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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress (name redacted) Specialist in Naval Affairs December 8, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov RL33745 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program Summary The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under the FY2018 budget submission, the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships is scheduled to be 36 at the end of FY2018 and 51 at the end of FY2022. Two Japan-homeported Navy BMD-capable Aegis destroyers included in the above figures—the Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and the John S McCain (DDG-56)—were seriously damaged in collisions with merchant ships in waters off the coasts of Japan and Singapore in June 2017 and August 2017, respectively, and will likely be nonoperational for a period of at least several months, and perhaps a year or more, until repairs on the ships are completed. The temporary loss of these two BMD-capable ships reinforced, at the margin, concerns among some observers about required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships, particularly for performing BMD operations in the Western Pacific. Under the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD operations, BMD- capable Aegis ships are operating in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran. BMD-capable Aegis ships also operate in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2018 budget, as amended on November 6, 2017, requests a total of $2,173.5 million in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania that are to be part of the EPAA. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program. Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following: required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships; a proposed reduction in planned procurement quantities of SM-3 Block IB and IIA missiles under the FY2018 budget submission, compared to planned quantities under the FY2017 budget submission; whether the Aegis test facility in Hawaii should be converted into an operational Aegis Ashore site to provide additional BMD capability for defending Hawaii and the U.S. West Coast; burden sharing—how European naval contributions to European BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to European BMD capabilities and operations; the potential for ship-based lasers, electromagnetic railguns (EMRGs), and hypervelocity projectiles (HVPs) to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal- phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles; technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program; and the lack of a target for simulating the endo-atmospheric (i.e., final) phase of flight of China’s DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile. Congressional Research Service Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Aegis Ships ............................................................................................................................... 1 Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers ........................................................................ 1 Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers .............................................................. 2 Aegis Ships in Allied Navies .............................................................................................. 2 Aegis BMD System................................................................................................................... 2 Versions of Aegis BMD System ......................................................................................... 3 Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles ........................................................................................ 3 European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD.......................................... 5 Planned Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Interceptors ................................. 5 Homeporting of BMD-Capable DDG-51s in Spain .................................................................. 6 Aegis BMD Flight Tests ............................................................................................................ 7 Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program ......................................................... 8 Japan ................................................................................................................................... 8 Other Countries ................................................................................................................... 9 FY2018 MDA Funding Request ............................................................................................. 10 Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 10 Required vs. Available Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships ............................................ 10 Overview ........................................................................................................................... 10 BMD-Capable Destroyers Fitzgerald and John S McCain Seriously Damaged .............. 12 Proposed Reduction in Planned SM-3 Block IB and IIA Procurement Quantities ................. 13 Potential Aegis Ashore Site in Hawaii .................................................................................... 13 Burden Sharing: U.S. vs. European Naval Contributions to European BMD ......................... 14 Potential Future BMD Contribution from Lasers, Railguns, and Hypervelocity Projectiles ............................................................................................................................. 15 Technical Risk and Test and Evaluation Issues ....................................................................... 15 December 2016 DOT&E Report ...................................................................................... 15 April 2016 GAO Report.................................................................................................... 20 Target for Simulating Endo-Atmospheric Flight of DF-21 ASBM ......................................... 21 Legislative Activity for FY2018 .................................................................................................... 22 Summary of Action on FY2018 MDA Funding Request ........................................................ 22 FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/S. 1519) ........................................ 23 House Committee Report .................................................................................................. 23 House Floor Action ........................................................................................................... 25 Senate Committee Report ................................................................................................. 25 Senate Floor Action........................................................................................................... 26 Conference ........................................................................................................................ 26 FY2018 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 3219/S. XXXX) ............................... 27 House ................................................................................................................................ 27 Senate ................................................................................................................................ 27 Figures Figure 1. Aegis BMD System Variants ............................................................................................ 4 Congressional Research Service Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program Tables Table 1. Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Missiles Under FY2017 Budget Submission ....................................................................................................................... 6 Table 2. MDA Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts, FY2018-FY2022............................................... 10 Table 3. SM-3 Block IB and IIA Missile Procurement Quantities ................................................ 14 Table 4. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2018 Request for MDA Procurement and RDT&E Funding for Aegis BMD Program ......................................................................... 23 Table A-1. Aegis BMD Flight Tests From January 2002 to the Present ........................................ 30 Appendixes Appendix A. Aegis BMD Flight Tests ..........................................................................................
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