UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org SPECIAL REPORT 2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPORT Susanna D. Wing This report seeks to explain the fragile nature of Malian democracy before the 2012 coup and the origins of the current crisis. Widespread corruption, resurgent violence in the north, and a growing illicit trade implicated state officials as the principal causes of state collapse. The Malian state had lost Mali’s Precarious touch with the people, and its military was divided. Many Malians welcomed the military intervention, but a long-term solution must be found to build durable peace. The author would like to thank Andrew Lebovich and Jon Temin for Democracy and the comments on previous versions of this report and USIP for their support of this research. Causes of Conflict ABOUT THE AUTHOR Susanna D. Wing is an associate professor of political science at Haverford College, where she is also coordinator of the Summary African and Africana Studies Program. Wing wrote the award-winning book Constructing Democracy in Africa: • Mali was recognized around the world as a free democracy when the March 2012 coup d’état Mali in Transition (New York: Palgrave, 2010). Wing has toppled its president and its democratic reputation. conducted research on Mali for twenty years, and her work • The reality was that Malian democracy was fragile and shallow. The consensus politics of has appeared in Foreign Affairs and other journals. President Amadou Toumani Touré undermined the political opposition. • Decentralization and dialogue were the hallmarks of democracy under President Alpha Oumar Konaré, Touré’s predecessor. The lack of commitment and follow-through with respect to decentralization illustrated the government’s lack of concern for improving local © 2013 by the United States Institute of Peace. governance and accountability. All rights reserved. • Corruption was rampant, and illicit trafficking in northern Mali was growing. The political class was seen as uninterested in addressing the poverty and insecurity that were daily fixtures for most Malians. SPECIAL REPORT 331 MAY 2013 • The government failed to follow through on peace agreements in the north, and the imple- mentation of the Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in northern Mali CONTENTS highlighted the divergent perspectives on security and the presence of the Malian state Malian Democracy on Shaky Ground 3 in the north. These factors contributed to the resurgence of a Tuareg rebellion in January Decentralizaion 6 2012. The Special Program for Peace, Security, 8 • The rapid dominance of militant Salafist groups in northern Mali and the implementation of and Development in Northern Mali 7 sharia was unprecedented in this secular state, although religion in Mali had been gaining Religion and Politics 9 a greater presence in the public realm since liberalization in the early 1990s. Moving Forward and Rebuilding 10 • Elections are necessary to help build democracy in Mali, but elections must be inclusive, Short-Term Recommendations 11 held throughout the territory, and incorporate refugees and internally displaced peoples. Long-Term Recommendations 12 Elections held too soon may merely bring about a precoup status quo. ABOUT THE INSTITUTE • Intercommunal and inclusive dialogue must be at the heart of conflict resolution in Mali. The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, The 1991 National Conference and the Espace d’interpellation démocratique are useful nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Malian models and initiatives that may help build a path to durable peace and Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, democracy. promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital world- wide. The Institute does this by empowering others with Global attention turned to Mali in March 2012 after a mutiny at a military barracks in Kati, knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct fifteen kilometers outside the capital of Bamako, spiraled into a coup d’état that led to the involvement in conflict zones around the globe. overthrow of President Amadou Toumani Touré, popularly referred to as ATT. When Touré was elected in 2002, he was a hero to most Malians. His fall from grace signaled the beginning BOARD OF DIRECTORS J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washing- of a rapid unraveling of the Malian state, revealing that, despite the country’s democratic ton, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of successes, real problems were eroding the foundation of its democracy. The mutiny had fol- Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC lowed weeks of protests in Bamako and just over two months of renewed conflict in northern • Judy Ansley¸ Former Assistant to the President and Deputy Mali. The coup derailed elections and set the country on a precarious course that included National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, losing control of a vast expanse of territory, first to Tuareg separatists in the National DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and then to militant Islamists such as Ansar Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Movement for Oneness and Jihad in Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School West Africa (MUJAO). By the end of June 2012, jihadist militias had claimed control of the of International Service, American University • Kerry Ken- major towns in northern Mali. In January 2013, they restarted their offensive, capturing the nedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and government-held town of Konna and moving closer to Sévaré, a strategic town and military Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, base located in central Mali. France intervened militarily on January 11, 2013, to prevent the Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen militants’ advance and help Mali reclaim its lost territory. D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Deciphering the story of Mali’s crisis requires analysis of the factors leading up to the collapse Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council of Mali’s Third Republic as well as close attention to what must be done to establish enduring on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, peace within its borders. The insurgency and French-led military intervention have garnered the Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA • Judy world’s attention, but the continuing political crisis in Bamako is rarely discussed. Peace and sta- Van Rest, Executive Vice President, International Republican bility in Mali are contingent on resolving the crisis in Bamako and establishing a legitimate and Institute, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice democratic government. With this in mind, Western governments that backed the French inter- President, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC vention demanded that Mali hold elections as soon as possible. In January 2013, the National Assembly approved a road map toward elections, designed to confirm the state’s commitment to MEMBERS EX OFFICIO democratic governance. Donors also required the road map to be in place before reopening the John Kerry, Secretary of State • Kathleen Hicks, Principal flow of financial assistance that closed after the coup. In February 2013, the European Union Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy • Gregg F. 1 Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, National Defense unblocked 250 million euros and distributed 20 million euros as the first portion of this aid. The University • Jim Marshall, President, United States first-round presidential election is scheduled for July 7, 2013. Legislative elections and a runoff Institute of Peace (nonvoting) election for the presidency (if needed) are scheduled for July 23. Elections pose two problems. First, they are necessary but insufficient for consolidating democracy. Second, elections held too soon may only aggravate the crisis by returning the reins to the same political elites.2 Mali’s recent history illustrates that the path to legitimate government and democracy is long and easily obfuscated. The imperative underlying chal- lenge is to create a government that does not recreate the precoup status quo, in which a political class is seen as thriving while they remain oblivious to, or unconcerned with, the daily struggles and needs of the broader populace. In recent years, the political class lost touch with the concerns and needs of the majority of Malians. At first this did not seem to have any consequences for political elites, but the increase of state corrup- tion and a general sense that the government was not accountable to the people soon contributed to overall public frustration with the country’s leadership. The growing divide between the government The views expressed in this report do not necessarily and the people was also the result of failed decentralization and unmet promises from local gover- reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, nance across the country. Decentralization was designed to reinforce the state’s accountability to the which does not advocate specific