Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency

Policy Briefing Asia Briefing N°80 Bangkok/Brussels, 28 August 2008 Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency I. OVERVIEW been little progress on holding security personnel ac- countable for notorious past abuses. The government of Thai Prime Minister Samak Sun- Ending the violence in the Deep South requires more daravej is struggling for political survival and has than a military response. Now, with the insurgents on handed the military full responsibility for tackling the the defensive, is a good time to take decisive steps to violent insurgency in the Muslim-dominated Deep address the root causes of the conflict. The political South, which has claimed more than 3,000 lives in deadlock in Bangkok, however, makes it unlikely that the past four years. The military has restructured its the government will be able to turn its attention to the operations and has made headway in reducing the Deep South any time soon. The longer this is put off, number of militant attacks, but temporary military ad- the harder it will become to contain, let alone resolve vances, though welcome, do nothing to defuse the the conflict. underlying grievances of the Malay Muslim minority. For that to happen, the otherwise preoccupied gov- The insurgency’s lack of a declared political leadership ernment needs to find the will and energy to under- or platform is a major obstacle in the search for a ne- take a serious policy initiative. gotiated settlement. Nonetheless, there is much that the government could do unilaterally to address The political turmoil in Bangkok continues to distract Malay grievances in the realms of education, justice, attention from the violence in the South. Samak’s gov- language, history and economy. But this requires a ernment is threatened on several fronts. Three parties rethinking on the part of the predominantly Buddhist in the coalition, including his own People Power state, which needs to recognise the distinct ethnic Party (PPP), face dissolution on charges of electoral identity of Malay Muslims and find ways of allowing fraud. The government’s efforts to amend the consti- them to be Thai citizens without having to compro- tution to avoid this threat led to mass demonstrations mise their cultural differences. organised by the People’s Alliance for Democracy, whose campaigns in 2006 led to the coup that ousted In particular, the government should: Samak’s patron, Thaksin Shinawatra. Three of Samak’s ministers were forced to resign between May and July appoint a deputy prime minister to take charge of 2008, including Foreign Minister Noppadon Patama, the effort to cope with southern violence, instead who left office in the face of nationalist anger whipped of allowing the military to lead on the issue; up by anti-government forces over a border dispute with empower the Southern Border Provinces Adminis- Cambodia. trative Centre (SBPAC) by expediting the enact- ment of a law to govern its operations and to make Against this backdrop, the military has been left to it independent from the military-controlled Inter- lead operations in the Deep South and has made some nal Security Operations Command; progress in reducing violent attacks in the first half of the year. But the insurgents, well-established and revoke martial law, amend the emergency decree hardened, are far from being defeated, and the ad- and the internal security act to increase account- vances come at a price. The “sweeping operations” ability of the security forces, and allow detainees since June 2007 have involved the indiscriminate de- prompt access to lawyers and family; tention of thousands of suspected insurgents and sympathisers, and there are credible reports of torture ensure accountability for past human rights abuses, of detainees. The case of an imam beaten to death in such as the deaths of nearly 200 Muslims in the military custody in March 2008 attracted severe con- 2004 Tak Bai and Krue Se incidents – the single demnation from human rights advocates. There has most effective way to rebuild trust with Malay Muslims; Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°80, 28 August 2008 Page 2 make clear it is ready to negotiate seriously with sial populist platform – including low-cost health care genuine leaders of the insurgency, but make it a and housing, debt suspension for farmers and village condition of the negotiations that their inter- development funds – earned him loyalty in the coun- locutors demonstrate they genuinely control insur- tryside but hostility from urban middle-class voters gents on the ground; and who resent “the tyranny of the rural majority”. This “tale of two democracies”, rural versus urban, shapes give serious consideration to ways of granting some present-day Thai politics.3 degree of self-rule, or decentralisation of power, to help end the conflict. Critics of Thaksin focused on his autocratic leadership style, his capitalist-populist economic policy, his clumsy interference in security operations in the Deep II. POLITICAL CRISIS South and the blurring of the boundaries between public policy and private business interests. They took heart from signs of tension between King Bhumibol Following the September 2006 coup, the military- Adulyadej and the nouveau riche Thaksin.4 In the face installed government of Surayud Chulanont pledged of mass protests starting in January 2006, Thaksin to make its top priorities reconciliation in the country called a snap election, which was boycotted by three and the southern insurgency.1 By the time it relin- political parties and later annulled. Further street quished power to an elected government in February demonstrations culminated in a bloodless military 2008, it was clear that it had failed to make real pro- coup on 19 September 2006, whose leaders accused gress on either front. Despite some positive steps, him of corruption, undermining checks and balances, including an apology to the people of the South for insulting the king and polarising politics. the injustices they had suffered and a reorganisation of governance and security structures, the security Thaksin continued to fight from self-imposed exile in situation in the South deteriorated in 2007. And the the UK against the coup leaders’ attempt to remove massive victory in the December 2007 election for the him from politics. His Thai Rak Thai Party was dis- very political forces the coup had overthrown re- solved by the Constitutional Court in May 2007 for turned the country to its former political stalemate. violating the election law, and 111 party executives, including Thaksin, were barred from political office A. PRO- AND CONTRA-THAKSIN for five years. Other Thai Rak Thai members, however, set up the People Power Party (PPP). Despite frantic efforts by establishment forces, the PPP cap- A political scientist described the political crisis as tured 233 of 480 seats in parliament in the December rooted in “a deep-seated and irreconcilable conflict 2007 general election and formed a six-party coalition between the older, more traditional Thailand and a government, leaving the Democrat Party – its nearest new Thailand, a tussle between establishment forces rival – as the sole opposition. Samak, a 73-year-old revolving around the bureaucracy, military and mon- politician known as a right-wing political bruiser, be- archy on the one hand and Thaksin Shinawatra and 5 2 came prime minister. He is widely considered a stand- his crew on the other”. Thaksin, a media tycoon in for Thaksin, who returned to Bangkok in February turned politician who ruled the country between 2001 2008 but jumped bail – he faces charges of corruption and 2006, tapped into the widening gap between the and abuse of power – and fled again to London in rural poor and better-off city dwellers. His controver- August. 1 This policy briefing examines developments in the Deep South since the December 2007 election and the impact of 3 Kasian Tejapira, “Toppling Thaksin”, New Left Review, no. national politics on policies towards the region. The research 39, May-June 2006, pp. 14-15. Also see Anek Laothamatas, was conducted in Bangkok and the South between March “A Tale of Two Democracies: Conflicting Perceptions of and August 2008. Earlier Crisis Group publications include: Elections and Democracy in Thailand”, in R.H. Taylor (ed.), Asia Reports N°98, Southern Thailand: Insurgency Not The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia (New York, 1996). Jihad, 18 May 2005; N°105, Thailand’s Emergency Decree: 4 Kasian Tejapira, “Toppling Thaksin”, op. cit., pp. 32, 35. No Solution, 18 November 2005; N°129, Southern Thailand: 5 Samak, once governor of Bangkok, was best known as a The Impact of the Coup, 15 March 2007; and N°140, South- staunch denouncer of left-leaning student activists in the ern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 1970s. His anti-communist rhetoric on radio and at rallies 2007. helped stoke sentiment that led to the lynching of students on 2 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Thailand’s Transformation”, paper 6 October 1976. Official records states that 46 people were presented at Institute of South East Asian Studies’ Regional killed. The number of dead has not been verified, as the mas- Outlook conference, Singapore, 8 January 2008. sacre remains a taboo subject in Thailand. Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°80, 28 August 2008 Page 3 B. RETURN OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT charge often used to destroy political enemies.9 On 9 July, the Constitutional Court disqualified Health The coup leaders’ main tool for preventing a recurrence Minister Chaiya Sasomsab, because he failed to in- of the populist Thaksin regime was a new constitu- form the National Counter-Corruption Commission that his wife held more than 5 per cent of shares in a tion, drafted by a military-appointed assembly.

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