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King and Karabell BS k o No. 2 • March 2011 o l Iran’s Secret Network: Major General Qassem t Suleimani’s Inner Circle u O By Ali Alfoneh This is the second in a series of Middle Eastern Outlooks about Qassem Suleimani.1 n r On January 24, 2011, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei promoted Qassem Suleimani, chief of the Quds Force e of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), to major general, the highest rank in the IRGC since the end of t the Iran/Iraq war in 1988.2 As discussed in the first Outlook in this series, Suleimani’s rise to prominence in the IRGC has been gradual rather than meteoric. His personal and professional background and the Taliban takeover of s Afghanistan in the late 1990s helped advance his career. However, Suleimani’s network matters, too. This Outlook a identifies members of Suleimani’s network within and outside the IRGC. It also argues that fluctuations in their careers could serve as indicators of Suleimani’s authority in the Islamic Republic. E From September 1981 until the end of the Iraq competition, factionalism, and outright enmity e war in 1988, Suleimani was stationed at the between them. It is therefore important to seek l 3 Southern front. The Forty-First Tharallah reliable information about Suleimani’s factional d Division participated in most major military loyalties within the IRGC. operations under his command, and he was in d daily contact with all the important IRGC Suleimani’s Network within the IRGC i commanders. Suleimani maintained those relationships after the end of the war during This Outlook identifies two political letters signed M his tenure as IRGC Kerman chief, and after his by Suleimani and a group of other IRGC com- appointment as IRGC Quds Force chief sometime manders that shed light on Suleimani’s factional between September 10, 1997, and March 21, network within the IRGC. The first is an open 1998.4 This Outlook therefore argues that Suleimani’s network of IRGC commanders during the war is more important than any other Key points in this Outlook: network he may have had before. • Two letters reveal Major General Qassem But Suleimani’s extensive war-era network Suleimani’s secret network in Iran. poses an analytical challenge. Reconstructing the IRGC’s order of battle during the war with • Suleimani’s inner circle has risen to power Iraq and since the end of the war is beyond within the Islamic Revolutionary Guards the scope of this Outlook. Also, the fact that Corps since the Iran/Iraq war. Suleimani was in contact with many other top • By following fluctuations in the careers of IRGC commanders does not preclude fierce other individuals in Suleimani’s network, we Ali Alfoneh ([email protected]) is a resident fellow can assess his power in the Islamic Republic. at AEI. 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202.862.5800 www.aei.org • Ahmad Gholampour • Amin Shariati • Morteza Ghorbani • Nour-Ali Shoushtari • Mohammad-Ali [Aziz] Jafari • Qassem Suleimani • Gholamreza Jalali • Ali [-Reza] Zahedi • Ahmad Kazemi • Yaghoub Zohdi - 2- • Mohammad Kowsari letter signed by thirty-four IRGC commanders praising FIGURE 1 Mohsen Rezai upon his resignation as IRGC chief, MAJOR GENERAL QASSEM SULEIMANI’S NETWORK which coincided with President Mohammad Khatami’s Major General Qassem Suleimani’s Network first term in office in 1997. In the letter, the com- manders thank God for having had the opportunity to • Ali [-Akbar] Ahmadian • Habib Kashani “soldier and study” with• Rezai[Mahmoud ]“forAhmad palmostour [Daryani] two• Ya zdecades,”dan [Moyed-Nia] Sodagar Ahmadian and stress that Rezai was• Hlikedossein Ala ybothi by Khomeini• Assadolla handNaseh • [Mahmoud] Ahmadpour • Mehdi Rabbani Shamkhani Ahmadpour Khamenei.5 The letter •wasAkba ranGham outrightkhar act of• Mprotestorteza Saffar at Assadi Rezai’s dismissal. Rezai •hadHosse icriticizedn Hamadani Khatami• Ho sduringsein Salami Salami Ahmadpour • Seifollah Heydarpour • Ali Shamkhani Bagheri [Afshordi] [Daryani] the presidential campaign• Gh oandlamreza theJafari commanders• Ahma dblamedSodagar Fadavi Fazli Ghaani • Habib Kashani Saffar Khatami for his firing. The• Yazd ansecond[Moyed-Nia] letter, signed Gholampour Ghorbani Jafari Alayi Jalali Kazemi Kowsari by a group of IRGC commanders,• Assadollah Naseh threatens that if • Mehdi Rabbani Rabbani Mehrabi Qalibaf Raoufi Ghamkhar the Khatami government• M ofailsrteza Sa ftofar suppress the student Rashid Roudaki Shariati • Hossein Salami uprising of 1999, they will• Ali S takehamkhan ithe issue into their own Naseh Shoushtari Suleimani • Ahmad Sodagar Zahedi Zohdi Hamadani hands6 (see appendix). Yazdan Since Suleimani is a signatory to both letters, his net- [Moyed-Nia] Heydarpour work may best be illustrated by two concentric circles. Kashani Jafari According to this model, signatories of both letters in the inner circle constitute Suleimani’s core network; sig- natories of one letter, who appear in the outer circle, Signatories to one letter Signatories to both letters may have a relationship with Suleimani but are not as close as the individuals in the inner circle (see figure 1). NOTE: The names signed to the letters do not include the bracketed material. The inner circle is composed of twenty-one individ- SOURCE: “Nameh-ye Sardaran-e Defae-e Moghaddas Ba’d Az Este’fa-ye Doktor Rezai” uals, including current important IRGC commanders [Letter of Sacred Defense Commanders Following Resignation of Dr. Rezai], Forum Persian Tools Blog (Tehran), May 30, 2005, http://forum.persiantools.com/t19600 such as Mohammad-Ali Aziz Jafari, IRGC chief; Ali .html (accessed February 6, 2011); and “Matn-e Kamel-e Nameh-ye Farmandehan-e Fadavi, IRGC Navy chief; Ali Fazli, Basij deputy; and Sepah Be Khatami” [The Complete Text of the Letter of the Guards Commanders to Khatami], Aftab News Agency (Tehran), June 11, 2005, www.aftabnews.ir/vdcftjyd Esmail Ghaani, Suleimani’s deputy in the Quds Force. w6de.html (accessed February 6, 2011). Twelve of them were IRGC division chiefs during the war with Iraq, which is the most significant factor. Three were Iran/Iraq war–era IRGC base chiefs, three were Comparing the careers of the officers in the inner and war-era IRGC intelligence chiefs, and two were IRGC outer circles shows that the outer members had slightly operations deputies. With the exception of Yaghoub higher positions during the war with Iraq. With the Zohdi, whose role during the war could not be estab- exception of current IRGC deputy Hossein Salami, how- lished, all members of this circle were engaged in daily ever, officers from the outer circle have become scholars warfare during the war with Iraq (see appendix). at various IRGC research centers or have gone into busi- The composition of the outer circle of Suleimani’s ness. Suleimani and other individuals from the inner cir- network is very different. Out of the sixteen members, cle had slightly lower positions during the war but enjoy four were Iran/Iraq war–era top commanders, including top positions within the IRGC today, which may indi- Mahmoud Ahmadpour, deputy IRGC minister; Ali cate that they promoted each others’ careers within the Shamkhani, IRGC ground forces chief; Hossein Alayi, IRGC (see appendix). IRGC Navy chief; and Akbar Ghamkhar, IRGC logis- This is an important insight that not only helps us tics chief. Two were division chiefs, one was a division understand Suleimani’s authority today, but also provides deputy, and one was a battalion chief. The outer circle analytical tools to assess future changes in his power. includes no base chiefs, but slightly lower-level military If Suleimani’s fortunes depend on the fortunes of the personnel: a logistics deputy, an operations deputy, and members of his network, fluctuations in their careers an intelligence deputy. This circle also includes three could indicate changes in his authority. Apart from this, IRGC navy commanders. The role of Mehdi Rabbani Suleimani and members of the inner circle may also con- and Yazdan [Moyed-Nia] during the war with Iraq could stitute the dominant faction in the IRGC responsible for not be established (see appendix). strategic decision making within the IRGC and possibly - 3- in the Islamic Republic at large. By systematically analyz- Suleimani and other commanders that opposed the opera- ing statements made by these individuals, we may at the tion did not come up with an alternative war plan.13 Fol- very least better grasp the dominant strategic thinking lowing the Iraqi counteroffensive that proved disastrous within the IRGC. for Iranian forces, Suleimani openly accused Rezai of not having a plan for the war on January 1, 1988.14 Ebbs and flows in the careers of the Suleimani’s criticism provoked harsh comments from Yahya Rahim Safavi, then–IRGC ground forces deputy.15 members of Suleimani’s network After the end of the war, Suleimani was appointed IRGC within the IRGC could serve as Kerman chief, which does not indicate a close relation- ship with Rafsanjani.16 indicators of Suleimani’s fortunes. Suleimani and Ahmadinejad Suleimani and Rafsanjani Suleimani’s possible connections before and after the 1979 revolution with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Although Suleimani and former Iranian president Ali- and his close advisers, Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi17 and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani are both from Kerman Esfandiar Rahim-Mashaei, may also be a contributing Province, information about early contact between the factor to his rise in power and authority in the Islamic two is unavailable in the open-source material. There is Republic. Indeed, addressing IRGC veterans, Suleimani also no reference to contacts between Suleimani and defended the regime after Iran’s contested June 12, 2009, well-known clerical revolutionary figures from Kerman presidential elections.18 such as Mohammad-Javad Bahonar, Mohammad-Ali Suleimani could have established a working relation- Movahedi Kermani, and Yahya Jafari. It is quite possible ship with Ahmadinejad and Hashemi as early as 1979, that Suleimani and Rafsanjani did not have any ties when Suleimani was deployed with a company-size before the Iran/Iraq war.
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