I 47 the BDS Movement and European Leaders
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The BDS Movement and European Leaders: Mixed Trends and Questions about the Future The BDS Movement and European Leaders: Mixed Trends and Questions about the Future Shimon Stein and Gallia Lindenstrauss The BDS movement, which was founded in 2005, has called upon international civil society to divest from and boycott Israel, similar to the sanctions imposed on apartheid South Africa. The call was intended to assist in achieving the aims of the movement: terminating Israeli control over Palestinian and Arab territory conquered in 1967, destroying the security fence and Israeli settlements in the West Bank, ending Israeli discrimination against its Palestinian citizens, and respecting UN decisions regarding the right of Palestinians to return to their homes. A number of statements have been made in recent years by senior European leaders about BDS. For example, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Jerusalem in February 2014, she said: “We do not support the demands for a boycott. This is not an option for Germany.”1 This article examines whether this statement by Merkel reflects a similar trend in other central European countries – the UK, France, and Spain2 – and discusses to what extent decision makers are aware of the trends of delegitimization. It also questions whether there are trends that counterbalance the negative influences of delegitimization among decision makers in these countries. After over a decade of activity, it is fair to say that the BDS movement, whose activity is focused mainly in the Western world, has based itself in the margins of civil society in a number of countries (for example, the UK, Ireland, Sweden, France, and Spain), succeeding from time to time to penetrate the awareness of mainstream civil society. The movement’s agenda The Delegitimization Phenomenon: Challenges and Responses I 47 Einav Yogev and Gallia Lindenstrauss, Editors 48 I Shimon Stein and Gallia Lindenstrauss received media attention in the wake of the EU decision to label products from West Bank settlements and to prevent the transfer of money to fund EU activities beyond the Green Line. Among the movement’s achievements in Europe were its Apartheid Week activities in London in February 2016, when anti-Israel posters were posted at a number of underground stations, and the decision (later retracted) by the large department store in Berlin, KaDeWe, to remove wine produced in West Bank settlements and the Golan Heights from its shelves following the EU decision in November 2015 to label goods produced in the territories. BDS also takes credit for successes such as the decisions by a number of European corporations to end operations in Israel: the French infrastructure company Veolia, the Irish construction company CRH, and the French cell phone company Orange, as well as the announcement by the British private security company G4S that it will end operations in the future.3 Despite EU declarations that the decision to label products from the territories was a purely technical step,4 the move can be seen as an explicitly political act intended to highlight the distinction between Israel and the occupied territories. This act is seen by supporters of BDS and by some in Israel as the imposition of a boycott on Israel or at least a first step in that direction.5 However, the European Union, aware of the BDS movement and its goals, has made clear its opposition to BDS and its anti-Israel activities on a number of occasions. Thus, for example, the EU ambassador to Israel, Lars Faaborg-Andersen, during his speech at the Stop the Boycott Conference organized by the newspaper Yediot Ahronot in March 2016, said that “the European Union is against BDS, our policy is totally the opposite of BDS, our policy is one of engagement with Israel and we have a long, long track record to prove it.” Regarding the labeling of products made in the settlements, he said: “It is very important to distinguish between BDS and our policy regarding the settlements, which has no connection to BDS.”6 Similar statements have been made by European leaders and governments, who distinguish between criticism of Israeli policy on the settlements and the occupied territories and calls and actions intended to boycott Israel. On inaugurating a financing project for medical cooperation between Israel and the UK in February 2015, David Cameron, the former UK prime minister, said: “I have a clear message – Britain opposes boycotts... Israel’s place as a homeland for the Jewish people will never rest on hollow resolutions passed by amateur politicians.”7 President François Hollande, in a phone The BDS Movement and European Leaders: Mixed Trends and Questions about the Future I 49 call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in July 2015, expressed his strong opposition to boycotting Israel and his desire to maintain the economic relations between France and Israel. This occurred subsequent to an uproar over the remarks of the CEO of Orange, the French cell phone company, in Cairo, stating his decision to end the company’s operations in Israel (which took effect in early 2016), seemingly demonstrating the company’s capitulation to demands by boycott supporters (despite his later denials).8 In the wake of the decision to label settlement products in July 2015, a spokesperson for Angela Merkel said that “there will not be an Israel boycott in Germany. Israeli products will, of course, continue to receive preferential market access.”9 Nonetheless, Merkel’s government responded in the negative when asked whether it sees BDS as anti-Semitic.10 The BDS movement also engages in extensive activity in Spain. In August 2015 the management of a reggae festival announced (and later retracted after condemnations by politicians) the cancellation of a show in Valencia by the Jewish-American musician Matisyahu due to the activity of a local BDS chapter. Spokespersons for the chapter claimed that the musician refused to clarify his position on a Palestinian state. The Spanish Foreign Ministry condemned the cancellation but noted that Spain supports the establishment of a Palestinian state as a result of bilateral negotiations.11 At the same time, the Spanish government promoted actions that are consistent with those endorsed by the BDS movement in Spain. For example, the Spanish Agency for International Development (an operational arm of the Foreign Ministry) helped subsidize organizations that work to delegitimize Israel.12 Nonetheless, the former prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar, who in the past had promoted a proposal to expand the NATO alliance to include Israel, Australia, and Japan,13 stated in 2010 that if “Israel falls, we [the West] all fall,”14 and in 2011 the then foreign minister, Trinidad Jimenez, declared that “Israel is the homeland of the Jews.”15 These declarations by Cameron and Jimenez about Israel as the Jewish homeland are unusual. While EU leaders have publically held back from calls to boycott Israel, they have remained quiet on the question of Israel’s delegitimization. The European Union has repeatedly declared its support for a two-state solution but refrains from referring to two states for two nations. Even if there is an understanding among EU decision makers that Israel is the state of the Jewish people, they eschew saying so explicitly due, in part, to the lack of consensus on this issue. 50 I Shimon Stein and Gallia Lindenstrauss There appears to be a disparity between Israel’s negative public image in West European countries16 and the basic commitment of the European political elite to the continued existence of the State of Israel – a commitment that derives from a more pragmatic and complex understanding of the strategic reality. Provided it is not too wide, this disparity currently allows leaders some flexibility. There is, however, concern that if the disparity becomes too wide, the political elite will have difficulty ignoring Israel’s negative image. A similar disparity can be seen between the political elite and the advocates of the boycott, who have a not insignificant influence on the mainstream of various population groups. This disparity was illustrated, for example, by the publication of regulations in the UK prohibiting pension funds from basing their investment policy on unrelated matters such as political boycotts. Likewise, regulations were passed prohibiting local governments from acts of boycott in the issuing or awarding of tenders, based on the claim that such actions violate World Trade Organization regulations.17 It should nonetheless be pointed out that the official justification for these regulations was economic and resulted from international legal considerations and not from opposition to the BDS movement itself.18 In France, as laws against discrimination already make things difficult for supporters of the BDS movement, new legislation is unnecessary.19 In Spain too, the media furor surrounding the cancellation of Matisyahu’s performance and the condemnation by politicians acted as a boomerang against the BDS movement.20 However, winds of change are blowing in Europe, which can be seen, for example, in the statement by the Dutch foreign minister, Bert Koenders – following similar statements in Sweden and Ireland – that calling for a boycott of Israel is legitimate within the framework of freedom of expression.21 The BDS movement operates against the backdrop of much larger burning issues on the European agenda, including the refugee crisis, Brexit, and the EU’s economic and political crisis. Competition for public attention is therefore difficult, particularly if no large-scale military offensive breaks out in Gaza. From Israel’s perspective, there are both advantages and disadvantages to the weakening of some of the veteran political parties in Europe and the rise of new right-wing populist parties. Some of these right-wing parties, such as France’s far-right National Front headed by Marine Le Pen, are currently open to some of Israel’s claims.22 But Israel must ask itself whether, in light of the moral dilemmas involved, it is interested in a connection with extreme right-wing parties.