Organic Crisis, Social Forces, and the Thai State, 1997 – 2010

THE OLD IS DYING AND THE NEW CANNOT BE BORN: ORGANIC CRISIS, SOCIAL FORCES, AND THE THAI STATE, 1997 – 2010 WATCHARABON BUDDHARAKSA PhD UNIVERSITY OF YORK POLITICS FEBRUARY 2014 i Abstract This thesis is a study of the crisis-ridden social transition of the Thai state (1997-2010) by analysing the interrelations of social forces in the Thai historical bloc. The thesis argues that the recent political conflict in Thailand that reached its peak in 2010 transcended the conflict between the Thaksin government and its social antagonists, or merely the conflict between the Yellow and the Red Shirt forces. Rather, the organic crisis of the Thai state in the recent decade should be seen as social reflections of the unfinished process of social transition. Furthermore, this transition contains features of ‘crises’, ‘restructuring’, ‘transition’ and ‘other crises’ within the transition. The thesis employs a Gramscian account as a major theoretical framework because it stresses the importance of history, provides tools to analyse configurations of social forces, and offers a combined focus of political, social, and ideological matters. This thesis finds that the street fights and violent government repression in May 2010 was only the tip of the iceberg and the incidents of 2010 themselves did not represent a genuine picture of Thailand’s organic crisis. The crisis, this thesis argues, was not caused only by the Thaksin government and its allies. The Thaksin social force should be seen as a part of a broader social transition in which it acted as a ‘social catalyst’ that brought social change to the Thai state in terms of both political economy and socio- ideological elements. Therefore, the crisis of the Thai historical bloc resulted from the clash between the two distinct ‘social relations’―old and new―and the clash is still ongoing. In addition, this thesis has revealed the ‘three’ underlying crisis-ridden characters of the Thai state including social inequality, overwhelming roles of royalism- nationalism, and the harsh application of lèse majesté laws. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i TABLE OF CONTENTS ii LIST OF FIGURES vii LIST OF TABLES viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ix DECLARATION x CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 1 1.1 Research Rational 1 1.2 Contemporary Thai Political Economy in Theoretical Perspective 4 1.3 Overview of the Core Chapters: History, Crisis, Transition, and Crisis within Transition 9 2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 13 2.1 Research Aims 13 2.2 Central Research Questions 13 2.3 Methods of Inquiry 13 2.4 Unit of Analysis 13 2.5 Period of Study 14 CHAPTER 2 WITHOUT HISTORY, THERE IS NO CRISIS AND THERE IS NO TRANSITION: EXPLORING TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS OF THAI POLITICAL ECONOMY 1. INTRODUCTION 15 2. POLITICAL ECONOMY 16 2.1 Modernisation 16 2.2 Political Economy 18 3. POLITICAL SCIENCE 22 3.1 Behaviouralism 22 3.2 Institutionalism 24 4. CULTURAL STUDIES 28 4.1 Religious and Cultural Approach 28 4.2 Ideological Approach: Thai Monarchy and its Ideological Functions 31 5. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 33 6. CONCLUSION 37 CHAPTER 3 GRAMSCIANISM: HEGEMONY, CRISIS OF HISTORICAL BLOC, AND SOCIAL TRANSITION 1. INTRODUCTION 39 2. CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD: GRAMSCI’S CRITIQUE OF ECONOMISM 40 2.1 Critique of Economism 40 2.2 Gramsci’s Solution: Structure and Super Structure Relationship 43 2.3 The Integral State: The State = Civil Society + Political Society 44 2.3.1 Civil Society in Hegel and Marx 44 iii 2.3.2 Civil Society and Political Society in Gramsci 44 2.3.3 The Integral State (Force+Consent) 45 3. MAN AS THE MAKER OF HISTORY: SOCIAL FORCES AS PROTAGONIST OF CHANGE 47 3.1 Social Forces 47 3.1.1 Defining Social Forces 47 3.1.2 The Ruling Social Classes 48 3.1.3 The Subaltern Social Classes 49 3.2 Balance of Class Forces: War of Position and Passive Revolution 51 3.2.1 War of Position 51 3.2.2 Passive Revolution 52 3.3 Gramsci’s Analysis of Relations of Force 53 4. CONFIGURATION OF SOCIAL POWER: HEGEMONY AND HISTORICAL BLOC 55 4.1 Hegemony 56 4.1.1 Hegemony before Gramsci 56 4.1.2 Gramsci’s Hegemony 57 4.2 Historical Bloc 60 4.3 Gramsci’s Conception of the Intellectuals 62 5. THE ROUGH TRANSITION: CRISIS OF AUTHORITY AND UNFINISHED SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 64 5.1 Crisis of Hegemony 65 5.2 Hegemony, Historical Bloc, and Crisis of Authority: Dialectical Relations 66 6. CONCLUSION: EMPLOYING GRAMSCIAN THEORIES TOWARDS CONTEMPORARY THAILAND 67 CHAPTER 4 THE ‘OLD’ HISTORICAL BLOC: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND IDEOLOGICAL FEATURES 1. INTRODUCTION 70 PART ONE―POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL FORCES 70 IN THE ‘OLD’ HISTORICAL BLOC 2. CHANGING IN STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS OF THE ‘OLD’ HISTORICAL BLOC 70 2.1 Nationalist Political Economy: 1932-1957 71 2.2 Americanism and Modernisation:1957- the 1990s 72 2.2.1 Creation of the Bureaucratic State 73 2.2.2 American-Led Economic Development 74 3. SOCIAL FORCES IN THE ‘OLD’ HISTORICAL BLOC 79 3.1 The Ruling Social Classes 80 3.1.1 The Bureaucrat as a Former Dominant Social Force 80 3.1.2 The Capitalists as a Dominant Social Group 82 3.1.2.1 Pattern of Relationships: Bureaucrat, Capitalist, Politician 82 1) Banking Capital 83 2) Industrial Capital 84 3) Provincial/Local Capitals 85 4) Agro-Capital 85 3.2 Subaltern Social Classes 86 3.2.1 Labour 86 iv 3.2.2 The Peasants 88 PART TWO―IDEOLOGICAL HEGEMONY: ‘ROYALISM-NATIONALISM’ AS A COHESIVE FACTOR 91 4. ‘ROYALISM-NATIONALISM’ AS A COHESIVE FACTOR 92 4.1 The Thai monarchy and its Ideological Centre in the Thai Historical Bloc 92 4.1.1 Revitalisation of the Monarchical Power 93 4.1.2 Networks of Monarchy as Gramsci’s Intellectuals 93 5. PRODUCING COMMON SENSES 94 5.1 Being Sacred 95 5.1.1 Hegemonic Apparatuses 95 5.1.2 State Apparatuses 96 5.2 Being Popular 97 5.3 Being Democratic 99 6. CONCLUSION 101 CHAPTER 5 THE RUPTURE OF THE OLD HISTORICAL BLOC: THAILAND AND THE 1997 ECONOMIC CRISIS 1. INTRODUCTION 102 2. ECONOMIC BOOM: EXPORT-LED GROWTH AND FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION 103 2.1 Thailand in the 1980s 103 2.2 Explaining the Boom: Export-Led Growth and Foreign Direct Investment 104 2.2.1 Export-Led Growth 104 2.2.2 Foreign Direct Investment 106 2.3 Explaining the Boom: Financial Liberalisation in the 1990s 108 2.4 Onset of the Crisis 111 3. IMF AND THE RESTRUCTURING PROGRAMMES 115 3.1 The First Phase of the IMF Programme 116 3.2 The Second Phase 117 4. SOCIAL FORCES IN THE TIME OF CRISIS 120 4.1 The Capitalist 120 4.1.1 Banking/Financial Capital 121 4.1.2 Industrial and Local Capital 122 4.2 The Labour 123 4.3 The Middle Class 127 4.4 The Peasant 128 5. CONCLUSION 129 CHAPTER 6 THE OLD HISTORICAL BLOC IN TRANSIT: THAKSINISM AND NEW SOCIAL RELATIONS 1. INTRODUCTION 131 2. THE 1997 PEOPLE’S CONSTITUTION, CREATING THE STRONG STATE, AND THE PRE-THAKSIN ERA 131 2.1 Demanding a Strong State: Political Reform and the Making of 1997 Constitution 132 v 2.2 The 1997 Constitution and its Crucial Features 134 2.2.1 Securing Human Rights 135 2.2.2 Making Politics Clean and Honest 136 2.2.3 Creating a Strong Government 137 3. PRE-THAKSIN ERA AND THE RISE OF THAI RAK THAI PARTY 138 4. THAKSINISM, SOCIAL FORCES, AND THE TRANSFORMATIVE PROJECTS 143 4.1. Moment of Politics: Creating a Strong State 144 4.1.1 Parliamentary Domination 144 4.1.2 Interventions through Inspection Organisations 146 4.1.3 Controlling the Bureaucrats 147 4.2. Moment of Political Economy: Introducing to the ‘Thaksinomics’ 149 4.3. Moment of Ideology: Thaksinism and its Hegemonic Projects 155 4.3.1 Thaksinism and Hegemonic Projects: Politics of Consent Building 155 4.3.2 Ground-Breaking Social Policies 156 4.3.3 Leadership Management 159 4.4. Thaksinism and Antagonist Subaltern Social Forces 161 4.4.1 Thaksinism and the Labour Social Group 163 4.4.2 Thaksinism and the Reformation of Thai Bureaucracy 165 5. CONCLUSION 167 CHAPTER 7 SOCIAL TRANSITION AND THE CRISIS WITHIN: SOCIAL GROUPS AND BALANCE OF CLASS FORCES 1. INTRODUCTION 169 2. THE FALL OF THAKSINISM 170 3. FORMATION OF THE COUNTER-THAKSIN FORCES AND THE POLITICS OF THE YELLOWS 172 3.1 Counter-Thaksinism Social Forces: Political Economy Incentives 173 3.1.1 The Labour Social Forces 173 3.1.2 The Middle Class: Public Intellectuals/Academics 175 3.1.3 The Old Social Elites: Network of Monarchy and the Military 177 3.1.4 The Capitalist Factions 179 3.2 The So-Called ‘Yellow Shirts Social Force’ 181 3.3 The Yellow Shirts, Politics of Common Sense, and Ideological Struggle 183 3.3.1 The Thai Version of Common Sense 183 4. THE CRISIS WITHIN TRANSITION: 2006 MILITARY COUP AND THE REVERSION TO THE OLD HISTORICAL BLOC 185 4.1 The Coup d’état of 19 September 2006 185 4.1.1 Before the Coup: Some Signals Appear 186 4.2 Balancing of Class Forces: The Return of Thai Authoritarianism 188 4.2.1 Ideological Re-Arrangement 189 4.2.2 New Political Regulations and the New 2007 Constitution 190 5. THE REDS SHIRT MOVEMENT AND THE CRITIQUE OF COMMON SENSE 192 5.1 Political Uncertainties in 2008 and the Emergence of the Red Shirts Movement 192 vi 5.1.1 From the Counter-Democrat Government Movement to the Red Shirts Social Forces 193 5.2 The Red Shirts, Critique of Common Sense, and the Subversion of Subalternity 196 5.2.1 Subverting the Common Sense: Against Double Standards and Prai-Ammat Metaphor 197 6.

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