CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich N0. 231, September 2018, Editor: Matthias Bieri Belarus between East and West: The Art of the Deal Disputes over border management, gas prices, and the recognition of Crimea: Belarus is increasingly at odds with its closest ally Russia. President Lukashenko’s regime emphasizes its independent foreign policy as a country between Russia and the West. There are signs of Belarus strategically reorienting, but the actions taken also mirror tactics used to extort lucrative concessions from both East and West. By Benno Zogg During the Belarusian celebration of inde- pendence in July 2018, President Alexan- der Lukashenko stressed that Belarus would not choose between East and West. Belarusians would choose independence, peace and partnerships with other states. He thus reaffirmed statements he made at the Minsk Dialogue Forum in May 2018, a for Belarus unprecedentedly large confer- ence on Eastern European security that was well-attended by Western researchers and policy advisors. Since 2014, Belarus stresses its role as a bridge builder and me- diator in the Ukrainian conflict. At the same time, the government is pursuing a policy of strengthening national identity. In Russia, both officials and the state-con- trolled media are increasingly criticizing Since 2014, Belarus appears to be increasingly willing to move closer to the West. Vasily Fedosenko / Reuters Belarus’ lack of loyalty and its commitment to the alliance. Lukashenko is personally criticized for his perceived attempts to in- gratiate himself with the West. Tensions are further exacerbated because Belarus member of all Russian-led projects for eco- only experience of independent statehood does not recognize the “reunification” of nomic and military integration, and the was the Belarusian People’s Republic pro- Russia with Crimea, rejects the establish- countries have close cultural ties. It is there- claimed under German occupation in ment of a Russian air base on its territory, fore remarkable and significant for debates 1918, which lasted for only a year. After and introduced a limited visa exemption on European security that Belarus, neigh- that, Belarus developed into probably the for Western tourists. bor to Ukraine and strategically located be- most Soviet of all Soviet republics. tween Poland and Russia, has begun shift- These recent developments directly contra- ing its foreign policy priorities since 2014. President Lukashenko, who came to power dict the prevailing image in the West to in 1994 in the last free election in the date; that Belarus is Russia’s staunchest ally. Belarus in between country after independence, has preserved Belarus is indeed heavily dependent on Belarus, with its ten million inhabitants, is Soviet heritage in many ways, including Russian energy subsidies and markets, a located on the East European Plain. Its through state symbols and maintaining the © 2018 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 1 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 231, September 2018 Belarusian Integration also by Russia itself, as Russia’s “little broth- er” and satellite. No country is as closely tied to Russia as Belarus. 70 percent of Be- larusians speak Russian at home, despite re- cent government attempts to promote the use of the Belarusian tongue. In addition to membership in all multilateral Russian in- tegration projects (see chart), the countries are linked by the vague “Union State of Russia and Belarus”, based on treaties signed since 1996. The integration of the two countries includes free movement of persons, a common economic area, military assistance in the event of an attack and even joint air defence. The market share and in- fluence of Russian companies in Belarus, including in key industries, is high. Belarus hosts two Russian military bases, but no combat units may be stationed there. The army, which is not widely con- sidered as a powerful force in the region, and the Ministry of Defence are consid- name of the secret service “KGB”. Hasty consequence of the government’s balanced ered pro-Russian and are influenced by economic privatization, like what was seen governing tactics, which the population ap- training in Russia. Military cooperation in Russia or Ukraine, did not occur in Be- preciates. entitles Belarus to purchase military equip- larus. This limited the development of a ment from Russia at a discount. For Russia, powerful oligarchy and the commensurate The Lukashenko regime’s overriding inter- Belarus is strategically important as a tran- problems with inequality. The “market so- ests are self-preservation and a generally sit country for energy and because it almost cialist” economy remains state-controlled high degree of control. The result is an borders the Russian exclave Kaliningrad. in many areas and is not very dynamic. The overzealous restriction on democracy and The remaining “Suwalki gap” of only 65 ki- IT sector is flourishing, but overall the pri- freedom of expression and assembly. The lometers is, in turn, NATO’s only land con- vate sector produces only an estimated 30 organized opposition is oppressed, divided nection to its Baltic members. percent of Belarus’ GDP. Unemployment is and marginalized, and funded from abroad. low. Overall, the Belarusian economy has Lukashenko’s regime is autocratic but not Moscow buys its ally’s loyalty with loans grown above average since the end of the dictatorial. The system allows just as much and energy discounts worth several billion Soviet Union but has stagnated in the wake freedom as a stable, managed economy re- dollars a year. The (re)export of energy and of the Russian economic crisis since 2014. quires and that meets the basic needs of petrochemical products is an important Belarusian infrastructure is in consistently personal freedoms for a majority of citi- source of hard currency for Minsk. Under good condition. Access to education and zens. Lukashenko’s paternalistic policy of- Vladimir Putin, however, bilateral integra- health care is free – compared to most for- ten corresponds with the pre- mer Soviet countries, their quality is con- vailing opinion of his people, Lukashenko’s paternalistic sidered better. Civil servants and security and therefore garners some au- policy often corresponds with the services are also generally considered com- tomatic support. These policies petent and less corrupt than in other for- likely include limited LGBTQ prevailing opinion of his people, mer Soviet states. Grants from abroad in rights and the retention of the and therefore garners some the form of bilateral subsidies and loans death penalty. However, Lu- from development banks are indispensable kashenko’s policy differs from automatic support. for financing the current system. popular opinion in many re- spects. The majority of the Belarusian pop- tion has slowed. In addition to alleged per- After the economy began to stagnate, the ulation approves the annexation of Crimea sonal differences with Lukashenko, the government increasingly emphasized the for example, which may be partly due to pragmatist Putin is unwilling to subsidize value of stability: Belarus has been spared omnipresence of Russian media through- Belarus almost unconditionally. The two waves of migration, terrorist attacks (apart out the state. states have regularly disagreed over energy from an attack on the Minsk Metro in prices, which has led to hostility and the 2011) and a war like in Ukraine. Of all the State of the Union State suspension of supply. Russia imposed an six states geographically located between For a long time since the end of the USSR, import ban on Belarusian dairy products in the EU and Russia in Eastern Europe and Russia had not believed that Belarus, nor 2009, which was referred to as the “milk the Caucasus, which are members of the Ukraine, can pursue an independent foreign war”. Lukashenko is credited with maneu- EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), only Be- policy. Accordingly, disputes in recent years vering his position to gain an advantage in larus has had no territorial conflict. This have led to irritation in Moscow. However, each case, also through skillful tactical ne- stability is due not only to geographical there are good reasons why until a few years gotiations implying a closer relationship and historical factors, but is recognized as a ago Belarus was regarded by the West, but with the West. © 2018 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 2 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 231, September 2018 Russia has also indicated an ambition that for future international negotiations in Switzerland and Belarus is deeply troubling to the Belarusian ad- 2014. This resulted in two “Minsk Agree- ministration. A speech Putin gave in 2011 ments” on the Ukraine conflict in 2014/15. Switzerland has an Embassy office in Minsk. In bilateral talks, Switzerland stresses the enraged Minsk when he welcomed, and Minsk reaffirmed its willingness to partici- lack of human and political rights in Belarus, not for the first time, the idea of integrating pate in a possible UN peacekeeping mission namely unfree elections, the use of the Belarus as a Russian province. Minsk’s de- in the Donbass. Within the framework of death penalty and the lack of freedom of the cision to not recognize the regions of Ab- the Organization for Security and Co-op- media and assembly. Humanitarian khazia, South Ossetia nor the integration eration in Europe (OSCE), Lukashenko is cooperation was discontinued in 2010 and had largely been limited to the victims of the of Crimea, in turn, causes disgruntlement also attempting to initiate negotiations on a Chernobyl disaster. In 2016, Switzerland, like in the Kremlin. “Helsinki II”, a new edition of the CSCE the EU, lifted all financial sanctions and Final Act of Helsinki 1975. travel restrictions against Belarus. Relations Turning Point: Crimea have strengthened in recent years despite a Starting with the overthrow of the Ukrai- The West has become increasingly aware of modest volume of trade, for example through the formation of a “Parliamentary nian government and continuing through- the “in-between states” in Eastern Europe Friendship Group” in 2017.