Belarus Between East and West: the Art of the Deal

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich N0. 231, September 2018, Editor: Matthias Bieri

Belarus between East and West: The Art of the Deal

Disputes over border management, gas prices, and the recognition of Crimea: Belarus is increasingly at odds with its closest ally Russia. President Lukashenko’s regime emphasizes its independent foreign policy as a country between Russia and the West. There are signs of Belarus strategically reorienting, but the actions taken also mirror tactics used to extort lucrative concessions from both East and West.

By Benno Zogg

During the Belarusian celebration of independence in July 2018, President Alexan- der Lukashenko stressed that Belarus would not choose between East and West. Belarusians would choose independence, peace and partnerships with other states. He thus reaffirmed statements he made at the Minsk Dialogue Forum in May 2018, a for Belarus unprecedentedly large confer- ence on Eastern European security that was well-attended by Western researchers and policy advisors. Since 2014, Belarus stresses its role as a bridge builder and mediator in the Ukrainian conflict. At the same time, the government is pursuing a policy of strengthening national identity.

In Russia, both officials and the state-controlled media are increasingly criticizing Since 2014, Belarus appears to be increasingly willing to move closer to the West. Vasily Fedosenko / Reuters Belarus’ lack of loyalty and its commitment to the alliance. Lukashenko is personally criticized for his perceived attempts to in- gratiate himself with the West. Tensions are further exacerbated because Belarus member of all Russian-led projects for eco- only experience of independent statehood does not recognize the “reunification” of nomic and military integration, and the was the Belarusian People’s Republic pro- Russia with Crimea, rejects the establish- countries have close cultural ties. It is there- claimed under German occupation in ment of a Russian air base on its territory, fore remarkable and significant for debates 1918, which lasted for only a year. After and introduced a limited visa exemption on European security that Belarus, neigh- that, Belarus developed into probably the for Western tourists. bor to Ukraine and strategically located be- most Soviet of all Soviet republics. tween Poland and Russia, has begun shift- These recent developments directly contra- ing its foreign policy priorities since 2014. President Lukashenko, who came to power dict the prevailing image in the West to in 1994 in the last free election in the date; that Belarus is Russia’s staunchest ally. Belarus in between country after independence, has preserved Belarus is indeed heavily dependent on Belarus, with its ten million inhabitants, is Soviet heritage in many ways, including Russian energy subsidies and markets, a located on the East European Plain. Its through state symbols and maintaining the

Belarusian Integration also by Russia itself, as Russia’s “little broth- er” and satellite. No country is as closely tied to Russia as Belarus. 70 percent of Be- larusians speak Russian at home, despite recent government attempts to promote the use of the Belarusian tongue. In addition to membership in all multilateral Russian integration projects (see chart), the countries are linked by the vague “Union State of Russia and Belarus”, based on treaties signed since 1996. The integration of the two countries includes free movement of persons, a common economic area, military assistance in the event of an attack and even joint air defence. The market share and influence of Russian companies in Belarus, including in key industries, is high.

Belarus hosts two Russian military bases, but no combat units may be stationed there. The army, which is not widely considered as a powerful force in the region, and the Ministry of Defence are consid- name of the secret service “KGB”. Hasty consequence of the government’s balanced ered pro-Russian and are influenced by economic privatization, like what was seen governing tactics, which the population ap- training in Russia. Military cooperation in Russia or Ukraine, did not occur in Be- preciates. entitles Belarus to purchase military equip- larus. This limited the development of a ment from Russia at a discount. For Russia, powerful oligarchy and the commensurate The Lukashenko regime’s overriding inter- Belarus is strategically important as a tran- problems with inequality. The “market so- ests are self-preservation and a generally sit country for energy and because it almost cialist” economy remains state-controlled high degree of control. The result is an borders the Russian exclave Kaliningrad. in many areas and is not very dynamic. The overzealous restriction on democracy and The remaining “Suwalki gap” of only 65 ki- IT sector is flourishing, but overall the pri- freedom of expression and assembly. The lometers is, in turn, NATO’s only land con- vate sector produces only an estimated 30 organized opposition is oppressed, divided nection to its Baltic members. percent of Belarus’ GDP. Unemployment is and marginalized, and funded from abroad. low. Overall, the Belarusian economy has Lukashenko’s regime is autocratic but not Moscow buys its ally’s loyalty with loans grown above average since the end of the dictatorial. The system allows just as much and energy discounts worth several billion Soviet Union but has stagnated in the wake freedom as a stable, managed economy re- dollars a year. The (re)export of energy and of the Russian economic crisis since 2014. quires and that meets the basic needs of petrochemical products is an important Belarusian infrastructure is in consistently personal freedoms for a majority of citi- source of hard currency for Minsk. Under good condition. Access to education and zens. Lukashenko’s paternalistic policy of- Vladimir Putin, however, bilateral integra- health care is free – compared to most for- ten corresponds with the pre- mer Soviet countries, their quality is con- vailing opinion of his people, Lukashenko’s paternalistic sidered better. Civil servants and security and therefore garners some au- policy often corresponds with the services are also generally considered com- tomatic support. These policies petent and less corrupt than in other for- likely include limited LGBTQ prevailing opinion of his people, mer Soviet states. Grants from abroad in rights and the retention of the and therefore garners some the form of bilateral subsidies and loans death penalty. However, Lu- from development banks are indispensable kashenko’s policy differs from automatic support. for financing the current system. popular opinion in many re- spects. The majority of the Belarusian pop- tion has slowed. In addition to alleged per- After the economy began to stagnate, the ulation approves the annexation of Crimea sonal differences with Lukashenko, the government increasingly emphasized the for example, which may be partly due to pragmatist Putin is unwilling to subsidize value of stability: Belarus has been spared omnipresence of Russian media through- Belarus almost unconditionally. The two waves of migration, terrorist attacks (apart out the state. states have regularly disagreed over energy from an attack on the Minsk Metro in prices, which has led to hostility and the 2011) and a war like in Ukraine. Of all the State of the Union State suspension of supply. Russia imposed an six states geographically located between For a long time since the end of the USSR, import ban on Belarusian dairy products in the EU and Russia in Eastern Europe and Russia had not believed that Belarus, nor 2009, which was referred to as the “milk the Caucasus, which are members of the Ukraine, can pursue an independent foreign war”. Lukashenko is credited with maneu- EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), only Be- policy. Accordingly, disputes in recent years vering his position to gain an advantage in larus has had no territorial conflict. This have led to irritation in Moscow. However, each case, also through skillful tactical ne- stability is due not only to geographical there are good reasons why until a few years gotiations implying a closer relationship and historical factors, but is recognized as a ago Belarus was regarded by the West, but with the West.

Russia has also indicated an ambition that for future international negotiations in Switzerland and Belarus is deeply troubling to the Belarusian ad- 2014. This resulted in two “Minsk Agree- ministration. A speech Putin gave in 2011 ments” on the Ukraine conflict in 2014/15. Switzerland has an Embassy office in Minsk. In bilateral talks, Switzerland stresses the enraged Minsk when he welcomed, and Minsk reaffirmed its willingness to partici- lack of human and political rights in Belarus, not for the first time, the idea of integrating pate in a possible UN peacekeeping mission namely unfree elections, the use of the Belarus as a Russian province. Minsk’s de- in the Donbass. Within the framework of death penalty and the lack of freedom of the cision to not recognize the regions of Ab- the Organization for Security and Co-op- media and assembly. Humanitarian khazia, South Ossetia nor the integration eration in Europe (OSCE), Lukashenko is cooperation was discontinued in 2010 and had largely been limited to the victims of the of Crimea, in turn, causes disgruntlement also attempting to initiate negotiations on a Chernobyl disaster. In 2016, Switzerland, like in the Kremlin. “Helsinki II”, a new edition of the CSCE the EU, lifted all financial sanctions and Final Act of Helsinki 1975. travel restrictions against Belarus. Relations Turning Point: Crimea have strengthened in recent years despite a Starting with the overthrow of the Ukrai- The West has become increasingly aware of modest volume of trade, for example through the formation of a “Parliamentary nian government and continuing through- the “in-between states” in Eastern Europe Friendship Group” in 2017. Negotiations for out Russia’s annexation of Crimea and sub- and the Caucasus as potential partners and a European Free Trade Association (EFTA) sequent interference in eastern Ukraine, is seeking to strengthen their indepen- agreement on free trade with the EAEU have Russia’s activities since 2014 have shocked dence. Disputes with Russia over imports been on hold since the Crimean annexation. and gas supplies have shown Academic and political exchange on the Disputes with Russia over practice of neutrality, which Belarus claims that even Belarus as Russia’s to apply situationally, could be fruitful. imports and gas supplies have closest ally can be a victim of Russian interests. This back- shown that even Belarus as ground may help explain why Russia’s closest ally can be a Western sanctions against Be- larus were lifted in 2016. The victim of Russian interests. latest rapprochement with the market and put pressure on Belarus to sup- West, however, has hardly led to port costly Russian counter-sanctions. Belarus. The Belarusian government has an improvement in the human rights situ- been fostering a moderate nationalism to ation in Belarus. Opposition and free me- Although Belarus is the least engaged of all create a sense of identity distinct from Rus- dia remain oppressed and the death penalty EaP countries, the EU offers opportunities sia. Minsk emphasized its “situational neu- is still practiced – perhaps Lukashenko rec- for markets, investment, visa-free travel trality” in the Ukrainian crisis and contin- ognizes the latter as a potential bargaining and support for its membership in the ued business with both countries. It chip for future negotiations. World Trade Organization. However, gen- circumvents Russia’s counter-sanctions, for uine cooperation relies on Belarus liberal- example by relabeling goods from the West From Belorussia with Love izing, privatizing and improving the invest- and exporting Norwegian seafood and The West is accustomed to Belarus’ skillful ment climate, which Minsk has so far Turkish kiwis as Made in Belarus to Russia. tactical and cyclical turnings to the West, avoided. Belarus is also the per capita Russia is also irritated by its neighbor’s visa while making rhetorical promises in the Schengen visa world champion. Belaru- regime, which has allowed Western nation- hope of Western concessions, loans and the sians are eager to travel and are not as iso- als to stay for short periods without a visa lifting of sanctions. Hopes for meaningful lated as the authoritarian regime may lead since February 2017. In response, Moscow political and economic reforms in Belarus one to believe. Negotiations to reduce the has unilaterally reintroduced border con- often translated into no concrete action, high cost associated with the Schengen trols. like when the International Monetary visa have so far failed, however. According Fund lent billions to the government in to surveys, the population would welcome Lukashenko’s actions displeased Russian 2010/2011. Yet since 2014, Belarus seems greater cooperation with the EU, provided nationalists on account of his apparent per- to show an increased and genuine willing- it does not jeopardize relations with Russia. fidy and displeased liberals for extorting ness for dialogue and rapprochement with This sentiment is reflected in the govern- subsidies. Russian experts and media, the West. This is also an expression of in- ment’s pragmatic policy. which are often state-controlled, accuse ternal power structures: the Foreign Minis- him of disloyalty for this strategy. Conve- try has always been considered more pro- In the spirit of diversifying its political and niently, this condemnation also further dis- European and more economically liberal economic partners, Minsk has also sought credits the existence of a viable “second than, for example, the security services, and out potential partnerships in other regions. Russia”, a stable alternative to Putin’s sys- seems to have gained influence. For example, Minsk does not want to be tem. The Russian population, among whom left out of the “New Silk Road.” Chinese Lukashenko was very popular for a long In addition to considerations of foreign re- investment in the country has subsequently time, increasingly sees him as an opportun- lations, Belarusian advances towards the increased. When Russia refused to supply ist. Yet despite the growing divide, no other West have economic justifications. The Minsk with modern tactical missiles, Be- country remains as close to Russia in terms outcome of economic integration with larus decided to cooperate with China to of values, culture and state structure as Be- Russia is mixed. Russia dominates the de- acquire missile technology. Lukashenko’s larus. sign and control of the economic area, and youngest son Mikalai is learning Manda- trade barriers remain. The economic crisis rin. However, bilateral trade and invest- In order to emphasize the value and degree in Russia, caused by Western sanctions and ment remain modest and a genuine strate- of Belarusian independence on the interna- the oil price collapse since 2014, revealed gic partnership with China, which Minsk tional stage, Belarus offered itself as a place Belarus’ overdependence on the Russian hopes for, is not in sight.

Belarus’ Way Forward The EU is not actively trying to remove forts to promote values and human rights. The Belarusian economy is currently grow- Belarus from the orbit of its powerful Cooperation and compatibility between ing again, but this is attributed to the re- neighbor. A majority of Belarusians are in the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union covery in the region rather than any re- favor of alliances with Russia. Lukashen- (EAEU) would be in Belarus’ interest. But form. Despite reservations among the ko’s position among the elite is secure and Lukashenko feels closer to the mostly au- population, the pressure to intensify timid he seems to be in the best of health. De- tocratic EAEU members than to the lib- economic reforms, privatize state-owned spite animosities and increased unpredict- eral EU democracies, which often make enterprises, strengthen the rule of law and ability, the Kremlin believes he remains the normative demands. diversify the economy will increase. Re- best guarantor of a stable, pro-Russia Be- forms can make the economy more robust larus. Ultimately, Belarus is indispensable The days when Belarus could be considered and ultimately serve the national leader- for the European facet of Russia’s Eurasian Russia’s compliant satellite are thus over, ship’s desire for independence. Compared integration projects. Interven- to the more corrupt, oligarchic Ukraine, re- ing in its neighboring country Gradual economic reforms that forms would be easier to implement in Be- would amount to Russia admit- do not endanger the regime larus due to the competent civil service and ting that its previous policies stable institutions already in place. Gradual and integration projects have seem realistic. Domestic political economic reforms that do not endanger the failed. Lukashenko, in turn, ex- changes are unlikely. regime thus seem realistic. Domestic po- aggerates the danger of the litical changes are unlikely. No progress on Russian threat and the specter democracy can be expected. The potential of a “Ukraine 2.0” scenario for the Western yet it will remain a close Russian ally as for a revolution is low. public to receive support with as few con- there is no alternative to the Belarusian ditions as possible. state’s dependence on Russia. The Belaru- In terms of Belarusian foreign policy since sian desire and willingness to act more in- the Russian annexation of Crimea, the The two countries therefore depend on dependently between East and West has West has increasingly taken radical scenar- each other and will continue to do so for grown. Since 2014, the country has started ios for Belarus into consideration. NATO the foreseeable future. China’s increasing repositioning itself strategically by empha- analyses and simulations, which had previ- influence will not alter this. But Russia will sizing the value of its role as mediator and ously regarded Belarus simply as Russia’s try to keep the Lukashenko regime on a bridge builder and by increasing its efforts marching area, recently dealt with the pos- shorter leash and strengthen its influence to strengthen the national identity. As it sibility of an overthrow of the Lukashenko through economic dominance and the pro- has done in the past, Belarus will still tacti- regime or a Russian invasion. It’s assumed motion of well-heeled civil society organi- cally alternate between approaching East that Russia will keep its neighbor within its zations. While Russia’s hold can manifest and West. As Lukashenko attempts to sphere of influence at all costs, even if that in a number of ways, a prime example branch out, what will garner praise from necessitates orchestrating a coup. The al- would be if Belarus no longer resisted the Brussels will incense Moscow. He has legedly tense personal relationship between establishment of a Russian air base on its proven that he can successfully lead Putin and Lukashenko may increase the territory. Belarus will continue to seek the through tricky diplomatic environments likelihood of such a scenario. Belarus would maximum reward for their ongoing loyalty. with slow course changes, while catering to have little political, economic, and particu- As this dynamic appears stable, the regular the needs of enough of his population. larly military means to oppose any signifi- tactical crises of recent years will continue With these qualities, his regime is likely to cant Russian pressure. The Belarusian accordingly. remain stable for the foreseeable future. identity and army would not be strong enough to wage a war with Russia. With regard to Belarus’ relationship with the West, Belarus is gaining significant However, such scenarios are unrealistic in traction in Brussels as an in-between state Benno Zogg is Researcher at the Think Tank of the Belarus, despite the effective use of similar that requires attention and a specific strat- Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. His tactics in Ukraine. Belarus is not divided egy. For the time being, geostrategic con- areas of interest include the post-Soviet space and into pro-Russian and pro-European camps. siderations will take precedence over ef- development and security in fragile contexts.

CSS Analyses is edited by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at Most recent issues: ETH Zurich. Each month, two analyses are published in German, French, Contracting Out – the EU’s Migration Gamble No. 230 and English. The CSS is a center of competence for Swiss and international Swiss Experiences in Addressing Religion in ConflictNo. 229 security policy. The UN Human Rights Pillar on Shaky Ground No. 228 Editors: Christian Nünlist, Matthias Bieri, Fabien Merz, Benno Zogg; Proof- Subsidiarity and Swiss Security Policy No. 227 reading: Ally Chandler; Layout and graphics: Miriam Dahinden-Ganzoni Views on Islam in Times of Terrorism No. 226 ISSN: 2296-0244; DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000284146 The Putin System No. 225 Feedback and comments: [email protected] More issues and free online subscription: www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/css-analyses-in-security-policy © 2018 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 4