The Situation in South Vietnam No. 11
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Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050006766050 ~~-‘992-83'3’5‘?!o.:o2:;.l-J--8~..:--3~3~5~9n7~-----......;.---- I 3.5(c)3iflo) -w;_~“ ~I ~ v 2C 3.5(c)3iflo) if.) 3.5(c)3iflc) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGBNCYAGENCY Directorate of IntelligonceIntelligence 2 February 1968 EOEC) 13526 I~ELLIGBNCiINTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 13526 3.3(h)(2)ihxz) EOEC) The Situati.onSituation in South Viet-namVietnam No. 9 13526 (As of 11:30 A.M. EST)EET? .. 3.5(c)sexc) 1. The CommunistnCommunists aroare continuing to apply heavy pressure against a number of 111ajo1·major population cento1·scenters and their surrounding environs tlu•oughoutthroughout the four ..cerps corps areas of South Vietnam..Vietnam. The allied military position appears to be most critical in Huo,Hue, K.ontum,Kontum, Ban Mehe Thuot, Da Lat, al'\dand Ben Tre. There are indications that the Communists ar,3are planningplanni11g renewed atattacks tacks in the Saigon area, although the situation at present remains relatively stable. I Col"PSCorps 2. Fighting continues in.in Hue as US and South Vietnamese troops 1,reespress against:against Communist:Communist forces who continue to offer stiff resistance w1t11inWithin the citadel and in scattaredscattered 1,arts.parts of the city.·city.' Quang Ngai rere- mains quiet, howove1·,however, a late 1•eportreport states that the 1nassingmassing of Conu1\unistCommunist troopstrOOps that withdrew from their attack on 30 January pososposes a soriousserious 1,otet1tialpotential threat to the provincial capital. WII Corps 3,3. In the western highlands, the allied situasitua- tion reinainsremains most critical at.at Bat1Ban MaMe Thuot at1dand Kontum City, where regimental-slzoclregimental-sized NortbNorth Vietnamese forces continue their occupation of major portions of both cities and surrounding environs. Civilian casualtiescaSualties continue to mount in both areas, largely because of allied air sti•ikesstrikes again.stagainst enemy m1ltsunits holed up 111in heavily populated sect:io1,s.sections. Enemy rorcesforces have also resumed battalion-sized or larger attacks agail'tstagainst PleikllPleiku City,City. T~ I 3.5(c)3150 ~KEI~l-~I 3.b(C)3tnog) ..-.... n u - a . .. - I.-~o—o-_ :- . .o-u.—..... -.-—-.-...u.--—- .- Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050006766050 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050006766050 C02833597002833597 4'-"' •rop~'FOP ‘JET 3.5(c) --1'---------~ - 3.5(c) 4. In the coastal provinces of II Corps, North VietnameseVietnamose forces apparently continue to maintain a major 1>resencepresence in Da Lat and Phan Thiet.Thiet, thathe capitals of TuyenTuye11 DueDuo and DinhBinh Thuan 1>rovin.ces,provinces, respectively. No major fighting has been reported in Kh.an.hKhanh Hoa Province, the scene of recent heavy enemy activity. ‘ Saigon andand_III III Corps 5,5.- Vietviet Cong t1troops1 oops are attempting to move into positions within Saigon and 011on the outsltirtsoutskirts o:Cof the city in preparation for·for renewed attacks,attacks. accordi11gaccording to 3.3(h)(2)3£XhX2) aQ 11\tmbernu ber of late reports I I1 3.3(h)(2) . ~---~I AnA11 estimated 2,000 Co1n1nunistsCommunists were reported nearnenr the Saigon pertport area; anothoranother 200 were said to be preparing to attack a police precinct station and I .possibly the USUs raclioradio tra11smitti11gtransmitting station in Cholon. 6. To the 1io1•thnorth of SatgonSaigon in t.hethe III Corps area there were no new attacks on 2 February, however, there are indications that the capitals of Tay Ninh, Binh Long, nnd·and Phuoc Long provinces along the Cambodian borderbordor may be the next targets to come under attack. Some 4,000 refugoosrefugees have been generated lnin the Bien HeaHoa city aroa,area, where fighting in recent days has rere- sulted in heavy damage to civilian housing..housing •. IV Corps 7. The CommunistsCOmmunists continue to apply pressure 4 against several provincial ca1,1talscapitals and key areas according to information as of 1800 Saigon time on 2 February. The most critical area appears to be Ben Tre where heavy fighting 1sis taking place. The enemy co11trolscontrols most of tilethe city. Spo1·adicSporadic s11ipo1·sniper fire and fighting in the outskirts is reported . in Can.Tho,Ca_n ,Tito, ~ocMoe Hoa,flea, Soc T~angTrang and IIYMy'The._ Tho,. VC eleele- , ments ·remainremain in the,the imn1ediateimmediate vicinity of Ca11Can Tho,The, Ca1nau,Camau, and RaeRac GiaGin and additional attacks a1•eare exex- pocted.pected. There is no :Curtherfurther 111forma'tio1tinformation 011on the situation at VinhVi1th Long. - 2 - 3.5(c) --~C I . 3.5(c) ~ETL__lTo ) .aa'r _~I . l .·····---------·-··•-··..l Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050006766050 _ ----------------ApprovedApproved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050006766050 -C02833597- C 0 2 8 3 3 5 9 7 ‘ , . - -~ ... _ 3.5(c)35(0) . — .. 3.5(c)3.5. Stat\lSStatusfl gfzof fiEnemynemy_Forces Forces . a.8. Available evidonceevidence indicates that the ComCom- anunistsmunists rotairetain n major combat elements 111in I and II . r Corps which have not been committed in their current offensive effort. The situation in III and IV Corps . is less clear, but is probably substRntiellysubstantially the same. i In I a,1dand II Corps thothe 1remaining-units4 om11ining units are capable of launchinglaunching.additional .additional st1strong4 0~1g attacks 111in certai11.certain areas and can also roinfo1·c:ereinforce th,&the current assaulassaults. t.s. 9. Enemy strength along the DemilitnrizodDemilitarizod Zone anc\and 111in northern Quang T1•iTri Province remains co11siderconsider— able--up to four divisions. There are indications that two battalions participated in attacks on Quang Tri City and majormajor_elements elements of the 6th North VietnamVietnam- 4 - ese Regiment werewe1·e involved in heavy fighting at Hue. It .appearsappears that two North Vietnamese rcgi1nentsregiments and several indepet1del\tindependent a11dand locallbcal force battalions are still available in the no1·tbernnorthern coastal provinces. 10. 11'In the Quang Nam and Qua11gQuang Tin Province 1•egio1\s,regions, elements of the 2nd North Viet11ameseVietnamese DiviDivi— sion have been Joinedjoined by local force units in attacks at Da Nang, Hoi An and Tam Ky and scattered actions in the countryside. At least two 1•eg1mentsregiments and 1>robprob- ably as n1aI1ymany battalions;,t3main_ 'V‘pmain unco1n1111uncommitted tted in this area,area. f271- \ · ' . ·- L 11. .TheThe picture 111in Quang Ngai is L1otnot clear. However, it appears the Et11emyenemy has used at least eleele- i ments f.romfrom many of his sovo11seven battalions here at this ' Juncture.juuoture, 12. It\In coastal II Coi·ps,Corps, the situation is uneven. Most of the 31•d3rd NerthNorth Vietnamese Division a11dand soveralseveral local force battalions are still available !orfor action. Further south, about one--halfonewhalf of the 5th NorthNbrth VietnamVietnam- ese Division has been idontifiedidentified at Tuy Hoaflea and Nha Trang, while·while the majo1•imajority ty oi'of enemy local force strength herehore has been committed. - 13.13- Despite heavy fighti1igfighting at KonKontnm tum and Pleiku, only a s11,allsmall percentagepercentag-e of the B-33-3 Front combat power has participated.pal"ticipated. Upu1, to fivafive rogime11tsregiments and a few more ' separatoseparate battalionsbattali.ons remflinremain uncommitted and ava11Dbleavailable in.thoin the western central highlands.highlands, - 3 l 3.5(c) 3.5(c) . .... -·····-- - . ---·--····· . .. ........... -......... - ... -·-·-· . ··-·--·--- --------·-·--••. J Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050006766050 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050006766050 I C02833597 3.5(c) TO~IT0) “Rt. - 3.5(c) ---1in! ~~ v , Politicalgglitical_________ Developments __ 14,14. Vietnamese Cc,mmunistCommunist propaganda on the Tet ofiensivooffensive 111in employing a st1"ongstrong anti-American theme in an offo1·teffort t.oto rally 1:iopularpopular support for Communist objectivos.objectives. Broadcasts by both Ha1\oiHanoi a1\dand the Libei•a•Libera- tion F1Front.. ont have cha1•acto1"izedcharacterized the curre1\tcurrent offeusivaoffensive as primarily directed toward ridding the country of the US ''imperialists""imperialists" and their Saigo1\Saigon -u1aclteys.“lackeys.” 11 The programprogr.am of the Liber.ationLiberation F1"011tFront is sin.gladsingled out as thothe guide to achieving these objoctives.objectives. 15. A Front broadcast 01\on l1 February pipitched tchod the anti-AmericanantinAmerican appeal directly to South VietnamesoVietnamese armed forces and l)Olicepolice personnel.personnol. Aftei·After painti11gpainting a black picture of American involvement in South Vietnam, it told __ tllesothese people that theil"their "goldon"golden cha11cechance"0 to contribute to the salvation of their country had come and u1•go11tlyurgently called on them to "resist the Americans." The broadcast:·broadcast :&."Gtnindadreminded them that the pl'ograrnpregram of the Front contains provisions for rewarding those who Joinjoin the Communist causacause as well as those who cooporatocooperate in the anti-American struggle, even if they do not Joinjoin the CoinmunistsCommunists now,now. The broadcast stressed the need fotfor immediate action, saylngsaying that the •~ituation"situation is urgenturgei1t and time does not wait."wa1 t." _ 16. The theme that the offensive repres~ntsrepresents a groundswollgroundswell of popular 1a<mtimo11tsentiment favoring an antianti- AmericanArnorican struggle was also unclet•scoredunderscored in a 2 FebFeb— rL1aryrnary