants selected computer professionals who would report on a problem after they fixed it. This delegation of responsibility will be proven courageous when it is carefully examined, as it will be in this thesis. 22 Chapter Two: The Lead-up to Installation of Computers: 1956 - 1964 The changes associated with automation are particularly likely to arouse feelings, especially anxiety, because they conjure up the nightmare of Frankenstein destroyed by the monster he himself created (K.F. Walker, Prof. Psychology, University of Western Australia, 1956). Introduction This chapter describes events leading to the introduction of computers into the Queensland Government. A monumental problem of this period was the way in which computers were being misunderstood, a difficulty enhanced by the press. Set against this, were the pressing problems of ever increasing workload faced by the public service as business in Queensland increased. These problems, it seemed, particularly when the previous history of earlier technology such as punched card machines is considered, was capitalised on by marketing individuals such as John Marshall who clearly contributed to technology push but in a non-technical way. The pressure of other states already having the technology encouraged the government to examine the issue, but a State Planning Officer, hired to manage the computer installations introduction, was buried in copious reporting tasks which resulted in much delay and procrastination. Despite Hiley's earlier concerns such as resulting unemployment, computers were introduced into the Queensland Government in 1965. The Press Treatment of Early Computing It is instructive to commence this chapter with an examination of how computers were written about by the press to gain an appreciation of how computers were described to the community, including public servants, as the descriptions were often sensationalised to the point where any knowledge gained about computers from the articles was misleading and often incorrect. On 24 February 1960 an article by Murdoch Wales entitled 'Talking Typewriters in Office of Future' appeared in the Brisbane paper The Courier-Mail. Murdoch Wales, an author and historian for the SGIO, had the article stored in the SGIO. He stated: ... Watson [president of International Business Machines World Trade Corporation] outlined the office of the future equipped with voice writers to 23 replace typewriters and with machines to provide instantaneously information which today takes several weeks to complete ... Professor Herbert Simon, a professor of industrial management at the Carnigee Institute of Technology, said electronic computers were being developed which were to think, learn and have insight. He said it had been claimed that the machines would share with managers the task of making decisions (The Courier-Mai/, Wednesday 24 February 1960: 13). Clearly, the fear of redundancy was generated by the way computers were being portrayed by the press. In 1962, the press was again describing the computer in a sensational tone. A computer 'acts as well as thinks', claimed The Australian Financial Review (The Australian Financial Review, 18 January 1962: 30). Computers 'forecast election results with remarkable accuracy' (Australian Financial Review, 22 February 1962: 40). In the text of an article computers were 'adding a worldwide mental capacity to mankind [sic]' and 'they have helped medical research workers establish the effectiveness of a new antibiotic' (Australian Financial Review, 25 January 1962: 34 ). Another article in the same vein describes computers as 'supplying Pan American World Airways engineers with the answers to questions about the operation of supersonic transports' (Australian Financial Review, 17 April 1962: 33). An article in The Courier-Mail of 11 June 1960 had the title 'A 100,000 pound 'Brain' for University' (The Courier-Mai/, 11 June 1960: 6). It described the University of Queensland's decision to buy a 'computing brain' (The Courier-Mai/, 11 June 1960: 6). The 'machine would solve mathematical problems', the article stated (The Courier-Mai/, 11 June 1960: 6). It would in some cases 'operate 1,000 times faster than a human would with an electronic calculator' (Courier Mail, 11 June 1960: 6). Some reporters raised ethical issues. In 1961, a staff reporter for The Australian Financial Review stated: 'there is no shortage of details about computers and the rest of automation's hardware, but the scarcity of facts about the broad effects of automation on people and economics is appalling' (The Australian Financial Review, 18 January 1961: 6). In 1962, it was further reported in the Australian Financial Review that: 'the time and labour-saving aspects of its [automation's] introduction for these purposes will alone be found, in the majority of cases, to justify its installation' (Australian Financial Review, 22 February 1962: 40). However, the effect of these savings was not seriously discussed. 24 Meanwhile the officials struggled to comprehend the potential of the new technology. Real understanding of what a computer could do was rare, even among some of the highly qualified professionals. The problem was to think of a machine in human terms. To correct the situation, many computer consultants termed computers as 'giant morons' that could not perform their function without exact instruction or programming. The press continued to adopt a science fictional approach to describing computers as super-machines with overwhelming capabilities. In his 1979 thesis, Grierson, currently a senior Queensland Public Servant, made an important point in relation to the media when he states: Regarding the media as a source of information, one must be aware of the apparent paranoia of some sections of the media in introducing the emotive 'big brother' stereotype whenever discussing computers ... [others in the media] tend to introduce the computer as some form of demi-god and create the false image of computer personnel being geniuses who wear asbestos coats and push buttons. A further problem inherent in media references, apart from the sensationalism, is the inaccuracies that exist on many occasions when computers are involved in any newsworthy project. The computer is constantly plagued by the media using the computer as a scapegoat, if not directly, then certainly by implication. The public service is bound by the 'Vow of Silence' and is provided little opportunity to reply (Grierson 1979:). A sense of frustration with the code of silence in the Public Service is obvious in this description and it is clear that Grierson found his opportunity to reply. Thus, the press place external pressure on public servants and politicians both to speak out and to undertake courses of action. The Department of Education One of the earliest applications for punched card technology in Queensland Government was at the Department of Education. The Department of Education, which did some data processing work for other Departments, was in part a precursor to and later merged into the Treasury - EDP Branch. It is worth describing punched card methods here so that the process can be understood in relation to later computing techniques. 25 During 1958 expressions of interest were called for anyone interested in pursuing automatic data processing (ADP). The Main Roads Department and the Department of Education were looking at introducing punched card ADP type systems. Punched card equipment arrived from the United Kingdom and was set up in the basement of the Treasury Building. Interestingly, this is where the first Treasury computer was placed. Scholarship examination results proved to be the pilot project for the Department of Education. Junior and Senior examination processing was done at Queensland University. The University of Queensland conducted data processing of junior results and Col Clapper, head of the punched card installation in the Department of Education, examined it working (Clapper 2000, pers. comm., 23 March). The Education Department work was done in the following manner. Operators punched eighty column cards (a card held eighty characters of information) using a keyboard similar to a modern keyboard. Examination numbers, names of students (family name, first name and so on) were held on each card. A card had fixed fields with a set number of characters and multiple cards were used. One card held the name and the date of birth; the next their address details; the next their school details; and another held examination details. The system was based on the two states, on and off or 0 and 1. This commonest form of input was either a hole or no hole in a punch card or paper tape. This simple form was expanded to include 0 to 9, letters A to Z and symbols such as the dollar sign. The card was divided vertically into twelve zones of which the lower ten represent the numbers 0 to 9. Two upper zones not numbered on the card were usually called the X and Y zones or sometimes 10 and 11 or 11 and 12. The alphabet is made up of a combination of two holes in the same column using a zone punching and a number, thus A is 11 and 1, while Z is 0 and 9. Paper tape had from 5 to 8 rows in which holes were punched, absolute values being given to them by virtue of their position and combination with other holes. Female staff (and all keyboard staff at that time were female) produced the cards with slots on the correct characters (Clapper 2000, pers. comm., 23 March). It was possible to program the other machines to recognise the combinations of characters. Tabulators, printers and calculators and so on all had plugged 26 .... = ! - - = ""' -= r: - ...... ,. '-" =... ,.._., °" er. ...... ,.. c.. -lo - k ,,_ -Ge> O> Mi ~ ... - ~ - .... 11 C::- P• - (-.. a.:i. .:ft' .• ct ~ - ,...... ,.,;i; Qi ~ - "'°"' ""' a Cl- " - r--. ,., • ...,, ~..a ""' cn !jJ :;,- ...... M '\.A ii.A ,_ Ali ~ .-,. rz .,., \.a 00 "" ~ ,_, ....., ""' - ... :11 r"""1 lliZl' ~ U::...... ""~ =~~· r""')o -2- "1 ... &::::> .. ·· - ...... - <.a CiO =~ ;~ .. "" m.:; °' "'; - ,...,. ,_, CD en ~ ;l .,...... ~ ,,,. - r-. Q) Q)~ .., =~ ..,"° a"::= a ..n a:> .,.,, ... - O"'!'..; .n ...... ,.,-~ ::: ..,., ...... :f !:'- .... cn !;1 = .n a>7 Ii - ...... - ..,. = i'- ~ > N -+ = lll ""lo ~ 2 Q:;l'I = l'l ICT 80 Column Punch Card 27 Keyboards and operators slotted cords into a machine to form a whole matrix. The machines read what was necessary from the cards and presented it on a printer. The same was true for calculations. For example, machines could read a series of cards according to the wired programming to produce a total of payments. The cards were the data source, and the panel provided the program. It was possible to read the card and so on using a variety of machines. For example, a sorter would sort 1400-2000 cards a minute. It could sort the cards into alphabetical order. School code numbers were added into each student's card and the tabulator would add them up. The tabulator was also a printing machine. A reproducer would automatically punch on each card the same information, for example, a school code. The keyboard was also programmable. It had automatic skips and so on that is, if a keyboard punched the first card with a code, it could be programmed to punch the same code on the following cards (Clapper 2000, pers. comm., 23 March). The operator punched a card and it was passed to a second operator for checking. If there were discrepancies a red light would come on. It was often necessary to verify on a different shift so there would be no cooperation between keypunch operators over interpretations of the information. There were two shifts to get the work done on time and it included overtime (Clapper 2000, pers. comm., 23 March). Marked sensing was later used. This was where information could be marked on the card using a 2H pencil. It was then not necessary to punch the cards. A board of university students would mark the results onto the marked sheets. They would call back the results from the paper and not from the summary sheets. Approximately 30,000 results would be handled, including Junior and Apprenticeship examination results. They would then be run through a machine, which would punch the card. This was an addition to the existing technology and many people could mark cards instead of being forced to rely on two people using a keypunch. It made the work faster because it was possible to use as many people as necessary to mark the cards (Clapper 2000, pers. comm., 23 March). In the early 1960s the Department of Education installation took on the apprenticeship examinations. The press list was required first. Candidates queued on the street for the results and the punched card Centre became the focal point. In addition, the Department of Education was one of the first Departments to do their accounts using automation. Land tax payments for the Treasury Department and the Land Tax Office were finalised. The Education Department's ADP section then 28 advised on how these Departments could set their rates. The children's services payments for parents with foster children were done for the Children's Services section. The Department of Education had a resource that could be used across the public service and Clapper went door knocking offering the service on a fee basis to other departments (Clapper 2000, pers. comm., 23 March). The ADP branch of the Education Department merged into the EDP Branch - Treasury. All keyboard operators were transferred and they became the input operators. The Department of Education changed the data processing systems from punched card operations to computer operations. They took the programming from the keyboards into the programming on magnetic tape. They still used punched cards in the new computer installation by using a card reader on the computer. Punched cards were used for some years to the late 1960s. In the late 1960s they converted from punched cards to encoders. Essentially, keyboard operators did the same thing but they keyed directly onto magnetic tape but the principle of entering and verifying was still done. The keying to magnetic tape was a lot faster than punched cards although the operators developed repetitive strain injury and it became necessary to slow them down (Clapper 2000, pers. comm., 23 March). The Department of Education gradually phased out and closed down the punched card process. The system was totally manual before punched card machines. Scholarships were all hand written or typed. These were enormous tasks. When they moved to punched cards it eased the process. Senior results had to be finalised before universities started. The results had to be out before Christmas - that was the set target date. Clapper posits that was the driving force for automation. Furthermore, the ADP Branch did a lot of educational research, including statistics that could not be done before, as well as research modelling (Clapper 2000, pers. comm., 23 March). Clapper recalls that he was: Given a pretty free hand to do what I wanted to. When there was an opportunity I would go and have a look at it and provide a report. I was only young and I did not know all the intrigues of the bureaucracy (Clapper 2000, pers. comm., 23 March). The level of autonomy is interesting to note here and it is also important to note the transition from punched card technology to the computers. The card was used on both machines in the beginning. 29 John Marshall As cited earlier, Caudle (1990) argued that the urge for technology came from management rather than from the computer professionals because technologists tend to explain benefits in technical terms rather than in practical uses for the technology. Yet, John Marshall made a significant contribution to computing during the period through his work in distribution and support. The result of a salesperson's work was undoubtedly the promotion of the computing methods to business and Government. This promotion provided a forceful external influence on the decision to adopt technology and it is well worth considering his involvement here before proceeding, as it invalidates Caudle 's argument. Marshall responded to an advertisement posted by Powers-Samas for a Queensland Manager of Queensland operations. He was to sell a new type of calculating machine and located his concern in the Penny's Building in Queen Street, Brisbane. In about 1958 Power-Samas merged with British Tabulating Machines (BTM) and became ICT. Marshall took over servicing the Department of Education application after the merger as the Hollerith Company was under the auspices of BTM. This application, according to Marshall, was well regarded. Marshall stated that it: 'enabled them to collate examination results much more quickly and I should think much more accurately than they had done earlier' (Marshall 2000: pers. comm., 28 January). The other Government applications running prior to Marshall's posting were sold from New South Wales. The SGIO had been sold a sixty-five Column Powers Samas installation for actuarial statistics then completed by the State Actuary, Jack Rutherford. The SGIO was not considered part of the 'accepted Government'; it was a separate institution whereas the Department of Education was considered to be part of the Government mainstream (Marshall 2000: pers. comm., 28 January). There were many private punched card applications functioning at the time. Mount Isa Mines (MIM) had installed a punched card system and they were undertaking accounting work that was tedious and lent itself well to punched card technology, for instance, costing, general ledger, stores and wages. All this work was done by hand previously assisted only by simple calculators. Another application was at the Golden Circle Cannery at Northgate. The City Electric Light Company had a very 30 primitive Powers-Samas application in a bureau fashion. They punched and verified their cards in their office and then sent them to the Powers-Samas office where they were sorted and tabulated. Another application was located at Paul's Ice Cream factory. They were doing some accounting work on van stock control in their own office. In 1958 Powers-Samas created a machine called the Electronic Multiplying Punch (EMP). This machine could take two fields of a card and multiply them together. One of Marshall's first accomplishments was to upgrade the City Electric Light Company's bureau application to a full on-site application. He sold them a forty column application, and, according to Marshall, the Secretary of the Company Harry Baskerville was an innovator and he gladly took delivery of an EMP. This meant, for example, that wages costing could be done automatically. Punched cards were separated into types of labour and each type of labour would have an hourly rate. The machine called an interpolator would be used to place a card containing the hourly rate in front of each type of labour. The EMP would take the rate from the hourly rate card, calculate it by the number of hours in each successive card and punch the answer into the card. There was room for a lot of ingenuity in the development of the systems. Marshall stated that a statistician/accounting background made such tasks easier. Marshall would participate in the development of applications using his knowledge and then teach staff how to develop their own systems. BTM had done some work on advanced calculators and primitive computers prior to their marriage with Powers-Samas. Out of this development came the machine called the ICT 1301. This machine was a computer and not a calculator because it had a drum memory facility. Paul's Ice Cream had a competitor in Brisbane called Peters. About the time of the ICT 1301's introduction Paul's and Peter's merged to become Queensland United Foods, now called QUF industries. The directors of the company became interested in the ICT 1301, which was an 80 Column machine. The directors asked Marshall to conduct a survey of their business to ascertain how the work could be done better on a computer. Marshall recalls that this was a very demanding task. The directors of Queensland United Foods decided to choose an ICT 1301 rejecting the proposal offered by IBM. This was the first commercial computer sold in Queensland. In 1964, Marshall brought engineers from Britain so that installation and maintenance crews would be available for the machine's arrival. Marshall provided an on-site engineer with the ICT 1301 in order to solve any 31 ongoing problems. QUF retained the services of a programmer named John Barker who headed up their programming section for many years. ICL was formed by the British Government as it felt that it was necessary to form some cooperation between the many companies in Britain all working on computer manufacturing in order to achieve the best form the technology for Britain. Companies such as ICT, Elliott Automation, Leo, English Electric and Ferranti were all merged to form ICL. The ICT executives became the senior executives of ICL in England. In Australian not many of the above companies were represented. In Queensland, for example, ICT was the only one operating. ICL brought the RCA 301 into Australia and re-labelled the machine the ICL 1500. It was a more advanced machine than the 1301. At about this time Marshall visited Southern Cross, a foundry in Toowoomba headed by a manager named Griffiths, and he sold him an ICL 1500 for accounting work. During this time the Queensland Government was rationalising the electricity industry. The City Electric Light Company was merged with Toowoomba Electric Light Company to become the Southern Electricity Authority of Queensland (SEAQ). Another regional electric light Company was established at Rockhampton called the Capricornia Regional Electricity Authority (CREB) and another at Townsville named the Townsville Regional Electricity Board (TREB). Marshall sold installations to the Boards at Townsville and Rockhampton. Marshall sold other Brisbane firms installations. ACF and Shirley Fertiliser received a forty-column installation and Allen and Starks also received a forty-column machine. Chandlers was another such installation. The Brisbane City Council received an installation at about this time. W.D. Scoot and Company (Management Consultants) received a contract to assist with transport operations. Marshall worked with the consultant on the project, John Woodhead, to help solve a system problem through the use of punched card technology. The Brisbane City Council had about six Tabulators and Summary Card punches and SEAQ had about the same. The Summary Card punch operated behind the Tabulator and when an accounting balance was produced, for example, it would go through to the Summary Card Punch to be stamped. The Machine proved to be extremely noisy in operation and staff wore no ear protection. Marshall recalled that the Queensland Government had an office machine controller 32 named Evan Fell but 'he had no great knowledge of office accounting' (Marshall 2000, pers. comm., 28 January). At the time of approaching John Marshall, Pope found that ICL had little to offer with the exception of a machine started by Ferranti and finished by ICL named the ICL 1900 series. This machine, according to Marshall, was unmatched by any other competitor. This was because the machine had features like standard interface that is, the same cable could be used to connect all the peripherals to the central processor. It was not necessary for the paper tape reader and the magnetic tape to have special cables. The same standard interface cable could be used for both. Multi-programming was a major feature that hastened the completion of a task. Once the central processor issued an order to a peripheral, such as a card reader, the time taken by the card reader to complete its task would be quite significant. On other computers that was time wasted. The operating system on the 1900 developed a method of using that time to do something else such as making a calculation, punching paper tape or sending data to magnetic tape. Multi-programming was a significant feature of the ICL 1900 it had much appeal to computer professionals. Marshall posited that 'such a man was Pope' (Marshall 2000, pers. comm., 28 January). The machine had a Cobal compiler and a sound operating system. Programs were interchangeable within the system so that when the Main Roads computer was received a Main Roads program could be run on the Treasury machine and the converse (Marshall 2000, pers. comm., 28 January). Marshall's efforts in promoting computers provides evidence that technology push was a factor in the adoption decision, although Marshall focused on the needs of the user and matched them with machines, thus selling on what the machine could do rather than its technicalities. Prior to purchasing a computer the Queensland Government used the University of Queensland's machine. It is informative to examine events during this period. The University of Queensland's Computer In 1957 Sydney Prentice, Head of the Department of Electrical Engineering of the University of Queensland, went on leave to the United States where he witnessed the IBM650 computer. Prentice understood its implications for engineering and, in particular, the speed and power it gave to design engineers. Prentice, convinced he needed a computer, lobbied the Professorial Board of the University. Richard Kelly, a tutor in engineering at the time, recalls that the Board, unwilling to 33 proceed with the purchase of a computer, established a study team to study the value of installing a computer. Kelly claims its main aim was to draw out Prentice's proposal. In 1958 a report was prepared on computers by Kelly, who was subsequently appointed the University's computer technical adviser. Kelly admits that his knowledge of computing was not extensive, but others in the University knew less at the time. Vice Chancellor J.D. Story suggests Kelly, was very cautious about spending such large sums of money on new machines (Kelly 1997 pers. comm., 10 October). The Queensland Government played a part in the University of Queensland's computer purchase, although obtaining this contribution was time consuming. The University of Queensland Board approached the Queensland Government on 21 October 1959 to ascertain if the Government was interested in contributing towards the purchase of a computer. This prepayment was for future use of the machine. The University proposed that the machine could complete a number of tasks for many Queensland Government departments, including Main Roads, Forestry, Agriculture and Stock, Local Government, Auditor General, Public Service Commissioner, Education, Coordinator General, Railways, Development and Mines, the Survey Office and the SGIO. Other groups to contribute to the purchase of the machine included the Brisbane City Council, Olympic Tyre, the Alfred Grant and Mount Isa Mines. This extraordinary assemblage of partners was itself a sign of the unique development that was about to take place In September 1960, £114,525 was promised by the Government with a further £25,000 to be promised in the near future. This commitment was in stark contrast to the initial negative reply for funds received by the University of Queensland's Senate Vacation Executive Committee from the Director General of Education on 15 December 1959. Fred Schonnell, vice-chancellor of the University of Queensland, sought a Treasury loan to cover costs while the pledge funds arrived. This loan was made as part of the 1959-1960 grants to the University of Queensland. Promises 34 totalling £114,525 were made as follows: 1. 1960 - 1961 £9,525 2. 1961 - 1962 £30,667 3. 1962 - 1963 £34,667 4. 1963 - 1964 £32,666 5. 1964 - 1965 £7,000 (UQA S130 Subject Files 'Old Series' [1911-1966] Establishment Computer Centre 1959-1960). It was estimated that the running costs for the first year of operation would be as follows: 1. Salaries £11,000 2. Maintenance £2,000 3. Research vote £1,000 4. Recurring capital costs £2,000 (UQA S130 Subject Files 'Old Series' [1911-1966] Establishment Computer Centre 1959-1960). Other charges included such items as punch tape. These additional charges were considered, but not costed (UQA S130 Subject Files 'Old Series' [1911-1966] Establishment Computer Centre 1959-1960). Contributions reached £142,000 in April 1961 and an order was placed for the GE225. At the same time a site was constructed for the computer in the new Faculty of Engineering Building. The GE225, which cost a total £135,000 and which took four years to realise, was installed in the University of Queensland in March 1962. After installation in March and testing, the computer began service in May 1962. D.W. Fraser, the Pubic Service Commissioner, who assisted in encouraging contributions from the Queensland Government, opened the Centre. This computer became the first to be used by the Queensland Government in Queensland. In spite of Story's concerns in November 1960 that not all funds would be received, all monetary promises were kept by the government departments which in return received proportionate use of the machine. The Departments to make the most use of the computer were the State Electricity Authority and the Mines and Main Roads Department. 35 The State Government Insurance Office's Dilemma 1 The Public Service Commissioner Fraser wrote in the 36 h Annual Report that: 'The improvement of efficiency by the use of the latest labour saving machines and efficient system is fostered throughout the Public Service' (Queensland. Public Service Commissioner, Annual Report: Year Ended 3dh June, 1957: 29. In 1957, John Marshall, sold the SGIO a Hollerith/ICT punched card machine to replace old breaking down Powers-Samas equipment that had been is use since 1937. 1 It is instructive to examine here the events leading to this decision. The reading public were told in the annual report that in 1956-1957 an investigation was made into proposals for the installation of 'machine methods' in the departments and approval was given to purchase: accounting machines; adding machines; addressing machines; calculating machines; duplicating machines; franking machines; microfilm equipment; and, most importantly, punch card equipment all to the total value of over £30,000 (Queensland. Public Service Commissioner, Annual Report: Year Ended 3dh June, 1957: 29.) In 1957-1958 departments were granted the installation of fifty-three office machines to the total value of £23,000. These machines included: accounting machines; adding machines; calculating machines; duplicating machines; photocopying machines; and collating machines. The Main Roads Department was granted hire and use of punched card equipment for various analysis of accumulations under The Roads (Contribution to Maintenance) Act of 1957. Mechanised accounting methods were commenced at the Departments of Labour and Industry and Electricity Supply during that year. A photocopying machine was installed in the Department of Agriculture and Stock for its 'use and the use of any other Department close enough' (Queensland. Public Service Commissioner, Annual Report: Year Ended 3dh June 1958: 38). Developments behind the scenes are illuminating and are not widely disseminated. The SGIO was one of many departments experiencing immense problems with business volume and costs, partly due to the limitations of accounting machines. It is particularly useful to examine the problems experienced by the SGIO in some detail. 1 This machinery was very noisy and ear protection was not worn. 36 In 1946 Cec Grimley, the then Insurance Commissioner, announced an intention to extend the addressograph system at a cost of £1,600 per branch. Evidently, it would greatly assist with the production of expiry notices. As early as 1946 the employees of the SGIO were having difficulty coping with the volume of business. The main difficulty for many departments, particularly the SGIO prior to 1965, was tracing outstanding balances in an accounts system with increasing transactions. From 1939 to 1951 premium income increased by 17 4 percent while staff levels increased by only eighteen percent. More business was not actively sought due to the problems in handling the current volumes. The manual work required and additional overtime was large, as many paper records had to be traced. In an attempt to remedy the crisis, in 1949 Grimley was still pressing with attempts to install addressograph machines only manufactured in the United States. As well as the problem of doing the work in the time available, there was no room for extra staff. Another problem was that much of the old office machinery needed ongoing replacement at considerable cost. One reason for the labour shortage was employees were not as well paid as their peers in private enterprise. Therefore, work was more lucrative for a young officer in private enterprise than in the Public Service. Grimley was accused of making profits by underpaying staff. Grimley claimed that accusations published in The Courier Mail were a deliberate attempt to push through an increase in wages by employees and unions (Thomis and Wales 1986: 129-136). In 1953, staff increased from 346 to 364 in head office. Despite an increase of eighteen staff, Grimley continued to emphasise to Treasury the increased cost of overtime. This message fell on the ears of V.C. Gair (Premier) and E.J.Walsh (Treasurer) at the time. The supply of senior experienced officers dried up in 1954 and most new appointments were juniors. There were long delays in the front desk area of the SGIO. The officers of the SGIO could not complete their work in ordinary hours. In 1955 to 1956 staff overall in the SGIO increased from 688 to 717, yet overtime was still needed. Grimley preached the problems of the SGIO when Hiley was appointed Treasurer in 1957. He complained of the constant difficulty of finding sufficient experienced staff to fill clerical positions. Grimley was well liked in the position of head of the SGIO. As far back as 1946, the Grimley philosophy as Insurance Commissioner was that 37 'mechanisation is the secret in reduction of expenses these days' (Quoted in Thomis & Wales 1986: 138). Grimley, who was close to the end of his career, gave considerable impetus for Hiley to introduce computing to Cabinet. On 7 August 1956 Grimley wrote to the Under Secretary that debits had increased by thirty-one percent from 1950/51 to 1955/56 and workers' compensation claims had increased by seventy percent in 1950/51 to 1955/56. He continued: For some years past I have realised that the increasing volume of business transacted by the Office is bringing with it very serious problems, particularly in the Accounts Department and the Statistical Department of head office. This phenomenal growth in the work in the Accounts and Statistical Departments also increases the difficulties associated with balancing accounts. A multitude of entries has to be checked to find the outstanding balance, much time is lost in checking and other work accumulates in the meantime and overtime becomes very expensive. In balancing the accounts for 1955-1956 we have already worked 966 hours overtime. It is obvious that some drastic action is necessary to enable us to cope with the work and future expansion. After much thought and investigation I am satisfied that the answer to the problem lies in the adoption of a punched card accounting ... I recommend a Committee to investigate (Memorandum to Under Secretary from Insurance Commissioner, 7 August 1956, QSA, TR 1193/4, Box61, T3, EDP Files 1925-1982). Validated here is Bugler and Bretschneider's point that users need to solve pressing problems - in this case large amounts of paperwork - was the drive for computer adoption. Van Den Ende's notion that wider societal factors influence the adoption proved valid also as factors, such as increased spending on education and other post-war expansion, increased the volume of public service business and, as a result, indirectly led to the adoption decision (Fitzgerald 1986: 218). In the previous year, the balancing of account difficulty cost the SGIO £1140 in 1386 hours overtime. It was felt that the new technology would: 1. Eliminate overtime; 2. Improve efficiency in accounts, statistics, policy and claims department; 3. Save twenty-one Officers; 4. Enable staff to cope with increases in business (Memorandum to Under Secretary from Insurance Commissioner, 7 August 1956, QSA, TR 1193/4, Box 61, T3, EDP Files 1925-1982). The Hollerith Machine was thought to be capable of doing the following tasks: Fire and General Insurance - premiums, printing renewals; Cheques; Expenditure Dissection; Cashbook; Ledger; Outstanding Expenditure Cheques; 38 Payroll; and, Monthly life group collecting books (Memorandum to Under Secretary from Insurance Commissioner, 7 August 1956, QSA, TR 1193/4, Box 61, T3, EDP Files 1925-1982). The Insurance Commissioner on 27 November 1956 wrote in a memorandum with the subject: 'Accounting System SGIO' to the Under Secretary Treasury: Further to my recommendation of the 7 August 1956 and the approval of the Hon The Treasurer to an investigation by a Committee representing the: Auditor General; The Pubic Service Commissioner; The SGIO, this investigation has now been completed. In my memorandum of 7 August 1956 I explained how imperative it is that the most modern system of accounting be adopted with as little delay as possible ... Apart from the monetary loss to the office I believe that overtime is not a good thing for the staff ... The saving of staff is estimated as 21 officers. The most important advantage is that present staff will be able to cope with the increase in business visualised (Memorandum to Under Secretary from Insurance Commissioner, 27 November 1956, QSA, TR 1193/4, Box 61, T3, EDP Files 1925-1982). Grimley urgently wanted a solution to the crisis faced by the SGIO. On the one hand, he felt that overtime was not good and on the other he suggested that a saving of twenty-one employees could be made. This appears somewhat contradictory. Clearly, of paramount importance was the need for new business to be executed by the minimum number of staff without overtime. The need was critical but Grimley recognised that the rapid progress in electronics may in a few years lead to dramatic changes in data processing equipment. He sensed if they purchased the equipment there might have been difficulty in selling the equipment at a later date and this most certainly proved true. Therefore, in line with this, the Insurance Commissioner recommended adopting the Hollerith system at a hire of £13,333 annually for five years, including incidental expenses. He recommended that the order of November 1955, which was held awaiting confirmation, be cancelled. Cabinet approved this action on 19 February 1957. A hand written note at the bottom of the Insurance Commissioner's memorandum penned by an unknown scribe stated: 'It will may well be that a computer can serve quite of number of Departments and should be installed for the greatest general convenience of those Departments' (QSA, TR 1193/4, Box 61, T3, EDP Files 1925- 1982). Regardless, the Hollerith machine was installed in the Accounts, Policy and Statistical Departments of the SGIO, and from 1 July 1957 the Hollerith machine 39 was in operation. In 1958, in the opinion of the Accountant, Tierney, labour savings could not be reached until the installation of two new tabulators by June 1959. In June 1959 approval was sought to hire an electronic calculator and equipment for the preparation of workers compensation and renewal notices. The Insurance Commissioner recommended on 2 March 1960 that ICT might make a user needs survey but John Marshall had already stressed the enormity of such a task. The report was a large and perhaps biased document. Later Hiley understood that such a bias could only be avoided by independent studies by an impartial planning officer. As a consequence of a study completed by ICT, the company suggested the use of an ICT555, which was virtually a small computer as it had magnetic drum storage but it did not store its own program and thus was not a complete computer. The cost was to be £12,765 per annum (Memorandum to Under Secretary from Insurance Commissioner, 2 March 1960, QSA, TR 1193/4, Box 61, T3, EDP Files 1925-1982). The leadership of the SGIO was altered through legislation in 1960 and it is necessary to highlight the significant changes here as it benefits understanding of the SGIO commercial nature as, although it was still controlled by Treasury, it freed itself from some of its regulatory constraints and pursued business openly and in a less monopolistic fashion. Due to it size though, it was able to afford a computer and thus it regained the edge it was forced to lose. The SGIO was originally named the State Accident Insurance Office. The Office was established to orchestrate compulsory workers' compensation insurance in Queensland and the Office thus had a legislated monopoly. It was headed by the position Insurance Commissioner. It eventuated that the Insurance Commissioner's powers to control insurance matters in the State could be construed as competitive advantage when the Office's insurance interests became widespread. Thus, in 1960, a new SG/O (Qld.) Act 1960 passed which formally separated the position of insurance commissioner from the SGIO. Cec Grimley retired from the SGIO on 31 March 1960 and became Insurance Commissioner. McGrath became General Manager and Jack Demaine became Deputy General Manager, newly created positions prescribed by the SG/O (Qld.) Act 1960. In early 1963 Jack Demaine became General Manager and he subsequently retired in November 1963. Obtaining the post of Deputy Under Treasurer, announced in The Courier-Mai/ on 40 26 February 1961, and then leaving the post of Deputy Under Treasurer in 1963, Eric ('Butch') Riding was appointed SGIO's General Manager on 8 November 1963. Called Butch because of his boisterous manner, he was eager to please his supervisor Hiley. He threw a great deal of energy into computing but, according to some professionals like Pope, had some unrealistic views as to what it could accomplish (Thomis and Wales 1986: 193). On 8 March 1960 Cabinet appointed a Committee to investigate a proposal for the installation of an electronic calculator and associated equipment at the State Government Insurance Office. Early in the investigation, on 22 April 1960, the Committee clearly struggled and felt the situation called for immediate submission of an interim report containing some recommendations. The Committee began its report with a history of the development of machine methods in the SGIO. They noted that, following investigation by a committee, the existing punched card accounting system at the State Government Insurance Office was inaugurated in 1957 based on the rented equipment of Hollerith Australia Pty. Ltd. The Committee noted that the system was not fully developed and they noted that in the opinion of the Accountant of the State Government Insurance Office2 the work undertaken under the punched card accounting system was running smoothly and up to expectations and the installation was fast approaching the point where it would be economical. The type of saving that had been achieved, they argued, is demonstrated in the taking over by the Office of the monthly life departments collecting books. This led to a staff saving and other benefits. They claimed that: It is estimated that this work would entail five additional officers whereas by using punched cards and new procedures no increase of the Policy Department staff resulted. Further, the experience gained by officers is undoubtedly of considerable value and a necessary preliminary to the extension of the system and the introduction of further systems. On the other hand, difficulties have emerged and are continuing a fact that is hardly surprising in work that is intricate and in many ways novel to the Officers concerned. The presence of these difficulties has a positive educational use in that it indicates desirable and essential requirements for the future. This theme is very relevant to the introduction of the electronic computer (Interim Report of the Committee Established to Investigate the Extension of the Punched Card Accounting System at the State Government Insurance Office, 22 April 1960, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923-1982). The education gained through experience was not sufficient to meet the demands of computing work. 2 This publicly reticent man, Thomas Tierney, later said to Pope in private that there is 'nothing in the whole of the SGIO that is in anyway suitable for computers ' (Quoted in Pope 2000, pers. comm., 10 March). 41 One demand was planning and the Committee felt that no one in the SGIO was sufficiently trained to provide assistance in planning for computer work. They stated that: In our opinion no officer of the SGIO can be regarded as sufficiently trained at present and give adequate assistance in the planning of computer work. Such training would entail about four months of formal instruction. We also think that there is scope for further training among the senior operatives of the punched card accounting system. Admittedly, the officers concerned have gained valuable practical experience, one man has completed four weeks formal training in Sydney, but the full and efficient utilisation of the machines presently held, and as a preparation for further developments, something more systematic and regular appears desirable (Interim Report of the Committee Established to Investigate the Extension of the Punched Card Accounting System at the State Government Insurance Office, 22 April 1960, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923-1982). Coupled with the problem of training was retention. The officers allocated to computing would be permanent and they, it was considered, may even jeopardise future promotion within the public service. This was not the case as Malcolm Grierson, allocated to computing in 1965, is currently at the most senior post of Director General. Another unrealistic fear emerged - the fear of 'conservatism'. The committee claimed that: It is a common trait of mankind [sic] to oppose change and many examples of this inherent conservatism from the destruction of the new machines announced during the industrial revolution to modern deciphers of electronic brains could be quoted. The obvious personal or economic reasons for this characteristic need not be elaborated. Conservatism in our context is good in that it counsels caution but bad to the extent that it fosters opposition to and stifles the exploration of new fields of action and new modes of thought. Allied to negative conservatism is the pernicious attitude of apathy. It would be surprising if this negative conservatism did not appear in the SGIO. Obviously it can hamper, if only temporarily, transition from one system to another. The main remedies lie in time and education (Interim Report of the Committee Established to Investigate the Extension of the Punched Card Accounting System at the State Government Insurance Office, 22 April 1960, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923-1982). Senior public servants reflected that it would be a safeguard to compel key officers, other than officers presently connected with the punched card and associated systems, to attend punched card appreciation courses in Brisbane in order to understand the subject more clearly and thus they would be less fearful and resistant to change. 42 Another concern was mechanical breakdowns and faults and the Committee voiced the apprehension that: Machine faults and breakdowns must occur ... and frustrations of the inability of the machine to perform all the tasks that would be desirable may be felt. The breakdown or faults could appear in electrical or mechanical components or result from incomplete servicing, inadequately trained or inexperienced operators, incorrect planning and so on. The frustration may be the consequence of too little detail in original planning. Whatever the reason there have been some breakdowns (Interim Report of the Committee Established to Investigate the Extension of the Punched Card Accounting System at the State Government Insurance Office, 22 April 1960, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923-1982). Not only were there breakdowns but also there were many reasons for them, including the central concern of planning. Here is yet another appeal for a planning officer. Also, the Committee felt unable to comment on the advantages of using the equipment of any particular company. The transfer of SGIO policy department work from existing systems to punched card systems had been delayed due to breakdowns in the Hollerith tabulator and by limitations in the rented Hollerith equipment. As a result, the administrator concerned considered using an IBM tabulator. This piloted the consideration of an electronic computer and the Committee contemplated that at the present stage of the SGIO's development a overriding consideration existed that must triumph, that is it would be impracticable to rent a Hollerith punched card accounting system concurrently with an IBM computer system as the Hollerith system remained unproven. The adoption of the latter would compel the replacement of the former with IBM technology. They felt that the penalty of this might well be harsh and they postulated that it must be recalled that the present punched card accounting system had not been entirely tested or considered in all its detail so its eventual success or failure could not be gauged. In addition, highly trained personnel capable of accomplishing the changeover did not exist. The Committee was fearful of change and concerned that due process be adhered to. They asserted: It is not wise to change horses in mid stream ... If, after the Hollerith application is working, then and only then should a small ICT computer be considered if it can cope with a small system only then should the SGIO consider more large scale changes such as those handled by electronic computers. If ICT is not to be viewed as receiving preferential treatment.. .other companies should be allowed to present their propositions (Interim Report of the Committee Established to Investigate the Extension of 43 the Punched Card Accounting System at the State Government Insurance Office, 22 April 1960, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923-1982). The Committee wanted to keep ICT's service sharp by forcing competition. The issue of hours was then raised. The Hollerith equipment was hired on a rental basis under the condition that work would be limited to one shift per day. In practice there was provision to use it for additional hours to offset breakdown delays and phenomenal overtime. Accordingly, as the machines carried out more work, consideration, they claimed, must be given to negating normal public service hours of nine to five in the case of punched card operators or operators of associated equipment. Authority to work overtime to offset breakdowns needed to be immediate or automatic. They concluded, 'for the moment, pending further investigation, we content ourselves with simply bringing attention to this matter' (Interim Report of the Committee Established to Investigate the Extension of the Punched Card Accounting System at the State Government Insurance Office, 22 April 1960, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923-1982). The issue of centralisation was then raised. The SGIO was decentralised to a sizeable degree and this was in harmony with Government policy. As the development of punched card equipment and computer equipment developed in the office, there must be, they claimed, a reversing trend of centralisation in Brisbane. During a visit during 1957 to the North American continent, the Insurance Commissioner, whilst in Toronto, was satisfied with the use of an electronic computer for the creation of workers compensation premiums and complementary issuing of premium notices. The work of about 100,000 assessments and notices per annum was completed at the time of this report at head office and other branches in the State. The advantages of centralisation of this work using an electronic computer had in the opinion of the Committee the following advantages: Tighter control of procedures and reduction of errors. Some staff could be redirected which would result in a net saving of staff. Assessment would be completed more quickly and the notices sent earlier. The acceleration of Assessments would to a large extent offset the cost of installation (Interim Report of the Committee Established to Investigate the Extension of the Punched Card Accounting System at the State Government Insurance Office, 22 April 1960, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923-1982). This led the Insurance Commissioner to place a tentative order for a 550 electronic calculator at a cost of £1,000 pounds per month. A machine of that nature, it was noted, was already operating at the Commonwealth Statisticians Office, Canberra and The Ford Motor Company, Geelong. Other successful installations were 44 advantageous to a sale. ICT suggested that a 555 Computer should be used. A major conclusion was reached at this point, that is ICT could not do all the assessments and a planning officer was required. Again the push for a planning officer was furthered. The 550 calculator was in transit to Australia, advised ICT, and they wanted to know by the end of April 1960 whether the office wished to proceed with the order. ICT suggested that the order could be cancelled and investigations made for a new order of 555 computer about the middle of 1961. The report was signed by Rutherford, Tierney, Riding and Fell on 22 April 1960 (Interim Report of the Committee Established to Investigate the Extension of the Punched Card Accounting System at the State Government Insurance Office, 22 April 1960, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923-1982). Insurance business in Brisbane was expected to increase, manual data processing was set to increase, and decimal currency was coming. There were three problems associated with decimal currency. First, existing accounting records had to be converted. Second, there needed to be a conversion of existing statistical records. Third, there needed to be maintenance of a dual system. There also had to be a calculation of payment schedules and balances for workers compensation. The introduction of decimal currency was postponed more than once. It was predicted to arrive in 1961 and yet it arrived in 1966. For instance, an announcement appeared in The Courier-Mai/ on 17 July 1961 that explained that date of changeover was being delayed as recommended by the Decimal Currency Committee but it could be as early as 1963. Thus, the date for the changeover was an imperceptible fluid that could not be grasped and the Queensland Government panicked (The Courier-Mai/ 17 July 1961: 1 ). They feared the cost of office equipment conversion. The Courier-Mail predicted that conversion would have 'the biggest effect on office machines' (The Courier-Mail 25 August 1960: 1 ). The article stated that the: The cost of converting office machines will probably be the most important disadvantage of adopting decimal currency, the Commonwealth Decimal Currency Committee said in its report to Federal Parliament. The Committee estimated the cost of... £31, 700, 000. The Committee said that to defer the changeover date to 1970 would make the cost of converting accounting machines and cash registers alone from £23,000,000 to £38,000,000 (The Courier-Mail 25 August 1960: 1 ). This article was found in a file held by the SGIO. 45 Meanwhile, union activity was contributing more pressure to use computers and there were several successful wage claims made by unions around this time. In the early 1960s, most unions were very active and militant in their approach and the Federated Clerk's Union was such a union. A case was heard in the State Industrial Court in March 1961 regarding a claim for an extra week's leave for those who worked on Saturday or Sunday. Officials within SGIO understood that introducing computers would result in a reduction in current and future labour costs. At this time plans for introduction were gaining some momentum. The Insurance Commissioner wrote to the Public Service Commissioner on 2 February 1961 regarding the punched card equipment at the SGIO and he advised that a committee had been formed to study the introduction of EDP into the public service. The matter of development of the punched card accounting system at the SGIO could be refereed to this committee for advice as to what action might be necessary. Thus, the request for punched card accounting at the SGIO was referred to the committee on 2 February 1961 (Memorandum, Insurance Commissioner to Public Service Commissioner, 2 February 1961, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923-1982). Meanwhile, as more work was transferred to the punched card system, the Public Service Commissioner and the Treasury Department raised the question of reduced staff numbers. McGrath wrote to Treasury on 27 February 1961: It is a difficult problem to assess the staff saving due to the installation of a punch card system in this office, but my accountant (Scott) has endeavoured to make the required assessment by listing all the work at present being performed on the punch card system. After consultations with senior officers concerned, the staff required to do the same work if the punch card system was not in existence is: In all a total of 32 Present Punch Card Staff 17 Savings of approximately 15 The biggest proportion of the present Punched Card staff are junior female officers, but without the Punched Card System the majority of the staff of 32 required to do the same work would need to be experienced semi-senior and senior officers (Memorandum to Treasury from McGrath, 27 February 1961, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923-1982). It was also noted the growth in business must be considered in the calculation and therefore, because of the punched card system, it was possible to replace senior and semi-senior staff with junior female workers, who were the least expensive. 46 On 22 March 1961 the EDP Committee wrote to the Treasury regarding the EDP Committee investigation of the SGIO. It was noted that on 14 December 1960 the SGIO requested replacement of Powers-Samas Equipment. The Statistical Department requested the approval of an ICT quotation and the EDP Committee recommended that the request by the SGIO for a new self contained Hollerith system for the Statistical Department be refused. They felt that the absence of progress in the SGIO planning for future EDP meant that no radical change in the existing punched card system could be considered. Moreover, any attempt to depart from Hollerith equipment was untimely and inept. The Committee recommended that the SGIO be authorised to rent from ICT Australia additional Hollerith equipment consisting of one tabulator, two automatic punches and two automatic verifiers, subject to final confirmation by the Public Service data processing Committee. Another proviso was that the information on Powers-Samas' cards could be transferred to Hollerith cards. The existing and new Hollerith equipment was merged into a separate Department in the SGIO divorced from Statistical or Accounting Departments. This recommendation was of crucial importance and it was considered paramount that the work of each department in the SGIO must be treated with fairness with regards to priorities and timetables and this can only be achieved through separate control. It was realised that data processing facilities must be shared but planning had not reached a sufficient stage though to recommend going to computer tender, although some planning has been done. This planning was directed to the General Manager and the officers of the punched card committee and the public service data processing committee. Jack Rutherford signed this message, Chairman, EDP Committee (Memorandum to Treasury from EDP Committee, 22 March 1961, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T3, EDP Files, 1923-1982. In the next memorandum the cautious EDP Committee wrote on 1 August 1961 to the Under Treasurer that the: Extension of punched card systems be denied because insufficient preliminary investigation has been undertaken and in general the Office is not prepared for such a major development. Changeover from Powers to Hollerith equipment will occupy the office for some months and will involve the reorganisation and the control of work in the machine section. No further equipment should be installed at the SGIO until the Treasury planning officer has had an opportunity to review and report upon the whole position. I recommend continued research by Mr. Kelly and his colleagues (Memorandum to Under Treasurer from EDP Committee, 1 August 1961, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T3, EDP Files, 1923-1982). The SGIO it seems was forced to use old technology and the Committee it also 47 seems would not commit to any decision until they were provided with a planning officer. What was implied here was that the Hollerith changeover must be completed before going further with computing tenders. Some in the SGIO saw Kelly as a quasi-planning officer and he was in charge of the punched card section after recruitment but he was not knowledgeable enough to assist with computing. It was also implied that his research had not achieved suitable outcomes. On 16 October 1961 the Deputy Under Treasurer wrote to the Under Treasurer regarding electronic data processing in the SGIO and he noted that on 2 July, after studies by the Office Planning Officer Kelly (Pope did not arrive until October), that a memorandum was received from the General Manager requesting the purchase an 1004 Data Processor. The memorandum stated: With your concurrence I have arranged for the investigation to be extended to cover the possibility of the installation of a computer in the Office. Following the reading of the report, it is considered that an 1004 processor purchase is unwise and an early installation of computer requires consideration (Memorandum to the Under Treasurer from Deputy Under Treasurer, 16 October 1961, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923- 1982). Pope's influence was felt even at this early stage and the computer was now the prime concern. The blind muddling through had ended but the bureaucracy was still dawdling, although at a faster pace. Insurance offices throughout the world, including Australia, had, with the omission of the smallest offices, embraced computers for data processing, noted the Deputy Under Treasurer. He stated: In England last year I inspected the computer centre of the Commercial and Union Group and established that it had a capital cost approaching 1,000,000 Australian pounds. The planning officer has scheduled some 19 insurance offices in Melbourne and Sydney currently using computers (Memorandum to the Under Treasurer from Deputy Under Treasurer, 16 October 1961, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923-1982). The Deputy Under Treasurer felt that the SGIO had not achieved much mechanisation of manual processes. The decision to achieve early introduction of computers necessitated preparation including a detailed study of the exact costs; the selection and training of systems and programming staff; detailed systems analysis; and the writing of programs and duel running of takeover applications. Pope suggested, noted the Under Treasurer, a feasibility study team should consist of the: Deputy Director General; Assistant General Manager; Secretary; Accountant; and, Head of policy Department. The Under Treasurer wrote 'I recommend that 48 Pope3 be made available to convene and preside over the feasibility study team of the SGIO' (Memorandum, Deputy Under Treasurer to Under Treasurer, 16 October 1961,QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923-1982). The General Manager was to make up to four officers available on a full-time basis to undertake a feasibility study of all possible applications within the SGIO. The Under Treasurer also recommended that an invitation be sent to SGIO personnel interested in training in system analysis and programming. The feasibility team was asked to investigate other applications outside the SGIO which may be conveniently processed on a computer application and assess the likely workload applications for other authorities (Memorandum, Deputy Under Treasurer to Under Treasurer, 16 October 1961,QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T2, EDP Files, 1923-1982). It is clear that the pace had increased, marginally, because of Pope's arrival. Unfortunately, as in the University of Queensland case, copious reports, meetings and investigations were used to delay any decision. Still, at this point desperation was expressed in a memorandum regarding the Computer for State Government Insurance Office, dated 17 January 1964 to the Under Treasurer from the General Manager. It was said: There is nothing inherent in the SGIO that will prevent the operation of a computer. The computer would be the greatest value in the conversion to decimal currency whether the work concerned had already been placed on a computer, where it had not, the computer would not be more than a little a advanced punched card calculator for this task. For work actually on magnetic files prior to the time of conversion, the computer could effect conversion on entire files overnight and the balance internally could be done at the highest speed attainable including the conversion of all debt files (Memorandum to Under Treasurer from General Manager, 17 January 1964, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T3, EDP Files, 1923-1982). The computer was clearly meeting resistance, apathy and 'conservatism'. Pope recalled that the SGIO felt that their work was not suitable for computing (Pope 2000 pers. comm., 20 February). Riding, who was on the side of computing, noted that there was considerable pressure within overseas insurance companies to use computers because of workloads. On 20 January 1964 in a letter to Edwards (NCR) (copied to Tait IBM 3 Pope was employed by the Queensland Government primarily to investigate the introduction of a computer to be located in a new section of the Treasury Department, which later became named Treasury- EDP Branch. In reality, Pope was ordered to do many studies relating to the adoption of computers, of which the SGIO study was only one. 49 and Marshall ICT) regarding the Installation of Computer Systems, the General Manager wrote that a small feasibility team required a detailed quotation for supply of equipment (Letter to Edwards from General Manager, 20 January 1964, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T3, EDP Files, 1923-1982). On 7 February 1964 Pope wrote in a letter to C.J. Potter of AMP Society, Sydney that the General Manager, Riding, 'wants you to show us your IBM installation' (Letter to Potter from Pope, 7 February 1964, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T3, EDP Files, 1923-1982). It was noted that they indeed were rivals and if they refused no feelings would be hurt. On 8 April 1964 Ken Pope lodged a report to Riding regarding the quotations for computer installation from IBM, ICT and NCR. He wrote 'I regret the delay in submitting this report' but other matters required attention (Memorandum to Riding from Pope, 8 April 1964, QSA, TR1193/4, Box 61, T3, EDP Files, 1923-1982). Relevant sections of Cabinet Minutes up to the end of the year 1969 have been read at the Queensland State Archives. It can be seen from the previous section highlighting the inner workings of the SGIO, that valuable insight can be gained into decisions by examining the files created and held by a Department. It is even more instructive to reveal the insight into decisions gained from the examination of Cabinet Minutes. What was Cabinet told? What did it decide and why? What was said in the confidential arena of Cabinet? Developments in the Queensland Government's Cabinet On 20 January 1960 Hiley read a submission to Cabinet about the introduction of EDP. Paraphrasing Public Service Commissioner Fraser, Hiley drew attention to the 1955/1956 annual report of the Public Service Commissioner. Hiley noted: The inevitable movement of automation overseas and envisaged the re adjustment which would eventually be required in the Public Service of Queensland on its introduction here (QSA, A53465, Z2360, Cabinet Minutes, Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 20 January 1960: 1). Hiley went on to quote Fraser: Overseas experience has already proved that such operations as salary and wages computations, pay sheet compilation[ ... ] are but a few operations in which automation would surely replace clerical workers (QSA, A53465, Z2360, Cabinet Minutes, Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 20 January 1960: 1).4 4 Fraser's full statement was: 'Automation, an inevitable movement which is gradually but surely finding its place in the industries overseas will eventually find its 50 Hiley avoided highlighting Fraser's claim that public service workers would be freed from the 'drudgeries of repetitive routine operations' and they would be able 'to take a wider interest in departmental activities' (Queensland. Public Service Commissioner, Annual Report: Year Ended 3dh June, 1956: 27.) Hiley did note that New South Wales had conducted substantial research into the problem and they had ordered a computer (QSA, A53465, Z2360, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 20 January 1960: 1 ). He advised Cabinet that Treasury Officers in June 1959 were given an opportunity to examine the EDP systems in use in the Commonwealth Treasury and the Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics in Canberra. He said 'the scope of the programming and the speed with which data was processed was most impressive' (QSA, A53465, Z2360, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 20 January 1960: 1 ). Despite this Hiley did have some fear but the first is not obvious to readers today. Hiley, it seems, was afraid of being left behind in the race to obtain computers. Hiley was concerned that the Queensland Government would be, and would be seen to be, backward if it did not get computers. He concluded his submission as follows: In view of the rapid developments taking place in this field, it is considered place in the Public Service of this State and its introduction will bring about a radical re-adjustment in the organisation and structure of the Service. One has but to visualise the wide and varied operations now undertaken by manpower [sic] in the Public Service to realise the vast change which will take place in their transference to an automated office manned by electronic brains. Overseas experience has already proved that such operations as salary and wages computations, pay sheet compilation, assessments, statement and notice preparation, ledger posting and accounting, correspondence, storage of data and information, statistical compilation and tabulation, and involved mathematical calculations are but a few operations in which automation will surely replace clerical workers. The high capital cost of automation will, however, necessitate a convergence of the present diverse departmental operation to focal points in a centrally-controlled unit or units - in other words, automation connotes centralisation. Thus, the event of automation in the Service would result in a complete re-adjustment of the whole of the structure of the Service and its operations and control. And what effect upon the staffing f the Service? True, a comparatively smaller number of clerical workers will be required. But officers freed from the drudgeries of repetitive routine operations and will be enable to take a wider interest in departmental activities and to take their place in the planning, developing, and examination of departmental policy and action. To officers, especially to junior officers, comes the call to equip themselves to meet the demand for higher skill, higher qualification, and higher mental powers in an age which will call for an over-all intellectual control and direction of machines with almost limitless potentialities so as to ensure their effective use' (Queensland. Public 1 Service Commissioner, Annual Report: Year Ended 30 h June, 1956: 27.) 51 desirable that the Government should take steps to keep itself fully informed of the latest trends and techniques, with a view to gaining any benefit which might be achieved by the introduction of electronic systems (QSA, A53465, Z2360, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 20 January 1960: 1). Hiley suggested that it was necessary for a pilot study be undertaken to determine: (a) The work which could be gainfully and economically translated to these processes; (b) The practicability of centralising such work; (c) The type of machine best adapted to the processing of this work; (d) The cost involved in acquiring, housing, and operating ancillary machines necessary to process data; and (e) A study of the personnel problems involved (QSA, A53465, Z2360, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 20 January 1960: 2). The carefully crafted list of matters to be studied would have needed little decoding by Hiley's colleagues. 'Personnel problems' could be construed to embrace everything from staff retraining and redeployment to redundancy. 'The practicability of centralising' was a signal to all interested departments and agencies that there might be some compromising of their autonomy. This was the case. Pope recalls: We did not have problems with the Department over losing staff, we had problems with some of the senior people losing status and not having quite the same responsibilities they thought they were entitled too ... So some of them welcomed the opportunity to have that kind of activity taken away from them. We did not have a lot of opposition (Pope 2000, pers. comm., 10 March). On 26 January 1960, the Queensland Cabinet decided to set up an Advisory Committee to 'investigate the possibilities of the introduction of EDP systems to the Public Service' (QSA, A53465, Z2360, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, 26 January 1960: 1). The committee was to comprise the following members: (a) The Public Service Commissioner (or his representative) - Chairman and convenor; (b) An officer from the: (i) Treasury (ii) Auditor-General's Department, (iii) Railway Department; and (iv) Education Department (c) The State Actuary; and 52 ( d) A person skilled in Electronic Data Processing (perhaps a member of the University Staff). (QSA, A53465, Z2360, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, 20 January 1960: 2). The Committee was set to furnish its report through the Treasurer to Cabinet. A new task for the current Committee was added and on 8 March 1960 Cabinet directed the following officers to investigate the proposal for the 'installation of an electronic calculator and associated equipment at the State Government Insurance Office': Mr J.T. Tierney (Accountant, State Government Insurance Office); Mr J.G. Rutherford (State Actuary); Mr B.E. Riding (Deputy Under Treasurer, Treasury Department); Mr E. F. Witzke (Assistant Chief Inspector, Department of Auditor General); and Mr E. F. Fell (Public Service Inspector). Here Hiley was yielding to a recommendation made by Grimley. Mr Tierney was appointed Convenor of the Committee (QSA, A53467, Z2360, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, 8 March 1960: 1). The Committee was to furnish its report to the Public Service Commissioner who was to forward it to the Treasurer and Minister for Housing with his comments and recommendations. 'A person skilled in Electronic Data Processing' (perhaps a member of the University Staff), was not appointed at this point as suggested. The terms of reference of the committee confirmed a significant narrowing of focus. Hiley's ambitious approach had evidentially encountered qualified enthusiasm: (i) Whether the preparation of Worker's Compensation Assessments and Renewal Notices and associated accounting and statistical work could be economically carried out by a system using an electronic calculator and associated equipment; (ii) What would be the advantage of such a system and what savings could be expected; (iii) What other work at the State Government Insurance Office could be economically carried on the electronic calculator and associated equipment; (iv) What electronic calculator and associated equipment should be installed; (v) Whether, and if so to what extent, work could be performed for other Departments of the Public Service; 53 (vi) Whether the installation of equipment of this nature should be considered purely from a State Government Insurance Office point of view or be regarded in the light of the overall requirements of the Public Service; and (vii) Having regard to the foregoing, whether the installation of computing equipment in the State Government Insurance Office is recommended (QSA, A53467, Z2360, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, 8 March 1960: 1). It was clear that the SGIO study was to be the centre of focus for the committee, but 'the overall requirements of the public service' were to be assessed and taken into account in determining whether to proceed with meeting the specific needs of the SGIO. Thus, there is a merging here of the current investigation with this new investigation and the Committee was clearly to have both sets of terms of reference in mind. On 10 October 1960 Under Treasurer J. A. Sewell submitted a report entitled 'Report of Committee Appointed by Cabinet to Investigate the Possibilities of Introduction of EDP in the Public Service' to Treasurer Hiley.5 Hiley lodged a copy with Cabinet. It recommended that a Feasibility Study Team (comprising a Planning Officer, a Treasury Officer, a Public Service Commissioner representative and from time to time a representative of the particular Department in which the feasibility study is being carried out) and a Supervising Committee (comprising a Public Service Commissioner representative, a Treasury Department representative and the State Actuary) be established. A minority report submitted by two members of the Committee also recommended that a representative of the Auditor-General be appointed to the Committee. Hiley noted the committee recognised that knowledge on the subject was lacking. Sewell understood that the Public Service Commissioner recommended the feasibility study be undertaken by his department and be confined initially to Public Service payroll and superannuation. According to Sewell's report, the Public Service Commissioner wanted a suitable Treasury officer to be co-opted to work full time under the direction of the Public Service Commissioner's Department and that reports on 'feasibility be reviewed by a Committee constituted in accordance with the minority view' (ie. with a representative of the Auditor-General) (QSA, A/53475, Z2362 Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Sewell, 1O October 1960: 2). Sewell was brave enough to state on record in writing at this point that 'it is not clear from the 5 Under Treasurer Sewell, the Local Government Director [continuing], was also Under Secretary 1 March 1961 at the age of 44. He was cautious but supportive to his staff. 54 Commissioner's minute whether he proposes that one or more of his officers should be detailed to the feasibility study on a full time basis' (QSA, A/53475, Z2362 Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, 10 October 1960: 2). (Sewell reported to the Treasurer: Whilst a number of State Officers have attended appreciation courses, we have no one in the service of the State who has really a complete understanding of the subject and its technologies. It is also apparent that this is a field in which changes in processes and technologies virtually occur overnight (QSA, A/53475, Z2362 Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Sewell, 10 October 1960: 2). Sewell noted that both the Committee and the Commissioner recognised the need for a full-time feasibility study, with each team member undergoing basic training before undertaking their duties. At this point Sewell's tone became more abrasive. Sewell stated that 'neither recommendation indicates the source of that training' (QSA, A/53475, Z2362 Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, 10 October 1960: 2). General training from 'a disinterested expert source' was highly recommended. Sewell mentioned here that Hiley had suggested Brian Stonier. Sewell wrote: You [Hiley] mentioned to me after a recent accounting convention in Melbourne, that a young chap (I think his name was Stonier) has made an intensive study of the subject here and overseas and was now in private practice specialising in the matter. It might be that he could assist in this behalf (QSA, A/53475, Z2362 Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Sewell, 10 October 1960: 2). A sense that this document was never intended to be directly lodged to Cabinet develops here, as the writing is rather personal and ad hoc. Sewell did not agree with the recommendation of the Commissioner or the Committee on the structure of the Feasibility Study Team. He supported the appointment of a Planning Officer but Sewell also felt that the Auditor-General should be involved in studies as he might find, on review, that the proposals were unacceptable. The bureaucratic struggle intensified at this point as Sewell countered the Public Service Commissioner's idea that the study should be under his control and made what would have been a rather appealing suggestion to Hiley that 'the activities should be under your broad control as a Treasury function. Sewell won this battle (QSA, A/53475, Z2362 Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Sewell, 10 October 1960: 3). On 19 October 1960, Treasurer Hiley presented a submission to Cabinet entitled 'The Introduction of Electronic Data Processing'. The Treasurer warned that this matter required careful handling so to avoid the equipment becoming a 'white elephant'. Hiley argued: 55 This is a subject, which, according to the manner in which it is handled, could be gravely disappointing. I have accumulated a long experience coming across the tragic consequences of installing expensive plant of impressive capacity but which is either unnecessary or unsuitable to the need to which it is directed (QSA, A/53476, Z2362 Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 19 October 1960: 2). Hiley was expressing concern here over the Hollerith punched card system which, he said, was currently on rental and not being fully utilised. Hiley stated: The installation at State Insurance [SGIO], which fortunately was on a rental basis, has done useful work but only a part of what should have been possible ... installations ... must be capable of extracting all possible use out of the machine. It can fairly be said that the State Insurance installation fell down on both these counts (QSA, A/53476, Z2362 Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 19 October 1960: 2). It is reasonable to argue that Hiley had been convinced that the computer would solve some Public Service operational bottlenecks and without it Queensland would not be competitive. Nevertheless, Hiley was to some extent concerned that a computer would be a waste of funds and would not be utilised sufficiently. He observed that automation 'is a field of not vast but of violent change in development' (QSA, A/53476, Z2362 Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 19 October 1960: 2). A machine must be given a workload equivalent to its capacity and it would be prudent, keeping in mind the cost of such equipment and rate at which it is updated, that the machines be hired, considered Hiley. He noted that the New York Stock Exchange reported that month that the installation of a machine on a hired basis dealt with transactions from over 100 connected branches at the rate of 1,000 transactions a minute cost $72,000 per month - over 400,000 Australian pounds. Hiley understood that just because a machine of that capacity is available, centralisation of every function is not necessarily desirable. He judged that absolute centralisation was undesirable but, contrary to the Public Service Commissioner's suggestion, more work could be found for the machine than just payroll and accounting. The speed of the bigger installations would suggest that a larger installation would have been better than a series of smaller installations. Hiley did not believe that one machine could handle all payrolls and all Head Office accounting for the Departments. Further, Hiley argued, underutilisation must not be allowed to occur and it may be best to obtain a large machine and centralise appropriate functions to ensure work for the machine. Again, he referred to the progress in other States, recommending: There would be wisdom in the members of the Committee having the opportunity to observe the functioning of major installations in other Governments throughout Australia ... (QSA, A/53476, Z2362 Cabinet 56 Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 19 October 1960: 2). It was clear that Hiley wanted to benefit from the research of others. The imminence of decimal currency was mentioned and he urged Cabinet to consider the consequences of adoption of decimal currency. Hiley feared that many businesses would want computers to aid with the conversion. Hiley claimed: We might easily meet a situation where any delay in knowing what we want could result in our being at the end of a very lengthy order book and thus forced to delay changes which we consider to be desirable, merely because the necessary machines cannot be obtained in time. (QSA, A/53476, 22362 Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 19 October 1960: 2) It was at this time that the issue of unemployment directly confronted Hiley. When asked in Parliament by James Donald (member Ipswich East, Australian Labor Party) 'would the installation of this equipment [EDP equipment] affect the employment of young people in the future?' Hiley's answer was a rather firm and confident 'no' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 18 November 1960: 1622). Hiley understood, it appears, that no one would be dismissed and if necessary they would be re-deployed. At this time another sensitive issue confronted Hiley. The appointment of a consultant was somewhat controversial in view of the expense. 6 The report of the committee emphasised the necessity of a consultant as no one in the service of the Government had suitable knowledge or skills. Hiley, perhaps inadvertently, played down the length of time the consultant would be required which made the costs seem less. Despite these issues the project proceeded. On 24 October 1960, Cabinet decided that a Feasibility Study Team be established for the detailed study of the application of EDP to State Government activities. The team consisted of a: (a) A Planning Officer from outside government; (b) A Treasury Officer; (c) A representative of the Public Service Commissioner Department; 6 The are no records of the costs of particular consultancies in the early in the 1960s, but P.A. Management Consultants, charged 410 pounds for seven and a half days Consultantcy in October 1964; 560 pounds was quoted for development, planning and control techniques; and 5,600 pounds for system design (QSA, SGIO Special Files, TR 1193/4 Box 63 File no. T 19, Memo to Under Treasurer from General Manager, P.A. Management, 25 September 1964). B.E. Riding accepted a quotation from P.A. Management and placed an order for Consultantcy to an amount not exceeding 2,560 pounds on 28 September 1965 (QSA, SGIO Special Files, TR 1193/4 Box 63 File no. T 19, Quotation Letter from P.A. Management to B.E. Riding, 28 September 1965 and Return Letter of Acceptance. 57 (d) A representative of the Auditor-General; ( e) A representative of the particular Department concerned during the period when a study is being made of that department, but not otherwise (QSA, A/53476, Z2362 Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, 24 October 1960: 1 ). Cabinet also decided to establish a Committee to supervise the work of and review the reports of the Feasibility Study Team. This Supervising Committee consisted of: (a) A representative of the Treasury Department; (b) A representative the Public Service Commissioner's Department; (c) A representative of the Department of the Auditor-General; (d) The State Actuary (QSA, A/53476, Z2362 Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, 24 October 1960: 1). As Under Treasurer Sewell had recommended, and Cabinet then decided that endeavours should be made to engage Brian Stonier, a 28 year old chartered accountant with the Melbourne firm Messes Kent, Brierl and Fisher, to act as an external consultant to the committee. Hiley knew Brian Stonier. Hiley was a Certified Accountant and he knew this firm. He also knew Stonier was interested in computers and Stonier was invited up to Brisbane to address the EDP Committee. Pope went down to Melbourne in 1962 to meet Kent, Brierl and Fisher, but he never saw Stonier again after that. Kent Brierl and Fisher were part of the Melbourne elite, and, claims Pope, knew little about computers. Stonier never returned to Brisbane and he took no part in the Commttee's deliberations. It is important to note here that the EDP Committee met once per month and the agenda was consistently the same format. Pope presented reports on the areas of the Public Service he thought would repay the introduction of computing (Pope 2000, pers. comm., 20 February). On 26 January 1961, after preliminary investigations by the Supervising Committee, Stonier met the committee, which comprised the following individuals: E.F. Fell - Public Service Inspector (a representative of the Public Service Commissioner's Department); J.G. Rutherford (the State Actuary); N. Fowles - Deputy Auditor General (a representative of the Department of the Auditor-General); 58 B.E. Riding - Deputy Under Treasurer (a representative of the Treasury Department) (QSA, A/53479, Z2363, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, 26 January 1961: 2). Fowles had a sound influence on all deliberations of the Committee as he had experience. The Supervising Committee realised that the way forward was more likely to be found by emphasising the task to expert individuals rather than inexpert groups. They submitted a report to Treasurer Hiley dated 27 January 1961 through E. Fell, Convener recommending that: (a) Stonier be added as a further member of the Committee; (b) A meeting of Departmental heads and responsible Union officials be called by the Treasurer to announce the appointment of the Committee, the purpose of same and to seek full co-operation and commitment; (c) The Feasibility Study Team not be established, but Study Team or Teams be appointed from time to time when necessary; (d) The Planning Officer of the Feasibility Study Team be a member of a Supervising Committee and such Study Team or Teams as required; and, ( e) The appointment of the Planning Officer proceed with applications to be called through nationwide press (QSA, A/58386, Z2363, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, 2 February 1961: 2). Fell, a member of the EDP Committee, was thought by the Public Service Commissioner of the time to be the fount of all knowledge on anything relating to office mechanisation, but nevertheless all he knew about was accounting machines and offset lithe machines. He was not very cooperative, and sometimes actively hostile to the Treasury Development. He did not understand computing. But because he knew more than anyone else in his Department at that time, was regarded in awe by the other public service inspectors. Fell felt that all reports of all study teams, whether appointed by the Committee or not, should be made available to the Committee for analysis and recommendation, before any installation was made or any commitments were entered into. Fell noted the appointment of Messrs. Ford, Bacon and Davis to undertake investigations in the Railway Department and sought clarification as to its field of investigation in that Department. The Railway Department installation seems to carry on under its own momentum and Fell was clearly seeking clarification here. 59 Hiley agreed with these recommendations and submitted his report to Cabinet on 2 February 1961. He emphasised the importance of the position of the Planning Officer: Whilst the recommendation does not say so, I should inform Cabinet it is quite possible that the man [sic] who is appointed to the position of Planning Officer may eventually move into the position of manager of a central installation. The proposed classification has determined as reflecting not only what would be necessary to command a suitable planning officer but also to hold a competent manager. This is not an ordinary accounting task. It requires ability in the field of higher mathematics and it could be one of the most rewarding challenges in the whole of public administration. It is not a position to be filled by promoting some of our senior departmental accountants. It may be that one of them may posses the peculiar qualities for such a task. My hope is that we may find a suitable man from within the Service, but it will be noticed that the recommendation envisages that the appointment could be made from outside (QSA, A/58386, 22363, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 2 February 1961: 2). He agreed with the Committee's summation that there may be a resistance to change and an announcement of the role and purpose of the Committee would be an essential safeguard. Cabinet will appreciate that this grasps the nettle of what could be a rather difficult aspect. I think they are wise in endeavouring to reduce the hazard of a general resistance to both the investigation and eventual installation (QSA, A/58386, 22363, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 2 February 1961: 2). On 7 February 1961, Cabinet approved that Stonier be added as a full-time member of the Supervising Committee. It was also decided that: (3) The Hon. the Treasurer, in conjunction with the Public Service Commissioner, take action to call a meeting of meetings of Departmental Heads, senior public servants, and responsible Union officials, for the purpose of - (i) Explaining the purpose of the Committee; (ii) Seeking full co-operation and facilitating a comprehensive survey by the committee of its officers of Departmental functions which would be considered as likely applications for any subsequent installation or installations; and (Iii) Giving an assurance that, should Electronic Data Processing be installed, although it may be necessary to re-allocate staff, there will be no dismissals of permanent staff (4)(a) That the establishment of a Feasibility Study Team, as approved ... be no longer proceeded with, and that the Committee be now empowered to appoint such Study Team or Teams as it may deem 60 necessary from time to time, provided that Study Teams already established, or to be established, by the Departments of Education and Main Roads, are not affected hereby; (5)(b) That applications [for the position of Planning Officer] ... be called through the Daily Press in Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane, together with The Australian Financial Review and such other newspapers or periodicals as the Committee and/or the Public Service Commissioner may determine; (5)(c) That applicants be required to have had experience in investigation, installation, and operation of Electronic Data Processing Systems for commercial application (QSA, A/58386, Z2363, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, 7 February 1961: 2). The team was placed under the portfolio of Treasurer Hiley. A meeting of department heads and some union officials was held as planned at Parliament House on 28 March 1961 (QSA, Survey Office Batch Files, A/27839 File 347/1 Electronic Computers 1959-1962). After this meeting, one of the Committee's first actions was to send a circular/questionnaire to all departments on 29 March 1961 requesting a survey of the department's activities, functions, and duties to obtain a broad picture of the need for the use of computers. The questionnaire sought, for example, details of the number of account transactions and so on (see Appendix). The survey had to be returned to Riding before 14 April 1961 (QSA, Survey Office Batch Files, A/27839 File 34 7/1 Electronic Computers 1959-1962). As with the SGIO project, what was to become the Treasury - EDP Branch project stalled. Pope threatened resignation and even spoke to the press in 1963 about the delay. The result was dramatic and will be explored in full later, but it was not until 17 October 1963, that Hiley submitted to Cabinet a summary of the report prepared by the Chairman of the Public Service EDP Committee when he committed himself to purchase. Hiley commenced by noting that earlier submissions had been made regarding the introduction of EDP machines. He reminded Cabinet that a Committee comprised the: The State Actuary and Insurance Commissioner (Chairman); The Deputy Auditor-General; The Deputy Under Treasurer; A representative of the Public Service Commissioner; Planning Officer, Electronic Data Processing, Treasury Department; 61 Mr. K.B. Stonier of Messrs. Kent, Brierly and Fisher, Chartered Accountants, Melbourne (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963: 1). Hiley stated that the work of the Committee had resulted in a report covering the main issues involved in introducing EDP equipment. The report was the result of a considerable amount of work carried out not only by the Committee, but also the work of many officers in various Departments, who supplied material for the study, said Hiley. This was clearly an attempted explanation for the delay. Pope recalls that he got diverted to look at particular things because the Treasurer thought it an area that needed looking at. Some of the reports, Pope recalls, took six months to complete. Time went on with lots of reports completed and no computers ordered. Hiley was convinced that the report was conducted in an unbiased manner and that its recommendations were based on sound methods. Hiley wanted to assure Cabinet that the report did not interfere with other inquiries into EDP being conducted other Departments. Hiley stated that the report was concerned with describing the range of work that could be conducted on a Treasury computer and did concern itself with all the work that a Department may complete. Hiley was keen to identify the work that could be common to many Departments and thus be conducted on a centralised machine. Hiley then outlined the main issues involved in the project towards computerisation. A summary of the issues follows. Firstly, what work would a computer do? In answer: accounting, payroll, statistics, costing, stock control, records, mathematical and technical calculations, and so on could be completed. Hiley noted that 'it [the work] is so large that one single computer would not be practicable' (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17October1963: 2). Hiley was determined to look after his biggest revenue earner, the SGIO. Secondly, where would it be located? The only two tasks common to all Departments that could be completed on the machine were accounting and payroll. These would become the machine's primary tasks and other tasks would be requested from the Departments and completed as secondary functions. It was envisaged that other Departments would obtain their own machines for specialised work. This proved to be true and the Mines and Mains Roads Departments machine was such an example. 62 Thirdly, what would be the financial effect? The cost of hiring the machine, staffing and the housing of the machine would be about £80,000 per year. The costs were made up of the following: Computer hire £38,000 Ancillary equipment £6,000 Data preparation equipment £3,000 Computer work staff £5,000 Data preparation work £6,000 Programming staff £8,000 Systems staff £8,000 Premises £6,000 Total £80,000 (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963: 2). Fourthly, would loss of employment result? The new systems would be introduced over five yeas and no staff would be dismissed. Staff would be re-deployed and retrained for other tasks. Fifthly, what changes in policy would be necessary? The Treasury machine would provide data services to many Departments. This would involve the centralisation of computing. Hiley claimed that: It would involve the centralisation (subject to agreed safeguards) of the processing of posting to heads of expenditure and receipts, payments to creditors and payroll. There is no intention to withdraw accounting responsibility form Departments, but only to free them from routine clerical work (QSA, A/63381, Z37 40, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963: 2). The safeguards mentioned here referred to measures taken to ensure the protection of a Department's activities. Later safeguards took the form of departmental guidelines for computing work. Sixthly, what would be the effect of decimal currency? A computer could operate in any currency. Moreover, a computer could operate in dual currency. To ensure that Treasury obtained a computer that could assist with the conversion, it was unwise, Hiley postulated, to delay the ordering process. 63 Seventh, was the right time to go ahead now? It would take some years to develop a substantial centralised installation so it was wise to proceed with a system that was within reach, suggested Hiley. Regarding technical developments, Hiley posited that no developments were likely to arise within the next two years that would invalidate any installation proceeded with now. Finally, what action was desirable? In order to obtain a precise costing for the Treasury machine, it was desirable to obtain immediate Cabinet approval in principle, invite tenders on the basis of detailed specifications, and conduct preparatory work involved the obtaining and training of staff. Hiley went on to argue that the centralisation of tasks, such as posting procedures, would involve 'a major question of policy' (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963: 4 ). The safeguard against this was to ensure that work was prepared for the computer within the Department and then processed in the Treasury facility. It would be later analysed within the Department thus ensuring the confidentiality of a Departments' data. The Reports of the Planning Officer, Pope, advised that a central installation was very practicable and that the Treasury installation should be considered the 'first phase of electronic processing in state departments' (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Summary of Report, 17 October 1963: 2). Hiley relied heavily on Pope. It was envisaged that the Railways Department, the SGIO and Mines and Main Roads would have small specialist installations of their own. The question raised here is did the other public servants want theirs done by a centralised machine? After installation generally Departments, such as Education, welcomed centralisation because they knew that they could not do the work themselves, especially payroll. Another example was the computerisation of driving licenses. The Main Roads Department welcomed that. It must now be recalled, that The Department of Education had experience using like technology and the Main Roads Department had their own machine. The SGIO, Forestry and many other Departments had used the University of Queensland's computer. However, resistance to computers existed but anxiety did not relate to the technology as much as it did to the policy of centralisation. Hiley had struck a nerve in many public servants. 64 Expensive purchases raise concern and Hiley wanted to ensure that the computer purchased must have the capacity to perform tasks over a period of years and not need replacing within a very short time. Unfortunately, the use of computers expanded much more quickly than Hiley anticipated. For instance, the decision to replace the SGIO computer was made in 1968 just three years after receipt of the first computer. Another unforeseen point was that Initial analyses revealed that the computer would pay for itself after the completion of its primary tasks. The computer completed more than its primary tasks and thus paid for itself many times. Hiley then considered matters of policy. He stated: It is necessary, however, to consider certain matters of policy which arise in the Report and a decision on these is a necessary prelude to any further step towards electronic data processing (QSA, A/63381, Z37 40, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963: 6). Hiley was concerned that the notion of integrating functions for the purposes of using the computer system was not sound. He said that it has been past practice of like installations that functions were inter-related and not regarded as separate functions. The Report considered that the total integration of functions was not possible and integration could only be applied to specific functions such as accounting functions. Yet, even within this single function there was difference of opinion within the Committee. The Chairman due to some difference of opinions, Hiley noted, had only signed the report. Hiley stated: It [the report] has been signed by the Chairman of the Committee only because differences of viewpoint as to the procedures to be followed within the Committee, and as to the approach to be adopted towards the introduction of electronic data processing, prevented the Committee from reaching unanimity (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963: 1 ). One view was that fully integrated systems for the function of accounting could not be adopted for the Public Service until an investigation into stores work had been finalised. On the other hand, the task of stores investigation was considered to take much effort in view of the complexity of the existing stores operations. The choice then, considered Hiley, was to obtain a machine that was capable of completing basic functions or waiting some time for a machine large enough to complete more advanced functions. Hiley felt it would be easier to focus attention on obtaining a machine in reasonable time that can perform basic functions rather than opt for a machine that could theoretically complete all possible functions but in reality be practically difficult to realise. 65 Hiley mentioned decimal currency as being an additional reason why Cabinet should not delay any further. He stated: ... Decimal currency is likely to present considerable problems in data processing by conventional methods, and the availability of a computer installation capable of large-scale file processing would undoubtedly be a tremendous advantage (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963: 7). In the recommendations of his submission, Hiley contended that the 'introduction of electronic data processing is a major step towards the development of modern systems in selected areas of the public service, and I have no doubt at all that it is an inevitable step' (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963: 7). Hiley understood that the step to computing was of some 'magnitude' and should not be taken lightly or without preparation. He suggested that the time was right to go to tender. Cabinet decided on 21 October 1963 that the establishment of a computer installation be approved in principle. It decided that public tenders be called for the equipment required to carry out work as specified by the Treasury. After quotations had been invited, no major step was to be taken towards introduction without reporting to Cabinet for further approval. In addition, the obtaining of quotations was the responsibility of Treasury in consultation with the Public Service Commissioner, the Auditor-General and other departments. This order was to a large extent rescinded and finally, the Treasury was authorised, 'subject to adopted procedures', to incur such expenses as necessary to obtain and consider quotations, to begin training staff and to arrange with the Public Service Commissioner the selection and training of staff for the project (QSA, A/63381, Z37 40, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963: 1). An evaluation committee was established for each Department but they worked in close consultation. Later, Schubert and Pope, who sat side by side, interviewed manufacturers for the final decision. Quotations that included aspects of decimal currency were considered, as it was necessary to prepare the teaching staff payroll in decimal currency within nine months. The tender documents for the Treasury machine outlined the following primary tasks intended for the computer: (1) Governmental accounting procedures for expenditure, receipts and budgetary control; (2) The preparation of fortnightly salaries payrolls; and, (3) Examinations work for the Department of Education. 66 The tender document also outlined the following secondary tasks: (4) Inventory control for a selected Department; (5) Indexing of Births, Deaths and Marriages Rolls; (6) Maintenance of Electoral Rolls (Queensland Treasury. Tender and specifications for the Electronic Digital Computer Installation of the Treasury Department, Brisbane, [1964: 2). The following firms submitted a tender for the Treasury computer: Australian General Electric Pty. Ltd.; Control Data Corporation; English Electric - Leo Computers Ltd.; Honeywell Pty. Ltd.; IBM Australia Pty. Ltd.; ICT Pty. Ltd.; NCR Pty. Ltd (see Appendix) The tenders were considered on twenty separate aspects the main aspects being the following: Consideration Requirement Price A capital value less than £190,000 Modernity of The design must be of such an advanced nature as to ensure 10 Design years use of the machine without fear of obsolescence. It must incorporate the latest advances in simultaneous processing and multi-processing, or allow for their inclusion at a later date. Delivery date Because of the need to begin the teaching staff payroll in July 1965 and examinations work in September 1965, with decimal currency following in February 1966, the computer must be installed and operating during June 1965. Systems and It must be possible to prepare programs in advance and to carry programming out initial file conversion by June 1965. Programming languages support available or under development must be of the highest order, and adequate staff must be guaranteed to assist in setting up the installation. Systems The computer system must be capable of meeting first priority performance applications within a total of 60 hours a month and the total loading on the work quoted in the tender document must not exceed 50 per cent of prime shift. (QSA, TR1810/2, Z3997, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Evans, 8 October 1964: 2). It was decided that the purchase of a computer was a better option than hiring one. Cabinet decided to purchase ICT machines for the Treasury Department and the Main Roads Department (Source: QSA, TR1810/2, Z3997, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Evans, 8 October 1964: 2). Tenders were called on 2 67 April 1964 for the Treasury computer, which was at the centre of the above debates, to be returned by 22 June 1964. 7 The State Planning Officer It was mentioned previously that the appointment process for the Planning Officer proceeded. Pope was the hired expert for the computing introduction project and it is instructive to examine his role further as it was vital. Essentially, it can be argued that without Pope's skill, and sometimes bravery (shown by threatening resignation and seeing the press), computer adoption would have been delayed. In accordance with the Cabinet direction, advertisements were placed in national media but as Hiley had recognised in his 20 January 1960 submission, there was vast experience overseas. In the United Kingdom governments were already using the same computer the Queensland Government considered installing. In the United States of America, IBM was 'the' computer company of the time and were constantly researching and developing new computers. The successful applicant for the position of Planning Officer was a highly qualified Englishman named Ken Pope. Pope was born in 1922. He served in the British Army from 1940-1946. Pope obtained a Law Degree from London University in 1949 and was later employed by London County Council as an Administrative Class Officer. By 1954 he was a Principal Assistant and was asked to join an LCC Working Party to consider likely effects of these new machines called 'electronic digital computers' on organisation and structure of work in offices. At the time there were only about twenty commercial computers in the United Kingdom. The Working Party recommended Council to acquire an installation after detailed study by a team of which he was joint head. Pope was responsible for tender documents and when the team made its decision in 1957, he was appointed Head of Systems and programming group. The first application was main salaries payroll and pensions for about 40,000 employees. 7 Tenders were invited on the basis of outright purchase and annual hire. The list of tenders is set out in Appendix 4 showing the prices quoted in the original tenders and as re-stated in subsequent correspondence. After scrutiny, it was apparent that the machine systems offered by certain manufacturers did not conform to minimum requirements considered necessary, and they were further modified after discussion with the tenderers to revised proposals, which are indicated in Appendix 4. 68 Pope was a founding member and subsequently Fellow of the British Computer Society, and he wrote and lectured extensively on systems analysis and programming. Pope reflects: The computer world was a very small world in those days and the staff of all the installations - only about two hundred machines installed by the time I left United Kingdom - knew each other to some degree .... More than anything else you learned by practical experience - few Universities had anything more than scientific-based machines dedicated to very early versions of FORTRAN, and none recognised the significance of commercial computing. My team had acquaintance with all manufacturers then in UK - IBM, Elliotts, Univac, LEO, English Electric, Bendix, Hollerith, Powers-Samas and Burroughs. At that time my experience was therefore considerable (Pope 1998 pers. Comm., 1 April). The EDP Committee had been in existence for about two years when Pope arrived in Brisbane in October 1961. He was required to determine where the best applications lay for the computer, specifically in terms of: (a) Cost savings. Pope states that whether it was admitted outwardly or not, cost saving was undoubtedly the main objective, linked with objectives of greater efficiency. This was fairly general among larger organisations considering 'mechanisation', and was as true for the initial Treasury venture in Queensland as anywhere else. The potential cost savings were seen to be very great - but there was also the increasing belief that the rapid increase in clerical work of all kinds in society could no longer be met by human beings - there just weren't going to be enough of them. (b) The upcoming conversion to decimal currency; and (c) Relief of bottlenecks in paper-work. Pope was informed that teacher numbers had soared in the post-war period, and their salaries were prepared by conventional NCR and Burroughs control bar driven accounting machines (Pope 1998: pers. comm., 1 April). To pause on some of Pope's recollections here, he remembers that he met resistance to the new technology. Pope remembers finding the public service to be rigidly hierarchical. 'There was simply no understanding or no desire to learn in the senior echelons' (Pope 1998 pers. comm., 1 April). Politicians' knowledge of computers was so minimal that it was easily worse than the knowledge held by administrators. He posited that few in the Legislative Assembly had degrees (Pope 1998 pers. comm., 1 April). Administrators could not see the real benefits of the 69 computer, he stated. Pope mentioned that they were afraid of the new machines and generally wanted little to do with them. Against this culture sits a set of political policies, such as the expansion of education previously mentioned, which pressured this administrative conservatism by forcing it to cope with increased demands and workloads. These political policies were still nevertheless conservative as Australians, argued Lewis (1973), 'have subconsciously maintained a balance between the ethical and technical aspects of economic progress' and, in the same way, 'Queensland politics have always been middle-of-the-road conservative with potentially extreme right and left wings' (Lewis 1973: 244-245). Apart from this though, is an omnipresent failing in understanding a new technology. Pope could see the future uses of the computer that others did not see. He knew that they were here to stay and described what operations the computer would be performing to departmental officials in clear non-technical terms. He insisted that others in the public service needed to understand the potential of computers. Officials in the public service saw it as part of technical officers or researcher's tool. Pope drove the agenda of application development to many departments (Grierson 1998: pers. comm., 11 February). There was a lot of scepticism about the computer in the public service and comments like 'they will never do it' were regular (Grierson 1997: pers comm., 6 November). Pope was well received by some and treated indifferently by others. One person stamped their fist on the desk and said 'there will never be computers in my department' (Grierson 1997: pers comm., 6 November). Despite Cabinet's decision and Hiley's attempts to gain the support of departmental officials, Pope and his staff experienced much resistance to the introduction of computers. Malcolm Grierson, who was on Pope's staff, had similar problems. Grierson stated: 'I went to the Head of the Registrar General's Department and I was told that I should come back in eighteen months after he had retired' (Grierson 1997: pers. comm., 6 November). Grierson attributed this treatment to the department head's feeling of apathy and his fear of loss of control. As well as being concerned with staff resistance, Pope faced other serious issues. Pope was concerned early in the piece that the computer's information was secure. Grierson concurred: 'Compared to today's security it was amateurish' (Grierson 1997: pers. comm., 6 November). Each officer was aware of guidelines in relation to computers but they were not known as codes of ethics. Privacy and the 70 discussions about government databases were issues that were raised in the United States first. Pope also had to consider that there was an inability to recruit appropriately trained staff. There were no resources available for them except for the lectures Pope gave to them and departments and this situation changed only gradually. Pope feared the actual costs of installation, whether it was within an existing building or in a new building. A major policy difficulty occurred when it became necessary to challenge the total inflexibility of public service regulations in order to obtain working arrangements needed to rush the initial application through to meet the change to decimal currency. Pope recalls: The Public Service Board simply could not imagine that I wanted my staff to work day and all night, and also at weekends. Nor that I wanted shift work in the installation to keep the computer constantly productive. You must remember that the general level of entry into the Public Service in those days was the Junior Examination. Even Heads of Departments usually had no more that that. I often doubted the ability of Public Service inspectors (who ruled all staff conditions of service with an iron hand) to understand the problems we faced - their breadth of education was simply not wide enough to meet the challenge of moving into modern times (Pope 1998 pers. comm., 1 April). This has changed dramatically today. Pope's contribution to the introduction of computing was crucial as he had the skills gained from overseas experience that could not be matched in Queensland at the time by most and these skills were a vital prerequisite to the task. He was also dedicated to the job at hand to the point where he placed his employment on the line in order to advance the project. Finally, Pope went to the press with the help of the computer industry. He completed a radical step which forced some action, thus breaking the public service code of silence that still remains till now. Unemployment Concerns about unemployment were raised and youth unemployment was a problem at the time, and later, articles relating to it appeared in the press as previously cited. Professor John Bennett, pioneer of computing at the University of Sydney, argued in 1962 that the clerical worker would be the first to be affected by computers. They will lose their jobs, he stated, 'because of the computers' ability to handle process control' (Quoted in Australian Financial Review, 15 February 1962: 71 45). He went on to postulate that these people could be channelled into computing positions. The Courier-Mail of 16 January 1962 recorded the number of people registered for employment as 115,936 of whom 12,461 were juveniles. The extent that school leavers affected the position was given special consideration. The Australian Department of Labour and National Service survey showed in an increase in the number of young men who were seeking clerical work and young women seeking 'office work' (Courier Mail, 16 January 1962: 1). The difficulty lay in that to transfer the youth to computing much training was needed. In 1962, George Wallace (Cairns) asked the Minister for Transport:: A (1) Is it a fact that the Railway Department contemplates the installation of electronic computing machines for accounting purposes? If so, what effect will their installation have on the numerical strength of the clerical staff in that section of the Department? A (2) If, as is believed by members of the clerical staff, a drastic reduction in their number will result, what steps, if any, have been envisaged to protect the continuity of service of these employees? Hon. Gordon W.W. Chalk (Lockyer) (Minister for Transport) confirmed Bennett's opinions: A (1) and (2) The Department is in the preliminary stages of installing an automatic mechanical data processing bureau for the Northern Division. It is anticipated that these machine operations will require an adjustment of clerical staff in the Northern Division, but it is too early at this juncture to gauge what numbers of employees will be affected. However, the Honourable Member can be assured that in introducing installation, the Government will, subject to economic operation, endeavour to reduce to a minimum the impact upon the clerical, but some disturbance will be unavoidable (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 13, March 1962: 2307). Ernest Evans provided the clearest effect of computers on staff. Evans, Minister for Mines and Main Roads, contended: One hundred and ninety seven clerical officers (of whom 139 are engaged on routine duties) ranging from temporary Clerk-typists to classified officers of the second grade would be affected. One hundred of these officers would be required on duties, which will be carried under the computer system. While all staff would be needed during the period of nine to twelve months while the electronic data processing system was being installed, since both this and the Addressograph system would be running con-currently, the balance could be reallocated once the computer system is fully operated. There is a normal annual loss of 35 - 40 officers engaged on routine duties in the Department's Head Office. The difference of 97 above would be lost in the ensuring 2 - [2.5] years without any retrenchment being necessary. In the period when they were supernumerary to the Registration Branch they could be absorbed into other clerical functions because, with the increase in 72 departmental activities, naturally the clerical established would not remain stationary. There is a shortage of technical staff and any of these released from work inside the office could be used for outside supervision where there is a constant need (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Evans, 14 October 1963). Pope mentions the following about Main Roads Department staffing issues: They [Mines and Main Roads Department] did not lose staff or anything like that, because it was fortunate that this computerisation coincided with an expansion of economic activity in the State. More people were coming into Queensland. So if you chopped public servants in that Department generally speaking they could always be moved to another Department or you could rely upon natural wastage and so on (Pope 2000, pers. comm., 10 March). This confirms Evans' assessment. Despite job losses predicted by Minister for Mines and Main Roads Evans some days earlier, Hiley stated that there would be 'no job losses in the Queensland Public Service' as a result of installation (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963). Of particular concern to some parliamentarians was the possible loss of job opportunities for juveniles. Hiley states that: It is not considered that, when the development of the state as a whole is taken into account, there would be any adverse effect on employment opportunities for juveniles (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963). Further, argued Hiley, relocation of staff and retraining will occur as necessary. According to Hiley there will be new types of employment and new skills, but the problem of some magnitude will be the selecting and training of staff required for computer work (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963). On the same day, and later in the same submission, Hiley stated the following in relation to employment effects: Considerations of this kind lead naturally to the fear that the results of setting up an installation will be loss of employment, or a significant restriction of opportunities for employment [my emphasis], particularly amongst school leavers. I am confident that this fear can be allayed at the outset. .. As regards the overall employment situation, it must be remembered that the introduction of the new techniques must take place over a period of some years and that the new equipment in itself creates new types of employment and new skills. I do not consider, therefore, that we should worsen the employment situation by moving towards electronic data processing, either now or in the future. The whole emphasis of our development in this 73 direction will be in fact towards the introduction of the most modern systems, rather than to obtaining staff savings (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963: 6). In this statement Hiley does not consider that there will be lost opportunities for future school leavers nor does Hiley consider that some school leavers would not have the aptitude for computer work. The Queensland Government downplayed the unemployment that resulted from the introduction of computing (QSA, A/63381, Z37 40, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Hiley, 17 October 1963: 1 ). Pilz (1963) made a few suggestions regarding the introduction of ADP. He advised that when business increases after adoption and the resulting staff displacements, re-hiring and retraining, have settled, the total net number of employees hired would not usually fall. Second, unions and staff should be kept as fully informed as possible so that rumours and unrest, caused by ignorance and fear, did not occur. Third, a large percentage of positions eliminated by computer were those occupied by junior staff (Pilz 1963: 65). Interestingly, this article describes the three fears that were articulated by the Queensland Government: displacement; the need to inform unions; and, junior unemployment. In 1963 Geoffrey Bills, a Senior Lecturer in Industrial Administration, University of Melbourne wrote 'The Impact of Automation'. The main impact of automation, he said, would be in large organisations in the service industries such as banking, insurance and communications, which have many routine clerical operations. (Note that automation is used in relation to mechanisation of clerical operations). The trend would lead to technological unemployment where some workers would be displaced and need to find new jobs (Bills 1963: 210). Youth employment opportunities would be affected by automation. Bills states: Young people entering the workforce will thus find relatively fewer opportunities in manufacturing, especially in routine production and clerical tasks, and will turn increasingly to such tertiary industries as transport and communications, commerce and finance, education, health, amusements and the professions (Bills 1963: 211 ). Yet, both Clapper and Pope said that unemployment was not an issue. Pope said that: 'unemployment was not a concern in my time' (Pope 2000, pers. comm., 20 February). Clapper said that: 'we had full employment so it was not an issue' (Clapper 2000, pers. comm., 23 March). It is widely known that, compared with today, there were historically low levels of unemployment at the time and a 74 threatening change loomed which would have mitigated anxiety, but, as even now, youth employment was a hot political issue at the time. John Bennett, Emeritus Professor of Computing Science, Sydney University, stated in a 1993 interview for Computerworld: And now we have this ridiculous situation that people are working longer hours than they were in 1970. The whole object of the exercise was to work fewer hours in the week. Sooner or later we'll have to face up to that problem. If we could solve it, we'd also solve the unemployment problem. There's something very wrong when people have to work longer and harder hours now that they did 20 years ago to produce the same material. At the same time we have 10 percent of the workforce and 35 per cent of the kids between 15 and 21 who want a job are out of work ... (Computerworld, 15th Anniversary Edition, July 1993: 2). Bennett points out here that on the one hand workers working longer hours and on the other hand, perhaps as a result of the former, there are fewer employment opportunities available. While the problem of youth unemployment was clear in 1993 as it is today, it is not so clear that it was partly caused by the introduction of computing. Simply put, many basic clerical opportunities taken up by the young are now no longer available due to computer adoption. Certainly, the introduction of computers facilitated the development of all sorts of new areas of the economy, but this in no way compensates for the overriding loss of employment opportunities after adoption. The issue of unemployment was of such concern in New South Wales that a State inquiry labelled the 'Automation Inquiry' commenced on 8 October 1958 and was referred to the Industrial Commission of New South Wales. The report was completed by J. Richards and was lodged on 6 June 1963. It reviewed employment or unemployment in a number of industries and occupations, including clerical. The clerical industry trade unions made requests to be heard at the inquiry. Richards recommended that the Department of Technical Education should establish courses covering the use of computers to assist with retraining. He considered working hours and leave entitlements but recommended further studies in these areas (Cullen 1963: 336). This confirms that unemployment as a result of technological change was definitely on the agenda and known about in Australia as early as 1958. The Richards report led to the introduction of a new section in the Industrial Arbitration Act to give the New South Wales Industrial Commission the ability to deal with automation and employers. In 1963 the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, 75 considered a commission to investigate automation and its effects. The ACTU again in 1965 called for consultation (Sydney Morning Herald, 12 September 1978: 3). The Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations (ACSPA) launched a campaign against shift work in the public service. It asked its members to 'back the ACSPA campaign against shift work in commercial-clerical areas'. The ACSPA stated that: 'machines should be made to serve men and women, not men and women made to serve machines'. They viewed that shift work should only be done in absolutely essential circumstances. They stated that shift work should not be: Merely for the purpose of serving the demands of Government and private employers for the continuing working of machines and machine systems, we express our positive opposition to shift work in commercial and clerical areas ... More production, more profit is the key motive - without a care for the effect of shift work on the lives of people ... shift work is an interference and should only be worked where absolutely necessary. It strikes at the Australian way of life built up over many years (ACSPA: 1-4). Unions were concerned about the possible effects of computers on unemployment and working conditions were undoubtedly adversely affected. The Delay These issues did not deter the Queensland Government from their plans for computer introduction. Nevertheless, there were delays. After two years, Pope became fed up with the lack of progress. Don Overheu, the first Reader in Computing at the University of Queensland, recalls: I had quite a lot of contact with Ken Pope who, at the time, was working for the state Treasury on the introduction of computers into government services and finding it rather heavy going. He very nearly gave up in despair at ever getting anything going. I can recall having lunch with him and a reporter from an interstate periodical where he said some rather harsh words about the current attitude of Government somewhat to my surprise (Overheu, D. 1997 pers. comm., 3 November). In 1963, a journalist named Cedric Allen met with Pope and Don Overheu. The article mentions a report outlining recommendations for computerisation submitted in April 1963 by Pope and his fellow committee members. In the article it is stated that: 76 There are growing fears that the report has been pigeon-holed because of possible retrenchments in certain Government departments should the report be implemented and the Government adopt a computer system ... There is a danger that Mr Pope's report will ultimately be considered by senior men too preoccupied with current duties and unwilling to learn a new, challenging profession' (The Australian Financial Review, 1 October 1963: 86). It is critical to note that, after a long pause, Cabinet resumed discussion about computers in October 1963 soon after this article was published. The influence of the press here cannot be denied. IBM and ICT had put some pressure on Allen to write about the development of computers, or lack of it, in the Queensland Government. Within his own office Pope had contact with all manufacturers. There was quite a good network established between the recognised computer professionals across Australia at that time (Pope 1998 pers. Comm., 1 April). According to Pope, the effect of Allen's article was electrifying. Under Treasurer Sewell and Pope were summoned to Hiley's office. Pope explained that it had become difficult to sell the idea of introduction to public administrators who had not seen the machine. Pope stated that others, who had seen computers, were convinced it was costly and the benefits of outlay had not been proved. However, Pope argued that only a computer could undertake the task economically and in the time available. For example, the Education Department was unable to meet the needs of the rising pupil numbers and long delays were occurring in processing Junior Examination results. Similarly, delays were occurring in the Main Roads Department (processing of motor vehicle license applications) and SGIO (about 180,000 life insurance policies and premium renewals per annum). Pope confirmed that these tasks could be more effectively and efficiently be undertaken by computers (Pope 1998 pers. Comm., 1 April). In the end Pope won the debate. The Mines and Main Roads Department While at the Bridge Branch, Graham Smith was selected to participate in a course on computer programming on the IBM650 in Sydney. This machine was then used to perform bridge geometry calculations. Computing work was sent to Sydney for processing but the tasks although quite difficult, were not numerous. IBM had a number of programs in their software library relating to bridge design used in the United States. This data was coded on punched cards and sent to Sydney by airmail and later the results were sent back. Smith stated: Manually it took a draftsperson nine months to do the calculations (an another nine months to check). The IBM650 did the job in two minutes. My 77 report (1960) was circulated to all engineers in the Department and caused considerable interest' (Smith 2000, pers. comm., 17 January). This was to be expected, as manual calculation of engineering data was onerous. In 1960 Charlie Barton was appointed Commissioner for Main Roads. A feasibility study committee was established to study computing introduction in the Department, especially the registration of motor vehicles. The Committee comprised the Assistant Research and Planning Engineer S. Schubert as Chairperson, Engineer C.G. Smith, J. Stoneham and K. Grant (Queensland Roads, December 1970: 72.) The Registration of Motor Vehicles initiative was not progressing quickly although contact had been made with a number of United States and Canadian Motor Vehicle Registration Authorities. To start this initiative Charlie Barton sent Jack Stoneham and Smith overseas on an eight-week study tour. They visited various State Motor Vehicle Departments and Highway Departments in the USA (Hawaii, California, lllinios, Michigan, Arizona, Texas) Toronto (Canada) and the United Kingdom as well as computer firms such as General Electric, Univac, Control Data, IBM and ICT. There were two modes of thought at Mines and Main Roads, one was to tidy the existing system before introducing a computer, and the other was to introduce the existing system and then tidy. In the end it was decided to proceed using the existing system. Smith recalls the reason for the slow development clearly: Queensland had an addressograph system. This system could not be converted to allow for decimal currency conversion in February 1966. Jack Stoneham and I went overseas in February 1962. Four years to bring in a new system may seem a lot, but it has to be realised that the basic data was on hard copy and there were no punch cards or magnetic tape. Nor could OCR [optical character recognition] techniques be used. The effort needed to convert the database to electronic form and keep it up to date would require a special effort. In Texas where they had seven million motor vehicles, prison inmates were used (housed in special air-conditioned buildings in prison yards). While such an option was not contemplated in Queensland (600,000 vehicles), the Texas experience highlighted the need for significant logistical support. A positive outcome of the overseas trip was the decision to leap frog punch card technology and go straight to computers. The variety of systems looked at opened our eyes to possible enhancements, which could be made to the existing system. Auditing and accounting techniques then in place for the manual system needed to be rethought for a computer system (Smith 2000, pers. comm., 17 January). A design was created for the system using punched card system that in the end did not look satisfactory. 78 A motivation for computer introduction was that the usage rates of the University of Queensland's computer by the Main Roads Department escalated rapidly after its first use. Prior to this the Main Roads Department had been using the Addressograph plate system since 1952. The system contained the master file of motor vehicle registrations. The increase in business volume placed this system under some strain and the Addressograph system was aging and needed replacing (Queensland Roads, December 1962: 54 ). On 14 October 1963 Ernest Evans, Minister for Mines and Main Roads, read a submission to Cabinet. Evans explained that the Main Roads Department motor vehicle Registration system had been using an Addressograph machine, accounting machines and manual sorting for twelve years prior to 1963. This system was pushed to overload and Evans argued that the expected increases in motor vehicle registrations could not be handled by the current methods. Evans pointed out: The position in the Registration Branch is causing concern as the present system has reached the limit of its capacity and is not suitable to handle the large increases in registrations that may be expected. The Addressograph machines in use have far exceeded their normal life span and even if they were replaced by new machines the position would not be satisfactorily adjusted to cope with the situation which is critical (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Evans, 14 October 1963). Evans posited that corrective action was urgent. He said that the trend for extra Addressograph staff and extra equipment was continuing as the number of registrations increased. As at the 30 June 1963, 520, 785 vehicles were registered and this was expected to increase to 750,000 vehicles within ten years and one million within fifteen years. Evans asserted: It is therefore essential that the most up to date equipment be installed in order that the system may operate as effectively as possible to cope with the anticipated increase. However, if the Department is not to be quickly crowded out of its new building by increased staff, it is obvious that electronic data processing must be used, since this is the only system which will handle large work increases with relatively small staff increase (QSA, A/63381, Z37 40, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Evans, 14 October 1963). It can be seen from this statement that the Main Roads Department was besieged by similar problems to the SGIO. Evans went on to outline the advantages of computers. The Commissioner for Main Roads reported to Evans that many road authorities overseas used computers for many tasks, such as engineering design, traffic analysis, and economic examinations of alternative designs. Evans argued that 'the need for road 79 authorities to have computers has been definitely established' (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Evans, 14 October 1963). Computers postulated Evans, completed complex tasks and ensured the best use of technical staff of which there was a shortage. He suggested that computers could also perform other tasks, such as stores accounting, plant accounting, job and other ledgers and so on. Main Roads Department staff had been using the computer at the University of Queensland for some time, to the point that without the assistance of a computer their works program would have been severely hampered. Evans suggested that without the computer, the Department would have difficulty keeping its operations up-to-date - 'it cannot now go back' (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Evans, 14 October 1963). The work done successfully on the University computer was evidence, claimed Evans, that the Main Roads Department needed a computer. Evans contended that the cost of work completed by the University's computer was increasing. He also suggested that the University machine should not be tied up with non-technical work. Evans understood that an advantage of the establishment of a computer service bureau was the Department would be guaranteed use of the machine. The Department could also take advantage of the work done on the machine by other road authorities and it would allow staff to develop computing skills before a computer was purchased. The problem of concern was where would the computer be housed while the new Department building was being completed. The Bureau, realised Evans, would greatly assist with the conversion to decimal currency and save some £50,000. Finally, Evans stated that 'The Police Department, Brisbane City Council and insurance companies would benefit from the installation of this system by reason of the ease with which information could be ascertained and lists published' (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Evans, 14 October 1963). This is a crucial statement. Obviously, Evans did not consider the issue of privacy when considering this sharing of information. Evans, in his submission, announced that technical functions completed by the Department on computers would at least treble in four to five years. Without utilising computers, the Department's workload would necessitate hiring more staff, 'many in classifications not readily available' (QSA, TR1810/2, Z3995, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Evans, 20 March 1964: 1 ). The annual cost of hiring 80 computing time is as follows: University computer (mostly technical) £25,000 IBM Service Bureau £31,000 Total £56,000 (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Evans, 14 October 1963). The cost of purchase was estimated to be between £200,000 and £300,000. Evans argued that the purchase of a computer could be justified on the basis of only six years of life. Evans also felt that it would be indeed possible to install a computer in the new Mines and Main Roads Building on a rental basis and thus avoid the heavy capital outlay of purchase. Cabinet decided: (1) the commissioner of Main Roads be authorised to enter into a contract with IBM (Australia) Pty. Ltd. for a Computer Bureau Service for a period expected to be two years; (2) That the Commissioner of Main Roads be given approval in principle for the installation of a computer in the new Head Office building when a suitable section is available for occupancy for this purpose. (QSA, A/63381, Z3740, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Evans, 14 October 1963). Tenders were called on 18 July 1964 for the Main Roads Department to be returned by 7 September 1964. Smith recalls: In 1964 Charlie Barton told me that he had got into trouble about Main Roads calling its own computer tender. He told me in jocular manner, not to worry and that he had sorted out the matter. I believe that Ernie Evan's position in Cabinet was so strong that the Treasurer of the day had to give in. From there on in Main Roads had a clear run. I believe that the matter was brought up at Cabinet. Our Minister Ernie Evans supported the Department's initiative and that was an end to the issue. After that Main Roads and Treasury officers had good working relationships. It was apparent to all that Main Roads with both its technical computer work and its registration of motor vehicles system required a computer of its own (Smith 2000, pers. comm., 17 January). Regardless, Cabinet decided that approval be granted for the Commissioner of Main Roads to call tenders for installation of a computer in the proposed building on the basis of purchase or alternatively of hiring such a computer (QSA, TR1810/2, Z3995, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Evans, 20 March 1964: 1 ). A Committee of officers representing the technical and administrative sides of the 81 Department completed the specifications. It was later thought, that Main Roads Department work would be transferred to the Treasury computer, but the Main Roads Department continued to use the University of Queensland machine because it already had technical programming completed on it (QSA, TR1810/2, Z3997, Cabinet Minutes Decisions and Submissions, Evans, 8 October 1964: 1). Conclusion Plans for computer introduction into the Queensland Government were not taken seriously until the University of Queensland's machine was used. 'It then developed from an interesting plaything into a valuable tool' (Queensland Roads, December 1962: 54). Only then, within the Department, was an EDP Feasibility Committee established. The key problem with computing introduction, according to Pope, was undoubtedly the choice of manufacturer by a tendering process. Pope found the tendering process cumbersome to work with. Another difficulty was the reliability of equipment, 'especially in the face of hostile Press criticism ... The "tall poppy" syndrome was as present then as now' (Pope 1998, pers. comm., 1 April). Pope was careful not to promise too much concerning computer installations. Pope intentionally built relationships with members of the Queensland Works Department architects and computer company engineers to make sure he got the kind of Installation he wanted. Pope stated: The problems of creating installations in old buildings were severe. For example, the first Treasury installation was placed in the basement of what is now called the Treasury Casino. The walls were one metre thick and made of stone. Drainage also had to be very carefully considered. In addition space had to be found for air-conditioning equipment and ducting, and also stand-by generation equipment. Rats ate some cabling, but this was not a major problem. Generally all support equipment worked well (Pope 1998, pers. comm., 1 April). Training staff already in the public service who had degrees or were working towards one offset another difficulty; the difficulty to find trained staff. All departments were circularised and applications invited from officers for selection to undergo the necessary aptitude tests for training in computing. Over 350 officers were tested and certain officers were selected to attend the first six-week data processing course held in the Public Service Commissioner's Department. Some staff were sent to Commonwealth training centres. As an aside, computing instruction began in Queensland in 1960 under the Auspices of the Australian 82 Computer Society (ACS) and were conducted by John Marshall and held in the City Electric Light Company's basement in Brisbane. In 1962 a course was conduction by Ken Pope and Don Overheu at Queensland United Food's premises in Brisbane. It was updated and repeated the next year and the courses proved to a great success (Bosson 1993: 18). The old machinery, including the Hollerith machine, which in turn had replaced the Power-Samas punched card equipment, had paved the way for the introduction of the computer. Sales material sent to Pope claimed that the Hollerith was said to be a base model machine from which followed small computers up to large machines. Therefore, even though there is a vast difference between the punched machine and the computer Pope was considering purchasing, the need for both was based on a crisis in paper-work being handled at the SGIO and other Departments. The computer purchase decision, it seems, stemmed from the successful installation of the Hollerith machine, a less significant piece of office equipment. Earlier eagerness to employ mechanical aids led the SGIO, in a logical fashion, 'to the employment of modern electronic computers' (History of Computing File, QSA, TR 1193/4, Box 61, T5, 1961 ). Clearly, the period 1956 to 1965 features some key developments in computer introduction. Decimal currency was also an impending pressure for most Departments. Hiley had some unjustifiable concerns regarding the introduction of computers and matters were slow to progress until Pope, in conjunction with the press and a threat of resignation, forced the issue. Hiley was aware of tensions in the Public Service over computers and was clear to state that the investigations during 1963 would cover the whole Service but it did not seek to interfere with investigations already in process in individual Departments. He realised that the tasks before the computer were too great for one single machine so he allowed other investigations and solutions. He was keen to stress that any new computer centre would be under Treasury control. Hiley felt that the computer would initially be uneconomic but its value exceeded expectations. Hiley realised that some centralisation was necessary but he was keen to stress that accounting responsibility would not be withdrawn from Departments but only the more routine work would be done centrally. This was not the case as the computer proved its value. The Committee clearly had disagreements within its ranks even over on aspect such as the integration of accounting. One view was that a computer should 83 not be installed until stores work was catered and the other view that this would take many months and it would slow the project. Hiley felt that full integration would case communication and work load problems. Hiley suggested that an installation should come into fruition sooner rather than later. Decimal currency problems looming on the horizon was the big incentive. Yet, still computing was met with apathy and fear. There was little interest being shown politically or socially, or in the media at the time of introduction. Debates became more prevalent about ten years later when everyone concerned, including the public, was a little better informed. In the next chapter covering the period 1965 to 1970, it will be seen that more unemployment concerns were discussed. Despite the overwhelming need for technology evidenced by the toils of the SGIO, for example, the conservatism of the public administration of Queensland frustrated the efforts of Pope. Given the quite apparent benefits of computerisation, it was still difficult to introduce them because the decision makers simply did not see the obvious benefits of computers. It must be remembered that the technology being adopted was very similar to earlier punch card technology and in many cases computers were able to use cards for input. Many people today do not understand the concepts of random access memory and disk storage, the key defining characteristics of computers. 84 Chapter Three: The Acquisition of Computers 1965-71 'We are fast entering a computerised world, and in some ways computers are becoming monsters that cannot be controlled' (Collin Bennett Hon. Member for South Brisbane, Queensland Parliament, 1971). Introduction During 1965 computers were installed in the Queensland Government for the first time but in 1971 politicians in the Queensland Government began to see some problems with computing. First, at the time of the computer installations, a computer's cost was of some concern. However, later the need to continually upgrade computer equipment due to its ever-increasing uses, dramatically added to the cost of computerisation. This problem was of concern to the Queensland Government. Second, following the installation of more up-to-date equipment, it became clear that the demand for computer use was going to continually exceed expectations. Third, also during the above period, it became clear that some groups, such as the unions, had clear objections to the arrival of the computers in government, which they made clear through active promulgation. Finally, towards the end of the decade, it became clear to government and other interested parties that threats to privacy and increasing unemployment were an unwelcome spin off of the computer installations. Installation of computers in Queensland Government: The Cost By 1965, computer installations were being completed in the Queensland Government. On 8 June 1965, a NCR-315 was installed at the State Government Insurance Office (the first of its type installed in Queensland).8 On 14 June 1965, the Queensland Treasury took delivery of an ICT 1903. The ICT 1904 was ordered 8 This statement appeared in Insurance Lines, the journal of the SGIO: The ship carrying the computer berthed at 5:30p.m. on 8th June, 1965. At 8:57 p.m., due to the complete co operation of everyone concerned, from the SGIO. (Q) Caretaker to the Brisbane Wharf Authorities and Shipping Agents, five tons of computer were receiving a welcome from the General Manager and members of the computer staff in the courtyard of the SGIO (Q) Building. By midnight, all units of the computer were in place, ready for the NCR engineers to start the complicated labour of cable laying and connecting early next morning. At 11 :20 p.m. on Wednesday, 9th June, the computer played a series of Christmas carols and the birth was complete. A bulletin announced that both the computer and the NCR site representatives were now resting comfortably (Insurance Lines, July/September 1965: 6-7). 85 at the price of £173,220 plus a maximum of £9,900 for freight and insurance to be delivered within one year. The machine went in the basement of the Treasury Building. Walls three feet thick had to be drilled through to get air-conditioning installed, which was controversial, as the rest of the building was not air-conditioned. The SGIO computer manager, G.H. Lovell said that the machine: Will be handling the office's mounting volume of business and in the changeover to the decimal system. It is hoped that the use of the NCR-315 Computer would ultimately lead to increased profits, more competitive policies, and increased bonuses for policyholders of SGIO (New 120,000 computer for SGIO, State Service, June 1965, 16). The changeover to decimal currency was problematic and it was not completed as planned. The Main Roads Department called for tenders in mid-1964 and in December 1964 an agreement was entered into with ICT for an ICT1905 computer at the price of £237, 189 plus a maximum of £5,310 for freight and insurance. The computer was delivered in March 1965, but delivery was delayed because the Main Roads Department had nowhere to place the machine. The problem of finding a place to house the computer was realised as early as October 1963. It was placed temporally in the Queensland Treasury Building and in 1967 the computer was removed from the Treasury Building and installed the Mines and Main Roads Department's new building at Spring Hill, Brisbane (Queensland Roads, December 1968: 35). The preparations for the computer were considerable. The room to house the computer in the Mines and Main Roads Department's building was obstructed by columns and had heavy beams installed in their place. Air conditioning was installed and a temperature of seventy-two degrees (F) was maintained with the relative humidity set at fifty percent. These conditions were maintained and monitored even when the machine was not in use. Two air conditioning machines were installed and these were capable of outputting seventy-five percent so if one malfunctioned the other served as a backup. In addition, water sprinklers were replaced with carbon dioxide outlets which, after an alarm bell rang, functioned automatically after ten seconds. Power for the machine was drawn directly from the building substation and an alternator was used to smooth out any peaks on the mains (Queensland Roads, December 1968: 36). The Treasury computer and the Main Roads Department computers were to cost 86 £410,409 pounds at time of order (Courier Mail, 24 December 1964: 7). After the computer was installed in the SGIO, the Main Roads Department and the Queensland Treasury, it became clear that computing costs were going to exceed expectations Pope claimed: It [the initial cost] was not seen as very great, because it must have fallen around £400,000 for the first Treasury equipment. It was not until the second time round (when I returned in 1975 to set up what is now CITEC) that the cost jumped to millions of dollars (Pope 1998, pers. comm., 1 April). Thus, the cost of the early machines, according to Pope, was accepted but the cost of the equipment though was, to some extent, questioned in Queensland Parliament. Nevertheless, R. Jones, member of the Australian Labor Party, asked Gordon Chalk, Minister for Transport, about the cost of the computer installation: What is the total amount of expenditure for the purchase, installation and operating costs of the Railway Department's Electronic Data Processing Bureau in respect of (a) computers and/or similar equipment, (b) stationery, (c) wages, and (d) other expenses? (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 11 November 1967: 802). Chalk replied: The machines are hired from the supplier at a yearly rental of $145, 465. The cost of providing accommodation and installing the machines was $7 4, 674. The cost for the financial year ended June 30, 1967 was: stationery - $18, 071; wages - $99, 492; other expenses - $13, 717 (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 11 November 1967: 802). Whether or not the installations were cost effective, Pope states: No formal cost-benefit analysis was conducted after the event. Such refinements did not exist in those days - and I am sure that this would be as true of the other States as of Queensland. Perhaps the real point is that in Queensland the applications were successful. .. (Pope 1997 pers. comm., 4 November). These successes and failures led to two views of computers. Some people knew computers were costly, but they could see the benefits; others were convinced they were costly, but they could not see the benefits. Relief of bottlenecks leads to increase use of computers Upon taking up his position as Planning Officer, Pope was advised that one of the main reasons why computers were being installed in Government Departments was to relieve bottlenecks in paper-work such as the payrolls for teachers and police and the processing of Queensland Junior and Technical Education examination results. 87 Prior to using computers the teacher's payroll was done on about thirty NCR and Burrough's Accounting Machines but they were antiquated and very slow. The machines would have needed to be converted to decimal currency and the cost of replacing them would have been enormous. Pope states that 'the teaching payroll was successful, and the public service payroll itself was added to it' (Pope 1998: pers. comm., 1 April). It is important to note that the computer was not initially used for the Treasury accounting functions, which was essentially an enormous adding up function called an exhaust. Treasury exhausted the day's totals against the budget provision for the month making sure that over spending did not occur. It was considered not worth using the computer to replace such a simple adding up function, but the work was nevertheless awful. Also, in the beginning, forecasting or forward projections could not be done because there was no software designed to do it, in the event that anyone had been adroit enough to think of it. Regardless, it was not beneficial to take over such a simple function. Pope recalls: The function was going to continue and all we were doing was transferring an accounting machine function to the computer. So at that stage it just wasn't worth the effort (Pope 2000 pers. comm., 10 March). Similarly, the same circumstances applied to revenue accounting. Revenue came in much larger chunks over a much smaller number of heads, but it was the same process. It necessitated filling in a ledger card and looking at the bottom to see how much money remained and where it was located. The more detailed accounting work was done in each Department. Each Department had a mirror of that process but within that Department the number of heads of accounting for expenditure and income was much greater than at the centre. This was because in the centre many of them were summarised together with the details deleted. Therefore, it was not worthwhile doing Treasury work and, even though Pope examined accounting functions within the Departments, he could not ascertain how to put them into the computer, except in the case of the Department of Public Works and Local Government. The constant process of producing cheques for contractors and subcontractors created a lot of money movement and it was very easy to lose control and, in some instances, in small accounting sheet sections, cheques got delayed beyond their due date. There was much political pressure from contractors to get their money from the Government and they could not get it because of backlogs. Pope decided upon a recommendation that the Department of Public Works and Local Government was to be the first Department to receive computerised accounting assistance. The Treasury system did not change until around 1970. 88 However, it had not been anticipated that the computer would be used for so many different applications. As Dennis Luttrell (1997), former SGIO computer specialist, stated: 'they did not realise the use of computers would blow out to such an extent' (Luttrell 1997, pers. comm., 5 November). The decision to replace the NCR-315 was made in 1967. An ICT 1904A was ordered in January 1968 and received in August 1970. Pat Kelly stated in A History of Electronic Computing in the SGIO: The short life of our first computer may, in hindsight, be attributed to an initial misunderstanding of the demands for complete computer systems and the beginning of an explosive growth in the availability of bigger and better commercial facilities (QSA, History of Computing File, TR 1193/4, Box 61, T5, 1961 ). To illustrate the increase in applications, the progression of computing work can be exemplified by referring to the case of the Mines and Main Roads Department. The following table highlights that growth. 89 EAR WORK UNDERTAKEN USING A COMPUTER AVERAGE USE PER MONTH 1966 Motor vehicle registration processing, road design, Not available Department statistics, plant hire 1967 Motor vehicle registration processing, road design, Not available Department statistics, plant hire, traffic analysis processing 1968 Motor vehicle registration processing, road design, 249 hours Department statistics, plant hire, traffic analysis processing, traffic and advance planning surveys, reports on plants and stocks, reports of mechanical branch operations, cheque preparation and payments 1969 Motor vehicle registration processing, road design, 264 hours Department statistics, plant hire, traffic analysis processing, Traffic and advance planning surveys, reports on plants and stocks, reports of mechanical branch operations, cheque preparation and payments, road design, plant accounting, traffic studies, advance planning, bridge design, materials testing, staff and establishment records, motor vehicle registration, standard engineering specifications, accounting and pre-construction and job construction scheduling. 1970 Road design, plant hire, traffic transportation studies, Not available advance planning (monthly and annual reports, road and bridge inventory), bridge design (plane frame and grade analysis, space frame analysis, continuous beam analysis, re-enforcement scheduling, interaction curves for circular concrete columns, sheer design of complexity of pre- stressed concrete girder, three dimensional pile analysis, analysis of rectangular concrete column, geometry of bridge on curve) 1971 Road design, plant hire, traffic transportation studies, Not available advance planning, bridge design, accounting system for payroll costing, survey analysis of axle loading of trucks, analysis of data concerning vehicle mileage travelled and extraction of traffic planning information from vehicle registration. Under development in 1971 was an accounting system ledger, general input and validation system, graphical representation of road maintenance expenditure, road design systems and integrated graphic plotter system. (Complied: Queensland. Public Service Commissioner 47th and 50th Annual Reports.) It has been highlighted previously that prior to computer installation in Government, 90 Departments processed data with any technical elements on the University of Queensland's GE225 computer. Prior to that, some Departments hired time on the IBM 650 Service Bureau in Sydney. The installation of computers in the SGIO and Treasury changed policy towards such processing: Contributing departments to the Computing Centre at the University of Queensland have continued to make increasing use of the facilities at the Centre during the year. However, as State Government Computer installations come into operation, it is expected that technical departments will transfer their processing to these installations (Quoted in Grierson 1979: 10). Some computer facilities were indeed centralised in 1965 when the Treasury Department provided computing services to all Government Departments excluding Mines and Main Roads and the SGIO, which had its own computing facilities. Most of the work done by Treasury focused on the central commercial activity of the Department concerned. For example, the Queensland Housing Commission developed a rental payment system, the Forestry Department developed stumpage accounts (timber for the use in building), the Valuer-General Department established a master file of Queensland properties and so on. However, the Mines and Main Roads continued to use the University of Queensland machines because much of their work was prepared for that machine. Decimal Currency The need to obtain the computer before decimal currency was introduced was a sound idea in theory. Unfortunately, SGIO computing staff was unable to meet the decimal currency conversion date as they were struggling with the task due to limited experience. The Addressograph machine, used prior to computers, processed records such as premium notices. Every policy with the SGIO had its own Addressograph plate and attached to the plate was a piece of cardboard, which showed what was on the plate. Every endorsement clerk changed the cardboard to reflect changes in the address and other details of the policyholder. The Addressograph was then sent to the plate change room where the leaded plate would be changed or a new one would be made. There were thousands of plates. When the computer arrived, a worksheet recorded the details of the policy, which was then sent to the computer room. This process proved to be no faster or easier. An Addressograph cardboard record could be changed in three or four minutes when the computer room often took as long as six months to complete changes. 91 This put tremendous pressure on endorsement clerks (Wales 1998, pers. comm., 19 May). In the end, the Addressograph plates were converted manually, a tedious task that took a special team some twelve months to complete (Thomis and Wales 1986: 200). In the SGIO there was a room filled with rows of wooden cabinets with trays full of Addressograph plates. They were organised on a time basis and when necessary the next month's drawers were opened and the plate was passed through the Addressograph machine. The machine printed the policy renewal form with the names and address from the plate at the top of the form. Clerks often had to adjust the forms because some policies would have lapsed and some people would have died and so on. Pope recalled that this was theoretically sound, but the sheer volume of the procedure made it flawed. There were no safeguards and as a result, at some time in the past, the back had fallen out of some of the drawers and some plates had fallen onto the floor. For some years the Auditor General had refused to pass the SGIO accounts and as for as many years the Auditor General had submitted a report stating that he was unable to verify the accounts for this particular section of the SGIO, such as the Life. The Auditors General's remarks were not taken seriously for some time. Upon his arrival Riding saw the problems and, through the use of the computer, corrected the process but it took two to three years before it was fully remedied (Pope 2000, pers. comm., 10 March). Murdoch Wales, an insurance clerk with the SGIO in 1965 and later co-author of SGIO to Suncorp, helped change the plates. He later became a historian/librarian for the SGIO. He summarises events at the time through his recollections: The computer was going to do everything, but it did not. They could not program it. The change to decimal currency had to been done manually. This was a tremendously arduous task that took one year. They [SGIO] had punched card technology certainly, but the computer was recognised as new and different by general staff. Lower level staff were worried about losing their jobs but this did not eventuate. More staff were hired for computer work. Staff were required to fill out a worksheet which was then sent to the computing department. You might get something back, but you may not (Wales 1997 pers. comm., 3 November). On the one hand, a computer professional blames the Addressograph system and, on the other hand, a clerk blames the computer professional. 92 Labour Cost Savings and Unemployment One of the reasons why the Queensland Government was keen to introduce computers was to lower staffing costs. The State Industrial Commission increased salaries for most of Queensland Public Service's 18,500 employees (approximately) on 9 April 1963 retrospective to 1 January 1963. Again on 29 March 1965, the Commission gave approximately 318,000 employees a rise, which added an estimated £2,325,000 to the State payroll (QSA, TR1193/3, File T 19, EDP Files, 1923-1982). In 1965 at the SGIO, the need for additional hours to be worked was so great that many staff worked Saturdays voluntarily to keep up with work that could not be handled during business hours. Much later, in December 1970 where in a memorandum from the General Manager to Under Treasurer, it was requested that the SGIO move from two shifts to three shifts because of the volume of work. Gordon Chalk made such a decision on 22 January 1971. Even though the installation involved additional computing staff and additional working hours at the outset, redundancies began to occur after installation. This was the basis of staff cost savings. An understated consequence of computing then , was its effect on employment later. Full-time computing personnel numbers increased some 180 per cent between 1967 and 1979, compared with a general Queensland Public Service increase of 93 percent over those years. In two years only did the increase in staff slow. This was due to a decline in the rate of increase in data preparation staff (Grierson 1979: 11 ). The growth of staff is indicated in Figure 1. Staff Involved Full-time in QPS Computing 500 450 400 ...t/l 350 Cl) .0 300 E z:::i 250 200 ns =ii5 150 100 50 0 00 0) 0 ..- N C") ' (Source: Grierson 1979: 12). 93 It can be seen from this diagram there was a steady increase in computing staff. This was where some of the displaced staff were replaced. Conversely, in the Main Roads Department there was an overall increase in the number of male and female clerical staff but this peaked and slowed after computer introduction. The numbers are presented in the figure 2. Staff Employed By Main Roads 1200 & ... 1000 800 ...I/) ..cQ) E :l 600 z :t: ni Cl)- 400 200 - Male c:::=::i Female 0 (0 r- CXl O> 0 N C"l ' 0 -+- Total LO (0 LO LO (0 co (0 (0 (0 (0 (0 (0 (0 (0 r- t: .....O> .....O> .....O> .....O> O> .....O> .....O> .....O> .....O> .....O> .....O> .....O> .....O> .....O> .....O> .....O> Date as at 30 June (Source: Compiled from Queensland. Public Service Commissioner's Annual Reports). In 1968, female clerical numbers dropped from 614 to 577. The diagram also illustrates the number of future jobs that ceased to be available for both men and women. After 1966, the year of computing introduction into the Mines and Main Roads Department, the number of staff employed slowed dramatically due to the reduced need for staff as a direct result of the computing introduction. Simply put, fewer positions became available for job seekers. Evans predicted how this occurred and this was outlined earlier. The following figure3 displays inflation. As can be seen inflation is reasonably steady at the time of introduction. So it would seem that inflation had little to do with staff numbers. 94 Inflation, 1949-50 to 1972-73 20 c: 0 ~ 15 ;;::: .E 10 5 0 ' ' ~N CO N ~ l!) Ol CD ~ ~ Financial Year (Source: Ball 1975:2) In a publication of the Main Roads Department in 1970 entitled Queensland Roads, the Public Service Commissioner Fraser stated: The computer [punched card machine] begun to quietly invade [my emphasis] the Department in 1959 as a replacement for the time-honoured mental calculations the complex has now infiltrated [my emphasis] most Departmental activities (Queensland Roads 1970: 72). These kinds of carefully chosen words were prevalent at the time of computer introduction. (Fraser's stance is contradictory as it may be recalled earlier that he was pleased to assist with computing introduction.) As a result the computer was blamed for a myriad of difficulties, including the problem of unemployment. It is useful to consider some of these here. Karmel ( 1981) argues that the decline in employment opportunities after installation had been especially great for females. He states: Full-time employment for young men and women aged 15 to 19 years has been declining steadily since 1966 - the number of full-time jobs has declined from about 110,000 as against an increase of about 245,000 in the population in the age group. The decline has been particularly severe for females, about 30 percent over the last fourteen years compared with 10 percent for males. In 1966, 58 percent of the 15 to 19 years age group were in full-time jobs; today the proportion is 38 percent (Karmel 1981 : 100). These statistics, as Karmel would admit, are non-conclusive. 'The causes of youth unemployment are complex, and there is likely to be no single explanation' (Karmel 1981: 103). Redundancies were absorbed by some vacancies elsewhere, but an overall reduction in clerical staff intakes resulted. The work to be done was, in 1970, increasing at a rate of six percent, but staff increased by a rate of only three percent. 95 The computer filled the gap. Certain types of jobs vanished. Routine billing was all done by computer (Stanley 1970: 133). In the 12 months to September 1968, 1,217 persons were reported to have been replaced by the computer in Australia. In 1965, 1,282 displacements were reported. Despite the questionability of the data, the 1965 figure included females at a rate of 70 percent (Stanley 1970: 133). In summary then, the necessity for controlling or lowering costs was a major reason for the introduction of the first computers in most organisations, including Government Departments. In 1968, the Australian Department of Labour and National Service conducted a study of three organisations: an insurance company, a manufacturing company and a public utility. All three firms stated that computerisation had caused an increase in workload which in turn meant an increase in costs. At the same time, the variety in work decreased, as did the work become less interesting after installation (Department of Labour and National Service 1968: 7-8 ). Most organisations adopted the policy of no retrenchments at installation. The answer to excess staff was to allow natural attrition and transfers to absorb possible unemployment. The jobs vacated by these means were no longer required and ceased to exist. Evans (1965) states: 'to put the effect of automation at its mildest, it is obvious that considerably higher production will result from the employment of fewer workers' (Evans 1965: 8). Deery, in a Ph.D. thesis, states that: 'it would also appear that the introduction of computer technology will remove routine tasks and reduce the need for lower skilled clerical workers' (Deery 1987: 20). The effects on employment were not noticed significantly during the period in question as many easily found other employment. Deery states: There was an expansionary upswing in the economy and high levels of employment from the mid 1950s until the mid 1970s. Even where employees were made redundant as a result of technological innovations they experienced little difficulty in obtaining alternative work (Deery 1987: 58). Rose (1967) warns that statistics do not adequately assist in the determination of the rate of unemployment that results from automation. Rose states: 'empirical research and discussion have shown that a rational and reliable statistical treatment is inadequate for dealing with the effect of automation on unemployment' (Rose 1967: 66). First, automation does not account for individuals who would have been hired if not for the introduction of automation. Second, increased productivity 96 resulting from other factors may have led to the employment increases if any (Rose 1967: 65-68). On the other hand, Blatt (1981) counters this by stating 'perhaps the worst form of prevarication is the assertion: we do not have adequate statistics to come to any firm conclusion' (Blatt 1981: 84 ). Sullivan ( 1986) agrees when he states: This claim as to technological unemployment has always been that the statistical evidence does not enable concrete conclusions to be made. Despite the fact that this claim has been made for possibly twenty years, there is little sign that determined efforts are being made to correct the statistical deficiency, to enable a more precise analysis of what the empirical evidence underscores (Sullivan 1986: 100). Nevertheless, technological unemployment was of sufficient importance that federally, the Commonwealth Government announced that it would institute a separate section of the Department of Labour and National Service to look at technological change. In 1969 the Department of Labour and National Service began a three-year study on the employment and technological change (Sydney Morning Herald, 25 September 1978: 10). Federated Clerk's Union The Federated Clerks Union of Australia argued that the introduction of computers would result in widespread youth unemployment. The first sign of the awareness of a problem with technology came to the Federated Clerk's Union in the 1950s with the advent of automation. As early as 1956 they stressed the need for consultation between unions, government and business on the correct planning and introduction of automation. At the same time as it parried off the Federated Clerk's Union, the Federal Government wooed the ACTU. It expounded a theory of tri-partism that representatives of employer's organisations, the unions and the government should meet and discuss how best it should manage the economy (Hagan 1989: 34). Of concern was the extended amount of shift work required by employers of clerks in EDP sections. At this time fifty percent of staff assigned to computer installations were working one or two shifts in addition to the day shift (Cited in Ciric 1968: 24). This problem was mentioned and suggested in an Australian paper of 1958 by the 97 Economic Society of Australian and New Zealand, to be a cost consideration (Anthony 1958: 2). Anthony (1958) states: Then, as previously indicated, full utilisation of a computer system is highly desirable, and this usually leads to shift work for machine operators. Such circumstances have hitherto been unknown in Australian office life, but the growth of EDP may well give rise to a complete rethinking of attitude by both management on the one hand and the organised forces of labour on the other (Anthony 1958: 5). By 1966 the Federated Clerk's Union, annoyed at the lack of consultation on automation between government, unions and industry, adopted a 'consultation or confrontation' approach and warned of hitherto unseen industrial action on automation. The Federated Clerk's Union also promulgated the dangers of computers and stated that youth employment was not recognised and encompassed in the planning of information technology despite calls for such planning. The first major challenge came to the Federated Clerk's Union in the form of a battle with Mobil Oil Company. They launched a claim on the company designed to protect the employee's rights during the change. The Federated Clerk's Union finally took the claim to the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. The resulting decision ensured that employees and their unions were to be consulted by management about changes to working life which were a direct result of technological change. In 1967, the President of the Federated Clerk's Union preferred to accept the issue of computers as going beyond shift work and going to general question of major technological change. The battle on shift work was a hard one to fight as many awards were to be changed as a result of shift matter and a global federal change did not seem possible. Despite the Federated Clerk's Union's attempts, there is little evidence to indicate that the Union was effective in its moves to curb the effects of the new technology. Governments recognised the need to inform unions of change in order to alleviate possible action, but they paid scant attention to their views (Deery 1987: 283). Hiley expressed the same need to consult with unions based on the Supervising Committee report of 27 January 1961. Health problems were identified by the Federated Clerk's Union but this was difficult to lobby on, as not one common symptom was identifiable with which to launch an attack (Minutes of the meeting of the Federal Executive Council held at Shoal Bay, New South Wales 11th to 151h August 1969). 98 In the minutes of the meeting of the Branch Executive of the Federated Clerk's Union, held in the union rooms at Jubilee house, Brisbane on Monday 7 July 1969, Item 15 on the agenda contained a record of the Capricornia Regional Electricity Board's (CREB) announcement of a study of apply a two shift day for computer staff. A consulting firm, acting for CREB, was to examine the proposal to use the CREB's computer on a double shift basis. Members were told that the computer was at present worked on a one-shift basis, but overtime was being paid. Brown, Secretary of the Federated Clerk's Union, then advised that he had written to the Board. Brown said in the letter that the subject was highly volatile as shift work was not, and never had been, part of normal clerical work and for this reason the board will need to tread carefully before it makes a final decision. The salaried officers award, he said, had a provision for shift work, but it was introduced eleven years ago for powerhouse staff and thus it had no relevance at all to clerical officers (Minutes of the meeting of the Branch Executive of the Federated Clerk's Union held in the union rooms at Jubilee house, Brisbane on Monday 7 July 1969, Item 15). The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) The effects of computing on employment were, to some extent, considered by the ACTU after the Federated Clerk's Union put forward their policy. A statement from the ACTU included the following: That the introduction of planned automation by joint Government, Trade Union and Employer consultation holds out the promise of vast improvement in the standard of living. Its application can eliminate routine, repetitive or arduous work. Legislative power of Governments, as well as the properly organised forces of employers and labour, must be directed to: Avoiding dislocations of the labour force, which cause social hardship, or labour displacement; training or re-training in skills to meet the new technological development; and ensuring that purchasing power is expanded to keep pace with the nation's productive capacity and with the lessened need for human effort, improved living standards and greater leisure. The A.C.T.U call on commonwealth and State Governments and employers to accept their responsibility, with the Trade Union Movement, for joint consultation and planned introduction of automation for the transition to the era of the new technology with beneficial results instead of hardship and industrial chaos that was experienced in countries which have introduced automation without the proper planning and adequate consultation between Governments, employers and Trade Union organisations (Quoted in Walker 1956: 61 ). There are several points of interest here. There was the expectation that 99 automation would help replace repetitive and arduous work with better work and allow a lessened need for human effort, improve living standards and increase leisure time. The introduction of new technology resulted, for the majority of members of the Federated Clerk's Union in less rather than more interesting jobs. Many members reported that the work they were required to do doubled after automation. Second, the ACTU recognised the potential of automation to cause hardship and 'labour displacement'. This was clearly evident after automation and arguably the near full employment experienced by most nations in the 1950s will never to be regained. In 1958, Anthony stated: Automatic processes in the office do not necessarily mean wholesale displacement of staff. They can make for widespread redistribution [my emphasis] of staff, as routine clerical tasks are one by one adapted for automatic processing (Anthony 1958: 4). In EDP installations the 'redistribution' became a fuzzy synonym for 'displacement' as redistribution was never complete and in most cases many staff suffered immediate displacement. Over time the displacement became structural and by the 1990s was clearly evident as many jobs ceased to exist. The ACTU required State Governments to compel employers by legislation to notify the relevant department and unions if they were involved in a feasibility study relating to technological change. They were also to give notice of any impending introduction and advance notice of an intention to retrench, re-locate, downgrade, or in any other way, affect the terms and conditions of employees' work. Finally, according to the ACTU, minimum notice of termination or pay in lieu was necessary where any retrenchment occurred as a result of innovation (ACTU Executive. Recommendation to Congress, September 1969: 2). State Secretary of the Printing and Kindred Industries Union, T. Burton, stated that: 'more than 20 years have elapsed since the last general reduction in working hours in Australia' (Quoted in Courier Mail, 8 November 1969: 8). Burton argued: In this period production of goods and services had increased at a tremendous rate because of technological improvements and increased mechanisation. This led to greater exploitation of labor [sic] than ever before, bringing in its train greater physical and mental strain (Courier Mail, 8 November 1969: 8) The increasing technology gave rise to the push for a 35-hour week. After adopting 100 the Automation Sub-Committee's report, the 1957 Congress resolved: The Congress recognises that notwithstanding the expanding needs of modern society, the increasing application of automation to industry and commerce, over all, steadily reduces the workforce required to satisfy the needs. Therefore Congress now places in the forefront of its fighting platform the demand for the reductions of the working week from 40 hours to 35 per week without loss of pay, and initiates a nationwide campaign to compel employers and Governments to bring about this necessary reform (Quoted in Deery 1987: 264). Deery argues that the Federated Clerk's Union was not fully supportive of the 35- hour week proposal put forward by the ACTU as they did not see any real benefit in it. The Federated Clerk's Union argued that real benefit though could be gained from shortening the annual or 'working life' hours worked (Deery 1987: 264 ). The Press As in the previous chapter the press of the late 1960s changed little in its approach. A computer was a powerful tool that was not beyond the understanding of the average person said The Australian (The Australian, 18 August 1965: 2 Supplement). However, many other newspaper reports were not as realistic. Other articles read 'Machines are Helping to Run the Country' (The Australian, 16 August 1965: 8). In medicine computers were diagnosing 'and monitoring critical ill patients' (The Telegraph, 11 December 1968: 52). Computers were writing poetry, composing music, creating dance sequences and sending the electricity bill. In farming they were increasing farm profits by determining the best way to use the land. The list of achievements was rather long and they all have a common trait. The common trait was that computers were the achievers of such accomplishments and not the scientist, poet, dancer, power authority, doctor and so on, using the computer as a tool. Computers in general were predicted to be in our lives in ways that never eventuated. For instance, Professor Ovenstone, Adelaide University's professor of computing, told Queensland readers of The Courier-Mail in 1968 that most 'Australian households would be connected to a central computer in fours years for shopping, education and other purposes' (Courier Mail, 5 December 1968: 4). He said that people would purchase a computer console with their televisions in four to five year's time. Thirty years later the convergence of these technologies was still only a minor element in the market place. 101 Privacy The privacy issue became heated at the beginning of the seventies. In July 1970 an article was published in The Courier Mail, Brisbane, entitled 'Big Brother is Watching You: With a Dossier'. The article outlined how agencies in the United States, such as the police, the army and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, were amassing large amounts of information on individuals. This information, the article's author Penberthy claimed, was being swapped with credit reporting agencies (The Courier Mail, 6 April 1970: 10). It was long after the introduction of computers that sharing of information became a concern. The Main Roads Department had a remote computer terminal connection to the computer at the University of Queensland in 1971. Prime Minister Gorton commissioned the first national computer online network on 6 April 1970. The network was set to use the Post Master General's (PMG) telephone lines to link terminals in Brisbane to a computer in Sydney. The Australian Post Office had introduced data by telephone circuits in response to demand. The impetus for this move was a need to reduce turn around times handling customer inquiries (The Courier Mail, 6 April 1970: 10). The turnaround times were a significant problem for many government departments in Queensland. The SGIO computer centre broke new ground by providing online interrogation of a data bank as a service to the public. The clerks interrogated the data banks to find answers to their queries. Queensland Deputy Premier and Treasurer in 1968, Gordon Chalk, stated that the aim of the new system was to 'speed up day-to-day transactions and to provide fast and accurate reference to the records held' (Quoted in Courier Mail, 6 April 1970: 10). All policy records were maintained in the data bank which included an individual's address, the types of policy, the sum insured and the premium due date. This was moving towards significant problems relating to privacy. The main cause of concern was the sharing of such information across supposedly impossible boundaries (Cowled 1972: 23). Information, it was viewed, should only be used for the purpose it was gathered. Sharing the information contained in data banks to others that had other uses for the information was frowned upon but not legislated against. 102 Conclusion In conclusion, it can be seen that the Queensland Government introduced computers some three years after the University of Queensland's installation. After introduction the uses or applications for the computer dramatically increased. The cost of computers was somewhat accepted, but as uses for the computer increased so did the cost of upgrades. Also, during the above period, unions began a battle to curb redundancies. Finally, at the end of the period, the issue of privacy began to be discussed, particularly in view of the way that the sharing of information was being conducted. In the next chapter, which covers the period 1971 to 1984, legislators began to debate legislation to guard against the invasion of privacy. It is very surprising though to find such a lack of understanding of the issues of privacy and unemployment in Queensland Government as there was so much written about such issue in both Australia and overseas. In the case of the Mines and Main Roads Department, calculations of how many staff would have been employed if computers had not been introduced have not been made. Nevertheless, Hiley's definitive 'no' to the youth unemployment issue is highly questionable. Hiley did not understand that some jobs, many of them taken by the youth, would later be gone forever. This cartoon (below) summarises the argument (Source: Modern Unionist, January/March 1979: 7). The concerns of Hiley regarding the under utilisation of the computer effectively were later proved to be unwarranted, that is under utilisation and unsuitability were not matters for concern. In contrast to the 'white elephant' not occurring then, as predicted by the Treasurer, the computer was well used for many functions. 103 Chapter Four: The Problems Recognised 1971-1984 Throughout the 1970s, the technologically advanced world under-went a post industrial revolution which will change society in the 1980s more rapidly than any decade since the 1970s [sic] when the industrial revolution began in Great Britain. In the 1970s, politicians, bureaucrats and economists were too close to post industrial changes to see them in perspective, recognise what was happening and work out appropriate responses (The Honourable B.O. Jones, Federal Minister for Science and Technology, 1983). (Deery 1987: 258). Introduction In 1971 the privacy debate heated. It was discussed for the first time in parliament. There was much published on the privacy debate in Australia coming to a head around the 1976 census. It was noted by many that computer centres were compiling and sharing information in computer data banks. Despite efforts to limit the information that was being gathered, Queensland Government departments had, in reality, large amounts of information. Also, during the period the unemployment debate continued and culminated in a Royal Commission, which appeared rather biased in its findings. The Privacy Debate The proposed legislation of 1971 entitled the Invasion of Privacy Bill was first mentioned in Parliament on 6 October 1971. It originated partly to 'protect consumers against arbitrary or erroneous credit ratings, and to ensure high standards are observed and maintained with respect to the information in the credit reports and in the files or credit reporting agents' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 13 October 1971: 1061 ). The legislation was designed to protect the privacy of individuals and control the use of the technology that made such collection of information possible: the computer. An early participant in the privacy debate was Justice Kirby. Kirby summarised the new problem of data banks and privacy as follows: Nowadays we speak of 'information privacy' meaning the individual's 'zone of privacy' relevant to today's world. 'Information privacy' is the claim of the individual to have some control over the way he [sic] is perceived by others 'on his [sic] file'. In a rural society privacy may be protected in law by defending the person, property and territory of individuals. In a society of databases, perceptions of the individual and intrusions upon his [sic] personal life will generally have nothing to do with his [sic] physical person or 104 immediately surrounding territory. Vital decisions will be made as a result of perceptions of an individual through his [sic] 'data file'. Modern privacy is the business of asserting and upholding the individual's rights in respect of personal data about himself [sic]. Privacy invasion today is a problem of the database not the 'keyhole' (Quoted in Cowan 1981: 5). The perceptive Justice Kirby's concerns were undoubtedly reflected in the wider society. The Minister for Justice and Liberal Party member, P.R. Delamothe, stated that the 'right to privacy is a matter of great and increasing importance, especially in an age of unbelievable technological resources and inventiveness' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 13 October 1971: 1061 ). R. Jones stated that: 'with the present trend to computerisation, firms are compiling lists of possible customers' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 13 October 1971: 1069). In the same way, Douglas Sherrington (Australian Labor Party member) claimed that: 'these books are sent out to people whose names appear on a list drawn up by a computer' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 13 October 1971: 1069). Thus, there was recognition by the Government that computer processing made invasions of privacy easier. Delamothe recognised the 'possibility of computer-processing of recordings to identify automatically the speakers or topics under surveillance' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 13 October 1971: 1063). Heavy penalties were proposed for the offence of obtaining information falsely, unauthorised disclosure of information, supplying false information and falsifying records of credit reports. Information that was more than five years old must, it was intended, be deleted by the credit agency. The Government was keen to maintain that this legislation was the first of its kind in Australia soon to be emulated by other States. Such legislation though had been introduced in many of the States of the United States and in two provinces in Canada. Privacy, argued Clive Hughes (Liberal Party member), has been infringed for many years. The Government argued, 'we live in a 'data-processing world' where so much is known of the affairs of private citizens that is necessary for the introduction of a bill which will correct the errors of the past' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 13 October 1971: 1075). Charles Porter, Liberal member for Toowong, agreed stating that the private person was being swamped by the 'very technology that he [sic] created' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 13 October 1971: 1078). He continued to argue that there could be no doubt that the current concern over privacy was 'focused on the 105 development of machines' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 13 October 1971: 1079). Porter stated: We live in an electronic age where so much can be done in taking note of a person's private life. Details from a whole host of sources can be collected in the one place, and those collected details can be traded from one computer bank to another, so that eventually a computerised version of a person can be built up which would be quite different from what the person is in reality. But for commercial purposes, for credit purposes, the individual is what is in the computer banks. We have reached a very sorry situation indeed when a person becomes much less than a number - merely a collection of odd pieces of recording in the banks of computers (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 13 October 1971: 1079). The problem of information trading or swapping was recognised, as was the power of data processing. Both factors increased the problem of privacy invasion. At the same time the Opposition suggested that it would be better if credit bureaus were operated by the State rather than by private individuals. Liberal Party member William Hewitt replied with 'I think the people of Queensland should understand that if a Labor Government finds its way to office in 1972, George Orwell's 'Big Brother' will arrive 12 years early' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 20 October 1971: 1307). He concluded that the State had enough information on individuals and it would be 'distasteful' if the State controlled and accessed to additional records. The new Act excluded the Public Service's activities. Labor Party member Collin Bennett made the strongest statement against computers in Parliament on 21 October 1971: We are fast entering a computerised world, and in some ways computers are becoming monsters that cannot be controlled. If computerisation is introduced to the credit bureau world, we might find ourselves with a super monster that cannot be handled (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 21 October 1971 : 1334). Porter's interjection was simply 'do you want to turn the clock back' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 21 October 1971: 1334). Bennett's reply was that the whole matter was arguable, stating that those who argued that if computers are allowed to develop unchecked they would become the enemies of 'human liberty', may 'prove to be right' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 21 October 1971: 1334). He continued to argue: Data-processing machines are still in their infancy and many aspects of their impact on individual members of the public are still guesswork. In this country, of course, we are in a fortunate position of being able to watch what is happening in other countries, and many of them have got themselves into difficulties on this matter; many mistakes have been made, and much harm 106 has been done [my emphasis] (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 21 October 1971: 1335). Porter argued that the Bill was designed to protect people against the 'encroaching power of any growth of centralised information in this electronic age' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 21 October 1971: 1335). The Bill was passed with one amendment and was effective from early 1972. The Invasion of Privacy Act of 1971 made provision for: (1) The licensing and control of credit reporting agencies; (2) The licensing and control of private inquiry agents; and (3) The regulation of the use of listening devices (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 13 October 1971 : 1061 ). 9 The Concerns of the Australian Computer Society The Australian Computer Society (ACS) noted that there was a lot of media coverage on the issue of privacy. As Bright stated in a conference on the Human Consequences of Technological Change, it was reported that there was no control over the use of the computer or what information was being stored: It is in the recording of credit ratings that there have been most outcries against the computer. On a number of occasions in the past year [1971 ], there have been reports in the newspapers of the misuse of computer information. There have been moves, both here and in Britain, aimed at limiting such misuse. There is no legislation to limit the use to which the information which bears on our credit ratings. What is feared more is that, by error or even malice, our high rating may be destroyed. There is no redress; we may be refused credit without being given the reason or the source of the information on which it is based. (Bright 1972: 7). 9 Interestingly, during this debate, it was argued that the Bill had been leaked to the Press before parliamentary members had the opportunity to hear the Bill. An article in the Telegraph entitled 'New Bill Hits at Snooping on Privacy' did indeed appear before the Bill was read in Parliament (Telegraph, 13October1971: 5). The Bill was first motioned at 2.15 p.m. Liberal Member John Murray had read the article well before 2.15 p.m. Murray claimed: The article that I am about to quote appears in the City Final edition of the "Telegraph", which apparently appears of the streets before 2.15 p.m ... I certainly picked this paper up before 2.15 p.m. (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 13October1971: 1073). Thus, the Opposition had knowledge of the Bill that was yet to be introduced in Parliament. The Opposition jibed that Parliament need not have resumed as members had knowledge of what was to be debated before the debate started. 107 This required, according to the ACS, some comments. In general, the ACS wanted to balance against the fear campaign the press were pushing and had to counter the media's views. For example in 1973, the Australian Computer Society introduced an article entitled: Data Banks and Privacy - The Attitude of the ACS. The ACS called for legislative controls of privacy in spite of the Invasion of Privacy Act of 1971 being in place. The Society believed the Act did not go far enough to control the large amounts of information being stored in computer files and was concerned with protecting the rights of individuals in relation to privacy. The ACS claimed that computing technology expansion and introduction was inevitable and that society could not function without the collection of information, however the ACS was also concerned about how such information could be used. What was required, according to the ACS, was a list of rights to be adhered to by all. An individual should know who: Was keeping what data; Would have access to that data; Would have access to change to that data; Would have the right to challenge the validity of that data; Would have the right to have data removed; Would have the right to restrict the flow of that data; and Would have the right to sue in relation to that data. The ACS considered it necessary to have a regulatory body to control data banks; register data banks; distribute names of persons who have access to that data; control the exchange of data; have regular audits of such data; and the deletion of old data. The ACS was also concerned about the security of such data (Australian Computer Society 1973: 39-40). The Debate in Parliament Resumed In 1976, publications on the issue of privacy in journals and the daily press had increased dramatically throughout Queensland. Journalist Greg Chamberlain published an article in July 1976 entitled: "Is our Name on a List" for the Bundaberg News Mail. Chamberlain mentioned that the Queensland Government was set to introduce legislation and establish a permanent privacy committee to counter the 108 growing privacy abuses of data banks and computer technology (Chamberlin 1976: 19). On the 1 April 1976, Deputy speaker and Liberal Party member William Hewitt spoke of The Invasion of Privacy Act of 1971. He stated: 'even though that was five short years ago they were more leisurely days and we spoke infrequently about privacy' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates 1 April 1976: 3334). Hewitt noted that 'some four years before this Bill found its way into this Parliament, the British section of the International Commission of Jurists was applying its corporate ability to this problem' and it arrived at the conclusion that: The tendency in sophisticated and technological society is for infringements of the right of privacy to increase, and accordingly the need for legal protection and increases (Quoted in Queensland. Parliamentary Debates 1 April 1976: 3334). Hewitt highlighted the work of Mr Justice Kirby and quoted him: Data is held in respect of taxation, medical matters, credit references, bank records. Data storage may soon move into the retail supermarkets. In the United States, computer product codes are used in supermarkets and can be used to store information on customer's buying pattern's (Quoted in Queensland. Parliamentary Debates 1April1976: 3334). Hewitt pointed out: Significantly, Mr Justice Kirby also made reference to the closeness of 1984. His reference to data banks of course reflects the greatest concern of all people when they contemplate privacy, because with data banks and computers it is now possible to record all sorts of information, damaging and otherwise, with regard to a person's background (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates 1 April 1976: 3334-5). At this time the New South Wales Government had a Standing Committee examine matters of privacy. Hewitt wanted Queensland to have such a Committee. Hewitt said: I think it is far better for a committee to look at them for a while, to understand how those areas can be breached in any way at all, and in the light of case history which is forthcoming make recommendations to the Parliament, and the Parliament then act upon them ... The purpose of my rising tonight is to say to the Minister that I believe that a similar committee could be entertained here in Queensland (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates 1 April 1976: 3335). At this point, Hewitt mentioned that a subcommittee of the Liberal Party policy committee was formed to examine the privacy issue approximately three years previously. Hewitt then mentioned the 1976 Census. He said: 'I know a lot of 109 people who get upset when they have to face the census taker once every now and then, and are required to supply information they consider to be peculiarly their own' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates 1April1976: 3335). An applicant for credit, claimed Hewitt, is required to provide a great many details about themselves, and this information is loaded into a data bank. The Minister for Justice and Attorney General and Liberal Party member William Knox, was cited as stating that a committee would hear complaints about invasions of privacy. Hewitt, claimed that privacy was an issue where the Government was a worse offender than the people. William Hewitt stated in Parliament: As we move closer to the Orwellian 1984, we feel we must resist the suggestion that there will be complete intrusion into everything a person thinks, says and does (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates 1 April 1976: 3335). Hewitt went on to state that the invasion of privacy was a very real problem. Tom Burns, Australian Labor Party member and Leader of the Opposition, interjected with the comment that 'a computer in California raided another computer and got information out of it' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates 1 April 1976: 3335). Hewitt replied that 'this is computers going wild' and mentioned the New South Wales Government's commission of the Morrison Report of 1973 and referred to their standing committee on privacy. Burns went on to argue that perhaps '1984' was already here, outlining the amounts of invasive interactions on a person's privacy by organisations including governments using computerised data banks. A debate raged at the time. It related to the to government invasion of privacy during the 1976 census. Knox spoke again on the issue in Parliament on 9 April 1976. Knox explained that the Opposition had raised issues outside the 'scope of the amendments of the bill' and requested a submission on the computer privacy abuses (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 1 April 1976: 3335). The Bill's main thrust at the time was to protect the privacy of individuals in their homes against unscrupulous door-to-door marketing. The amendments to the bill were passed but the legislation again was discussed in 1984. 110 The Reality of Privacy Despite the legislation, according to Grierson (1979), EDP sections of each government department mainly developed the policies on a day to day running of the computing section. For example, the Queensland Public Service stored the following types of personal information in 1979: Birth information; Education results; Electoral roll data; Jury eligibility data; Insurance policies of all types; Registration details of motor vehicles and boats; Marriage details; Health and hospital records; Property ownership, land valuation, water-works licenses and land tax details; Registration details of professional boards; Registration of business names; Personnel and payroll data of public servants, teachers and police; All State Government superannuation contributors' details; State social welfare; Death information (Grierson 1979: 140 ). Grierson described the handling of the privacy issue in 1979 as follows: The computer administrator in the Queensland Public Service has opted to date to place the responsibility for the individual's privacy in the hands of the user department. SGCC [State Government Computer Centre] computer personnel are informed in writing of their obligations regarding confidentially of data files, programs printouts and the like. Some officials report having been approached by associates in private enterprise who have inquired as to the possibility of acquiring lists of new employees or promotions from payrolls, or lists or parents recording births. Both categories are extremely valuable to insurance salesmen. To date, however, no incident of misuse of personal data files has been detected. The procedure adopted in the case of the SGCC is that any request for data from computer files must be referred to the user department for authorisation. The cross matching of information files has not occurred in Queensland to any great extent. It has been restricted to the matching of superannuation data with payroll files, and systems now being designed that will provide death information automatically to state electoral roll files. Neither case could be classified as a threat to privacy (Grierson 1979: 144-145) Dennis Luttrell, formally of the SGIO computer section, stated that: 'they realised the issues but they behaved professionally to manage these issues to the best of their ability' (Luttrell 1997: pers. comm., 5 November). The Public Service of Queensland was not required to obtain a license, as credit 111 agencies were required to do. Certainly policies discussed above relating to purchase and other issues were controlled by the other monitoring organisations. Yet, systems staff determined policies relating to privacy and so on at this time. Except for the Health Department and Police (they had special advisory committees), EDP staff in the department concerned developed the policy. They were controlled by the ethics of the ACS of which most were members but little else bound them. Adding to the complexity of this position was the inability of these Queensland Public Service staff to comment on matters relating to politics and government, a requirement that still exists within the Queensland Public Service. This meant that when challenged on issues by the press they could not publicly comment, which meant little was really known of the exact treatment of the policy in question within the EDP section. Some of the issues of concern to writers up to and including 1976 were privacy, fraud and data security. Of most concern here then was that governments were accumulating large amounts of information about private individuals using information technology without policy and practice to guide their thinking on appropriate uses and safeguards. Other areas of public administration had years of policy to draw on for guidance on most issues, but systems staff were treading new ground. Grierson stated: Of further concern however, is that in an industry only some fifteen years old in the Queensland Public Service, administrators of computer centres have been and are increasingly being confronted, with problems and situations not experienced in traditional government departments such as Works, Health, Education and so on. Because of the relative youth of the industry, the administrator of computing does not have the precedents and established practices of policy formulation and direction that guide the management of the older public service departments (Grierson 1979: 3). Grierson claims that The Invasion of Privacy Act of 1971 did not directly deal with information technology and consequently was not effective in its aim. The Government and the Opposition were certainly concerned about computers. In 1984, Parliament passed a Privacy Committee Act yet, due to a sunset clause, the Committee was disbanded in 1991. As noted earlier in the thesis, The Invasion of Privacy Act of 1971 does not cover the problem of computers and privacy effectively. It is useful to examine some of the debate over this Act in order to illustrate what politicians hoped the Act would achieve. 112 Prior to this in 1982, the Queensland Government reviewed the Invasions of Privacy Act. In August 1983, Sam Doumany (Kurilpa - Liberal Minister for Justice and Attorney General) brought the Privacy Committee Bill to Parliament. The Bill set out to establish a Committee to examine issues of privacy and then assist in the drafting of new legislation (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 2 & 3 August 1983: 99). At this point in time the Bill went no further. In 1984, Bob Gibbs (Australian Labor Party member) noted that the Bill was previously introduced by the Minister for Justice and Attorney General but an election prevented its debate. Gibbs noted that: The Bill, which was introduced by the Minister. .. is a facsimile of the legislation that was introduced to this Parliament last August but which was never debated because of the State election in which the former Attorney General was defeated (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 27 March 1984: 2093). Gibbs described the Bill as 'having the teeth of a gummy shark' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 27 March 1984: 2093). Gibbs felt that the proposed legislation was as weak as the legislation in New South Wales and Victoria. Gibbs described the legislation proposed by the Labor Government in South Australia as the only government that had looked seriously at the problem. Gibbs described the work of Sir Zelman Cowan in relation to privacy as being expert. Gibbs acknowledged that a suitable definition for privacy was almost impossible to find. Further, Gibbs claimed that The Invasion of Privacy Act related to credit-reporting agencies and private inquiry agents. He claimed that: The Bill does absolutely nothing to stop the holding or collating of wrong information by credit agency bureaus or computers; nor does it stop the feeding of the wrong information a person's privacy, particularly on financial matters, into the community (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 27 March 1984: 2095). He later continued to discuss privacy and also alluded to the problem of security: When people find that they are unable to keep up their ongoing payments to Waltons, that information is put into the data bank as a personal black mark against them ... people are uncertain about the security of those records. It is very easy for people with knowledge of computers, with a plug-in system to computers, or with contacts in the computer world, to get specific details on individuals. There is no guarantee of privacy (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 27 March 1984: 2097-8). Gibbs then turned his attention to the work of the Australian Law Reform Commission. He cited the report as stating: 113 Development of computers to handle personal information there by allowing record keepers involved in traditional relationships with clients, customers, patients, researching subjects and others to increase the volume of information held about their record-subjects, and encouraging them to allow that information to flow in directions never envisaged by the existing legal and ethical framework governing those relationships; and extensive and expanding use of computers in public and private administration (Cited in Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 27 March 1984: 2100). On the 28 March 1984, David Hamill, Labor party member for Ipswich, asked 'how will the Government, through the legislation deal with the very real threat to privacy that the information revolution is presenting' (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 27 March 1984: 2199)? If information was to be gathered, argued Hamill, there must be safeguards against the information being disseminated to individuals who have no legitimate reason or desire to obtain the information (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 27 March 1984: 2199). He asked: 'can those who control the data banks and the raising of information be relied upon to self-regulate their practices to ensure that accuracy, access security and legitimate dissemination are upheld? (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 27 March 1984: 2160). Hamill concluded that legislation was required. Legislation had recently been put forward in the United Kingdom, argued Hamill, which provided security and safeguards in relation to data banks in that country. Finally, Hamill recognised that it was not the computers that caused the invasions of privacy, but it was the illegitimate use of them. The debate changed course when Andrew Fitzgerald, National Party member, reminded Parliament that it was the establishment of a privacy committee they were debating. The Privacy Committee was to debate the raised issues and then recommend a course of action for Parliament (Queensland. Parliamentary Debates, 27 March 1984: 2163). The Royal Commission A Bureau of Labour Economics was not established as expected and in 1975, when the Hayden budget was announced, it was further stalled. Efforts of the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations to continue the research were frustrated when Fraser's Government cut back on Public Service programs. The reforming of the National Labour Advisory Council (NLAC) into the National Labour Consultative Council brought the matter of employment and technological change back to the 114 fore (Sydney Morning Herald, 25 September 1978: 10). Fraser employed an inter departmental committee to investigate the need for an inquiry into the matter and refused calls for an immediate inquiry until it had reported (Sydney Morning Herald, 12 September 1978: 3). In the Public Service Commissioner's Annual Report of 1980, the Public Service Commissioner stated that: 'the rapid advancement in technology with its social and industrial consequences is of particular concern to the board' (Queensland. Public Service Commissioner Annual Report 1980: 11 ). The Commissioner mentioned that research was currently being undertaken and he cited the work of the Myer Committee. Around this time microcomputers were gradually being introduced into Government. There appears a realisation at this point of the problems of such an introduction. The Commissioner stated that: 'at present policy is being formulated to ensure the word processing is introduced into the Service in a controlled manner' (Queensland. Public Service Commissioner Annual Report 1980: 11 ). K. Pope, W. Love, T. Tolhurst, P. Hack, G Boyd, G. Sanderson and J. Johnston prepared the Queensland Government's submission to the inquiry. The submission argued that when developing policy, the Government must juggle short and long term goals and socio-economic conditions. The submission concluded: Development of public sector policy is complex in that it must reconcile short and long term goals and socio/economic conditions so as not only to support development, but also to take full advantage of it. Such policies must be factually based taking into account all past and possible future developments (Queensland. Submission to the Committee of Inquiry into Technological Change in Australia 6 July 1979: Submission Number 186: 69). Thus, Governments are required to consider the social consequences of introducing change. They must also safeguard against harm through training. Greater knowledge of change must be spread so that impacts of that change can be understood. The submission recommended that a joint State/Commonwealth body should be arranged in order to disseminate information. Any change agent must consider whether support should be given to the process of change and consider the likely outcomes of policy. The unfortunate situation arose where economic growth was at such a rapid rate that the only limit appeared to have been social implications. It is the ability of individuals to accept change that was the pivotal factor to its success: No one would argue against the economic efficiency of technological improvement but the problem in recent times is that the rate of acceleration 115 of technological development is such that the limits are now social rather then economic or technical. It is the ability of individuals and society to accept and adopt new technologies, that is the controlling factor in the adoption of new technologies. This results in the familiar present-day dilemma, technological change verses social abilities to adapt to such change (Queensland. Submission to the Committee of Inquiry into Technological Change in Australia 6July1979: Submission Number 186: 69). Thus, it should be the function of governments to develop an understanding of the change and establish policies for that change, to facilitate its introduction with minimal effect on social conditions and maximum economic benefit. This was the central policy dilemma that needed to be articulated clearly in 1960s but it was not. However, in the 1979 other impacts were considered. The likely impacts of technological change on Queensland considered were that: The range and quality of services should improve; Work roles and organisation structure may change; There may be increased stress on individuals due to continual change; More detailed and longer-term planning may be required; Organisation should be able to offer services on a more decentralised basis; Consultation with the community, and in the area of industrial relations in particular, may be more crucial (Queensland. Submission to the Committee of Inquiry into Technological Change in Australia 6 July 1979: Submission Number 186: 69). The Queensland Government, claimed the submission, is aware of the implications of technological change and this has been allowed for in policy formulation. Finally, the submission recommended that a body should be established to consider problems of technological change and disseminate information. This body's terms of reference could include: Advising research bodies of the need for research in various areas, particularly those not reflected by the normal market system; Monitoring and fostering optimal research investment; Identifying, at an early stage, research which could have significant direct and indirect economic and/or social impacts; Assessing the direct and indirect impacts of technological developments that are significant enough to modify the normal economic and social response (Queensland. Submission to the Committee of Inquiry into Technological Change in Australia 6 July 1979: Submission Number 186: 71 ). 116 Of central focus to this submission was the need to educate individuals on the change in order to avoid resistance to that change. Also, another key feature was to plan for social impacts. It could be said that both of these issues were omitted for the computer introduction process in the 1960s. Finally, short and long term planning must be conducted with social and economic factors in mind. There is a sense that the Queensland Government Administration was attempting to safeguard against errors of the past occurring once again when it developed the submission. There have been a number of reviews of the work of the Myer Committee and it is not the intention of this thesis to repeat those here. It is instructive to briefly examine the work of some Queensland academics in this report and their attitude to the published product. Professor Don Lamberton, Dr. Stuart Macdonald, Tom Mandeville and Brigit Hodge worked on three areas of study - word processors, computers in local government and computers in small business. Macdonald claims that consultants on the project provided elaborate reports to the committee from which the 'Committee picked bits most suited to its argument. .. the committee is red blooded in its support of technological change' (Quoted in Courier Mail, [July] 1980). The report imagined that technological change would bring about no 'serious social or economic problems'. Macdonald stated that 'perhaps Australia should be grateful for any report at all, even this delayed and insulting effort' (Courier Mail, [July] 1980). Nevertheless there was recognition of the need for such an inquiry. Conclusion The central issue in the period following 1971 was clearly privacy. The Invasion of Privacy Act was developed, but in reality it did little to arrest data collection and it was later repealed. Privacy is still being debated in Queensland some thirty-two years later. The issue of unemployment brought about a rather biased Royal Commission Report. The unemployment problem is still being felt but it has not been formally recognised or dealt with. Ken Pope stated that he was surprised that: 'there has not been far greater opposition by workers generally to the use of integrated systems, because of the resultant unemployment, as organisations have in consequence shrunk in size' (Pope 1998, pers. Comm., 1 April). 117 Conclusion: An Assessment Automation or computers were said to be inevitable as early as 1956. The idea that automation would surely replace workers was unashamedly expressed at the same time. Politicians, like Hiley, knew of developments elsewhere, such as in New South Wales and in the Federal Government. Hiley wanted to keep abreast of the latest developments in business, thus there is evidence that he should have known about some of the dangers of computers sufficiently to develop more safeguards. Unemployment was not considered a danger and privacy was not considered at all, so safeguards were not put in place for these threats. Hiley was more concerned with business matters such as computer order delays and he and other officials predicted few problems. One safeguard Hiley instigated was a review of EDP needs, in order to lessen resistance to the project. This step failed and resistance to change existed amongst senior public servants. In addition, the notion raised by Hiley that the feasibility team needed to examine the personnel required appeared to have been dropped. It was at this point that Hiley, with the help of his public servants, became convinced the project needed a planning officer, an unbiased person not affiliated with a computer firm. This decision was sensible and once Ken Pope was hired it proved to be a very wise action indeed. The computer professionals were allowed a great deal of responsibility in their roles and fortunately they met the challenge well. Pope confirmed that the problems of using computers in the early 1960s were: Inability to recruit appropriately trained staff; Cost of creating installations, either within existing buildings or in new; Workforce resistance (in the event it did not materialise); and Breakdowns in operations (some installations were plagued by this, e.g. NCR-315 installation in SGIO and Department of Defence Hollywell installation) (Pope 1998, pers. comm., 1 April). These dangers, though practical, did not address wider social issues. The comments of the press did not assist with the introduction of computers from the beginning. The press developed a science fictional approach when reporting on computers, but stories about their use left Hiley with some concerns. A report by Cedric Allen spurred by Pope and IBM was the catalyst to 'get things going' (Pope 1998, pers. comm., 1 April). The press, pushed by computer manufacturers' 118 lobbying, highlighted the slowness of progress towards computing. Clearly, Pope put himself in some personal jeopardy when he broke public service silence and spoke to the press about the slowness but his gamble paid off and the project moved again. Pope seemed desperate at this point and he had threatened resignation many times, which Hiley refused to accept. Pope stated: Thomas Hiley showed the first interest, and prompted my appointment. .. If it had not been for Hiley's persistence in getting some action in the light of my threatened resignation - even if his political nerve nearly failed him about going out to tender - there would have been no Treasury computer (Pope 1998, pers. comm., 1 April). Hiley's concerns early in the computer project were unjustified and the computer could certainly not be described as a white elephant. Interestingly, Hiley was reported by the EDP Committee to be happy with the punched card application yet Hiley expressed his displeasure with it in Cabinet. Similarly, Tierney expressed support for computing in the various reports, but Pope recalls that in conversations with him the opposite was correct. There thus seems to be some discrepancy between what was said and what some public servants believed. Hiley was also convinced that unemployment would not result after the introduction of computers. It is also clear that many points raised by Hiley in Cabinet came from the SGIO and other Departments. The bureaucracy was the instigator at this point. Staff were difficult to obtain and business was expanding at alarming rates to the point of overload. Riding noticed that nineteen insurance offices in Sydney had computers and it is undeniable that he pushed for the machines. Also, decimal currency was coming and this proved to cause considerable work for the SGIO. It was the officials in the SGIO who suggested to Hiley that measures needed to be taken to avoid staff resistance. Clearly, Pope became one of the most important individuals in computing in Queensland after his appointment as many Queensland Government Department Heads had little knowledge of computing. They resisted the technology successfully for some time. A significant consequence of introducing computers, not predicted by Government, was the way it chipped away at public service rigidity. Computing in Government led to more shift work. Officials in Government, particularly parliamentarians, expressed concern about computing. They realised that they could not turn back the clock. Moreover no 119 formal cost benefit analysis of computing was conducted after introduction to introduce a more rational element to the debate. The use of computers grew to a point that exceeded all expectations. Early Government decisions not to embrace the technology changed in the 1970s. In the 1970s, it was not the issue of displacement that was the question, as most staff were easily placed elsewhere. Rather, it is the reality that staff were no longer required for many positions. Pope stated that he was always surprised by the lack of lobbying on the issue of unemployment. In the 1970s, parliamentary debates raged in relation to the issue of privacy and fears of 1984 and 'big brother' were common. The major realisation though was that the collection and dissemination of personal information had to be legislated against. The Invasion or Privacy Act did not cover the guiltiest party: Government. About this time, the Australian Computer Society was concerned about the highly emotive and biased debate against computers that appeared in the press, journals and monographs. The Australian Computer Society spoke out for the computer in order to create some balance in opinion. The unemployment debate again surfaced in the latter years but after a Royal Commission investigated the effects of technological change in Australia computing discussion slowed. The bias of the Report was very much in the computer's favour. Officials in Treasury knew that computers were very costly to purchase, operate and maintain and this was a key reason why the State Government Computing Centre was under the Treasury portfolio. While under the control of Treasury, the Computing Centre had easier access to funds. As computer capacity was used up quickly, Pope was regularly forced to ask for more money to purchase more up to date computing equipment. These expenses were met as the computer proved its value. No one at the time realised that the computer was going to have such an impact on budgets and policy, particularly during the 1970s. In addition to costs, a policy lag was felt when computers were introduced. There was no current computer application development policy to guide computing staff through difficulties, such as privacy concerns. Later, as Grierson points out, some Departments such as Health, Police, Forestry and so on, had applications development policy determined by departmental steering committees which 120 consisted of senior public servants, often from other departments. In other cases, such as the Valuer-General's Department, the computer played such a vital role that the Department head took an active role in applications policy development. In the Main Roads Department the Management Services Division played an active role in computer applications policy together with the Chief Engineer, Deputy Commissioner and Secretary who formed a steering committee. In the SGIO, Department Heads (that is Fire, Life and Marketing departments) all viewed and provided comment on the proposed Management Services Department two-year and five-year plans, however, the SGIO was without a steering committee (Grierson 1979: 24). As a result computing applications development grew at an alarming rate with, in many cases, only computer staff professionalism to monitor the advances. In addition, Grierson claims that ministerial involvement in computing appeared to be minimal, except when the purchase of equipment would have a major effect on the Department (Grierson 1979: 24). The relationship between the public service and politicians in relation to the introduction of computing, particularly concerning Hiley, is clear. One very important push to use computers in Government came from the SGIO based on the earlier work of Grimley. Hiley, who shared the vision to increase the business of the SGIO, took the idea to introduce computers to Cabinet. Another push came from the Main Roads Department and yet another from the Education Department. Cabinet instigated the customary steering committees and feasibility studies and finally left the matter in the hands of public servants without need to report back to Cabinet until they were close to tendering. It is instructive to look at some work that addresses public administration theory by Leon Peres to examine briefly the relationship between administration and politics. Peres ( 1978) argued that although it is theorised that the relationship between politics and administration is a continuum, the feeling of public administrators is that the politicians are dominant and they are public servants. Yet, public administrators have a large amount of self-directed autonomy in running of bureaucracy often without interference from politicians. Often an issue arose that attracted the attention of the politicians or the public or both. It was at this time that politicians became dominant and the dichotomy between servant and master became vividly clear. Peres admits the relationship is complex, but his best attempt to explain the relationship is that the administrative continuum and political continuum twist and spiral around each other. It is clear, from this study, the political and administrative intersect at times when a project is of significant size or expense (Peres 1978: 18). 121 After the matter is decided, control is passed back to the administrators who passed it on to the computer professionals. Peres states: ... technology has been an area in which we have conferred very high degrees of policy autonomy on few participants. We trusted the judgments of those, especially experts, who dominated the various fields (Peres 1978: 18). As mentioned previously, Pope argued that administrators in government knew little of computing and they were apathetic. When considering the difference in knowledge of administrators and others, Pope postulated that there was: ... no comparison at all. You cannot blame the administrators. There were no resources available to them except for lectures, which I gave to Departments and others. But they were afraid of the new machines, and generally wanted nothing to do with them. Only gradually did this situation change (Pope 1998, pers. comm., 1 April). So, as Grierson argued, the decision-making power moved, to some extent, to a group of computer administrators (Grierson 1997 pers. comm., 8 November). This was also due to the lack of knowledge of politicians on the issue. Pope claimed that politicians' knowledge was 'worse than that of administrators' (Pope 1998, pers. comm., 1 April). Pope posited: I often doubted the ability of Public Service inspectors (who ruled all staff conditions of service with an iron hand) to understand the problems we faced ... The problems were overcome in due course. Undoubtedly, however, the advent of the computer into the Treasury did much to free up staff conditions (Pope 1998, pers. comm., 1 April). Often then, the computer professionals were making key decisions. Dennis Luttrell argued that most computer professionals acted professionally under auspices of the ACS and 'managed' the challenges as best they could. Mistakes in judgment of the 'thing' they used occurred, but they did the best job they could (Luttrell 1997 pers. comm., 5 November). In the 1990s, the employment effects of computing were still being felt. An article in The Press, Christchurch, published in New Zealand entitled 'Computer will not cut front-line jobs - police' tells of how front line police jobs will not be cut as a result of the introduction of new computer systems. New Zealand's Police Commissioner, Peter Doone, told Parliament's justice and law reform committee that the '540 jobs that would go were all behind-the-scenes positions in support of middle management' ... No positions had yet gone', claimed Doone, 'but jobs would start going next year when the computer system started being introduced' (Quoted in The Press, Christchurch, 20 November 1997: 12). The job losses were to be made 122 through attrition over the next four years. Today many would be surprised today by the frankness of such statements. Yet, we as a society are set to face more challenges. Research, Science and Technology Minister of New Zealand, Maurice Williamson, stated that: 'a coming information technology revolution will change the life of everyone' (Cited in The Press, Christchurch, 20 November 1997: 5). The most 'amazing change in society you can ever imagine was on its way' (Quoted in The Press, Christchurch, 20 November 1997: 5). These articles may well have been written in the 1960s. Brooks ( 197 4) claims that sometimes, especially when the stability of society is compromised, not every innovation is desirable. Also, not every innovation appears when needed; the haphazard feature of technological growth seems to menace the social and natural environment. Brooks claims that 'change cannot be left to follow the logic of technology alone; society must adapt itself, both to moderate innovation according to needs and to avoid undesirable side-effects' (Brooks 197 4: 137). A new complexity is recognising the major new technologies whose potential relations with society must be foreseen. New technologies, exactly because they are new, are expected to be of minor importance today, and it is problematic to spot those that will have the most influence twenty or thirty years from now (Brooks 197 4: 142). This difficulty was clear in the case of computing introduction into the Queensland Government. The first recommendation in Benn's ( 197 4) thesis is that 'the assessment work undertaken by government departments should be greatly strengthened, and the findings of all assessment units should be automatically made public before ministerial decisions are reached' (Benn 1974: 162). The second recommendation is that 'technology assessment units should be developed in universities and polytechnics, and made available to do contract work for local authorities on their behalf .. .'. The final recommendation is that some funds 'should be specifically allocated to trades unions and other recognised community groups to allow them to sponsor relevant research into the best means of safeguarding the interests of their members' (Benn 1974: 163). Lord McCorquodale (1965), in the International Congress on Human Relations, raised pertinent point regarding the case of the United States and unemployment. He stated 'America's experiencing a combination of prosperity and serious and continuing unemployment - and some experts claim that this is because America is 123 the first nation to experience automation on any considerable scale' (Lord McCorquodale 1965: 2). The question of whether the unemployment situation to follow automation resulted from its introduction is a valid question. To answer this question accurately would be difficult because it is impossible to isolate automation from other perhaps contributing factors. Unemployment, as reported by Lord McCorquodale, may be due in part to the change in labour demands as a result of automation. It may also be due to structural defects in the labour market peculiar to the United States and due to insufficiencies in cumulative demand, in a period when the numbers in the labour force were increasing (Lord McCorquodale 1965: 3). Yet, in a time of prosperity, demand would ordinarily be high and supply short. Low demand and prosperity do not seem to coincide. These defects in the labour market would most likely be structural unemployment, the result of automation. Structural unemployment is partly when the 'average skill is moving up, away from manual dexterity, and heavy manual labour to jobs requiring understanding, responsibility and mental alertness' (Rose 1967: 67). In other words there is a shift to greater demand for white-collar workers with more education and less demand for semiskilled or unskilled workers with less education (Rose 1967: 67-70). Relationships between unemployment and automation are difficult to prove. However, on face value, there seems to be a link with automation in the lowering of full employment. Finally, an article in Courier Mail, 24 October 1997, used the headline Headless Clones for Organs. The article described the process where it will be possible to grow human organs in an embryonic sac living in an artificial womb (Courier Mail, 24 October 1997: 1). When most people read this article, or science prediction articles like it, there is a sense of amazement and horror. This sensation was a similar one to that felt by individuals when they read the 1960 articles about computers. This action by the press, which could be termed science sensationalism, gave readers an inaccurate feel for the possible and provided them with an explanation of the impossible. The reality of most technological innovations is that they are far more slow and gradual. Significant leaps, which are often predicted, do not always occur and change is far more gradual. For example, Pope, when asked if computing developments surprised him, he said that it was a difficult question to answer, 'because hindsight is such an exact science' (Pope 1998, pers. comm., 1 April). Pope stated that developments at which he was not surprised included: 1. The progress made in microminiaturisation. During 1967 to 1974 we saw quite clearly the trend which resulted in the personal computer, and the 124 spread of microtechnology into areas such as medicine and control engineering; 2. The integration of "data processing" with communications technology, and the growth of real-time processing in all its myriad applications; 3. The almost fantastic increases in raw power which have resulted from chip technology; and, 4. I also envisaged a network of State computer centres throughout Queensland, cheap multi-purpose centres linked together in a wide area network servicing the community generally, although found little support (Pope 1998, pers. comm., 1 April). Pope said that he honestly believed that he and his colleagues had a reasonable idea of the outcomes in these cases at least. As late as 1992 Pope was selling to government departments the concept of the 'office of the future', recommending to them that they should plan for the arrival of global and local multimedia facilities in the future, particularly in view of the likely impact on office organisation and work practices. Pope said 'I regret to say that this call too went unanswered' (Pope 1998, pers. comm., 1 April). Some developments surprised Pope and these included: 1. The speed at which the personal computer was taken up within society generally, in particular the total reversal of the situation where once computers were feared, they are now accepted. Sometimes I feel doubtful outcomes, as witnessed by the pushing of computers into low level education and the exaggerated and sometimes hysterical forecasts made of the benefits of surfing the web by school-children 2. That it took so long for speech recognition and speech management to become a marketable product, when it was available in a working form around 1965, and could well become a dominant technology within a few years. But its significance has not so far attracted a great deal of attention (Pope 1998, pers. comm., 1 April). Marshall was very surprised by the way computers developed over the years. He stated that: 'I really felt that in the early days people were making too much of a fuss - to me they were just another punched card unit. I certainly did not foresee the development of personal computers' (Marshall 2000: pers. comm., 28 January). Clearly, Queensland Government officials did not see the partly predictable, future ethical and policy dilemmas associated with major technological innovation and when they did they often ignored them. In a recorded interview on 29 January 1985, Hiley stated the following on computing: On the side of computers, they were being got ready during my period but the real computer growth came later. They had some early which weren't overly successful. If I remember rightly they had some wrong programming and malfunctioning, but I lived to see where the advantages of push the button and have instant information flashed through to your desk was just such value as to be unbelievable, and I know it was a tremendous selling aid to the office. I think that this is where the size of the office [SGIO] paid its 125 dividend. They [smaller insurance firms] wouldn't have enough business to keep the computer going for one minute a week, and that was where the size of the Office [SGIO] and its mechanisation proved to be self-funding. The size fed the demand on the computer, the advantages of the computer showered out more effective treatment of the great bulk of business, and in fact, allowed it to reach out for more and more and more (QSA, SGIO Special Files, TR/1193/4, Box 67 Transcript of Interview with Sir Thomas Hiley, 29 January 1985). In 1985 economics still seemed to be the prime concern. It is clear Information technology is now essential for many types of economic activity. For example, banking and transportation industries would not cope with the volume of work without technology. Across all sectors of the economy, technology is more predominant and relied upon. Computing has moved from data processing, which was considered to be mainly a support function, to today's computing which is regarded as an investment in the strategic future of an organisation and as such is at the forefront. Now, in 2001, this technology, which is at the top of most organisations' agendas, is to lead the way forward towards full employment and economic growth. Despite the costs some saw real practical and tangible benefits against the outlandish promises promulgated by popular writing. A pragmatic Patrick Kelly, an official of the SGIO, writing in the journal of the SGIO entitled Insurance Lines puts it so well it is worth repeating here in full: What sort of marvel is this machine that translates from Russian to English, controls the destines of astronauts in space, checks the authorship of disputed manuscripts, controls the production of steel mills, reduces a year's mathematical calculations to hours, selects compatible marriage partners, diagnoses disease, sets type on a newspaper, flies supersonic planes and prints a humble life renewal notice. Has man [sic] created a monster that will control him? Despite the misgivings of philosophers about the future the answer for the present is clear; it is a very obedient servant. Its greatest failing is, perhaps, just that. It does precisely what we tell it to do - not what we want it to do and, alas, these are not always the same ... we [the SGIO EDP section] have now had our computer one year. If we have disappointed those who expected that all of our problems would instantly disappear we are sorry. To offset this we recall with pleasure the look on the faces of those who previously had to calculate eighty step loan repayment schedules when the computer printed them out faster than the eye could follow; the relief of the officer responsible for monthly Bank Orders who estimated that it was just not possible to product them in time by the old system; the utter disbelief of those who remembered how 'all hands and the cook' worked for upwards of six weeks to calculate the bonuses when the machine did the same work in 55 minutes. And as for the decimal currency conversion - what a pleasure it was to feed in the thousands upon thousand of cards in £ s. d. 126 and have them returned in dollars and cents - and all correct. .. Life Bonus certificates that previously took up to three weeks to print by punch card machines were printed in 15 hours ... I hope I have been able to show that the computer is just another office machine although it represents a radical departure from previous ideas (Kelly 1966: 29-35). Note there was some disagreement regarding the success or failure of the decimal currency conversion. Wales recalled that much of the process had to be completed manually due to computing delays and errors. This thesis began with a question. Considering the problems relating to the Internet that have been well documented, including privacy, censorship, pornography and the social problem of unemployment and considering the significant changes that have resulted from the computers' arrival, what were the debates and discussions that the people who were introducing computers had? In answer, there were few. Discussions about these matters did not occur at the time of introduction with the exception of unemployment. For instance, the term privacy did not become used in relation to computers until the early 1970s. One theory why this occurs is that computers were a logical progression from punched card machinery, accounting machines and people. While this is true, it does not go far enough. The people involved with computers knew that they were spearheading change and that was, in many cases, what drove them on against strong odds. The blinking lights, 'gee whiz' approach to computing that the press adopted was not more than sensationalism. Computers offered a way of taking over enormous areas of clerical drudgery. That was the initial revolution, undoubtedly. Computers have enabled information to be managed more efficiently and effectively. The introduction of the computer was also driven by society's need for greater transparency and computers provided this to the customer. The computer of the 1960s was a simple tool though. It was an early step in the evolution of bits and bytes that provided a basis for the Internet of the year 2001. Perhaps a useful analogy is the motor vehicle industry. They were not introducing a Holden, Volvo or Mercedes; they were introducing a Model T Ford. The latter was a basis to the evolution of the former. While the computing technology of the 1960s was certainly pervasive, the machines had cumbersome tape drives, very little processing power and some still used punched cards or paper tape. 127 To return to the theoretical framework for this thesis, this study verifies that both external factors and internal factors influenced the adoption decision. In this case study there are interest groups, such as the press on the one hand (an external factor), and a Minister (an internal factor) on the other hand. Both played a pivotal role. Also, the theoretical framework suggested that some individuals might play a vital role. Pope played a pivotal role in this case. But this case has shown that were interrelationships between the internal and the external factors. The internal minister is clearly pressured or coerced by the external press, provoked by an internal key individual. Clearly, this thesis has shown that there is often a blurring of factors, sometimes imperceptibly, and that there is merging and crossing of factors. Simply put, the external influences the internal and visa versa. The outcome of this struggle of the fittest was computer adoption. 10 1°Ken Pope left the Queensland Government for many years to return as head of IT for World Expo 88. SURVE\:/ OFFICE I r- 0 0 2 21 :JP~!~ 11. APR.19 61 J.... CIRCULAR TO DEPARTMENTS: --QUEENSLt\ND ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING IN STATE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 1.· Following the meeting of the Hon. the Treasurer and the Public Service Commissioner with Departmental Heads, Union Representatives, and others on 28th March, 1961, the Committee set up by Cabinet to investigate the application of electronic data processing to State Government activities is now desirous of obtaining, as a background to its detailed research, a broad picture of the possible scope for the use of electronic computers and data processing machines in the various Departments. To this end, it seeks your co-operation in answering the attached Questionnaire. 2. It is asked that the question,s be answered by each separate Section or Branch into which the functions of the ·Departments or Sub-Departments under your control naturally fall - for example, the questions, insofar as they may be relevant, should be answered separately by Accounts Sections, Stores Sections, Statistical Sections, ~nd so on. Some of the questions will not affect some Sections - thus, the questions regarding Accounting can probably be answered by an Accounts· .Section on behalf of a Department or Sub-Department, and ignored by all other Sections. Normally, where country Branches exist, all relevant information will be available at the Head Office, and it should not be necessary to send the Questionnaire to such Branches. You are not asked to collate the information so received; it will be sufficient to transmit the relevant answers in toto to the Tiata Processing Committee. 3. Because some of the questions have had to be worded in fairly general terms, some doubt may arise as to whether or not any particular Department:ftl activity lends itself to electronic computing or data processing. In this connection, it is known that quite a few officers, from several Departments, have already gained some insight into the subject, and a considerable body of knowledge appears to exist regarding its scope, potentialities, and practice. Should, however, any Department, Sub Department, or Section be in doubt as to the answering of a question, it is requested that contact be made immediately with any of the following members of the Committee Tele-phone Nos. Mr. E.F. Fell, Public Service Inspector 32-0321, Ext. 28 Mr. N. Fowles, Deputy Auditor-General .2-8433 Mr. B.E. Riding, Tieputy Under Treasurer 2-5464 Mr. J.G. Rutherford, Sta~e Actuary 2-6708 • 2. 4. It is requested that the completed answers to the que.stions submitted be returned to Mr. E. E. Riding, Deputy Under Treasurer, The Treasury, Erisbane before 14th April, 1961. 5. Should further copies of this Circular and Questionnaire be required for circulation among the Sections under your control, will you kindly contact Mr. Riding at the Treasury? (J. G. Rutherford) Chairman Electronic Data Processing Committee 29th March, 1961 Acting Surveyor-General: For your information and necessary attention rlirect, please. 'Secretary. "5. 4.1961. ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING COMMITTEE QUESTIONNAIRE 1 . Name of Department or Sub-Department. 2. Section of Department or Sub-Department. (a) As an indication of the volume of transactions, state the approximate amounts of current annual receipts and expenditure, and the approximate number of transactions involved. · (b) Name any major accountancy work that is not generally applicable to all State Departments. Examples could be the maintenance of individual loan repayment records by the Housing Commission, the Public Serv'ice Superannuation Board's records of individual superannuat~on contributions, and so on. 4. Costing: Name any specific type of costing work that is normally undertaken, and, if possible, give some indiGation of the total volume of the items involved. 5. Stores: State for each location (a) Value of stock in hand. (b) ·Approximate number of different i terns. (c) Value of annual turnover. 6. Statistics: Name any regular work of a major nature that entails the collection, recording and/or tabulation of statistical information for purposes other than those covered by previous questions. Such work includes the preparation of statistics for Annual Reports and other publications, the maintenance and use of card systems for statistical purposes (as in insurance or superannuation work), the Herd Recording system of the Department of Agriculture and Stock, and so on. 7. Records: Name· any major record systems, not already covered by previous questions, that require regulsr maintenance and which involve numerical information, .or information, such as names and addresses, occupations, etc., that can be readily coded or handled on a numerical basis. Such records may be in the form of cards, lists, addressograph plates, certificates, etc. and could.be' hand-written, typed, punched or printed. Examples are staff records, electoral rolls, licensing records, catalogues, examination results, and so on. . 2. 8. Mathematics: Identify any specialised mathematical work tFiat';"t)Y-reason of its complications or magnitude, lends itself to the application of electronic computers. Such work might relate to analytical statistics (e.g. in biometry), engineering (e.g. in bridge construction), commercial work (e.g. in the preparation of compound interest tables), and so on. 9. Miscellaneous Work: Name (a) Any existing or planned major work that cannot be classified under any previous heading, but which, by reason of its numerical or allied nature, might form a suitable subject for electronic computing or data processing. (b) Any work that, whilst at present impracticable by reason of its volume or comp+exity, is regarded as desirable, and which may be capable of solution by means of electronic computers or data processing installations. 10. Current Research: Give brief details of any current research or training that is at present being carried out in the field of electronic computing and data processing. ---oOo--- Q U E E N S L A N D S T A T E G 0 V E R N M E N T Tender and specifications for the ELECTRONIC DIGITAL COMPUTER INSTALLATION of the TREASURY DEPARTMENT, BRISBANE, Copy No. 31 No. EDP/1 THE TREASURER OF QUEENSLAND ELECTRONIC DIGITAL COMPUTER INSTALLATION, TREASURY DEPARTMENT, BRISBANE. PART I - GENERAL INFORMATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF TENDERERS PURPOSE OF THE INSTALLATION Policy 1. It is the intention of the Queensland State Government to set up a computer installation in the Treasury Department, Brisbane. As its primary tasks the installation must carry out (1) Governmental Accounting procedures for expenditure, receipts and budgetary control, (2) the preparation of fortnightly salaries payrolls, and (3) examinations work for the Department of Education. This work may be supplemented, according to the capacity of the equipment selected, by applications drawn from a list of secondary tasks which are as follows:- Inventory control foraselected Department Indexing of Births, Deaths and Marriages Rolls Maintenance of Electoral Rolls. It should be noted that examinations work occurs once a year only, but continues intermittently over a period of about three months. It is also hoped that the installation will pr~vide modest facilities for mathematical and scientific calculations for certain technical Departments, in addition to its normal work load. 2. The degrees of priority allocated to each of the secondary tasks referred to are shown above. These are nominal and subject to review in the light of the equipment to be proposed. Object of the tender 3. The object of this invitation to tender is to secure tenders for the supply and installation of the electronic digital computer referred to above, capable of carrying out the three primary tasks referred to as its base-loading. As an indication of the size and capacity of the installation envisaged, it is necessary that the primary tasks of Governmental Accounting (excluding loan accounting) and salaries payroll should be. carried out in not more than a total of 60 hours a month, assuming a single shift of 176 hours a month, excluding maintenance, 4. The equipment must also be capable of carrying out some, but not necessarily all, of the tasks envisaged as the secondary work load, and the tenderer is required to indicate which of these tasks would lie within the capacity of his equipment. Certnin additional information is also sought from each tenderer concerning systems and programming support, maintenance facilities to be made available with the equipment, accommodation and power supply requirements. Systems and operational requirements 5. The systems and operational requirements of the primary and secondary work loads are contained in APPENDICES A-F of the tender document. These constitute the factual basis of the work load of the installation and the requirements which must be met by the equipment proposed. They should be studied in detail. Opportunity will be given for discussion and examination of the work concerned, if requ~sted. Two bench mark problems, relating to office and mathematical data processing are also included, and must be completed by every tenderer in the manner indicated. The data which is required to perform the office type problem will be supp]jed to each tenderer in the form of punched card files. BASIS OF OPERATION OF THE INSTALLATION Data processing service 6. The basis on which the installation will operate is that it will provide a data processing service for the various Departments of the State Government, except for specific areas of activity which have already been turned over to electronic data processing in other installations. Control of the project is vested in the Under Treasurer, subject to consultation with the Public Service Commissioner and the Auditor General, as appropriate. As far as possible, the staff to be employed in the installation will be recruited from within the Public Service, and required to undergo such courses of training as may be prescribed by the Treasury Department and the manufacturer of the equipment. The operational control of the installation will be the responsibility of the Planning Officer for Electronic Data Processing, Treasury Department, who will be responsible to the Under Treasurer for the pre-installation activities. 7. It is planned that the flow of data to and from the installation shall be under the direction of a Control Section responsible for the scheduling of input and output, and the observance of accounting controls and reconciliations as necessary. The existence of this Section may be assumed in connection with all machine schemes proposed by the tenderer. Hours of operation -8. The normal hours of operation will be those of single shift working, but the possible use of the equipment outside those hours is also envisaged, as may be dictated by the needs of tre work. Office hours are normally 9.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. Development of the work load 9. It is envisaged that the development of the work load of the installation will take place over a period of up to five years, so as to ensure a gradual turnover to the new procedures with minimum dislocation. The initial tasks to be taken on will include the governmental accounting and salaries payrolls applications, but the order in which work will be placed upon the installation will not be finally decided until specific equipment has been selected. Because of this, tenderers must consider the first two years' operation only in assessing the amount of data preparation equipment required. The ultimate data preparation needs of the installation will be re-assessed during this period in the light of the speed of development of applications and the need for decentralised data preparation. ~ 10. The installation will be located in the Treasury Building, Queen Street, Brisbane. The suite of rooms allocated will include provision for systems and programming staff, data preparation and control staff in addition to areas reserved for computer and ancillary equipment. ENQUIRIES 11. Enquiries concerning this tender and the specifications contained in it should be addressed to the Under Treasurer, Treasury Department. SEQUENCE OF THE TENDER DOCUMENT 12. The sequence of this document is as follows:- :PART I General information for the benefit of tenderers. :PART II The general conditions of tender. The tender form. :PART III The requirements which must be met and the information which must be given, to be completed by each tenderer. APPENDICES Notes concerning presentation of information in the Appendices. (A) Governmental accounting (B) Sal~ri&s payrolls (C) Examinations procedures (D) Inventory control (E) Births, Deaths and Marriages (F) Electoral rolls (G) Bench mark problem one (see paragraph 13 below) (H) Bench mark problem two (I) Accommodation plan (see paragraph 13 below) (J) File of specimen documents (see paragraph 13 below) 13. Only one set of the following documents will be supplied to each tenderer, and must be specifically reguested from the Under Treasurer:- Appendix (G) The file of punched cards necessary to process bench mark problem one. Appendix (I) The plan of the proposed accommodation in the Treasury Building. Appendix (J) The file of specimen documents. 0000000 THE TREASURER OF QUEENSLAND ELECTRONIC DIGITAL COMPUTER INSTALLATION; TREASURY DEPARTMENT, BRISBANE. PART II - CONDITIONS OF TENDERING GENERAL METHOD OF TENDERING ETC. 1. Every tender shall set forth the full description of the Company tendering and the address of its registered office. If registered outside Queensland, the name of the agent in Queensland authorised to accept service on behalf of the Company shall be given. 2~ Every tender shall be in the form of tender to which these conditions are annexed and shall be completed in triplicate except as may be otherwise indicated. Tenderers must provide the information sought in Part III of this document in the form specified. .Any tender which does not comply in every respect with the requirement of the Tender Document aa .r.e~rds this ·Condition may be re~ected, 3. Every tender form and completed Schedules 1 - 6 shall be enclosed in a sealed envelope or parcel addressed to the Treasurer, Treasury Department; Brisbane, and such envelope or·parcel shall be legibly endorsed thereon, "Tender for electronic digital computer installation - Form of tender and Schedules 1 - 6". The remaining material, literature, etc. which is required for completion of the tender shall be enclosed in a separate sealed parcel which must be delivered at the same time, ru1d which must be endorsed "Tender for electronic digital computer installation - 11 Supporting literature 1 etc. and Schedules 7 - 25 • 4. The tender documents referred to in (3) may be lodged by post, but otherwise shall be lodged in the tender box at , the office of the State Treasury Department, Brisbane, by being placed therein before 12 NOON on Monday 22nd June, 1964. Any tender not in the tender box before the specified closing time will not be considered unless there is evidence satisfactory to the Treasurer that such tender - (a) Was delivered to the Treasury Department before the specified closing time; (b) Was posted to reach the Treasury Department under normal circumstances before the specified closing time but was still in course of postal delivery at that time. 5. No tender received by telephone or telegraphic advice will be considered. 6, Tenderers are required to visit the site of the proposed installation and satisfy themselves of local conditions and facilities, the Treasurer not being liable for any claim on the ground of insufficient information. 7. Full partioulars,:including the Tender Documents, may be inspected and/or obtained at the office of the Under Treasurer, Treasury Department, Treasury Bui·lding, Brisbane. Ocipies of .the tender document may be obtained at a price· of £5 per copy, and the charge paid will be returned in each, , · _. case when a bona fide tender is submitted and not witlidraWn: Within the time limit in the tender, but not otherwise. · .·· · ·-. 8. Any tender which does not comply in every respec-t _ with the requirements of the Tender Documents may be rejected. 9. The Treasurer shall not be bound to accept the .lowest or any tender. 1 O. The Treasurer shali not be bound by any verbal advice given or information furnished by any officer of the Treasury in respect of the contract but shall be bound only by written advice or information furnished by the Under Treasurer. 11. The attention of tenderers-is drawn to the Standard Oode of Tendering, 1959, copy of which is attached. 12. Every tenderer as a guarantee of good faith shall lodge and deposit with his tender the sum of Two hundred pounds (£200) •. Every such deposit shall be a fixed deposit receipt in the name of the Treasurer or a bank draft .or a Post Office order payable to the Treasure.r or a cheque in favour of the Treasurer endorsed by the Manager of the Bank on which it is drawn or other security as approved by the Treasurer,. As soon as possible after a decision has been reached in respect of tenders submitted the deposits lodged by unsuccessful tenderers will be refunded to them, 13. (i) The successful tenderer (if any) shall withi:n, twenty one ( 21 ) days after the date .of the notice _in writing of the acceptance of his tender.enter into wi,th the Treasurer a Contract for the due performance and · fulfilment.of his tenQ.er and shall deposit with the Treasurer as security.for the due performance· of.such contract an amount calculated in accordance .with the following scale:- Contract price Amount· Over £10,000 and not £500 plus 2i% of the above £50,000 amount l:ly which_ the contract price exceeds £10,000 Over £50,000 £1,500 plus 1%.of' .the amount by which the contract price exceeds £50,000. The 11 contract price" for th:is p:trpose shall be taken as the total annual hire charge of the equipment to be supplied, or the total price for outright purchase, as appropriate . The Treasurer will refund to the successful tenderer the amount of the preliminary deposit lodged by him upon payment of the security amount referred to. (ii) If the successful tenderer (if any) shall fail, neglect or refuse to comply with the last preceding paragraph (13(i)), the Treasurer in addition and without prejuO.ice to anything contained in the Conditions of Tendering or any other right, power or.remedy of the Treasurer may by notice in writing to the tenderer rescind the acceptance of the tender and forfeit.all moneys and/or securities theretofor deposited by the tenderer in respect of the tender. (iii) In addition to tenders pursuant to these conditions, the specifications and other tender documents, tenderers may submit alternative proposals for the said_ Service. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION REQUIRED AFTER TENDERS HAVE BEEN LODGED 14. The Under Treasurer may request any tenderer to supply supplementary information in respect of the equipment tendered, its operating characteristics, components, programming systems, installation and supporting services to be supplied by the tenderer. The Treasurer may also request evidence of items of equipment similar to that tendered which have already been produced and are working in other installations. The tenderer shall within the shortest parcticable time comply with such requests. Failure to comply with a reasonable request for such supplementary information within a reasonable time shall be sufficient grounds for rejection of the tender. PART AND COMPOSITE TENDERS 15. Unless the tenderer expressly stipulates in his tender to the contrary the tender may be accepted wholely or in part .. 16~ Composite tenders from more than one tenderer may be submitted but the Treasurer shall not be obliged to accept any such composite tender. ACCEPTANCE OF EQUIPMENT DELIVERY DATE ETC. 17. The tenderer must deliver, installo!LJ'Jit.c.. ond test all equipment concerned in his computer system within the Treasury Building in such time as to allow for operation of the computer by Treasury Department from and including 1st July, 1965, except as regards data preparation equipment, the delivery programme ~or which shall be the subject of a separate agreement. 18. Tenderers shall submit with their tenders a detailed timetable of the proposed periods of and completion dates for the installation of the equipment and for the testing and acceptance trials. TRANSPORTATION AND DELIVERY 19. The tenderer shall deliver and install the equipment and shall provide all plant, equipment and services, including any lifting, erecting or other equipment that may be necessary. The supervision of packing, unpacking and placement of equipment shall be furnished by the tenderer without additional charge. The tenderers are requested to indicate any additional l:bour which it may be necessary for the State Government to supply to assist with packing and unpacking. INSPECTION OF SITE 20. The tenderer shall be deemed to have satisfied himself by a visit to the Treasury Building concerning all conditions likely to affect the installation and operation of his equipment in the accommodation which is agreed on. A claim for additional payment will not be allowed on the grounds of misunderstanding of this matter •. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS ELECTRICITY 21. The power supply at the computer centre at Brisbane is an alternating current of 50 cycles per second; 3 phase; 4 wire; 415/240 volts. The tenderer shall ensure that all electrical fittings and wiring to be undertaken by him conform with the specifications set out in the document "Electrical Wiring Rules" published by the Standards Association of Australia. 22. The tenderer shall make adequate provision to prevent the equipment causing electrical interference and to .prevent malfunction of the e;i.uipment due to mains-borne or radio interference. 23. The tenderer shall supply, or advise on the supply of:- ( 1) Any rectifying or 11 smoothing" equipment that may be required for use in the installation; (2). Motor generator sets that may be required as part of the installation; and (3) Any transformers other than those normally provided by the supplier of electricity. ACCEPTANCE TESTS 24. Before the contract is signed the tenderer shall prepare for consideration by the Treasurer details of the proposed engineering and operational acceptance tests. The Treasurer may, if he so requires, arrange for the equipment to be inspected and tested at the Contractor's premises and require the Contractor to work and test it to the Treasurer's satisfaction. After the equipment is delivered the tenderer shall carry out the acceptance tests already referred to and shall make good any materials or items damaged during tests either at his premises or on the site. If the tests at the site show that the equipment is satisfactory and in every respect in accordance with the contract, the Treasurer will accept thee::iuipment provided that in the case of outright purchase such acceptance shall be without prejudice to ro:ry claim in respect of defects that develop or of which there is evidence of impending development during the subsequent period of 12 months. 25. If the tests show that the e~uipment is unsatisfactory in the opinion of the Treasurer, the Treasurer shall request the contractor to make good such parts as may be defective, or to replace such components as he considers unsatisfactory in performance before the computer system and peripheral e~uipment are handed over to the Treasury Department. The date or dates on which the State Government will assume responsibility for the computer system or any parts of it shall be as determined by the Treasurer. 26. The length of time over which tests shall be conducted shall be as determined by the Treasurer, and this shall not be less. ;than ten working days. 27. ·The Contractor shall be responsible for operating the equipment during the tests, but the Treasurer may provide staff to assist in preparing input data and checking output data. OPERATION OF THE INSTALLATION PERCENTAGE USE OF THE INSTALLATION 28. . The size and capacity of the installation to be set up must be such that the total time required for processing of the salaries payroll application and the Governmental Accounting applications excluding loan accounting does not exceed 60 hours per month of a single shift. Single shift for this purpose is construed as 176 hours usage per month, excluding maintenance. SUPPORT FACILITIES 29. There must be available in Australia in the Cities of Sydney, Melbourne or Brisbane by 1st January, 1965, at the latest, a compatible installation which can be used for the preparation of programs in advance of delivery of the equipment for the Treasury Department. The manufacturer must guarantee that facilities of this kind will be made available. 30. Preference may be given to a tenderer who can suitably guarantee that there is available in, or in the vicinity of, Brisbane by 1st July, 1965, a compatible installation which can be used, by agreement, for the performance of Treasury Department work, in the event of serious breakdown. 0000000 TREASURY TENDER NO. EDP/1 THE TREASURER - QUEENSLAND ELECTRONIC DIGITAL COMJ?UTER INSTALLATION, TREASURY DEPARTMENTt BRISB.ANE. TENDER F 0 R M We the undersigned do hereby tender to provide an electronic digital computer installation to be located within the Treasury Department, Brisbane, in accordance with the Specifications issued by the Treasurer of Queensland. In accordance with the requirements of the Conditions of Tendering We herewith deposit with our tender Schedules in the required form setting out details of the equipment and services which We propose to supply for the abovementioned installation. (Bank draft We enclose (Bank cheque for the sum of Two hundred (Money order pounds (£200) as a preliminary deposit as required by the Conditions of Tendering. Dated at ...... this ...... day of ... , ...... 1964 (Name in full, address and ...... •· ...... signature of person or fr; •••••••••••••••••.•••••••••• 0 ...... company tendering) ...... (Signature and address of ...... Witness): ...... ' , ...... APPENDIX A !'RICES QUOfED TO T,!IE TREASURY DEPARTMENT Compacy Computer Total Total. attei s;ratelll outright modi.fioatione. purche.ee reoommemded 1 and freight, insurance, etc., r., t. " Australian General. E1ectric GE 225 111,875 Rot considered· Pty. Ltd" A'lfatraJ.ian General E1eotric GE 415 173,926 178,526 Pty.. Ltdo Control Data Corporation CDC 3100 155,791 Not considereQ.-[ Contro1 Data Corporation CDC 3200 215.408 186,852 I l :PRICES QYOTED. TO THE .DE.1.>ART.MEN"~ OF MAIN ROAl>S COn1.PUter f-- ;~tal --· ~Tot.al a.f·l;e·~~ eyatem i outright 1j mod:i.fi~eticn.s I } pµroheae recommen.O.ed t~ J and ~ m.cc't i f.:reigb.t D¢par.tmen"..;a~. ~ ~· ~ ! t ;_; l inourancc j I requi.re;:;icmt<:: Ii., ~to. ~ ~------;.------~· £ 1,· -= -.-- i '.7'.. AUatralian General GE 235 ! 239r 536 2Tl r471 i t'' :Electrio P'ty., Ltd c l i 1 . '-~i;ralian Gener~ GE .i25 ~ 263,638 ! Not coruJitt!'x:ed ~-·-. · (;!Ctric l'ty o Lto.o , f;,.,:="rol lJata l'ty, Ltd. CDC 3200 250,:;?3 246,647 I r. \ f;f·'.~txol Data Pty. Ltd~ CDC 3100 219,5'12 Not consiclered 1 ~ ~ .... .~ :;. Elliott Automation :ety. 503 221,695 2441 980 (:i.n.clurli.""lg ! r ritd~ flrst year ! maintenance} i . ·~ 1:· n •- Eng11ah Elec;rh:r:l.o-Leo LEO 360 347,250 Not consider~d , . Computere Ltdo i .. :~-. Ellgl.ieh Electric-Leo KDF 9 331~5?5 ~: .~mputera Ltdo i~ 1. i~{'!tgliah Electrio-Leo lCDF 6 Not considered ~ I 1,.. Computera Ltdo ~ b!' Australia Pty ~ Ltd. 360 18;h228 Uot considered i ..f .. ~M Australia I'ty. Ltd. 360 218~755 3013~612 I I. Honeywell Pty .. Ltdo 300/200 2S0,6C6 293,445 (pl.U5 duty i and freight} d Honeywell Pty. Ltd. 2200 250,959 Not considered I. .Honeywell ?ty. Ltdo 200 184, 109 Not oon.sidered IC'1 Auetr.ali.t- Hy. Ltd,. 1904 221,439 fg1~i i~~r :BCR :Ptyo Ltdo .315-Rlro 219,.000 316,a.3; (including t'iret year lll.8.intenanoe} (The pricee shown take account or conceaeions o~fered ~or duaJ.-purohase)Q !-. 128 Bibliography A.C.T.U. Executive. 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