NOT A SIMPLE PATH A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR CENTRAL ASIA

by

Kai Wegerich

e-mail: [email protected]

Occasional Paper No 28 Water Issues Study Group School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) University of London February 2001

“It was Moscow, the centre, the Soviet Union … it was the barbaric use of water resources that led to the Aral tragedy.” (Uzbek President Karimov1)

Introduction

The new millennium opens the possibility to break with the past and to choose a new path for the future, a realistic path leading to a stable environment, an optimistic path focusing the hopes from the disappointing past and present to a vision for the next 25 years. The UNESCO ‘Vision 2025’ presented in The Hague 2000 is this optimistic path for the water management in Central Asia, which hopes to be as much optimistic as realistic in its vision. It is anticipated to save 20 km3 of water annually for the Aral Sea, so that it stabilises at its current size.

However, the future is still a child of the past, which is influenced by the mistakes made in the past and dependent on the ‘Gemeinschaft’ in which it is raised. In this paper the positive outlook adopted by UNESCO for the Aral Sea Basin is critically evaluated in context of past and present constraints.

The paper is structured in the following sections. The first part will describe the current status of the Aral Sea to give an understanding, what is going to be sustained, which is followed by the goal of the ‘Vision 2025’. The method leading to sustainability is theoretically evaluated through economic and social theory, giving an explanation of necessary social and economic changes, and their constraints. The theory leads also to an explanation to the adopted ‘vision’.

1 quoted in D.R. Smith, ‘Environmental security and shared water resources in post-soviet Central Asia’ (Post-Soviet Geography, Vol. 36, No. 6, 1995 p.365) A brief survey into the history of cotton production in Central Asia before and during the Russian colonisation, the Soviet Union and the first 10 years of independence serves as an introduction for explanations of the causes for the desiccation of the Aral Sea and leads to an overview into the current situation of the basin. The remaining part analyses independence and land reforms with its consequences for water management and conflict on the international as well as on the local level, finishing with an evaluation of suggested solutions to manage the resource scarcity.

Description of the Aral Sea disaster

The Aral Sea is a landlocked lake in Central Asia. In the beginning of the 1960's it was still the fourth largest lake in the world; however, by the beginning of the 1990's the surface area had decreased by half: from 66,085 km2 to approximately 33,500 km2. The lake is today divided into two separate bodies of water. The decline of the Aral Sea influenced the ecological, social and economic structures and systems that were traditionally established in the deltas of the lake. For example, the diminished size and increased salinisation of the lake caused a decline of biodiversity of flora and fauna. One of the immediate consequences was the fading and disappearance of traditional economic structures such as tourism and fishing industry. High unemployment and social migration followed the decline. Consequently, the urbanisation of the autonomous republic Karakalpakstan’s is higher than Tashkent oblast, 48.2 per cent and 43.8 per cent respectively.2 Furthermore, the dwindling lake was cause for highly polluting dust and salt storms, effecting not only the health of the inhabitants of the Aral Sea deltas, but also communities located throughout the region of the basin.

Let’s make the disaster ‘sustainable’

The UNESCO report for Central Asia offers as goal a future scenario, in which 20 km3 of water are annually allocated to the environment, that is to the Aral Sea. The utilisation of more efficient technology in agricultural production is believed to guarantee a saving of the natural resource water. The implementation of technical changes will lead to an average water-use decline.

Possible goals for 2025 Present Future Average water use per hectare in cubic metres for wheat, net, 5,000 <3,200 Average water use per hectare in cubic metres for rice, net, 30,000 <14,000 Average water use per hectare in cubic metres for cotton, net, 12,000 <8,000 Water application efficiency in % in the field 40 >75 Efficiency of water distribution to the fields, in % 50 >70 % of irrigated area salinized (middle and highly salinized) 45 <10 (UNESCO report 2000, p.17)

Theoretical analysis of a future path

It will be reasoned below that Central Asia has enough water to provide the population with water for industry, domestic and agricultural use. In other words, real

2 R.R. Hanks, ‘A separate space? Karakak nationalism and devolution in post-soviet Uzbekistan’ (Europe Asia Studies Vol.52, No.5, 2000) p.947

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scarcity of water does not exist. This leads to the question, whether the water scarcity is a scarcity of the natural resource or of the adaptive capacity of the institutions dealing with the Aral Sea problem. The theoretical analysis will indicate why the vision got accepted as solution to the crisis. Furthermore, it will give indication of the constraining factors influencing future changes.

The ‘Vision 2025’ can be explained with the model of the environmental Kutznets curve advocated by Allan and Karshenas.3 While the negativists argue that the future is already determined and the direction is the Malthusian catastrophe, Allan and Karshenas are positive in their prediction for a possible future. The negativist approach assumes population growth leads to resource depletion. Moving from a sustainable position first to unsustainability and than either towards the Malthusian or the environmental catastrophe. Significant of this concept is that the amount of resources and the standard of living is continuously shrinking. The Aral Sea Basin followed the negative pattern and took until now the path towards environmental unsustainability.

The positivists assume that the future is not negatively determined and that there is potential for change through development. According to Allan and Karshenas, three ‘positive’ future scenarios are possible: a ‘conventional’, a ‘precautionary’ and one reconstructing the natural resource. While in the first scenario, raising of living standards is based on natural resource depletion; in the ‘precautionary’ scenario development first reduces the natural resource, but then stabilises at a certain level of natural resource depletion. In the third scenario, the resource-use, in this case water, not only stabilises but also gets reconstructed.

The implementation of the scenarios is dependent on the political will of the leadership. In the case of water, to enforce the ‘conventional’ strategy, decision- makers have to save only small amounts of water and to allocate the water savings away from the agricultural sector towards more profitable sectors such as industry, services or households. In countries dominated by agriculture, water-use in agriculture is approximately 90 per cent of all water consumption. To save water for other sectors would require the raising of water-use efficiency in agriculture either of the distribution system or at the level of the end-user. Reallocation is a matter of politics. In this case reallocation of water towards other sectors might not be difficult, especially if one considers the high returns from these sectors and the assumption that these sectors utilise water without wasting it. The utilised water feeds recycled back into the circle (at least in theory); therefore the amount of the available water is not reduced.

However, the ‘conventional’ strategy does not allocate water towards the environment. The “precautionary approach requires that economic development should not reduce the stock or the value of environmental capital for future generations”.4 In the case of the Aral Sea, the enforcement of this strategy not only has to reallocate water to industries, services and households, but also towards the environment. In the precautionary scenario it is only as much water required

3 J.A. Allan & M. Karshenas, ‘Managing environmental capital: the case of water in Israel, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, 1947 to 1995’ in J.A. Allan (ed.), Water, Peace and the Middle East: Negotiating resources in the Jordan Basin, (Tauris Academic Studies: London, 1996) 4 ibid pp.125-6

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sustaining the lake at the current level. The problem is that ‘environmental’ water has on the one hand no immediate financial profits, it is not utilised and therefore it is wasted, at least in the paradigm of modernity. As with water for the other sectors, water allocated towards the environment has to come from the main user of water, the agricultural sector. The ‘Vision 2025’ assumes that the water needed to stabilise the lake can be saved only through an increase of technical efficiency of water management in agriculture. Similar to the conventional scenario, savings could be achieved either in the distribution system or at the end-user. While the first suggestion is purely technical the second is also in need of a change in understanding: water is not any more just a resource; it is a scarce good and therefore valuable. Consequently, the end-user will use water more efficiently.

In the scenario of natural resource reconstruction, the water needed for the environment cannot be saved through technical improvements alone. To rehabilitate the Aral Sea to a past size, the agricultural sector not only has to cut down on its water consumption through an increase in efficiency, but the agricultural sector has to decrease in scale. Hence, the society as an institution has to change and to adapt new structures.

Ohlsson’s 5 approach, which regards the ‘adaptive capacity’ of society as a resource, is useful for explaining the model of Allan and Karshenas. If the adaptive capacity of a society is high, then the society is able to change in a transforming environment. However, in the case of a low adaptive capacity, the society fails to change and the resource gets further depleted. Ohlsson calls the failure of the society to adapt to changes a ‘second order scarcity’. In the case of the three different development scenarios, the adaptive capacity of the society has to be lower for the ‘conventional’ than for the ‘precautionary’ development path and must be highest for the path of natural resource reconstruction. While the ‘precautionary’ path could be achieved through an increase in efficiency in the agricultural sector, the third path suggests a fundamental reallocation of water between different sectors and a shift in the structures of the society. Society can be defined as an institution. However North, associated to scholars identified as ‘New Institutional Economics’ [NIE], gives a broader definition of institutions: “Institutions provide the framework within which human beings interact. They establish the co-operative and competitive relationships, which constitute a society and more specifically an economic order. [...] Institutions are a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioural norms designed to constrain the behaviour of individuals.”6 The definition will be applied in the remainder of the paper. Economic theory and anthropology are both dealing with institutional change; their framework is utilised to explain the adaptive capacity of an institution.

The NIE approach distinguishes two different methods of change: demand and supply induced change. The first is induced through changes in relative prices, leading to

5 L. Ohlsson, Environment, scarcity and conflict: a study of Malthusian concerns (Department of Peace and Development Research, Göteborg University, 1999) 6 D. North, 1981: pp.201-202, quoted in D. Feeny, ‘The demand for and supply of institutional arrangements’, in V. Ostrom, D. Feeny & H. Picht, Rethinking institutional analysis and development (International Centre for Economic Growth: San Francisco, 1988) p.171

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marginal adjustments of institutions,7 the second focuses on advances in knowledge to induce changes, which is similar to induced technical change. 8

The anthropological approach of Douglas divides society with its institutions into centre and periphery. She argues that the “centre is too constricted in its casing of institutional habits” and claims that “no change ever comes from the centre, all innovation comes from without”.9 Changes suggested from the centre focus not on real alternatives but on suggestions, about already “best known and closest to existing programs”.10 This contradicts North, who does not question the value of change as such. While ‘marginal’ changes reconfirm the institutional structure, ‘real’ changes alter the institutions.

Supplied ‘knowledge’ as well as institutional structures vary in different cases. Hence, they have to be analysed according to the situation. The evidence suggests that supplied knowledge will be accepted by an institution and its stakeholders, if the overall benefits to an institution are high, and if ‘outside’ knowledge does not threaten the interests of the stakeholders. Hence, the borrowing of institutional innovations is not necessarily possible. Institutions are location and community dependent and existing institutional arrangements affect the acceptance of institutional change, hence, changes of and within institutional systems are path-dependent and not as flexible as indicated in the NIE approach.

The approaches of NIE and Douglas do not take into consideration the role of elites and their influence on institutional change. Elites are power position holders in institutions; the positions enable them to resist or to manipulate changes. Institutions have to be interpreted as multi-layer constructs, layers are determined by different actors with their specific interest. Changes can be interpreted as risk situation for certain levels of the institution. Supply induced changes can face resistance when they effect layers and therefore particular interest groups and stakeholders of the institution negatively.

The theoretical reasoning implies that marginal changes are induced from within the system, in terms of Uzbekistan, it implies that change according to the ‘conventional’ development strategy is possible. Marginal changes do not disturb the balance within the institution. A second weakness of the NIE and anthropological approach is that a change of awareness is not considered as change. However, according to Hajer, new awareness is an institutional change.11 The change of awareness to achieve the ‘precautionary’ strategy is not a marginal change of the institution but a real change. The shift in social awareness of the value of water is induced from the outside and might threaten existing institutional settings. The more powerful these settings are the more likely is their resistance to change and outside influence.

7 D.C. North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; New York, 1990) and D.C. North, ‘institutions and economic growth: an historical introduction’ (World Development, Vol. 17, No. 9, 1989) 8 H.P. Binswanger & V.W. Ruttan, Induced innovation (John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1978) 9 M. Douglas & A. Wildavsky, Risk and culture (University of California: Berkeley; London, 1982) p.189 10 ibid. p.93 11 compare M.A. Hajer, The politics of environmental discourse (Claredon Press: Oxford, 1995) p.55

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The theoretical evaluation facilitates the analysis of the water situation in Central Asia, and gives explanation to the chosen path and to expecting constraints for future approaches.

Precautionary path or resource reconstruction?

Prior independence an environmental discourse in Central Asia pointed to the malfunction of the cotton sector. However, national leaders and international organisations focused on simple negotiation sets, such as water; and later, water and energy; but avoided more complicated negotiation sets such as water, energy and agriculture, which would have addressed the issue of environmental protection.12 Spoor indicates that it was neither the intention of the international donors nor of the national governments to restore the lake to its 1960s level.13 A World Bank mission concluded, “the Sea could not be saved”.14 The verdict was reached because of the understanding that reducing the wasteful use of water was not enough “to change the desiccated sea”.15

Weinthal argues that the Central Asian water specialists preferred ‘simple’ technical solutions to ‘complicated’ political solutions.16 She reasons that due to the “importance of cotton as a mechanism for social and political control”17 radical restructuring would have been socially destabilising. Even the World Bank admits that reducing the irrigated rice and cotton area was not viable because “millions of people were living in the irrigated areas”.18 Technical solutions focused on improving the efficiency of water distribution. In 1996, Israel sponsored pumps for sprinklers for the irrigation systems, however, a field visit to a site in Syr darya oblast showed that the pumps have not been used. The high maintenance and energy costs for operating the pumps and the low costs for water and the abundant water supply make the use of sprinklers inefficient.

Weinthal argues that “the old water nomenclature sought to restructure the system of water management just enough to ensure that they retained their positions of power and to procure much coveted foreign assistance”.19 Spoor also points to the vested interest at national and local levels with the cotton sector.20 Cotton did not only guarantee political and social stability, but also foreign revenue earnings, which were used to “reinforce regionally-based patronage systems”.21 Hence, the leadership was unwilling to pay the transaction costs for agricultural reforms.

12 compare: E. Weinthal, ‘Sins of omission’, forthcoming 2001 13 M.Spoor ‘The Aral Sea Basin Crisis: transition and environment in Former Soviet Central Asia’ (Development and Change Vol.29 1998) p.412; confirmed through informal interview with Dr. Sokolov, Deputy Director SIC ICWC, Tashkent 2000 14 World Bank, fostering riparian co-operation in international river basins (Technical Paper No. 335 1996a) p.13 15 ibid. p.13 16 E. Weinthal 2001, p.26 17 E. Weinthal Making or braking the state Ph.D. thesis (Columbia University 1998) p.159 18 World Bank 1996a p.13 19 E. Weinthal 2001, p.20 20 M. Spoor 1998, p.411 21 E. Weinthal 2001, p.29

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The UNESCO vision is to interpret according to the old approaches, which do not disturb the institutional setting of the elites in place. The following analysis will indicate whether the current setting of the institutions is ready for the ‘precautionary’ development path.

Historical perspective

Russia’s policy of cotton production

Prior to the Russian conquest of Central Asia, agricultural production of cotton was already established in the Central Asian region and was used for trade with the Russian state. Russia received its cotton mainly from the United States. During the US civil war 1861-65 cotton imports ceased, and Russia had to find ways of getting the necessary cotton for its rapid developing industry. Lipovsky argues that this was one of the reasons for conquering Central Asia from 1864-1885.22 After the conquest, the Russian government promoted actively the production of cotton in Central Asia, by means of an increase in tax on imported cotton, the introduction of cotton seeds of better quality and with higher yields; and through the introduction of a tax system, which advantaged the production of foreign cotton compared to local cotton.23 Clem adds that Russia also imported cotton-processing machinery from the USA and in the early 20th century the Russian state subsidised cheap credits to cotton farmers to advance further cotton production.24 The Russian focus on cotton lead to a decline of agricultural land planted with food crops and gave rise to a shift from food crops to the cash crop cotton. Consequently, Central Asia ceased to be food self-sufficient.

The Minister of Agriculture, Krivoschein, stated in 1912, “The present development of cotton plantation can and should be intensified still further by means of further reduction in the quantity of grain crops planted on irrigation land. […] Every extra pood of Turkestan wheat means extra competition for Siberian and Cuban wheat; every pood of Turkestan cotton means competition for American cotton. Therefore, it is better to give the territory imported wheat – even at extra cost – but to make irrigated land available for cotton growing.”25 Hence, wheat had to be imported to the region at subsidised prices, which created a dependency for food on external producers.26 By the beginning of World War I more than 50 per cent of the agricultural land used for crop production was used exclusively for cotton. The Russian expansion of cotton production was not based on an increase of irrigated area, but solely on a shift from food crops to cash crops.

The Soviet Union’s policy of cotton production

The revolution had no direct impact on the agricultural sector. Only one decade later, under Stalin, peasants with their land were forced to join collective and state farms. These large-scale farms were vertically structured into the state’s planning system.

22 I. Lipovsky ‘The Central Asian cotton epic’ (Central Asian Survey Vol.14 1995) p.529 23 ibid. pp.529-530, see also R.S. Clem ‘the new Central Asia: prospects for development’, in M.J. Bradshaw Geography and transition in the post soviet republics (Wilney: New York, 1997), pp.175- 176 24 I. Lipovsky 1995, p.532; R.S. Clem 1997, p. 176 25 I. Lipovsky 1995, p.530 26 R.S. Clem 1997, p.176

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Even though the regime changed, Moscow’s policies did not change and the specialisation of Central Asia in cotton production increased further.

Micklin argues that in the mid-1920s “so-called ‘modern’ irrigation techniques were mandated in Central Asia by the Communist regime.”27 However, it is questionable whether this mandate could have been implemented immediately. Starting from the 1930s the agricultural policy of the Soviet Union focused on bringing virgin land under agricultural production.28 The policy reached its height with Krushchev’s project of ‘virgin land’ in 1953. The project was supposed to raise agricultural productivity. By 1956 an additional 88.6 million hectares of land was cultivated in the Soviet Union, mainly in Kazakhstan and Western Siberia. Additionally, with the ‘virgin land’ project Krushchev promoted the idea of expanding the irrigated areas in Central Asia. 29

Kotlyakov states that the irrigated area increased in the early 1960s “in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan by 1.5 times, in Kazakhstan by 1.7 times and in Turkmenistan by 2.4 times”.30 While, in 1965, an area of 4.5 million hectares was irrigated in Central Asia, by independence the total irrigated area had increased by an additional 2.5 million hectares.31 A symbol of the cotton expansion policy is the Kara Kum canal (1,400 km long) in Turkmenistan. Before the construction of the canal in 1954 the irrigated area in Turkmenistan was only 0.35 million hectares. The irrigated area increased from 0.5 million hectares in 1965 to a total of 1.25 million hectares in 1988. 32

Brief introduction to agricultural policies since independence in Kyrgyzstan (upstream) and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (downstream)

Kyrgyzstan

After independence the Kyrgyz government privatised agricultural land and reformed the law on private property.33 Former collective and state farms were abolished; their land was divided into shares depending on density of rural population and available land. As indicated in the SERA report and the study by Bauman, the land reform and distribution of land and farm assets created inequity amongst the rural population. Inequity of wealth is a direct consequence of the time the individual employees left the state and collective farms and applied for their fair share of the collective farm.

27 P.P. Micklin, ‘The Aral Crisis: Introduction to the special issue’ (Post Soviet Geography Vol. 33 No. 5, 1992) p.270 28 J. Pallot, ‘Agriculture and rural development’, in D.J.B. Shaw (ed.), The post-soviet republics: a systematic geography (Longman Scientific and Technical: Halow, 1995) p.104 29 B.Z. Rumer, Soviet Central Asia (Unwin Hyman: Boston; London; Sydney; Wellington, 1989) p.88- 9 30 V.M. Kotlyakov, ‘Concept for preserving and restoring the Aral Sea and normalizing the ecological, public health and socioeconomic situation in the Aral region’, (Post Soviet Geography Vol. 33, No. 5, 1992) p.285; N.F. Glazovsky, ‘The Aral Sea basin’, in J.X. Kasperson (ed.), Regions at risk: Comparisons of threatened environments (United Nations University Press: Tokyo; New York 1995) p.105 31 V.M. Kotlyakov, ‘The Aral Sea Basin: a critical environmental zone’, (Environment Vol. 33, No. 1, 1991) p.5 32 Z. Lerman & K. Brooks, ‘Land reform in Turkmenistan’ in S.K. Wegren (ed.), Land reform in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Routledge: London, 1998) p.165 33 for more detail see: P.C. Bloch & K. Rasmussen ‘Land reform in Kyrgyzstan’, in S.K. Wegren(ed.), Land reform in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, (Routledge: London, 1998)

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Due to the rising debt of the state and collective farms and the equal distribution of assets and of debts the early leavers were better of then the late leavers.34 In addition, the studies show that the former state farm managers are still in powerful situations, controlling land and farm assets.35

Kyrgyzstan has an irrigated area of approximately 1 million ha. The irrigated area increased only marginally after independence. However, without the guidance of the government the agricultural production changed rapidly. In the time period from 1992 to 2000 the area allocated to cotton, wheat, rice and vegetables increased from 21,500 to 36,000; 284,400 to 495,000; 1,900 to 6,000 and 24,400 to 56,000 ha respectively.36 Livestock declined in the same period. The data suggests a change in agriculture, which leads to a higher water demand, based on a shift from fodder to food and cotton crops. The high poverty of the rural population is responsible for the shift towards food crops.37 Only rich and powerful farmers are able to plant the riskier crop cotton. Overall, the agricultural sector became more important, since independence the agricultural sector dominates the Kyrgyz economy and accounts for 45 per cent of the GDP.38

Turkmenistan

Since December 1991 the policy of the sovereign government was to strengthen its independence. An aspect of independence is the policy of food self-sufficiency,39 which is a direct contradiction to the former Soviet Union agricultural policies for Turkmenistan.

Since independence the area allocated to household plots increased from 52,000 ha to 102,000 ha. Citizens could apply for 50 ha of virgin land from 1993 onwards. Consequently, the irrigated area increased from 1,500,000 ha in 1992 to 1,800,000 ha in 1996. In 1994 state and collective farms started to be transformed into new privatised peasant farms. However, Brooks and Lermans analysis indicates that the transformation is a shift in terms and not in ownership and production.40 Furthermore, the state kept tight control for cotton and wheat, in terms of area and expected yields. The area allocated to cotton production remained stable at a level of 570,000 ha. Even though the production fluctuated during the last decade, in 1992 cotton production was at the same level as in 1999 at approximately 1,300,000 Mt. The area allocated to wheat increased from 197,000 ha in 1992 to 550,000 ha in 2000, the amount of wheat harvested increased from 377,000 to 1,700,000 in the same period.41 Brooks and Lerman point out that during the Soviet Union 2 per cent of the area were exempt from the state production and marketing orders; today it is only about 10 per cent.42

34 P. Baumann, Kyrgyz Republic, agriculture area development project, social diagnosis, July 1999 p.17 35 ibid. p.13 36 FAO data 18/12/2000 37 B. Baumann 1999, p.26 38 UNESCO report: water related vision for the Aral Sea Basin 2000, p.60 39 K. Brooks & Z. Lerman, Turkmenistan: an assessment of leasehold-based farm restructuring, 2000, p.17 40 ibid. p.35 41 FAO data 18/12/2000 42 K. Brooks & Z. Lerman 2000, p.18

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The UNESCO report points out that even though 40 per cent of the population are employed in the agricultural sector, its contributions is only 10 per cent to GDP. 43

Uzbekistan

In 1991 collective and state owned farms covered 4,2 million ha of irrigated area. In 1992 and 1993 the first privatisation of land took place. 500,000 ha (around 12 per cent of cultivated land) were distributed among former state or collective farm employees as household plots. A further 100,000 ha of land were allocated in 1994 to establish livestock farms. These farms could receive 0.3 to 2.0 ha per head of cattle.44 In the mid nineties the land was still distributed unevenly among the different users: households plots 530,000 ha, peasant farms 350,000 ha and collective and co- operatives 3,500,000 ha.

With the beginning of the year 2000 another wave of land distribution took place. Unprofitable collective and co-operative farms gained independence and their land was distributed among their former employees. Land allocation was dependent on the location and the pressure on land, the number of family members and on the amount of life stock on the farm.

The early land reforms had no negative effects on the production of cotton and wheat. Until today, cotton and wheat production are centrally controlled and ordered by the Uzbek government. Hence, from 1992 to 2000 the cotton area harvested declined from 1,666,700 to 1,425,000 ha only. This change is based on the quest of the Uzbek authorities to reach food self-sufficiency.45 However, farmers do not receive the real price for cotton and wheat. According to data from the UNESCO, the agricultural sector generates only 20 per cent of GDP, however, cotton accounts for 40 per cent of the total exports. 46

Causes of the Aral Sea Crisis

A literature review shows that the reasons for environmental destruction in the Aral Sea Basin are manifold. McKinney points out that there are two distinct groups of scholars, identifying two different causes for the environmental destruction of the Aral Sea region. Former Soviet water planning specialists believe that the root cause is an incorrect economic development strategy.47 On the other hand, Micklin argues that the introduction of modern large scale irrigation techniques and the shift from individual farming towards collective farm enterprises is the cause of the environmental crisis. The analysis indicates that both approaches are valid in their argument.

One of the main representatives of the first approach is Kotlyakov. He argues that “the region's economy has reached a catastrophe, not because of the desiccation of the

43 UNESCO report 2000, p.64 44 M. Spoor 1998, p.51 45 Area of wheat harvested increased from 626,990 in 1992 to 1,452,000 in 1996 but decreased again to 1,108,000 ha by the year 2000 46 UNESCO report 2000, p.64 47 D.C. McKinney, ‘Sustainable water management in the Aral Sea Basin’, 17.01.97 (http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/McKinney/papers/aral/AralSus.html), p.4

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Aral; conversely, the Aral catastrophe is the inevitable result of a deep crisis in the regional economy."48 The Soviet economic strategy for Central Asia focused on a high specialisation in agriculture, namely in cotton production. Cotton is a high water consuming plant. However, the specialisation in cotton production was not the main reason for the increased depletion of the Aral Sea. The collected data shows that since the 1960s the area of irrigated land has increased rapidly. A third reason for the high demand of water is the use of low-productivity land, which required more water.49 Glazovski, agreeing with Kotlyakov, adds that the development of cotton production focused on the expansion of irrigation systems and not on increasing the productivity of already irrigated land.50 However, the increase in the expenditure of fertilisers and pesticides which was on a genuinely higher level in the Central Asian Republics compared with other Soviet Republics could lead to the conclusion that an increase in productivity on already irrigated land was propagated. Arguably, the policy focused on an increase of the productivity of the land and not an increase in water efficiency. This is validated by Kotlyakov who argued that individual irrigation systems tended to be of low quality design, construction and operation.51 Glazovsky substantiates Kotlyakov’s reasoning with estimates showing that 30-45 percent of water was lost due to canals and drainage collectors being constructed without linings. Glazovsky stresses that irrigation techniques were 'primitive', including the use of furrows or even watering by hand instead of the use of sprinklers.52

Although Micklin admits that large-scale expansion of irrigation is responsible for the drying up of the Aral Sea, he argues additionally that the problem is deeper and that concentrating on the current irrigation system is a superficial way of addressing the real issue. He focuses on a study of irrigation systems at the time of the October Revolution in 1917, reasoning that past systems have been environmentally friendly and sustainable. Micklin argues that in the past, small-scale farms have managed irrigation systems with an average size of 2-3 hectares and with irrigated fields of 0.3- 0.8 hectares. The introduction of collective and state farms increased the flooded area to 3.5 hectares. The expansion of irrigated area in the 1950s lead to an additional increase in the area flooded.53 For Micklin the introduction of large-scale enterprises and the collectivisation of private land are the fundamental causes for the destruction of the Aral Sea.

Where are we now?

The claim that currently 10 km3 of water reaches the Aral Sea annually54 is very optimistic. A flow of 23 km3 is enough to sustain the sea at the current level. To refill the lake to the level of the 1960s the time before the expansion of large-scale irrigation was implemented would require an annual flow of 60 km3. To refill the lake 1000 km3 are needed. This would be equivalent to 10 years of full flow of the Amu Dar’ya and Syr Dar’ya together.

48 V.M. Kotlyakov 1992, p.287 49 ibid. p.286 50 N.F. Glazovsky 1995, p.106 51 V.M. Kotlyakov, 1992, p.286 52 N.F. Glazovsky, 1995, p.107 53 P.P. Micklin 1992, p.270 54 UNESCO report 2000

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The level of the Aral Sea is not the only changed factor. Since the 1960s a variety of other factors changed the possibilities of the current policies and put constraints on the future development of the region.

Changes 1960 1990 Irrigated area [million ha] 4,5 7,0 Population [million] 14 50 Water requirements [km3] 60 120 Salinity of the lake [g/l] 10 40

The present status of the Aral Sea can be defined as unsustainable. The development strategy of the Soviet Union in the 1960s led directly to a condition of environmental unsustainability. The current situation could be defined as beyond sustainability or even as a position in the sphere of an ecological catastrophe. However, the definitions are fuzzy and it is a question of ideology to define an exact position.

The occurred changes determine the future development of the region; evidently it is not possible to turn back the wheel and to focus on the past as a possible future. The governments of the downstream countries [Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan] already indicated that they are not inclined to return to the situation of the 1960s. Evidently, it is not politically and socially feasible to reduce irrigation to save water for the environment or to cut the production of cash crops such as cotton in a time of economic crisis and foreign currency dependency.

Constraints for the future development

Environmental and population constraints

An exact estimate of the population growth rate within Central Asia is not available, only rough estimates, UNESCO claims that the rate of annual increase is currently around 1.61 per cent, the World Bank estimate is by 2,5 per cent. Taken the UNESCO rate for face value, in 2025 the population in the region will have increased to 70 million.

As the analysis of the historical data shows under the influence of Russia and later the Soviet Union, Central Asia was forced to focus on an agricultural development based on cash crop mono-culture at any price, irrespectively of economic, social and environmental costs. The two countries with the highest environmental burden caused from the production of cash crops through irrigation are Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The World Bank reports that Uzbekistan has an irrigated area of 4,280,600 ha, of which 2,140,550 ha are highly saline; Turkmenistan’s irrigated area is 1,744,100 ha of which 652,290 ha have high salinity.

In addition to the high level of salinity, in Central Asia the use of fertiliser was very high compared to other Soviet Union republics. In 1965 Uzbekistan used 147 kilograms of fertiliser for each irrigated hectare (kg/ha), this level increased to 238 (kg/ha) in 1975 and 306 (kg/ha) in 1987, compared to an average of 122 (kg/ha) in the Soviet Union in 1987. The amount of pesticides used for agriculture was approximately 30-35 (kg/ha); this is almost 30 times higher than the average amount in the USSR. The extensive use caused degradation of the arable land as well as the

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pollution of groundwater. Both have long term implications for the future development and cause currently health threats to the rural and urban population.

The sudden independence of the Central Asian states left the economic infrastructure in turmoil. Central Asia depended completely on imports in kind and money transfers from the Soviet Union. With independence the Central Asian states had to search for new trading partners for their natural resources and had to make up for the income loss from Moscow.

Even though Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are poor in terms of domestic water resources, they are rich on other natural resources. Both countries have large natural gas and oil resources. It is anticipated to utilise these resources for export. However, both countries are landlocked; therefore the costs to reach the world market will be high. Furthermore, neighbouring countries are also trying to export gas and oil; this might lead to competition and to less profitability of natural resource exploitation.

The potential for conflict

“Nowhere in the world is the potential for conflict over the use of natural resources as strong as in Central Asia”. Smith55

The sphere of conflict can be divided between potential international conflicts and local conflicts among different water users. The study on ‘environmental degradation as a cause of war’ from ENCOP on the Aral Sea Basin is the most detailed analysis of potential conflicts.

A river basin is as well as a single irrigation system a common pool resource, this has two implications: “(1) the difficulty of excluding individuals from benefiting from a good and (2) the subtractability of the benefits consumed by one individual from those available to others”.56 The problem faced is one of agreement of how water is shared and utilised, and secondly of externalities, such as water pollution and water scarcity downstream.

After independence the Central Asian republics agreed to manage the basin water on the basis of the International Water Law. This implied equitable, reasonable and mutually advantageous water resource use for the countries within the Aral Sea Basin.57 The principal objective of the treatment was that water is co-ordinated according to sustainability towards long-term conservation planning. Water resources have to be preserved, developed and maintained for present and future generations. Even though, the Central Asian states signed to obey international law, the governments agreed to employ water resources according to their utilisation prior independence. Furthermore, Weinthal argues that past pattern of prior use, local customs, and oral agreements continue to undergrid ongoing negotiations over water

55 D.R. Smith 1995, p.351 56 E. Ostrom, R. Gardener & J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool resources (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 1994), p.6 57 World Bank: Fundamental provision of water management strategy in the Aral Sea Basin 1996b p.13

13 sharing.58 She states that water management in Central Asia does not have a “tradition of rule of law” and that “engineers do the drafting without any legal expertise”59 Consequently, the International Water Law is not applied.

Furthermore, future developments and possible claims are not taken into account. The Amu Dar’ya receives 8 per cent of its water from Afghanistan. This is not reflected in the current agreement, it implies that in the future Afghanistan could claim a fair share of water for its own development.

Water flow in the Aral Sea Basin watershed Country Amu Dar’ya Syr Dar’ya total Agriculture Industry Afghanistan 6.18 - 6.18 - - Kazakhstan - 4.5 4.5 27.41 6.26 Kyrgyzstan 1.9 27.4 29.3 9.5 0.59 Tajikistan 62.9 1.1 64 10.96 .91 Turkmenistan 2.78 - 2.78 23.29 0.49 Uzbekistan 4.7 4.14 8.84 54.37 3.68 Total 78.46 37.14 115.6 125.53 11.93 (WB 1996, p.37)

As the table indicates the water distribution is unequal. The countries, which contribute most to the shared rivers, utilise least. Equitable water resource management, according to the International Water Law, does not exist. Small changes in policies can disturb the current agreement. An increase in irrigated area or the employment of more water intensive agriculture of the upstream countries (as happened in Kyrgyzstan) would disturb the current equilibrium and would lead to tension.

Smith, in his analysis of the water availability in Central Asia, argues that water in the region is abundant. This is confirmed through maps from IWMI showing water scarcity on a global scale. IWMI does not identify Central Asia as water scarce region either today or in the next 20 years. Using the framework of Myer, which states that a situation can be classified as water scarce when 2000 people share one million m3 of water, Smith argues that water availability in Central Asia is from a low of “52 people per every one million m3” in Turkmenistan, to a high of “192 people per every one million m3 in Uzbekistan”.60 Hence, in Central Asia there is no natural resource scarcity. Allan confirms this view and argues that the problem does not lie with the resource but with the institutions managing it.61 However, Smith argues that it is possible to interpret the situation in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as water scarce, due to their dependence on water from outside their territory.62 Gleick, who identified four criteria for a country’s water vulnerability, confirms this. He points out that vulnerability is dependent “on the extent to which water is shared” and “the degree of dependence of a country on shared supply".63 As the table above indicates the

58 E. Weinthal, ‘Making waves: third parties and international mediation in the Aral Sea Basin’ in M.B. Greenberg, J.H. Barton & M.E. McGuinness, Words over war (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, Md., 2000) p.288 59 ibid. pp.287-8) 60 D.R. Smith 1995, p.358 61 J.A. Allan 2000, School of Oriental and African Studies, personal conversation 62 D.R. Smith 1995, p.358 63 ibid. p.359

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downstream countries Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are vulnerable to water scarcity, according to Gleick’s method. However, Gleick does not take into consideration the adaptive capacity of a country, which could add to the argument of water scarcity in Central Asia. Turton and Ohlsson point out that even if a country can have water abundance, it can be unstable in terms of water resources, because of a low social capacity to manage water.64 This implies that water is wasted. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan use their water inefficiently; hence, they experience water scarcity in a time of water abundance.

Areas of Conflict

Kloetzli indicates that conflicts are not only about water quantity between upstream and downstream states, but also about quality and the sovereignty over water reservoirs. After independence, the control and use of hydro-technical assets became politicised. Kyrgyzstan controls dams and reservoirs along the Syr Darya. In 1993, Kyrgyzstan used these resources for the production of hydropower during the winter months, which caused shortages for the irrigation area downstream later in the year.65 Further confrontation over sovereignty rights over reservoirs was reported between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Kayrakum reservoir, Tajikistan); Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Tuyamuyun reservoir, Uzbekistan), and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Chardara lake, Kazakhstan), the dispute over water is fuelled by ethnic minorities living in the regions of contest. Not only reservoirs are under dispute, but also canals crossing international boundaries. “The most contentious inter-basin transfer is the Kara Kum Canal”.66 While it was agreed in Soviet times that the canal should divert only 6 km3, it transfers annually 12 km3. Weinthal points out that the allocation between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is at present shared equally, but plans of further opening of irrigated land in Turkmenistan could endanger the agreements.67 However, according to Kloetzli, Turkmenistan wants to utilise water saved through technical improvements.68

The WB states that the water supply of the region is insufficient to satisfy future demands. According to their report, Kyrgyzstan wants to “increase irrigated acreage more than two-fold”, Turkmenistan is “expanding irrigated acreage by 600 ha to 2,345 thousand ha” and Uzbekistan “plans to increase the area of irrigation to 4,92 million ha”.69

However, the problems of water allocation and water use within the basin are not only quantitative but also qualitative. The salinity of water downstream in the basin is high. According to Spoor “a total of 84 million tons of salt is discharged annually into the river”.70 Furthermore, discharges from upstream industries and mines are polluting the rivers upstream and causing contamination of irrigation and drinking water in the

64 A.R. Turton & L. Ohlsson, Water scarcity and social stability, (SOAS Water Issue Study Group, Occasional Paper No.17, 1999) p.4 65 S. Kloetzli, ‘The water and soil crisis in Central Asia’ in G. Baechler & K.R. Spillmann, K.R. (ed.): Environmental degradation as a cause of war (Verlag Ruegger: Zuerich, 1996) p.291 66 ibid. p.294 67 E. Weinthal 2000, p. 272 68 compare section on local level conflict 69 World Bank 1996b, p.53 70 M. Spoor 1998, p.421

15 middle and lower basin. Pollution can be identified as a further contributing factor for potential conflict.

Conflict resolution on the international level

In her analysis, Weinthal, points out that co-operation over water resources happened immediately after the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991. On 12 October 1991 the Water Ministers of the newly independent states jointly declared that the Soviet principles of water allocation would remain in force.71 It is astonishing that an agreement over water resources was reached in this early stage of nation state building. Nationalistic policies and strategies to secure the sovereignty over territorial resources are very common for new nation states, an example for this is the policy of food self-sufficiency in all Central Asian countries. However, the Central Asian leaders recognised the importance of water for the stability of the state influence in society and agreed on the old water allocations. Weinthal states that “co-operation was constructed to serve the political goal of ensuring stability and preventing conflict”.72 National leaders and international organisations focused on negotiation sets such as water and, later, water and energy to secure national and international stability. Weinthal points out that foreign assistance were used as side payments for the old water nomenclature. She argues that financial assistance became a form of side-payment to compensate key domestic interests whose positions are being undermined by the transition.73 Given the current weak financial position of the Central Asian countries, the international community might be able to stabilise the region also in the near future.

Small-scale local conflicts

A new dimension of conflict about water resources comes through the emergence of new small-scale farms. In 1996 in Kyrgyzstan 40,000 farm enterprises existed, compared to 450 state and collective farms in 1990. Out of these 38,000 are small- scale farms, with an average arable land area of less than 9 hectares. A study conducted by SERA reports small-scale conflicts over local water resources; the conflicts are about quantity and quality of water. SERA reports that individual farmers at the tail of irrigation systems complained “about the poor availability of the water as well as its poor quality”.74 Furthermore, SERA points out the potential for conflict “between whole settlements or villages at the head and tail end of the canals”.75 Ethnic diversity may fuel conflicts between villages over water.

The newly introduced Water User Associations (WUA) in Uzbekistan will encourage unequal use of the costs for water; small scale agricultural water users will not be responsible for the costs of operation and maintenance of the irrigation and drainage system. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the WUAs can control water consumption of small-scale users. Hence, the situation at the local level is prone to

71 UNESCO report 2000, p.51 72 E. Weinthal 2001, p.15 73 E. Weinthal 2000, p.284 74 SERA Report, Kyrgyz Republic World Bank on-farm irrigation project social diagnosis: Osh and Jalalabad Regions SERA August 1999, p.31 75 ibid. p.31

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conflict between the different water users, especially in years with low average flow. In Uzbekistan, oblasts differ in terms of water availability. As the quality and quantity of water in upstream oblasts is higher than in downstream oblasts, this might lead to tensions on a regional level, especially in the case of Karakalpakstan.

In Turkmenistan marginal virgin land is opened for agricultural use. The new peasants have neither the knowledge nor the financial competence to introduce an irrigation system, which is efficient in terms of water use. However, they have to “open virgin lands by their own efforts and with their own resources”.76 The new areas will be in competition with the already established farms in terms of water resources. Furthermore, taken the experience from other Central Asian countries, the former state farm managers will stay in power and can determine membership within the newly formed association. Their power position, which is a symbol of the past vertical hierarchy, will cause further social instability and insecurity, and may lead to conflicts about water on the collective farm level.

Overall, independence for the Central Asian states has increased the number of water users. Former on-farm irrigation canals have become transformed into inter-farm irrigation canals, without any facilities for measuring water use at the outlets to the individual farms. Privatisation has aggravated the water-use situation. Furthermore, the evidence from the different countries suggests that private farms will be incapable of self-financing the agricultural sector in terms of operation and maintenance of the irrigation and drainage system.77

The institutions have changed in part or as a whole, these institutional changes could give rise to conflict as long as the old structures are still hanging on to their old power position and manipulate the changes. As soon as the transitional phase has past, the potential for conflict will cease. The new institutions have to be fully established and accepted so that vacuum of instability fuelling conflict disappears.

Given the success of the international organisations to prevent conflict on the international level, it seems reasonable to assume that the transitional phase on the local level can be guided with the assistance of NGOs and international organisations. TACIS pilot project to implement WUAs in Uzbekistan was a success, in terms of local participation and the management of water on the local level. Assistance is necessary for guidance and to train farmers about their responsibilities in terms of operation and maintenance of the irrigation and drainage system. Furthermore, it has to be assured that old structures of institutions do not manipulate the induced changes, so that real, not only marginal, changes can occur.

Suggested solutions to reach the precautionary development path

Recent suggestions for the continuation of the crisis and proposed solutions to manage the available water are still diverse. It seems that general understanding is that “any real solution to the crisis must be found […] by using less water, or, by using the

76 K. Brooks & Z. Lerman 2000, p.31 77 compare: World Bank 1996b, p.78

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available water more efficient.78 However, it seems that the policies for enforcing this goal differ.

Weinthal claims that the cause of the water problem is “that all the Central Asian states want to be independent in food production as well as to continue cotton production for export”.79 Even though, she argues that “the Soviet legacy of economic interdependence could have served as an asset for expanding environmental co- operation”,80 she does not expand this into the trade in food. She identifies as the best long-term strategy to replace cotton with less water intensive crops,81 in this case maybe just food crops. Hence, she does not take into consideration the geographical position of Central Asia as comparative advantage for cotton production. On the other hand, Spoor, who analyses the crisis in a socio-economic context, argues that any solution can only be realistically designed in the context of the continued, widespread presence of cotton.82 He claims that the policies of food crop production have “very high economic and environmental costs.” 83

Spoor is reasoning that water has to be managed more efficiently. He argues that the proposed organisation of WUAs will not be successful because of the reluctance of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to restructure farms.84 However, the recent development has already contradicted Spoors reasoning. It seems that Spoor is in favour of farm restructuring as in the case of Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan WUAs have been introduced with the aim that they take over the full cost of operation and maintenance of the irrigation and drainage systems; however, the willingness and ability to pay the full costs are low.

Spoor sees water pricing as the key to a more efficient and sustainable way of using water.85 Perry, who argues that water pricing is useful for cost recovery but does not lead to water savings in agriculture, contests this view.86 “Only in the domestic sector is price seen as a viable approach to constraining demand. Why, then, are so many still advocating the use of pricing to limit agricultural demands in countries that do not yet have water rights, do not have well regulated distribution, do not have a well educated rule-following group of agricultural users.... etc”?87

Spoor points out “the great disadvantage is that working with planned norms of water use is leading to the ‘use it or lose it’ principle.”88 However, this is in direct contradiction with the experience of Pakistan, where farmers have to manage water on a level of highly induced resource scarcity. Hence, with planned and induced scarcity it is possible to influence decision of farmers how to use scarce water more efficient.

78 M. Spoor 1998, p.425 79 E. Weinthal 2001, p.25 80 ibid. p.16 81 ibid. p.25 82 M. Spoor 1998, p.413 83 ibid. p.412 84 ibid. p.430 85 ibid. p.430 86 C. Perry, former Director of the International Water Management Institute, Lecture at SOAS 2000 87 C. Perry, e-mail discussion SOAS Water Issue Group 2000 88 M. Spoor 1998, p.430

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Conclusion

The analysis of the current situation in the Aral Sea Basin indicates that the newly achieved independence of the Central Asian states did not reduce but heighten the environmental burden caused by agriculture. The evidence suggests that the disadvantage of water management according to national boundaries instead of water basin management, as in the Soviet Union, can be resolved through the intervention of external actors, such as the World Bank, or USAID. These international organisations have already proved capacity to bring about change. It has been possible to avoid war over water and to manage water on a Basin scale.

However, it seems that the reform process of the newly independent states does not encourage water savings, but could even increase water use in agriculture. This is due to the fact that WUAs are not fully functional. There are a variety of reasons for their dysfunction: organisational flaws in the set up of WUAs, the remaining external constraints such as fixed production ratio and prices as it is the case in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the small size of the membership farms of the WUAs and lastly the diversified livelihood strategy of farmers in Kyrgyzstan. Shah identifies these last two elements as reasons for unsustainability of WUAs.89 The established WUAs will not be able to address equal water sharing and will fail to deal adequately with the operation and maintenance of the irrigation and drainage systems. Hence, the irrigation system will further deteriorate and water distribution on the local level will become more prone to conflict.

Furthermore, due to the economic situation in both countries, in combination with the fact that water is not treated as a scarce good, water users will neither have the ability nor the willingness to invest into new technology or even the reconstruction of the irrigation and drainage canals to use water more efficiently.

The analysis of the current situation indicates that old institutions, utilising North’s definition, are still manifested in current Central Asia. The influence of the old institutions prevents new institutions from establishing. This not only increases the possibility of conflict on the local and national levels, but it makes the attempts to induce change towards efficient water management prone to fail.

89 T. Shah, Institutional alternatives in African small-holder irrigation, IWMI, Draft June 2000

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