THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF HURT 1

The Distinctive Constitution of Feeling Hurt:

A Review and a Lazarian Theory

David J. K. Hardecker Leipzig University, Department of Early Child Development and Culture, Germany Email: [email protected]

Tel: T +49 (0) 341 97 31 874

September 28, 2018

The author is supported by a financial scholarship from the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Germany.

Abstract What is the nature of feeling hurt? I answer this question by systematically reviewing and integrating theories and empirical findings on feeling hurt using Lazarus’ theory of . Following this approach, feeling hurt is constituted by a primary appraisal of an illegitimate devaluation and by a secondary appraisal of low controllability which together activate an action tendency to withdraw from an interaction. I derive several predictions, e.g., that an increase in appraisals of controllability should turn hurt into . I also point out hypotheses on the facial, vocal, bodily and behavioral expression of feeling hurt and it’s communicative function. Further, I draw important conceptual distinctions between a broad and a narrow concept of feeling hurt as well as between feeling hurt as an emotion, a hurtful event and a long-term emotional episode of hurt. Finally, I systematically compare feeling hurt with , , , disappointment, , and anger.

Keywords: hurt , self-conscious emotion, shame, humiliation, anger

The Distinctive Constitution of Feeling Hurt: A Review and a Lazarian Theory

1. Introduction As several newspapers reported in August 2015, a man called Ebrahim H. B. had been engaged to be married but the family of the bride-to-be had unexpectedly canceled the wedding just a few weeks before the wedding feast. He left to join ISIS in Syria. At his return, he explained why he had done so. According to Mail Online (Hall, 2015), he had been angry THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT 2 but the term he originally had used was „gekraenkt“(SZ, 2015) - a German word that translates better to hurt feelings – „the core emotional marker of “(DeWall & Bushman, 2011) . This translation problem motivates the question addressed in this paper: what is the distinctive constitution of feeling hurt? What makes it different from anger as well as from other ?

Although several emotion researchers (e.g.,Barrett (2009); Moors (2017); Scherer (1994)) may challenge the value of this question, distinguishing emotions is indispensable even often for their own research (cf. Scherer (1997)), for other research fields (e.g. developmental psychology, social psychology) as well as for practical applications such as training (e.g. Nelis et al. (2011)). As the latter often rely on emotion research, they usually fail to include feeling hurt. The general importance of this emotional phenomenon results from at least three sources: clinical, because feeling hurt is presumably related to personality disorders of narcissism and borderline (Staebler, Helbing, Rosenbach, & Renneberg, 2011), or posttraumatic embitterment (Linden, 2003), societal, because it can lead to severe crime, e.g. (Frijda, 1994; McCullough et al., 1998), and anthropological, because feeling hurt is presumably a universal phenomenon. At least 24 languages know equivalent words, for example, ”Seergemaak” in Afrikansk, ”Mindua sentitzea” in Basque, ”Megbntottsg” in Hindi and ”verletzt” or ”gekraenkt” in German (Fontaine, Scherer, & Soriano, 2013). And even though educationists in the US think of feeling hurt as so important that they explicitly teach preschool children to verbally express when their feelings have been hurt, many emotion researchers seem to be reluctant to investigate this emotion. Thus, this paper is intended to stimulate both empirical research and debate.

Recent empirical evidence points to the distinctiveness of feeling hurt on a holistic level. Feeney (2005) conducted a word sorting-task, in which participants were asked to sort emotion terms into five categories (sadness, anger, , shame , hurt/injury). She found that, although the hurt/injury category overlapped with all other categories, “in ”, “damaged”, “torn apart”, and “shattered” emerged as specific terms for the hurt/injury category. (2) Leary, Springer, Negel, Ansell, and Evans (1998) asked participants to recall hurtful episodes and to report how they had felt using 18 emotion terms. They found that other emotion ratings such as anger or sadness could not totally explain the variance of hurt feelings and that 6 to 13 % of variance could best be explained by hurt feelings. (3) Leary and Leder (2009) could replicate those findings both in another retrospective study, but also in an experimental study, in which hurt feelings were elicited by being chosen last by a team captain. The authors conclude that the term ‚hurt feelings‘ seems thus to refer to a specific emotional experience or feeling.

In this paper, I will deepen and stimulate the debate by presenting an integrative view on the distinctiveness of feeling hurt on the level of its components, mainly its appraisal and action tendency component. I speak of “feeling hurt” instead of “hurt feelings” because of it being grammatically more simple to use, but I think of those terms as synonymous. First, I will specify criteria for the distinctiveness of an emotion based on the theory of Frijda (1986) and Lazarus (1991). Second, I review empirical findings and integrate theoretical ideas on feeling hurt into what I call the Lazarian Theory of Feeling Hurt. I will argue that based on a new conceptual distinction that is derived from the linguistic usage of feeling hurt as well as by taking into account left–out data we arrive at a promising theory. I will go beyond former accounts by suggesting how those components interact with each other THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT 3 and by formulating falsifiable predictions. Besides taking into account the empirical evidence, I will also argue that there is a consensus among authors who did conceptualize feeling hurt independently from each other. Importantly, I do take into account writings of psychotherapists as I assume them to have in-depth knowledge about hurt feelings. Third, I elaborate on the theory by pointing out how feeling hurt can be coherently distinguished from other emotions. I will argue that only such a comprehensive theory is able to distinguish feeling hurt properly from other emotions. Finally, I derive novel predictions from the theory. In order to present a focused and precise discussion, I will not discuss findings of ’social pain’ (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; MacDonald & Leary, 2005) as MacDonald (2009) classifies feeling hurt as one kind of social pain (the most relevant brain area in social pain, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), seems not specifically related to rejection and feeling hurt, but to negative in general (Eisenberger, 2015)). Thus, the findings on social pain, although not optimal, are neglected here.

2. The Distinctiveness of Emotions What distinguishes one emotion from another? According to Frijda and Scherer (2009) there seems to be a consensus that emotions consist of several components: (1) The cognitive component contains appraisal processes that evaluate objects and events concerning their significance for the organism. This significance arises because of its relation to the organism’s needs or motives. (2) The overall result of the appraisal process is an action tendency or more general, a change in action readiness (Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, & Schure, 1989) that prepares and directs action (Scherer, 1987, 2005). (3) Those changes come along with physiological changes in the autonomous nervous system which provide energetic support (system regulation). (4) All those three components are monitored and subjectively experienced (Frijda, 1986) as a feeling and expressed via the action component (5) which serves communicative functions. Nonetheless, there are some important differences concerning the question of the relevance of each component for the distinctiveness of an emotion. According to the basic emotion approach, no component seems to be particularly pertinent, and 11-13 different characteristic features are more or less required (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011). Unfortunately, it is rather unclear how those many characteristics relate to each other. I prefer an organizational approach that is more parsimonious because it stipulates some components as central (e.g., appraisal, change in action readiness) (Frijda, 2008; Lazarus, 2001) and specifies how the different components relate to each other. I mainly follow Lazarus (1991, 2001) according to whom an emotion is distinct only if it can be described by a unique composition of a primary appraisal, a secondary appraisal as well as a change in action readiness. The primary appraisal refers to how an event is relevant for the individual and whether it is congruent or incongruent with a certain need. The secondary appraisal concerns the coping potential/controllability of the situation. I further distinguish between perceptual dimensions of appraisal that consist of mere knowledge (Lazarus & Smith, 1988) or perceptual content which is itself not valenced (e.g., agency, intentionality) and motivational dimensions (needs, motives, values).

3. The constitution of feeling hurt In this section, I discuss the nature of feeling hurt along the outlined components of emotions, thus showing the distinctiveness of feeling hurt in this framework. To abstract from specifics of the English language (Wierzbicka, 1999), I review not only conceptual ideas and findings of feeling hurt but also about the corresponding German emotion called Kränkungsgefühl. Further, I will also take into account the hypothesis of psychotherapeutic authors who are likely to have in-depth knowledge of hurt feelings. THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT 4

Following Leary and Springer (2001), most authors have agreed that we do not refer to any kind of socially painful situation by ‚hurt feelings‘. Loss of a loved person is a situation in which we would typically not feel hurt in the sense intended here. It thus seems that ’feeling hurt’, as it is true for other emotion words, is used with different broad meanings (cp. Parrott, 2010). Here, I suggest another distinction: In the emotion literature, we find such sentences as „anger that is the result of feeling hurt“(L’Abate, 1977, p.13) or „hurt [... ] that warrants anger“(Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’connor, 1987, p.1082). This meaning variant implicates that „feeling hurt“ can not be properly distinguished from other emotions, because we refer to only a part (e.g., the appraisal) of an emotion. This could be called the broad concept of feeling hurt. Here, I will focus on a narrower meaning of feeling hurt that is further constituted by a particular action tendency. seems to have had it in mind when he wrote that linguistic usage most likely describes the silently endured as hurt feelings [Kränkung] (Freud, 1952a, S.87).

The broadness of the concept is associated with another conceptual distinction that should be made. At least two different temporal units should be distinguished (Frijda, 2007, p.182f): an immediate emotional reaction (feeling hurt) and a long-term emotion episode of hurt that may endure longer and may include emotions as well as other emotion-like states (e.g. moods) as parts of it. According to Frijda (2007, p.184), emotion episodes can be conceived of as a unit because of a primary appraisal and the resulting emotional process having in common to deal with it. Whereas this primary appraisal stays the same, the action tendency and thus the emotion proper may change. Hurtful episodes may endure for a long time, as it is true for other emotional episodes that are related to injustice or unfairness (Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998). With some distance in time to the hurtful event, secondary appraisals of controllability might change (Frijda, 2007), therefore turning hurt into anger or sadness at some point in the hurtful episode. In this sense, L’Abate (1977) might be right in saying that hurt lies at the bottom of other emotions. According to the terminology developed here, it is not feeling hurt in the narrow sense but hurt in the broad sense (defined by the primary appraisal alone) that lies at the bottom of other emotions – in the sense that it is the beginning of a hurtful episode.

Instead of rejecting the view that emotions can not be defined by necessary and sufficient conditions (e.g.,. Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, 2003), I argue that they can - when the ambiguity in emotion concepts is removed. Thus, I will define the narrow concept of feeling hurt using necessary and sufficient conditions. With ‚contingent conditions‘ I refer to moderating influences on feeling hurt. Importantly, the theory must be judged in how good it explains the following eliciting situations of feeling hurt: rejection or abandonment, ignorance, betrayal or cheating, criticism, teasing, when being taken for granted or being falsely accused (Feeney, 2004; Leary et al. 1998; Vangelisti, Young, Carpenter-Theune, & Alexander, 2005). But, and this has been neglected so far, it must also explain why the main reaction towards the individual who feels hurt is – in case the perpetrator is aware and willing to – apologizing (Leary et al., 1998), in other words, correcting a normative transgression.

3.1 Appraisal 3.1.1 Perceptuals. Feeling hurt is caused by the action of another person (agency) (Leary et al., 1998). Thus one would not talk of feeling hurt if someone hurt himself in some way. A contingent perceptual is expectedness that is presumably based on social norms (see below), that specify what should be done. In describing the situations in which people had felt hurt, Feeney (2005) found frequent reports of and Vangelisti et THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT 5 al. (2005) found a corresponding factor ’shock’ (e.g., ”It was unexpected”). Nonetheless, according to those studies, expectedness seems to be an intensity moderating factor for feeling hurt, not a defining and thus necessary aspect. The perception of an action as intentional or accidental (causal attribution/perceived intentionality) has also been found to influence the intensity of feeling hurt: the more intentional an action is perceived, the more hurtful it feels (Feeney, 2004; McLaren & Solomon, 2008, 2010; Vangelisti & Young, 2000; Vangelisti et al., 2005). Familiarity as a characteristic of the agent is also relevant but open to variation. An open question is whether feeling hurt can indeed arise in a situation with mere acquaintances as found by (Snapp & Leary, 2001) or whether hurt happens only in interaction with familiar individuals as suggested by the findings of Leary et al. (1998). Publicity which is a dimension that is relevant to (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996) and to humiliation (Fernández, Saguy, & Halperin, 2015) and that is about being in the context of a third party, I hypothesize to be an intensifying parameter as well: the more public, the more intense hurt. 3.1.2 Primary appraisal. Three needs have been discussed as central for the primary appraisal of feeling hurt: self-esteem, morality and the need for security.

(1) Self-Esteem. Self-esteem as a motivation refers to the evaluation of oneself as good/worthy or bad/unworthy. Recognition, compliments, being loved are important events that raise self-esteem (Leary, Terdal, Tambor, & Downs, 1995). Elicitors of feeling hurt are the negative complements of those events: not being recognized (e.g. not being listened to), being criticized, being betrayed, abandoned or excluded. Leary et al. (1998, p.1225) therefore inferred that feeling hurt is constituted by the (primary) appraisal of ”relational devaluation: the perception that another individual does not regard his or her relationship with the person to be as important, close, or valuable as the person .” His inference is supported by independently formulated but similar views: Freud (1952b, p. 170), who was the first to write scientifically about feeling hurt or injuries to the ego (literally: Kränkung), conceptualized it as a rejection within the sphere of the ego-ideal. Similarly, the gestalt psychologist Philip Lersch (1964, p.249) spoke of one’s striving for standing not being fulfilled as the cause of feeling hurt and Mees (1992) formulated a similar view. Thus, there seems broad consensus for the view that hurt involves that someone’s action violates ones’ need for self-esteem, that is, to be important/valuable (cp. table 1. This discrepancy is referred to as devaluing. This consensus has been confirmed by Leary et al. (1998) who found that hurt feelings correlated significantly with lowered self-esteem in a questionnaire study in which participants had to recall a hurtful event. In another retrospective study by Feeney (2005) participants judged a recalled hurtful event as devaluing the relationship. In yet another recall study, Lemay jr. et al. (2012) asked for devaluation behaviors of the perpetrator (e.g., “Said that he/she does not a relationship with you”; “Said that he/she has negative feelings about you”, etc.) and found that such devaluing behaviors predicted both hurt feelings, but also anger. Future studies should also use implicit measures to investigate devaluation/lowered self-estem (e.g., Krause, Back, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011).

(2) Normativity. Although devaluation might well explain the eliciting situations of feeling hurt, it is an insufficient theory because it can not make sense of the fact that „perpetrators“quite often apologize (Leary et al., 1998). Apology is a response to a normative transgression and indicates thus that feeling hurt involves also an appraisal of illegitimacy: it was not okay what the other one has done. A depressive, shameful reaction would be the opposite: that oneself feels wrong. The argument for a THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT 6 normative aspect of feeling hurt is again supported by the literature, both theoretically and empirically. Mees (1992) referred explicitly to violations of one’s honour as the cause of feeling hurt (literally: Kränkung) and Shaver et al. (1987) reported participants view of being wronged as the cause of feeling hurt. Similarly, Vangelisti and Sprague (1998) inferred ”relational transgressions, violations of a moral imperative or social standard” to be the central appraisal of feeling hurt. So far, this claim is supported by only one empirical study. Feeney (2005) found that almost all instances of hurtful events in a recall study were reported to involve violations of normative expectations, most often concerning interpersonal norms such as supportiveness, loyalty, openness and . Feeney argued that such transgressions would often signal devaluation. This is in line with the result of a conceptual analysis on hurt religious feelings by Statman (2000). He comes to a similar conclusion: that both aspects, ”perceived unfairness” and ”disrespect” must be present in order to feel hurt. This view is shared by several practicing psychotherapists (e.g., Dryden, 2007; Haller, 2015).

(3) Security. The need that is fulfilled by the proximity of familiar individuals, may be central for feeling hurt according to Shaver, Mikulincer, Lavy, and Cassidy (2009). They hypothesized that one’s sense of attachment security may be endangered in feeling hurt and thus that a person’s attachment style may influence their reaction to hurtful situations. In a priming study, the authors found evidence that attachment style influences the intensity of remembered hurt. What they did not show is that appraisals of insecurity determine the quality of feeling hurt. Security is much more associated with not feeling hurt. Furthermore, if an endangered sense of security would be at the center of feeling hurt, this could not explain why hurt individuals often end the relationship with the perpetrator. Thus, the need for self-esteem and the need for morality are the better explanations for feeling hurt. Paternalistic behavior could function as a final test. Paternalistic behavior is defined as overprotecting behavior, i.e., behavior that spends more security than desired. Thus, if feeling hurt would result from a lack of security, paternalistic behavior could not hurt - an inference that allows to falsify the hypothesis of security as the central unfulfilled need underlying hurt. This is not to say, that attachment relationships are entirely irrelevant to feeling hurt. This is of course not the case.

The Lazarian Theory of Feeling Hurt: 1. Primary Appraisal: The situation is appraised as devaluing, which is defined as a state of negative discrepancy to the need for self-esteem. This state is commonly referred to as disapproving, denigrating or disrespecting. This devaluation is further appraised as illegitimate, which is defined as a state of negative discrepancy to one’s normative expectations. This state is commonly referred to as unjust, wrong, inappropriate, unfair or undeserved.

All hypotheses on the appraisal of feeling hurt mentioned have been summarized in Table 1, all existing evidence is reported in Table 3.

Table 1 Theories on the Primary Appraisal of Feeling Hurt Author Appraisal Freud (1952b, p.170) of satisfaction within the sphere of the ego-ideal Lersch (1964, p.249) unfulfilled striving for standing Shaver et al. (1987, p.1082) ”when he or she has been wronged” THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT 7

Mees (1992, p.37) libels done by others/ violations of one’s honour Leary et al. (1998, p.1225) ”relational devaluation, the perception that another individual does not regard his or her relationship with the person to be as important, close or valuable as the person desires” Vangelisti & Sprague (1998, p.124) ”arise as a result of a percevied transgression” Statman (2000, p.207) ” believes [...] (a) his behavior is unfair, and (b) it sends a message of disrespect” Dryden (2007, p.11) ”when you consider this disapproval to be undeserved” Shaver et al. (2009, p.99) ”endangering one’s deeper sense of security” THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT34

3.1.3 Secondary Appraisal: Coping Potential/Controllability. Coping potential or controllability refers to the influence a person perceives him or herself to have in a given situation and constitutes what Lazarus (1991) called the secondary appraisal. The central and integrating idea is that feeling hurt involves a low to medium controllability. The following image might illustrate this idea: A knight with a sword and a shield is being attacked. He is able to fight back because he has the weapons to do so (high coping potential). But what if he would have no shield and no sword? He would feel helpless and would get hurt. In a study by Feeney (2004), participants recalled hurtful events and reported their subjective control and power. She found that all hurtful events were significantly associated with perceived low power. Lemay, Overall, and Clark (2012) found in a similar study that feeling hurt was also significantly associated with less power than anger. Further, Hareli and Hess (2008) conducted a vignette study in which participants read a scenario in which they received bad grades. In short, they had to imagine that some explanation for this event would be true. They found that the more uncontrollable they perceived the explanation, the more hurtful participants rated the event. In summary, the secondary appraisal of low controllability seems to be well supported by empirical evidence.

The Lazarian Theory of Feeling Hurt: 2. Secondary Appraisal: The situation is appraised as being of low controllability which means that the individual sees itself as having little or no influence.

3.2 Action Tendency and Communicative Function of Feeling Hurt Based on the two aspects of the primary appraisal, the action tendency of feeling hurt should concern two motivational struggles: coping with the devaluation and coping with the injustice. Lersch (1964, p.249) proposed that feeling hurt [gekraenkt sein] involves ”withdrawal, during which one is still squinting at the world waiting for being called back.” This is what is typically called sulking behavior. As Dryden (2007) puts is:”you tend to shut down direct channels of communication with the person about whom you have made yourself feel hurt. [...] your goal is to indirectly show the other person how you feel.” Evidence for the first aspect, a ”readiness to avoid or distance themselves relationally from the source of the pain” (Vangelisti & Young, 2000) has been supported by findings of McLaren and Solomon (2008, 2010) and Vangelisti and Young (2000). The second aspect concerns the desire that the morally right should be re-established (cp. Lemay et al. (2012)). It is likely that the communicative function of feeling hurt lies in signaling this desire: that one has been wronged, thus wanting reparation. Indirect support for this claim comes from the finding of a study in which 38 % of the perpetrators were reported to either have apologized themselves or asked for the victim’s (Leary et al., 1998). MacDonald (2009) also suggested that individuals might experience an approach-avoidance conflict, which involves the tendency to distance oneself, but also to pursue connection. This might sound trivial, but the kind of connection one has to the perpetrator is likely to go along with particular variations of the action tendency: (i) in case one is hurt by a stranger: ending the interaction (ii) in case one is hurt from within a relationship: a temporary withdrawal to allow for reparation (e.g., physical distancing, turning away, becoming silent). This state is commonly referred to as sulking, ’showing the cold shoulder’ or as ’silent treatment’. (iii) when being hurt by someone’s ending the relationship or being excluded from a group: distancing and crying. THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT35

All hypotheses that relate to the action tendency of feeling hurt have been summarized in Table 2, all empirical evidence is listed in Table 3. The Lazarian Theory of Feeling Hurt: 3. Action Tendency and Communicative Function: to internally devalue/distance oneself from the perpetrator and to await reparation (e.g., expecting an apology) leading to sulking and/or crying.

Table 2 Theories on the Action Tendency of Feeling Hurt Author Action Tendency Freud (1952a, p.87). the silently endured suffering Lersch (1964, p.249) Withdrawal during which one is still squinting at the world waiting for being called back. Vangelisti & Young (2000, p.397) ”Readiness to avoid or distance themselves relationally from the source of their pain.” Dryden (2007, p.18) Sulking: ”shutting down direct channels of communication [...] to indirectly show the other person how you feel” MacDonald (2009, p.550) ”motivated to avoid closeness, especially with the hurtful individual. At the same time [...] motivated to reveal vulnerabilities and pursue to soothe their sense of injury” Lemay et al. (2012, p.983) ”Restore perpetrator’s ”

3.3 Emotion Expression The nonverbal display, as well as nonverbal behaviors of feeling hurt, should by definition implement its communicative function: signaling that one has been wronged, potentially eliciting guilt in and thus reparation attempts (e.g., apologizing) by the perpetrator. Hence, an individual that feels hurt should be readily recognizable. But so far no existing study has examined whether there is a typical display in adults. Recently, [citation removed] have found that the prototypical expression of feeling hurt can be directly observed in children’s sulking behavior. They found that children from western cultures typically utter sentences like ”You are unfair/mean”, ”That was not fair”, ”Leave me alone”, ”Go away”, ”We are not friends anymore”, which perfectly reflect the primary appraisal as well as the action tendency of feeling hurt. The most distinctive behavioral features aside from those sentences were: pouting lips, narrowing eyebrows, crossing arms, turning away, avoiding gaze, silencing and going away, which all involve a kind of withdrawing from a social interaction. In adults from western cultures, the expression might be more subtle, but it might still be observable. In psychotherapeutic work, the author has observed that patients, when telling about hurtful events, often cross their arms and substantially reduce eye contact. In other more interdependent cultures, the pouting expression might be expressed more openly in adults, as has been observed anecdotally by (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1997) in the Uaicás (Yanomami), which are indigenous people in Venezuela/Brazil. As experimental manipulations of mild hurt are possible (Lemay et al., 2012; Snapp & Leary, 2001), such hypotheses should be tested further.

3.4 Physiology A lot of work has so far been concerned with social evaluative threats, not with THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT36 explicit devaluation (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Only recently, empirical work has started to look at physiological processes of hurt feelings. In two experimental studies for example, Gunther Moor, Bos, Crone, and van der Molen (2014) and Gunther Moor, Crone, and van der Molen (2010) found that cardiac activity is slowing down after unexpected social rejection. Maner, Miller, Schmidt, and Eckel (2010) found changes in progesterone levels following social exclusion. There are several studies more to discuss here but future work must first clarify which experimental paradigms are specifically eliciting hurt feelings (at least typically). Social exclusion, for example, is also associated with loss and might thus lead to processes that are not caused or accompanied by hurt feelings but also by sadness. Rejection by strangers certainly is different from rejection by familiar individuals. Thus, discussing the transferability of findings from the broad literature of social rejection, social exclusion and social pain (DeWall & Bushman, 2011; Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Eisenberger, 2015; Kemeny & Schedlowski, 2007, cp.) is beyond the scope of this paper. THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT 36

Table 3 The Lazarian Theory of Feeling Hurt - Summary on Necessary and Contingent Characteristics and their Evidence Component Characteristic Necessity Evidence Appraisal -Perceptuals Agent you / someone else necessary Leary et al. (1998) Unexpectedness increases intensity contingent Feeney (2005), Vangelisti et al. (2005) Familiarity increases intensity ? Leary et al. (1998), Snapp & Leary (2001) Vangelisti & Young (2000), Vangelisti et al. (2005), Feeney (2004), McLaren & Intention increases intensity contingent Solomon (2008, 2010) Publicity increases intensity contingent Primary Appraisal Freud (1952b), Lersch (1964), Mees (1992), self-esteem devaluation necessary Leary et al. (1998) Shaver et al. (1987), Mees (1992), normativity/morality illegitimate necessary Vangelisti & Sprague (1998), Feeney (2004) Secondary Appraisal controllability low to medium necessary Lemay et al. (2012), Hareli & Hess (2008) tendency to distance from the perpetrator, but demand Lersch (1964), Vangelisti & Young (2000), Action tendency reparation necessary McLaren & Solomon (2008, 2010) Heart rate slowing down, change in progesterone Gunther Moor et al. (2010), Maner et al. Autonomic Response level contingent (2010) Subjective feeling Painfulness contingent Feeney (2005) Narrow, tense and thin Vocal Expression voice contingent no evidence Facial Expression Anger-sadness-blend contingent no evidence arms crossed, turned away, Posture head lowered contingent [citation removed] going away, stopping to interact, ambivalent or Behavior avoidant gaze contingent [citation removed]

4. Distinguishing Feeling Hurt from Closely Related Emotions The Lazarian Theory of Feeling Hurt is so far supported by consensus among diverse authors but not sufficiently supported by direct evidence. In opposition to strong empiricist claims, several philosophers of science maintain that a theory can be accepted without empirical testing and only by explanatory virtues alone (cp. Psillos, 2002). Mackonis (2013) suggests the following criteria for evaluating an explanation and thus a theory: (a) coherence THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT 37

(fit with background knowledge), (b) breadth (unification of phenomena), (c) depth (clarity or explanation of the explanatory mechanism itself), and (d) simplicity (parsimony). I do not intend to argue that the following considerations are indeed sufficient to confirm the Lazarian Theory, but what I they will show is that the theory (a) coheres with findings on other emotions in (d) a parsimonous way and (b) unifies emotional phenomena by pointing out important differences as well as overlaps. In the following, I will compare feeling hurt with disappointment, humiliation, shame, guilt, sadness and anger. The main results of this comparison are summarized in Table 4, the main overlaps and differences with anger, shame, disappointment and humiliation are summarized in a decision tree in Figure 1.

4.1 Disappointment The verb ’to feel disappointed’ is used at the linguistic level in two contexts. In the first, disappointed means that one has expected something positive that did not enter. In the second, one talks of being disappointed by someone. Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2002) call the former Outcome Related Disappointment (ORD) and the latter Person Related Disappointment (PRD). ORD is generally elicited if the expectation of some positive event is violated (Frijda, 1986). In contrast to PRD no agent has to be present there. Disappointment in the second sense (PRD) – that someone is disappointed by someone else – is linguistically a variant of feeling hurt, namely, feeling hurt that involves an expectation that is not met by someone (e.g., breaking of a promise) as a necessary component. Accordingly, the results of Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2002, p.800) for PRD can be used to evaluate the Lazarian theory of feeling hurt. The following findings confirm it substantially: low controllability (”The situation is perceived as one in which little can be done about it” ), wrongness (”oneself is perceived as being morally right [...] think that this person did something he/she should not have done”), tendency to distance oneself (”tendency to get away from the situation, to ignore and to avoid the other person.”).

4.2 Humiliation Eliciting events that cause humiliation – criticism, being laughed at, being ridiculed, being put down, being excluded (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999) – largely overlap with the eliciting events of feeling hurt. Following Elison and Harter (2007, p.311), humiliation involves the following appraisal: (1) ”being lowered in the eyes of others: losing self-esteem, social status, or dignity” , (2) ”the role of the other. The humiliated person is made to feel psychologically lowered by someone else [...] through put-downs, teasing, mocking, and even torture” , (3)”a sense of unfairness is often part of the experience” and (4) it happens in ”the eyes of others.” Furthermore, humiliation has been found to involve powerlessness and with regard to action tendency withdrawing and desiring revenge (Leidner, Sheikh, & Ginges, 2012). Thus, humiliation overlaps largely with feeling hurt. I hypothesize humiliation (see Table 4) to differ only in two respects from feeling hurt. First, it ”occurs in the eyes of an audience” – the fourth condition by Elison and Harter (2007). The second difference lies in the proposition that ”the humiliated person is made to feel psychologically lowered” – that is, the other person indeed intends something bad. I therefore suggest speaking of humiliation as being intentionally made to feel hurt in public. Both, intentionality and publicity, are predicted to increase the intensity of feeling hurt, which is also in line with recent findings by Mann, Feddes, Leiser, Doosje, and Fischer (2017). THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT 38

4.3 Shame In case the reconstruction of the relationship between feeling hurt and humiliation is appropriately described, the relationship between humiliation and shame should be transferable to the relationship between feeling hurt and shame. Shame is elicited by failure, inappropriate dress, doing something morally wrong or hurting someone emotionally (Tangney, 1992). The following differences between humiliation and shame have been suggested: (1) humiliation is about the action of another person, whereas shame is not directly about one’s action but about oneself globally (Gilbert, 1997; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), that is, they differ on the perceptual of agency. (2) Shame involves a devaluation and therefore in shame feelings of unworthiness (to be not right or not good) emerge (Lewis, 1995, S.34, Sznycer, Tooby, Cosmides, Porat, Shalvi, & Halperin, 2016). This is also true for humiliation. (3) ”People believe they deserve their shame; they do not believe they deserve their humiliation” (Klein, 1991, p.117). (4) Controllability is in both cases low. (5) Both, shame and humiliation, involve some kind of withdrawal. But based on (3) the difference concerning deservingness, shame involves the urge to hide or to disappear in the ground (Lewis, 1995, S.34), whereas humiliation consist of withdrawing and desiring revenge (Leidner et al., 2012). Note that a broad concept of feeling hurt as only defined by the appraisal of devaluation might lead to mixing up feeling hurt and shame. May and Jones (2007) for example distinguished between introjective hurt (self- blame) and retaliatory hurt, which are, according to the arguments presented here, better referred to as shame and feeling hurt. To sum up, both shame and feeling hurt contain a devaluation, but the devaluation involved in feeling hurt is hypothesized to be be caused by the action of someone else and appraised as undeserved or illegitimate, whereas the devaluation in shame is hypothesized to be perceived as deserved or legitimate. According to the literature review, both emotions are likely to share a low controllability and a distancing tendency: feeling hurt because the perpetrator is to blame and he is in consequence devalued which leads to distancing and shame because oneself is to be blamed.

4.4 Guilt Guilt is in one way the complement to feeling hurt (Vangelisti & Sprague, 1998): A person feels guilty if she believes that she has done something wrong to another person. Guilt is thus concerned with the evaluation of a particular action (Lewis, 1995, S.34) by the perpetrator whereas feeling hurt is concerned with the very same action from the perspective of the victim: hurt feels the one who has been wronged. If those emotions complement each other, then the eliciting events for both emotions should be similar: a breaking of interpersonal obligations, betrayal/infidelity, lying, cheating or neglecting a relational partner are typical eliciting events of guilt (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Tangney, 1992) and also of feeling hurt. So there is a complementary relationship between those two emotions - guilt is the emotion of the perpetrator, feeling hurt the one of the victim. Furthermore, guilt involves a tendency for reparative actions (e.g., confessions, apologies)(Tangney et al., 2007), actions that are desired and may be provoked by the one who feels hurt (Lemay et al., 2012).

4.5 Sadness According to Lazarus (1991) and Shaver et al. (1987), eliciting events of sadness are the death of a loved person, social rejection and loss of positive regard or failure – events that clearly overlap with eliciting events of feeling hurt. The primary appraisal is THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT 39 assumed to be irrevocable loss (Lazarus, 1991). Loss usually refers to the loss of attachment figures but it probably can also arise in reaction to the loss of non-social objects. It decisively contains no blame/no accountability (Lazarus, 1991). Whereas this is a reaction that is part of the attachment system, feeling hurt is about self-esteem (devaluation) and moral motivation (illegitimacy). Interestingly, a loss could be in principle perceived as illegitimate and devaluing, too (Parkes & Prigerson, 2013) thus cause feeling hurt. An overlapping case is loss of positive regard as an event that could involve feeling hurt as well as sadness – but only in case the loss is perceived as illegitimate (e.g., violating norms of supportiveness, trust, etc.), otherwise shame would result. Both emotions share the secondary appraisal outcome of low controllability – not being able to change the unpleasant circumstances – but because of those different primary appraisals the resulting change in action readiness differs: ”inaction or withdrawal into oneself” in (passive) sadness versus the tendency to distance oneself from the perpetrator, but demanding reparation in feeling hurt.

4.6 Anger As stated above, feeling hurt and anger seem to be closely related: Mees (1992) puts feeling hurt in the anger-family and Leary et al. (1998) found high correlations between reported anger and feeling hurt. But the concept of anger as it is used in ordinary language is presumably very loose. Törestad (1990) let young people describe anger provoking situations and found 10 different kinds of situations. Eliciting situations that overlap with those for feeling hurt were: teasing situations, situations, in which people were blaming and bullying, insulting and disparaging, physical harassment and assault, normative violations against property (stealing). In accordance with those findings it has been found that anger is mainly constituted by the appraisal of unfairness respectively other blame (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1993), something that is shared with feeling hurt. Furthermore, devaluation has been found to lead to anger (Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 2006). In line with that, the difference between anger and feeling hurt has been found in the secondary appraisal of controllability (Lemay et al., 2012) and the resulting change in action readiness: whereas anger consists of high controllability, feeling hurt consists of low controllability. Thus, following Frijda (1986, S.72) anger is the urge to attack or more properly, the urge to regain freedom of action and control. Feeling hurt is a defensive tendency that leads to withdrawal and may thus signal that one has been wronged (thus intending to make the perpetrator feel guilty).

Table 4 Comparison of Feeling Hurt with Other Emotions (Necessary Conditions).

Emotion Primary Appraisal Action Tendency Perceptuals Feeling Hurt Illegitimate devaluation Sulking: Distancing, Action of someone else, awaiting reparation familiarity Person Related ‘’ ‘’ ‘’, + violation of Disappointment expectation Humiliation ‘’ ‘’ ‘’, ‘’ + intentional, in public Anger ‘’ Approach and attack THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT 40

Shame Legitimate devaluation Withdrawal, search for appeasement Sadness Irrevocable loss Withdrawal, search for Familiarity help

Figure 1: Decision Tree on Feeling Hurt, Shame, Anger, and Humiliation

4.7 Summary I have argued that feeling hurt can be unambiguously distinguished from shame, guilt, sadness and anger. For those emotions that are associated with devaluation, a decision tree summarizing the key differences in appraisal are shown in Figure 1. Note that this is a classificatory tree, not a causal diagram. All results of this comparison are summarized in Table 4 with regard to the primary appraisal, action tendency and necesssary perceptuals.

5. Novel predictions of the Lazarian Theory of Hurt A theory should state falsifiable predictions (Popper, 1959). Based on the Lazarian Theory of Feeling Hurt and the comparison of hurt with other emotions, the following predictions are made: If we assume that appraisals are not always stable and robust but sometimes ephemeral, there should be the following transitional phenomena: (1) Events in which the appraisal of illegitimacy changes due to certain events or due to random fluctuations to legitimacy, thus changing feeling hurt to shame. (2) Events in which the appraisal of controllability changes from high to low. Thus, anger should turn THE DISTINCTIVE CONSTITUTION OF FEELING HURT 41 into hurt and vice versa. Those phenomena should be most frequently observable in children, if we assume that their appraisal processes are the least stable one. The relational context is hypothesized to modify the action tendency: (i) in case one is hurt by a stranger: ending the interaction; (ii) in case one is hurt from within a relationship: sulking, that is a temporary withdrawal to signal that one has been wronged (e.g., physical distancing, turning away, becoming silent); (iii) when being hurt by someone’s ending the relationship or being excluded from a group: distancing and crying.

6. Conclusion and Future Directions According to the Lazarian Theory presented here, feeling hurt is a distinct emotion constituted by a primary appraisal of an illegitimate devaluation, a secondary appraisal of low controllability and an action tendency to withdraw. A hurtful event may lead to a long-term episode of hurt in which the initial event leads to several other feelings over time. This could explain why feeling hurt has been found to be highly correlated with other feelings in self-reports: they might have occurred later. The defining core of a hurtful event is the primary appraisal of an illegitimate devaluation. This integrates the view of L’Abate (1977, 2011) who proposed that hurt in the sense of a hurtful event might lie at the bottom of other emotions.

Future research should investigate the transferability of research on the physiology of social rejection and social exclusion to hurt feelings and adress the expression and behavioral component of feeling hurt. This would allow for using non-verbal measures in the research on feeling hurt. Open questions also involve developmental changes concerning the intensity, frequency and prevalent types of eliciting situations over the entire lifespan as well as the topic of coping with intense hurtful events (e.g. forgiveness and revenge). The Lazarian Theory of Feeling Hurt could provide a good starting point for addressing those questions.

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