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Issue 8 (38), 2013

RELIGION IN : LIMITED INDEPENDENCE

Since the concept of secular state has become a issue of “The Bell” is dedicated to answer these standard in a Western world long time ago, the questions. position of the Church is not very much discussed while speaking about the political issues. How- In the first article Anton Radniankou analyses the ever, there are tendencies of the rising interest of three biggest confessions in Belarus and reveals the Putin’s regime on involving Russian Orthodox their connection with the regime. He states, that Church to strengthening its power. while the Orthodox Church is the most familiar Anton Radniankou is a project to the government, Protestants are the least loyal manager of the Local Foundation And we might find similar approach of the Belar- to A.Lukashenka. “Interakcia”. He also edits intellec- usian regime. A.Lukashenka calls the Orthodox tual online magazine IdeaBY. Church as the main ideologist of the statehood, In the second article Natallia Vasilevich takes while remaining a non-believer – some kind of a deeper look into relations between Orthodox Natallia Vasilevich is a politi- strange “Orthodox atheist” composition. More- Church and the regime. She finds out that there cal scientist, lawyer and theolo- over, the authorities are different groups among the Church branches, gian. She is director of Centre have a direct influence on the Belarusian Church, which position ranges from pro-Russian to pro- “Ecumena” and editor of website forming its shape and ideology. It is clear that Nationalist wings. All in all, it is mostly influ- “Carkwa”. other confessions are less handy to Lukashenka enced by authorities in and the political but their situation remains unclear. Thus, this regime of Belarus. Vytautas Keršanskas, Editor

Regime and churches: what is therebetween? Anton Radniankou

Belarusians’ attitude towards is unique. ferent, shares of particular are almost On one hand, Belarus is one of the least religious the same. countries of the world, according to findings of Gallup Belarus. On the other hand, a number of Confession (religion) Share studies suggest that the church enjoys the high- est level of trust among . Though Orthodoxy 82,5 % unreligious, Belarusians find church’s role im- Catholicism 12 % portant. Protestant churches 2 %

There are no accurate statistics of believers in Other religions (, Judaism, 4 % Krishnaites, etc.) Belarus. The religion is not a mandatory ques- CONTENTS tion during official censuses under the legisla- Source: The Commissioner on Religions and Ethnicities 1 tion. Therefore, any statistics are based on sur- veys, hardly fully adequate to issues of belief. The level of trust in the Orthodox Church in : LIMITED Belarus is higher than that in the government INDEPENDENCE According to the studies of the Informational and personally A.Lukashenka, something that 1 and Analytical Center under the Presidential makes the Church a potentially significant po- Regime and chur ches: what Administration, 93.5 per cent of Belarusian litical actor. As different churches have different levels of influence and represent different world is therebetween? citizens associate themselves with a certain reli- gion, though only 65 per cent of Belarusians be- views, the authorities have different attitudes to- 3 lieve in God. These findings are in contradiction wards them. Orthodox Church in with the data provided by the Commissioner Belarus: between the on Religions and Ethnicities, stating that only Joined at the hip Russian Orthodox Church 58.9 per cent of population associate themselves with some confession. Though a share of those Aliaksandr Lukashenka calls the Orthodox and Belarusian society who reported a link with some religion is dif- Church “the main ideologist of the Belaru- 1 Issue 8 (38), 2013

sian statehood” and declares that he has never for activities of priests coming from abroad. separated the Church from the state, since he Under the lead of Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz, the Calling himself an “Ortho- believes that “they are sharing the same task”. Catholics have been holding mass rallies in Be- dox atheist”, the head of Calling himself an “Orthodox atheist”, the head larusian cities increasingly often, with growing the state has established of the state has established strong links with the numbers of people taking part in pilgrim pro- strong links with the Or- Orthodox Church during the years of his rule. cessions. thodox Church during the years of his rule. The Church supports Lukashenka’s regime and The fact that the holds masses receives funds for construction of temples in in Belarusian is also a problem for the Belarusian return. In 2003, Belarus and the Belarusian government. Given the rapid in Be- Orthodox Church signed a cooperation agree- larus, with even the transferred ment, resulting in Mitropolit ’s support to to Russian in schools, the is still Lukashenka during the referendum’2004 on an banned for masses in the Catholic Church. The opportunity for the President to be re-elected government is concerned about all these facts. for an unlimited number of terms. The Belarusian authorities would care much less However, the Orthodox Church of Belarus can- about these problems, if they had influence on not be fully loyal to the government. Being in the Catholic Church similar to that they exert fact a branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, on the Belarusian Exarchate of the Russian Or- the Belarusian Orthodox Church is Belarusian thodox Church. The increasing activeness of the only by name. Notably, the Belarusian Auto- Catholic Church irritates the regime. cephalous Orthodox Church does not possess a legal registration in Belarus. The only temple As a result, two criminal investigations were attempted to construct by it was demolished for launched, one against a Catholic priest and anoth- formal reasons. er against a Catholic activist. The priest is suspect- ed in espionage, with no details shared neither by Though not formally announced, the willing- the government, nor by the Church. The activist ness of today’s leadership of the Russian Ortho- is prosecuted for creating a shelter for homeless dox Church to replace the Belarusian Mitropolit people. Having denied registration to the shelter, causes serious worries for the ruling elite of Be- authorities launched a criminal investigation for larus. The current Mitropolit is so loyal to the “activities on behalf of an unregistered organiza- Belarusian government that he has awarded the tion” (Article 193.1 of the Penal Code). Order of Saint Vladimir to Dzmitry Paulichen- ka, suspected by the international community The Catholic Church will probably try to main- in murders of Belarusian opposition leaders tain good relations with Lukashenka’s regime, back in 1999-2000. despite the prosecutions. It feels too week to confront the government. So far, at least. The symphony of the Orthodox Church and Be- larusian authorities is endangered not only by the Tough case for Belarusian government Russian influence. The Orthodox Church is be- coming increasingly assertive on issues of death Relations between the government and protes- penalty and abortions. Belarus cannot be positive tant churches are the coldest. The regime does about it, being the last state in still execut- not register multiple protestant communities ing capital sentences and with almost one in four and obstruct their activities. pregnancies ending up in an abortion. An attempt by the authorities to move the New Cold and hot relations Life church out of their building is the most no- torious case. The believers had received a plot Formally, the Belarusian government is in good around a crumbling cowshed for perpetual use, relations with the Catholic Church. Lukashenka and built a temple there. The authorities wanted praises the Catholic Church’s role in improving to seize the building, something resulting in the relations with the West. During the dialogue most massive hunger strike in the history of Be- with the West in 2008-2010, he visited the Vati- larus. More than 200 believers went on hunger can and invited Benedict XVI to Belarus. The strike in 2006 for about a month. The authori- Belarusian Catholic Church stays off the poli- ties retreated, but attempts are still under way to tics, with Mitropolit Kondrusiewicz using his seize the temple. chance to stay silent even after the brutal crack- down on a post-electoral rally on 19 December, Some protestant churches actively participate in 2010. politics. The Bishop of Christians of Evangelical However, cold relations hide behind the screen Faith openly spoke against political persecution of mutual respect. The government does not re- of Dzmitry Dashkevich, a leader of the oppo- turn old temples to the Catholic Church, limits sitional Young Front. By the way, Dashkevich construction of new ones, and create obstacles is a member of the Pentecostal Church of John

2 Issue 8 (38), 2013

the Forerunner, as well as other leaders of op- The Belarusian regime is likely to continue attempts Approaches of Lukash- positional Young Front, Belarusian Christian to ‘educate’ Catholics and Protestants and to make Democracy, and Conservative Christian Party them more loyal; however, the Orthodox Church is enka’s regime to Christian of BPF. also a threat. will try to replace the aging Mit- churches differ, though ropolit Filaret (born in 1935) by a more pro-Russian an ambition to control is Protestant churches are the least controlled by Mitropolit. Activeness of the Catholic Church has what they all have in com- the government, therefore are exposed to the provoked the Orthodoxes to be more active and to mon biggest pressure. Regardless of the government’s openly oppose abortions and the death penalty. resistance, Protestants are the most rapidly growing confession in Belarus, causing serious It is not worth expecting Christian churches concerns for the authorities. to openly oppose the regime; yet, dissatisfac- tion with government’s policies is growing in Conclusions churches. Active Christians are joining some opposition organizations, e.g. Young Front or Approaches of Lukashenka’s regime to Christian Belarusian Christian Democracy. churches differ, though an ambition to control is what they all have in common. The govern- Belarus is a country where Christmas is offi- ment enjoys control over the Orthodox Church, cially celebrated twice, but a monument of Lenin while possibilities to do so are limited vis-à-vis remains in each city. It leaves few hopes for the the Catholic Church, and almost absent vis-à-vis to become a catalyst of change. But protestant churches. This is a reason behind the it is certainly an institution all political actors differentiated attitude by the government. should try to get support from.

Orthodox Church in Belarus: between the Russian Orthodox Church and Belarusian society Natallia Vasilevich

In discussions on the national identity of Belarus recognised by the Orthodox Church in general. the Belarusian Orthodox Church is commonly The status of Exarchate is granted to the Ortho- referred to as the Russian Orthodox Church in dox Church in Belarus (IX.15), which presuppos- Belarus. On the one hand, this reflects the real- es comparatively limited autonomy with all deci- ity of administrative subordination of the Or- sions being approved by the general Synod of the thodox Church in Belarus to the Moscow Patri- Russian Orthodox Church, which also appoints archate, as well as the reproduction of cultural all the local bishops (IX). and ecclesial patterns of the Church in Russia as normative ones. On the other hand, both in the The Belarusian Orthodox Church in 2012 consist- administrative and cultural sense Belarusian or- ed of 1,594 communities2 united in 11 dioceses, thodoxy is connected to the historically specific but there is no registered membership nor inter- multi-dimensional situation on the border of so nal Church or external state statistics of Orthodox called canonical territory of the Russian Church, Church membership, therefore the number of Or- influenced by specific features of the Belarusian thodox believers or those who identify themselves political regime and the low level of civil society with orthodoxy is not known. Data on religious development. affiliation and behaviour vary, depending on the methodology of the sociological research, and According to inter-Orthodox consensus and the generally the number of Orthodox believers rang- Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church,1 Belarus is a canonical territory of this church (I.3), which means, that there are no canonical jurisdictions in Belarus other than the Moscow Patriarchate, and the few alternative communities claiming in- dependence from this ecclesial structure are not 2 В религиозной жизни Беларуси сохраняют ведущую роль традиционные конфессии - Гуляко. - http://www. belta.by/ru/all_news/culture/V-religioznoj-zhizni-Belar- 1 Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church. - https://mo- usi-soxranjajut-veduschuju-rol-traditsionnye-konfessii- spat.ru/en/documents/ustav/ --Guljako_i_622119.html 3 Issue 8 (38), 2013

es from 403 to 804 per cent of the population, with public life during the last decades of Belarusian The Belarusian govern- significantly weaker connection to the religious independence”,7 which, she says is a result of pa- ment prioritises the Or- community and less regular church attendance ternalistic politics from the government side, as 5 thodox Church over other compared to Roman Catholics and Evangelicals. well as the absence of strong religious communi- ties inside the Church able to lobby their interests religions in public dis- The Regime and the Church in the public sphere. course and legislation, however, this privileged The Belarusian government prioritises the Or- Limited influence position is balanced by thodox Church over other religions in public dis- strict state control of its course and legislation, however, this privileged Among the topics which are raised by the Ortho- activities. position is balanced by strict state control of its dox NGOs and hierarchy in the public sphere the activities. On the level of institutionalised state- following dominate: state registration numbers church relationship, there are special agreements (ID of persons); demographic decline, abortions, between the Orthodox Church and central and general pro-life agenda, reproductive technolo- local governmental authorities, and this alone gies (in vitro fertilisation, surrogacy, etc.), public gives higher symbolic status to the Belarusian morality, family values, juvenile justice; these top- Orthodox Church over other religions in Belarus, ics basically limit the domain of social inclusion of none of which has a similar official relationship the Church. However, there are Orthodox circles with the Belarusian state authorities. These agree- of semi-official character that are also concerned ments, which are numerous and often without with the death penalty, the issue of political pris- clear structure and mechanisms of implementa- oners, human rights, domestic violence, ecology, tion, are often identified both by state and church overcoming the Communist past, and even na- authorities as evidence of special state support tional revival of Belarus, but such initiatives rarely to the Orthodox Church. However, despite the enjoy support from the official hierarchy. agreements, in reality the Orthodox Church in Belarus has less freedom of activities in compari- One particular example is Hrodna diocese in son with neighbouring countries, even predomi- western Belarus, on the border with the Padlasie nantly Catholic and , where the region of Poland, which has a strong active Or- Orthodox religion is part of the school curricu- thodox Church, often connected to Belarusian lum, and where restitution of church property has national identity. This link helps Hrodna diocese been made, there are Orthodox chaplains in the to maintain other ecclesial and cultural patterns army and the Church receives funds from the na- different from Russian post-Soviet ones. In con- tional budget. trast, in eastern dioceses Russian Orthodox in- fluence is much more significant. It depends not This approach of the Belarusian state authorities only on the geographical position of the local towards the Orthodox Church, which is believed diocese or cultural self-colonisation due to the to be particularly favoured, can be illustrated by normative status of Moscow as the centre of re- the statement of Belarusian President Lukashenka ligious life. This dependence is also determined who claimed that, “in our turn, we have the right by general Russification and Sovietisation of the to expect assistance from the side of the clergy”,6 Belarusian people, stereotypes and ignorance and the expectations of the state authorities are about local history, personal approach and values that the Orthodox Church at least remain loyal, of the local bishop and local leaders, who pro- which is not always the case as there are more mote a different position and prioritise different and more examples when representatives of BOC things in their pastoral policies. It must be admit- dare to oppose state authorities. However, Bela- ted, that in practice the great influence of Russia rusian sociologist Olga Breskaya argues that “the comes not only on the official level of promoting Church failed to become an autonomous actor in ideology formulated by the higher establishment of the Russian Orthodox Church, but also on the anti-hierarchical level in connection with popular movements of the special cult of the late Russian 3 Калинов А. Выступление на Ежегодном совещании по Tsar Nikolay II, which, while still being marginal вопросам человеческого измерения ОБСЕ в г.Варшаве in character involves an active but limited num- (Республика Польша) 7 октября 2008 г. // HDIM. DEL/335/08 7 October 2008. - http://www.osce.org/ru/ ber of people. odihr/34116; Информационно-аналитический центр. The centralising tendency in the Russian Ortho- Общественное мнение о ситуации в национальной dox Church started by Patriarch Kirill (Gundy- сфере.-http://iac.gov.by/ru/sociology/research/Ob- aev) of Moscow elected in 2009 is more significant schestvennoe-mnenie-o--situatsii-v-natsionalnoj- sfere_i_0000000214.htmla in the case of Belarus due to recent weakness of Metropolitan Philaret (Vakhromeyev) of 4 Религиозность и мораль беларусов. - Исследование НИСЭПИ. - 09.2010. - http://www.iiseps.org/analitica/143 5 Кацук Н. К методологии эмпирического исследования социокультурных стратегий верующих 7 Olga Breskaya, Model relacji między Cerkwią a państwem различных конфессий. - Социология №3, 2008, с.118. na Białorusi w kontekście postsekularyzacji społeczeństw 6 http://afn.by/news/i/24378 europejskich. - Politeja 2012; 9(22/1):133-152. С.152 4 Issue 8 (38), 2013

because of his age and health problems. Metro- the one hand, there is the ecclesial centre in The Church failed to be- politan Philaret as a person of great authority in Moscow, which promotes the ideological con- the Orthodox world has governed the Orthodox come an autonomous ac- cept of the “Russian World” as a spiritual, cul- Church in Belarus since the end of the 1970s, and tural and political entity, including not only the tor in public life during through his authority has united the Belarusian ecclesial dimension of the Orthodox Church in the last decades of Belaru- Orthodox Church in local entities on the national Belarus, but of the Belarusian people in general. sian independence. level; while in recent years each diocese and bish- op without the presence of a strong leader on the On the other hand, there is the political centre national level started to be more oriented to other in Minsk, which seeks loyalty towards the Be- centres, first of all, Moscow, which led to decen- larusian regime from the Orthodox Church. tralisation of the Orthodox Church in Belarus These two centres have mechanisms for exercis- locally, while centralisation in general however, ing pressure. However, there are several circles gave more autonomy to bishops of alternative ori- in the Belarusian Orthodox Church which try entation, as already mentioned in the example of to formulate their own agenda not only in ac- Hrodna diocese. cordance with the two centres, but also as alter- natives to them. The position of the Belarusian

Conclusion Orthodox Church was clearer in the past due to its outspoken leader Metropolitan Philaret, The main centres of influence of the Belarusian while at the present time there is no clear power Orthodox Church are external in character. On or decision-making centre.

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Vytautas Keršanskas Phone: +370 5 2705993 Fax: +370 5 2736953 Email.: [email protected] This publication has been produced with the financial support from the Nordic Council of Ministers. The content of STUDIES CENTRE this publication is the sole responsibility of the coordinators of the study and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Nordic Council of Ministers, nor of the Eastern Europe Studies Centre.

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