.

“BEYOND POLITICS?” – THE BELORUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND REPORT THE CHALLENGE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Instituut voor Oosters Christendom ALFONS BRÜNING Institute of Eastern Christian Studies

There is now more than a month of protest in Belarus. The longer the Erasmusplein 1 (17.04d) Postbus 9103 protests, which erupted after the evidently faked elections of August 9, 2020, 6500 HD Nijmegen the more virulent becomes the question of how further, and what might be The Netherlands next. Protesters seem yet to agree, that this is another post-soviet story. At times one could witness the performing of songs from the perestroika era 0031 24 361 56 03 and the immediate post-soviet period of the 1990s (the poet Victor Zoi, the [email protected] rock band “kino”), and the regime of president Lukashenko more than once had been labelled as Europe’s last dictatorship, the last bastion of Soviet September 2020 paternalism, and a buffer state between the spheres of Russia and the West.

But as the former optimism of political analysts of a quasi-automatic transition from Soviet rule towards liberal democracy, widespread in the 1990s, has meanwhile disappeared, there is now also a growing uncertainty BIOGRAPHY among Belorussian protesters about the future form into which state and society would be supposed to develop. The geopolitical situation between Europe and Russia, to put it stereotypically, adds to the difficulties. Prof. dr. Alfons Brüning is lecturer Eastern Christianity (Eastern Europe) Protesters themselves seem to be aware of existing threats, as quite some at the Institute of Eastern Christian Studies/Radboud University in of the placards carried on the streets suggest, emphasizing that there shall Nijmegen and chair holder "Orthodoxy be no Maidan (allusion to the Ukrainian protests in 2013/14). There might be and Peace Studies in Europe" at the some distorted images of the Ukrainian events at work, but this message Protestant Theological University suggests that they want to avoid the impression that ideological confrontation (PThU) in Amsterdam. between East and West is behind the protest, or that any allegedly “anti- Russian” revolution or eruption of violence need to be feared.i The only thing one might possibly take for granted at the given state of affairs is that any return towards the former status quo would be unacceptable to the protesters, and also any future system that would not include strong elements of human security, human rights and rule of law, and space for civil society.

Society in Belarus has changed over recent decades, but is this also true for post-Soviet Orthodox Christianity in this region. Can there be expected any constructive impulses from the churches in this situation? If there is something like geopolitics of Christianity, Belarus is situated at a precarious borderline not only between Russia and the European Union, but also between Western and Eastern Christianity. Among the protesters most probably are also many Orthodox Christians, although few of them make themselves visible as such. President Lukashenko’s rather aggressive call,

that the churches should keep their own business and not interfere into politics, can be read as a sign for the actually growing importance of the churches’ voice, but also of an increasingly threatening level of confrontation.ii The probability of a more than negligible presence of Orthodox among the protesters can be derived from existing statistics. According to diverse polls out of recent years, a bit more than a half of the population of Belarus declares to be religious, and a vast majority among these religious people consists of faithful of the Belorussian Orthodox Church. Next to this majority, there is a significant minority of Roman Catholics, often with close ties to the neighbor Poland. Roman Catholicism in Belarus is concentrated in the Grodno region, with a common border with Poland. In addition, there exists a group of around 100.000 Greek Catholics, a branch of Byzantine Orthodox Christianity which since the late 16th century recognizes the Roman Pope as its head, and has been widely influenced by Roman Catholic theology and rite since then.iii The situation reflects the history of Belarus as a region on the border between East and West. Its Western parts around the city of Grodno, for example, formed a part of interwar Poland, and only after World War II became part of the Soviet Union.

Belorussian Orthodoxy is closely linked to the Moscow patriarchate. It is also called Belorussian Exarchate of the Moscow patriarchate, but in canonical terms it has an autonomous status. That means that its head, the Metropolitan of Minsk, is member of the bishop’s synod of the Moscow patriarchate, whereas otherwise the church is supposed to regulate its internal affairs independently. Despite this legal framework, influence from Moscow in recent years has grown stronger. When the widely respected Metropolitan Filaret (Vakhromeev) retired in late 2013, after 35 years in charge, the implementation of his successor Metropolitan Pavel caused some unrest, as this had happened virtually without any consultation of local clerics.iv Already since 2003 there existed a concordat between the Orthodox Church and the Belorussian state, which guaranteed the legal status of the church, and underlined the need for church-state cooperation, as between government departments and branches of the church in areas of social welfare and culture, to the benefit of Belorussian society. It is worth noting, that this society in the comparatively brief text remains a completely passive entity, and any allusions to something like a civil society with independent actors and private initiatives or NGOs remain distant.v

Recent research about other countries with an Orthodox majority among the believers has shown, that in case of failure of state structures vis-à-vis a crisis situation, religious communities are among the first to act as providers of human security. The nature of such responses, generally, is yet ambiguous. Religious communities have the potential to aggravate violence but also to support peace and reconciliation. On the other hand, Orthodox churches advance geopolitical state interests with an impact on the political evolution of the wider region. Belarus in many respects fits the same patterns.vi There is yet also a certain specificity in the Belorussian situation, as the Orthodox Church here has not betrayed any peculiar inner differentiation. Different from what is known from Russia, or from Ukraine before and after Maidan, one can hardly speak, for instance, of fundamentalist or nationalist subgroups of any significance within the

2

Belorussian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, there is a certain political dimension also to the public appearance of Orthodoxy in Belarus. The Russian Church, of which the Belorussian Exarchate is a part, has rather tried to strengthen the mental ties with the “Russian World”. This concept subsumes the “canonical territory” of the Russian Orthodox Church (which virtually coincides with most of the former Soviet Union) as one cultural entity, shaped by Russian spirituality and religiously informed cultural codes. Correspondingly, and different from other Eastern European countries, there is no independent Belorussian national project that would regard Orthodoxy as an integral element. Only recently there have appeared some oppositional tendencies to this mainstream.vii

But even if Belorussian Orthodoxy as a more or less homogenous whole is challenged by the current situation, responses are rather diverse, and illustrate the emergence of inner divisions. Keeping the previous situation generated by the concordat, the Orthodox Church in Belarus has apparently been badly prepared to meet the protests and react adequately. It seems to have been too much an integral part of a patrimonial, i.e. state centered and “quasi-soviet” system. The system collapsed under the combined attack of a corona pandemia handled with overt ignorance, massive election fraud and uncontrolled brutality of state organs in reaction to emerging protests. Widespread agreement with existing structures among the population faded, as the structures themselves proved to be no longer a guarantee for stability and modest wealth. These events only further shifted the accents in a general set of subsequently changing convictions among especially the younger generation of Belorussians. In February 2019, the Berlin Center for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) conducted a survey that provides insights into the political attitudes of Belarusians aged between 16 and 34, their political engagement, and their views on and experiences with other countries in the run-up to the parliamentary vote on 17 November 2019 and the presidential election due by August 2020 at the latest. The institutions enjoying the highest rates of trust, by this time, were police, army and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The president and the presidential administration, but also the churches achieved mixed results. Two thirds among young Belorussians identified themselves as Orthodox Christians, whereas only a small minority among them attends church services more often than on important church holidays, if at all.viii In early 2019 political convictions within the segment of younger aged still betrayed a high degree of basic loyalty to the regime and favor for stability. However, after recent events, one must presume, that the trust in president, police and army have declined considerably. Trust in NGOs and institutions of a not state-run, civil society has probably been less affected by these developments, whereas the churches – the Orthodox Church in particular - are looked at with interest and expectations.

First reactions from the hierarchs after the elections had been as always. Following long established habitudes, there came immediate and quasi automatically released congratulations to president Lukashenko from both Metropolitan Pavel and Russian Patriarch Cyrilix. The only reaction to the rising protests consisted in an intentionally tranquilizing admonition from the bishop’s synod to refrain from violence and enter into dialogue. Two

3

passages in this declaration deserve to be mentioned: First, as it says, “the church is always with the people”. Secondly, the bishops emphasize that “…the Orthodox Church always was, and always will be outside politics. We do not divide humans according to party emblems or convictions, we do not deal with propaganda in favor of any political party or of political leaders, doctrines or regimes.”x

“The people” on the streets took the message with irritation. Open letters criticized the sanguine reaction of the church leadership. With its expressive impartiality and even partial adoption of the presidential regime’s rhetoric (by warning not to listen to external provocateurs) such message under given circumstances could at maximum be regarded as well-intended, but meaningless – certainly so in comparison with the voice of the Roman Catholic church and its head archbishop Kondrushevich, who immediately took a much clearer stance and action against fraud and state run violence.xi Catholic priests were among the first to condemn fraud and organize help for the many imprisoned. Kondrushevich’s growing influence, as is well-known, later motivated state authorities to reject him return after a visit in Poland, declaring his Belorussian passport non-valid. Comparable in terms of echo among the protesters, and the only exception within the ranks of the Orthodox hierarchy was archbishop Artemii of Grodno and Volkovysk, who in his public sermons vigorously condemned the brutality of the regime and called for immediate release of the prisoners.xii

That might indeed have seemed as an exception confirming the rule, but actually even among the hierarchs the rule itself has become uncertain. Metropolitan Pavel later reluctantly joined the protests and took part in public prayers for the imprisoned and visited victims in a hospitalxiii, only to be released from office shortly afterwards – as the protocol of the Moscow synod of bishops says, on his own request.xiv His successor, Metropolitan Veniamin of Minsk, brings with him the personal advantage of being an ethnic Belorussian, but is also known as a clear opponent to any ideas of Belarussian autocephaly. In other words, with his personal profile and biography he stands for the prevention of any repetition of a Ukrainian scenario with the emergence of another autocephalous church independent from Moscow. Apparently, this is what is feared most in the Moscow Holy Synod.xv He is further known as a “non-political” person, from whom seemingly dangerous calls for public resistance would not have to be expected.xvi

For many believers, this “peaceful” attitude is just disappointing.xvii The public prayers Pavel had joined had been organized as grassroots activities, initiated mainly by parishioners and ordinary priests. At this point, one might feel tempted to see at work an old pattern apparently characteristic for Orthodox Christianity in particular, namely the antagonism between the hierarchs and “black clergy”, recruited out of monasteries and among celibate monks, and the “white clergy”, the married parish priests, which in many respects are much closer related to the life of ordinary believers. At any rate, Orthodox parish priests were among the first to express open protests to the faked election results, and the brutality against the protesters that followed. It was also them who organized help for the imprisoned in

4

Minsk and other cities, and called for public prayers and processions in support of the protest.xviiiHowever, a closer look reveals the inner conflict in which many of the priests find themselves. Protests by priests on social media were not widely shared (even after the temporary blockade of the internet had been reversed), and readers expressed doubts whether such notes of protest would not mean a threat for public order or incenting rebellion – in a word, whether they are not too “political” and therefore inappropriate for clerics. Furthermore, there were also many examples of priests and monks openly supporting the regime, and condemning the activities of their fellow priests. A repeated argument within this fraction, in addition to conspiracy theories, is that priests are not supposed to deal with politics, and those who supported the protesters would violate the rules of their clerical estate.xix Statements to be heard in the Holy Synod in Moscow, on occasion of the report of (by then still) metropolitan Pavel about the events in his homeland, had a clearly similar echo, repeating the prohibition to every priest to deal with political issues.xx But even a well-known personality as priest Aliaksandr Shramko, who had been banned from church service due to his public critique on Moscow patriarch Cyril’s lacking sensitivity for common believers two years beforexxi, expressed his – and generally the church’s – clear support for the protesters in word and deed, but at the same time felt urged to emphasize, that the church does not intend to deal with political business: At the given moment, however, it needs to raise its voice as testimony for the truth.xxii It is, in his terms, not a particular political opinion, but a prophetic voice against the forces of evil in an extreme situation of misuse of power.

The wish to explain, and the uncertainty about what priests and also Orthodox believers are allowed to do in such situations is a general phenomenon to be observed among priests and protesters alike in current Belarus. Where does prophecy end, and turn into mere political business? Strictly speaking, this problem is not exclusively Belorussian. The statements of the Belorussian clerics, bishops and priests betray a certain similarity with the open letter issued in February 2020 by some Russian priests, and eventually signed by nearly 200 others, in their protest against excessively harsh court sentences for a number of protesters in Moscow. Notably, the signatories call for an adequate and measured application of given laws, because the opposite would undermine the trust of ordinary citizens in the legal system and thus threaten public order. They do not question this legal system as such, or ask for any revision.xxiii In all such statements, one finds the invocation of biblical sentences but hardly any reference to more abstract concepts such as human rights, although the violation of the latter is obvious in all the cases addressed. Reactions to the public statements always included critique as that it would be not a priests’ business to interfere in political matters. This viewpoint is obviously shared by a majority of the protesting priests and believers themselves, which explains the caution inherent in some explanatory passages of their statements. More than one feels urged to emphasize, that the motivation for his action was pastoral, not ideological, and not motivated by political concepts.

The issue of church-state relations overlays broader debates on political theology in the Orthodox world. Whereas in large parts of Orthodox

5

Christianity recent years have seen an intense discussion about what might be called an “Orthodox political theology” (in response to concepts developed in Catholic and Protestant theology in the second half of the twentieth century, by theologians such as Johann Baptist Metz or Jürgen Moltmann), and how such a theological approach could appropriately be formulatedxxiv, these attempts have always met extreme skepticism within Russian Orthodoxy. “Political Orthodoxy” within the Russian, or perhaps more generally in the Post-Soviet hemisphere is established as a rather negative term, usually applied first and foremost to fundamentalists and right wing radicals.xxv In a slightly broader sense, since the Ukrainian crisis the term has acquired the meaning of faith distorted and blinded by alien “political” ideological causes such as nationalism, socialism or liberalism. Such distorted faith would no longer be a means to peace and conflict de- escalation, as Orthodoxy in particular was supposed to be. Rather, it would be a fire accelerator driving people into violence and ultimately war. The Belarusian clerics are also shaped by this discourse, which explains why they are sometimes eager to avoid any corresponding suspicion.

The assessment of a somehow suitable position of Orthodox theology towards politics and political ideologies (the term applied in a neutral sense) belongs into the more general framework of a coherent social concept. Since the end of Communism at least, Orthodox Churches try to formulate such a concept that would form both an appropriate reaction to modern developments and be a match to Roman Catholic or Protestant forerunners. Efforts into this direction have largely intensified after the fall of Communism. The Russian Orthodox Church had offered a pioneer document with the publication of its “Bases of a Social Concept”xxvi as early as 2000, followed in 2008 by a document clarifying its attitude towards “dignity, freedom and human rights”.xxvii Among others, father Aleksandr Shramko explicitly refers to this “basis”. The documents have attracted criticism and provoked discussion with their inherent emphasis on stability and public morality, uniform vision of society and ambivalent relation to human rights. It has been claimed that some constitutive elements of this post-soviet document, as the emphasis on morality and patriotism, have actual origins in Soviet times themselves.xxviii It is no real surprise, in a sense, that protests in a spirit of surmounting the last remnants of Soviet times can find little to their favor in a social doctrine somehow still shaped by the Soviet past.

In recent years, other social documents within the Orthodox world appeared as alternatives. Among them are those published in connection with the Pan- orthodox Council on Crete in 2016xxix or the recent document by the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America.xxx These concepts put many accents differently – with unconditional support to human rights, approval of freedom as not only a spiritual but also civil and political category, and positive attitude to concepts of civil society. Also developments in Ukraine, not in the last place among clerics and theologians of the still Moscow-related Ukrainian Orthodox Church, need to be mentioned. The Maidan events currently get a somewhat unjust treatment by Belorussian protesters, who stereotypically address only the final phase of violent eruptions. Ukraine has contributed to a general debate in Orthodoxy worldwide. The Maidan protests have not only seen heroic attempts of priests and clerics from all denominations to prevent

6

violence, but have also inspired new and more intense reflections about “church and society” and the place of a less ascetic and distanced “public theology” (notably, not to be confused with “political theology”).xxxi

For members of the Russian Orthodox Church, for clerics and laymen, the “Basis of a Social Concept”, in particular its passages about “church and politics” (chapter III) and “church and politics” (chapter V) can be regarded to have widely shaped the discourse on “political Orthodoxy” ever since its publication. In short, they propagate a far-going loyalty to the state and leave only an ultimate option of resistance in case of extreme contradiction of the state’s legislation or action with church tradition. Civil activity of Orthodox believers – much less so clerics – is permitted or even recommended, but only as long as such activity is in accordance with Orthodox tradition and would not disturb the loyalty of the Christian towards the church itself. In short, there might be some space for initiatives of Orthodox social activism, and these actually have developed in recent decades also in Russia.xxxii On the other hand, in fact civil activism in Russia increasingly develops independently from the church, or even in contrast to it – something for which post-Communist Russian Orthodoxy still betrays little understanding.xxxiii The possibilities for independent initiatives and the emergence of NGOs, the defense of abstract concepts that might on occasion go beyond the limits of Orthodox tradition, like certain aspects of human rights, or for an active, even moderate participation in political processes often remain limited. In this sense, there is also no basic tension between the “Basis of a Social Concept” and the reality of Belarus in recent decades, as it was shaped, among others, through the concordat of 2003.

Consequently the Russian Orthodox “Social Concept” to priests and believers like those in current Belarus – again, different from, for instance, their Roman Catholic counterparts - offers little theoretical assistance in a conflict like the current one. Their current experience is that it is sometimes difficult to just remain “outside politics.” The phrase does not work – if it ever has, seen the “political” nature of the “Russian World” concept spread before also in Belarus. Belorussian Orthodox are faced with the dilemma, that in some situations at least, a sentence like “The church does not deal with politics” in itself is a political statement, that would yet allow for a variety of interpretations. It can mean a conscious distance towards political processes in general, and result in meaningless impartiality (in this sense it would be welcomed by most despots). The sentence can mean, in its prophetic dimension, a protest against all political structures of suppression, persecution and totalitarianism. The interpretation of father Aleksandr Shramko is certainly different from that of president Lukashenko.

At any rate, even if the principle of a church keeping aside from political argument might sound appealing for many Christians worldwide, there is a specification needed, which has been made by Western theologians over the 20th century, and has long become a matter of discussion among Orthodox as well. Dealing with politics does not necessarily have to mean that priests are at the head of outright political movements or stand on barricades, or candidate for political parties, or that authoritative “recommendations” whom to vote for (perhaps accompanied by a threat with hell and damnation for

7

political dissent) are announced during sermons. But if a conflict is political by nature, the means helping its solution also are. This can result in a certain degree of solidarity with one of the parties involved, but does not have to. “Political theology” deals with exactly this borderline. Human rights, in the end, are also “beyond politics”. As far as politics means the solution of conflict to the benefit of all, it can mean the call for the neglect of ideological differences and solution of conflicts by dialogue, and without any kind of violence or of exaggerated dogmatism. It can also not be avoided, in the long run, to constructively answer the question which political order, and which image of society, and also which vision of man and corresponding ideological framework would best serve the mission of the church in the contemporary world – and which would not. Answers given so far in Belarus, also by the Orthodox Church, within what had been called post-soviet paternalism have obviously proven insufficient. Society also in post-Soviet Belarus has changed, and so has the Orthodox flock; this very fact generates the necessity to give a more specific and more constructive meaning to the sentence that “the church does not deal with politics”. One can currently look with a mixture of hope and concern on further developments in Belarus. Anyway, impulses and concepts for better answers do exist, also within Orthodox Christianity.

i Правмир: «Это не Майдан, люди надеются на мирные перемены»; https://www.orthos.org/biblio/publication/2020/08/16/pravmir-eto-ne-maydan-lyudi-nadeyutsya-na-mirnye-peremeny [09-22-2020] ii Alena Alshanskaya, “Ambivalente kirchliche Reaktionen auf die Proteste in Belarus,“ in Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West 9, 2020, pp. 3-4; also online on https://g2w.eu/zeitschrift/leseprobe/1735-ambivalente-kirchliche-reaktionen-auf-die-proteste-in- belarus [09-09-2020] iii 58,2% Religious, among them 82% Orthodox, 12% Roman or Greek Catholic, 6% of other affiliation – according to a census from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 2011, now available via https://web.archive.org/web/20171014085840/http://www.mfa.gov.by/upload/pdf/religion_eng.pdf [09-08-2020] iv Herman Teule, Alfons Brüning (eds.), Handboek Oosters Christendom, Leuven 2018, p. 541f. v Соглашение о сотрудничестве между Республикой Беларусь и Белорусской Православной Церковью, on http://exarchate.by/resource/Dir0009/Dir0015/index.html [09-08-2020] vi Lucian Leustean (ed.), Religion and Forced Displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World, via https://fpc.org.uk/publications/religion-and-forced-displacement-in-the-eastern-orthodox-world/ [09-22-2020]; see also id., Religion, Violence and Geopolitics in Belarus, Berkley Forum, via https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/religion-violence-and- geopolitics-in-belarus [09-22-2020] vii Nelly Bekus, On the Political Mission of Orthodoxy in Belarus and its Consequences for the Church and State, in Orthodoxy versus Post-Communism. Belarus, Serbia, Ukraine and the Russkiy Mir, ed. Michal Wawrzonek, Nelly Bekus, Mirella Krzeniewska- Wiszniewska, Cambridge 2015, pp. 71-158. viii Félix Krawatzek, Youth in Belarus: Outlook on Life and Political Attitudes, ZOiS Report 5/2019, October 2019, on https://www.zois-berlin.de/fileadmin/media/Dateien/ZOiS_Reports/ZOiS_Report_5_2019.pdf [09-22-2020]. ix Патриарх Кирилл поздравил Лукашенко с победой на выборах, via https://www.belta.by/politics/view/patriarh-kirill-pozdravil- lukashenko-s-pobedoj-na-vyborah-402404-2020/ x Обращение Синода Белорусской Православной Церкви к народу Республики Беларусь о прекращении народного противостояния, via http://church.by/news/obrashenie-sinoda-belorusskoj-pravoslavnoj-cerkvi-k-narodu-respubliki-belarus-o- prekrashenii-narodnogo-protivostojanija [09-09-2020]. xi Кондрусевич обратился к Караеву и попросил о личной встрече, on https://news.tut.by/society/697105.html [09-22-2020] xii Обращение архиепископа Гродненского и Волковысского Артемия к клиру и пастве Гродненской епархии, via https://orthos.org/eparhiya/bishop/speech/2020/08/14/obrashchenie-arhiepiskopa-grodnenskogo-volkovysskogo-artemiya-k [09-09- 2020]

8 xiii https://www.interfax.ru/world/722145 [09-22-2020] xiv http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5681796.html [09-22-2020], Protocoll of the meeting of the Holy Synod on August 25, 2020; “Журнал но. 46” xv https://ria.ru/20200825/sinod-1576309244.html [09-22-2020] xvi Installation of metropolitan Veniamin and speeches by Patriarch Cyril and the new Metropolitan, on https://mospat.ru/en/2020/09/06/news186281/ [09-09-2020] xvii Alena Alshanskaya, The Belorussian Orthodox Church between Confession and Self-Preservation – Berkley Forum, via https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/the-belarusian-orthodox-church-between-confession-and-self-preservation [09-22- 2020] xviii Alshanskaya, “Ambivalente Reaktionen” (as in note ii). xix Alshanskaya, “Ambivalente Reaktionen” (as in note ii). xx See note xii. xxi https://naviny.by/person/aleksandr-shramko [09-22-2020]. xxii His interview in the German journal “Osteuropa”, on https://www.zeitschrift-osteuropa.de/blog/die-kirche-steht-auf-der-seite-der- wahrheit-2/?fbclid=IwAR2YNNG2pn2A082higQXdx0qfNUn7QNH2gCI6WNqgoDZuIb_eSWOb9IbTps [09-09-2020]; the Russian Original on the site of “Radio Svoboda”: "Власть показала сатанинское лицо". Церковь и белорусские протесты, on www.svoboda.org/a/30792357.html [09-09-2020] xxiii“Открытое письмо священников в защиту заключенных по «московскому делу», on https://www.pravmir.ru/otkrytoe-pismo- svyashhennikov-v-zashhitu-zaklyuchennyh-po-moskovskomu-delu/ [09-09-2020] xxiv Important works are: Pantelis Kalaitzidis, Orthodox Political Theology, Geneva 2012; Aristotle Papanikolaou, The Mystical as Political, Notre Dame 2012. xxv See e.g. Anastasia Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy. Actors and Ideas, Stuttgart 2005. xxvi The Basis of the Social Concept, on https://mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/ [09-09-2020] xxvii The Russian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights, on https://mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/ xxviii Regula Zwahlen, The Soviet Genealogy of “Orthodox Morality”, Public Orthodoxy: https://publicorthodoxy.org/2019/06/14/the- soviet-genealogy-of-orthodox-morality/#more-5283 [09-09-2020] xxix Especially “The Mission of the Orthodox in Today’s World,” on https://www.holycouncil.org/-/mission-orthodox-church-todays- world [09-09-2020] xxx “For the Life of the World. Towards a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church” on https://www.goarch.org/social-ethos [09-09-2020] xxxi Archimandrit Cyrylo Hovorun, Ukraiins’ka publichna teolohiia, Kyiv 2017; see also the “Open Orthodox Network” via https://www.facebook.com/groups/mereza/about [09-22-2020] xxxii O.A. Bogatova, E.I. Dolgaeva, A. V. Mitrofanova: Activities of the Socially Oriented Organizations of the Russian Orthodox Church: Regional Aspects, Regionology 27, no. 3, pp. 489-512 (Russian); see https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336211958_Activities_of_the_Socially_Oriented_Organizations_of_the_Russian_Orthodox _Church_The_Regional_Aspects [09-09-2020] xxxiii Elena Stepanova, Competing Moral Discourses in Russia: Soviet Legacy and Post-Soviet Controversies, in Politics, Religion & Ideology 20, 2019, no. 3, pp. 340-360.

9