Russian Civil War Was in Every Sense a As an Important and Often Decisive Arm Was Period the Reds Sought to Consolidate Their Unique Struggle

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Russian Civil War Was in Every Sense a As an Important and Often Decisive Arm Was Period the Reds Sought to Consolidate Their Unique Struggle 30 1918-1922 by Richard B. Spence The Russian Civil war was in every sense a as an important and often decisive arm was period the Reds sought to consolidate their unique struggle. Few wars have had such an reminiscent of the Napoleonic period. The position and crush the nascent White move­ ments. The Whites organized, built up their important effect on the future of a nation and fanaticism and brutality ' prevalent on all sides "'I the world. Fewer still have been so compli­ and the wholesale destruction meted out to forces, and repulsed the Red attacks. The cated or so little understood. The war was a the civilian population was on a scale unseen salient feature of this phase was the German strange combination of old and new. On the since the Thirty Years War. occupation, which greatly inhibited the political level it pitted the revolutionary The actual fighting in the war was charac­ build-up and operations of both sides. The concepts of communism against traditional terized more by local engagements and second and most crucial phase was the year Czarist autocracy with any number of shades skirmishes than by large-scale battles. Move­ 1919. During this year, White forces launched of opinion in-between. Militarily, the war was a ment was marked by startling advances and three separate and consecutive attacks against throwback to earlier ages . "Modern" precipitous retreats. Betrayal and defection the Reds. All were initially successful, but the weapons, such as tanks and aircraft, were were commonplace. Reds were able to concentrate against each employed, but their numbers and overall effect one in turn and decisively defeated the White was inconsequential. The use of armored Basically, the Russian Civil War can be divided Armies. The last phase, 1920-21, saw the Reds trains and the importance of railways for into three major phases. The first phase runs mop up the last pockets of White resistance in supply and as lines of strategic advance harken from the Bolshevik seizure of power in the Crimea and Siberia and crush the back to our own civil war. The role of cavalry November 1917 to the end of 1918. During this nationalist separatist movements which had ..•••.......••.••• .. German Occupation Line, 1918 = Furthest advance of Whites, 1919 • Furthest advance of Whites, 1918 ----- - Wrangel's position, 1920 31 sprung up in various parts of the former forming a regular army in February 1918. each two regiments of two battalions. These' Russian Empire. The notable exception to the Attempts to form a purely volunteer army units were characterized, however, by low Bolshevik success was their defeat by the proved unsuccessful and a decree instituting effective strengths. Battalions seldom dis­ Poles, which' ended Red hopes of extending compulsory recruitment was issued on 22 April posed of more than two-hundred-fifty to three­ revolution into Germany and Western Europe. 1918. hundred rifles. The "average" effective strength of a division was thus around four THE BELLIGERENTS The task of forming the new army was thousand. In many cases, this dropped as low The initial stages of the war were fought with entrusted to Trotsky, who became the as two thousand while in units beefed-up for small, largely volunteer formations of varying People's Commissar for War. The construction an attack, effectiveness might total seven or military efficiency. As the fighting progressed, and the ultimate success of the Red Army was eight thousand. The armament of rifle divisions both sides resorted to conscription to build due largely to this one man. Even Lenin did not also varied greatly. The number of machine large and, more or less, regular armies. The interfere with Trotsky's handling of the guns might vary from forty to nearly three mass of the conscripts had little interest or situation, except to smooth over the quarrels hundred, while divisional artillery might have which developed between Trotsky and understanding of the causes for which they as many as seventy guns, or as few as a dozen opponents of his policies, most notably, Stalin, fought. This gave most units a rather low or less. combat effectiveness and made desertion a Voroshilov and Frunze. serious problem. At the end of 1919, for The Cavalry Division consisted of three Trotsky'S most serious problem was finding an brigades tof two regiments), each of which example, the Red Army had some one million adequate number of competent officers to men under arms. During the same year, was given a battery of four guns. Each command the forces. Both the quantity and regiment had four squadrons and two or three however, nearly two million men deserted quality of communist officers proved from the Soviet ranks. The situation for the supporting machine guns. Total effective inadequate and he was compelled to call upon strength was about two to three thousand. Whites was generally no better. the services of former Imperial officers. The relatively low morale of most of the troops Initially, some twenty-seven thousand former THE WHITE ARMIES meant that unusually large numbers of officers were called to service and thousands The White forces were raised by various prisoners were taken whenever an army more were added in the following years. 'In leaders in such differing locales as Siberia and suffered a setback. More often than not, these 1919, for example, four-fifths of all Red Army Estonia. Nevertheless, they maintained very troops were simply incorporated into the officers were formerly Imperial ones. Many of similar characters. Initially, most White forma­ victorious ranks, often as complete units. these men served out of patriotic duty, others tions consisted of bands of ex-Imperial officers because there was usually no safe way to and a few troops who stuck with them out of The fate of captured officers was another refuse. personal loyalty. Their main problem, therefore matter, however. Red officers, especially was one of "too many cheifs and not enough commissars, met distinctly unpleasant ends in The fact that Communists made up such a small portion of the officer corps and the rank indians." To some extent this was advan­ the hands of the Whites. Captured White tageous in that it gave the Whites a high officers fared no better. and file obviously presented a serious problem of loyalty. The problem of the officers was degree of competence and morale. As the Because of the low standards and general dealt with by the institution of commissars armies increased in size and the original cadres unreliability of most troops, all armies formed attached to all levels of command with were killed off, this qualitative edge various elite units for carrying out important coordinate powers. Their counter signature disappeared. tasks. The Reds employed "shock" battalions, was required on every military order. A double It is generally assumed that the White leaders often composed of foreign ex-prisoners-of­ hold was often placed on especially question­ were men of upper class origins and war. The Whites often formed special units able officers by holding their families in monarchist sympathy. In fact, most were from with distinctive names, such as "Death's "special custody." In the ranks, Communist middle class backgrounds and many had Head" or "Guards." Even such picked units, Party cells were organized down to the worked their way through the ranks. In political however, often left much to be desired in company level. These army Communists were views, they presented a broad spectrum, terms of performance. Among the White used to stiffen the resolve of doubtful units. ranging from the staunch monarchism of forces in Siberia was the so-called "Immortal" They were urged to be examples to the other Kolchak to the democratic leanings of men Regiment. It lived up to its name by fleeIng troops, and, in cases of failure, their punish­ such as Alexev and Deniken. These political whenever the enemy approached. ment was propo-tionately more severe. It is not differences were an important factor in surprising, therefore, to find that the combat THE RED ARMY creating suspicion and rivalry among the White effectiveness of a Red division was factions, which inhibited their attempts to form The first military units formed by the proportionate to the number of Communists in a centralized command and a viable Bolsheviks were the Red Guards. These were its ranks. government. improvised detachments recruited largely in the factories from staunch Bolshevik sup­ Trotsky himself, however, was often the most The principal White Armies were Kolchak's in porters. They were openly armed and drilled on effective agent of Red morale. He had outfitted Siberia and the Volunteer or Deniken's Army the eve of the November Revolution [all dates a special train on which he rushed about to operating in South Russia. Smaller forces were are new style]. numbering some twenty threatened fronts. Onboard was a special staff formed in Estonia under General Judenich and thousand. It is indicative of the weakness and and a hundred or so picked troops. There were in the Murmansk-Archangel region under incompetence of the existing Provisional also stores of tobacco, new boots and Miller. Deniken's Army was ' the best-led and Government that it could or would do nothing uniforms - not enough for everyone, but equipped of the White Armies, and came the to prevent the formation and maintenance of enough to make an impression on discouraged closest to success, while Miller's motley this potentially dangerous force in its midst. At and war-weary troops. Thus, despite the lack collection was the least effective. any rate, these mostly amateur Red Guards of any practical training, Trotsky proved were able to topple the Provisional Govern­ himself a competent strategist, an excellent In terms of composition, the White Armies ment, albeit without any real fighting.
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