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The Historical Developmental Perspective of Thomas S The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School College of the Liberal Arts THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE OF THOMAS S. KUHN: A SEARCH FOR FIRST PRINCIPLES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE OVER TIME A Thesis in Philosophy by Rebecca E. Wayland © 2003 Rebecca E. Wayland Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy December 2003 The thesis of Rebecca E. Wayland was reviewed and approved* by the following: Daniel W. Conway Professor of Philosophy and Science, Technology and Society Thesis Advisor Chair of Committee Emily R. Grosholz Professor of Philosophy and Institute for Arts and Humanistic Studies Fellow John P. Christman Associate Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies James E. Martin Associate Professor of Psychology Mitchell S. Aboulafia Professor of Philosophy Head of the Department of Philosophy *Signatures are on file in the Graduate School. Abstract This dissertation reconsiders the work of Thomas S. Kuhn on the basis of what he characterized as the historical developmental perspective. The perspective examines the activities, processes and choices involved in the development of scientific knowledge over time. It reflects case-based, rather than rules- based reasoning and provides an alternative and insightful basis for discerning changes in knowledge, ideas, and assumptions over time. The historical developmental perspective guided Kuhn’s research activities throughout his career, and through those investigations, he developed and refined both the approach and the insights that it provided. Yet the unique aspects of Kuhn’s historical developmental perspective were not recognized by many of his readers – nor, to a great extent, were they appreciated fully by Kuhn himself. As a result, much of Kuhn’s work has been misinterpreted by his readers and many of his most important ideas have remained unexplored. iii Table of Contents LIST OF FIGURES.................................................................................................................................... vii ABBREVIATION OF SELECTED WORKS BY THOMAS S. KUHN............................................... viii INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 1 OVERVIEW 2 THE INTERPRETIVE DEBATES SURROUNDING STRUCTURE 4 AN HISTORIOGRAPHIC RECONSIDERATION OF STRUCTURE 13 KUHN’S FURTHER (PHILOSOPHICAL) DEVELOPMENT 18 CHAPTER ONE: AN HISTORIOGRAPHIC INVESTIGATION OF KUHN’S RESEARCH ACTIVITIES .............................................................................................................................................. 22 OVERVIEW 22 SECTION ONE: THE ARISTOTLE EXPERIENCE ........................................................................... 24 THE “MECHANICS” OF KUHN’S ARISTOTLE EXPERIENCE 28 THE CONTEXT OF KUHN’S ARISTOTLE EXPERIENCE 32 THE IMPLICATIONS OF KUHN’S ARISTOTLE EXPERIENCE 35 SECTION TWO: STUDY AND RESEARCH IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE.............................. 37 THE TRANSITION TO THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 37 “RANDOM EXPLORATION” OF RELATED FIELDS 43 THE LOWELL LECTURES OF 1951 46 THE TENURE TRACK AT HARVARD 47 SECTION THREE: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTAL ACCOUNTS............................................. 50 THE RETURN TO PHILOSOPHY 50 THE ROAD TO STRUCTURE 52 THE FINAL PIECE OF THE PUZZLE 63 CHAPTER TWO: AN HISTORIOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION OF STRUCTURE.................... 69 SECTION ONE: THE ORIGINS, OBJECTIVES AND OUTLINE OF STRUCTURE...................... 70 THE NEW HISTORIOGRAPHY 71 STRUCTURE’S SCHEMATIC ACCOUNT OF SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT 72 IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW HISTORIOGRAPHY 75 FURTHER IMPLICATIONS 80 SECTION TWO: FOUR IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW HISTORIOGRAPHY ........................... 83 PARADIGMS AS THE ROUTE TO NORMAL SCIENCE 84 NORMAL SCIENCE AND ITS PRACTICES 93 ANOMALIES AS THE ROUTE TO DISCOVERY, INVENTION, AND REVOLUTION 100 SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 108 SECTION THREE: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE.................................... 120 THE INVISIBILITY OF REVOLUTIONS 120 THE RESOLUTION OF REVOLUTIONS 125 SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS THROUGH REVOLUTION 130 iv CHAPTER THREE: THE INTERPRETIVE LEGACY OF STRUCTURE....................................... 137 SECTION ONE: QUESTIONS OF METHOD .................................................................................... 138 RESPONSES TO CONCERNS ABOUT METHOD 138 DISTINCTIVE ASPECTS OF KUHN’S METHOD 140 IMPLICATIONS 157 SECTION TWO: DIFFERENT VIEWS OF NORMAL SCIENCE................................................... 160 RESPONSES TO PHILOSOPHERS OF SCIENCE 160 STRUCTURE’S NEW IMAGE OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 163 IMPLICATIONS 172 SECTION THREE: THE CHANGE FROM ONE NORMAL SCIENTIFIC TRADITION TO ANOTHER................................................................................................................................................ 179 RESPONSES TO PHILOSOPHERS OF SCIENCE 180 THE COGNITIVE AUTHORITY OF SCIENCE 182 IMPLICATIONS 185 CHAPTER FOUR: CLARIFICATIONS AND ELUCIDATIONS..................................................... 187 SECTION ONE: THE COMMUNITY STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE............................................... 190 THE FUNCTION OF SPECIALIST COMMUNITIES 193 THE INTERRELATION OF INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES 199 IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 202 SECTION TWO: THE DISCIPLINARY MATRIX............................................................................ 206 SYMBOLIC GENERALIZATIONS 207 HEURISTIC AND ONTOLOGICAL MODELS 210 VALUES 211 EXEMPLARS 212 SECTION THREE: EXEMPLARS AND THE LANGUAGE-NATURE LINK............................... 215 “SECOND THOUGHTS:” EXEMPLARS AND THE COGNITIVE CONTENT OF SCIENCE 216 THE 1969 POSTSCRIPT: A COMMUNITY-BASED “WAY OF SEEING” 224 “REFLECTIONS:” EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE EMBEDDED IN LANGUAGE 227 CHAPTER FIVE: EXEMPLARS, INCOMMENSURABILITY AND LEXICAL STRUCTURE . 231 SECTION ONE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS AND AUTHORITY OF EXEMPLARS .......... 234 THE RELATIONSHIP OF THEORIES AND EXEMPLARS 235 EXEMPLARS AND THE METAPHOR-LIKE PROCESS IN SCIENCE 239 THE AUTHORITY OF EXEMPLARS 242 SECTION TWO: INCOMMENSURABILITY AND THE THEORY OF MEANING.................... 248 THE “DOUBLE-FACED CHARACTER” OF SCIENTIFIC LANGUAGE 250 TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION 252 INTERRELATED TERMS, POSSIBLE WORLDS, AND THE CAUSAL THEORY 259 SECTION THREE: INTERRELATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ................................................... 274 KIND TERMS, LEXICONS, AND THE LEXICAL STRUCTURE 274 THE COGNITIVE BITE OF INCOMMENSURABILITY 281 KUHN’S “POST-DARWINIAN KANTIANISM” 291 v CHAPTER SIX: INSIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF KUHN’S HISTORICAL (DEVELOPMENTAL) PERSPECTIVE................................................................................................ 306 SECTION ONE: KUHN’S HISTORICAL (DEVELOPMENTAL) PERSPECTIVE ...................... 308 DISTINCTIVE ASPECTS OF KUHN’S HISTORICAL (DEVELOPMENTAL) PERSPECTIVE 308 A “NEAR-TRIVIAL” JUSTIFICATION 312 IMPLICATIONS OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 316 SECTION TWO: THE CASE FOR DYNAMIC RATIONALITY..................................................... 318 THE “RATIONALITY” OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 318 THE AUTHORITY OF DYNAMIC RATIONALITY 324 IMPLICATIONS 327 SECTION THREE: THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS ............................................................... 329 “PROGRESS” WITHIN THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 329 SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND THE AUTHORITY OF SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 331 PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS 334 A RECONSIDERATION OF LEGACY 336 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................... 339 vi List of Figures Figure 1: The Development of an Historical Narrative 144 Figure 2: The Development of Scientific Knowledge 147 Figure 3: The Development of an Historiographic Case Study 152 Figure 4: The Development of an Historical Developmental Account 155 Figure 5: Kuhn’s Proposed Image of the Nature of Science 165 Figure 6: The Role of Dynamic Rationality in the Development of Scientific Knowledge 325 vii Abbreviation of Selected Works by Thomas S. Kuhn CR The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought (1957) ET-SS The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (1977) RSS The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographic Interview (2000) SSR The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962/1970a) SSR-PS “Postscript” to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1969/1970a) AW “Afterwords” (1990/2000) CCC “Commensurability, Comparability, and Communicability” (1982/2000) CCDP “Concepts of Cause in the Development of Physics” (1971/1977) DR “Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Designation” (1990) EC “Energy Conservation as an Example of Simultaneous Discovery” (1959/1977) ET “The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research” (1959/1977) FM “The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science” (1956/1977) FTE “A Function for Thought Experiments” (1964/1977) HS “The History of Science” (1968/1977) HSSD “The Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery” (1962/1977) LDPR “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?” (1965/1970b) MET “Mathematical versus Experimental Traditions in the Development of Physical Science” (1976/1977) MS “Metaphor in Science” (1977/2000) OVJ “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice” (1973/1977) PW “Possible Worlds in
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