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Follow-Up Report on the Application of the Helms Burton Law During the Year 2006

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Follow-Up Report on the Application of the Helms Burton Law During the Year 2006 Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe Latin American and Caribbean Economic System Sistema Econômico Latino-Americano e do Caribe Système Economique Latinoaméricain et Caribéen Follow-up report on the application of the Helms Burton Law during the year 2006 XXXII Regular Meeting of the Latin American Council Caracas, Venezuela 28 to 30 March 2007 SP/CL/XXXII.O/Di Nº 4 - 07 Copyright © SELA, March 2007. All rights reserved. Printed in the Permanent Secretariat of SELA, Caracas, Venezuela. The Press and Publications Department of the Permanent Secretariat of SELA must authorise reproduction of this document, whether totally or partially, through [email protected]. The Member States and their government institutions may reproduce this document without prior authorisation, provided that the source is mentioned and the Secretariat is aware of said reproduction. SP/CL/XXXII.O/Di Nº 4-07 Follow-up report on the application of the Helms Burton Law during the year 2006 CONTENTS FOREWORD I. BACKGROUND 3 II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA AND OF THE HELMS BURTON ACT 4 III. EASING OR TIGHTENING OF SANCTIONS? 5 IV. IMPACT OF THE HELMS-BURTON ACT AND THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA 9 V. THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF THE U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA 13 ANNEX I: LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES ON THE HELMS-BURTON ACT AND THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA 17 ANNEX II: STATEMENTS AT INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS 19 ANNEX III: UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 21 SP/CL/XXXII.O/Di Nº 4-07 Follow-up report on the application of the Helms Burton Law during the year 2006 FOREWORD This report of the Permanent Secretariat of SELA summarizes the most important aspects concerning the enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions and the Helms-Burton Act against Cuba from mid-2005 through 2006. The mandate given by its Member States to the Permanent Secretariat to submit to the Latin American Council an annual report on this problem has its roots in its negative implications for one Member State of SELA, but also in the fact that – as several organizations have recognised – it imposes certain rules and standards on the international community on how to conduct economic relations with Cuba This document is an update of the preceding report with the same title, which was submitted to the XXXI Regular Meeting of the Latin American Council (November 2005). The descriptive approach and the structure of the reports are similar. After discussing the enforcement of the sanctions and whether the U.S. restrictive measures have eased or tightened, the document makes a summary of the impact of the Helms-Burton Act and other economic sanctions on Cuba – in the opinion of Cuban authorities. Finally, the report presents some evidences of the extraterritorial implications of the U.S. legislation on Cuba. Follow-up report on the application SP/CL/XXXII.O/Di Nº 4-07 of the Helms Burton Law during the year 2006 3 I. BACKGROUND The economic sanctions imposed by the government of the United States against Cuba for more than four decades now have been criticized by the international community, through practically unanimous resolutions of UN General Assembly in 14 consecutive occasions. In 2006, 183 nations urged the U.S. to put an end to the sanctions and once again rejected their extraterritorial application, in defence of the principles and norms of the International Law. Among other limitations, as a result of the economic blockade, Cuba cannot export any goods to the U.S. or to import any products from that country at all; 1 neither can it trade goods with U.S. companies’ affiliates operating in third countries. It cannot receive American tourists or use the U.S. dollar in its foreign transactions. It does not have access to credits from financial, multilateral, regional or U.S. institutions and is not allowed to operate with them. In addition, its ships and airplanes cannot enter U.S. territory. Moreover, the U.S. government has increasingly applied legal provisions against Cuba that are considered to have an extraterritorial effect. They involve restrictions to international trade which have intensified in the last few years, affecting commercial operations that otherwise could have been conducted with Cuba. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the U.S. government maintains the suspension of the enforcement of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act – which has been widely criticized by many U.S. allies as it authorizes legal actions against those companies dealing with properties confiscated in Cuba. Former President William J. Clinton, who suspended enforcement throughout his second term, explained that his decision to continue the suspension was based on his conviction that “this action will enhance efforts by the United States to strengthen international cooperation aimed at promoting a peaceful democratic change in Cuba”.2 Title III has been repeatedly suspended for six-month periods by President George W. Bush since he took office. In his declarations announcing his decision to continue with the suspension, the President has acknowledged that real differences remain between the United States and our allies concerning the best methods for pursuing change in Cuba. However, he has shown himself to be a decided defender of economic sanctions against the island. However, one of the recommendations made by the “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba” in his second report was to start to apply Title III of the Helms- Burton Act to those countries allegedly supporting Cuba. Regardless of these decisions about Title III, the remaining titles of the Act (I, II and IV) are in force, and although Title III is considered to contain the core provision of the Act, several international firms and corporations claim to have been affected by the Act or to have been pressured by the U.S. authorities following the enactment of this legislation. 1 Since late 2001, and under strict conditions, the U.S. government has allowed the sale of foodstuff to Cuba, as mentioned later in this report. 2 See Public Diplomacy Query (PDQ), Clinton extends suspensión of Títle III of the Helms-Burton Act, 17 January 2001 (Electronic version: http://usinfo.state.gov). Permanent Secretariat Globalization 4 II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA AND OF THE HELMS BURTON ACT The report submitted by the government of Cuba to the Secretary General of the United Nations in August 2006 once again emphasizes that the blockade is fully in force, and that U.S. authorities have increased pressures on the financial system, as well as their follow-up of any economic of commercial operation conducted by Cuban in various markets; while hardening the prohibitions and restrictions to travels, money remittances and academic exchanges in various areas, as well as their punitive actions against investments and tourism in Cuba. Since the creation of the “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba”, whose first report was approved by President George W. Bush on 6 May 2004, the U.S. policy has further tightened the application of the economic sanctions against Cuba. After the approval by President Bush of the report drafted by the “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba”, which was submitted to the White House on 6 May 2004, a series of new measures to tighten the sanctions and encourage the “transition to democracy” in Cuba entered into force on 30 June 2004. The report recommended “firm enforcement” of the sanctions contained in Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act – which prohibits the granting of U.S. visas to foreign investors in Cuba – and urged U.S. authorities to conduct a rigorous study to evaluate if the enforcement of Title III is contrary to U.S. interests, or if its enforcement could speed up the fall of the Cuban regime. Thus, after the approval by President Bush of the report drafted in May 2004 by the “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba”, a series of new measures to tighten the sanctions and encourage the “transition to democracy” in Cuba entered into force on 30 June 2004. The report recommended “firm enforcement” of the sanctions contained in Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act – which prohibits the granting of U.S. visas to foreign investors in Cuba – and urged U.S. authorities to conduct a rigorous study to evaluate if the enforcement of Title III is contrary to U.S. interests, or if its enforcement could speed up the fall of the Cuban regime. On 10 July 2006, the U.S. government submitted the second version of the plan to promote the change in Cuba. The plan identifies new measures which entail more economic sanctions, stronger follow-up to activities of Cuban companies, greater retaliations against those persons conducting business with Cuba, and an increase in the amounts of financial and material support to civil groups, which according to the government of Cuba, are carrying out activities to subvert the constitutional order in that country. The Commission’s new report recommended: to establish an inter-agency Cuban Nickel Targeting Task Force to reinvigorate the nickel import control regime; to reinforce the Cuban Assets Targeting Group; to prohibit medical equipment sales that would be destined to be used in large-scale medical programs that cater foreign patients, medical training or aid to other countries; to impose sanctions to companies collaborating in oil exploration and production; and to start applying the provisions of Title III of the Helms- Burton Act to those countries supporting Cuba. According to conservative estimates of Cuban authorities, the direct cumulative economic damage to Cuba caused by the blockade surpasses US$ 86,108 million – a yearly average of US$ 1,832 million. Follow-up report on the application SP/CL/XXXII.O/Di Nº 4-07 of the Helms Burton Law during the year 2006 5 The official report of the Cuban government to the UN Secretary General indicates that, in 2005, at least 38 countries were affected by the extra-territorial provisions of the blockade against Cuba.
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