HUSSERL's DESCRIPTION of the ORIGIN of a SYMBOLISM for NUMBERS.L

APPENDIX I

HUSSERL'S DESCRIPTION OF THE ORIGIN OF A SYMBOLISM FOR NUMBERS.l

According to the Philosophy of A rithmetic, the concept of number differs from that of multiplicity in that it specifies the precise form of multi• plicity involved in a given case. When faced with a group of objects, it is enough to know that there is a multitude there to have the concept of multiplicity apply. In order to apply the concept of number, we must be able to say how many objects there are; that is, we must specify which of the forms of multiplicity is present in this case. When we are limited to authentically given numbers, we have only a handful of such forms to deal with. Only a few numbers are actually given in direct consciousness. It would be easy to decide on a few names or signs to represent them symbolically. Now that symbolically given multitudes are introduced, however, the picture changes. We know that a specific number corresponds to each multitude that can be symbolized, but now there is no limit to the diversity of forms of multitudes that can be involved. The weakness of our imagination and memory and the limits of our ability to perform actual collective liaisons do not matter any more. We know that every number, every form of multiplicity, can be changed into another form simply by the addition of one number, and that this process can, theoretically, be carried out indefinitely. The only limitation on it is that imposed by our mental powers of collecting, and since we are no longer dealing with actually collected multitudes, this element of factual limitation falls away. Husser! says, "So the re• strictions on the conception of number concepts fall away, together with the restrictions that check our presentation of multitudes. In a symbolical, but in a very determined way, we can speak of numbers even where an authentic presentation is forever denied us, and on this level we are even in a position to determine the ideal infinity of the realm of numbers." 2. Thus we are now faced with a limitless variety of forms of multitudes or numbers; what sort of symbolism are we to devise for them, so that, given the symbol, we will know exactly which form of multiplicity we are dealing with? The first problem is to devise an appropriate system of symbols. What materials do we have to work with? We have the names of numbers which are authentically given to us. Let us say they go as far

1 To § 10, Chapter I. a "So sind wirklich mit den Schranken, die unser Vorstellen von Mengen hemmt, auch diejenigen fiir die Konzeption der Zahlbegriffe gefallen. In symbolischem aber ganz bestimmtem Sinne konnen wir von Zahlen sprechen, wo dert'n eigentliche Vor• stellung uns fiir immer versagt ist, und wir sind auf dieser Stufe sogar in der Lage, die ideelle Unendlichkeit des Zahlenreiches festzustellen." Phil. Al'uh., pp. 251-52. APPENDIX I 225 as ten or twelve. We have the operations of addition and subtraction, and the relationship of more and less.1 We have the principle that each number, each form of multiplicity, differs from its immediate prede· cessor and successor by one unit each; it is one more than its predecessor and one less than its successor. One way of building a series of signs to symbolize all possible numbers, the first method studied by Hussed, would be to do so in an unsystematic way, through "systemless symbolization of numbers." 2 This could be done, he says, by taking the symbols for authentic numbers and adding them together to form complex symbols for new numbers which are not given in direct encounter. Thus "10 + 5," "9 + 6 + 8," "7 + 10 + 5," etc., could each be complex signs for numbers greater than those we encounter directly. The difficulties in such an unsystematic method are apparent. The complex symbols become very long and unwieldy once the numbers become large, and the strain on memory and imagination becomes very great. Also, it becomes difficult to determine whether two such complex symbols stand for the same number or not, and if they do not, it is hard to determine which of the two represents the larger or the smaller number. Thus the main purpose of numeration, to indicate which form of multiplicity we are dealing with in a given case, is not achieved by this method. This purpose can best be attained, says Husserl, by use of a systematic method of forming symbols. 3 The systematic method Hussed adopts is developed as follows. Let our symbols be defined in a sequence running parallel to the sequence of number concepts. This means that each symbol will be introduced as being equal to its preceding symbol plus one, just as each number is equal to its predecessor plus one unit. This results in a sequence of symbols as follows: I; 2 = I + I; 3 = 2 + I; ••. 9 = 8 + I. This process can be continued indefinitely, and will generate a system of signs each of which corresponds to a given form of multiplicity, to a given number, since each number is also generated from its predecessor by the addition of one. However, it should be noted that nothing we have said so far, none of the rules we have introduced, justifies our repeating the cycle of symbols, "I," "2," "3," etc., after we have passed beyond the number 9. Strictly speaking, we must find altogether new symbols for all the succeeding numbers. "Every new step in the symbolical formation of numbers demands a new step in naming them." 4 This would result in an unlimited

1 Husserl explains the relationship of more-less after he treats the origins of au• thentic numbers, and uses this relationship to explain addition and subtraction, which he considers the two fundamental operations of arithmetic, the two to which all other operations can be reduced (ibid., pp. 203-II). The explanation of the re• lationship more-less does not involve any principles different from those presented in Husserl's treatment of the origins of groups. The relationship arises, once again, as a result of psychic acts of relating, but in this case the things related are groups. In forming this relationship, we form a higher order group, we form a group of groups (p. 99). Once we relate two such groups, we can see, says Husserl, which is greater than the other. This is the origin of the relationship more-less. I "Die systemlose Zahlsymbolisierungen." ibid., p. 252. 8 Cf. ibid., p. 254. , "Jeder neue Schritt der symbolischen Zahlbildung erfordert einen neuen Schritt der Bennenung." ibid., p. 256. 226 APPENDIX I number of symbols, each different from the others, generated by our series. The series would continue: 9; x = 9 + I; Y = X + I; Z = Y + 1. ••. We would have as many different symbols as there are numbers. This result will not do, since the limits of memory and imagination once again make such a series of symbols useless. The difficulty can be resolved by carrying on the sequence for a given distance, then repeating the same sequence over again, but indicating somehow that a repetition is being carried on. Thus we build up the first sequence, I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Then we repeat it, but add a "I" to each repeated symbol to indicate that we are now in the second phase of the cycle: 10, II, 12, 13, 14, IS, 16, 17, 18, 19. When we repeat the sequence another time, we add "2" to each symbol: 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 ..• and so forth, with appropriate changes made for hundreds, thousands, etc.l This system of symbols satisfies all the requirements for a good set of signs for the number system. Each symbol differs from its predecessor by one unit, so the system of symbols is parallel to the system of numbers. Furthermore, we can tell at a glance which of two symbols represents the larger of two numbers, and how far apart they are in the number series. Thus these symbols serve to identify clearly which number, which form of multiplicity, we are dealing with in any given case. If we accept the principle of a recurrent cycle of symbols for our number system, the question then arises, how long should each cycle be ? How many units should it include? The only requirements imposed are (I) the cycle should not be too short, or else the symbols quickly become too complex and too long. If we repeat the cycle after only two or three units, for example, we would soon have very complicated symbols to deal with. (2) It should not be too long, or else we would have too many different basic symbols in the first cycle. For example, if the cycle ex• tends over seventy-five different units before repeating itself, we would have to handle seventy-five different basic signs. Both of these re• quirements are imposed, once again, by limitations of our memory and imagination, perceptual discrimination, and other such psychological factors. 2 The fact is that our number symbols repeat in cycles of ten units. There is no apriori necessity that dictates this. The cycle could just as conveniently have extended over, for example, twelve units before re• peating, and Hussed observes that mathematically a number system based on twelve units would be more advantageous.s Hussed suggests a historical explanation for the choice of ten units in the basic cycle, re• ferring to the fact that primitively ten fingers are used as the most common means of counting.4

1 Ct. ibid., pp. 260-63. 2 Ct_ ibid., pp. 265-68. a Ct. sbid., p. 268. 4 Ct. sind., p. 279. APPENDIX II

CONSTITUTION IN THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

The thought expressed in the Idea of Phenomenology, which dates from courses given in 1907, is much the same as that which we have found in Ideas I, especially concerning the concept of constitution. Husserl sets out to found his phenomenology as a science, and to describe the radi• cally new method and attitude it must have.l He will focus his study on that which is absolutely given, which is the region of our conscious experience, the sum of our cogitationes. 2 In order to limit himself to this sphere, Husserl performs the transcendental epoche; the reduction is carried out in a Husserlian interpretation of Descartes' universal doubt.3 Carrying out the reduction leaves us with the first impression that we are preparing for a science of the immanent elements of our experience: "It looks almost as though it were a question only of a science of the absolute cogitationes." 4 On closer inspection, however, we see that within the field left after reduction, there also remain the "transcendental objects" which we suspended in our epoche. They remain simply as objects given to consciousness, correlates to our cogitationes. These objects, which were formerly considered as completely transcendent to our consciousness, are now found to be present within the immanence of our consciousness. "We become puzzled when we look closer and consider how, in the experience of a tone, for example - even after the phenomenological reduction - appearance and that which appears stand opposed to one another, and do so within what is purely given, thus within genuine immanence."6 Finally, this "transcendence" which remains in our immanent experi• ence is said to be constituted, and the task of phenomenology is to des• cribe what teleological pattern the cogitationes must have in order to con• stitute a given type of object. 8

1 Die Idee der Phtinomenologie, pp. 24-26. I Cf. ibid., pp. 29-32, 71-72. 8 Cf. ibid., p. 30 • , "Fast scheint es, als kame es nur auf eine Wissenschaft von den absoluten cogilationes an." ibid., p. 46. a "Wenn wir naher zusehen und nun achten, wie im Erlebnis etwa eines Tones, auch nach phanomenologischer Reduktion, sich Erscheinung und Erscheinendes ge• geniibersetzen und sich gegeniibersetzen inlnitten der reinen Gegebenheit, also der echten Immanenz, so werden wir stutzig." ibid., p. II. Cf. Walter Biemel's intro• duction to this volume, p. viii: "Den Zugang zu der transzendentalen Betrachtungs• weise bildet die phiinomenologische Reduktion, sie ermoglicht den Riickgang auf das 'Bewusstsein'. In ihm erschauen wir, wie die Gegenstiinde sich konstituieren .... In den fiinf Vorlesungen hat Husserl zum ersten Mal diese Gedanken, die sein ganzes spateres Denken bestimmen sollten, offentIich ausgesprochen." e Cf. ibid., pp. 14, 73, 75. 228 APPENDIX II

This pattern of thought, and especially the inclusion of constituted objects within the region of pure subjectivity, is similar to that of Ideas I. Nevertheless, there are some notable differences between the two books. We will mention some of the more apparent ones. First, Husser!'s motive for doubting the reality of transcendent objects, and for affirming the in• dubitability of immanent ones, is slightly different from the motive given in Ideas, where the decisive factor is that real things appear in profiles while immanent ones do not. In the Idea 01 Phenomenology, Husser! says he can doubt external objects simply because they are transcendent to consciousness, while immanent objects are not and therefore cannot be doubted. "The transcendence of the thing demands that we put it into question." 1 This same idea is expressed in Ideas I when Husser! observes that immanent objects belong to the same stream of consciousness as the reflective acts which know them, whereas real objects are outside this stream. The argument is completely subordinated in Ideas, however, to that based on profiles. The reasoning by which Husser! includes "transcendent" reality within subjectivity. is also slightly different. In the Idea 01 Phenomenology, Husser! performs the reduction and finds immediately that cogieationes are present in what remains. The next step, however, is a detour in com• parison with the method followed in Ideas, for Husser! then goes on to show that universals are also present in the region of subjectivity. He argues that after the reduction, we can analyze eidetically our conscious experiences, and thus form universal concepts of them. These universal concepts then remain as data in subjectivity and are also absolutely given.s Thus through ideal universals, Husser! introduces the first type of "transcencence" within the sphere of immanent subjectivity. Then the third step is to find that not only universals, but also every• thing which is given to consciousness is also retained, as given, within the sphere of subjectivity.3 For instance even a color, as something given to consciousness in perception, is present as a pure phenomenon in sub• jectivity.4 Husser! never speaks of "absolute being" or "relative, intentional being" in the Idea 01 Phenomenology. These "idealistic" terms, which are so abundant and important in Ideas I, are not mentioned in the earlier lectures. The meaning of the word "phenomenon" is ambiguous in the Idea 01 Phenomenology.') Husser! begins by appiying it to the cogitationes which

1 "Die Transzendenz des Dinges fordert, dass wir es in Frage stellen." ibid., p. 49. Cf. also pp. 4-5, 43· I Cf. ibid., p. 10: "Wie weit reicht Selbstgegebenheit? 1st sie beschlossen in der Gegebenheit der cogitatio und der sie generell fassenden Ideationen?" Cf. also pp. 51, 56-57· I Cf. ibid., p. II: "Also dasselbe, was wir auch beim Allgemeinheitsbewusstsein fanden, dass es ein Bewusstsein ist, das eine Selbstgegebenheit konstituiert, die nicht im Reellen enthalten ist und iiberhaupt niOOt als cogatitio zu finden ist, das finden wir auch beim Phinomen der Wahrnehmung." 4 Cf. Rudolf Boehm, "Zum Begriff des 'Absoluten' bei Husserl," pp. 214-16. Only once in the Idea of Phenomenology does Husserl approach the manner of speaking found in Ideas I, when he speaks of the cogito as "lautes pures Sein." Even this is not equivalent to saying that SUbjectivity is absolute, however. Cf. pp. 70-71. a Cf. ibid., p. 14: "Das Wort Phiinomen ist doppelsinning vermoge der wesent• lichen Korrelation zwischen Erscheinen und Erscheinendem. 4>«,WIJ.EVOV heisst APPENDIX II 229 are given in reflection after reduction is carried out, but later he applies it to the "transcendent" objects which remain as given within the sphere of subjectivity. He finally concludes that the authentic meaning for the word is the second one. Finally, there is a constant ambiguity in Husserl's use of the term "transcendent" in the Idea 01 Phenomenology. At first, it is referred to all that exists outside my stream of consciousness, to the realities in the world. Later it acquires the sense of that which is present in my consciousness, but only as given from outside, as something which constitutes itself in consciousness.1 "Constitution" acquires its technical sense for Husserl in association with the second sense of "transcendence." Despite the differences we have listed, the overall train of thought found in Ideas I is already prefigured in the Idea 01 Phenomenology. The search for an apodictic science, the determination of subjectivity as the object of this science, the reduction, and finally the concept of reality as something constituted by consciousness, are all found in Husserl's thought in 1907.

eigentlich das Erscheinende und ist aber doch vorzugswiese gebraucht fiir das Er• scheinen selbst, das subjektive Phanomen ...... 1 Cf. Rudolf Boehm, "Les ambiguites des concepts husserliens d"immanence' et de 'transcendance' ... pp. 487-92. APPENDIX III

GLOSSARY

The following are the English-German correlatives that have governed our English version of Husserl's terminology.

GERMAN-ENGLISH ablaufen, to elapse leibhaft, "in person" Abschattung, profile Lebenswelt, lived world Anschauung, intuition Leistung, achievement, Anzahl, cardinal number performance Auffassung, apprehension Ausdruck, expression Mannigfaltigkeit, manifold Aussage, utterance objektivierende, objectivating Bedeutung, meaning (esp. word meanings) prinzipiell, "in principle" Begriff, concept Beseelung, animation Sachverhalt, state of affairs Bildung, formation Satz, assertion setzen, to assert Deutung, interpretation Sinn, sense sinnlich, sensory eigentlich, authentic, genuine Stiftung, establishment Einstellung, attitude Empfindung, sensation lJr-(auffassung, primal, primitive Erfahrung, encounter -empfindung, Erfiillung, fulfillment etc.} Erlebnis, experience lJrsprung, origin Erscheinung, appearance urspriinglich, originary erzeugen, to produce, lJrteil, judgment engender Verbindung, liaison Gebilde, formation Gegebenheit, givenness Vernunft, reason Vielheit, multiplicity Gegenstand, object, object of reference Vorstellung, presentation Gegenstindlich- objectivity keit Wahmehmung, perception Gegenwart, present Inbegriff, group Zahl, number Inhalt, content Zusammenhang, interconnection APPENDIX III 231

ENGLISH-GERMAN achievement, Leistung manifold, M annigtaltigkeit animation, Beseelung meaning (esp. Bedeutung appearance, Erscheinung word meanings), apprehension, Auttassung multiplicity, Vielheit attitude, Einstellung number, Zahl assertion, Satz (to) assert, setzen object, Gegenstand,Objekt object of refer- Gegenstand cardinal number, A nzahl ence, concept, Begritt objectivating, objektivierende content, Inhalt objectivity, Gegenstandlich- keit encounter, Ertaht'ung origin, arsprung (to) engender, erzeugen originary, ursprunglich (to) elapse, ablauten establishment, Stittung perception, Wahrnehmung experience, Erlebnis performance, Leistung expression, Ausdruck "(in) person" leibhatt present, Gegenwart formation, Bildung, Gebilde presentation, V orstellung fulfillment, Ertullung (to) produce, erzeugen profile, A bschattung genuine, eigentlich primal, ar· (auttassung, givenness, Gegebenheit -empfindung, group, Inbegritt etc.) "(in) principle," prinzipiell "in person," leibhatt "in principle," prinzipiell reason, Vernuntt interconnection, Zusammenhang interpretation, Deutung sensation, Emptindung intuition, Anschauung sense, Sinn sensory, sinnlich judgment, arteil source, QueUe state of affairs, Sachverhalt liaison, Verbindung lived world, Lebenswelt utterance, Aussage BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography includes books and articles cited in our study and others directly relevant to it.

WORKS OF HUSSERL

Carlesianische Meditationen 14M Pariser Vortrage. Edited by S. Strasser Husserliana, I). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. Carlesian Meditations. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. "Entwurf einer 'Vorrede' zu den 'Logischen Untersuchungen'." Edited by Eugen Fink, Tijdschrilt voor Philosophie, 1 (1939), pp. 106-133; 319-339. Erlahrung und Urteil. Edited by Ludwig Landgrebe. Hamburg: Claassen, 1954· Erste Philosophie. Volume I. Edited by Rudolf Boehm (Husserliana VII). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956. Erste Philosophie. Volume II. Edited by Rudolf Boehm (Husserliana VIII). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959 Formale 14M wanszendentale Logik. Halle a.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1929. "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem," Edited by Eugen Fink, Revue internationale de Philosophie, 1 (1938-1939), pp. 203-225. Reprinted in Husserliana VI, pp. 365-386. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931. Die Idee der Phanomenologie. Edited by Walter Biemel (Husserliana II). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950. Ideen zu einer reinen Phtinomenologie 14M phtinomenologische Philosophie. Volume I. Edited by Walter Biemel (Husserliana III). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950. Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie 14M phanomenologischen Philosophie. Volume II. Edited by Marly Biemel (Husserliana IV). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952. Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie. Volume III. Edited by Marly Biemel (Husserliana V). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952. Idees directrices pour une pMnominologie. Translated by Paul Ricoeur. Paris: Gallimard, 1950. Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phano• menologie. Edited by Walter Biemel (Husserliana VI). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Halle a.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1900. Second, revised edition: Halle a.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1913. BIBLIOGRAPHY 233

Logische Unleysuchungen. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phanome• nologie und Theone der Erkenntnis. Halle a.S.: Max Niemeyer, 190I. Second, revised edition in two parts, with the following subtitles: Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phdnomenologie und TheOYie der Er• kenntnis, I Tell. Halle a.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1913. Zweiter Band: Elemente einer phdnomenologischen Aufkldrung der Er• kenntnis, II Tell. Halle a.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1921. Phdnomenologische Psychologie. Edited by Walter Biemel (Husserliana IX). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962. "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," Logos, I (19IO-19II), pp. 289-34I. Philosophie der Arithmetik. PsychologisGhe und logische Untersuchungen. Volume 1. Halle a.S.: C.E.M. Pfeffer, 1891. " Phllosophie der Arithmetik, " (Selbstanzeige) , V ieyteljahrsschrift fUr wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 15 (1891), pp. 360-361. "Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik," PhilosoPhische Manats• hefte, 30 (1894), pp. 159-191. Ueber den Begrill der Zahl; psychologische Analysen. Habilitationsschrift. Halle a.S.: Heynemann'sche Buchdruckerei, 1887. VOYlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. Edited by Martin Heidegger. Halle a.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1928.

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Eley, Lothar. "Husserl-Bibliographie," Zeitschrift fur philosophische For• schung, 13 (1959), pp. 357-367. Patocka, Jan. "Husserl-Bibliographie," Revue internationale de Philoso• phie, 2 (1939), pp. 374-397. Raes, Jean. "Supplement a. la bibliographie de Husserl," Revue inter• nationale de Philosophie, 14 (1950), pp. 469-475. Robert, J.D. "Elements de bibliographie husserlienne," Tijdschrift vooy Philosophie, 20 (1958), pp. 534-544. Van Breda, H. L. "Bibliographie der bis zum 30. Juni 1959 vert>ffent• lichten Schriften Edmund Husserls," in Edmund Husserl, I859-I959. Edited by H. L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959, pp. 289-306.

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Elwert, 1903. - "Ueber objektive und subjektive Begriindung der Erkenntnis," Philo- sophische Monatshefte, 23 (1887), pp. 257-286. Osborn, Andrew. The PhilosoPhy of Edmund Husserl. New York: Columbia University Doctoral Dissertation, 1934. Paton, H. J. Kant's Metaphysic of Experience. 2 volumes. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961. Picard, Yvonne. "Le temps chez Husserl et chez Heidegger," Deucalion, I (1946), pp. 95-124. Pietersma, Henry. Edmund Husse'TZ's Concept of Philosophical Clarifi• cation: Its Development from I887 to I9I3. University of Toronto: Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 1961. 236 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Schutz, Alfred. De,. sinnhafte A ufbau def' sozialen Welt. Vienna: Springer, 1960. Spiegelberg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement. 2 volumes. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. Stumpf, Carl. "Erscheinung und psychische Funktionen," Abhandlungen def' klJniglich p,.eussischen Akademie de,. Wissenschaften, 1906. pp. 1-40. Thyssen, Johannes. "Husserls Lehre von den 'Bedeutungen' und das Be• griffsproblem," Zeitschf'ift fa,. philosOPhische FOf'schung, 13 (1959), pp. 163-186, 438-458. Toulmin, Stephen. The Uses of A"gument. Cambridge: The University Press, 1958. Vallenilla, Emesto. Fenomenologia del conocimiento. Caracas: Doctoral Dissertation, Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1954. Van Breda, Hermann L. "Het 'zuivere phaenomeen' volgens Husserl," Tijdsch,.ift VOOf' Philosophie, 3 (1941), pp. 477-498. Van Peursen, C. A. "La notion du temps et de l'ego transcendental chez Husserl," in HusSBf'1 (Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie III). Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1959, pp. 196-207. Van Riet, Georges. "Realisme thomiste et phenomenologie husserlienne," Revue philosophique de Louvain, 55 (1957), pp. 58-92. Volkmann-Schluck, K. H. "Husserls Lehre von der Idealitat der Be• deutung a1s methaphysisches Problem," in HUSSBf'1 et la pensee mo• def'ne. Edited by H. L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959, pp. 230-24I. Weyl, Hermann. Philosophy of Mathematics and Natu,.al Science. Princeton: The University Press, 1949. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Text and translation by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1958. INDEXES INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

Ca,t. Mea. Fcwm e,an. LogiA (cont.) 43 185 22 100 55 185 68 18 58 186 73 18 61 186 76 6 62 186 76-77 18 67 186 87 18 71 186 96 18 77 179, 184, 186. 101 IS 79 186 133 167 80-82 184 133-134 167 90 186 138 168 90-91 185 147 175 95-96 188 148 170 99-100 187 149 168 100 187 159 168 102 188 160 168 103 189 161 168 108 189 177 168 112 175 184 16g 113 176 185 169, 170 114 176, 186 186 173 195 171 206 175 215 190 E,jahfung una Uneil 216 171 242-255 68 217 173 221 172 227 181 E,ste Philosophie, I 233 16g 252 178,209 173-174 113 253 179, 209 256-257 174 275 170 E,ste Philosophie, II 278 173, 184 279 176 xxxvii-xlii 213 284 173 217-218 21 3 219-228 132 252 21 3 I dee de, PMnomenologie viii 227 4-5 228 Fo,m. tran. Logik 10 228 14 167 10-11 135 240 INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

Idee der Pb4nomenologie (cont.) Ideen I (cont.) 11 228 174 21 7 14 227. 228 195 187 24-26 227 196-208 120 29-32 227 197 160 30 227 197-198 160 43 228 198 77. 160 46 227 208 49. 140• 203 49 228 21l 141. 142 51 228 21l-215 120 55 135 214 141 56-57 228 218 140. 180 70 21 7 218-219 143 70-71 228 219 143 71-72 227 222 143 73 227 225-226 151 75 227 221 144 143 142• 143 247-249 120 248 144 Ideen I 257-258 145 5 117 260 147 7 117. 146 266 146 29 118 285-295 120 69 119. 122 290 148 81 49 291 148 85 124 293 146 86 125 315 150 90 133 321 151 92 134 324 152 96 122 331 152 96-97 123 332 153 97 123 335 154 98 134 340 155 99 134 353 121 102 125 354 153 103 161 356 157 107 125. 200 377 156 lOS 124. 200 381 153 109 125 109-110 122 110 127. 129 111 128. 136 Ideen II 114 130 114-115 119 xvi 112 114-117 221 22 112 115 128. 130 22-23 112 11~116 128 23 112 117 128. 135 24 113 118 128 29-32 158 119 II9. 127 56-57 158 1l1-1l2 119 152-15' 158 128-130 119 133-135 119 134 129 135 129 146-147 140 Ideen III 148 131 1l0-124 158 INDEX OF TEXTS CITED 241

Krisis Log. Unt .• first edition (cont.) 207-214 21 382 42.43 384 42 388-389 53 390 48 Log. Unt.; Pf'oleg .• first edition 392 48 vii 19. 20. 37. 39 396-398 44 243 37 445-462 46 244 38 458 47 145 38 459 48 478 65 485 53 Log. Unt.; Proleg., second edition. 486-488 H 491 53 vii 19. 20, 37. 39 494-495 53 242 37 504-508 59 243 37 532 43 243-244 38 534 54 244 38 559 58 562 51 564 43.64 Log. Unt .• first edition. 600 6g 602 67 4 38, 58 606 54 9 39 613-614 23 20 38 615 65 39 42 617 54 45 53 618 61,66 46 H, 45 619 65 49 45 619-621 61, 67 50-51 54 621 54 66-67 H 622 67 75 50, 51, 54, 55. 61 625 54,68 77 H 626 67. 68. 6g 78 H 628 67 93 41 631-636 68 95 41 631 65 104-105 43 633 65 109 63 638 70 111-112 H 640-641 64 144-145 53 645 70 164 60 653 67 252-253 74 655 49 305 6g 327 51 330 96 331 187 Log. Unt., second edition. Part I. 346-350 56 3 38,58 360 52 8 39 361 55 21 38 362 57,62 39 42 363 52,57 45 53 364 50 46 44, 45 369-374 49 49 45 370 49, 50 50-51 54 372 51 66-67 44 374-375 49 75 50, 51, 54, 55, 61 381 42,53 77 44 242 INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

Log. Unt., second edition. P. 1 (cont.) Log. Unt., second edition, P. 2 (cont.) 78 44 147 65 92 41 147-149 54 95 41 149 54 104-105 43 150 67 109 63 153 54, 68 111-112 44 154 67,68,69 146 53 156 67 165 60 159 65 259 74 159-164 68 314 69 161 65,67 348-349 51 166 70 352 96 168-169 64 353 187 173 70 366-370 55 181 67 382 52 183 49 383 55,62 384 57 385 50, 52 391-397 49 Phdnomenolog. PS'Ychologie 392 49, 50 166-167 178 395 51 602 133 397-399 49 406 42,53 407 43 408 42 Phil. als sIr. Wiss. 409 42 413-414 336 1I7 53 340-341 1I7 415 48 417 48 421-424 44 477-499 46 Phil. Arilh. 493-494 47 494 48 v 7 vi 31 1 25 7 8 8 8 Log. Unt., second edition, Part 2. 9 9 v 70 9-10 10 6 65 10 16 13 53 12 13 14-16 44 13 16 19 53 15 10, 13, 24 22 53 17 7 32-36 59 17-67 24 52-53 54 29 25 60 43 44 18 87 58 68 24 90 50 69 II 92 43. 64 70 21 128 69 73 II 130 67 79 12. 14 134 54 83 16 141-142 23 86 12. 14 143 65 89 8.9 145 54 90 9.13 146 61.66 91 14. 15. 18, 20 INDEX OF TEXTS CITED 243

Phil. Arith. (cont.) Z eitbewusstsein 94 17 368 101 103 7 369 75, 108, 109 III 9 370 75,79 130 7 370-371 79 131 7 371 79,95, 105 101 8,27 371-371 103 lO3-111 225 371 102 111 26 371-373 107 114 26 373 75,76 115 27 373-374 74 117 27 374 102, 108 118 28 384 77 219 27 391 92 220 28 391 85 215 28,29 401 85 227 28,29 418 103 239 29 419 103 240 29 419-421 94 245 30 420 102 250 9, 27 422 83,85, 103 251-252 225 422-423 85 252 225 423 84 254 225 425 106 256 225 428 78 258 33 429 92 260-263 226 430 88 164 32,33 432 84 265-268 226 436 89,90 268 226 437 80,81 275 34 439 83 279 226 442 87 443 81,84 444 80, 82, 86, 87 448-449 109 Selbstaftzeige: Phil. Arith. 451 87,94, 95 456 110 360 7 360-361 26 460 106 461 106, 107 461-462 II 462 110, III 470 83 Psyclwl. Stwd. z. elem. Logik 471 96, 196 183-184 31 472 91, III 185 31 473 81, 87, III 475 104 486-490 109

Ueber d. Beg,.ifl d. Zahl

61-63 13 Mss. B 113 I. 8 180 INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

Asemissen, H. 180 Hanson, N. 213 Hegel, G. W. F. 135 Bachelard, S. 6, 19, 32, 171, 1].4 Heidegger, M. ].4, 133, 218 Baumann, J. 18 Hume, D. 181 Berger, G. 139 Biemel, M. II2 Illeman, W. 6, 32 Biemel, W. 6, 16, II 6, II9, 191, 203, Ingarden, R. 6, 19, 131 227 Boehm, R. v, 56, 74, 77, 78, 94, 95, lCant, 1.40, 46,133,136,214,215,216 137, 138, 162, 179, 184, 200, 213, Kern, 1. vi, 40, 132, 133, 216 228,229 Brand, G. 180 Landgrebe, L. 6, 68, 76 Brentano, F. 56 Lauer, Q. 6 BrOcker, W. 84 Levinas, E. 64, 134, 135, 156, 162

Cairns, D. 167 Merleau-Ponty, M. 211 Capek, M. 222 Celms, T. 40, 158, 161 Natorp, P. 40, 57, 89, 214, 215, 216 Cohen, H. 215 Newton, 1. 192 Nietzsche, F. 56, ].4, 179, 184

Derrida, J. 173, 174 Osborn, A. 8, 20 Descartes, R. 132, 133, 185, 186, 196, 227 Paton, H. 215 De Waelhens, A. 175, 218, 220 J. Picard, Y. 104 Diemer, A. 85 Ricoeur, P. 122 Dilthey, W. 184 Ryan, J. K. v

Einstein, A. 222 Schiitz, A. 100 Eigler, G. 78, 94, 101 Smolko, J. v Eisler, R. 57 Stumpf, C. 57 Euclid 194 Toulmin, S. 212 Fink, E. 52, 153, 161, 197, 203 Follesdal, D. 40 Van Breda, H. L. vi, 131 Frege, G. 17, 40 Weyl, H. 213 Gadamer, H. G. 184 Wittgenstein, L. 63, 212 Gibson, W. II6, 122 Wundt, W. 17 GENERAL INDEX

Absolute. ambiguity of the term. 126. non-intentional sensations. lIo-I13 129-130. 196; givenness of sub• time apprehensions. 75. 79-80; and jectivity. 108-log. 123-126. 195- objective time, 103-104; and re• 196. 219. 227-228; independence of tention, lIo-I13; see Act, Schema subjectivity. 127-128. 195-196; time of matter-form as ultimate absolute. 77. 160-162. Apriori. of time. 108; in transcendent• 199-201 al aesthetics. 174; before perception, Abstractive. 124-125 155; in genetic constitution. 171, Act. structure of. 46-51; quality of. 199; innate apriori of ego, 186 47-48 ; material of. 47-48; analysis Arithmetic. foundations. of, 7 ff.; and into partial intentions. 61; differ• logic. 37; and symbolic numbers. entiation of acts in stream of 26-27. 224 consciousness. 92--93; equivalent to Assertion, and evidence. 153; and apprehension. 50. 88; experience of. reason. 152 52. 88--g2. 1I3-1I4; reflection on. Association, does not explain sym• 14. 22-24; modifications of. 145- bolism. 30; and group symbolism, 148; and meaning. 42-44. 53; and 29; empiricist concept of. 176; in objects. 46-47. 54; and categorical transcendental aesthetics. 175-177 objects. 65-68. 146; and logical forms. 15. 17. 21. 23-24. 38. 65-68. Being, absolute being of subjectivity. 148; and groups. 1I-12. 16-17; and 127-128-228; relative and phenome• sensations. 48-51. 54-58. 98; see nal being of reality. 128-130; 228 Apprehension. Noesis. Schema of Belief. as normal noetic attitude, 145 matter-form. Active genesis, 175, 193. 207 Categorical acts, structure of, 69-71; Addition and subtraction, 225 and sensory data, 70; see Categorical Adequateness, of subjective experience objects in Idem I. 124-126; denied in Cart. Categorical objects. described. 65; Med., 185-186, 189-190 constitution of. 67-68; as result of Aesthetics, transcendental, 174-177. jUdgment, 67-68. 170; and sensory 182 data, 70-71; not first model for Analogies of Experience. 215 constitution. 202-203; found in Anticipations of Perception. 215 Phil. Anth.• 6, IS, 18-22. 202; in Apodicticity, of subjective experience, Log. Unt .• 38. 139; in ldeen I. 146; 123-126, 219; separated from ade• in Zeitbewusstsein, 109; and re• quateness. 185. 189-190 flection. 23-24 Apophantics, 167 Categories. Kantian. 214-216 Appearances. for sense qualities. 49- Causality. implied in noema of 51, 79-80; for time, 79-80. 101- "thing." 155; needed in mechanics. 103; as opposed to reality. 133-134; 192 see Representants, Schema of mat• Cause. subjectivity not a cause of ter-form reality. 137-139. 159. 197. 199. 201; Apprehension, equivalent to acts. 50, subjectivity is cause of categorical 81; of sensory data by intentions. objects. 217; in genetic constitution. 50-51,54-58. 62. 79. 140. 177; and 170-171, 192 246 GENERAL INDEX

Condition of possibility, historical, Encounter, defined, 4-5, 78; makes 191-192; see Subjectivity, Now• objects present, 174-175; alter• instant nation with judgment in genetic Consciousness, see Intentionality, constitution, 170--172, 174, 207- Structure of consciousness, Sub• 209; affected by prior judgments, jectivity 172, 176, 188, 207; see Perception Constitution, source of the term, 214- Epoche, 122, 227; see Reduction 216; synonyms for the term, 216- Establishment, of meaning, 164, 190 217; the term in ldeen I, 118-121; Experience, defined, 4-5, 78; of acts, in Phil. Arith., 15-22; basic pro• 52, 88--92 ; of sensations, 51-52, 56, blematic of, 38--39, 101, 136, 168, 93--98; of both, 82 ff.; opposed to 202-204; and paradox of tran• perception, 89; is without profiles, scendence, 126-131, 133-136, 165, 123-125 196-197, 227; expresses relation• Evidence, defined, 153; and percep• ship between an absolute and its tion, 154-155; of reality, 120; of corresponding relative, 200--201; changing reality, 221; of time, 76; expresses relation between noesis of immanent objects, 209-210; pre• and noema, 140--148; 157-158; not predicative, 173 creation or causality, 136-139, 196-198; basic model for, 202-204; Facticity, of content of consciousness, and schema of matter-form, 55-58 159, 191, 198-199, 217-218; in (q.v.); based ultimately on time, genetic constitution, 171, 191-192, 159-162, 199-201; as a process 194 (q.v.); self-constitution of ego, 76- Fictitious objects, 45, 151-152, 220 78, 92, 188-189; formalism of, 59- First philosophy, I, 213, 218 60, 72, 93, 149-150, 158-159, 201, Form, see Schema of matter-form see Content; needs two sources, 218, Formalism, of static analyses, 115, 220--223; see Meaning, Objects of 183; of all Husserl's analyses, 138, reference, Things, Categorical ob• 198; see Content of acts, etc. jects, Immanent objects, Reason, Founded and founding acts, 67, 146 Pre-predicative consciousness, Ge• Fulfillment, of acts, 54, 59 netic constitution, Active Genesis, Passive Genesis, Temporality and Genetic constitution, anticipated, 56, world time 59, 71 , 98, 113; demanded by Hus• Content, and group relations, 11-12, serl's temporal analysis, 162-164; 14, 30; of acts and temporality, 93, allows integration of temporality, 100, 201; and numbers, 20, 25; of 178-179, 183, 206, 208; process of, meanings and objects not explained, 169"-171; and objectivity, 181-183; 60, 101, 138-139, 191, 197-198,218; and life philosophy, 184, 189; still of noesis and noema not explained, allows facticity, 171, 191-192, 194 149-150, 158-160, 162-164, 166, Geometry, 190, 192 201; of sensations not explained, Groups, defined, 9-10; and collective 97--98, 100; of objective time not relations, 10--12, 23; constitution of, explained, 109-110; change in 15 ff., 35; objectivity of, 16-17, 24; content of noesis, noema, hyle, 162- depend on consciousness, 16-17; 164, 171-172; and genetic consti• symbolic groups, 27-32 tution, 159, 183-184, 191 Cycle, of numbers, 225-226 Habitualities, 188, 213 Hermeneutics, 172-173, 190, 213 Decisions, 188 History, of consciousness, 92--93, 184, Deduction of categories, Kant's, 214 189; cultural history, 191; of ego, Dialectic, between subjectivity and 188-189; of meaning, 169, 182,208; reality, 174, 192, 198-199, 219, 222- of noeses and noemas, 163-164; of 223 science, 192, 213; in pre-predicative consciousness, 175; historical con• Ego, definitions of, 187-188; as mo• ditions of possibility, 191-192 nad, 188-189; see Subjectivity Horizon, in memory, 106; of now• Empiricism, 218 instant, 85; of obscurity in meaning, GENERAL INDEX 247

185, 190; of sedimented meanings, 65; and word meanings, 41-44; see 169, 172, 212-213 Content of meaning, Noema Hyle, defined, 140; and noesis, 140- Memory, and number, 30, 224-226; 143; and noematic constitution, and objective time, 105-107 149; see Sensory data Metaphenomenology, 213 Monad, 188-189; 191 Idealism, 136-139, 159, 197, 218, 228 Motivation, of one judgment on Imagination, and number, 30; see another, 170-171, 192 Fictitious objects. Multiplicity, concept of, 13; arises Immanence, 77, 122, 229; see Imma• from groups, 9-10; and number, nent objects 8--9, 15; and reflection, 13; sym• Immanent objects, are sensations and bolic, 27; and symbolic numbers, intentions, 80-82; lack spatial 224 profiles, 123-124; cannot be doubt• ed, 123-126, 228; constitution of, Naivete, of ordinary experience, 116- 88-101; individualization of, 83; 117, 150; of phenomenology, 213 and temporality, 77, 79-80, 82-84; Natural attitude, 117-118, 150 see Act, Apprehension, Schema of Necessity, in genetic development, matter-form, Sensations 171, 190, 199 Intentionality, structure of, 3, 38-39, Neutralizing, of noeses, 146 45-51, 151-152; and sensory data, Noema, described, 143-145; and act• 48-51, see Schema of matter-form; material, 48; structure of, 143-144, as objectivating, 47, 147-148 ; 151-152; correlated to noesis, 120, reaches reality, 46, 133-136; implies 145-150, 157-158, 165; changes in, reality as horizon, 220 162-163 Intersubjectivity, 2; and genetiC Noesis, described, 140-143; and act• constitution, 190-191 quality, 48; not distinct from hyle, 180; objectivates noema, 147-148; dependent on now-instant, 161- JUdgment, constitution of, 67-68, 162, 199-201, 210; changes in, 163- 168-169; individual and universal, 164; see Noema, Schema of matter• 175; basis of meaning and concepts, form 170-172, 207 Now-instant, described, 84-86; not constituted, 200-201; as ultimate Language, 57-58; see Words. absolute, 161, 200-201; ultimate Life, of consciousness, 184, 206; life source of meaning, 182; as con• philosophy, 184, 189, 207 dition of possibility of immanent Linguistic analysis, 212 objects, 161-162, 199-201, 210; Lived meanings, 172, 208; lived objectivation of, 103; in Phil. world, 184 A rith. , 25; see Partial intention, Logic, foundations and origins of, 37- Phases, Present 39, 167-169; as formal system, 14- Number, explanation of, 8-15, 20; 15, 167; universal applicability of, and multiplicity, 8--9; number 148; and categorical objects, 65-66; series, 32, 224-226; symbolical, 20, and sensory data, 33-35; material, 25-27, 32-33, 224-225 regional logic, 156-158, 212; logical forms and acts, 14-15, 17, 21, 23- Object of reference, constitution of, 24, 38, 148; see Categorical objects. 39, 53-54, 60-61; and meaning, 45- 46; and noema, 143-144, 151-152; Material, of acts, described, 47-48; and pre-predicative constitution, does not constitute meaning, 58- 174-175 59; and noesis, 48, 140 Objectivating acts, described, 46-48; Mathesis universalis, 38 and meaning, 54; and noema, 144; Meaning, and acts of meaning, 43-44; structure of, 47; and time, 103-104 constitution of, 38, 53, 58-60, 143- Objectivity, basic problem in consti• 144; genetic constitution of, 169- tution, 39, 55, 136, 202-204; of 172; and object of reference, 45-46, categorical objects, 71; of content 144, 151; and sensory data, 56, 62- of knowledge, 39, 170; of logical 248 GENERAL INDEX

forms. 16. 18-22. 66. 168; of objectivity. 181-182; in reality. meaning. 43-44. 54; of noematic 221-222 sense. 147-148; of time. IOI-IIO; Profiles. in perception. 61; in all real and schema of matter-form. 54-58. things. 123-125; and time, 89-90; 71. 141. 165. 177. 203-204; ge• makes rigorous science impossible. netically explained. 181-183. 207- 123. 195. 220. 228; can allow 208; see Subjectivity and Ob• apodictic judgment, 221 jectivity Proofs, methods of. 34. 156-157. 212 One. concept of. 12-13. 15 Protention. 84-85 Psychologism. concept of. 209; in Phil. Anth., 6. 18-22.30,34-35.40; Pain. experience of. 90-97 in Log. Unt .• 40; in schema of Paradox. of transcendence. 134-135. matter-form. 178-180, 209-210 165. 227 Partial intentions. and acts. 61. 67. 79. Quality of acts. described, 47-48; and 87; accumulate to constitute im• noesis. 140. shares in constitution of manent objects. 99; not constituted meaning. 59; and time, 93 themselves. 81-82; and consti• Quasi-qualities. 28 tution of judgments. 67-68; equi• valent to temporal phases. 86-88. Reality. presumptive. 125-126; as 91. II3; and evidence. 154-155; and phenomenon. 129-130. 151; as experience of immanent objects. 89- basis for judgments. 170; apodictic 92 as horizon. 219-220; gives con• Passive genesis. 175. 193. 207 sciousness its sense. 220; exists in Perception. basic form of conscious• profiles and change. 221; see Ob• ness. 145; and experience. 51-52. jectivity. Subjectivity and Ob• 89-90; and evidence. 154-155; and jectivity categorical constitution. 67-68; and Reason. and reality. 120. 150-159. categorical objects. 65. 69; and 165. 186-187; reason described. constitution of meanings. 59. 73 ; 152-IS3; and discursive thought. and constitution of objects as IS6-IS7 given. 54. 60; of past. 85; pre• Reduction. beginning of phenome• predicative. 176-177; reaches real nology. II7-II9. 164. 19S. 227; things. 133-136; and sense data. proof of possibility. 121-133; ways 63-65 to reduction. 132-133. 164. 190; Phantoms. 207-208 and constitution. 3. 126-131. I9S- Phases. temporal. described. 84-86; 196; and time, 74-7S. 109; phe• and experience of acts. 88-92; and nomenology of. 213 experience of sensations. 93-98 ; Reflection. on acts. 14. 22 ff.; based same as partial intentions. 86-88. on prior retention. 91; and multi• 91. II3; see Now-instant plicity. 13-14; and formal concepts, Phenomenon. ambiguity of the term. 14-15 228-229; of consciousness to itself. Relations. collective, 10; psychic and 89; of time. 74-75. 101. 108; world primary. 10-1 I; objectivity of. 16; as phenomenon. 129-130. 151 and time. 24 Pre-predicative consciousness. 172- Remembering, and objective time, 177. 207 105-107; and time horizon. 106 Present. living and flowing. 162. 200; Representants. SI; for categorical see Now-instant. objects. 70-71 Primal sensation. 80-82; see Sen• Retention. described. 84-86; and ex• sation perience of immanent objects. 89- Process. leading to groups. 10. 25. 28. 92; and total stream of conscious• 35; leading to logical relations and ness. 92; objectivation of. 103-104; categorical objects. 18-19. 25. 68. prior to apprehension. IIo-II3; 72. 204; in perception. 61. 72, 204; and reflection. 91 leading to immanent objects, 99. Rigorous science. aim of phenome• 205-206; in genetic constitution. nology. 3. II6-II8. 131, 164. 167. 170-172; genetic process leading to 18S. 227; based on subjectivity. GENERAL INDEX 249

124-125. 186. 195. 219; not based 58, 174. 181-182; of noeDlas, 158- on reality. 123-126. 185. 195; 159; of tiDle. 75-76. 100. II5; of includes reality. 130-131. 133. 139. logical fOrIns, 14, 16. 23. 38. 66. 168; 219-220. 227; deDlands return to subjectivity as source for reality, now-instant. 200; only an ideal. 185 136-137; two sources needed for constitution, 218 ScheDla of Dlatter-forIn. described. Space. experience of. 183. 212; and 54-58. 177; first Dlodel for consti• profiles in things. 123; prior to tution. 202-204; and language. 57- constitution of things. 112 58; and Dleaning. 58-59; and ob• Spectator. fallacy of extra. 89. 91 jects. 60; and objective tiDle. 102- Static analysis, 59. 71. 143, 164; 103; and categorical acts. 69-71. surpassed. 183, 206-207 204;andiDlDlanentobjects. 81. II4; StreaDl of consciousness. absolute. 78; as noesis-hyle. 120. 139-143. 165; and experience of iDlDlanent ob• not valid in constitution of acts. 91- jects. 89; no boundaries for. 92; as 92. 205; not valid in constitution of ego. 187; see Ego. Subjectivity. sensations. 94-95. 98. 205; not Structure. of consciousness, 1I7. II9, applicable to sensation and in• 140-143; of logical fOrIns. 16; of tentions. 98. 140. 142. 205; not acts, 47-48, 51. 87; teDlporal valid for objective tiDle. 104-105; structure of acts, 88-92; teDlporal liDlitations of. 204-206. 209-210; as structure of consciousness, 86-88. psychologisDl. 177-178. 180. 209- 186; of categorical acts. 69-71; of 210; rejection of. 177-180. 182. 186. noeDlas. 143-144. 151-152; of tiDle, 205-206; as pedagogical aid. 178; in 76. 85-86; analysis of, 52. 58. 120, Brentano. 56; in other writers. 57. 140; structural analysis surpassed, 215-216; in Phil. Arith.• 203 169, 181-183. 206-207; see Act, Science. theory of. 37. II6-II7 Intentionality, Subjectivity, struc• SediDlent. of earlier judgDlents. 172. ture of 182. 188. 213 Subjectivity, absolutely given, 108- Sensations. as iDlDlanent objects. 77- 109, 123-126. 195-196, 219, 227- 78.80-82; as representants. 51. 79; 228; basis for rigorous science. 124- content is not explained. 97-98; ex• 125. 186, 195. 219, 227-228; and perience of and tiDle. 93-98. II3- sYDlbols, 31; and neo-Kantian II4; equivalent to states of con• constitution, 214-215; and absolute sciousness. 96-97; not distinct froDl streaDl of consciousness. 92; struc• acts. 98. 178-180. 205-206; ex• tural analysis of. 40 ff .• 140 istence of non-intentional. 49. 110- Subjectivity and Objectivity, sub• II3; pre-predicative. 176-177. 207. jectivity separable froDl objectivity, 2II; and genetic constitution. II3. 102, 121-122, 127-128, 138, 164, 177. 2II; see Content of sensation. 195-196; objectivity correlated to Sensory data subjectivity. 108-109. II4, II9. 126- Sense. see Meaning 131, 137-138, 164; 195; objectivity Sensory data. experience of. 51-52; transcendent to subjectivity. 133- apprehension of. 55-56. 141-142; 136, 165, 196-197, 228-229; sub• and intentional acts. 48-51; as jectivity is condition of possibility appearances. 51. 79; and content of for reality of objectivity, 126-131, Dleaning. 62-65, 149, 210-211; and 137-138, 159. 191- 193, 195-197, logical entities, 33-36; for cate• 199 gorical objects, 70-71; for objective SYDlbols. and nUDlbers. 20, 25 ff., tiDle. 102-105; see Content of 224-225; and Dlultitudes, 27; and sensations, ScheDla of Dlatter-forDl. sense q.ata, 63; not explained in Sensations Phil. A1"ith., 30-33, 35 SiDlultaneity. 25, 85 SODlething, concept of, 12; priority of Teleology, of noetic-hyletic patterns, this concept. 15; and nUDlbers, 20 141-142, 171. 227; of growth of Sources, of nUDlbers, 7-II, 15, 24 ff. ; Dleaning. 171; of pre-predicative of sytnbolic nUDlbers, 25 ff., 32; of constitution. 175, 207 sYDlbols, 30-32; of Dleaning, 38, 57- TeDlporality, as phenoDlenon, 74-75; 250 GENERAL INDEX

as process, 99; origin of, 75-76; and Thing, perception of, 177; constitution numbers, 24-25, 36; world time, 75, of in Log. Unt., 54; genetic consti• 79, 101-IIO; and experience of tution of, 169, 175 immanent objects, 80, 82-84; and Transcendence, of things is consti• experience of acts, 88-92; and ex• tuted, 133-136; paradox of, 134- perience of sensations, 93-98; per• 135, 165, 227; see Subjectivity and vades consciousness and its objects, Objectivity 22, 143, 183, 206, 208, 222; as final absolute, 77-78, 142, 160-162, 199- Variation, free, 53 201; basis of obscurity in ego, 161, 186, 190; excluded in Idem I, 120, Ways to reduction, 132-133, 164, 196 140, 159-162; as condition of Will, 188 possibility, 161-162, 199-201, 210; Words, word meanings, 42-.U; written two flows of time needed, 222 arabesques, 31; see Language