Coalitions and Political Order in Northern Côte D'ivoire
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Concordia University Research Repository ‘Big-Men’ Coalitions and Political Order in Northern Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2013) Jeremy S. Speight A Thesis in The Department of Political Science Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of: Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science) at Concordia University Montréal. Quebec, Canada August 2015 © Jeremy Speight, 2015 CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY School of Graduate Studies This is to certify that the thesis prepared By: Jeremy S. Speight Entitled: ‘Big-Men’ Coalitions and Political Order in Northern Côte d’Ivoire (2002- 2013) and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of: Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science) complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality. Signed by the final Examining Committee: _________________________________Chair Dr. Effrosyni Diamantoudi _________________________________Examiner Dr. Leander Schneider _________________________________Examiner Dr. Michael Lipson _________________________________External to Program Dr. Kregg Hetherington _________________________________External Examiner Dr. Pierre Englebert _________________________________Supervisor Dr. Amy Poteete Approved by: ________________________________________ Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director _____________2015 __________________________________ Dean of Faculty ABSTRACT ‘Big-Men’ Coalitions and Political Order in Northern Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2013) Jeremy Speight, Ph.D Concordia University 2015 Civil war creates significant opportunities for the contestation of political authority. In Sub- Saharan Africa, rebels commonly use organized violence to challenge the authority of pre- conflict elites. Nonetheless, armed movements also ally with pre-conflict elite actors as a strategy for mobilizing popular support and maintaining political order. Contestation and cooperation between rebels and pre-conflict elites is possible because local communities are often comprised of multiple elite groups. What explains coalitional choices? Why do local leaders of armed movements ally with certain actors and not others? These questions are puzzling because local- level rebel leaders sometimes make counterintuitive coalitional choices that restrict their ability to establish and maintain social control. To explore the relationship between coalition-building and control, this study focuses on the political crisis and war-to-peace transition in Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2013). It compares three towns – Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou – that fell under the military control of the principal armed movement involved in the conflict, the Forces Nouvelles (FN). Despite being under the control of the same group, each of these cases demonstrated marked variation in the ability of the FN to politically control local populations. My argument is advanced in two steps. First, what explains patterns of coalition-building in rebel-held zones? I argue that coalition-building is shaped by pre-conflict brokerage relations. Brokers are those political actors that link local communities to the state. I argue that if elites function as brokers between local communities and the central state in the pre-conflict period, this limits their availability as potential allies for leaders of armed movements. Pre-conflict brokerage relations constrain the choice of potential local partners. Second and relatedly, this study explains levels of control established by armed movements that result from coalition- building. The wartime authority of armed movements can, in some cases, be met with stiff resistance from local actors. In others, the wartime political order imposed by armed movements is underwritten by broad support within local communities. I explain these differences by focusing on what I call ‘hierarchical configurations’. Hierarchical configurations describe the relative levels of social hierarchy of competing elite groups. I argue that the level of wartime control established by armed movements is a function of variation in hierarchical configurations because these differences influence the political clout of rebel allies relative to their broker counterparts (or those elites aligned with the state). In summary, pre-conflict brokerage relations influence the coalition-building strategies of armed groups. These coalition-building strategies shape levels of contestation and rebel control as a result of variation in local-level hierarchical configurations. iii Acknowledgements Writing and finishing a dissertation is a stark reminder that life’s accomplishments are rarely ever the result of the work of any one individual. In completing this dissertation, I have indebted myself to a great number of people. First, I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) for funding received in 2010-2011. Without SSHRC’s support, fieldwork for this research project would not have been possible. At Concordia, I developed many debts that I hope one day will be repaid. My supervisor, Amy Poteete, has generously supported me throughout my doctoral studies. I will be forever grateful for her time, effort and commitment to this project. Her willingness to read and comment on a now unknowable number of draft chapters greatly contributed to the overall quality of the dissertation. She represents the kind of professional scholar worthy of emulation by any grad student. Leander Schneider has been invested in this project from its early days as well. He has been a constant source of encouragement during my time at Concordia. Michael Lipson became of committee member later on, but provided invaluable support and constructive criticism during the later stages of the writing the process. In a variety of different ways – from providing commentary on papers to casual chats in the hallways – many others at Concordia contributed to the completion of this project. I received constant support from Elizabeth Bloodgood, Graham Dodds, Peter Stoett, Daniel Douek, Tina Hilgers, Axel Huelsemeyer, Ara Karaboghossian, Jean- Francois Mayer, Norrin Ripson, Francesca Scala, Kimberly Manning, Marlene Sokolon, Peter Stoett and Arjun Trembley. Wednesday morning hockey with Patrik Marier was the ‘necessary distraction’ required for the completion of any dissertation project. The shared stresses of graduate school forged close friendships with other students, at Concordia and elsewhere. At Concordia, I could not have gotten through the program without the friendship of Renee St. Amant, Phillip Villard, Nika Deslauriers, Marek Brzezinski, Kerry Tannahill, Ali Halawi, Chris Bourne, Cherry Marshall, Hannah Ivanoff, Osman Shah, Kenneth Martin, Josh Libben, Jocelyn McGrandle, Dennis Molina, Matthew Flanagan, Alan Wong, Laura Khattab and Munir Katul. While at Concordia, Julie Blumer and Kathryn Rawlings kept my head on straight. Throughout my time at Concordia, I was privileged to be able to work closely with a number of graduate students at other universities, including Matthew I. Mitchell, Kathrin Heitz, Katrin Wittig and Maja Bovcon. David Hornsby remains one of my closest friends and cherished colleagues. He has been a constant source of support. During the last year of writing the dissertation, I was fortunate to be part of the Department of Political Science at Memorial University of Newfoundland. This last year was difficult both professionally and personally. I could not have gotten through the year without the many lunches, beers, squash games and support from Amanda Bittner, Russell Williams, Scott Matthews, Dimitri Panagos, Lucian Ashworth, Karlo Basta, Matthew LeRiche and Osvaldo Croci. I am indebted to a number of people in and outside of Côte d’Ivoire who made fieldwork possible. Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni spoke to me on several occasions, in Montréal and Côte d’Ivoire. She helped me with the details of the trip and for this I am grateful. Mohamed, Sekou, iv Ibrahima and Des assisted me in a countless number of ways during my stay in Côte d’Ivoire. I could not managed those seven months in Côte d’Ivoire without their help. So many other Ivoirians took time out of their schedules to meet and talk with me. This dissertation could not have been written without their willingness to share their stories and experiences with me. Melanie Ferrara, my talented sister-in-law, assisted me with the creation of the maps used in the dissertation. Finally, this project would not have been completed without the loving support of my dear wife Stephanie Ferrara. Writing and finishing this dissertation (even the acknowledgements!) has been much more emotional than I ever thought it would be, largely because this project was always part of the background to all the other things we have gone through over the last year. I hope its completion is part of the beginning of many happy years ahead. Thanks so much for your constant encouragement and willingness to put up with the absent-mindedness that comes from writing a dissertation. I always wanted to dedicate this dissertation to you, but I am sure you won’t mind if I dedicate it to our sweet daughter Ellie, who left us far too soon. v For Ellie vi Table of Contents PART I ............................................................................................................................................. 1 Chapter 1. Coalitions and Control: Political Authority in Violent Conflict ........................