Community Defense in AFGHANISTAN By S E TH G. JONES ince the December 2001 Bonn independent tribes in Nuristan and Pashtun Agreement, which established an areas, and a range of ethnic minorities in the interim Afghan government, the west, north, and center. As illustrated during S United States and international Afghanistan’s most recent stable period, from community have focused on building Afghan 1929 to 1978, security has historically required National Army (ANA) and Afghan National a synergy of top-down efforts from the central Police (ANP) forces as the linchpin to security. government and bottom-up efforts from local While necessary, national security forces have tribes and other communities. Based on this never been sufficient to establish security in reality, America’s counterinsurgency (COIN) Afghanistan. This strategy reflects a Western strategy needs to better incorporate working Dr. Seth G. Jones served most recently as a Plans understanding of the “state,” more appropri- with tribal and other community forces in Officer and Advisor to the Commanding General, ate for U.S. efforts in Germany and Japan after Afghanistan, with a direct link to the Afghan U.S. Special Operations Forces, in Afghanistan. He is World War II. Both of these nations had his- government. an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and tories of strong central governmental institu- This article outlines the development the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. His most recent tions and competent technocrats. But Afghan- of local defense forces in Afghanistan, which book is In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War istan is a much different state and combines should be leveraged along with other efforts in Afghanistan (Norton, 2009). a central government in Kabul, fiercely to build the ANA and ANP, counter the Afghan National Army soldiers during graduation ceremony from Kabul Military Training Center U.S. Air Force (Larry E. Reid, Jr.) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 57, 2 d quarter 2010 / JFQ 9 FORUM | Community Defense in Afghanistan pervasive corruption, and improve gover- One of the most significant challenges likely be a gap of at least 150,000 troops to nance.1 It begins by outlining the importance in Afghanistan has been protecting the local secure the Afghan population, even with the of protecting the local population, especially population, especially in rural areas. Some projected increases in Afghan National Secu- the challenge of relying only on Afghan studies argue that a rough estimate needed to rity Forces.7 More importantly, even during National Security Forces to establish order win a counterinsurgency is 20 security forces Afghanistan’s most recent stable period—the in rural areas. It then examines the historical per 1,000 inhabitants.5 As the U.S. Army and 1929–1978 Musahiban dynasty led by Nadir precedent for working with tribal and other Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual Shah, Daoud Khan, and Zahir Shah—central local defense forces. It concludes by outlining notes, “Twenty counterinsurgents per 1,000 government forces generally did not establish a community defense initiative that needs residents is often considered the minimum security at the village level. Instead, local to be carefully monitored and shaped by troop density required for effective COIN forces assumed that task in rural areas. In the Afghan government and international operations; however, as with any fixed ratio, Pashtun areas, the role of tribes has been par- community. such calculations remain very dependent ticularly important. the tribal structure has evolved over the past several decades because of such factors as war, drought, migration patterns, and sedentarization Tribes, subtribes, clans, qawms, and other local institutions have historically played an important role in Afghanistan. A qawm is a unit of identification and solidar- ity, and could be based on kinship, residence, or occupation.8 Pashtunwali, the Pashtun code of behavior, shapes daily life through such concepts as badal (revenge), melmastia (hospitality), ghayrat (honor), and nanawati (sanctuary). The tribal structure has evolved over the past several decades because of such factors as war, drought, migration patterns, and sedentarization, the process by which U.S. Marine Corps (William Greeson) tribes cease seasonal or nomadic lifestyles and Marine on Civil Affairs group patrol and tribal leader discuss infrastructure improvements in settle in permanent habitats. The 1978 tribal Helmand Province rebellion against the communist regime and subsequent Soviet invasion initiated a cycle of Protecting the Population upon the situation.”6 This ratio translates into warfare causing massive displacement among Successful counterinsurgency requires a force requirement of approximately 660,000 tribes.9 The departure of the Soviets in 1989 protecting the local population and gaining troops for Afghanistan, which has approxi- ushered in another civil war among compet- its support—or at least acquiescence. Both mately 33 million people. Yet these numbers ing factions that triggered mass migration.10 insurgents and counterinsurgents need the do not provide a clear roadmap, and they Nonetheless, the tribal structure support of the population to win. “The only certainly do not take into consideration such remains strong in many Pashtun areas of territory you want to hold,” one study con- variables as the competence of local forces western, southern, and eastern Afghanistan, cluded, “is the six inches between the ears of and what types of forces should be used. For and jirgas and shuras remain instrumental the campesino [peasant].”2 British General Sir example, what percentage of the forces should in decisionmaking at the local level. A jirga Frank Kitson argued that the population is a be international versus Afghan? Among has historically been a council established on critical element in COIN operations, as “this Afghan forces, what percentage should be a temporary basis to address specific issues, represents the water in which the fish swims.”3 national versus local? while a shura has been a more permanent Kitson borrowed the reference to the water There is no clear-cut answer—and cer- consultative council. However, the terms are and fish from one of the 20th century’s most tainly no magic number—of U.S. and Afghan often used interchangeably. Tribes tend to be successful insurgents, Chinese leader Mao forces to conduct a successful counterinsur- more hierarchical in southern and western Tse-tung, who wrote that there is an inextri- gency campaign and establish security. Most Afghanistan than in the east. The southern cable link in insurgencies “between the people public discussions in the United States have Durrani tribes, for instance, are divided and the troops. The former may be likened to focused on increasing the number of interna- between the Panjpai (including the Alizai, water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it.”4 tional, ANA, and ANP forces. But there will Ishakzai, Khugiani, Maku, and Noorzai) and 10 JFQ / issue 57, 2 d quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu JONES the Zirak (Achakzai, Alikozai, Barakzai, and still faced armed opposition from Hazaras, had loose command and control. Ultimately, Popalzai). In some areas, the Taliban appear Aimaqs, Nuristanis, and various Pashtun tribal however, the lashkars were not effective in to be currying favor with some of the Panjpai confederations throughout the country.13 securing Kashmir because they faced a much tribes—including some of the Ishakzai, Alizai, In 1929, Nadir Shah assembled a tribal better organized Indian army, and many of and Noorzai subtribes—against the Zirak army to capture Kabul from Habibullah the lashkar fighters were not from the areas tribes.11 However, there appear to be opportu- Kalakani, and he used tribal forces against they fought in, undermining their legitimacy.16 nities to coopt a range of Durrani and other an uprising by the Shinwari subtribes and Pakistan also used lashkars during Operation communities across Afghanistan to help them Tajiks in Kabul. These forces were effective in Gibraltar in 1965 to liberate Kashmir from establish village-level security. overthrowing the Kalakani government and Indian control. They were trained and led establishing order, though they did face some by Pakistan’s Special Services Group, as well A History of Bottom-up Security resistance from Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras.14 Establishing security in Afghanistan has When Nadir Shah took power, he exempted generally been a combination of top-down some tribes in eastern Afghanistan from con- tribal and other local forces efforts by the central government, whose forces scription in the military and police. Arbakai have been used throughout have established security in major cities and were used as a police force by tribal jirgas to the history of Afghanistan and along key roads, crushed revolts and rebellions, implement their decisions or to respond to Pakistan and mediated intratribal disputes, and bottom- specific threats against the community or up efforts from local tribes and other commu- tribe. During the reign of King Zahir Shah, nities, whose forces have established security at the government often did not provide direct as Azad Kashmir and Jammu officers. Much the village level in rural areas. salaries to the arbakai in Loya Paktia, but like in 1947, however, they were ineffective. The bulk of the current insurgency is instead gave privileged status, property, The lashkars were defeated by regular Indian occurring in Pashtun areas. There are at least money, advisory roles, and exclusion from forces, and were viewed as illegitimate by locals five traditional Pashtun institutions for orga- military service to tribal authorities.15 since few if any of the commanders spoke nizing local security forces. In each case, they implement decisions of tribal jirgas or shuras. A tsalweshtai is a guard force. Members of the tribe are appointed for a special purpose, such as protecting a valley from raiding groups. An arbakai is similar to a tsalweshtai and is Lopez) (Efren U.S. Air Force a tribal police force.