Chapter 2

Conceptual Clarification of ‘Axiology’, Its Antecedents And Parameters

2.1. Western Philosophy:

2.1.1. History of Western Philosophy: Philosophy in the Western world is traditionally traced back to ancient Greece, particularly to the region of Ionia, which includes Attica (especially Athens), Samos, Miletus, Ephesus, and the islands strung along the Aegean Sea from southeastern Greece to the western coast of Asia Minor. The three men regarded as the first philosopher were Thales (e.624-546 B.C.), Anaximander (e. 610-545 B.C.), and Anaximenes ( fl. 585-528 B.C.). Since they lived in Miletus (which was probably the capital of Ionia during the sixth century B.C.), these philosophers and their followers became known as the Milesian School. The Milesian philosophers are also referred to as Ionian Physicist because of their almost exclusive interest in physics, or more properly, cosmology, as this term used in philosophy. Cosmology is that branch of metaphysics which deals with the nature or essence of the orderly universe cosmos. History attributes remarkable intellectual accomplishments to Thales, the first of the Milesians, who predicted the eclipse of the sun (for May 28, 585 B.C.), determined height of the pyramids (by measuring their shadows), and invented a device for calculating the distance of ships at sea. Thale made his principle contribution to philosophy by postulating a single substance, water, as the cosmic stuff comprising the universe. It is not difficult to understand why he selected water as the basic component, for water exists in all three forms of matter: liquid, solid and gas. Furthermore, with keen insight he decided that all matter must consist of a single substance which remains in the same despite such different states of aggregation. Using these theories to explain the position of the earth among the planets, he concluded that the earth is floating in space, just as a ball floats in water. Thales and other philosophers believed in the doctrine of hylozoism (or hylopsychism ), the theory the matter possesses life or sensation that life and matter are inseparable. The Milesians ascribed life or soul to substance, and, according to Thales,

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God is in everything, in all three forms and manifestation of matter. Thus he even attributed a soul to the magnet because it has the power to attract metallic objects. According to Anaximander, ultimate cosmic matter consists of Apeiron that is the Boundless , or the Infinite . The fundamental elements of matter are of necessity infinite; otherwise they could not account for the ceaseless, multifarious creations and changes which take place in nature. If natural processes are infinite, they would eventually exhaust their creative potentialities and cease; consequently, the Boundless, God, must be infinite, unlike the finite forms of matter which proceed from it. Matter is perceptible, but that fundamental reality, from which it originates, the Infinite or God, is imperceptible. Finally, Anaximander formulated a theory on the transmigration of souls. According to his theory (which appears to have been quite similar to the Hindu point of view) cosmic matter creates itself disintegrates. And then recreates itself in a perpetual life process of never ending transformations. The third philosopher selected air as the fundamental substance; also rejection the Boundless of Anaximander, he attributed the origin of the entire universe to air. Since air is the most mobile of all elements, is essential to the growth of all natural objects and thus to life itself, it contributes the only satisfactory basis for the explanation of reality. 1 From these meager beginnings among the Milesian thinkers, philosophy was introduced into the Western world. The way philosophy started proved to be most favorable to the development of science, for these earliest philosopher were interested primarily in scientific knowledge, that is to say, in knowledge about physical world, an interest which has been the centre of attention among modern scientists to the present. It was in a much later period than the Milesian, especially during the time of Socrates, that man’s thoughts turned to a philosophy of practical life, a pragmatic philosophy which a person could practice and live by. Meanwhile, the Milesian philosophers had initiated the search for ultimate answers to questions about the true nature of universe. A number of great philosophers followed the Milesians during the pre-Socratic period, beginning with Xenophanes of Colophon and Heraclitus of Ephesus. All of them concentrated on the problems of metaphysics, the attempt unveil the mysteries of ultimate reality, to account for the origin of the physical universe, and to demonstrate how the phenomenal facts manifested in human experience stem from ultimate reality. 2 The Greeks are the precursors of Western European philosophy. Pythagoras coined the term philosophy and it came to symbolize one’s love for wisdom. Pythagoras

1 . William S. Sahakian, History of Philosophy, New York, Barnes & Noble Books, 1968, pp.1ff 2 . Ibid, pp. 3f. 17

(6 th century B.C.) and the Pythagorean School represent the next important movement. They maintained that the origin of the universe is number. The Pythagoras considered this discovery a secrete doctrine. They might have thought that the world was ultimately due to some numerical relation between the ultimate part of the world, whatever they might be Russell thinks that, according to Pythagoras, these constitute might be atomic. The Pythagoras conception of number was crude and naive, being that of shapes. 3 The Pre- Socratic Greek philosophy concerned itself with the problems of origin and the nature of the universe. Socrates is credited to have brought philosophy from heaven to earth, i.e., he not only discussed philosophy with the common people where they habitually congregated but also because he made man a central theme of his philosophy. His emphasis on human values is contained in his famous statements such as ‘Virtue is knowledge’ and ‘Know thyself’ The philosophical principles such as these made philosophy a practical thing. 4 This goes with the idea of “know thyself “ of Upani ṣad , Atman is a central idea in all of the Upani ṣads and “know your Atman” is their thematic focus in Katha Upani ṣad , in book 1, hymn 3.3 to 3.4, describes the widely cited analogy of chariot for the relation of “Soul, Self” to body, mind and senses. The hymn says: +Éi¨ÉÉxÉ ®úÊlÉxÉÆ Ê´ÉvnùÒ ¶É®úÒ®ú ®úlɨÉä´É iÉÖ ¤ÉÖÎvnù iÉÖ ºÉÉ®úÊlÉ Ê´ÉÎvnù ¨ÉxÉ: |ÉOɽþ¨Éä´É SÉ **3** 5 Know that the Atman sitting within is the master of the chariot which is the body; know the pure discriminating intellect to be the charioteer and the mind as the reins. 6 In Plato’s philosophical thinking the idea of Good came to be treated as the ultimate reality as well as ultimately the highest goal of human life. Plato conceives of the ultimate real in terms of his famous value-triad of truth, beauty and goodness, the truly real is truly good and truly good is the truly beautiful. It is similar to “ºÉiªÉÆ Ê¶É´ÉÆ

ºÉÖÆnù®ú¨É” of Indian philosophy. The beauty in nature is nothing but the imperfect manifestation of the idea of good. Aristotle was pre-eminently, a metaphysical thinker yet in his philosophy, there is found an emphasis on the ideas of perfection. This means that everything in this universe is constantly striving for its own perfection. The Stoics

3.Bertrand Russel, A History of Western Philosophy, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1945, p. 63. 4.S.G.Nigal, Vedic Philosophy of Values , New Delhi, Northern Book Centre, 2009, p. 4. 5.Geeta Press, Gorakhpur, Kathopnisad, 3.3, p. 76. 6. Swami Satyananda Saraswati, Nine Principle Upani ṣads, Yoga Publication Trust, 2007, p. 121. 18 also invoked the principle of moral excellence. To them, the rationality and divinity of nature and man were complementary. They maintained that the moral laws were in harmonious unison with the laws of nature. 7 In the succeeding phase of medieval philosophy, the supremacy in philosophical thinking passed from rationality to dogmatic theology. The quest for secular values was turned into veritable efforts at God-realization and this came to be upheld as the highest value of human life. For St. Augustine, Thomas Acquinas and many others. God became the ultimate value to be realized and attained faith, hope, charity and many akin theological virtues were preached by the medieval theologians and philosophers. During the renaissance, Descartes and others accepted provisional doubt of a starting point of their philosophizing. Self-consciousness according to Descartes was indubitable. Some philosophers like Locke and Hume emphasized the importance of sense experience, and others, Descartes and Spinoza emphasized reason as the source and standard of knowledge. And even here there were philosopher like Spinoza for whom philosophy was intimately connected with human life. In the eighteenth century, Kant tried to reconcile rationalism and empiricism. Though Kant was mainly concern with epistemological problems, yet he gave importance to and upheld the claims of practical or moral reason. He asserted the dignity of man as a member of “The Kingdom of ends” and showed that moral law is the expression of man’s rationality. It was the first time in Western philosophy that moral consciousness was treated as sui-generis. Fichte regarded the practical aspect of the self as more fundamental than the theoretical one. According to him, non-ego can be conquered solely through the practical activity of the self. For Hegel philosophy was concerned mainly with ontology. Thus up to Hegel the nature and the methods of Western philosophy were mainly epistemological, notwithstanding that values were implied as well as presupposed in their philosophizing 8.

2.1.2. The Nature of Philosophy:

The word ‘philosophy’ consists of two Greek words, namely ‘ philos ’ and ‘Sophia ’ Hence the etymological meaning of the term is the ‘the friendship or love of wisdom’. As such, a philosopher may be called a ‘ wise man ’ However, this title is too pretentious. Therefore, Socrates defined philosopher as ‘a seeker of after wisdom’. Even, when, so defined the term ‘philosophy’ does not become any more precise. The

7. S.G.Nigal, op. cit. p. 4. 8. Ibid, ,p.5. 19 important thing is to note that philosophy seeks wisdom, and not knowledge. |ÉYÉÉ (wisdom) and not the empirical knowledge: 9 ºÉ´ÉÉÇ {ÉÞÎl´ÉÊ´É Ê´ÉkÉäxÉ {ÉÚhÉÉÇ ºªÉÉiEòlÉÆ iÉäxÉɨÉÞiÉÉ ºªÉÉʨÉiÉÒ Even if the world be full of wealth, how does this lead to immortality? Again: 10 ªÉäxÉɽÆþ xÉɨÉÞiÉÉ ºªÉÉÆ ÊEò¨É½Æþ iÉäxÉ EÖòªÉÉǨÉ This search after wisdom is a comprehensive undertaking and is directed to the solutions of such problems. In the Western Modern Philosophy Kant outlined the problems of philosopher thus: 1. What can I do? 2. What I ought to do? 3. What may I hope? From the above consideration it follows that the subject matter of philosophy is all comprehensive. According to Whitehead it is descriptive “of the generalities which apply to all the details of experience”. Similarly, Hoernle holds that to philosophies is ‘to seek an attitude towards the universe as a whole’. Thus philosophy is both an intellectual pursuit and an attitude to the reality as a whole. Hence an author of the book, defined philosophy as a resolute and persistent attempt to understand and appreciate the universe as a whole.11

2.1.3. Definition And Meaning of Philosophy : It is very difficult to define philosophy as much as it is difficult to define Art and Religion. The concept of philosophy is so universal and comprehensive that it never excludes any particular approach or definition. Ever since the first man born into this world, he began to philosophies in the sense that he started raising question within himself and trying to answer them by himself. The word ‘philosophy’ literally means ‘love of wisdom’. For our purpose let us examine some of the major approaches or conception involved in the West. At the first instance, philosophy has been as the ‘synthesis of the sciences’. It however means a systematic knowledge of the physical world from a comprehensive angle. In this particular sense, philosophy can be defined as

9. Brih. Upanishad, 2.4.2. This is question asked by Maitreyi. 10 . Ibid, 2.4.3.3. Svet Upanishad 1. 11 . Y. Masiah, A critical History of Western Philosophy, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, 2016, p. xvii 20 the universal science. When we say universal science, we automatically mean that science which tends to units and synthesis the results of the special sciences into a consistent system. Herbert Spencer belongs to this category who attempted to explain philosophy in terms of unified knowledge. Secondly, when philosophy has been approached from the logical stand-point it has been defined as the logic of the sciences. According to third interpretation, philosophy is no other than the knowledge of the metaphysics. Metaphysics is the science of being que being . It is also interpreted as the science of the ultimate Nature. Kant one of the greatest philosopher of the modern period, he has defined philosophy as the metaphysics of experience . Some time he tried to define philosophy is an ‘ apriori knowledge ’. 12 Yet in spite of diversity, philosophy is important. Plato declared that philosophy is a gift the gods have bestowed on mortals. 13 This may reflect man's ability to reason about the world as well as man's life within it. Socrates' famous statement, "Know thyself," reflects this aim of philosophy. Plato also warned against the neglect of philosophy. He wrote that "land animals came from men who had no use for philosophy"14. We now turn to consider several definitions of philosophy. These will include the historical approach, philosophy as criticism, philosophy as the analysis of language, philosophy as a program of change, philosophy as a set of questions and answers, and philosophy as a world-view. Along the way we will also analyze the definitions and attempt to reach some conclusions about this analysis. Hegel says in his Philosophy of Religion : “Philosophy is not wisdom of the world, but is knowledge of what is not of the world; it is not knowledge which concerns external mass or empirical existence and life, but is knowledge of that which is eternal, of what God is, and what flows out of His nature.” 15 Philosophy is a necessary means for the possession of the higher knowledge of the Self. But, if it is defined as process of the function of the intellect, we have to note that it is not a always the sole means; for philosophy in Sw āmi Sivananda, as in Plato, Plotinus and Spinoza, makes its appeal not merely to the intellect of man, but to the heart and the feeling as well. It is not enough to understand the teachings of philosophy, it is necessary also to feel them in the depths of one’s heart. Feeling, at least in certain respects, surpasses understanding, albeit that feeling is often strengthened by

12 .V.N.K.Reddy, Eastern and Western Philosophy, An Introduction, Delhi, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1980, pp. 134f. 13 .H.D.P. Lee, Trans. Timaeus , Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965, p. 64 14 . Ibid, p. 121. 15 . Swami Krishnanda, The Philosophy of Life, Rishikesh, The divine Life Society, 1992, p.19 21 understanding. Philosophy is an intensely practical science. “Philosophy has its roots in the practical needs of man. Man wants to know about transcendental matters, when he is in a reflective state. There is an urge within him to know about the secret of death, the secret of immortality, the nature of the soul, the creator and the world.” “Philosophy is the self-expression of the growing spirit in man. Philosophers are its voice” 16 According to Aristotle, philosophy arises from wonder. Man experience rains, drought, storm, clouds, lightning. At times, he is greatly terrified. Then the events of life and death mystify him. He begins to reflect over the events. The sun, moon and the stars appears to him wonderful and beautiful . As a result of his reflections, he thinks that the events can be explained by powers akin to man. He proposes to control them by means of magical spells. This magic gives way to science, philosophy and religion in due course. 17

2.1.4. Divisions of Philosophy 18 :

Philosophy covers many subjects and emphases. The following divisions are important in an over-view of the subject of philosophy.

A. Epistemology - Epistemology is a Greek word translated as the theory of knowledge. Epistemology is a foundational area for other areas of philosophy. Epistemology involves three main areas: (l) the source or ways to knowledge. How do we know what we claim to know? How do we know certain kinds of things? (2) The nature of knowledge. What do we mean when we say we know something? If I declare I know a pin oak tree, do I know this directly or indirectly? (3) The validity of knowledge. In this the matter of truth or falsity is considered. How do I claim to know that something is true? Why is one statement regarded as true or false? Epistemology is an enquiry into the nature of knowledge ; it is also defined as the theory of truth and certainly of knowledge. It is the science of correct knowing. It discovers the relation between knowing and the known. Epistemology is a theory of knowledge which investigates the origin, structure, method and validity of knowledge. It is an important branch of philosophy, which may be defined in one word as the criticism of knowledge. John Locke, Immanuel Kant and Fichte etc. can be categorized under the broader group of Epistemological philosophers.

16 . Ibid, pp. 20f. 17 .Y. Masih, op. cit. p. 1. 18 .Dollas M. Roark, Introduction To Philosophy, Emporia, Dalmar Publishing, 1982, pp. 11f. 22

B. Metaphysics - Metaphysics is another Greek word which refers to the attempt to describe the nature of reality. It involves many questions such as the nature and makeup of the universe, whether the world is purposive or not, whether man is free, whether the world is eternal or created, and many other issues. It is one of the most important branches of philosophy. Aristotle, Bergson, Kant and Hegel are known for their higher metaphysics in philosophy.

C. Logic - Logic is a term used to describe the various types of reasoning structures, the relationship of ideas, deduction and inference, and in modern times. Symbolic logic which becomes quite mathematical. Logic is too technical to consider in the confines of a general introduction to philosophy. There are many excellent texts that may be consulted for a general look at logic. Aristotle, Bradley, Dewey, are considered to be most important logicians in the West.

D. Axiology - Axios , the Greek word of worth, is related to two different areas of worth. There is, first, moral worth, or ethics. Ethics is a discipline concerning human moral behavior and raises the questions of right or wrong. Ethics has generally been the science or discipline of what human behavior ought to be in contrast to a discipline like sociology which is the study of what human behavior is . The second area, aesthetics, is concerned with the beautiful. What is a beautiful work of art? Music? Sculpture? What makes a beautiful woman? A handsome man? An ugly one? Aesthetics seeks to give some answers to these questions.

E. "Philosophies of" - Another category of philosophy is called "philosophies of" because of the term being related to various other subjects or disciplines like Philosophy of art, biology, history, law, physics, natural sciences, religion, sociology etc.

Different writers have mentioned different discipline of philosophy in their writing. Some has stressed more upon Ontology and Axiology and some others on Pedagogy. In fact, all these disciplines are equally important from the point of view of philosophy.

2.1.5. Axiology- The Branch of Philosophy:

Axiology is one of the important branches of philosophy; Axiology is divided in two sub branches i.e. Ethics and Aesthetics. Now let us see what ethics is .

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2.1.5.1. Ethics:

2.1.5.1.1. The Nature of Ethics:

In ordinary conversation we hear such statements as: ‘He ought not to have done this’, ‘It is a good thing to help one’s neighbours’, ‘He is a thoroughly good man’, ‘His character is bad’, ‘He was only doing his duty’, or ‘It is always right to speak the truth.’ When such statements are made they are frequently contradicted by someone hearing them, and this by itself suggests that they are not as simple as at first sight they appear to be. If a friend disagrees with my statement that Smith is a thoroughly good man, he may do so for one of two reasons. (a) He may know facts about Smith’s behaviour which are unknown to me; and if he tells me these facts and convinces me that they are true, I shall then be ready to admit that Smith is in some respects not a good man. (b) It may be the case, however, that my friend and I both know the same facts about Smith, and yet I continue to hold that Smith is thoroughly good, while my friend considers him to be bad. Now we are using the words ‘good’ and ‘bad’ with different meanings, and, until we come to some agreement as to their meanings, we are not likely to agree in our opinion of Smith. This is just the kind of question with which ethics deals – what is the truth meaning of such words as ‘good’ and ‘right’ and ‘ought’ which are used so commonly in everyday conversation. When we come to an agreement as to the meaning of such words, other questions will arise. We may ask whether it is possible for us to know whether Smith is good or bad; we may ask on what grounds Smith should give up those activities which we have agreed to call bad, and should engage in those which we have agreed to call good. All these and many other similar questions are within the scope of ethics. 19 Ethics is a normative science – Ethics is science which is systematic knowledge. It deals with human conduct together with the inner volitions and their motives systematically. It is a science in so far as it depends upon observation, classification, and explanation of human conduct with reference to an ideal. 20 According to Charles A. Ellwood, the 14th President of the American Sociological Society, the Study of Society Ethics is the science which deals with the right or wrong of human conduct. Its problems are the nature of morality and of moral obligation, the validity of moral ideals and the norms by which conduct is to be judged, and the like. While ethics was once considered to be a science of individual conduct it is now generally conceived as being essentially a social science. The moral and the social

19 . William Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics, Mumbai, Allied Publishers Limited, 2001, p.1. 20 . Jadunath Sinha, A Manual of Ethica, Calcutta, New Central Book Agency, 1994, p. 2. 24 are indeed not clearly separable, but we may consider the moral to be the ideal aspect of the social. “It needs to be emphasized, however, that the most primitive groups are not war like” This view of morality, which, for the most part, is indorsed by modern thought, makes ethics dependent upon sociology for its criteria of rightness or wrongness. Indeed, we cannot argue any moral question now days unless we argue it in social terms. If we discuss the rightness or wrongness of the drink habit we try to show its social consequences. So, too, if we discuss the rightness or wrongness of such an institution as polygamy we find ourselves forced to do so mainly in social terms. This is not denying, of course, that there are religious and metaphysical aspects to morality these are not necessarily in conflict with the social aspects,—but it is saying that modern ethical theory is coming more and more to base itself upon the study of the remote social consequences of conduct, and that we cannot judge what is right or wrong in our complex society unless we know something of the social consequences. Ethics must be regarded, therefore, as a normative science to which sociology and the other social sciences lead up. 21

2.1.5.1.2. Definition of Ethics :

The word ‘ Ethics ’ is derived from the Greek adjective ‘ ethica ’ which comes from the substantive ‘ ethos . ‘ ethos’ means customs, usage or habits. Ethics is also called “Moral Philosophy’. The word ‘moral’ is derived from Latin substantive ‘ mores’ which also means customs or habits. Customs are not merely habitual ways of acting. They are also ways approved by groups. Thus literally ‘Ethics’ means the science of custom or habits of men. It is the science of the habitual conduct of men. Habits are the expression of settled disposition of the will or character. Character is the permanent habit of willing, the inner bent of the mind, which is expressed in habitual conduct. Character is the inner counterpart of conduct, which has its outer expression. Thus Ethics is the science of character and conduct. It evaluates the voluntary actions and habitual actions of persons and considers their rightness or wrongness. It evaluates the character of persons and considers its virtueness or viciousness. 22 We may define ethics as the normative science of the conduct of human beings living in societies – a science which judges this conduct to be right or wrong, to be good or bad, or in some similar way. This definition says, first of all, that ethics is a science,

21 .Lee Archie and John G. Archie, Introduction to Ethical Studies, the article “ Ethics are Culturally Relative” by Charles A. Ellwood, American Sociological Association, 2003, pp.27f. 22 .Jadunath Sinha, op. cit., p.1. 25 and a science may be defined as a systematic and more or less complete body of knowledge about a particular set of related events or objects. In this account of science, the important word is systematic ; scientific knowledge differs from the ordinary, haphazard knowledge of uneducated people in being arranged in a definite coherent system. A science also aims at providing as complete a knowledge of its subject- matter as it can, although, in the present state of knowledge, no science is perfect in this respect. 23 Ethics may briefly defined as “the science of morality” or as “the study of right conduct or duty.” It is the science which explains the fact of moral life and indicates the course in which human activities should be directed. It is essentially an investigation into the notions of good and bad, right and wrong , and the connected notion of duty, as applied to conduct or voluntary action. We see then the Ethics is concerned with the rightness and wrongness of conduct. But the conduct is the exponent of character , and is good or bad, right or wrong, only as revealing a character . In other word, the conduct of a man springs out of, and expresses his character , and is good or bad according as his character is good or bad. Hence Ethics may also be defined as “the science of moral character as expressing itself in right or wrong conduct or action,” or as ‘the science which deals with the goodness and badness of human character and seeks to determine the ideally perfect type of character which it is the duty of all men to strive to realize within themselves.’ Indeed, the derivative meaning of Ethics is “ science of character .” 24

2.1.5.1.3. Ethics and Philosophy of Law.

Ethics is that study or discipline which concerns itself with judgments of approval and disapproval, judgments as to the rightness and wrongness, goodness and badness. Ethos concerns with the collective will of the people. So the word ‘ Ethics ’ came into existence. Almost all great philosophers referred to the problems of Ethics in their writings. On some occasions the term ‘ Ethics ’ is used more often than the term ‘Philosophy’ itself. Cicero was the first person who introduced the idea of Law of Nature as being innate in Man. Every man is governed by some or other law which binds him to the Universal Code of Conduct. In Greek Philosophy, the legal laws were meant not so much to punish the people as they were mainly meant to reform them. 25

23 .William Lillie, op. cit., p.2. 24 . P. Chatterjee, The Principles of Ethics, Delhi, New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2001, p. 1. 25 . V.N.K.Reddy, op. cit., p 138. 26

2.1.5.2. Aesthetics: Aesthetics is the branch of philosophy (sub branch of Axiology), which deals with beauty or the beautiful especially in Art. It concern directly with taste and standard of value in judging Art. Kant, the modern philosopher used the term ‘ Transcendental Aesthetics ” in order to explain the ‘ apriori ’ principle of sensible experience. Later on, Hegel also adopted the same word but called it Aesthetick. In recent years, the subject is achieving a more independent status. It has adopted into its fold several theories. Normally what is ‘beauty’ and what is ‘art’ are the two basic questions raised in Aesthetics. The Aesthetics judgment is based upon two criteria or standards, the intrinsic and the extrinsic . The Aesthetics and the religion are very closely related to each other. When we use the phrase ‘ sublime ’ and the ‘ holy ’ it automatically implies the two areas of Aesthetics and Religion. Aesthetics stands for the ‘ sublime ’, whereas Religion symbolizes the ‘ holiness ’ and ‘ perfection ’. Schelling’s interpretation of Art and Hegel’s theory can be taken as well-known example in Aesthetics. Thus Aesthetics is a universal science. 26

2.1.6. History of The Concept Axiology 27 : The term “value” originally meant the worth of something, chiefly in the economic sense of exchange value, as in the work of the 18 th century political economist Adam Smith. A broad extension of the meaning of value to wider areas of philosophical interest occurred during the 19 th century under the influence of a variety of thinkers and schools: the Neo-Kantians Rudolf Hermann Lotze and Albrecht Ritschl; Friedrich Nietzsche 28 , author of a theory of the transvaluation of all values; Alexius Meinong and Christian von Ehrenfels; and Eduard von Hartmann, philosopher of the unconscious, whose Grundriss der Axiologie (1909; “Outline of Axiology”) 29 In the twentieth century the term axiology was apparently first applied by Paul Lapie ( Logique de la volonte , 1902) 30 , further used the term in a title and Wilbur Marshall Urban, whose valuation, Its Nature and Laws (1909) 31 was the first treatise on this topic in English, introduced the

26 . Ibid, p. 141. 27 https://www.britannica.com/topic/axiology, accessed on 10/10/2014 at 7.45 P.M. The Editor of Encyclopedia Britanica, Theory of Value, 28 Nietzsche, The Transvaluation of all Values, Dominicana, Vol. 45, No.2, pp. 147ff. 29 Eduard von Hartmann, Grundriss der axiologie , German, Bad Sachsa im Harz, Hermann Haacke, 1908. 30 .http://www.ditext.com/runes/e.html accessed on 19/08/2017)Degobart Runes, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,New York, Philosophical Library, 1942. (Site 31 Urban Wilbur Marshall, Valuation, its Nature and Law, Being an Introduction to General Theory of Value , Charlestar SC, USA, Bibilot Life, 2009 27 movement to the United States. Ralph Barton Perry’s book General Theory of Value (1926) 32 has been called the magnum opus of the new approach. A value, he theorized, is “any object of any interest.” Later, he explored eight “realms” of value: morality, religion, art, science, economics, politics, law, and custom.

A distinction is commonly made between instrumental and intrinsic value— between what is good as a means and what is good as an end. John Dewey, in Human Nature and Conduct (1922) 33 and Theory of Valuation (1939) 34 , presented a pragmatic interpretation and tried to break down this distinction between means and ends, though the latter effort was more likely a way of emphasizing the point that many actual things in human life, such as health, knowledge, and virtue are good in both senses. John Dewey (1859-1952), in his book Theory of Valuation,sees goodness as the outcome of ethic valuation a continuous balancing of “ends in view”. An end in view is said to be an objective potentially adopted, which may be refined or rejected based on its consistency with other objectives or as a means to objectives already held. Other philosophers, such as C.I. Lewis, Georg Henrik von Wright, and W.K. Frankena, have multiplied the distinctions—differentiating, for example, between instrumental value (being good for some purpose) and technical value (being good at doing something) or between contributory value (being good as part of a whole) and final value (being good as a whole). Many different answers are given to the question “What is intrinsically good?” Hedonists say it is pleasure; Pragmatists, satisfaction, growth, or adjustment; Kantians, a good will; Humanists, harmonious self-realization; Christians, the love of God. Pluralists, such as G.E. Moore W.D. Ross, Max Scheler and Ralph Barton Perry, argue that there are any numbers of intrinsically good things. Moore, a founding father of Analytic philosophy, developed a theory of organic wholes, holding that the value of an aggregate of things depends upon how they are combined. Axiology is the Philosophical theory of value. i.e. study of value, or goodness, in its widest sense. The distinction is commonly made between intrinsic and extrinsic value i.e., between that which is valuable for its own sake and that which is valuable only as a means to something else, which itself may be extrinsically or intrinsically valuable. Many different answers have been given to the question what is intrinsically

32 Ralph Barton Perry , General Theory of Value , Cambridge, Mass, United State, Harward University Press, 1926, p.720 33 John Dewey, Human Nature and conduct , Newyork, Modern Library, 1922, pp.24f. 34 John Dewey, Theory of Valuation ,, Cicago, University of Cicago Press, 1939, P.15, 28 valuable? For hedonists, it is pleasure; for pragmatists, it is satisfaction, growth, or adjustment; for Kantians, it is a good will. Pluralists such as G.E. Moore and William David Ross 35 , assert that that the concept of intrinsic goodness is analyzable in terms of the fittingness of some “pro” (i.e., positive) attitude, G.E.Moore 36 , assert that there is a third, still more radical threat to the computation of intrinsic value. Quite apart from any concern with the commensurability of values, Moore famously claims that there is no easy formula for the determination of the intrinsic value of complex wholes because of the truth of what he calls the “principle of organic unities” . Moore's position has been endorsed by many other philosophers. For example, Ross says that it is better that one person be good and happy and another bad and unhappy than that the former be good and unhappy and the latter bad and happy, and he takes this to be confirmation of Moore's principle 37 . Along with the traditional standpoint like the cosmological, epistemological, and ontological, the axiological standpoint was developed as one of the basic perspectives in philosophy. But the real place of ‘value’ in philosophy was carved with the thinking of philosopher like Lotze, Windelband, Rickert, Titschi, Munsterberg and other Urban’s article on ‘Axiology’ in Encyclopedia Britannica attributes the philosophy of axiology to Lotze and Nietzsche. Lotze asserted that ‘value’ is the ultimate notion in philosophy. He attempted to reduce logic, ethics and metaphysics to ‘axiology’ Ritschi propounded that the concept of ‘value’ is central in theology and religion. The judgments of facts are subordinate to the judgment of values. According to Windelband, philosophy is the science of universal values, the study of principles of absolute value judgment. All axioms in logic, morality and aesthetics are norms whose validity is based on the presupposition that the thought aims to realize the purpose to be true, the purpose of will to be good and purpose of the feeling to apprehend beauty in such a way as to be universally acceptable. Nitzsche invoked the concept of ‘Transvaluation’ of values which calls for the revaluation of all values. 38 According to Frank Thilly, Some of the philosophies examined are based on judgment of value; they interpret reality in term of a highest good: the world must be, at bottom, what the ethical, aesthetic or logical consciousness demand as the ideal.

35 .Ross, W. D., 1939, Foundations of Ethics , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1939, pp. 275f.

36 .Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1903, pp.28,96

37 . Ross, W. D., 1930, The Right and the Good , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930, p.72. 38 . S.G.Nigal, op. cit. pp. 5f. 29

According to him, philosophy is a science of universal values, the study of the principles of absolute value-judgment (logical, ethical, aesthetic); the subject matter of all other sciences being theoretical judgments. There is fundamental difference between the propositions: This thing is white, and, this thing is good. 39 Since “axiology” can also mean a system of values one cherishes – is a quite young discipline as it is more or less one hundred years old. A question arises why it was singled out as a discipline with its own problems as late as the turn of the 20th century since the issues of values had been addressed at least from the times of Socrates. The main reasons were behind this. till the modern times the questions of values functioned within the structure of philosophy proposed by Aristotle – the division into a theoretical philosophy (with metaphysics as the first philosophy) and practical philosophy, where the theoretical one was a foundation of the practical one; therefore problem of value was subordinated to the problem of being and stayed within the area of interest of metaphysics. 40

2.1.7. The significance of Axiology:

Axiology is sometimes defined as the science of value, and one group of ethical theories, the teleological group, holds that when we call as action right or good all that we mean is that it brings about consequences that are of value. Unfortunately the common practice in English is to use the word good and not the word valuable when referring to things of value, and, at the risk of some ambiguity, we shall have to refer to things of value as good things. It is clear that there may be good things, in this axiological sense, which are not affected in any way by human actions, such as ‘the starry heavens above’, and ethics is not at all concerned with these. Even among the things produced in part by human action which are commonly called good, some appear to be produced by actions that we would not usually call ‘right’ or good in ethics. The moral quality of the conduct of a wine producer is commonly judged on other grounds than whether the wine he produces is good or bad. Prohibitionists would hold that his conduct while engaged in his trade is always wrong; and even those who admit its rightness will hold that this is affected only in a lesser degree by the quality of the wine he produces. We shall call those consequences of human actions which may be held to affect the rightness of the action ‘morally good’ or ‘morally bad’, and it is to be

39 . Frank Thilly, History of Philosophy, New Delhi, SBW Publishers, 1993, pp.500f. 40 .Andrzej Chmielecki and Ewa Chmielecka, op. cit. p. 9,10. 30 remembered that these consequences may be events, including actions, as well as what we usually call things. (It is just one of the characteristics of deontological theories of ethics that they hold that actions are the only objects that can be morally good.) Our problem then is: ‘Which consequences of value can be appropriately regarded as morally good? The term ‘value’ itself came to ethics by way of economics. 41

2.1.8. Axiology-The Theory of Value : According to Reverend Dr. Sun Myung Moon 42 , the contemporary age is an age of great confusion and great losses. Wars and conflicts never cease, and innumerable vicious phenomena are covering the world, such as terrorism, destruction, arson, kidnapping, murder, drug abuse, alcoholism, declining sexual morals, the breakdown of the family, in justice, corruption, oppression, conspiracy, and slander. In the vortex of this great confusion, humankind's most valuable assets are now almost lost. Moon is referring to the loss of mutual trust among people, the deterioration of parental authority, teachers' authority, and governmental authority, the neglect of personal human dignity, the disregard of traditions and the loss of the dignity of life. What is the cause of such confusion and losses? The cause is the collapse of the traditional views of value. That is to say, the traditional points of view concerning trueness, goodness, and beauty have been lost. Among these, the concept of goodness especially is being weakened, and existing ethical and moral views are rapidly being lost. Then, what are the causes that have brought about the collapse of the traditional views of value? First, God is being eliminated from every field, including economy, politics, education, and art. At the same time, religious values are being neglected. Since almost all traditional systems of values are based on religion, a view of value that loses its religious basis cannot but decline. Second, materialism, atheism, and especially Communism are infiltrating everywhere. Communism has been working to divide people into two classes and then to foment conflicts between those classes by increasing the sense of distrust and spreading hostilities everywhere. In so doing, it has criticized and attempted to destroy the traditional views of value, claiming that traditional values are feudalistic and intended solely to maintain existing social systems. Third, conflicts among religions and philosophies are themselves speeding up the collapse of values. Existing values have

41 . William Lillie, op. cit. pp. 207f. 42 . Reverend Dr. Sun Myung Moon, New Essentials of Unification Thought, Tokeyo, Japan, Kogensha , Udagawa-cho, Shibuya, 2006, pp. 199 ff/

31 been established on the basis of the various religions and philosophies; therefore, if disagreement among religions and among philosophies exists, people will be led to regard these values as merely relative. Fourth, traditional religious virtues have lost their power to persuade modern people, who tend to think scientifically. When the teachings of traditional religions either contradict science or are unrelated to science, they become unacceptable to modern people, who tend to place absolute confidence in science. When we see this collapse of traditional values, we realize that there is a need for a new view of value. This new view of value, first of all, must be able to embrace the fundamental teachings of all religions and thought systems. It must also be able to overcome materialism and atheism. Furthermore, it must be able to embrace and even guide science. This would be a view of value that is centered on the absolute God. Unification axiology seeks to present such a view of value. This new view of value is presented for the sake of establishing our future society. The future society is a society that will be built by people of original nature, whose intellect, emotion, and will are centered on Heart. Accordingly, the future society will be a society where the activities of people's intellect, emotion, and will are carried out in it harmonious way, centering on heart. Here, new values refer to the values corresponding to the original faculties of intellect, emotion, and will. The faculties of intellect, emotion, and will seek the values of trueness, goodness and beauty, respectively, and through these, a society of trueness, an artistic society, and an ethical society will be actualized. In doing so, what is required for the realization of a society of trueness is a theory of education for the pursuit of die value of "trueness"; what is required to pursue a society of "beauty," or an artistic society, is a theory of art for the pursuit of the value of "beauty"; what is required for the realization of a society of "goodness," or an ethical society, is a theory of ethics for the pursuit of the value of "goodness." Since axiology is a theory that deals generally with the values of trueness, goodness, and beauty, axiology is the general theory serving as a basis for these three particular theories. The future society will thus be a society where the values of trueness, goodness, and beauty will be realized; in that society, the economy will attain a high level of development through the progress of science, solving, once and for all and completely, all the economic problems of society. People's lives will be focused primarily all realizing values. The society where the values of' trueness, goodness, and beauty, centered on heart, are realized is a society with the culture of heart, or a society heart, or a society of unified culture.

32

A new value perspective is necessary in order to prepare for the future society. Yet, this new value perspective is necessary not only for preparing for the future society, but perhaps even more importantly, it is necessary in order to clear the confusion of our present world. As mentioned, in today’s world values are generally collapsing due to various factors. In order to solve this problem, there exists an urgent need to re-establish a proper value perspective. A new value perspective is also essential in the effort to unify cultures. That is, in order to fundamentally solve the world’s present-day confusion, it will be necessary to bring various traditional cultures into harmony. Cultures are based on certain religions or thoughts, and those religions and thoughts all advocate certain values. Therefore, in order to unite cultures, it is necessary to unite the various value perspectives such as the Christian view of value, the Buddhist view of value, the Confucian view of value, and so on. Also, it is necessary to unite the views of value of the East and the West. Therefore, once again, it is necessary to present a new view of value which can genuinely embrace all value perspectives.

2.1.9. Axiology and Significance of Value 43

Value theory is dealt with in economics, in ethics, and in various other disciplines. In philosophy, axiology refers to the philosophy of value. In other words, it is that field of philosophy that deals with value in general. The content of axiology, even fragmentarily can already be found in ancient times. But, it is in modern times, especially after Kant made his well-known distinction between fact and value, that axiology became an important field of study in philosophy. Particularly, Rudolph H. Lotze (1817- 81), who made a distinction between value and existence, whereby value is regarded as being in contradistinction to existence, argued that existence is comprehended with the intellect, while value is comprehended with the emotion. He became the founder of axiology by introducing the clear concept of value into philosophy.

2.1.9.1. What Are Values? 44

Since the term “value” was originally derived from economic life, it refers mainly to economic value. Today, however, the term has become more generalized, being used in almost all areas of human activity, including society, politics, economics, law, morality, art, learning, religion, etc. In the Unification Thought view, there are both

43 . Ibid,, p.202. 44 . Ibid,, p.202. 33 material values and spiritual values. Material values are connected with the daily necessities of human life, such as commodities; on the other hand, spiritual values refer to those values corresponding to the faculties of intellect, emotion, and will, namely, the values of truth, beauty, and goodness. Of these two kinds, Unification Axiology deals primarily with the spiritual values.

2.1.9.2. Definition and meaning of Value:- The word ‘Value’ is derived from the Latin word ‘Valerie’ meaning to be strong and vigorous. Values are similar to attitudes but are more ingrained, permanent and stable in nature and influence attitude. At a more concrete level, Values are principles which guide one’s desires, feelings and actions. Values mean different thing to different people. It may be regarded as normative standards, by which human being are influenced in the choice among alternative courses of action. A value can also be a general belief about some way of behaving or some end state that is applicable to the individual. Values are guide actions and judgments in many different situations and beyond people’s immediate goal or more ultimate end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence. A value may be viewed as a conception, explicit or implicit, of what an individual, group or organization regards as desirable and in terms of which a selection of the means and ends of action is made from the available alternative modes. Throughout one’s life the basic values may not change, but one may rearrange them in some sort of order or priority. The priorities change as one matures, therein the needs and goal change. One set of values are known as terminal values; representing goals one will strive to accomplish before the end of one’s life. Other values will reflect the way one prefers to behave, which are known as instrumental values. An instrumental value includes those values that encourage work attitudes of renewal, optimism, growth, effective coping, perceptual restructuring and change, which will enhance the meaning of one’s job. 45 Without values community life would be a chaos and individual life meaningless. A ‘value’ less life is valueless life. And who want a life that’s not worth a time? We all want our life to have some meaning, some direction, and some self evolved authority for guidance. Values give us all this, so it is foolish to close eyes to them. Let’s open our eyes. The well known American Psychologist Abraham Maslaw

45 .R. Kumar Bhaskar, article on Value Education, Philosophy and Science of Value Education, Kolkata, The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 2007, p.42 34 writes: However “values” are defined in many ways, and mean different things in different people. Values is most commonly used as a substitute for the words ‘virtue’ and ‘morality’ 46 2.1.10. Axiological Theories of The Western Philosophers:

2.1.10.1. Wilbur Marshal Urban (1873 – 1952)

A well known American Philosopher has elaborated on ethics and values in his book “FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY”, His book comprising three parts includes nineteen chapters and in each chapter he has explained various aspects of Ethics and Moral philosophy beautifully. His Moral philosophy is outlined in brief as below:-

2.1.10.1.1, The Object of Ethics as a Study 47 : According to Urban on entering upon the study of any subject it is only natural that one should ask: What is its use? What is its value? This is an entirely proper question. Few things in this world are done without some purpose; it is only human that the student should ask: What is the good of the study to which he devotes his time. What is the good of mathematics? It teaches us how to calculate and measure. Why do we study physics, biology, and economics? Each one of these "sciences" or fields of knowledge is related directly to certain well-recognized fields of human action to the making of machines of some kind, to the care and cure of living organisms, as in medicine, or the organization and direction of human activities of exchange, banking, etc. Nevertheless, it is the practical in knowledge that first attracts our interest, and in this respect ethics is no exception to the general rule. Like other sciences the question arises what is ethics and why then do we study ethics? The simplest answer is: It tells us how to act rightly; what actions are right or wrong, good or bad. We frequently find ethics defined as the science which deals with conduct in so far as this is considered right or wrong, good or bad. We all recognize that there are right and wrong ways of doing things. There is, for instance, a right way and a wrong way of building a bridge, a right way and a wrong way of performing a surgical operation, right ways and wrong ways of doing business, of

46 . A V ēdanta Kesari Presentation, Value, The Key to Meaningful Life ,Chennai, Adyaksha, Sri Ramkrishna Math, 2012, p.1. 47 . Wilbur Marshall Urban, Fundamental of Ethics, An Introduction to Moral Philosophy, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1938, pp.1ff. 35 carrying on economic operations. What is good and what is bad in these cases are relatively simple. A good bridge is one that is safe for travel. A good operation is one that saves a human life or restores an organ to its normal functioning. Good business practice is that which shows a profit. There are right and wrong ways of doing all these things and it is important that engineer, surgeon, and merchant should learn these ways. The obligation of being intelligent is almost the first law of our modern life and the place of all places where it is in chief demand is in the world of human and moral relations.

2.1.10.1.2. Definition of Ethics 48 : The definition of ethics arises then strictly out of its use or value as a study. The simplest definition is in a sense the best. Ethics is the science that deals with conduct in so far as, it is considered right or wrong, good or bad. The meaning of these terms, right and wrong, good and bad we understand in a sense immediately just as we understand the terms hot and cold, true and false. Just what things are hot and cold we learn only by experience. What is true or false we learn only by certain methods of verification or testing. But the meaning of the terms is in a sense given to us immediately. The same seems to be true of the terms good and bad, right and wrong. But this does not mean that we cannot make the meanings of these terms clearer to ourselves by definition. Definition does not create meanings, but makes the meanings more definite.

2.1.10.1.3. The Idea And Definition of Value, according to Urban 49 :

First definition of value – The idea of value is the basal concept of ethics. As we shall see presently, one of the most important questions of ethical theory is just this: what makes things good or bad wherein value, positive or negative, ultimately consists. Let us for the moment merely examine the general idea of value as used in all the value sciences. The simplest and most general notion with which almost everybody begins is that value is that which satisfies human desire. All things that satisfy human desire have value, or are good. This we may call the first definition of value. This definition of value is simple, clear and intelligible so far as it goes. This second definition of value 50 is also clear and intelligible as far as it goes. But, like the first, it also does not go far enough. It is an admirable definition of

48 .Ibid, pp.6f. 49 .Ibid, pp. 16ff. 36 value for primitive forms of life. It is easy to see what is good in the world of animal life. It may be described almost completely in terms of adjustment to environment and consequent survival; value here is essentially survival value. It is almost as easy to see what is good and what is bad behavior in the case of primitive man, because his ends are limited and his aims narrow. Looking back today, we may see that in the man his customs and folk-ways correspond to the conditions of biological life, and have what we call survival value. Even his sacrifices to the gods, while in itself unable to bring him rain or make him victorious over his enemies, may have had a secondary value of consolidating the tribe and thus making it more able to survive. But such a conception of value is wholly inadequate when we come to complex civilizations such as our own. Men's wants are much more numerous and complex; the aims they set themselves are often most comprehensive and remote. It becomes extremely difficult to see the value of the actions they perform and of the knowledge they acquire in terms of such simple definitions. We may say, to start with, that anything is good that conserves or enhances life, but we soon find that we are compelled, like Aristotle, to distinguish between mere life, or living as such, and the "good life," or living well; that life is not necessarily a good in itself, but gets its value rather from that which living realizes. The Third definition of value 51 :- Ethical thinkers have, in the main, felt that such a line of thought is inevitable, and the further developments of our study will show, In that case we are driven to a third definition of value, namely, that alone is ultimately and intrinsically valuable that leads to the development of selves, or to self- realization. In the beginning it appears that whatever satisfies desire is a good or value. But we find on closer examination that our wants and desires must themselves in turn be valued in terms of their relation to the survival and enhancement of life. Life itself is, however, not intrinsically valuable, but in turn gets its value from the kind of life it is. Precisely what is the good life for man is, of course, the fundamental problem of ethics, and we do not propose to attempt to solve it in the Introduction. Even at this point it is clear, however, that value for man must go beyond the concepts of satisfaction of desire and organic welfare. We may define intrinsic value in the following way. An intrinsic value is not merely one of the means of living well, but part of the actual content of the good life, or rather one aspect of the nature or character of the good life itself. This distinction is of the utmost importance in the study of the relations of ethics to other value sciences such

50 . Ibid, p.17. 51 . Ibid, p.18. 37 as economics and jurisprudence. In general it may be said that the latter deal only with instrumental values, ethics being concerned with intrinsic as well as instrumental. To a more detailed study of the relation of these fields we must now turn.

2.1.10.1.4. Fact And Theory of Ethics 52 : The morals of a people are the ways they think they ought to act, in other words their judgments of good and bad, or of right and wrong. It is true that we often speak as though the morals of a man were the behavior itself. A man of low morale is one who does certain things that fall below the standard or norm of conduct. But not only does the conduct itself proceed from ideas and judgments of good and bad, but the act or behavior has an ethical quality and significance only in relation to the standards or norms in terms of which it is judged. Ethical facts are then always judgments; ethical theories the reasons we give for these judgments. The fact has to do with the judgment of right and wrong; the theory with the question of why it is right or wrong. We may call the everyday standards of common sense. Lord Balfour has said that while there is general agreement on the question of what is right and wrong, there is considerable variation in the reasons which men give for their judgments. From this he would seem to have us infer that our common sense in morals, what the Germans call the "healthy human understanding" is to be trusted in the man rather than moral theory and ethical reflection. Be this as it may, let us start our investigation by considering first whether there is this agreement, and secondly what significance such agreement, if it exists, has for ethical science. Balfour's statement is itself, of course, open to question. The general agreement of which he speaks is precisely what most of us would vigorously deny. Historically there has been the greatest divergence in men's judgments as to what is right and wrong. Infanticide, slavery, and other customs now condemned, were approved or suffered by the highly civilized Greeks, as are suttee, polygamy and suicide by some modern races. To eat your parents, to sacrifice your first-born, to refrain from washing there is hardly anything so monstrous or so trivial that it has not been somewhere considered a duty, although somewhere else a crime. These are simply facts of history and constitute but a small part of a large body of evidence against any general agreement in this sense. Evidently it is not agreement of this sort that Balfour has in mind. There are very few things, perhaps, on which the moral judgments of all men, at all times and in all places, have completely agreed. The

52 .Ibid, pp. 29ff.

38 consensus of moral judgment here spoken of has reference rather to the level of present- day reflective morality. On this level there is a much larger measure of general agreement. To be sure, mutually contradictory moral judgments are found here moral judgments fall into two quite distinct types or classes which must be carefully distinguished. Practically, the moral judgment is always concerned with the particular act. Did this particular cashier do right or wrong in temporarily using certain funds of the bank to tide him over a difficult situation? Did Nora, in Ibsen's A Doll's House, do right or wrong in leaving her husband? 53 It is evident that here variations of judgment of considerable moment are bound to occur. "Circumstances alter cases." But there is another type of moral problem and another type of moral judgment. Not whether I ought or ought not to do this particular thing, but whether such and such a type or class of acts is right or wrong. Here the range of variation and the ` chance of contradiction is increasingly less. In the case of the first type of judgment the variations are all of the nature of exceptions and are recognized as such. The exception does not destroy the rule or norm, but, in the words of the old proverb, "proves" or assumes it. The cashier would never dream of justifying his act as a universal practice. Few would be disposed to say that any woman should leave her husband whenever she wants to. In all such cases it is always assumed that the norm is the fundamental thing and that the variation from it must justify itself by an appeal to some higher principle or norm, or to some more general theory of the good which will explain or justify the exception. Now it is with types or norms of conduct that ethical reflection or science is primarily concerned. It cannot of course ignore the problem of the particular act. But in the last analysis ethical science, like all science, is concerned with universals or laws in this case universals of the type of norms. Here also, it cannot be denied, great divergence is possible and contradictory judgments in evidence. But the range of variation and the chance of contradiction are increasingly less. It is conceivable that there might be some who would say that any cashier should take the funds of his bank whenever he can "get away with it," that any wife should leave her husband whenever she wants to. It cannot be denied, for instance, that there are many for whom private property is the chief of evils and the source of all injustice. There are those for whom monogamy is anathema and "free love" the ideal. It is at such points that the fundamental problems of ethics arise, namely as to the value of our institutions themselves. But so far as our present

53 . Ibid, p. 31.

39 point is concerned, there can be no question. These variations represent inconsiderable variations from the general consensus of moral judgment. It is idle then to deny that there is a large body of beliefs and judgments as to what is right and wrong upon which there is general agreement and when it was no longer sought in the will of God it is sought in the will of the majority. The majority is always right. No one believes now, however, that the mere fact of agreement makes right or wrong, any more than it makes truth or falsity. In his An Enemy of the People, Ibsen makes Doctor Stockman says that the majority is always wrong. Extravagant as this may be, we should all agree that we cannot determine the true or the right by counting noses. This is in general the position of moralists or ethical philosophers on this important question. It is true that there are thinkers like Nietzsche who propose a "trans-valuation of all our values, who would turn our moral codes topsy-turvy. Such attempts have their value if for no other reason than by causing us to question and go to the root or the source of value. There are those who break completely with experience and try by their own reason to construct new institutions, and to remold the world according to their heart's desire. But the general position of responsible moralists is that it is not the business of ethics to make a new morality, but rather to understand and interpret the morality we have. As philosophers have not made morality so neither can they unmake it. 2.1,10.1.5.. Moral Reasoning, Ethical Theory 54 : A chief source of difference, both in our judgments as to what is right or wrong and in the reasons we give for these judgments, seems to lie in two contrasting attitudes which we may describe as the rigoristic and the liberal or latitudinarian. The rigorist in morals is the man who says "right is right and wrong is wrong. It is therefore only natural that when any doubt is raised as to the right or wrong of any act, we should ask what the good is or the use of it. The most immediate and natural answer to this question is that if it brings pleasure it is good, if it brings pain it is bad. This is one form of utility judgment and historical Utilitarianism has given this answer. But there are other conceptions of purpose and utility. Our only point here is that the latitudinarian appeals to some concept of utility or teleology. One of these questions was a variant upon the theme used by Victor Hugo 55 in his Les Aliscrables: May a poor man, without money, out of work, and unable at the time to find employment, take without the knowledge of the owner, a loaf of bread from a bakeshop in order to save from starvation the young children of a

54 . Ibid, pp.37ff. 55 . Ibid, p.38. 40 neighbor? Their mother, a widow, is sick in bed and unable for the time to earn money for their support. It is impossible to get the bread in any other way. The following are two typical answers are given by Urban: (1) "The man should not steal the bread. Respect for the property of others, under all circumstances, lies at the basis of our civilization. To indulge, in any degree, in wrong makes greater wrong easier and ultimate anarchy possible." (2) "I think that the poor man was justified in taking the bread under these circumstances. He would be doing an infinitely large amount of good compared with the trivial harm done, and he would be doing the good by the only possible method open to him." It is common sense in morals to think and believe that telling the truth is right and that lying is wrong. It is also common sense to believe that there are occasions when to tell the truth is not right and to tell what is not strictly true is a duty. These cases of Notliigc, or lies of necessity, as the Germans call them, have been the constant material of moral thinking and of no end of ethical disputation. In his Heaven and Hell, Mark Twain 56 tells the story of two maiden sisters who were nursing a sick sister whose recovery hung in the balance. The sick woman's little girl was not allowed to see her, but she had been sending her messages which greatly cheered the patient. But the daughter also became seriously ill and the two sisters faced the problem of what they should do. Mark Twain's picture of their despair, of their horror of telling a lie, and their firm conviction that they would be eternally damned if they did so, is extremely touching. It is interesting to note that in the new code of laws proposed for Mexico 57 in 1929provision is made for exceptional cases of this kind. In case of a man's stealing because of hunger, it is specifically stated that the law shall not take cognizance of the first offense, his description of the final triumph of their love over their "duty," when they finally decided to deceive the mother for her own good. As the author tells the story, we are left in no doubt as to his own attitude and feeling in the matter. His indignation at the very idea of a morality that would even raise such a question, his hatred of the moral fanaticism that would put abstract truth above life and love, finds, no doubt, an echo in the hearts of most of his readers. Most of us would share these feelings of Mark Twain. The philosopher Fichte 58 was such a rigorist and absolutist. When the question was asked him: what would you do if to tell your wife the truth when she was would kill

56 . Ibid, p.39. 57 . Ibid, p.39. 58 . Ibid, p.40. 41 her, he replied, if my wife must die by the truth let her die. A Zurich theater manager, in the case of a fire in his theater, gave a false reason for the suspension of the play and cleared the theater without injury to any one, when to have given the real reason would almost certainly have produced a panic and a fearful loss of life. Here, I suppose, there would be scarcely any one who would refuse to justify the manager's conduct. One of the more general questions in the examination for the first Thomas A. Edison 59 Scholarship designed to test the general intelligence and insight of the applicant was this: When do you consider a lie to be permissible? To this the successful applicant answered, "In case of serious trouble, pain and grief, and you do not benefit yourself in any way." This, we should all feel, is the answer of common sense.

2.1.10.1.6.. The Ballenger Baby Case 60 The illustrations we have taken to bring out the difference between the two general attitudes have to do with the old stock moral problem as to whether it is ever right to tell a lie. We might have taken cases involving the question of strict obedience to any of the moral commandments. Or we might take much more complex and involved moral questions, such as writers of modern problem plays and novels delight in. Was Nora in Ibsen's 61 A Doll's House justified in leaving her husband? Was the heroine in Eugene O'Neill's Strange, Interlude justified in what is morally called an act of adultery, in order to save the reason of her husband and in order to have the child which otherwise she dare not have? Any one of these problems would take us into the very heart of ethical thinking and bring out clearly both the nature of moral reasoning and the types of reason that develop into ethical theories. In November of 1915, a Chicago surgeon, J. H. Haiselden 62 , contrary to accepted medical ethics, refused to operate on a baby boy, four days old. This he did, he affirmed, "in the interest of the human race and more particularly of American manhood."He explained that the boy was extremely defective and would probably remain so throughout life. He believed the infant to be dying, but there was no extent distinctly to oppose mental development to a degree necessary to a self-reliant individual should be permitted to die. The only good or value for the child is in this capacity of development."Still others stressed the social side of the same argument. "It has always been my opinion," 63 writes one physician, "that all children

59 . Ibid, p.40. 60 . Ibid, p. 41. 61 . Ibid, p. 41. 62 . Ibid, p. 43.. 63 . Ibid, p. 44. 42 born with congenital abnormality are a detriment to society. I distinctly believe that it is humane to cut off their future sufferings and those of society." Our examination of the discussion of this important and interesting case has disclosed several points in ethical thought and argument which may be stated in general terms and extended to all cases of ethical thinking. In the first place, the reasons given for denouncing or justifying the act fall into two main groups, which may be described as Formalist and Teleological. On the one hand we have those for whom Miss Jane Addams 64 was a spokesman, who believe that at least some things and acts are inherently right or wrong, good or bad. In this particular case, life itself is an absolute good or value. Whether it is because God gave life and that gift confers an absolute value, or whether it is, so to speak, in the nature of things, "a law of nature," the good of life is intrinsic or absolute. From this follows the obligation to maintain life at all costs (an obligation which has generally been considered absolute in medical ethics and refusal to maintain life is a violation of that obligation. On the other hand, we have those for whom no act or thing is inherently right or wrong, good or bad. Iwen life itself the most precious of all the goods of God or nature, has only relative value. That value is determined by its utility, whether we define that utility in terms of its capacity to produce happiness, either individual or social, or in terms of the capacity or potentiality of that life to develop in itself, or to contribute to the development of society or the race. There is therefore no absolute obligation to maintain life at all costs. The obligation is merely conditional. The first types of reasons are what are called formalistic and the ethical theory it represents Formalism. The reason for this characterization is that this type of argumentation assumes that good or value is a quality, an essence, or a form, inherent in objects or acts themselves. From Plato on, Western philosophy has distinguished between the form and the matter of things, the form or essence of a thing being that which makes the thing what it is. Good is such a form or essence. The second types of reasons are called teleological. All ethical theories fall into these two fundamental classes. But there are distinctions within the latter group which it is desirable to make clear, even at this early stage of our study. The two types of teleological thinking which were clearly distinguishable in the arguments we examined, correspond completely to two types of ethical theory well established in the history of ethical thought. It may seem to be

64 . Ibid, p. 44. 43 practically of very little importance whether we say, let the baby die because he has no chance of happiness or because he has no capacity of development, because he will make his parents and other people unhappy or because his continuance in life is contrary to the interests of American manhood and of the race. But it is of considerable practical importance, as we shall see, and of very great theoretical significance. In any case, the teleological arguments all fall naturally into two main classes: (a) those which thought of the good or value in terms of pleasure or happiness, and (b) those who thought of it in terms of development or self- realization. The first have been called the Hedonists, the second the Perfectionists or Self-realizationists.

2.1.10.1.7. Classification of Ethical Theories 65 : W. M. Urban has classified the ethical theories in following manner – I. Formalist Hedonist II Teleological Perfectionist (Self-realization) Both of the teleological theories may emphasize now the individual aspect of the good, or again the social or universal, as was apparent in the discussion referred to, thus get a further subdivision:

Teleological Theories – Individualistic I. Hedonistic Universalistic (Social Individualistic II. Perfectionist- Universalistic (Social) There is still a further distinction in perfectionist theories that is of importance, a distinction brought out also in this discussion. One may have one's eyes on the organic or biological aspect and think largely of organic welfare and perfection of organic life. Or one may think of life in its more spiritual and personal aspect and think of the good not so much as organic welfare, as self-realization or realization and perfection of

65 . Ibid, pp. 46ff.

44 personality. The first we shall describe as naturalistic perfectionism, the second as idealistic perfectionism or the ethics of self-realization. As the discussion itself developed, it seemed that in the main the formalists said the act was wrong and the teleologists said it was right. And it is true that the teleological line of argument was used mainly to justify the act. We might infer, therefore, that if we are teleologists we must necessarily and inevitably justify it and be on the side of novelty and "progress." That would be, however, to take an entirely too superficial view of the situation. A teleological line of argument might well be developed for the conservative and rigorous standpoint. One might, for instance, admit the fundamental principle that life is not an absolute value in itself, but gets its value from other values which it makes possible whether defined as happiness or development. One might further admit that the continuance of the life of the Bollenger baby could serve no good end, either for itself or for others, but might in fact bring with it evil consequences. Still the argument would not necessarily be convincing. For one might point out that the evil consequences of putting the right of life and death into the hands of physicians might far outweigh the immediate good. One might go further and say that the sacredness of the right to life while not necessarily absolute and intrinsic, is yet so basal in civilization, it has been worked out with such blood and sweat, that any tendency to weaken it will result in evils that would far outweigh any immediate good for the individual or individuals concerned. This is the present writer's position. But the only point of interest here is that a general teleological point of view in ethics does not commit one to the position that a physician is justified in allowing a human being to die under the given circumstances. In Ashtavakra’s case what the doctors would have done? ‘Ashtavakrs’ a famous Indian Philosopher whose treatise ‘Ashtavakra Geeta’ 66 is very famous for its spiritual content. Ashtavakra was born with eight crooks on his body – hence the name Ashtavakra. If his case is compared with the Bollenger Baby case, and if he was killed after birth thinking that he would suffer in his future life. India would have lost a great man. There is still another comment worth making in this connection, one which will serve to throw light on the working of "common sense" in moral matters. In this particular instance, the physician was exonerated by the coroner's jury. Other cases of a similar nature especially in recent years have been marked by similar leniency. In Sheffield, England, a year or two ago, the right of a doctor to let a patient die rather than

66 . Ashtravakra Gita 45 live on in un-remediable pain, was tacitly upheld by a coroner's jury there. The patient, a certain John Robinson 67 , took an overdose of a dangerous medicine. In view of the patient's great pain, his physician, Dr. A. T. Simpson,68 decided to make no attempt to counteract the poisonous effects of the medicine. The jury brought in a verdict that Robinson died from medicine taken to relieve pain and cause him to sleep. The coroner in summation declared that neither he nor the jury should either commend or censure Dr. Simpson. Still more recently in Karlshorst, Germany, a mother shot her incurably insane son rather than see him suffer the tortures of life without mental reason. Her case was treated with leniency, and in their decision the Berlin judges had similar cases of life- taking as a means of relieving victims from intolerable suffering to guide them, in all of which cases the utmost leniency had been shown. A similar case occurred in Dragauigan, France, in November, 1929, in which a certain Richard Corbett,69 a citizen of France, was brought before court and finally acquitted by a jury of peasant farmers on the charge of murder, for having shot his elderly French mother who was suffering from incurable cancer, the pain of which was no longer preventable by opiates. The comment Urban had made on all these cases are that they bring out with the utmost clearness the fundamental problem of ethics, namely the difference between justifying a particular exception to a rule or norm and elevating the exception into a new principle or norm. In the last case considered, the public prosecutor spoke of "the tremendously vital question whether society can permit one human being to take the life of another and remain unpunished. “Jury impressed by this, sought a way by which the principle of the sacredness of life could be upheld, and the individual allowed to go unpunished. This not being possible in French law, they declared him "not guilty." It is one thing, in morals as well as law, to find "extenuating circumstances" for variation from a norm. It is quite another thing to deny the norm itself. It is, as we have seen, with the norms that ethics is, in the first instance at least, concerned. In our study of ethics we shall find it convenient to begin with an examination of these theories in the light of moral facts. The earliest and in a sense the most natural theory is the formalistic. To this we shall now turn.

67 . Ibid, p. 48. 68 . Ibid, p. 48. 69 .Ibid, p. 48. 46

2.1.10.1.8. The Theory of Inherent Value 70 :

That some actions are intrinsically right or wrong, some things good or bad in themselves, some rights inherent in man and in the nature of man as such, are beliefs so widespread and of such great influence, that we can scarcely dismiss them merely as superstitions or as survivals of earlier stages of thought. They are still the driving force in the lives of large classes of people and the underlying assumption of a large part of our legal practice and thinking today. They still constitutes the ultimate appeal of many we would call modern and progressive and are often identified with the "moral idea" itself.

2.1.10.1.9. Historical Representatives of This View71 :

There has been a long tradition of formalism in the thinking of the race. The ethical philosophy of the Greeks was predominantly ideological, as we shall later see, Plato and Aristotle having provided the chief forms of moral reasoning for the Western world. But there was always a strong ingredient of formalism in Greek thought. The Sophists 72 , although relativists and skeptics in morals so far as human conventions and conventional morality were concerned, nevertheless appealed to a morality inherent in nature, to "natural rights" as founded on natural law, in the sense of elementary instincts and human nature. The Stoics 73 were, however, the chief representatives of the formalistic point of view, as they were also the chief upholders of the rigoristic attitude in practical morality. It is to them that we owe the first and most imposing use of the ideas of natural law and inherent right. Christian morality inherited a strong strain of formalism from the ethics of Judaism. The Ten Commandments, written on tables of stone, were also written on the "fleshly tablets of the heart." The code of morals thus embodied represented, not only the will of God but inherent laws of nature, rules of conduct intrinsically right. The philosophical ethics of Christian thinkers, such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, were predominantly teleological and derived from Plato and Aristotle. But Stoic formalism had great influence. Moral laws are laws of God, but they are also laws of nature which, as God's creation, are the expression of his will. The formalistic element in Greek and Christian thought was carried over directly into modern ethical philosophy. When, at the time of the Renaissance, modern states

70 .Ibid, p.51- 71 . Ibid, p.53. 72 . Ibid, p.53. 73 . Ibid, p.54.

47 tended to throw off the authority of the Church and the papacy, there arose a corresponding tendency to found both morals and law on laws of nature. With this came a natural tendency to revert to formalistic views and to doctrines of innate ideas. Men tended to insist upon the idea that in the "natural light of reason," and by going back to nature before the artificial and conventional institutions of society were formed, they could find fundamental laws, both of conscience and of nature, which are unchangeable and indisputable. In Locke's 74 writings and in the political creeds of the French revolutionaries and of the United States, the idea of natural law and natural right became fundamental. The philosopher Kant, who developed what is perhaps the most important philosophical expression of formalism, shared the premises and assumptions of this period.

2.1.10.1.10. Definition of Formalism 75 : As a practical moral attitude, formalism is the expression of the feeling that right is right and wrong is wrong, and that no amount of reasoning or theory can change the inherent quality of our acts. As an ethical theory, it is a reasoned argument for the view that distinctions of right and wrong are inherent in the nature of things and not derivable or deducible from anything else. According to formalism, then, the moral quality of an act consists in some inherent or absolute quality of the act, without regard to the results that flow from it or the end that may be achieved. Otherwise expressed, the formalist sees in moral rules norms or standards for the control of conduct, but he finds the authority for these rules in their own intrinsic nature. In this he differs from the teleologist who believes that these norms or standards must be carried back for their authority or validity to some more ultimate conception of the good. The representatives of formalism do not, of course, doubt that in the main good and desirable results will follow from good actions, and evil results from evil actions. They do not doubt that there is reason for the maxim, "be good and you will be happy," or that there is some connection, in the very nature of things, between virtue and happiness. What they do deny is that it is the results that make the goodness, or that it is happiness that determines the virtuous character.

74 . Ibid, p.54. 75 . Ibid, p.55. 48

2.1.10.1.11. Happiness - As Ultimate Value-Hedonism And Utilitarianism 76 : Urban elaborated on two possible forms of teleological ethics, Hedonism and Perfectionism. In his Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick says 77 : "I shall therefore confidently lay down that if there be any good other than happiness to be sought by man as an ultimate practical end, it can only be the goodness, perfection or excellence of human nature. " In this Sidgwick is undoubtedly right. To these two views all possible variants ultimately reduce. Now of these two views the most immediate and natural are that the end is pleasure, happiness, blessedness, or whatever other synonym we may choose. The reason for its first place in common sense and theory alike is obvious. If we think in terms of utility, we value our actions for the results they bring forth for ourselves and others. What more natural than that we should ask whether in this series of means and ends, of causes and effects, there is not a final term for which the others are there? And what more natural again, than that this final term should be found in the state of feeling, in the satisfaction which the fulfillment of desires and the realization of the proximate ends brings about? Thus it is that Sidgwick, in choosing between the two possible forms of teleological ethics, comes to this conclusion: "When we sit down in a cool hour and ask what it is that is good and valuable in itself, we find that it must be a pleasurable state of consciousness." This is the ethical theory called hedonism, and it consists in making ultimate value, or the good or valuable in itself, identical with a pleasurable state of consciousness. We have already seen how this is done in the case of certain arguments in the Bollenger baby case. When, it was held, child takes all the pleasure out of life for the parents, and is not beautiful or even good to look at, and is helpless, I think such a person should not be allowed to give unhappiness to the living." 78

2.1.10.1.12. The Argument For Hedonism. Psychological Hedonism 79 :

One of the most impressive reasons, at first sight, for holding that value and pleasure are identical is the fact, as it is supposed, that everyone does actually seek pleasure as his ultimate motive or object. This theory that pleasure is the motive of every act is called Psychological Hedonism. The classical statement is that of Jeremy Bentham

76 .Ibid, pp.72ff. 77 . Ibid, p.53. 78 . Ibid, p.74. 79 .Ibid, p.77. 49 who said: "Nature has placed mankind under the dominance of two sovereign masters, pleasure and pain. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do." This generalization regarding human nature and human motives is thought to be in a way similar to such generalizations as the law of gravitation or conservation of energy and thus to afford a psychological or scientific basis for human conduct and its evaluation. We shall have to ask two questions regarding it: (1) Is it true? Is it a fundamental psychological law? and (2) Even if it were true, would it form the basis for what is called Ethical Hedonism? There are certain facts that make this generalization at first sight highly plausible. The first group is such as common sense always and immediately brings to our attention.

2.1.10.1.13. Ethical Hedonism And The Theory of Value 80 :

Nietzsche 81 , with his customary mordant wit, has said, "Mankind does not desires happiness; only the Englishman does that. Although manifestly unfair, this quip is in so far true that it is largely as the result of English utilitarianism that this falsification of human nature by theory has come about. Psychological hedonism lust be rejected as inadequate to explain the facts of human conduct. Enlightened common sense and a really understanding psychology agree on that point. But this by no means disposes of hedonism as a theory of moral value, or of the happiness theory as a philosophy of life. Indeed it has been pointed out that the very fact that we do not always seek pleasure as our end might be the very ground for saying that we ought to seek it. We usually say that we ought to do a thing only because we often do not do it. Pleasure might be the true and ultimate value of life, and our seeking other ends and our employment of other standards might be the result of stupidity or self-deception with regard to the nature of our own good. Ethical hedonism then, as distinguished from the psychological formulation of the theory, claims, not that we necessarily always do have pleasure as the ultimate motive of all our acts, but that we ought to, and that if we were always reasonable we should. The grounds for this claim are that if we try to think out wherein the good or value ultimately consists we are forced to the conclusion that they can consist only in pleasure. In the words of Sidgwick 82 , already quoted, "When we sit down in a cool hour and ask ourselves what it is that is good or valuable in itself, we find that it must be a pleasurable state of consciousness." Ethical hedonism, in the strict meaning of

80 .Ibid, p.81. 81 . Ibid, p.81. 82 . Ibid, p.81 50 the words, always does, and indeed must, necessarily identify ultimate value with pleasure. For it pleasure and values are the same thing. Before examining the grounds for this contention let us note that there are other possible ways of conceiving the relation of pleasure to value. No one doubts that there is some close relation between the two, but there is great difference as to what the nature of that relation is. It is entirely possible that wherever there is realized value a pleasurable state of consciousness is always present, but it might be merely the accompaniment or sign of the value, and not the value itself. Again, it might be that a pleasurable state of consciousness is a necessary part of any value, but not the whole of the value. The point is that for hedonism it is necessary that the two concepts should be considered as identical.

2.1.10.1.14. Natural Selection And Morals 83 :

The question at issue, in so far as this first problem is concerned, is, of course, not whether morals have developed or evolved, but rather what have been the factors in this development. No one doubts the evolution of morals, in other words that morals have had a history. Everything that exist changes in some sense and to some degree. Everything living, at least, seems to develop from simplicity to complexity. Morality is no exception to this rule or law, if you choose so to call it. So far as we can see, morality began with simple customs (mores), developed into codified law, and finally reached the level of reflective morality. The contention of the "ethics of evolution, then, not merely that morality has had an origin and a history, but that the principle of natural selection is sufficient to account for this development. It was, however, in a third work, The Expression of Emotions in Animals and Men, that evolution was applied also to the mind of man. Once Darwin had been able to show the similarity between the emotional expressions of men and the lower animals, and to interpret them as survivals of formerly serviceable habits, the road was open to the extension of evolutionary conceptions to the entire mental life, including those ideas and sentiments which we call moral. The place of natural selection in the Darwinian Theory may be seen by reference to the famous formula of Darwin, wherein he tells us that species have originated "by natural selection, acting upon chance variations, leading to the survival of the fit." The meaning of this formula is pretty generally understood, but there are several aspects of it which must be recalled and made definite if we are to see how it has been applied to morals.

83 . Ibid, p.99. 51

Those forms of life whether plants or animals which have the favorable variations, tend then to survive in the struggle for existence. They are adapted to their environment, and it is this adaptation that constitutes what is called "survival value." This formula was originally developed to explain the evolution of organic species was in short primarily biological. But Darwin himself extended it, as we have seen, to psychology, and by implication at least, to morals.

2.1.10.1.15. Moral Value And Survival Value 84 :

Survival value or viability is, as we have seen, the explaining principle of evolutionary ethics. The Darwinian formula, "natural selection, through struggle for existence, leading to the survival of the fit", is applied directly to the phenomena we call moral. That becomes good which leads to survival, that bad which militates against it. That becomes good which leads to survival, that bad which militates against it. Fitness in the biological sense is the result of this struggle. What more natural than that this same fitness should be looked upon as the goal of the struggle, and that value should be identified with this fitness? This is of course what has been done. Precisely as the hedonist identifies value with a pleasurable state of consciousness, so the ethics of evolution identifies value with objective fitness and the survival that results. This theory of value has been stated in different ways by different writers, but the root idea in every case is this notion of fitness and of organic welfare. The notion of fitness is first of all defined in terms of adjustment. The ethical end, or ultimate value, is then just this complete or perfect adjustment to environment. This is, indeed, Herbert Spencer's formulation, whose Data of Ethics may be considered the first attempt to place ethical theory on a biological and evolutionary basis. Leslie Stephen in his Science of Ethics emphasizes the conception of organic welfare somewhat more. For him the end of moral conduct, and the standard in terms of which it is to be judged is, "the health of social tissue." The highest good is the maximum of social health and efficiency. The best statement of the conception is, however, that of S. Alexander 85 in The Idea of Value: Moral Order and Progress . The standard of value is, in his view, the " social equilibrium ". He writes "value is nothing but the efficiency of a conscious agent to promote the efficiency of society, to maintain the equilibrium of forces which that society represents."

84 . Ibid, p.106. 85 . Ibid, p.108. 52

It is clear that the same general idea underlies all these forms of expression. Value is, in the last analysis, identified with organic welfare or viability. It is clear also that we have here to do with a form of perfectionism in ethics, in that it is the perfection of function (whether perfection of adjustment of social health or efficiency), rather than a pleasurable state of consciousness, that constitutes the standard of value. In other words, value is essentially a biological phenomenon although it appears in psychological form. Being a biological phenomenon and that is the essential point our conception of good or value, even in ethics, must be defined and formulated in biological terms.

2.1.10.1.16. The Ethics of Self-Realization, The Idealistic Perfectionism 86 :

The limitations of a merely biological philosophy of ethics are now clearly evident. No adequate concept or criterion of human value can be based on organic categories alone. To recognize these limitations does not, however, mean to deny its significance and importance so far as it goes. It has, for instance, been made the basis of searching criticisms of erroneous conceptions of the economic life of man. As over against the ideal that the goal of the economic life is unlimited production of wealth, one may well set the ideal of organic welfare of welfare even in this limited sense. One may say, in terms of a philosophy enunciated centuries ago, that "the life is more than meat and the body than raiment." One may, from this point of view, deny the value of any civilization in which "wealth accumulates and men decay." Such a criticism, as for instance that of J. A. Hobson proceeds upon the conception that a "human standard" of economic value is "to value every act of production and consumption with regard to the aggregate effect on life." 87

2.1.10.1.17. Definition of Idealistic Perfectionism88 :

The simplest statement of idealistic perfectionism is perhaps the following. Good or value for man lies in the perfection of his functions, but these functions are more than organic. They are rational, spiritual ideal. In the words of Aristotle, one of the oldest representatives of this view, man is an animal, but he is a rational animal, and his good lies in the perfection of his rational or ideal nature.

86 . Ibid, p.116 87 . Ibid 88 . Ibid, p.117 53

The first and most important aspect of this form of perfectionism is the insistence that man is more than organic, and that the life he lives has a meaning and value that cannot be described in organic terms. In other words idealistic perfectionism recognizes hyper-organic values . The term hyper-organic, or super-organic, is one that has attained a wide vogue in present day sociological and ethical studies. The second aspect of this form of perfectionism is its emphasis on personality. The outstanding character of the hyper-organic level is the emergence of selves or personalities. It is the development or realization of selves that constitutes the "good" of this level, and for this reason the theory of ethics which makes this the locus of value is called the ethics of self-realization. By this is meant that the locus of the good or value is not found in pleasure, nor in organic survival or welfare, but in the complete energizing of our capacities as selves or persons, it being assumed that self-hood or personality constitutes a distinct kind of reality and has values not definable in terms of anything else. Even Kant, the formalist, recognized the truth in this idea when he laid down as a fundamental maxim of morals, that “we should never treat a human being as a means to an end but always as an end in himself” 89 Hegel, perhaps the chief modern representative of idealistic perfectionism, summed up all morality, in the phrase, "Be a person and respect others as person”90 The third aspect of this theory is that it is idealistic rather than naturalistic. The terms idealism and idealistic have made a great deal of trouble in philosophy, but they need cause no difficulty here. The terms, as applied in this case, mean that the self which I ought to realize, and in the realization of which my good consists, is not the self in a merely bodily or organic sense, not a mere bundle of instincts or impulses, but that integrated self which we call character. As the self is more than organic, so it is more than natural in the ordinary sense of the word. The natural self, of impulse and instinct constitutes the raw material of the ethical life, out of which the ideal self is made.

2.1.10.1.18. Historical Representatives of Idealistic Perfectionism 91 : Perfectionism in some form is the natural ethical philosophy of the great moral teachers and prophets, and its idealistic form the natural expression of more elevated conceptions of life. But it is by no means confined to the teachers and prophets. It

89 . Ibid ,p.118 90 . Ibid 91 . Ibid, p.120. 54 constitutes a well-defined moral theory which seems to many, when properly interpreted, to be the only workable moral philosophy. This ethical theory found its first expression in the works of the great Greek idealists, Plato and Aristotle, and resulted, in the first instance, from a criticism and clarification of hedonism. When ethical reflection first arose among the Greeks, it found expression in the natural or common sense notion that happiness constitutes the good of man. In meeting the ethical skepticism of the Sophists, Socrates maintained that knowledge of the good is possible, that such moral insight is the most excellent thing in the world, and that insight is inevitably followed by happiness. Socrates did not find it necessary to make any clear distinction between excellence and happiness, but Plato and Aristotle did. Their way of thinking is described as Eudemonism, to distinguish it from hedonism. Eudemonism is the theory that active well-being is the highest good of life and that that good is always accompanied by pleasure. In a number of his dialogues especially the Phcedo, Plato makes the distinction clear, and later Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, formulated it clearly. In a famous passage of that work he starts out with the statement that "to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, but the statement means little until we determine wherein that happiness consists." 92 He finds it to consist in perfection of function. This Greek notion was taken over into Christian ethics, Christian thought in general being greatly influenced by Greek philosophy. But something else entered into the Christian formulation, namely an emphasis on the self or person. The unique value of every human soul, as a son of God, the injunction "be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect,” 93 enunciated by the founder of Christianity and elaborated by St. Paul, finally entered into the very warp and woof of Christian thought. St. Augustine and St. Anselm, both Platonists, carried on the Greek tradition, but the complete formulation of Christian moral philosophy must be ascribed to St. Thomas Aquinas. For him, as for Aristotle, everything in nature, every created thing, has its own good and its own perfection and strives towards that perfection. The good of man consists in the perfection of his rational or spiritual nature, and ultimately in the beatific vision of God from whom his being and reason are derived.

92 . Ibid, p.119. 93 . Ibid, p.120 55

2.1.10.1.19.The Argument For Perfectionism 94 :

This brief historical sketch suffices to show both the continuity of this way of thinking, and also to make still more clear the point at which it differs from the naturalistic form of perfectionism, associated with Darwinian evolution. That which is common to them all, from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel, are first, that the good lies in development or realization, and ultimately in perfection; and secondly that the good life for man, to be thus realized, includes the perfection of other functions than those of the merely biological life. Aristotle starts out with the assumption that to say that happiness is the chief good is a platitude, but holds that a clearer account is desirable. This is possible only if we can first ascertain the function of man . He points out that in all things that have a function, or activity, the good or the "well" is thought to reside in that function. A flute player, a sculptor or any artist, have a function and a good artist is he who performs his function well. He then asks: Have these, or the carpenter and the tanner, certain functions or activities, and has man, as man, none? He thinks not and then seeks to find what this function may be. He starts out with man as a mere living organism with the "notion of Life." Life, however, seems to be common to plants as well, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be life of perception, but this also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every other animal. There remains then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle. It is in this rational principle that we find the unique function of man. Now the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre and the function of a good lyre-player is to do so well . If this is the case, human good turns out to be the highest activity of the rational principle, "to be the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there is more than one virtue, in accordance with the most complete." 95 The complete energizing of our rational or spiritual functions constitutes the good of man, and the excellence thus achieved is virtue. This line of thought is so simple and so inevitable that it appears wherever and whenever men think about the good at all. It is, nevertheless, also so fundamental that it is still the form in which men reason whenever they try to think out what is implied in the notion of the good or value. Let us now try to restate it in terms of present-day thought.

94 . Ibid, p.121. 95 . Ibid, p.122. 56

The good or value of anything is to be found, in the first instance, in its use or function. A good knife is one that cuts well; a good machine of any kind is one that performs its function efficiently. A good race horse or a good dray horse is horses whose structure is determined by their purpose or function. So also with a good carpenter or good physician. In each case the answer lies in the degree of the efficiency as an instrument or means to some end. But we may also ask what is the good of some organ of the body, such as the liver or spleen. What is the good of certain instinctive capacities in animals, etc.? The answer is value-for-life, their function in the conserving or furthering of the life processes. But finally, we may also ask what is the good of life? We can answer this question only by implying something else for which life is there. It is true we may answer that this is a meaningless question. That life is a good in itself, and that when we reach the notion of life in our thinking; we have, so to speak, reached the terminal point. There are those, indeed, who hold this position, but to most men it has seemed clear that life is not an end in itself, but is the condition of other goods to be realized either happiness or perfection of selves. If then we examine these illustrations we find that we get three relatively different conceptions of the "good," and that back of those conceptions lie the three fundamental conceptions of mechanism, organism and humanism, or personality. The good of a mechanism is its efficiency, and the notion of good as efficiency applies only to mechanisms. Thus even when we find the notion applied to human beings, or to human activities of any kind, we always think of the individual or society in a mechanical way. The good of an organism is its capacity for life, as the biologists say, its viability. Corresponding to this we have the notions of survival, organic welfare, fullness of life, etc. These notions, strictly speaking, apply only to organisms and organic life. When we find them applied in the human or social context, it always means that the individual or society is envisaged in a merely organic way. Finally, there is the conception of human good as something more than organic welfare. Man is an animal, but he is a "rational" and a social animal. Man is an organism, but he is also a personality, something hyper-organic which, for lack of a better term, we may for the moment call spirit. Man has therefore values which, in contrast to the merely organic, we may call spiritual.

57

2.1.10.1.20. Idealistic Perfectionism And Self-Realization 96 :

It follows from the foregoing that idealistic perfectionism naturally takes as its conception of the ethical end or good, that of self-realization. Recognizing, as it does, that the notions of self or personality stand for unique and super- organic forms of life that cannot be reduced to organic terms, it necessarily finds the good or value for man in the development of that personality, in the complete energizing or realizing of all man's capacities as a person. This does not mean, of course, that self-realization is possible in abstract to that is without including the satisfaction, fulfillment, realization of the organic tendencies, of the natural instincts of man. Self-realization involves the realization of these also. Nor does it mean that such self-realization is possible without satisfaction or realization of the social tendencies or instincts of man. The self is, as we shall see, essentially a social self. Self-realization involves the satisfaction of all these and more. For this reason the ethical good of man is said to consist in total self-realization. To understand what is meant by self-realization in this theory it is necessary to begin first with the more simple idea of realization. Realization is a general term for achievement, through human powers, along various lines of effort and attainment. It includes the idea of an object or an end and the bringing of the same to actuality or reality through accomplishment. In the ordinary life of economic and social accomplishment it is usually called success. And success in this narrower sense is normally a condition, in some part and to some degree of self-realization. But there are forms of realization for which success seems scarcely the appropriate term. There is, for instance, the realization of love between two human beings. Here realization lies first in bringing our love or devotion for another to full consciousness or actuality. This may take place without return and is still a form of self- realization. But if the love is returned, there is added the realization of another's love for us, and with it a new sense of attainment and possession. Here we should be likely to use the term fulfillment rather than success, for that which is brought to realization here is something which seems to lie deeper and to be a more integral part of the Self than the more external objects and projects to which we accumulates our effort. These then are forms of functioning or realization. But deeper than these deeper even, perhaps, than the realization of love or friendship between persons are the realization of ends which transcend persons. There are the individual goods described

96 . Ibid, p.125. 58 above, but there is also over-individual good the realization of those values which we subsume under the general terms of the true, the beautiful, and the good. These words are, to be sure, abstractions, but the things for which they stand are not abstractions, as all who pursue these ends know. Pursuit of these ends may, as Ibsen in his later plays showed, involve an abstraction from life which is ethically vicious, but these values correspond to functions basal in the "rational" life of man and their achievement represents, the highest functioning of his nature.

2.1.10.1.21. The Opposition of Egoism And Altruism 97 :

Thus far Urban have investigated the problems of human values without taking into serious account at all a certain contrast of good and bad which is fundamental in ethical practice and theory the contrast namely between selfishness and unselfishness, or Egoism and Altruism. The contrast is fundamental for the reason that in much of ethical thinking selfishness and bad conduct tend to become identical and unselfishness or altruism are made coextensive with goodness. These distinctions accordingly play a paramount role in all ethical discussion. Egoism and altruism, selfishness and unselfishness, are fundamental forms in terms of which we are accustomed to classify conduct, and this contrast in the practical life corresponds to equally thorough going contrasts in theory. There have been absolute egoists, such as Stirner and Nietzsche, and absolute altruists such as Tolstoy.

2.1.10.1.22. The Common Sense Attitude -Enlightened Self Interest 98 :

Most moralists have usually tried to mediate between these two tendencies, to seek a compromise between the two extreme attitudes. In this they represent in general what we have called the morality of "common sense." This common sense attitude may be roughly and somewhat bluntly expressed in the following way. The man whose actions are all egoistic or self regarding is a knave; the man whose actions are all other- regarding is a fool. The former may be a fool as well as a knave, for pure egoism is in the long run self-defeating also. The wise and good man is he who strikes a proper balance between them. Now this is probably a fair picture of what most men in practice actually do and think. The average "worthy citizen as he himself would say, indulges and asserts himself

97 . Ibid, p.135. 98 .Ibid, p.145. 59 in certain respects and restrains himself in others. He thinks of his own interests a large part of the time, but this does not exclude the interests of others. On the other hand, his common sense tells him that, even when he devotes himself to the good of others, "self- sacrifice" cannot intelligently go so far as to blind him to his own interests and welfare. He may in business put service above profit, but he cannot see how the best service is to be rendered if all profits to the individual is excluded. One of the classical attempts at a solution of the problem in this spirit is that of Herbert Spencer in his chapter entitled The Conciliation of Egoism and Altruism. The method employed is to show that neither extreme egoism nor extreme altruism is really enlightened. Both are irrational in that they defeat their own ends each constitutes a self- defeating process. Let us start with pure altruism, or pure self-sacrifice, which, as we have seen, is sometimes identified with the moral attitude as such. We are presented with the picture of a poor London clerk, devoted to his family and somewhat stupidly sacrificing himself at every point for what he considers their good. He denies himself sufficient food and the necessary clothes that would protect him from the weather. As a result he weakens his health and finally becomes the prey of a disease, which removes him from his family, just at the time when his care and protection are most needed. Even granted that this pure altruism is morally a noble quality, it was unintelligent altruism, because it defeated the very ends it had in mind. The evils of "unregulated altruism," such as this have much wider ramifications than at first appear. Parents who sacrifice everything for their children may not only diminish their own capacity for serving them, but even create in them the very qualities of irresponsibility and selfishness which will later prove their undoing. The height of such folly is reached when love for the child takes the form of the denial to him of that discipline which he will later, so sorely need. Unintelligent altruism, even from the standpoint of the altruist, defeats its own ends. Similarly unintelligent egoism defeats the very ends of the egoist himself. Egoism is not necessarily evil, as is often supposed, but its good or bad is determined wholly by the objects or ends towards which it is directed. Egoism has the sub-forms of self-preservation and self-realization. The first of these may be distinctly good and in fact a duty. It all depends upon what the life is preserved for. Self- satisfaction involves satisfaction through something. Whether it be morally good or bad depends wholly on what it is through which, and in which, the self is satisfied. The same is true of self- realization. It depends upon what self is realized. Altruism, or self- 60 sacrifice, is in itself no less neutral and non-moral. Altruism may, and history shows that it often does, attach itself to evil ends. Men's loyalties and self-sacrifices have been vicious almost as often as virtuous. The moral quality depends upon that for which the self is sacrificed. We have seen that self-preservation, self-satisfaction, and self- realization are morally empty and worthless if taken as ends in themselves. But if this is true, it is not clear why self-sacrifice for the preservation, satisfaction or self-realization of another should have absolute value. It is then fallacious to think of self-affirmation as intrinsically evil and self- denial as intrinsically good. Such views are simply part of the formalistic theory, which holds that the moral quality of an act lies wholly in its "inner form", and is wholly independent of the ends or consequences of the act. The same criticisms that apply to formalism in general apply also to this application of it. In fact, it has often been shown that altruism universalized would not lead to the highest good. We should have a situation analogous to that which existed on that apocryphal island on which "the natives made their living by taking in each other's washing." The second fallacy to which ethical philosophers quite generally call attention is even more fundamental and serious in its practical consequences. It is assumed; falsely we have seen, that the good is always somebody's good and that therefore we should always choose the good of others. This fallacy may be concretely illustrated by the case of St. Crispin who stole leather from the rich to make shoes for the poor. The motive in this case was undoubtedly one of sympathy and altruism. If the problems were merely one of the greatest welfare or happiness for the greatest number of individuals in a given practical situation, we should be strongly tempted to judge the saint's actions favorably. His fallacy lays in the false assumption that the good of individuals can be abstracted from the good of the whole. What he overlooked was the effect on society of the violation of the institution of property. The highest good is always over individual in this sense, social or common good. The fallacy here is again one of vicious abstractionism. It is an abstraction to think of my good as something that I can gain or enjoy to the exclusion of others. The very nature of my self-hood makes that impossible. It is equally an abstraction to think that the good of another individual, the alter, is such a good. Altruism, in this limited sense, is, as has been well said, merely "egoism multiplied.' If my individual good has no absolute value, there seems no reason why that of others should either. Enlightened ethical thought is coming more and more to the insight that the highest good is always the common good and that the highest functioning of man consists in activities that transcend the distinctions of the self and the other. 61

2.1.10.1.23. Absolute Altruism, Tolstoy 99 :

The supreme champion of absolute altruism in our own time is Tolstoy. In his novels and plays, no less than in his distinctively philosophical works, he consistently maintains (i) that moral goodness is identical with altruism and (2) that only in acts of self-sacrifice can the true self be realized. Egoism, whether in the form of the will to power or in gratification of the life of sense, is always self-defeating; and all his characters who attain to self-realization do so through insight into the illusions of egoism and through sacrifice of self to others. The philosophy underlying this view Tolstoy has expressed in vivid and telling form in My Confession and On Life.

2.1.10.1.24. The Table of Values 100 :

The unreflective "common sense" of men recognizes certain classes of human goods or values. It also tends, Urban has to put these groups or classes in a certain order. We shall find that it ordinarily includes eight classes of values called the system of value as follows: I. Bodily Values

II. Economic Values

III. Values of Recreation

IV. Values of Association

V. Character Values

VI. Esthetic Values

VII. Intellectual Values

VIII. Religious Values

These classes of values will be defined more fully as the discussion proceeds. The only merit we claim for this preliminary grouping is that it gives us a serviceable starting point for the exploration of the field of human values. It may be claimed, however, I think, that these class names represent goods that are immediately understood and appreciated; that all possible values are included in these groups; and that all are

99 .Ibid, p.151. 100 .Ibid, p.160. 62 actual values that is values universally recognized as representing things or objects that men do actually value. By some individuals some of these values may be thought of as of little importance, as for instance those included in the class, esthetic; by others some may, perhaps, be thought of as negative or of actual disutility, as in the case of the religious values in Soviet Russia. But no one would deny that a merely empirical grouping must contain all these values.

2.1.10.1.25. The Normal Order of Values 101 :

Thus far we have merely a grouping not an order or system. Yet even in this grouping there is a kind of order. The presentation of these groups in merely numerical arrangement suggests an order that is more than numerical. The mere fact that in putting them down on paper, they cannot be presented all at once, but must be put one after the other, involves some selection; and in this selection we include, almost instinctively as it were, another type of order than the numerical. The values are begun with religious and esthetic values and ended with bodily values, or might have mixed them all up; but something led us to put them in an order that would also suggest their relative importance. That which led us to do this, Urban think, is the fact that in the very notion of value itself is included the idea of more or less value, in other words of degree. To arrange values in any way that did not also suggest their relative values or languages would have something irrational in it. Now I think it is true that almost anyone would put these groups in something like the order chosen, and for the reasons indicated. The idea that one had in mind might be that the bodily and economic values are fundamental in that they are absolutely necessary for life, while the other groups are progressively less and less necessary. On the other hand, one might have the idea that while these are necessary for life, they are not as significant as the other values. He might call these the lower values and the others progressively higher and higher values. Whether, then, we interpret this order from the standpoint of what is basal or fundamental to life, or from the standpoint of what is more significant for the good life, in either case the goods or values would fall into this order, and that is the only point with which we are here concerned. Our task is then to explain or interpret this natural order. Before proceeding further in this interpretation, let us note something else. Almost anyone would, we have said, put the goods of life in these classes, and the classes in something like the

101 .Ibid ,p.162. 63 preceding order. But he would also do something else. He would naturally divide this table of values into three distinct groups. The bodily, economic and recreation values would naturally be thought of together, for they all involve the satisfaction of wants connected with what we may call the bodily self. The character values and the values of association would be thrown together, for they are connected with the social self and arise only in relations of the self to others. The esthetic, intellectual and religious values also go together because, however related to the bodily and social self, however conditioned by them, they really arise only in some functioning of the self that goes beyond them. We may say then, I think, that this division of values into three groups is not wholly arbitrary, but that it springs from some principle inherent in the nature and the relations of the values themselves. Making use, then, of concepts that are already to a large extent familiar, we may present our table of human values in the following form 102 : I. Organic a) Bodily b) Economics c) Recreation II. Hyper-organic 1. Values of Society a) Association b) Character III, Spiritual Values a) Intellectual b) Esthetic c) Religion Most of the terms in this classification need no special comment. The values of sociality, in the two forms of association and character values, are entirely understandable in the light of our discussion of the true self as the social self. It is clear, not only that self-realization is conditioned by association with others, and that the values of such associations involve greater degrees of self-realization than the merely organic functioning’s, but also that what we call character, and its values, is a creation of this level of association.

102 .Ibid, p.164. 64

It is the second class of values under the hyper-organic, namely the spiritual, that needs special comment here. First as to the term itself. The word spiritual is perfectly well understood and has a place in every developed language. In its first meaning it is anything that is not corporeal, and there are many objects or things in the world that are not physical, everyone but the crass materialist recognizes. In this sense all hyper- organic values are spiritual. But there is also a second meaning, according to which the term is used to characterize those objects of human interest which are of an ideal nature, such as truth, goodness and beauty. These are, as we say, things of the spirit; and he is said to be spiritually minded, who is sensitive to objects and relations in this sphere. Of the spiritual values, as thus understood, the intellectual values of knowledge are those that are immediately appreciated. Knowledge has a highly instrumental value and is appreciated a means acquisition of bodily and economic good. Its possession is also in certain ways, and to a certain degree, the condition of important social values. The value of education and the right to education are therefore recognized as conditions of self-realization. A man needs knowledge if he is "to make something of himself." But knowledge, in the sense of knowing and understanding for their own sakes, is felt to be, not only a good in itself, but also the indispensable condition of any genuine self-hood. Less easily appreciated, perhaps, are the esthetic values. Yet they also are everywhere present in the ordinary life of men. A man not only wants an automobile to drive in, but he wants the lines to be flowing and beautiful. He not only wants a house to live in or a building to work in, but he wants certain esthetic qualities to these buildings which may give him permanent satisfaction. Much of the beauty of "things of clothes, houses, etc. are the product of social mode and ephemeral taste, but a significant residuum is intrinsic. It is not difficult to see wherein the intrinsic value of esthetic experiences lies. The esthetic capacity is, in some form and in some degree, present in every individual. The power to appreciate immediately the rich content of color, line, form, sounds, etc. (to say nothing of the cultural heritage of created beauty in the arts), is not only a source of pleasure, as we say, but one of the chief conditions of the socializing and humanizing of men. Without hesitation we may then say, that esthetic value is widely present in all satisfactory living, and that the realizations of what we call beauty are a large part, and in the end an indispensable condition, of total self-realization. The religious values are the spiritual values par excellence , one meaning of the word spiritual given in the" dictionaries is "pertaining to divine things." From a purely psychological and sociological point of view, engaging in religious practices and getting 65 the values which come from those practices, is an essential part of the "behavior' of man. Nor do many deny that religion, and religious beliefs and practices, have instrumental value in the economic and social life of mankind. A sense of stewardship, of the duty to make the best of the opportunities that God has given one, may make a man "diligent in business, serving the Lord." The influence of religious beliefs and sentiments in the development of the economic life of America has been pointed out by various writers. Again, the place of religion as a means of "social control" has been emphasized ad nauseam by recent sociological writers. But when all this is recognized, it is, after all, as intrinsic values, as forms of realization in the individual life of man, that religious values have their highest moral significance. It is in this sense that they are understood when put into the class of spiritual values.

2.1.10.1.26. The Relation of Human Values To "Instincts" And Interests 103 :

A more complete exploration of the field of human values requires a further differentiation and expansion of these general groups. This can best be accomplished by following the clues of the fundamental wants or needs of man. Our first definition of value was, indeed, "whatever satisfies a human want ' Now it is a belief, of popular psychology at least, that man is in possession of a set of fundamental wants, the satisfaction of which constitutes his normal well-being and the arrest or inhibition of which, ill-being. These are commonly called instincts and the self thus constituted may be described as the instinctive self, in contrast to the rational self to be realized. It is unfortunate for our present purpose that recent "scientific" psychology is against our using instinct in this natural and popular sense. If we were constructing a table of values a decade ago we should be allowed to use this term without any question. William James stated that the existence of instincts "on an enormous scale in the animal kingdom needs no proof"; and went on to say that "man is distinguished from the other animals, not by the absence of instincts but by their comparative multiplicity." Today some psychologists talk of giving up instincts altogether, although popular opinion is in the directly opposite direction. The question really turns largely on an ambiguity in the term instinct. In sociological and ethical thought the term is used mainly to designate certain dispositions or tendencies which may be taken as fundamental springs of action. For the psychologist, the notion has also invariably included the idea of innateness. Some

103 .Ibid, p.166. 66 psychologists believe today that there is experimental and other empirical evidence which goes to disprove the innateness of the majority of those impulses we have hitherto called instincts. Now it does not follow that the absence of dispositions or tendencies in infancy disproves their existence in man. Some hereditary traits such as sexuality and walking may require the growth and maturity of the structures involved. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that these fundamental impulses or springs of action are merely habits. The present writer favors the hypothesis, shared by many psychologists, that the principal primary impulses or drives are really instincts, fixed in prehistoric, and to a considerable extent pre human, ages. They are modifiable, of course, but not to the extent that they would be if they were merely habits. In any case these technical questions need not disturb us here. From the standpoint of constructing a table or system of values, there are certain dispositions or tendencies which, whether innate or acquired, are fundamental and universal enough to be made the basis of human values. Whether we call them interests or instincts is immaterial. "Interest and instinct are," in the words of Professor R. B. Perry, "the same thing save that instinct implies a further theory of inheritance that must, for the present at least, be regarded as best as a probable hypothesis. Ignoring then these technical questions, not because they are unimportant from the point of view from which they have been raised, but because they do not affect the use which we wish to make of the concept of instinct, we may say that all these values correspond to fundamental instinctive needs or wants of men. Thus, any classification of instincts would include the instincts of hunger, sex and play, out of which the bodily needs and those of recreation arise. It would also include the gregarious instinct and the instincts of self-affirmation and self-denial, with which the values of association and of character are connected. It could scarcely fail to connect the intellectual values of man with that curiosity, so basal in both animals and men as to have given it the name of instinct. While there might be difference of opinion as to the exact instinctive basis of esthetic activities, whether for instance they may or may not be related to the play impulse, as Karl Groos held; and while some might deny any instinctive basis whatever to the religious emotions; surely these too are fundamental and universal enough to be recognized as basic springs of action, and therefore as instincts in our uncritical use of the term. With these considerations in mind, we present the following table of values 104 , the reader to make use of the term, instinct or interest, as he prefers:

104 .Ibid, p.169. 67

ORGANIC VALUES

Values Instincts (or Interests )

Bodily Hunger, Sex

Economic Acquisition, Bodily activity a) Property and expression b) Labor

Recreation Play

HYPER-ORGANIC VALUES SOCIAL Values Instincts Association Values Gregarious instinct Character Values Sympathy Self-assertion, Self- abasement HYPER ORGANIC VALUES - SPIRITUAL Values Instincts Intellectual Curiosity Esthetic Values Play (?) Religious Values Religious Instinct

2.1.10.1.27. Self-Realization And The Organization of Values 105 : It goes without saying that the ideal of self-realization, as we have defined and developed it, implies and requires the satisfaction of all these tendencies, or the realization of all these values. Self-realization is in one sense but a blanket term for the complete energizing all man's capacities. The actual truth, however, is that it is only an ideal, in the sense that it describes only a direction in which man's conscious activity may be directed. There is no such thing as total self-realization, realization of the self all at once, or in one act. Life is a process, by its very nature a series of choices. It is of necessity a sacrifice of one value for another. It is only in youth that we believe in infinite possibility that we can be anything we want and all things at once.

105 .Ibid, p.170. 68

It follows that, as we have seen, the very process of self-realization involves the putting of these goods of life in some sort of order. It becomes then merely the question of the right order. Even in any table of values there is, as we have seen, some kind of order. We have indicated also that the order or system of values developed out of this natural order represents that which is normal to the valuing life of man and corresponds to what is common sense in values. We must now attempt to discover the principle or principles which determine these preferences and thus constitute the normal order of human values.

2.1.10.1.28. Principles of Organization, Laws or Norms of Value 106 : There are three principles which are generally recognized as present in determining our choice or preference among goods or values. It is our basic now to attempt to these principles are inherent in the nature of value and that their application to the groups of values we have distinguished results in the order that we have shown to be normal to the valuing consciousness of men. In fulfilling this task we shall at the same time be enabled to develop further the meaning of the classes we have distinguished. Starting with the bodily values, it is not difficult to see that these values, and the economic values of property and labor that derive from them, are primarily instrumental rather than intrinsic. In the case of the economic values there can be no doubt. Economic goods are valuable. In the case of the bodily values there may be some question as to whether they are not goods in themselves. The satisfaction of the instinct of hunger is indeed accompanied by a pleasurable state of consciousness which may easily appear to be an intrinsic good, especially after we have been denied its satisfaction for a considerable time, and certainly starvation may seem to be an intrinsic "bad." But after all, there is fundamental wisdom in the saying that we "eat to live, not live to eat." If we follow thought to its conclusion, we cannot escape the inference that, after all, the pleasures of the table cannot be made an end in themselves without a perversion of values. The same is true of the other bodily values of sex and recreation. It is doubtless true that, as we shall see, both men and women speak more frankly of the ''physical satisfactions" of sex as part of love, and there is doubtless an intrinsic element in these satisfactions. But the distinction between lust and love is ingrained in the experience of the race, and sex relations between men and women are recognized as losing a large part of their value unless they are instrumental to the realization of personal values also. Play

106 .Ibid, p.170. 69 has value in itself, but it also is mainly instrumental, in the sense that it is a means of recreation of bodily and spiritual functions. No one but the varies puritan would deny some intrinsic value to play, but its chief function is, after all, as is almost intuitively recognized, to keep us "fit." In any case, play as an end in itself is pretty definitely recognized as a perversion of values. The application of the second principle brings out the subordinate character of these values even more clearly. We need not here inquire why man seeks the permanent, the durable satisfactions of life rather than the transitory. There can be little question also as to where human experience has taught us that the more permanent values are to be found. The senses soon weary and cease to respond with pleasure to repeated stimuli, whereas the ideational activities are capable of comparatively long and unwearied exercise. Unless our life becomes filled with ideal content, unless it turns more and more to the values of association and character, and ultimately to the more permanent values of the mind and spirit, it is likely to be made up of long periods of boredom and weariness between the more intense sensuous gratifications. The bodily values, and the economic goods which are necessary instruments in securing them, are all indispensable conditions of life and ultimately of the good life. As such, they are always the primary objects of man's desire. But they cannot be made ends in themselves, or the permanent objects of man's conscious will, without initiating that self-defeating process of which the hedonistic paradox is the classical expression. The choice of the productive rather than the unproductive values constitutes still another principle of organization. It is characteristic of merely instrumental values that they are used up in the process of being used. This is the law of material things, but it is also more or less a law of the bodily values which the material things produce. In contrast to these, the hyper-organic values are progressively more and more productive, both for the individual and for the society of which he is a part. Especially do the spiritual goods of knowledge, art, and religion escape the law inherent in all material things; they multiply in distribution and suffer no loss in division. To share these things with others is not to impoverish one's self, but rather to increase one's own store. Goods of this sort are not only over individual, but they transcend the boundaries of nations. The more common and universal they are. the more productive they become. These three principles serve to explain the quite general subordination of bodily and instrumental values to the "higher" values of human association and character and to the over-individual values of knowledge, beauty and religion. They explain also, I think, the equally general subordination of the "social" values to the "spiritual." Associations of 70 various kinds, between man and man and between man and woman, those which we describe as love, friendship and community of interest in common ends all these are more intrinsic, more permanent, and more fertile in creation of new values than are the merely bodily or instrumental goods. But even these have their limitations. The human self is indeed a social self, and for this reason his relations with others are, as it were, his very nerves and sinews. But in a sense also he is over-social in his interests, and the common good which transcends distinctions of the self and the other is the source of his most permanent as of his most fruitful joy.

2.1.10.1.29. Human Values And Law 107 :

The test of any theory, however, is that it may in turn be made fruitful for further explanation and interpretation. We propose, therefore, to test our system of values by comparing it with the system of values presupposed and embodied in the law. The general relation of law to morals has already been defined. Law presupposes ethics and is concerned with the realization of minimum of morality necessary for the life of man in society. In terms of our present discussion it may be defined as an instrument for the protection for the furthering of all these human values. First of all, then, laws exist for the protection of some cases, for the furthering of all these human values. In other words, the various goods, bodily, economic, and spiritual, are all recognized as indispensable condition of the moral life of man, and are as such protected. Banthem are recognized fundamental needs of man, as which must be realized if the individual shall realize self, and if society is to continue and develop satisfaction. To these values correspond claims or ”rights" as they called, which it is one of the chief functions of law to hold and protect." In order to make our present point it is not necessary here to go into the important question of the ethical has human rights. It is enough that for every fundamental value law recognizes law are made for the right to life, to bodily security, the right to the holding property when it is acquired and more and more to labor as an indispensable condition of life have increasingly established themselves in modern law. There is the right to free marriage within certain restrictions, a right to leisure and recreation, as more and more important in modern legislation governing the hours of labor and the right to play of children.

107 . Ibid, p.177. 71

2.1.10.1.30. Respect For Law 108 :

It is out of this relation of law to the system of human values which we have been describing, that there springs that "respect for law" which characterizes all thoughtful people. Such respect for law is due not to any thoughtless formalism, but arises out of a sense of its close relation to the moral law within which, according to Kant, calls forth our deepest reverence. On this very question of respect for law there is much fallacious thinking at the present time. It is repeated parrot-like that "you cannot make men good by law," and in a sense this is of course true. Goodness, in the moral is autonomous and must spring from the law within. On the other hand, in order to the right men must know the right; and law, embodying as it does the ethical minimum necessary to the maintenance of the good life, is the first, if not the final, teacher of morality. The same thinkers who condemn the externality of law will, curiously enough, speak of social control through science. The only social control that is either practicable or desirable is that which comes about through consciousness of values, and of the significance of the law in which these values are embodied.

2.1.10.1.31.The Nature of Human Rights And Their Place In Ethical Philosophy 109 : In the chapter of Human Values and Right and Duties the author has put up all practical questions of morals can be put under three general heads: What ought we to do? What ought we to have? What ought we to be? To these three questions correspond the three fundamental notions of ethics, namely Duty, Right and Virtue. A complete answer to the question, what ought I to do, would be some sort of list of the fundamental duties of man, summarized perhaps in what our fathers called "the whole duty of man." An answer to the second question, what ought I to have, would result in some table of human rights, which might for political purposes be embodied in what our fathers called a bill of rights." An answer to the third question, what ought to be, would result in some picture of the "virtuous man," of whom our fathers, much more than we of the present, were fond of discoursing . Any treatise on ethics must, in a sense, be an answer to these three questions. We, no more than our fathers, can escape answering them, although the form of our answer must inevitably differ in some respects from theirs. These three notions are then fundamental concepts of ethics, for the reason that they afford the most

108 .Ibid, p.181. 109 .Ibid, p.184. 72 important points of view from which every human action and relation may be valued ethically. But all three are subordinated to a still more fundamental and ultimate conception, namely that of the good, or value, itself. Hitherto we have devoted our attention chiefly to the study of this fundamental concept and to the development of a system of human values. In the development of that system we have, indeed, already seen how the three notions of rights, duties and virtues are immediately implied in the values themselves, and how the minimum of morality embodied in law recognizes rights and duties in connection with all the values. Our task is now to study the fields of rights and duties in detail, and with this we enter upon the field of practical ethics.

2.1.10.1.32. Distinction Between Legal And Ethical Right 110 :

This distinction between legal and ethical right may be made clearer by an illustration. There is none better than the famous Dred Scott decision of the United States Supreme Court. Certain ethical "idealists," especially members of the Society of Friends and the abolitionists, thought that the Negroes were human selves and ought, therefore, as selves, to be free. They put their belief into practice by helping, through what was called the "underground rail- road," escaping slaves to reach freedom by secretly passing them along from point to point in their journey north. The owner of Dred Scott, one of the fugitive slaves, made a legal issue of the matter, which was ultimately carried to the Supreme Court of the United States. The decision of that court was that Dred Scott should be returned, and the decision was based upon the principle that the fugitive slave was property, and that those who helped him to escape were alienating property without due process of law. In the existing state of the law no other decision was possible, and it required a war, as it has often in the past required revolutions, to bring "legal" into harmony with "moral" right. This divergence, and ultimately conflict, of ethical and legal right, though real, should not be exaggerated. We have seen that, despite these divergences, there is a very real convergence and harmony. There is no single value of human life, from the lowest bodily to the highest spiritual value that does not receive some recognition and protection in the law, in connection with which some right is not acknowledged. The divergence here, as in the case of divergences of moral judgments from the norms of common sense, has to do not with principles so much as with applications.

110 . Ibid, pp. 187f. 73

2.1.10.1.33. The Classification of Rights 111 :

The another principle of classification which will serve still better to bring out the relation of ethical to legal right and in general of law to ethics. From this point of view, rights are quite generally divided into three classes: (1) Natural or Moral Rights; (2) Civil Rights; (3) Political Rights. Under the head of natural rights the attempt is made to group all these claims which the individual is held to have by virtue of his nature as a moral being. Under the head of civil rights are grouped all those claims which the individual is held to have by virtue of his membership in a civil society. Finally, political rights include all those further claims which an individual may make by virtue of his membership in a State or political order. As regards the objects of moral or natural right, it is usual to name three fundamental kinds: the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to property. This division appears in the three fundamental verbs, to be, to do, and to have. These are sometimes called physical rights, to which are then added certain rights to mental activity, such as freedom of thought and of affection, freedom of education and of worship.

2.1.10.1.34. The Nature of Duty: The Place of Rules In The Moral Life 112 :

There is, we have seen, a point of view from which our duties rather than our rights should be uppermost in our minds. The only proper perspective for the moral agent. as an individual, is expressed by the question, what ought I to do? I may, indeed, ask with a certain propriety, what ought I to have? (Every man, as man, has certain claims that he may make on life and society) and I, as a man, am no exception to the rule. I may, with even more propriety, ask, what ought I to be? Every man seeks the good rather than the bad. He is always doing and choosing. But he cannot act or choose, cannot achieve or realize anything, without inevitably achieving what we call character, realizing also what we call the self. It is eminently fitting that he should have some idea of what his character should be, what he as a self ought to become. But the fact remains that the practical moral problems of the individual revolve primarily around the question what he should do. This question may be asked in two different ways and has, therefore, twosome what different meanings. The first way in which it may be asked is: what ought I to do,

111 . Ibid, pp. 190f.. 112 .Ibid ,p.239. 74 as a human being and not as an animal, as a developed a "primitive, capable of being answer in a universal sense, in the universal sense which it is asked. This is the problem of ethics as a science. The other way of asking the question is, what ought I do as an individual in these particular circumstances? To this question science of itself can give only general hints and directions. For science deals only with general and universal. Ethics can ignore neither of these ways of asking the question and must find some answer to both. But it cannot be insisted upon too strongly that the first question is the primary one, and that it is with this that ethics, as an organized body of human knowledge about values, is first of all concerned. All sciences, including the descriptive and explanatory are concerned with general laws or universals. They must, indeed, also seek to explain individual happenings to subsume them under universal laws. But the determination and interpretation of the general law is the primary task. As the descriptive sciences are concerned with the discovery of Jaws, so the normative sciences are concerned with the formulation of norms, more specifically norms of right, of duty, and of virtue. The application of these norms to the specific situation although an inescapable part of moral "science," is a secondary problem.

2.1.10.1.35. The Concept of Duty, The Broader And The Narrower Notion 113 :

Duty in this narrower sense may then be defined as giving every man his dues or as respect for the rights of claims of men which follows upon the recognition and acknowledgment of human values. To this definition of duty in the ethical sense, we may with advantage add a definition of the notion of duty in law. Duty in this narrower sense being wholly correlative with rights, a classification of duties would be but a classification of rights in another form. Such tables or classifications could indeed be made, and would have a certain value. The property, and the character, of his fellows; the duties of a man to his wife and children; of employer to workman and of workman to employer; respect for truth and for the cultural or spiritual values in general, and for the moral order and the law in which the moral order is embodied all these might be tabulated and classified in the fashion of our system of values.

113 .Ibid, p.240. 75

2.1.10.1.36. Summaries of The Commandments or Duties 114 : It is precisely because of considerations such as the foregoing that the greatest moralists have constantly contrasted the "spirit" with the "letter" of the law, and have almost unanimously striven to lead the mind from moral rules themselves to the spirit or principle back of the rules. Thus the famous saying of Jesus, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets. In certain Christian liturgies this summary follows after the Ten Commandments. Similar attempts to summarize "the whole duty of man" can be found in all the more developed racial moralities and in what are called the ethical religions. Indeed, as has been frequently pointed out recently by Aldous Huxley however varied may be the minor rules of different races, corresponding to different environments and different stages of development, the moral and religious geniuses of all peoples show a singular unanimity in respect to what we call fundamental principles. What Huxley calls the "axes of reference we call good and evil" vary with the mental position of different peoples, but he goes on to point out that "the axes chosen by the best observers have always been startlingly like one another, Gotama, Jesus and Laotsze, for example. They lived sufficiently far from one another in space, time, and social position. But their pictures of reality resemble one another very closely. The nearer man approaches to these in penetration, the more nearly will his axes of reference approach to theirs."

2.1.10.1.37. Place of Moral Rules In Ethical Life 115 : The general nature of duty is now before us. To the question what ought I to do? In its first form and its primary meaning, we have given an answer which, while very general, does bring out the real nature of duty. Such an answer as this does not, it is true, take us very far into the complexity and richness of the moral life. It is only in the concrete context of the more specific study of the social institutions of mankind that we can give a really satisfactory answer to the question. Still more is it true that to the question what ought I to do in a specific situation, no answer can be given except in such a context. Nevertheless, it is still possible to lay down certain general principles regarding the place of moral rules in the ethical life. With this question what ought I to do ? In its second meaning, we come to what is, in many ways, the most difficult problem of ethics one on which, for some moralists,

114 .Ibid, p.248. 115 . Ibid, p.249. 76 the whole idea of ethics as a "science" comes to grief. Ethics, it is said, has no way of telling us what we ought to do in specific cases. In reality, the moral life is much more a matter of common sense, of intuitive insight, or of art, than of knowledge or science. Now there is just enough of truth in this position to make it necessary to examine this entire question of "moral rules" with great care. In general we have, in the history of morals, two contrasting positions. There is one represented by Kant, which bids us apply the norms or rules of conduct rigorously to each particular situation. Universality is the essence of reason, and variation from the norm, or the universal, is unreason. On the other hand, we have the more liberal position, according to which each particular problem of duty, each concrete moral situation, is unique, and can only be solved by the good sense or intuitive insight of the individual. Expressed negatively, this position tells us, in the words of Bernard Shaw, “the only golden rule is that there are no golden rules." The "quintessence of Ibsenism," the fruit of a long line of ethical studies in his "problem plays," is held by Mr. Shaw to be precisely this rule. There can be scarcely any question that the rigorous application of moral rules represents "common sense" in one of its moods. There can be just as little question that the more liberal interpretation represents this same "common sense" in another equally fundamental attitude. How shall we solve this contradiction? The first position is in a sense the more "logical." There is, we saw, an inherent logic of conduct according to which our world of values becomes a world of duties. But this logic extends further than this. Once the duties, corresponding to the values and rights, are acknowledged, this same logic seems to require us to argue in the following fashion. If property is an indispensable condition of self-realization, then to take property, or to steal, is wrong. Stealing is wrong; this act is a case of stealing; therefore this act is wrong. This form of reasoning has been described as the practical or moral syllogism, and for the rigorist it is as cogent as any properly constructed syllogism, in any other region of thought. Moral rules or universals are strictly applicable to particular cases.

2.1.10.1.38. Is Morality The Art of Life ?116 : There are those who see in the facts we have been considering the proof that ethics is not a science, but at most a matter of common sense, of intuitive insight of art rather than knowledge. The only golden rule is that there are no golden rules. Moral rules, such as they are, are made for life, not life for moral rules. Life is a free, creative

116 .Ibid, p.257. 77 process, and full and generous living spurns all moral rules. Genuine moral life, like all life, is free creation of values and is therefore more akin to art.

2.1.10.1.39. Practical Application of Economic Norms 117 :

The general principles that should control the production of wealth and its distribution, the acquisition of property and its use, are clear enough, if not wholly self- evident. It is when we come to the application of these principles to the particular problems of a complex economic and social structure that the difficulties arise. It is, as we say, a condition not a theory that faces us. The real problem is what I ought to do in the specific situation. This is, of course, merely an application with regard to a specific institution of the general problem of the place of rules in the moral life. It would manifestly be impossible to work out in detail particular problems of duty in the manifold relations and circumstances that constitute modern life. Instead, we shall suggest certain consequences that follow from the norms and principles above developed. Let us take as a concrete illustration the simplest of all rules in connection with the right of property: Thou shalt not steal. In a primitive economic society the distinction between mcum and tuum is simple and clear. The commandment, thou shalt not steal, is not elaborated in the decalogue: everyone knows what stealing is. The moral syllogism gives us little trouble. To be sure, questions of casuistry arise on the simplest levels. Was the saint right in stealing leather from the rich to make shoes for the poor? Is a man justified in stealing a weapon in order to prevent murder or suicide? Although questions such as these may present disturbing problems to the conscience of the individual, they are nevertheless soluble in principle, and the principle on which their solution is to be sought is clear enough when we understand the nature of moral values and of the obligations that spring from them. The difficulty of applying moral rules really becomes serious only on a complex level of economic development when changing notions of property and property right throw us into confusion. The difficulty on a complex economic level is not with the principle that stealing is wrong, but rather with the question, just what constitutes stealing. To revert for a moment to our moral syllogism: Stealing is wrong, This act is a case of stealing,

117 .Ibid, pp.284ff. 78

Therefore this act is wrong The problem here is obviously whether the act is a case of stealing. A man, let us say, or a group of men, get control of the majority of the stock of a corporation and, by manipulation of the stock, make worthless the holdings of a large number of individuals who in good faith have invested their earnings in the stock. Certain practices of this sort are taken cognizance of by the law; others are not. To call such sharp practices stealing in any legal sense would be a misnomer. But from an ethical point of view there can be no question. In our society, as constituted, property is an indispensable condition of the moral life. To take that property, by whatever means, without an equivalent, or without due process of law, is stealing in any intelligible ethical sense of the word. It is a violation of the respect for property, which in the end goes back to a violation of respect for the person for whose self-realization his property is an indispensable condition. The necessity of thinking things through of passing from conventional conceptions, developed in earlier social conditions, to the actualities that lie back of them in short from appearance to reality is clearly illustrated in this particular problem. But the same kind of thinking is required in connection with all the duties that arise out of the institution of property. Reinterpretation of duty in the light of the changed conditions of our economic society is imperative. As eternal vigilance is the price of freedom in the political field, so a similar vigilance is the price of welfare in the economic life of any modern people. There are many new obligations that have arisen in connection with property, but they may all be summed up under the one obligation "of being intelligent."

2.1.10.1.40. The Family, Its Duties And Right:

2.1.10.1.40.1. Sexual Morality 118 :

One's duties, one's obligations what one ought to do and what one ought to leave undone in all that pertains to the life of sex, have always constituted a central part of traditional ethics. That there is a right and wrong in these matters everyone recognizes, however that notion of right and wrong may vary with time and place, with social class and level of social development, with the disposition and attitude of individuals. The central place of these matters in the moral life and in ethical thinking is, of course, indicated by the fact that the terms moral and immoral, morality and immorality, are often identified exclusively with the special field of morals connected with the life of

118 .Ibid, p.286. 79 the sexes. According to a well known law of language, terms which have a general significance may in time tend to be confined to one of their special meanings because of popular interest and importance. That this has happened to the terms moral and immoral is significant for moral theory as well as practice. It expresses the general recognition, on the part of common sense, of the central importance of the sex life, and its associated activities, in the entire moral and social life of man; the degree to which the "happiness," welfare, and development of the individual depend upon what we call his sex life; and finally the degree to which the persistence, welfare, and progress, of the community depend upon the organization of that life in the family. This ancient wisdom has received extraordinary confirmation in recent years by the developments in the sciences of biology and psychology. The general effect of these studies has been to increase our sense both of the depth of the sex instinct in the organic and psychical life, and of the extent of its influence and ramifications in all the "higher" activities of man. With the development of eugenics, we have become aware of consequences of sex acts that far transcend the vision of earlier ages, and have become conscious both of rights (of the unborn), and of duties (to posterity), that were undreamed of in the sex morality of our fathers. If such knowledge has not exactly created a "new decalogue of science' as has sometimes been enthusiastically suggested, it has at least transformed the old rights and duties in significant ways. With the developments of modern psychology, we have also become aware of consequences for the psychical life of the individual of which our ancestors had but the dimmest sense. Whatever may be said of the Freudian psychology of its manifest exaggerations and fantastic interpretations it cannot be denied that, aside from what it has contributed to the analysis and cure of neuroses, it has undoubtedly served in most minds to fix the idea of the central place of sex in the mental and spiritual life of man. The influence of Freudianism is undoubtedly waning, but it has left a residuum of insight which is probably a more or less permanent possession of modern man.

2.1.10.1.40.2. Norms of Sex Life And of The Family 119 :

The acceptance of a teleological theory of the ethical basis of the family, leads inevitably to the idea that it is possible to formulate certain norms or principles of the sex life and the rights and duties that spring from them. If it is true that the permanent monogamous relation is the indispensable condition of the highest forms of self-

119 .Ibid, p.312. 80 realization, then not only must certain norms necessarily follow, but these norms, and the laws in which they are embodied, can be understood and interpreted. Without further prelude. These norms are under two heads, (a) The Norms of Sex Life and (b) The Norms of the Family. This does not mean, of course, that the two can be really separated. Our definition of the family excludes that possibility. It merely means that such a relative distinction will enable us to bring out certain important points more clearly than would otherwise be possible. First and foremost, is the general recognition that sex life is normally the indispensable condition of the good life. Everyone, therefore, has a right; in ascertain sense, to the values of sex, both organic and hyper-organic. As in the economic life, everyone has a right to share in the values created by society, so everyone has the right to values so fundamental to life as those comprehended in the word love. This norm, in its most general sense, would probably be disputed by no one. The life of sex is recognized as normally the condition of self-realization, and any form of society that would make impossible that life for great numbers of its members, would be recognized as both inimical to life and intrinsically unjust. Moreover, the right freely to enter into marriage, as contrasted with the limitations upon that right such as existed in feudal times, is but a single phase of that total freedom which the modern doctrine of "natural right" stands for. For the same reason, coercion is sufficient reason, both in civil and church law, for declaring a marriage ab initio null and void . The radical thought of the present trends, however, to give a much wider interpretation to this norm. The right to happiness, or "to live one's own life as it is euphemistically called, is often supposed to include the right to "free love," in the sense of the right to the values of sex without the correlative obligations. The right of every woman to have one child and no questions asked is supposed to be a direct deduction from this norm. Like the "vagabond wage," with which it is in spirit closely connected, it has a fantastic quality which prevents it from being considered seriously by most mature minds. Vagabondage, whether in life or in love, is a romanticism that in the main appeals only to the youthful mind. Scarcely less fundamental than the preceding norm, is that which tells us that in the sex life the values of the person should always be put above the physical or organic values. Here again, scarcely anyone would be disposed to dispute this norm in principle. The distinction between love and lust is one which it may not always be easy to make, but it is one that everyone understands. There is such a thing as "good, honest lust" to make use of the words of one plays right and physical satisfaction is an indispensable 81 part of sex life; but abstracted from the higher values, it tends, not only to become self- defeating, but to turn into cruelty and hate. Tolstoy's Krcutzer Sonata is doubtless an extreme and morbid presentation of these facts, but our accumulated wisdom regarding the sex life puts the truth of the general principle beyond cavil. In any case, this norm is recognized alike in morals and in law, and we may take it as operative in most of our moral judgments on acts of sex. There is a third norm of the sex life which there will be some disposition to dispute but only, I think, when it is not properly understood. It is that physical gratification or satisfaction should not be ultimately and permanently separated from the functions of propagation and parenthood. The normal life of sex issues in that consummation, and it seems to be a consummation necessary for the realization of all the values inherent in the sex life, and one the denial of which brings into action a self- defeating process. It seems to be a special case of that general principle of vicious abstractionism of which we have just spoken. It must be admitted that we are here on delicate and dangerous ground. This norm is capable of extreme and doubtful interpretation and application. There have been extremists who have held that all sex gratification without the intent of propagation is wrong or sinful which seems to be a manifest absurdity. There are those who set themselves absolutely against all birth control on the grounds that it is contrary to nature and to the laws of God. We need not commit ourselves to either dogma, in order to realize the indisputable element of truth in this norm. Even so liberal a thinker as Bernard Shaw expresses the opinion that "the essential function of marriage is the continuation of the race, its accidental function being the gratification of the amoristic sentiment of mankind. The artificial sterilization of marriage makes it possible for marriage to fulfill its accidental function whilst neglecting its essential one.' The artificial sterilization of marriage is, in itself, without question, in opposition to the true ends of marriage. On the other hand, no unbiased thinker will deny that other duties come into conflict with this one and make decision difficult. One of the strongest arguments for the practice of birth control has been expressed in the annual report of the Woman's Welfare Centre of England for 1924. "The only effective way of dealing with this human problem is to teach all married women, and especially the poorest, how they can limit their families without denying to themselves and to their husbands that physical union which is the basis of married life."

82

2.1.10.1.40.3. The Norms of The Family, Conjugal Rights And Duties 120 :

Already in the consideration of the norms of the individual sex life for the moment considered apart from the institution of the family it is obvious that no such norms can exist without implying both rights and duties. One cannot decently enter into merely casual physical relations with a member of the opposite sex without incurring at least a minimum of obligation. Just as the enjoyment of economic good presupposes the obligation to activity in some form, so the enjoyment of "love" implies at least a minimum of obligation. For these reasons, "free love" in any absolute sense is a will-o'- the-wisp. The simple fact is that love, by its very nature, is never free. The moment one falls in love he is already tied; he has voluntarily assumed obligations. The sense of duty and the feeling of sympathy and pity are strong enough in the majority of human beings to create a sort of natural morals of the sex relation. The norms of the family simply expand these norms of the individual sex life, develop them and sanction them. The concept of norms of the family expresses itself in the notion of martial rights and duties. Conjugal rights, as they are called, spring out of the legitimate expectations or claims, created by the fact that the sex instinct is functioning in a social medium with social consent. Conjugal duties may be defined as the respects we owe to these expectations by reason of the fact that we are social beings, in other words that we are men, not animals. Conjugal rights include the right to the love of one's spouse, or cohabitation, the right to support on the part of the wife and the children, the right to respect of the person, etc. These rights, as we have seen, grow directly out of the norms of the sex life itself. It is quite clear that society and the State, in embodying such norms in laws, can proceed only in an external and often crude fashion. The law cannot fail, however, to recognize the basal fact of cohabitation in marriage, the need of "love" and the expectations growing out of the mutual vows. It has been held by the courts in recent decisions, for instance, that a contract of marriage entered into without the intention of consummation, is contrary to public policy and ab inltio null and void. Nor can the law fail to recognize the legitimate expectation of support or the claims of the person, both physical and mental, to respect and protection.

120 .Ibid, p.312. 83

2.1.10.1.40.4. Violation of Sex Norms, Sexual Immorality 121 :

That there is a right and a wrong in matters of sex everyone recognizes. It is probable that there are few persons who would not set some limits to their lusts, and few who would not acknowledge some obligation, some claim or legitimate expectation, however slight, as growing out of the sex relation. Those to whom there are no such limits, and for whom there are no obligations, we properly describe as lacking all moral sense. Lack of moral sense is insensitiveness to the norms that spring naturally out of the sex life. Sexual immorality is a violation of these norms. We shall best understand them by an examination of the nature of sexual immorality. There is one notion, not so prevalent as it has been at times, but still not without its influence, which from the start prevents any proper understanding of the problem the notion, namely, that there is something intrinsically bad or shameful in the sex act itself, in the desires and bodily pleasures connected with its exercise. This notion has been connected in some minds with religion, in particular with the Christian religion. This is, of course, simply a result of ignorance. For Christian philosophy, the sex act has always been considered intrinsically good part of that creation of which it was said: "God saw that it was good." From the moral standpoint, the sex act is itself neutral as egoism and altruism are neutral its goodness or badness depending upon the relations or context in which it is exercised. Dirt is described as matter out of place, and moral dirt is nothing more nor less than the brute matter of life out of its normal place in terms of our earlier discussion, a perversion of values.

2.1.10.1.41. The Place of Virtue In The Moral Life 122 :

The third of the fundamental concepts of ethics is that of virtue. Like the other two, rights and duties, virtues have also been made the central thing in ethics. Virtue has often been contrasted with pleasure and, as a result of this contrast, virtue rather than happiness is said to be the summum bonum . In both Greek and Christian ethics the tendency is to put the emphasis on virtue. In both the "good man" is the central conception. To be, rather than to have or do, character rather than possessions or actions, are given the primacy in ethical thought. In a broad sense we may say, with Leslie Stephen, that "the direction of moral development is

121 .Ibid, p.314. 122 .Ibid, p.326, 84 from doing to being," and that the ultimate question for the moral agent is what ought I to be? Life today may be primarily a life of action, but we cannot achieve or realize anything without inevitably achieving also something that we call character, something that we call the self. It follows that we still want to know what that character should be and what the self ought to become. Certainly any theory of ethics that conceives the end in terms of self-realization must give a fundamental place to character values, and for such an ethics the ideal of the "good man" must be central.

2.1.10.1.42. The Broader And Narrower Meaning of Virtue 123 :

The term ‘virtue’ has a wider and a narrower meaning which it is important to distinguish. According to the wider meaning, virtue is any human excellence, any excellence of character. The radical sense of the term is, indeed, strength. In this primary sense we speak of the virtues of plants or drugs in medicine that substance or quality of physical bodies, by virtue of which they produce effects on other bodies. As applied to human qualities, its first signification was manliness, courage, and valor. This was the primary signification among the Romans, although the sense is now almost obsolete. This primary meaning easily and naturally expanded to include any quality of human character that is admired and valued. This was largely the meaning of the Greek use of the term, and it is in this sense that Plato and Aristotle spoke of the ethical end as virtue rather than pleasure. Taken in this sense, to define the ethical end as virtue is the same thing as defining it in terms of perfection or self- realization. It is only in this broader sense that virtue or character may be said to be the highest good and the form in which self-realization is achieved. But there is a narrower meaning of the term, more in accord with popular usage and understanding, from which we must take our start. According to this view, virtue is correlated with duty. The virtues are habits or aspects of character that are acquired in the performance of duties and in the recognition and fulfillment of claims or rights of various kinds. Virtue in this sense is not any excellence of human nature that we may admire, but only that form of excellence which is expressed in the good will that good will of which Kant said that it is the only jewel that shines by its own light. Virtue in this sense is related to overt human behavior very much as potential energy is related to dynamic. Virtuous dispositions are steadfast habits of obeying the

123 .Ibid, p.327. 85 commandments or of performing duties; and these habits or dispositions are valued in the first instance instrumentally, for their efficiency in promoting the welfare of society. We value the economic virtue of thrift or saving, especially in a capitalistic society, largely because it is only through saving that the capital necessary to production can be accumulated; and secondly because people of thrift do not become a charge on society. In general' life virtues of bravery, temperance, chastity, etc., all have their instrumental value. Intemperance and automobiles do not go together.

2.1.10.1.43. Norms of Character, The Ideal Self 124 :

To the question, what ought I to be?, traditional ethical thought, both Greek and Christian, answers that I ought to be virtuous. The ideal man is he who possesses all the virtues. In thus defining the ethical end in terms of virtue or character, it is assumed, however, not only that the virtues or character values have intrinsic value in the sense described, but also that virtue is understood in the broad sense of human excellence, and not merely in the narrower sense of obedience to the duties. The situation here is precisely the same as that which we found in the study of the duties. We may formulate a table of duties and label it the whole duty of man. But there is still the main thing lacking namely the spirit. For this reason we found the great moral geniuses formulating summaries of the commandments in which they seek to go back of the duties to the meaning of duty in the life of man. We find the same thing in the case of the virtues. In summarizing the totality of virtue, they pass from a sum of the virtues to the ideal of the "good man." To the question, then, what ought I to be, morality is likewise not content to say, be virtuous, and to enumerate the habits and dispositions that I ought to have or acquire. To this way of answering the question, it adds likewise maxims which summarize the whole virtue or excellence of man. Morality is full of such maxims. In different moods and different contexts we may say different things, but they all mean very much the same thing. Be yourself ; to thine own self be true. Be a person and respect others as persons. "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in Heaven is perfect." The relation of norms of character to the specific virtues may be stated in the following way. Each of the specific virtues examined represents some character value. Each is in reality a norm in terms of which we value character. But underlying all judgments of this type is some ideal of human character or personality, as a whole, some

124 .Ibid, p.341. 86 conception of the ideal self which directs and guides our judgments. An attempt to characterize, to some degree at least, the nature of this ideal is the final task of this chapter. The difficulties of this task are very great. If the precise meaning of the virtues changes from age to age and from class to class, still more do men's ideals of character. The "manly man" and the "womanly woman" are in many respects quite different persons in different epochs, epochs so near together even as the Victorian period and our present time. Still more are the ideals of the Greek medieval and modern times different. Nevertheless, if our general conceptions are sound, we may at least find some general principles of character rating which are universal in nature.

2.1.10.1.44. The Principles of Character Rating 125 :

Men are constantly grading or rating the characters of their fellows. They are constantly valuing them, not only in terms of what they have and what they do, but also of what they are. Even in such a practical publication as Bradstreet's, which gives the rating of business men and concerns, the amount of "credit" to which a person or institution is entitled is given in part in terms of character in the ethical sense. One man with a property of $500,000 may be graded as "A," the highest class, while another, with the same amount of property may be graded as "E," which means that he is unreliable. Rating of this sort is in terms of what men are, and what they are is determined in terms of what they have done. Their character, which is thus so important a part of their "credit," may then be said to be an instrumental value. This character is of course, in the first instance, rated from the standpoint of what we may call the more economic virtues such as thrift, honesty, the value of a man's word or promises, etc. But the rating really includes much more than this. Evidence that a man is intemperate, loose in sexual matters, unjust in his personal or social relations, inevitably affects judgment as to his credit in the financial sense, the reason being that, while we may analyze or separate out the different qualities, the individual is after all an integral whole. Here also the chain is no stronger than its weakest link. This general assumption underlying all character rating, from the most practical and commercial, to the highest ethical and esthetic judgment develops into a norm which we may describe as the norm of integrity. Integrity in the practical sense has special reference to uprightness in mutual dealings, trustworthiness in those relations which are developed in such institutional forms of life as property and the family, but it

125 .Ibid, p.344. 87 comprehends in the end the entire personality. We may describe it as integrity of life. This norm of character springs directly out of the ethical end or ideal of self-realization. We can describe the good of man in no other way than in terms of the realization or fulfillment of the varied functioning’s that make up his being or nature. In each realization or fulfillment, however, the self is involved; realization implies self- realization. Similarly we can describe the good man only in terms of the varied qualities that are acquired in these functioning’s. But the separate qualities are so related that they inevitably make a character a .harmonious or inharmonious whole. In the application of this norm two ways of judging, or two types of judgment on character, may be distinguished. The first of these may be called the quantitative and has to do with the strength or weakness of the character. The root meaning of the term virtue we found to be strength, and this meaning survives in all our judgments upon character, from the most primitive to the most highly developed. The common element in all the virtues we found to be steadfastness of will in choosing higher over lower values. In applying as a norm of character judgment any one of the virtues, one is applying also the norm of strength of character, and this strength or steadfastness is part of the ideal of integrity. The ideal or norm of integrity includes then always the quantitative notion of the strength or weakness of character, but it includes also a qualitative notion, the norm of harmony or totality. It is true that the notion of strength implies also to a degree that of harmony. Imperfect integration, lack of harmony among our impulses and desires, means weakness. A divided self is a powerless self. But a well integrated personality implies something more than the mere absence of conflict. Harmony is a positive concept and the objective reality for which it stands has intrinsic value. It seems scarcely possible adequately to interpret our judgments on character and personality without bringing in what may be described as an esthetic element. The Greek ideal of the kalokagathos, literally rendered, the "good and beautiful man," was determined by the specific conditions of Hellenic life and culture, but it appears to have in it an element that is independent of time and place. As the specific virtues have an intrinsic quality, or in other words are aspects of the very nature of character, of the very goodness of life itself, so integration, wholeness or harmony of life, are not only means to the good life but of the very essence of that life.

88

2.1.10.1.45. Moral Knowledge-

2.1.10.1.45.1. Definition of Conscience 126 :

Conscience may be defined as the sense or consciousness of moral worth or value, or their opposites, as manifested in conduct or character, together with the consciousness of personal obligation to act in accordance with the dictates of morality, and the consciousness of merit or guilt in so acting. More precisely, conscience is the recognition by the individual of the right or wrong of conduct, and the acknowledgment of the ultimate moral laws or principles upon which these moral judgments concerning conduct and character rest together with the attendant consciousness of personal obligation and of merit or guilt. The term conscience (from the Latin con-scicntta ) means literally "knowledge with"; but its specific ethical significance was only gradually acquired. It is, for instance, not used as a technical term of ethics by the classical philosophers. The consciousness of moral value and of moral law is designated by both Aristotle and the Stoics simply as reason, or the ruling part of the soul. The elaboration of the doctrine of conscience as a special form of knowledge is due to the scholastic writers who made dominant in their writings the conception of moral laws as laws of God, revealed by him in the soul of man laws written not only on tables of stone, but on the "fleshly tables of the heart ."

2.1.10.1.45.2. The Intuitionist Theory of Conscience 127 :

The theory of conscience, or of moral knowledge, thus formulated is called intuitional, and the moralists who have held it are described as the intuitional school. It consists essentially in the view that the knowledge of right and wrong is immediate or intuitive" and not the result of processes of association and reflection, as held by the empirical view of conscience. With this intuitional view is ordinarily, although not necessarily, associated the view that conscience is somehow innate or inborn, and derived historically either in the individual or race. Historically, intuitionalism has in the main been associated with Formalism in ethics. According to the latter, acts are intrinsically right or wrong without reference to it is only natural that if this is the case, this inherent rightness or wrongness should be supposed to be knowable, not by teleological reasoning, but by some immediate insight

126 .Ibid, p.364. 127 .Ibid, pp.365f. 89 or intuition of the "moral sense." Common sense, in one of its moods at least, is strongly imbued with the feeling that there is such immediate intuition. George Sand tells the story of a company of wandering actors, shipwrecked on a barren rock in the Adriatic Sea. They are without food and death by starvation is imminent. The captain of the vessel dies and one of the actors throws himself upon the corpse with the intention of devouring it. But the leader of the company grapples with him, and after a desperate struggle succeeds in throwing the body into the sea. As George Sand tells the story, it is clear how she expected this act to be regarded by the reader as a sort of "instinctive, " intuitive, revulsion against the horrid deed, as some profound reaction of the soul, deeper than reason. In like manner, it is felt that there is in man an innate repugnance to various other acts, such as incest, and that, when such repugnance is not felt, it is due to the clouding over of the moral sense by passion or by sophistical reasoning. The allowing of the Bollenger baby to die was felt by upholders of this view to be a violation of one of the deepest intuitions of conscience, a crime against mankind rather than the service to humanity it pretended to be. Is man then endowed with a native and inexplicable power of discerning right or wrong, or are his moral judgments explicable by reference to development, environment and education? Is conscience in any sense a special organ or faculty of special knowledge; or is it rather merely consciousness in so far as it is concerned with a special class of objects and judgments? This question has been hotly debated in practical morals, no less than in the realm of ethical theory and philosophy. It is precisely because, to many minds, the authority of conscience is bound up with its intuitive and inexplicable character, the validity of moral distinctions with their immediacy and innateness, that the entire problems have bulked so large in ethical discussion.

2.1.10.1.46. Morality And Religion-

2.1.10.1.46.1.The Relation of Ethics To Religion 128 :

Moral philosophers have always recognized the close relation of morals to religion. No one familiar with the history of mankind can doubt that these two phases of our experience constitute the warp and woof of a web of human life and culture which it is extraordinarily difficult to disentangle. But while all are agreed as to their close relations, not all are at one as to the necessity and inner nature of these relations. There are some who believe that this age-old connection will in time be severed and who, like

128 .Ibid, p. 447. 90 the philosopher Guyau, foresee an "irreligion of the future." There are others and these perhaps the greater number who holds that such expectations are without foundation, and that the close historical connection between religion and morals corresponds to an inner, necessary, logical relation. This belief has been expressed in various ways from the beginning of philosophical thought. In the terms of Kant, the existence or reality of God is a necessary postulate of morals.

2.1.10.1.46.2. Morality And Religion Interdependent129 :

The general conclusion to be drawn from this brief survey of the historical connections of morality and religion is that in all probability they are in some way dependent upon one another. Let us see if we can express this interdependence in a way that will bring out their true relations. The dependence of morality on religion, although real enough, has sometimes been stated in ways that can scarcely be maintained. It is sometimes said that (for a man to be moral he must also be religious) that is, that there is a necessary psychological relation between the good will and belief in God. It is, however, easy to point out that there are many people who do their duty and are naturally good and decent who have very little religion or none at all and is also possible to point to people who are religious but not very moral. The truth is, of course, that a large part of normal conduct is a matter of social convention and of social habit and sentiment. Even if morality and religion were in some way inseparably connected, it would be psychologically possible for morality and the feeling of moral obligation to continue, both in the individual and in society, long after belief in a religious basis of morality had passed. It would be possible for men to live on the acquired values of the past. It is doubtful whether this independence of morality of religion is possible in the long run, but it is certainly not to try to say that a man cannot be good without bring religions. It seems probable, then, that in some subtle and obscure way morality is in the long run dependent upon religion in the broadest sense of the term. It seems also that in a very real sense religion is dependent upon ethics or morals. It is quite possible that religion and religious beliefs may grow up relatively independent of moral conduct and sentiment.

129 . Ibid, p. 449. 91

2.1.10.1.46.3. Moral Argument For Existence of God 130 :

The close "logical" relation between morals and religion developed in the preceding paragraph has been made the basis in philosophy for one of the classical arguments for the existence of God. It is called the argument from conscience, or the moral argument. The force of the argument is expressed by Wordsworth in his Ode to Duty, when he apostrophizes Conscience as:

"Stern Daughter of the Voice of God! O Duty! If that name thou love Who art a light to guide, a rod To check the erring, and reprove ..."

This idea that conscience is the voice of God, a witness in man of a moral order that transcends him is as old as philosophic thought. We find it in Socrates' idea of the Daimon within him, so beautifully developed in Plato's Phaedo. We find it in the Stoics and finally in Christian theology and philosophy, especially that of St. Thomas. The moral argument, thus developed from the nature of conscience, is a part, as it were, of the philosophic reason of the Western world. Historically this moral argument was merely one strand in a tightly woven argument by which it was felt that the human reason could reach beyond the human to the Divine. It was held that reason could go beyond the human and the relative in several ways, but this was felt to be the chief way. Later, under the influence of criticism, it came to be thought of, as in Kant, as the only way. Let us examine this argument first and then consider its relation to other arguments. The essentials of the moral argument in its simplest form is that conscience is a witness to the Divine; that our consciousness of moral values, as embodied in our sense of obligation or duty, in our acknowledgment of claims or rights, and in our ideal of self-hood or character, reflects a moral order that transcends the merely natural order, and which implies that both its origin and its consummation are in the Divine. In other words, conscience requires, both for the explanation of its ultimate origin and the interpretation or justification of its meaning, the postulate of the existence of God. This argument, as we have seen, was historically more or less bound up with the formalistic theory of morals and the intuitionist theory of conscience. It is easy to see that if one believes that moral sense or moral axioms are innate, in the crude sense of

130 . Ibid, pp.456f. 92 inborn, one would naturally think of them as "implanted" in us, as it were, by the "Creator." It is also easy to see that if one holds, as did Kant, that the moral imperative is categorical and absolute and cannot be derived empirically, either by associations in the life of the individual or by natural selection in the life of the race, he would naturally look to some transcendental source for its explanation and interpretation. It is natural, therefore, for the student to think that this argument is bound up with formalism and intuitionism, and that with the criticism of the latter the argument itself looses force. Such an inference, although natural, is nevertheless erroneous. The argument is equally implied in a teleological or perfectionist view, as indeed Kant himself saw.

2.1.10.1.46.4. Religion And Natural Science, God And Evolution 131 :

The object of this chapter has been primarily to show the relation of morals to religion, how and why the existence of God has been supposed to be a necessary postulate of ethics in short to develop this aspect of the philosophical side of ethics. As we found it impossible to discuss the postulates of freedom and progress without reference to the views of science as to the nature of the physical universe, so it is equally impossible to discuss the problem of the existence of God without reference to the assumptions and the results of the physical sciences. In the earlier history of physical science it was quite generally held that the existence of God could be argued from the facts and laws of the universe disclosed by science itself. Thus Newton, the founder of modern physics and cosmology, not only believed in the existence of God but that his existence could be argued from the necessity of an intelligent first Cause. It is still true that in the main those scientists that deal with the physical world alone are more or less inclined, like Newton, to the idea that the order and law manifest in the universe witnesses to some intelligence that is more than human. It is primarily naturalistic evolution, as we have defined it that has seemed, at least to many, to weaken this view. It is true that on this question biologists and evolutionists generally have also differed widely. Thus Lamarck was as deeply convinced as Newton that God was the "first cause" of evolution, while Darwin, though made doubtful by his conception of the universe which the doctrine of "chance variations" seemed to imply, was merely agnostic in the matter. In the main, however, the general effect of older views of naturalistic evolution was in the direction of seeming to make the idea of God superfluous. In brief, what seemed before evolution to be explainable only on the

131 . Ibid, pp.462f.. 93 assumption of a designing or purposive intelligence seemed explainable now by merely natural causes, such as natural selection acting on chance variation.

2.1.10.1.47. Nature of God As Postulated By Morals 132 : But what, it may well be asked, is to be understood by the Divine or Deity thus seemingly postulated by morals? As we investigated the general relation of morals to religion before defining religion, so we have now attempted to give the force of the moral argument without defining clearly the notion of God, whose existence, according to this argument, is said to be implied by morality There can be no question, I think, that when we speak of "God" in the moral context we always have in mind a perfect being; perfect in the sense of possessing perfect knowledge, perfect power, and perfect goodness of holiness yes and perfect beauty, in so far as we are developed enough to put beauty among the highest values. This is, I think, what we uniformly mean by God. It is certainly what the highest ethical religions have always meant. It was embodied in the moral command of Jesus; "Be ye also perfect, as your Father in Heaven is perfect. 133 Professor J. W. Hudson insists that "the idea of God must mean at least these things to be of any moral value whatever." This is perhaps an exaggeration in that, as we have seen, many lesser ideas of God have been, and still are, of value in the history of the race. But we may say at least this much: the idea of God must mean these things if it is to be of the highest and of enduring value. For "there are two main ways in which an idea of God becomes of moral significance: first, as a moral ideal towards which we may strive and second, if not this, at least as a power that in some way guarantees the triumph of righteousness. If God is a moral ideal, He must be thought of as possessing the qualities of moral perfection; perfection in knowledge, in goodness, in all that we found to make the immortal ideal of a perfect self; if on the other hand, He is to be thought of as a moral guarantee, again he must in some way involve the same indispensable moral characteristics, as the very source of the moral order that requires them. No being save one that means reason, goodness, beauty and power in their perfection can guarantee the triumph of such things in the world." The conception of God seemingly demanded by the developed moral consciousness of man is the traditional notion which means merely that it is that idea of God which has been worked out in the long experience and thinking of the race. The

132 .Ibid, p.465. 133 .Ibid, p.468. 94 modern man may have difficulty with this conception. He may have his difficulties in thinking of God as a person. He may have even greater difficulties in thinking of him as perfect and as all-powerful. But it should be remembered that, although there are special sources of difficulty in the knowledge and life of today, the same difficulties have, in principle, always been present, and all the great thinkers have been conscious of them. So far as our present task is concerned, we have sought to show merely why the existence of God has been thought to be postulated by morality and the notion of God seemingly necessitated by the more developed moral consciousness. The further problems raised by this discussion must of necessity be left to more advanced courses in philosophy. 134

2.1.10.2. Aristotle’s Ethics: (384 – 322 B.C.)

2.1.10.2.1. Aristotle’s Work On Ethics:

There are mainly three works in which Aristotle comprises his philosophy of conduct; these are “ The Eudemian Ethics ”, The Nicomachean Ethics ” and “ Magna Moralia ”. The two former are full scientific treatises, in eight or ten books respectively. Magna Moralia is a smaller work more discursive in style, of which only two books survive, the later part being lost; the contents correspond partly with “ The Eudemian Ethics ”, The Nichomachean Ethics ”. It was probably compiled by a Peripatetic of the generation after Aristotle. Eudemus was the pupil of the Aristotle who followed the doctrine more closely; Nicomachus was Aristotle’s son, who fell in battle when a mere lad. Both may have been the compliers of the treatises that bear their names. Nicomachean Ethics has always been accepted as the authoritative exposition of Aristotle’s moral science. 135 It is a philosophical inquiry into the nature of the good life for a human being. Aristotle begins the work by positing that there exists some ultimate good toward which, in the final analysis, all human actions ultimately aim. Aristotles’s Nicomachean Ethics is a practical science, its object is not only to know but to act in the light of knowledge, he insisted that the highest virtue is reserved for the very few and that the purely contemplative life is best. The good that all men seek is happiness. Aristotle declares, and he defines happiness as the result of a life governed by reason, as

134 . Ibid, p.470. 135 . H. Rackham, trans. Aristotle ,Athenian Constitution, Eudemian Ethics, Virtues and Vices, London, Harvard University Press,1981,pp.190ff. 95

“an activity of soul in accordance with the perfect virtues.” 136 He devotes ten books each book comprising various chapters, his moral and ethical philosophy in brief is given in the following para’s.

2.1.10.2.2. The Eudemian And The Nicomachean Ethics:

The Eudemian Books IV, V and VI being identical with the Nicomachean V, VI, VII Scholars have debated to which they really belong, some holding that they fit the argument of the Eudemian and that the corresponding parts of the Nicomachean have been lost, others the opposite. But all the Aristotle’s treatises are so loosely put together that the argument for neither view are convincing. It is more probable that the three common books represent hid final doctrine, except in so far as they are modified by other parts of his works, thus the excursus on the ethical values of pleasure in Eudemian Ethics VI is similar to Nicomachean Ethics VII was doubtless superseded by the more accurate treatment of the topic at the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics Book X. 137

2.1.10.2.3. Aristotle ’s Nicomachean Ethics:

The Nicomachean Ethics is the name normally given to Aristotle’s best-known work on ethics. The work, which plays a pre-eminent role in defining Aristotelian ethics, which consists of ten books, originally separate scrolls, and is understood to be based on notes from his lectures at the Lyceum. The title is often assumed to refer to his son Nicomachus to whom the work was dedicated or who may have edited it (although his young age makes this less likely). Alternatively, the work may have been dedicated to his father, who was also called Nicomachus.

The theme of the work is a Socratic question previously explored in the works of Plato Aristotle's friend and teacher, of how men should best live. In his Metaphysics. Aristotle described how Socrates, the friend and teacher of Plato, had turned philosophy to human questions, whereas Pre-Socratic philosophy had only been theoretical. Ethics, as now separated out for discussion by Aristotle, is practical rather than theoretical in the original Aristotelian senses of these terms. In other words, it is not only a contemplation about good living, because it also aims to create good living. It is therefore connected to Aristotle's other practical work, the Politics , which similarly aims at people becoming good. Ethics is about how individuals should best live, while the

136 .Justin D.Kaplan, ed., The Pocket Aristotle, New York, Pocket Books,1958,p.158. 137 H. Rackham, Aristotle, op.cit. pp.191f.. 96 study of politics is from the perspective of a law-giver, looking at the good of a whole community.

2.1.10.2.3.1. Aristotle’s Views On ‘Good’ And ‘Goodness of Life :

Aristotle’s metaphysics and psychology form the basis of his theory of ethics, which is the first comprehensive scientific theory presented in history. The question to be answered by it is the Socratic question of the highest good. All human actions have some end in view. This end may be the means to higher end, this to a still higher, and so on; but finally we must reach a supreme end or purpose, an ultimate principle or good, for the sake of which every other good is to be sought. What is this highest good? The goodness of a thing consists in the realization of its specific nature; the end or pursuit of every creature is to realize or make manifest its peculiar essence, that which distinguishes it from every other creature. This for man is not merely bodily existence or mere sensuous feeling, the exercise of vegetable and animal functions, but a life of reason. Hence the highest good for man is the complete and habitual exercise of the functions which make him a human being. This is what Aristotle means by the term eudaemonia, which has been translated by the word happiness, to which no objection need be raised if it is not taken as pleasure. Pleasure, according to Aristotle, accompanies virtuous activity as a secondary effect and is thus included in the highest good, but not identical with it. 138

Every human action aims at some good. Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. 139 The good which is chosen for its own sake rather than as means to an end is the highest good. It may be defined in some such words as these: The good is that at which all things aim. If we are to understand this, we must form to ourselves a clear notion of what is meant by an aim or, in more technical language, an ‘end’. It is thought that every activity, artistic or scientific, in fact every deliberate action or pursuit, has for its object the attainment of some good. We may therefore assent to the view which has been expressed that ‘the good’ is ‘that at which all things aim.’ 140 Nicomachean Ethics is a philosophical inquiry into the nature of the good life for a human being. Aristotle begins the work by positing

138 . Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy, New Delhi, SBW Publishers,1993,p.89. 139 . Justin D.Kaplan ,op.cit. p.160. 140 .J.A.K. Thomson, trans The Ethics of Aristotle,The Nichimachean Ethics ,London,Penguin Classic,1966,p.25 97 that there exists some ultimate good toward which, in the final analysis, all human actions ultimately aim.

2.1.10.2.3.2. Good for Nation or City has a Higher Divine Quality:

Ethic is a branch of politics. That is to say, it is the duty of the statesman to create for the citizen the best possible opportunity of living good life. It will see that the effect of this injection is not to degrade morality but to moralize politics. The modern view that ‘you cannot make man better by act of parliament ‘would have been repudiated by Aristotle as certainly as by Plato and indeed by ancient philosopher in general. 141

Like strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term. And that end in politics, as well as in ethics, can only be the good for man. For even if the good of the community coincides with that of the individual, the good of the community is clearly greater more perfect good both to get and to keep. This is not to deny that the good of the individual is worth-while. But what is good for nation or a city has a higher, diviner, quality. 142

2.1.10.2.3.3. The Good For Man is generally agreed to be happiness :

The fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth or honour ; they differ, however, from one another and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth

141 .Ibid, p.26, 142 . Ibid, p.27. 98 when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable. 143 Aristotle defines the good for man as happiness, which may be interpreted variously as pleasure, honour, wealth, contemplation. The object of moral science, according to Aristotle is good.

Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just, and generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact is the starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the start need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting points. And as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him heard the words of Hesoid. 144

“The man is best who sees the truth himself;

Good too is who he hearkens to wise counsel,

But who is neither wise himself nor willing

To ponder wisdom. Is not worth a straw, he is a useless man.

2.1.10.2.3.4. Different Popular Opinion About Good:

According to the Aristotle there are different popular opinions about Good or Happiness. The men of the most vulgar type seem to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure like money, honour etc.; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are three prominent types of life, first life of pleasure, that just mentioned, second the political, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, like money, honour etc. preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus 145 , who was a Assyrian king who lives his life in very luxurious manner and lived the life of a women, and spending his days in the company of his concubines, to such an excess did he go of luxury and of the

143 . Justin D.Kaplan ,op.cit. p.163. 144 . Justin D.Kaplan ,op.cit. p.163. 145 . Justin D.Kaplan ,op.cit. p.164. 99 most shameless sensual pleasure and intemperance, that he composed a funeral dirge for himself and commanded his successor upon the throne to inscribe it upon his tomb after his death; it was compose by him in a foreign language but was afterword translated by a Greek as follows: “Knowing full well that thou wert mortal born. The heart lifts up, take thy delight in feasts; When dead no pleasure more in thine. Thus I, Who once o’er mighty Ninus ruled, am naught But dust. Yet these are mine which gave me joy In life – the food I ate, my wantonness, And love’s delights. But all those other things Men deem felicities are left behind.”146 Accordingly “The man has to eat, drink and love because life is perishable and whatever I possesses that I had ate and enjoyed freely with sex and love but at the end I felt worried.” The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take the afore named objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it is evident that not even these are ends; yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them.147 Good have been classified in three groups: those called external goods, goods of soul, and goods of the body, goods of the soul are the once, we called most strictly and more especially good, and action and activity of the soul we may attribute to the soul. Our conception of happiness, then, is plausible in so fas as it is accord with the views. A venerable one that has been accepted by philosopher. 148

2.1.10.2.3.5. Activity of Soul in Accordance With Goodness:

Aristotle has given the proposition about the function of man (a) The function of man is the exercise of his non-corporeal faculties or ‘soul’ in accordance with, or at least not divorced from, a rational principle. (b) The function of an individual and of a good individual in the same class – a harp player, for example, and a good harp player, and so

146 . http://www.newsteadabbeybyronsociety.org/works/downloads/sardanapalus.pdf, edited by Peter Cochran, site accessed on 24/08/2017, at 5.15 p.m. 147 .Justin D.Kaplan ,op.cit., p.165. 148 . Roger Crisp, trans., Aristotle , Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.13. 100 through the classes – is generically the same, except that superiority in accomplishment to the function, the function of the harp player being merely to play on the harp, while the function of the good harp player is to play on it well. (c) The function of man is a certain form of life namely an activity or actions of the soul exercised in combination with a rational principle or reasonable ground of action (d) The function of a good man is to exert such activity well (e) A functioned is performed when performed in accordance with the excellence proper to it. - If these assumptions are granted it conclude that the good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with goodness or ‘in accordance with the best and most complete form of goodness’. 149

2.1.10.2.3.6. Happiness Is More Than Momentary Bliss:

There is another condition of happiness; it cannot be achieved in less than a complete life time. One swallow does not make a summer, neither does one fine day. And one day, or indeed any brief period felicity, does not make a man entirely and perfectly happy. 150

The quality in question, then, will belong to the happy person, and he will be happy throughout his life. For he will spend all or most, of his time engaged in action and contemplation in accordance with virtue. And he will bear change in fortune in a particular noble way and altogether gracefully, as one who is ‘genuinely good’ ‘foursquare without a flaw’ 151

What is to prevent us then from concluding that the happy person the one who adequately furnished with external good, engage in activities in accordance with complete virtue not for just any period of time but over a complete life? Or should we add that he will live like in the future and die accordingly? The future is obscure to us and we say the happiest is an end and altogether quite complete, this being so we shall call blessed those of the living who have and will continue to have the things mentioned but blessed only in human terms. 152

2.1.10.2.3.7. Definition of Happiness:

Happiness as an activity in accordance with virtues is so far in agreement with that of those who say that it is virtue, that such an activity involves virtues. But of course

149 . J.A.K. Thomson, op.cit. p.39. 150 . Ibid, p.39. 151 . Roger Crisp, trans. op.cit. p.17.. 152 . Ibid, p.18. 101 it makes a great difference whether we think of the highest good as consisting in possession or in the exercise of virtue. For in ‘doing well’ the happy man will necessity do. Just as at the Olympic Games it is not the best looking or the strongest man present who are crowned with victory but competition – the successful competitors – so in the arena of human life the honours and rewards fall to those who show their good qualities in action. Thus, happiness is the best, the noblest, the most delightful thing in the world, and it meet all those qualities which are separately enumerated in the inscription upon the temple at Delos:

“Justice is loveliest, and health is best, And sweetest to obtain is heart’s desire.” All these good qualities inhere in the activities of the virtuous soul, and it is these, or the best of them, which we say constitute happiness. 153

The chief condition of happiness, then, barring certain physical prerequisites, is the life of reason, the specific glory and power of man, Virtue, or rather will depend on clear judgment, self control, symmetry of desire, artistry of means, it is not the possession of the simple man, nor the gift of innocent infant, but the achievement of experience in the fully developed man. Yet there is a road to it, guide to excellence, which may save many detours and delays, it is the middle way, the golden mean, the qualities of character can be arranged in triads. 154

2.1.10.2.3.8. The Kinds and Significance of Virtue In Aristotle’s Ethics: According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of Virtue: virtue of thought (dianoetikai ), and virtues of character ( ethikai ), they are also known as intellectual virtues and moral virtues. These two kinds of virtues are not contradictory to each other but they are complimentary. Of these the intellectual virtue is in the main indebted to teaching for its production and growth, and this calls for experience and time, while moral virtue, on the other hand is the child of habit, from which it has got its very name, ethics being derived from ethos , ‘habit’. This is an indication that none of the moral virtue is implanted in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot

153 . Ibid, p.43. 154 .Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy, New York, A Washington Square Press Publication,1961,p.75. 102 be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit. 155

Since virtue involves both intelligence and practical or moral action. Aristotle suggested that these are two corresponding types of virtuous activity; dianoetic- the proper functioning of natural thought; and practical or ethical – action directed by desire, by the free will of the individual. The practical or ethical virtues requires the correct channeling of and control over desire, bending the individual’s conduct to the dictate of his free will, moral conduct, therefore depends upon free desire, freedom of will It is true said Aristotle, that man’s inner lack of knowledge, as well as external restrains, may prevent him from performing free, moral action but certainly whenever no such obstacle confront him, the individual can deliberately and intelligently choose and follow a proper course of moral action. 156

It is evident that the theme of virtue is spread throughout the Ethical Works of Aristotle. Ethics for him consist of Man’s search for happiness. And the pursuit of happiness is possible by way well regulated activity in accordance with the guidance of right reason. 157

For moral excellence is concerned with pleasure and pain; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of pain that we abstain from noble one. Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the thing that we ought; for this is the right education.

Again, if the virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain, for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasure and pain. This is indicated also by the fact that punishment is inflicted by these means; for it is a kind of cure, and it is a nature cures to be effected by contraries.

155 .Justin D.Kaplan ,op.cit. p.182.. 156 .Willium S. Shakian, History of Philosophy, London, Barnes and Noble Books, 1968,pp.73f. 157 .George Olivera, Virtue In Diverse Tradition, Banglore, Asian Trading Corporation,1998,p.9. 103

The following facts also may show us that virtue and vice are concerned with these same things. There being three objects of choice and three of avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their contraries, the base, the injurious, the painful, about all of these the good man tends to go right and the bad man to go wrong, and especially about pleasure; for this is common to the animals, and also it accompanies all objects of choice; for even the noble and the advantageous appear pleasant. 158

Aristotle has given characteristic of virtue, for instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much or too little, and in both cases not well, but to feel them at the right times, with reference to right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with passion and actions. In which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristic of virtue. Therefore, virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate. 159

2.1.10.2.3.9. Formal Definition and Meaning of Virtue:

The Greek term for virtue is ‘arete’.160 Aristotle’s conception of virtue is wider than moral virtue. Here he follows the best tradition of the Greek Psyche. The Greek must saw the unity of human excellence behind its various forms. 161 Besides Aristotle has the historical heritage of his great master like Socrates and Plato, 162 the ancient Greeks made three kinds of contributions. First, they focused on virtues (traits of character) as the subject of ethics. For example, Plato's Republic described the virtues encouraged by democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, and meritocracy. Second, they analyzed specific virtues such as the ‘cardinal’ (major) ones of courage, temperance, wisdom, and justice. Third, they ranked types of character, e.g. Aristotle classified human character into five types, ranging from the great-souled man to the moral monster. Socrates did not write ant treatise on Ethics, but the outline of Socrates teaching in Plato’s Dialogues. Socrates silenced the Sophists who advocated the knowledge and virtue can be

158 . R.D.Ross , trans. Aristotle, Nichimachean Ethics , Kitchener, Batoche Books,1999, pp.23f. 159 . Justin D.Kaplan ,op.cit. p.190. 160 . Terence Irwin, trans., Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics, pp.430f. 161 . H. Rackham, op.cit. p.484. 162 . Greg Pence, Virtue Theory, pp.251f. 104 propagated without stressing the need to acquire it with education and deligent practice. Can Virtue be taught? Three hypothesis are proposed.

1) It is an object of teaching.

2) Or it is fruit of exercise.

3) Or it is good talent of nature

Aristotle incorporates all these three hypotheses, while formulating the notion of virtue in general and moral virtue in particular. 163

The best rendering of the term arete is ‘excellence.’164 That means any who excels in any art, or any handicraft is a man of technique, a man of skill or a man of excellence. Aristotle restricts this term not only for the non-moral category, but he applies this also for moral excellence. The man who excels in moral living is a man of moral excellence. He is a man of virtues. He is a man who thinks rightly and lives justly. A man of virtue is a happy man.

Aristotle has considered the formal definition of virtue; the human soul is conditioned in three ways. It may have (1) feeling, (2) capacities, (3) dispositions; so virtue must be one of these three. By ‘feeling’ or ‘passions’ mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, gratification, friendliness, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by ‘capacities’ means the faculties in virtue of which we are said to be capable of the feelings in question e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by ‘dispositions’ means the state of mind in virtue of which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the feelings concerned. For instance a bad disposition where angry feelings are concerned, if we are disposed to become excessively or insufficiently angry and a good disposition in this respect if we consistently feel the due amount of anger, which comes between these extremes. So with the other feelings. 165

The other definition of virtue is given as a disposition of soul, in which, when it has to choose among actions and feelings, it observes the mean relative to us, this being determined by such a rule or principle as would take shape in the mind of a man of sense or practical wisdom. 166

163 .Joseph Moreau, Aristotle et Son Ecole, Paris, Presses UniveRsitaires de France, 1962, p.209. 164 .Terence Irwin, trans. op. cit., p.431. 165 . J.A.K. Thomson, op.cit. p.62.. 166 .Ibid, p.66. 105

By ‘goodness’ the Aristotle mean the goodness of moral character, since it is moral goodness that deals with feeling and action, and it is in them we fine excess, deficiency, and a mean. It is possible, for example, to experience fear, boldness, desire, anger, pity and pleasure and pain generally, too much or too little or to right amount. If we feel them too much or too little, we are wrong. But to have these feelings at the right times on the right occasion towards the right people for the right motives and in the right way is to have them in the right measure, that is, somewhere between the extremes; and this is what characterizes goodness.. Goodness then, is a mean condition in the sense that it aims at and hits the mean.167

Consider, too, that is possible to go wrong in more ways than one. In Pythagorean terminology evil is a form of the unlimited, good of the limited. But there is only one way of being right. This is why going wrong is easy and right is difficult; it is easy to miss the bull’s eyes and difficult to hit it. As the poet says “Goodness is one, evil is multiform” 168

Now since Virtue is concerned with the regulation of feelings and actions, and praise and blame arise upon such as are voluntary, while for the involuntary allowance is made, and sometimes compassion is excited, it is perhaps a necessary task for those who are investigating the nature of Virtue to draw out the distinction between what is voluntary and what involuntary; and it is certainly useful for legislators, with respect to the assigning of honours and punishments. Involuntary actions then are thought to be of two kinds, being done either on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance. An action is, properly speaking, compulsory, when the origination is external to the agent, being such that in it the agent (perhaps we may more properly say the patient) contributes nothing; as if a wind were to convey you anywhere, or men having power over your person.

But when actions are done, either from fear of greater evils, or from some honourable motive, as, for instance, if you were ordered to commit some base act by a despot who had your parents or children in his power, and they were to be saved upon your compliance or die upon your refusal, in such cases there is room for a question whether the actions are voluntary or involuntary.

While concluding the Aristotle says that it is in our power to do the right or the wrong things; and equally in our power to refrain from doing so; and if doing right or

167 . Ibid, pp.65f. 168 . Ibid 106 wrong is, as we saw, the same as being good or bad ourselves, it completely depends upon ourselves whether we are to be virtuous or vicious. The words:

To sin and suffer – that offends us still:

But who is ever blest against his will? must be regarded as half truth. It is true that no one is blest against his will, but untrue that wickedness is in-voluntary. Otherwise we shall have to deny the truth of what we have just been saying and maintain that a man is not the originator of his own actions, of which he might be described as the begetter. 169 .

Aristotle was pre-eminently a metaphysical thinker yet in his philosophy, there is found an emphasis on the idea of perfection. This means that everything in this universe is constantly striving for its own perfection. That is to say everything aims at the realization of its form which is potentially contained in it. Thus likewise the human soul aims at its perfection and when it reaches its excellence in its ethical and intellectual activities, the accompanying feeling is pleasant. Thus happiness is excellence in the activity of the soul. He therefore emphasized ethical and intellectual values and virtues.

Ethical virtue "is a habit disposed towards action by deliberate choice, being at the mean relative to us, and defined by reason as a prudent man would define it." Each of the elements of this definition is important. Virtue is not simply an isolated action but a habit of acting well. For an action to be virtuous a person must do it deliberately, knowing what he is doing, and doing it because it is a noble action. In each specific situation, the virtuous action is a mean between two extremes. Finally, prudence is necessary for ethical virtue because it is the intellectual virtue by which a person is able to determine the mean specific to each situation.

2.1.10.2.3.10. Several Virtues According To Aristotle:

Let us take up several virtues, however, and says what they are and what sort of thing they are concerned with and how they are concerned with them. First let us speak of moral virtues as follows:-

169 . Ibid, pp.89f. 107

2.1.10.2.3.10.1. Courage or Bravery:

The first virtue discussed is Courage or bravery. Aristotle discusses at length on courage in Nicomachean Ethics Book 3, Chapter 6 to 9, anderia is the Greek term for courage, which means bravery. Each virtue is a ‘means’ between excess and defects.

All evils are naturally feared, but some (such as evil reputation) it is right to fear; the control of such fear is obviously not courage proper. Others (such as poverty, disease, and insult to one’s family, envy) perhaps ought not to be feared; but the control of such fears, again, is not in the strict sense courage. Courage must be concerned with the most terrible of all evils, namely death; with death, however, not in all circumstances, e.g. at sea, or by diseases, but in the most noble circumstances, i.e. in battle. The courageous man is he who does not fear a noble death. He will in point of fact be brave at sea, in sickness, but in such circumstances, scope for action and no nobility in death. The courageous man will feel fear but he will control it; he will face danger, as he ought and as the rule commands for the sake of noble, the noble being the end of virtue. 170

There are, Aristotle continues, five kinds of courage, other than moral courage proper. There is 171 :-

(a) Political courage - The courage which faces danger to gain the honours and to escape the degradation assigned by law to courage and cowardice respectively. This is most like true courage its motive is a noble one, viz. honour. A lower form of political courage is that in which the motive is the fear of punishment.

(b) The Courage of Experience – Such as shown by professional soldiers. When they once loss the confidence born of experience, they are more likely to play coward than the citizen soldiers previously described.

(c) Courage Inspired By Anger or Pain – This is akin to that shown by the brutes. This is the ‘most natural’ kind of courage; if choice and right purpose be added it develops into courage proper.

(d) Courage of Sanguine Temperament- When once hope has been disappointed, the courage soon disappears because it has not the right motive.

(e) Courage of Ignorance – Which is less enduring than the previous kind.

170 .W.D. Ross, Aristotle, London, Methuen & Co., 1933, p.204. 171 .Ibid , p.205. 108

Though courage is proper attitude towards the feeling of confidence as well as towards that of fear, it is most conspicuously shown in circumstances that inspire fear; it is essentially the facing of what is painful. Its end indeed is pleasure but this is overshadowed by the pain that attend it. Indeed Aristotle admits virtuous activities generally are pleasant only in so far as the end is attained; there is so much pre- established harmony between virtuous activity and pleasure as the account of happiness, too readily assured.

2.1.10.2.3.10.2. Temperance:

The next virtue is temperance. The Greek term to indicate ‘ temperance ’ is sophrosune ’. 172 The scope of this virtue is narrowed. It is said to be concerned with pleasures and pains, but in effect confined to the former. Mental pleasures are first excluded. We have other name than ‘profligate’ for men who are slave to these. The pleasure of sight, hearing, smell are excluded; temperance is concerned only with those senses in which lower animals as well as man take a direct delight, viz. touch and taste, not all the pleasures of touch and taste included, but only the most purely animal, those of eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse. The only pain with which temperance is concerned are those due to unfulfilled desire for such pleasures. 173

2.1.10.2.3.10.3. Liberality, Prodigality, Meanness:

Liberality is the third virtue which may be defined as a disposition to observe the mean in dealing with material goods. 174 It seems to be mean with regard to wealth; for the liberal man is praised not in respect of military matter, nor of those in respect of which the temperate man is praised nor of judicial decision, but with regard to the giving and taking wealth and especially in respect of giving. Now by wealth we mean all the things whose values are measured by money. Further, progilaty and meanness are excesses and defects with regard to wealth; and meanness we always impute to those who care more than they ought for wealth, but we sometimes apply the word “prodigality ” in a complex sense; for we call those men prodigals who are incontinent and spend money on self-indulgence. Hence also they are thought the poorest characters; for they combine more vices than one. ‘ Prodigal ’ means a man who has a single evil quality that of wasting his substance, since a prodigal is one who is being ruined by his own faults, and the wasting of substance is thought to be a sort of ruining of oneself, life

172 .George Olivera, op.cit., p.28. 173 W. D. Ross, op. cit., p.207. 174 .J.A.K. Thomson, op. cit., p.109.. 109 being held to depend on possession of substance.175 Now virtuous actions are noble and done for the sake of the noble. Therefore the liberal man, like other virtuous men, will give for the sake of the noble, and rightly; for he will give to the right people, the right amounts, and at the right time, with all the other qualifications that accompany right giving; and that too with pleasure or without pain; for that which is virtuous is pleasant or free from pain-least of all will it be painful. But he who gives to the wrong people or not for the sake of the noble but for some other cause, will be called not liberal but by some other name. Nor is he liberal who gives with pain; for he would prefer the wealth to the noble act, and this is not characteristic of a liberal man. But no more will the liberal man take from wrong sources; for such taking is not characteristic of the man who sets no store by wealth. 176

2.1.10.2.3.10.4. Magnificence:

The next virtue is Magnificence which is another virtue that has to do with money. It differ from liberality in being limited to such transaction as result in expenditure of money, operating on a larger scale than liberality, for, as the word itself implies magnificence is the suitable expenditure of wealth in large amount. 177

It consists giving large amounts for suitable occasions. The deficiency of this virtue is called meanness and the excess is ostentation. A magnificent man spends gladly and lavishly, not calculating costs, but always for a noble purpose. For this also seems to be a virtue concerned with wealth; but it does not like liberality extend to all the actions that are concerned with wealth, but only to those that involve expenditure; and in these it surpasses liberality in scale.

2.1.10.2.3.10.5. Magnanimity or ‘Greatness of soul’:

The fifth virtue Aristotle discusses is one of the peaks of virtue. Magnanimity is, as the word itself leads us to infer, concerned with great matter, and before we go further we must try to grasp what sort of matter they are. Not that it will make any difference whether we attend to the quality itself or to the person in whom it is embodied.

175 . Justin D. Kaplan, op. cit., p.210. 176 .Ibid, p.211. 177 . J.A.K. Thomson, op. cit., p.116. 110

What Aristotle means by a great-souled or superior man is one who claims, and is entitled to claim, high consideration from his fellows. 178 A magnanimous man claims and deserves great honors. Someone who deserves honors but doesn't claim them is low- minded , and someone who claims honors but doesn't deserve them is vain. It is better to be vain than low-minded, because vanity will be naturally corrected by life experience. A magnanimous man is great in each of the virtues, and is a sort of ornament of virtues because he shows how good a virtuous life is.

2.1.10.3.10.6. Pride, vanity, humility:

Pride seems even from its name to be concerned with great things; The man is thought to be proud who think himself worthy of great thing, being worthy of them; for he who does so beyond his deserts is a fool, but no virtuous man is foolish or silly. The proud man, then, is the man who has described. For, who he who is worthy of little and think himself worthy of little is temperate, but not proud, for pride implies greatness, as beauty implies a good-sized body, and little people may be neat and we; proportioned but cannot be beautiful. On the other hand, he who thinks himself worthy of great things, being unworthy of them, is vain; though not everyone who thinks himself worthy of more than he really is worthy of in vain. The man who thinks himself worthy of worthy of less than he is really worthy of is unduly humble, whether his deserts be great or moderate, or his deserts be small but his claims yet smaller. And the man whose deserts are great would seem most unduly humble; for what would he has done if they had been less? The proud man, then, is an extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims, but a mean in respect of the rightness of them; for he claims what is accordance with his merits, while the others go to excess or fall short. 179

2.1.10.2.3.10.7. Prudence: The Greek word for prudence is phronesis . Prudence is clearly distinguished from the practical intellect, a faculty, and is said to be a virtue concerned with action. Aristotle defines it as a truth attaining rational habits, concerned with action in relation to the things that are good for human being. 180 Prudence is the intellectual virtue of practical reason. It is concerned with human actions and gives a person the ability to choose what the virtuous man is in specific situations. Acquiring prudence requires time and experience. Prudence and ethical virtue are both necessary for one another.

178 .Ibid, p.120. 179 . Justin D. Kaplan, op. cit., pp.218f. 180 . George Olivera, op. cit, p. 29 111

John Casey dealing with cardinal virtues comments on the Aristotelian notion of prudence. According to him, Aristotle’s idea of phronesis is of unity in man of reason and desire. Practical wisdom is ‘a reason and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods.’ Phronesis provides for Aristotle a principle of unity of virtues, in that all other virtues imply, and employ, practical wisdom. Tefler agrees with this principle of unity of virtues in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: a person cannot have some moral virtues and not others, because (1) if he has some moral virtues properly so called, he must have practical wisdom; (2) If he has practical wisdom, he must have all the moral virtues. 181

2.1.10.2.3.10.8. Continence and incontinence:

A moral virtue implies that the action is done by choice. Both the voluntary and involuntary having been delimited. Choice then seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary, the later extends more widely. For both children and lower animal share in voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts done on the spur of the moment we describe as voluntary, but not as chosen.

Those who says, it is appetite or anger or wish or kind of opinion do not seems to be right. For choice is not common to irrational creature as well, but appetite and anger are. Again, the incontinent man acts with appetite, but not with choice, while the continent man on the contrary acts with choice, but not appetite to appetite. Again, appetite related to the pleasant and painful, choice neither to the painful nor to the pleasant. 182 These are concerned with bodily pleasures just like temperance and intemperance, but are distinct from them. The incontinent man is disposed to do what he knows is bad because of his passions. The continent man knows that his desires are bad but does not follow them because of reason. The difference between continence and temperance lies in the fact that for a temperate man his desires are in line with his reason.

2.1.10.2.3.10.9. Gentleness or Good Temper:

It is the disposition which observes the mean in anger. It is not a very good name for this disposition which is really nameless; and this is more or less true also of the extremes. Anger may be produced by a variety of causes, but, however that may be, it is the man who is angry on the right occasions and with the right people and at the right

181 . Ibid, p. 30. 182 . Justin D. Kaplan, op. cit. p.201 112 moment and for the right length of time who wins our commendation. Such a person would be what we mean by a ‘gentle’ man, if gentleness be regarded as a laudable quality. The deficiency may be called ‘tameness’ submissiveness, ‘meekness’ or some such name, and it is blamed by us because we think that a man who does not get angry when he has reason to be angry, or does not get angry in the right way and at the right time and with the right people, is a dolt. It looks like insensibility or want of proper spirit. 183

Now a hot tempered person got angry quickly and with any person and at the wrong thing and more than is right, but their anger ceases quickly which is the best point about them. This happens to them because they do not restrain their anger but retaliate openly owing to their quickness of temper, and then their anger ceases. By result of excess choleric people are quick tempered and ready to be angry with everything and on every occasion, whether their name. Sulky people are hard to appease and retain their anger long; for they repress the passion. 184

2.1.10.2.3.10.10. Modesty :

Though strictly speaking, modesty is not a virtue, being more like n emotion than a habit of soul. It is defined at any rate as a certain fear of disgrace, and it has an effect very like that produced by the fear of danger. The only difference is that we blush when put out of countenance, whereas fear of death induces pallor. So in both cases it is the body which is somehow affected, and that seem to be the result of a feeling or emotion rather than a settled state of mind. 185

2.1.10.2.3.10.11. Justice:

The Greek term for justice is ‘ dikaiosune .’ Aristotle says that in one sense, ‘justice’ may be taken as not a part of virtue, but as ‘virtue entire’, and that in one sense ‘injustice’ may be taken as not a part of voice but as ‘vice entire’. He also says that justice, along among other virtues is thought to be ‘another’s good’, because it is related to our neighbor. The best man is not he who exercises his virtue towards himself but he who exercises his virtue towards another, for this is a difficult task. And this is why, for Aristotle, justice can be seen as virtue entire. 186

183 . J.A.K. Thomson, op. cit., pp.127f. 184 . W..D. Ross, trans, Aristotle , Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit., p.66.. 185 J.A.K. Thomson, op. cit., p.136. 186 .John Ceasy, Pagan Virtue: An Essay In Ethics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp.172f. 113

Plato’s four cardinal virtues, justice and wisdom remain for treatment. To justice, Book V is devoted. Aristotle begins by recognizing two senses of the word. By ‘just’ we may mean (1) what is lawful or (2) what is fair and equal; there are ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ justice respectively. The first of these meaning is not one which we should naturally assign to the word ‘just’; it is to be explained partly by the fact that it meant originally observant of custom or rule in general. In later Greek justice tends to be identical with whole of righteousness. In particular the word used in Attic law to express any breach of law. Aristotle think that the law should control the whole range of human life, and enforce not indeed morality, since it cannot secure, that man shall act ‘for the sake of the noble’, but action appropriate to all the virtues, if the law of the particular state does this only partiality that is because it is only rough and ready administration of what law should be. Justice, in this sense, that of obedience of law, is thus co-extensive with virtue, but the terms are not identical in meaning; the term ‘justice’ refer to the social character which is implied in all moral virtue but which the term ‘virtue’ does not call attention. 187

Natural justice is that which is just in all times and places. Conventional justice is that which is made up of laws and customs. All laws are to some extent just because any law is better than no law, but are always at least slightly flawed in that they must be formulated universally and cannot take into account all specific circumstances. As a result, a judge should rule in accordance with the intention of the lawmaker or the idea behind the law when the law does not seem to properly fit the situation.

Now justice in this sense of the word is complete virtue – not justice unqualified, but as it appears between one party and another. Hence we often find it regarded as the Sovran virtue, ‘more wonderful than evening or morning star,’ and we have a proverb:

All virtues are summed up in dealing justly.

Justice is perfect virtue because it practices perfect virtue. 188

. Now 'justice' and 'injustice' seem to be ambiguous, but because their different meanings approach near to one another the ambiguity escapes notice and is not obvious as it is, comparatively, when the meanings are far apart, e.g. (for here the difference in outward form is great) as the ambiguity in the use of Kleist for the collar-bone of an animal and for that with which we lock a door. Let us take as a starting-point, then, the

187 ..W.D.Ross, Aristotle, op. cit., p.209. 188 . J.A.K. Thomson, op. cit., p.141. 114 various meanings of 'an unjust man'. Both the lawless man and the grasping and unfair man are thought to be unjust, so that evidently both the law-abiding and the fair man will be just. The just, then, is the lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair 189 .

Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding man just, evidently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and each of these, we say, is just. Now the laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the common advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold power, or something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the political society. And the law bids us do both the acts of a brave man (e.g. not to desert our post nor take to flight nor throw away our arms), and those of a temperate man (e.g. not to commit adultery nor to gratify one's lust), and those of a good-tempered man (e.g. not to strike another nor to speak evil), and similarly with regard to the other virtues and forms of wickedness, commanding some acts and forbidding others; and the rightly-framed law does this rightly, and the hastily conceived one less well. This form of justice, then, is complete virtue, but not absolutely, but in relation to our neighbour. And therefore justice is often thought to be the greatest of virtues, and 'neither evening nor morning star' is so wonderful; and proverbially 'in justice is every virtue comprehended'. And it is complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbour also; for many men can exercise virtue in their own affairs, but not in their relations to their neighbour. This is why the saying of bias is thought to be true, that 'rule will show the man'; for a ruler is necessarily in relation to other men and a member of a society. For this same reason justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be 'another's good', because it is related to our neighbour; for it does what is advantageous to another, either a ruler or a copartner. Now the worst man is he who exercises his wickedness both towards himself and towards his friends, and the best man is not he who exercises his virtue towards himself, but he who exercises it towards another; for this is a difficult task. Justice in this sense, then, is not part of virtue but virtue entire, nor is the contrary injustice a part of vice but vice entire. What the difference is between virtue and justice in this sense is plain from what we have said; they are the same but their essence

189 . W.D.Ross, trans., Aristotle , Nicomachean Ethics , op. cit., p.72.

115 is not the same; what, as a relation to one's neighbour, justice is, as a certain kinds of state without qualification, virtue. 190

2.1.10.2.3.10.12. Friendship:

2.1.10.2.3.10.12 .1. Friendship both necessary and noble:

Since friend is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in possession of office and of dominating power are thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? The greater it is, the more exposed is it to risk. And in poverty and in other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge. It helps the young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people by ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are failing from weakness; those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble actions 'two going together' for with friends men are more able both to think and to act. But it is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those who love their friends and it is thought to be a fine thing to have many friends; and again we think it is the same people that are good men and are friends. 191

2.1.10.2.3.10.12 .2. Three corresponding kinds of Friendship :–

In the corresponding form of love and friendship, there are three kind of friendship, equal in number to things that are lovable, for which respect to each there is mutual and recognized love, and those who love each other, wish well to each other in that respect in which they love one another. Now those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So too with those who love for the sake of pleasure; it is not for their character that men love ready-witted people, but because they find them pleasant. Therefore those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and not in so far as the other is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant. And thus these friendships are only incidental; for it is not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved, but as providing some good or

190 .Ibid, pp.72f. 191 . Justin D. Kaplan, op. cit., p.235.. 116 pleasure. Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved, if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the one party is no longer pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him. 192

So the friendship based on usefulness, friendship based on pleasure and friendship based on virtue. Only the last type is genuine friendship. Friendships based on usefulness and pleasure tend not to be very enduring, since they only last as the long as each party derives the usefulness or pleasure he desires from the relationship. Friendship based on virtue is based on wishing the good for the other person. This genuine friendship is necessary for self-knowledge and helps both of the friends to grow in virtue. Friendship presupposes justice and goes beyond it. The virtue of a friend is to love. The relationship one has with a friend is like the harmonious relationship between the different parts of the soul of a virtuous man. After what we have said, a discussion of friendship would naturally follow, since it is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in possession of office and of dominating power are thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? The greater it is, the more exposed is it to risk. And in poverty and in other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge. It helps the young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people by ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are failing from weakness; those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble actions-'two going together'-for with friends men are more able both to think and to act. Again, parent seems by nature to feel it for offspring and offspring for parent, not only among men but among birds and among most animals; it is felt mutually by members of the same race, and especially by men, whence we praise lovers of their fellowmen. We may even in our travels how near and dear every man is to every other. Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.

192 .Ibid, p.237. 117

Friendship being divided into these kinds, bad men will be friends for the sake of pleasure or of utility, being in this respect like each other, but good men will be friends for their own sake, i.e. in virtue of their goodness. These, then, are friends without qualification; the others are friends incidentally and through a resemblance to these, 193

2.1.10.2.3.11. Intellectual Virtues:- Now we have discussed in detail the moral virtues; Now we will discuss about intellectual virtues that the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial. There are five ways man attains the truth, these are - 1) scientific knowledge, 2) Art, 3) practical wisdom, 4) intuitive reason, 5) philosophic wisdom,

2.1.10.2.3.11.1. Scientific knowledge :

Now what scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak exactly and not follow mere similarities, is plain from what follows. We all suppose that what we know is not even capable of being otherwise; of things capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed outside our observation, whether they exist or not. Therefore the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that are eternal are ingenerated and imperishable. Again, every science is thought to be capable of being taught, and its object of being learned. And all teaching starts from what is already known, as we maintain in the Analytics also; for it proceeds sometimes through induction and sometimes by syllogism. Now induction is the starting-point which knowledge even of the universal presupposes, while syllogism proceeds from universals. There are therefore starting-points from which syllogism proceeds, which are not reached by syllogism; it is therefore by induction that they are acquired. Scientific knowledge is, then, a state of capacity to demonstrate, and has the other limiting characteristics which we specify in the Analytics; for it is when a man believes in a certain way and the starting-points are known to him that he has scientific knowledge, since if they are not better known to him than the conclusion, he will have his knowledge only incidentally. 194

193 . Ibid, p.240. 194 .Justin D. Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 226f. 118

2.1.10.2.3.11.2. Art:

Art is identical with a state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning. All art is concerned with coming into being, i.e. with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made; for art is concerned neither with things that are, or come into being, by necessity, nor with things that do so in accordance with nature (since these have their origin in themselves). Making and acting being different, art must be a matter of making, not of acting. And in a sense chance and art are concerned with the same objects; as Agathon says, 'art loves chance and chance loves art'. Art, then, as has been is a state concerned with making, involving a true course of reasoning, and lack of art on the contrary is a state concerned with making, involving a false course of reasoning; both are concerned with the variable. 195

2.1.10.2.3.11.3. Practical Wisdom:

Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by considering who the persons we credit with it are. Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general. This is shown by the fact that we credit men with practical wisdom in some particular respect when they have calculated well with a view to some good end which is one of those that are not the object of any art. It follows that in the general sense also the man who is capable of deliberating has practical wisdom.

Practical wisdom then must be regarded and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods. But further, while there is such a thing as excellence in art, there is no such thing as excellence in practical wisdom; and in art he who errs willingly is preferable, but in practical wisdom, as in the virtues, he is the reverse. Plainly then, practical wisdom is a virtue and not an art. 196

2.1.10.2.3.11.4. Intuitive reason:

It is the knowledge of the principles from which science proceeds. Scientific knowledge is judgment about things that are universal and necessary, and the

195 .Ibid, p.227. 196 . Ibid, pp.228f. 119 conclusions of demonstration, and all scientific knowledge, follow from first principles (for scientific knowledge involves apprehension of a rational ground). This being so, the first principle from which what is scientifically known follows cannot be an object of scientific knowledge, of art, or of practical wisdom; for that which can be scientifically known can be demonstrated, and art and practical wisdom deal with things that are variable. Nor are these first principles the objects of philosophic wisdom, for it is a mark of the philosopher to have demonstration about some things. If, then, the states of mind by which we have truth and are never deceived about things invariable or even variable are scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, and intuitive reason, and it cannot be any of the three (i.e. practical wisdom, scientific knowledge, or philosophic wisdom), the remaining alternative is that it is intuitive reason that grasps the first principles. 197

2.1.10.2.3.11.5. Philosophic wisdom :

It is the union of intuitive reason and science. Wisdom (1) in the art we ascribe to their most finished exponents, e.g. to Phidias as a sculptor and to Polyclitus as a maker of portrait statues, and here we mean nothing by wisdom except excellence in art; but we think that some people are wise in general, not in some particular field or in any other limited respect, as Homer says in the Margites ,

“Him did the gods make neither a digger nor yet a ploughman. Nor wise to

anything else.”

Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished off the form of the knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge of higher objects which has received as it were its proper completion. 198

2.1.10.2.3.12. Pathology of Pleasure:

Something’s are naturally pleasant, and of these some are pleasant in any case, while other gives pleasure only to a particular races or species of men or animals. But there are other things which are not naturally pleasant but come to give pleasure from some pathological cause, such as arrested development or vicious instinct, or as the result

197 . Ibid, pp.229f. 198 . Ibid, p. 230. 120 of bad habits. Consequently it is possible to see, corresponding to each of these unnatural pleasures, certain abnormal qualities of character which may be describes as ‘bestial’. Examples of such bestiality are they female who is said to rip up the bellies of pregnant women and devour the unborn children, and some of the savages by the shores of the black sea, who are the cannibals, or have a taste for raw flesh, and others among them who supply in rotation a child for the tribal feast, or the notorious behavior of Phalaris. All this may be called bestiality, but there are other perversions. Some are the product of disease, which may be mental, others the products of habits, such as plucking out hairs, biting one’s nails, eating charcoal or loam, homosexuality among men. Practices of this nature are sometimes the result of congenital tendencies, sometimes of habits, as in the case of those who have been subjected to gross indignities since childhood. 199

2.1.10.2.3.1 2. 1. The Theory of pleasure 200 :

Aristotle discusses pleasure in two separate parts of the Nicomachean Ethics (book 7 chapters 11-14 and book 10 chapters 1-5). Plato had discussed similar themes in several dialogues, including the Republic and the Philebus and Gorgias .

Pleasure is discussed throughout the whole Ethics , but

Pleasure is discussed throughout the whole Ethics , but is given a final more focused and theoretical treatment in Book X. Aristotle starts by questioning the rule of thumb accepted in the more approximate early sections, whereby people think pleasure should be avoided—if not because it is bad simply, then because people tend too much towards pleasure seeking. He argues that people's actions show that this is not really what they believe. He reviews some arguments of previous philosophers, including first Eudoxus and Plato, to argue that pleasure is clearly a good pursued for its own sake even if it is not The Good , or in other words that which all good things have in common.

In chapter 3 Aristotle applies to pleasure his theory of motion ( kinesis ) as an energeia as explained in his Physics and Metaphysics . In terms of this approach, pleasure is not a movement or ( kinesis ) because unlike the movement of walking across a specific room, or of building a house, or a part of a house, it has no end point when we can say it is completed. It is more like seeing which is either happening in a complete way or not happening. "Each moment of pleasurable consciousness is a perfect whole."

199 . J.A.K. Thomson, op. cit. p. 205, 206. 200 .https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicomachean_Ethics#Theory of Pleasre, accessed on 26/08/2017 at 2.45 p.m. 121

A sense perception like sight is in perfect activity ( teleia energeia ) when it is in its best conditions and directed at the best objects. And when any sense is in such perfect activity, then there is pleasure, and similarly thinking ( dianoia ) and contemplation (theoria ) have associated pleasures. But seeing, for example is a whole, as is the associated pleasure. Pleasure does not complete the seeing or thinking, but is an extra activity, just as a healthy person can have an extra good "bloom of well-being".

This raises the question of why pleasure does not last, but seem to fade as if we get tired. Aristotle proposes as a solution to this that pleasure is pursued because of desire to live. Life is an activity ( energeia ) made up of many activities such as music, thinking and contemplation, and pleasure brings the above-mentioned extra completion to each of these, bringing fulfillment and making life worthy of choice. Aristotle says we can dismiss the question of whether we live for pleasure or choose pleasure for the sake of living, for the two activities seem incapable of being separated.

Different activities in life, the different sense perceptions, thinking, contemplating, bring different pleasures, and these pleasures make the activities grow, for example a flute player gets better at it as they also get more pleasure from it. But these pleasures and their associated activities also impede with each other just as a flute player cannot participate in an argument while playing. This raises the question of which pleasures are more to be pursued. Some pleasures are more beautiful and some are more base or corrupt. Aristotle ranks some of them as follows:

1. Thinking 2. Sight 3. Hearing and smell 4. Taste

Aristotle also argues that each type of animal has pleasures appropriate to it, and in the same way there can be differences between people in what pleasures are most suitable to them. Aristotle proposes that it would be most beautiful to say that the person of serious moral stature is the appropriate standard, with whatever things they enjoy being the things most pleasant.

2.1.10.2.3.13. Vices According To Aristotle:

Aristotle has also elaborated on vices and observe that of what is to be avoided in respect of moral character there are three forms; Vice, Imperfect Self-control i.e.

122 incontinence, and brutishness or ‘bestiality’. There is no doubt as to what are the opposite disposition to two of these three; opposed to vice is virtue, oppose to incontinence is continence, But the opposite of bestiality? One may with propriety call it ‘superhuman virtue’ moral goodness on the heroic or godlike scale. One thinks of the words which Homer has put into the mouth of Priam respecting Hector, of whom because Hector was pre-eminently brave, he says:

Nor seemed he to be Son of the mortal sire, but of a god. So, if what men say is true, that mortal became gods by sheer mobility of character, the disposition opposed to bestiality will clearly be of this transcendent order. For virtue does not belong to a god any more than vice or virtue to a beast; the goodness of a god transcend our virtues, while the badness of a beast is different in kind from our vice. And on the same grounds as make it a rare thing for a man to be ‘divine’ in the sense in which that epithet is commonly applied by the Spartans when they wish to express the highest admiration, so a bestial person is a rara avis among men. 201

As far as describe exceptionally vicious men as ‘bestial’ in order to express our loathing of them. But to this bestial disposition we shall have to devote some attention later, while of vice. We should not think of either of those dispositions – the good and the bad as identical with virtue and vice respectively. In present case general beliefs are these, (a) Continence or endurance are good and commendable qualities, whereas their opposites, incontinence and softness, are bad and blameworthy, (b) The Continence man has the characteristic of sticking by the conclusions he has been led to draw, whereas the incontinence man tend to give his up. (c) The incontinence or morally weak man does wrong, knowing is to be wrong, because he cannot control his passions, whereas the continent man, knowing that his lusts are evil, refuses to follow them, because his principles forbid it, (d) The temperate man is always continent and enduring, though whether the continent man is always temperate is an open question, some asserting and others denying that it is so. (e) It is sometimes maintained that it is impossible for the prudent man to be incontinent , sometimes that some prudent and clever man are guilty of incontinence. 202

201 . J.A.K. Thomson, op. cit., p.193. 202 . Ibid, p. 194. 123

2.1.10.2.3.14. Happiness In The Highest Sense Is The Contemplative

Life 203

If happiness is an activity in accordance with the virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best thing in us. Whether it be reason or something else that is this element which is thought to be our natural rules and guide and to take thought of thing noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with the proper virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activity is contemplative we have already said.

So if among virtuous actions political and military actions are distinguished by nobility and greatness, and these are unleisurely and aim at an end and are not desirable for their own sake, but the activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems both to be superior in serious worth and to aim at no end beyond itself., and to have its pleasure proper to itself, and the self sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness , and all the other attributes ascribed to the supremely happy man are evident. Let those connected with the activity, it follows that this will be the complete happiness of man, if it is allowed a complete term of life.

But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature in its activity superior in that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue. If reason is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life.

2.1.10.2.3.14.1. The Life of Contemplation:

In Book X, Aristotle ultimately concludes that contemplation is the highest human activity. If happiness is activity in accordance with virtues, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtues and this will be that of the best thing in us . Whether it to be reason or something else that is the element which is throughout to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine. Whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activity is

203 . Justin D. Kaplan, ed. Op. cit. Pp. 263ff. 124 contemplative, perfect happiness is a contemplative activity. 204 This is largely a consequence of his teleological view of nature, according to which the telos, or goal, of human life is the exercise of our rational powers. In discussing the various intellectual virtues, Aristotle extols wisdom as the highest, since it deals only with unchanging, universal truths and rests on a synthesis of scientific investigation and the intuitive understanding of the first principles of nature. The activity of wisdom is contemplation, so contemplation must be the highest activity of human life. 205 2.1.10.2.3 .15. To Become Good We Must have Rightly Directed habits, Education And Legislation: 206

In Book X. Chapter 9, Finally, Aristotle repeats that the discussion of the Ethics has not reached its aim if it has no effect in practice. Aristotle says that some thinker hold that goodness comes by nature, others that we acquire it by habit, others that we are made good by teaching. The bounty of nature is clearly beyond our control; it is bestowed by some divine dispensation on those who are in the true sense of the word ’fortunate’. As for argument and teaching, it is to be feared they are not efficacious in all instances. Like a piece of land, which has to be prepared for the seed that is to grow there, the mind of the pupil has to be prepared for the inculcation of good habits, if it is to like and dislike the things it ought. The man who is passion’s slave will not listen to or understand the logic of anyone who tries to dissuade him from going on as he is doing. When a man is in that state, what chance has you of changing his mind by argumentation? In fact one may venture on the broad statement that passion is not amenable to reason but only to force. We must then have a character to work upon which has a natural bias towards virtues, loving the noble and hating the base. Education in goodness is best undertaken by the state. Yet it is far from easy to obtain a right training in goodness from youth upwards, unless one has been brought up under right laws. To live a hard and sober life is not an attractive prospect for most, especially when they are young. For this reason the nurture and the pursuit of young person’s should be regulated by law, for hard condition and sober living will cease to be painful when they have become habitual.

Theories are not enough. However, the practice of virtue requires good education and habituation from an early age in the community. Young people otherwise do not ever

204 .W.D.Ross, trans., Nicomachean Ethivs, Kitchener, Batoche Books, 1999, p.173. 205 . https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicomachean_Ethics#, accessed on 26/08/2017 at 2.45 p.m 206 . J.A.K Thomson, op. cit. pp. 310ff.

125 get to experience the highest forms of pleasure and are distracted by the easiest ones. While parents often attempt to do this, it is critical that there are also good laws in the community. But concerning this need for good laws and education Aristotle says that there has always been a problem, which he is now seeking to address: unlike in the case of medical science, theoreticians of happiness and teachers of virtue such as sophists never have practical experience themselves, whereas good parents and lawmakers have never theorized and developed a scientific approach to analyzing what the best laws are. Furthermore, very few lawmakers, perhaps only the Spartans have made education the focus of law making, as they should. Education needs to be more like medicine, with both practice and theory, and this requires a new approach to studying politics. Such study should, he says, even help in communities where the laws are not good and the parents need to try to create the right habits in young people themselves without the right help from lawmakers. Aristotle closes the Nicomachean Ethics therefore by announcing a programme of study in politics, including the collecting of studies of different constitutions, and the results of this programme are generally assumed to be contained in the work that exists today and is known as the Politics .

2.1.10.3. The axiological views of Plato (427 – 347 B.C.E.)

Plato was a poet at heart and his philosophical writing form a masterpiece of literature. He had to take recourse to myths, allegories, and metaphors, in order to express what could not be stated in prose with precision. He wrote in delightful dialogues with Socrates at the centre, but the philosophies of the previous period were all taken into account. He has given system of thought to the Western philosophy. 207 He is one of the world's best known and most widely read and studied philosophers. He was the student of Socrates and the teacher of Aristotle and he wrote in the middle of the fourth century B.C.E. in ancient Greece. Though influenced primarily by Socrates, to the extent that Socrates is usually the main character in many of Plato's writings, he was also influenced by Heraclitus Parmenides and the Pythagoreans .208

207 . Y. Masih, op. cit., p. 51. 208 . Site https://www.iep.utm.edu/plato /plato- Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Visited on 22/06/2017 at 3pm. 126

2.1.10.3.1. Ethical Position In The Early Dialogues:

The philosophical positions most scholars agree can be found directly endorsed or at least suggested in the early or "Socratic" dialogues include the following moral or ethical views:

• A rejection of retaliation, or the return of harm for harm or evil for evil ( Crito 48b-c, 49c-d; Republic I.335a-e); • The claim that doing injustice harms one's soul, the thing that is most precious to one, and, hence, that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it ( Crito 47d- 48a; Gorgias 478c-e, 511c-512b; Republic I.353d-354a); • Some form of what is called "eudaimonism," that is, that goodness is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to human happiness, well-being, or flourishing, which may also be understood as "living well," or "doing well" (Crito 48b; Euthydemus 278e, 282a; Republic I. 354a); • The view that only virtue is good just by itself; anything else that is good is good only insofar as it serves or is used for or by virtue ( Apology 30b; Euthydemus 281d- e); • The view that there is some kind of unity among the virtues: In some sense, all of the virtues are the same ( Protagoras 329b-333b, 361a-b); • The view that the citizen who has agreed to live in a state must always obey the laws of that state, or else persuade the state to change its laws, or leave the state (Crito 51b-c, 52a-d). 209

2.1.10.3.2. Moral Psychology The moral psychology of the middle period dialogues also seems to be quite different from what we find in the early period. In the early dialogues, Plato's Socrates is an intellectualist —that is, he claims that people always act in the way they believe is best for them (at the time of action, at any rate). Hence, all wrongdoing reflects some cognitive error. But in the middle period, Plato conceives of the soul as having (at least) three parts: 1. a rational part (the part that loves truth, which should rule over the other parts of the soul through the use of reason), 2. a spirited part (which loves honor and victory), and

209 . Ibid 127

3. an appetitive part (which desires food, drink, and sex), and justice will be that condition of the soul in which each of these three parts "does its own work," and does not interfere in the workings of the other parts (see esp. Republic IV.435b-445b). It seems clear from the way Plato describes what can go wrong in a soul, however, that in this new picture of moral psychology, the appetitive part of the soul can simply overrule reason's judgments. One may suffer, in this account of psychology, from what is called akrasia or "moral weakness"—in which one finds oneself doing something that one actually believes is not the right thing to do (see especially Republic IV.439e-440b). In the early period, Socrates denied that akrasia was possible: One might change one's mind at the last minute about what one ought to do and could perhaps change one's mind again later to regret doing what one has done—but one could never do what one actually believed was wrong, at the time of acting. 210 To speaking of Plato’s moral philosophy, it refer to two things; first to Plato’s answer to the normative question ‘How ought we live?’ and second to the answer to the epistemological question, ‘how can we know how ought we live?’, Plato’s answer to this normative question relies on his views about the connection between virtues and happiness and since his views about the virtues relies on his views about reason, desire and motivation. 211

Like other ancient philosophers, Plato maintains a virtue-based eudemonistic conception of ethics. That is to say, human well-being ( eudaimonia ) is the highest aim of moral thought and conduct, and the virtues ( aretê : ‘excellence’) are the requisite skills and dispositions needed to attain it. If Plato's conception of happiness is elusive and his support for a morality of happiness seems somewhat subdued, there are several reasons. First, his conception of happiness differs in significant ways from ordinary views. In his early works his approach is largely negative: Socratic questioning seems designed to undermine the traditional values rather than to develop a positive account of his own. Second, the positive accounts contained in his later works, especially that of the Republic , treat happiness as a state of perfection that is hard to comprehend because it is based on metaphysical presuppositions that seem both hazy and out of the realm of ordinary understanding. In other dialogues he confines himself to intimations of different aspects of what is good in and for the soul, intimations that are hard to fit together in a coherent picture. There is not, as there is in Aristotle, much talk about happiness as a self-sufficient state of the active individual. Third, in crucial texts Plato's moral ideals

210 . Ibid 211 .Terence Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, New York , Oxford University Press, 1995,p.3 128 appear both austere and self-abnegating: the soul is to remain aloof from the pleasures of the body; communal life demands the subordination of individual wishes and aims. 212 The difficulties of assessing Plato's ethical thought are compounded by the fact that it was subject to various modifications during his long life. In Plato's early works, the so-called Socratic dialogues, there are no indications that the search for virtue and the human good goes beyond the human realm. This changes with a growing interest in an all-encompassing metaphysical grounding of knowledge in Plato's middle dialogues, a development that leads to the positing of the ‘Forms’, as the true nature of all things, culminating in the Form of the Good as the transcendent principle of all goodness. In addition, moral values presuppose an appropriate political order that can be maintained only by leaders with a rigorous philosophical training. Though the theory of the Forms is not confined to human values, but encompasses the whole of nature Plato at this point seems to assume no more than an analogy between human affairs and cosmic harmony. The late dialogues, by contrast, display a growing tendency to see a unity between the microcosm of human life and the macrocosmic order of the entire universe. Such holistic tendencies would seem to put the attainment of the requisite knowledge beyond the boundaries of human understanding. But although Plato's late works do not show any willingness to lower the standards of knowledge as such, he acknowledges that his design of a rational cosmic order is based on conjecture and speculation, an acknowledgement that finds its counterpart in his more pragmatic treatment of ethical standards and political institutions in his late work, the Laws . Finally: At no stage in Plato's philosophy is there a systematic treatment of and commitment to basic principles of ethics that would justify the derivation of rules and norms of human interaction in the way that is expected in modern discussions. Nor is there a fully fleshed-out depiction of the good life. Instead, Plato largely confines himself to the depiction of the good soul and the good for the soul, evidently on the assumption that the state of the soul is the condition of the good life, both necessary and sufficient to guarantee it. And given that his approaches in different dialogues vary, readers have to fit together what often looks like disparate pieces of information. This explains the widely diverging reconstructions of his intentions in the secondary literature from antiquity to this day. 213

212 .Site https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-ethics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Visited on 222/06/2017 at 3pm. 213 .Ibid 129

2.1.10.3.3. Plato’s Notion On Virtue of Justice:

In Plato’s Republic there is found the outstanding exposition of the Greek doctrine of the four cardinal virtues, and there can be no better introduction to these virtues than to follow as far as possible Plato’s argument.

In a conversation between Socrates and some of his friends, the question is asked ‘What is justice?’ (The Greek word used, has rather a wider meaning than the English word ‘Justice’) Two common answers are given to the question, namely (a) that justice consists in doing good to one’s friend and bringing harm to one’s enemies, and (b) that justice is a name for the interest of the stronger. The former is akin to the modern view that justice consists in the giving to every man of what he deserves, but Socrates refutes this views by showing that, in so far as a good man is good, he does not do evil even to his enemies, because it is goodness and not evil that springs from a just character. The later is akin to the common explanation of morality given by skeptics, that those in power make the prevailing rules of morality in order to protect their own interests. Socrates replies by showing that every artists aim at the perfection of his own art, and he includes rulers and indeed men of action of every type among artists. A doctor as doctor seeks the good health of his patient; it is only in so far as he is a money-maker and not a doctor that he seeks big fees. Similarly the ruler or administrator of justice seeks the good of his subjects and not his own good. In the individual, as in the state, justice consists in each principle doing its proper works. The just man will not permit the several principles within him to do any work but their own, nor allow the distinct classes in his soul to interfere with each other, but will really set his house in order. In this way Socrates demonstrates that justice or righteousness is the normal healthy condition of the soul, and the vice or injustice is a diseased and unhealthy condition. Without further argument on the matter his companions are satisfied that justice is better than injustice. 214

Socrates admits that, while he has shown that the two suggested definitions of justice are false, he himself has not given a clear notion of what justice is. Two of his companions, with the design of arousing Socrates to give a fuller account of justice, state in detail how much more advantageous injustice is than justice in the practical life of the world. The just man is in the end likely to face martyrdom, while the unjust man even

214 .William Lillie, op. cit., , pp.274f. 130 after death can get better of the gods by a skillful use of atoning sacrifices. This causes Socrates to attempt to define and defend justice. 215

2.1.10.3.4. Categorical Nature of Values: Plato was the first luminary who grasped a distinct categorical nature of values as such, although he himself did not use the very term “value.” Speaking about moral good, beauty, justice, etc. i.e. what we today call values – he used to characterize them as divine elements in the world . Presenting metaphorically the soul as wings thanks to which it is possible to soar upwards and carry that which is heavy up to the place where dwells the race of the gods , he wrote: More than any other thing that pertains to the body it partakes of the nature of the divine. But the divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and all such qualities. Besides concrete changeable objects known to us through sense organs (and notions derived from them) Plato acknowledged the existence of separate objects of thought, attainable only to the mind. He called such objects Ideas (or Forms ). If, for instance, the object of perception is a round thing, the appropriate object of thought is a sphere “as such” (i.e. in mathematical sense). In contrast to “sensual things,” Ideas are general entities that are timeless (immutable); they differ as to the level of their generality thus forming a hierarchy of generality. According to Plato, the idea of the Good tops this hierarchy. 216

2.1.10.3.5. Plato’s contribution to Axiology: Plato’s another contribution to axiology was the postulated linkage between values and rationality. To demonstrate this let us remark that interpretation of the idea of the Good as comprehension the form of values cannot be the only one since all general entities (e.g. the idea of a sphere) partake in the idea, and not only those bearing the character of value. Such more general can be spotted in Plato’s works assuming that his theory of ideas is not a theory of the “outer cosmos” but of the “inner cosmos” – understood as we described it in “Epistemology”. With such interpretation the idea of the Good is better characterized by Plato’s formula from Phaedo according to which the

215 .Ibid, p. 277. 216 . Chmielecki Andrzej and Ewa Chmielecka, op. cit. p.13

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Good is “what links things in the best possible way” – assuming that “things” denote here elements of “inner cosmos” and not things in themselves. In this light let us consider Plato’s statement from the dialogue Republic : In the region of the knowable (that is inner cosmos ) the last thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the Good; but once seen, it must be concluded that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful – in the visible realm it gives birth to light and its sovereign; in the intelligible realm, itself sovereign, it provided truth and reason – and that the man who is going to act wisely in private or in public must see it . On the one hand the idea of the Good is characterized here as a principle allowing for identifying certain things or acts as being right and beautiful, which corresponds with our first interpretation of the idea of the Good as a form of values. But at the same time it is to determine the knowable world giving birth to reason, that is to certain spiritual power characteristic of individual persons. This makes one think that more general sense of the idea of the Good are universal – set by nobody but valid to everybody – principles of rationality according to which human mind functions, since its functioning is determined by certain formal (i.e. not linked with any specific spiritual content but concerning all of them) rules. Consequently, it suggests not to comprehend Platonic ideas as pre-existing beings, external to all persons, but as essential – and in this sense objective – determinants of the functioning of the mind, i.e. something binding, valid for every rational being; in a word, as immanent forms and rules of mind’s activity. The idea of the Good comprehended in this way was to guarantee the possibility of knowledge (episteme ) in contrast to mere opinions ( doxa ). 217

2.1.10.3.6. The Cardinal Virtues 218 :

The four virtues which Plato described in the Republic were called in later times the cardinal virtues. The word ‘cardinal’ is a derivative of the Latin word ‘cardo’ meaning a hinge, and the cardinal virtues are the virtues by which the moral life is supported, as a door is supported by its hinges. Medieval philosophers added to the four cardinal `virtues the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, but these, at any rate in the interpretation given to them by the Churchmen of the Middle Ages, are directed towards God rather than towards one’s fellow-men, and so are matters for

217 . Ibid, pp.14f. 218 . William Lillie, op. cit., pp.278ff. 132 religion rather than for morality. It is possible still to regard the four cardinal virtues, if they are widened somewhat in their scope, as the most important constituents of goodness, and they will certainly repay a fuller consideration.

(a) Wisdom - There has been a great deal of discussion as to what Socrates meant by saying that virtue is knowledge, and as to the exact nature of the wisdom which, according to the Republic , has the supreme place in the soul of the just or righteous man. In modern times a distinction is made between the natural intelligence, which psychologist’s measure by means of intelligence quotients and which is held to be largely a natural endowment, and the acquired knowledge which is obtained from observation and study. Natural intelligence itself appears to include more than one ability, at least an analytic ability and a synthetic ability. The scientist uses analysis to a greater extent than the philosopher, who uses synthesis especially in his attempt to view the universe as a whole. There is also held to be a distinction between theoretic ability and practical ability. Metaphysicians and mathematicians have theoretic ability, while stockbrokers and priests skilled at the confessional have practical ability. The Greek conception of the wise man, seems generally to have put the emphasis on theoretic and synthetic ability, but it is likely that Socrates included both natural ability in all its different forms and also acquired knowledge of all kinds in the virtue of wisdom.

(b) Courage - Plato recognized the subordinate place of courage in the moral life. Wisdom comes first in giving a man his directions, and courage is then needed to resist that fear of pain which drives a man away from the path in which wisdom directs him. There seem to be several closely akin virtues included in courage . There is a courage of the generous quality which is largely a matter of natural endowment, and which sometimes occurs in people who are very unworthy in other respects. This kind of courage may win the Victoria Cross in war, but it also may be seen in the performance of a daring crime. Of courage of the righteous quality there seem to be at least two kinds: (i) active courage or valour which persists in carrying through a course of action in spite of threats of pain or even actual experience of pain; and (ii) passive courage of fortitude which bears unavoidable suffering without flinching.

(c) Temperance - Temperance is regarded by Mackenzie as parallel to courage. Just as courage is the virtue which offers resistance to the fear of pain, so temperance is the virtue which offers resistance to the allurements of pleasure. Temperance is not merely a

133 negative virtue engaged in repressing the appetites. Plato himself describes it in more positive terms as unanimity on the question as to who will govern in the state, and in the individual temperance is at work when the two that are governed agree with that which governs in regarding the rational principle as the rightful sovereign. Temperance does not merely restrain our passions and desires, but it takes from reason guidance as to how far these desires should be satisfied. In no sense is temperance to be regarded as antagonistic to pleasure; indeed the only pleasure with which temperance is directly concerned would be, according to the Greeks, the pleasures of excitement, for to be governed by reason prevents one from being carried away by excitement. Temperance demands a reasonable moderation or a happy blending of the domination of reason with the other tendencies of human nature. This was a virtue highly rated by the Greeks as in their proverb, ‘Nothing too much’, and we shall see in the next section that it took central place in Aristotle’s conception of virtue.

Temperance is supremely a virtue which gives beauty to the moral life. It shuts out completely fanaticism or the irrational pursuit of any single limited good. Each human desire or aspiration is to be satisfied to its proper degree, and the whole moral life will have the harmony or proportion of a great work of art. This conception of the good life was characteristic of the Greeks; it was no accident that they referred to the good man as one who is ‘beautiful and good’. The limit up to which each craving of man’s nature may be satisfied is determined by reason in accordance with the supreme virtue of wisdom. There is no notion in the Greek view of an equilibrium reached through evolution among the contending desires of a man. The harmonious balance is to be accomplished by man’s use of his rational powers, and these need the help of man’s ‘spirited’ element to accomplish their purpose, for the moral struggle is not an easy one. This domination by reason gives a certain dignity and poise to the good life as it was conceived by the Greeks, and the Greek word, which is translated into ‘temperance’ in English, has always this suggestion of dignified serenity.

(d) Justice - Justice is distinguished from the other cardinal virtues in having a more explicit reference to man’s social relations. Wisdom, courage, and temperance are primarily virtues of an individual man; justice is primarily a virtue of a society. There are certain implications of Plato’s conception of justice that are worth noting. Plato appears to hold that a certain amount of freedom is required for the individual, for justice is ‘ the power that makes each member of a state do his own work’ and the rules are to see that

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‘no one may appropriate what belongs to others or be deprived of what is his own’. This surely means freedom from interference. Again, a certain amount of equality among individuals is implied in the recognition that every member of the community has a function to perform. Freedom and equality are not merely conventions that have been found useful in the development of society; they are in some sense natural, and based on laws of nature. It is naturally fitting that the individual should have some freedom for his creative work; otherwise the creative impulse remains suppressed. It is fitting again in some degree to treat human beings as equals; the resemblances among men are far greater than the differences. In our modern conception of justice we add a third implication intuitively known to us; as Butler indicated, conscience judges that pain is appropriate to wrong doing and happiness to well-doing. This too is a kind of justice.

2.1.10.3.7. Virtues of state & soul:

The division of functions that leads to the separation of three classes in the search for justice concludes the discussion of the social order. This sequence explains the peculiar character of Socrates' further procedure. The catalogue of what in later tradition has been dubbed ‘the four cardinal Platonic virtues’: wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice - is first presented without comment. Piety, as the text indicates, is no longer treated as a virtue, for religious practices should be left to tradition and the oracle of Apollo at Delphi. The definition of justice is to be discovered by a process of ‘elimination’. If there are four virtues in the city, then justice must be the one that is left over after the other three have been identified . There is no proof offered that there are exactly four virtues in a state, nor that they are items that can be lifted up, singly, for inspection, like eggs from a basket. Instead, Socrates points out the role they play in the maintenance of the social order. About wisdom ( sophia ), the only purely intellectual virtue and the exclusive possession of the rulers , little more is said than that it is ‘good council’ ( euboulia ) in decisions about the internal and external affairs of the city. Courage (andreia ) is the soldiers' specific excellence. Socrates takes some trouble explaining its nature, because it is a mixture of belief ( doxa ) and steadfastness of character ( sôtêria ). It is compared to colorfast wool: through thick and thin the guardians must be dyed-in-the-wool adherents to the laws' decrees about what is to be feared. Moderation ( sôphrosunê ) is not an intellectual excellence, but rather a combination of belief with a certain orderly disposition. It is a conviction shared by all classes about who should rule, a conviction based on a state of ‘order’ ( kosmos ), ‘consonance’ ( sumphônia )

135 and ‘harmony’ ( harmonia ) that consists in the control of the better part of the pleasures and desires of the lower parts. The third class, then, has no specific virtue of its own. The identification of justice, the excellence that is left over, is due to a sudden insight on Socrates' part: justice is neither more nor less than the principle that has been employed all along in the founding of the model-state, namely that everyone is to “do their own thing and not meddle with that of another”. At first sight it seems hard to tell how justice differs from moderation as a “consonance about who should rule and be ruled.” Justice as “doing your own thing” may represent a more active state of mind with a wider extension, given that its task is also to see to it that “no citizen should have what belongs to another or be deprived of what is his own”. But since the dispositions of justice and moderation are not specified any further, there seems to be only a fine line between the functions of justice and moderation in the city. That there are four virtues rather than three may also reflect the fact that this catalogue of four was a fixture in tradition. As will emerge in connection with the virtues in the individual soul, the distinction between justice and moderation is far less problematic in the case of the individual than in that of the city as a whole, because in the individual soul internal self-control and external self- restraint are clearly different attitudes. 219

2.1.10.3.8. Plato’s Views On Education 220 :

The aim of education is that the child may be educated on the right lines concerning pleasure, pain and dislike so that correct habit may be formed with regard to what he will learn to abhor and, relish when he grows up ( Laws 2,653b). What a child has to be taught has to be determined by judge who is truly a judge ( Laws 2,659a) Again

…that education is in fact, the drawing and leading of children to the rule which has been pronounced right by the voice of the law, and approved as truly right by the concordant experience of the best and oldest men. ( Laws 2,659d)

Therefore, education has to be conducted by experts, for Plato, regards education to be the highest blessing for mankind ( Laws 7,804d)

Education is supposed to start even when the child is in the womb, especially with regard to the health of the would be child ( Laws 7.759b). It is really lifelong process, for

219 . Site https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-ethics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Visited on 222/06/2017 at 3pm. 220 . Y. Masih, op. cit. pp. 68f. 136 it alone makes a perfect man. Much ahead of his time in matter of education, Plato recommends the same education for the male and female children ( Rep. 5.451c)

The principle of education is ‘a sound mind in sound body’ So early education begins with the exercise of body and the discipline of mind ( Laws 7,807d) , or as Plato put it through rhythmic dance and melody.

2.1.10.3.9. The Allegory of the Chariot and The Tripartite

Nature of the Soul 221

In the dialogue of ‘Phaedrux’ Plato present the allegory of the chariot to explain the tripartite nature of the human soul or psyche. The chariot is pulled by two winged horses, one mortal and the other immortal. The mortal, black horse is deformed and obstinate. Plato describes the horse as a “crooked lumbering animal, put together anyhow… of a dark colour, with grey eyes and blood-red complexion; the mate of insolence and pride, shag-eared and deaf, hardly yielding to whip and spur.” The immortal, white horse, on the other hand, is noble and game, “upright and cleanly made… his colour is white, and his eyes dark; he is a lover of honor and modesty and temperance, and the follower of true glory; he needs no touch of the whip, but is guided by word and admonition only.” In the driver’s seat is the charioteer, tasked with reining in these disparate steeds, guiding and harnessing them to propel the vehicle with strength and efficiency. The charioteer’s destination is the ridge of heaven, beyond which he may behold the Forms, Truth and absolute Knowledge. These essences nourish the horses’ wings, keeping the chariot in flight. The charioteer joins a procession of gods, led by Zeus, on this trip into the heavens. The ride is turbulent. The white horse wishes to rise, but the dark horse attempts to pull the chariot back towards the earth. As the horses pull in opposing directions, and the charioteer attempts to get them into sync, his chariot bobs above the ridge of heaven.

221 . https://aquileana.wordpress.com/2014/04/14/platos-phaedrus-the-allegory-of-the-chariot-and-the- tripartite-nature-of-the-soul/accessed on 02/08/2017.

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If the charioteer is able to behold the Forms, he gets to go on another revolution around the heavens. But if he cannot successfully pilot the chariot, the horses’ wings wither from lack of nourishment, or break off when the horses collide and attack each other, or crash into the chariots of others. When the chariot plummets to earth, the horses lose their wings, and the soul becomes embodied in human flesh. The degree to which the soul falls, and the “rank” of the mortal being it must then be embodied in is based on the amount of Truth it beheld while in the heavens. The degree of the fall also determines how long it takes for the horses to regrow their wings and once again take flight. Basically, the more Truth the charioteer be held on his journey, the shallower his fall, and the easier it is for him to get up and get going again.

2.1.10.3.10. The Notion of God 222 : Plato appears to be a devout man, for according to him, ministry to God is the highest post of man on this earth. Ontologically speaking God can never cease to be . He is eternal and does not change. From the moral point of view God is altogether good and righteous. God is simple and true in deed and word, and neither changes himself nor deceives others by vision or words or the sending of signs in waking or dreams. Again in Theaetetus (176a.b), Plato tells us that in God there is no shadows of uprighteousness; there is perfection in him. There is no evil in him. He is source of all things and He provide food and the means of enjoyment for man.( Epinomis 977a). God is the creator of the whole world. In the beginning there was nothing but chaos. God created the world by introducing order into it according to the original in the heaven. He created the world out of four elements of water, air, fire and the earth. God has created time has come into being with the creation of world. But in eternity there is no past, present and future. But the distinction of time we wrongly transfer to eternal being.

2.1.10.3.11. A Hierarchy of Pleasure 223 : Plato asserted that since God is the creator of nature, then it is as good as it can possible be made. At the same time, however, he posited a threefold classification of

222 . Y. Masih, op. cit. pp. 76f. 223 . William Shakian, op. cit. pp. 56f.. 138 pleasure: (1) the sensual pleasures, which he regarded as base, (2) the sensuous pleasures which comprise an intermediate grade of good, and (3) the ideal pleasures, which are spiritual and supremely worthy, for they conform to the nature of God. Men’s sexual desire is an example of the first, or inferior, class of pleasure; admiration of beauty as an attribute of womanhood is an example of the second, or intermediate, class of pleasures; and intellectual )Platonic) love for women’s soul is an example of the third, or superior, class of pleasure.

2.1.10.4. The Axiological Views of The Socrates (469-399 B.C.E.):

Socrates is one of the few individuals whom one could say has so-shaped the cultural and intellectual development of the world that, without him, history would be profoundly different. He is best known for his association with the Socratic method of question and answer, his claims that he was ignorant (or aware of his own absence of knowledge), and his claims that the unexamined life is not worth living, for human beings. He was the inspiration for Plato, the thinker widely held to be the founder of the Western philosophical tradition. Plato in turn served as the teacher of Aristotle, thus establishing the famous triad of ancient philosophers: Socrates, Plato and Aristotle Unlike other philosophers of his time and ours, Socrates never wrote anything down but was committed to living simply and to interrogating the everyday views and popular opinions of those in his home city of Athens. At the age of 70, he was put to death at the hands of his fellow citizens on charges of impiety and corruption of the youth. His trial, along with the social and political context in which occurred, has warranted as much treatment from historians and classicists as his arguments and methods have from philosophers. 224 Through his portrayal in Plato's dialogues, Socrates has become renowned for his contribution to the field of ethics and it is this Platonic Socrates who lends his name to the concepts of Socratic irony and the Socratic Method or elenchus . 2.1.10.4.1. Socratic paradoxes:

Many of the beliefs traditionally attributed to the historical Socrates have been characterized as “paradoxical” because they seem to conflicts with common sense. The following are among the so - called Socratic paradoxes: 225

224 . Site http:// www.iep.utm.edu/socrates , Socrates, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , visited on 21/06/2017, at 1.30pm 225 . Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics, Vol.1, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 147. 139

• No one desires evil. • No one errs or does wrong willingly or knowingly. • Virtue – all virtue – is knowledge. • Virtue is sufficient for happiness. 2.1.10.4.2. Virtue: Socrates believed the best way for people to live was to focus on the pursuit of virtue rather than the pursuit, for instance, of material wealth. 226 He always invited others to try to concentrate more on friendships and a sense of true community, for Socrates felt this was the best way for people to grow together as a populace. 227 His actions lived up to this standard: in the end, Socrates accepted his death sentence when most thought he would simply leave Athens, as he felt he could not run away from or go against the will of his community; as mentioned above, his reputation for valor on the battlefield was without reproach.

The idea that there are certain virtues formed a common thread in Socrates' teachings. These virtues represented the most important qualities for a person to have, foremost of which were the philosophical or intellectual virtues. Socrates stressed that "the unexamined life is not worth living and ethical virtue is the only thing that matters." 228

2.1.10.4.2.1. Virtue Is One:

The kind of knowledge to which Socrates is pointing is not mere intellectual achievement. It is the kind of knowledge which controls the will and necessarily issues in action. Some sort of this thing is contained in what is known as Ideo-moror theory. The theory means that if one concentrates on an idea with sufficient intensity and frequency then it issues into an appropriate action. For Socrates, however, the idea of the good controls all other ideas and ultimately guides the whole man, his will and feeling too, and necessarily issues into good acts. Hence, it lies in the culture of soul which ultimately leads to soul, in a virtuous man, towards regaining its pure, pristine glory. This is real interpretation of ‘no one does wrong knowingly’, and that ‘knowledge is virtue, and virtue is true knowledge.’ This is the eudaemonistic theory of Socratic ethics, which are

226 .Brickhouse T.C., Smith N.D, Socrates On Trial, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 165. 227 . Nichols M.P., Socrates And Political Community: An Ancient Debate, Sunney Press, 1987, p. 67. 228 .Duignan B., The 100 Most Influential Philosopher of All Times, The Rossen Publishing Group, 2009, p. 33. 140 taught by Aristotle. But in Plato the knowledge of the good has stereological end, which can finds in the philosophy of Sāṃkhya and Advaitism .229

There is also another sense in which Socrates says that virtue or goodness is one, For example, cowness is one but many cows poorly imitate it. Similarly, wisdom, temperance, courage, justice and holiness are five kinds of virtues, but there is one single reality which underlies them all. In the same way Socrates speaks of one form of excellence only. In Gorgias , Socrates says that goodness is due to the presence of arrangement and order in the soul and that this can only be produced by knowledge, not by experience or routine. In the Republic same theory worked out in the most elaborated fashion. Socrates point out that all kinds of bodily excellence follow from one single health of the body, similarly, all kind of virtues follows from the health of the soul . And what is meant by ‘health of the soul’ ? The health of the soul follows from the order and arrangement between the different function of the soul. Socrates speaks of reasoning, temper and desires as the three parts of the soul. The function of reasoning is wisdom, of temper is courage, and of desire is soberness or temperance . Now the health of the soul follows from the discipline among these parts. Wisdom commands, while temper assists in the execution of these commands, and, desire finishes the material basis of action. 230 A successful functioning of the harmonious activities under the regulation of reason yields happiness. Hence, Socrates means that virtue is one in the sense that the self of a good man is an organic unity of all its function, Lastly, Socrates, as also Plato is supposed to hold that there is one idea of the Good which underlies all that is right and beautiful.

2.1.10.4.3. Ethics of Socrates: Socrates who is commonly regarded as the founder of the Western philosophy, while he shared to the full the tendency of the Sophists to ask questions about matters of conduct, was less confident than most of his colleagues of his ability to answer these questions. This was especially unfortunate; because he considered that a thorough understanding of the nature of goodness was a necessary condition for living thoroughly good life. He expressed this view in the maxim ‘Virtue is knowledge’. Socrates’ own personal goodness of character seems to have concealed from him the fact that in the case of most men good will or the purpose to do what is right is needed along with knowledge of the nature of goodness to secure practical goodness of living. Or it may be that Socrates realized this, and that his maxim was simply his way of emphasizing the

229 . Y. Masih, op.cit. pp. 48f. 230 . John Burnet, Greek Philosophy, Thales To Plato, Part 1, London, Macmillan & Co., 1964, p. 144. 141 importance of a knowledge which most people regard as of no importance at all. It is not known whether Socrates himself ever made an explicit statement that morality is a matter of nature and not of custom, but this was almost certainly his view. He quoted with approval the saying ‘Know thyself ’, and this suggests that he realized that a knowledge of human nature is important for the good life, or even perhaps that goodness is natural in the sense of being based on human nature. The two great followers of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, pursued systematically that knowledge of ethical matters which Socrates had considered to be essential for virtue. 231

2.1.10.4.4. Priority of The Care of Soul 232 :

Throughout his defense speech, Socrates repeatedly stresses that a human being must care for his soul more than anything else. Socrates found that his fellow citizens cared more for wealth, reputation, and their bodies while neglecting their souls. He believed that his mission from the god was to examine his fellow citizens and persuade them that the most important good for a human being was the health of the soul. Wealth, he insisted, does not bring about human excellence or virtue, but virtue makes wealth and everything else good for human beings.

Socrates believes that his mission of caring for souls extends to the entirety of the city of Athens. He argues that the god gave him to the city as a gift and that his mission is to help improve the city. He thus attempts to show that he is not guilty of impiety precisely because everything he does is in response to the oracle and at the service of the god. Socrates characterizes himself as a gadfly and the city as a sluggish horse in need of stirring up. Without philosophical inquiry, the democracy becomes stagnant and complacent, in danger of harming itself and others. Just as the gadfly is an important to the horse but rouses it to action, so Socrates supposes that his purpose is to agitate those around him so that they begin to examine themselves. One might compare this claim with Socrates’ assertion in the Gorgias that, while his contemporaries aim at gratification, he practices the true political craft because he aims at what is best. Such comments, in addition to the historical evidence that we have, are Socrates’ strongest defense that he is not only a burden to the democracy but a great asset to it.

231 . William Lillie, Op. cit., , pp. 93f. 232 . http://www.iep.utm.edu/socrates , site accessed on 22/06/2017, at 5 p.m. 142

2.1.10.4.5. Unity of Virtue: All Virtue is Knowledge 233 :

In the Protagoras , Socrates argues for the view that all of the virtues, justice, wisdom, courage, piety, and so forth—are one. He provides a number of arguments for this thesis. For example, while it is typical to think that one can be wise without being temperate, Socrates rejects this possibility on the grounds that wisdom and temperance both have the same opposite: folly. Were they truly distinct, they would each have their own opposites. As it stands, the identity of their opposites indicates that one cannot possess wisdom without temperance and vice versa.

This thesis is sometimes paired with another Socratic, view, that is, that virtue is a form of knowledge. Things like beauty, strength, and health benefit human beings, but can also harm them if they are not accompanied by knowledge or wisdom. If virtue is to be beneficial it must be knowledge, since all the qualities of the soul are in themselves neither beneficial not harmful, but are only beneficial when accompanied by wisdom and harmful when accompanied by folly.

2.1.10.4.6. No One Errs Knowingly, No One Errs Willingly 234 :

Socrates famously declares that no one errs or makes mistakes knowingly. Here we find an example of Socrates’ intellectualism. When a person does what is wrong, their failure to do what is right is an intellectual error, or due to their own ignorance about what is right. If the person knew what was right, he would have done it. Hence, it is not possible for someone simultaneously knows what is right and do what is wrong. If someone does what is wrong, they do so because they do not know what is right, and if they claim they have known what was right at the time when they committed the wrong, they are mistaken, for had they truly known what was right, they would have done it. Socrates therefore denies the possibility of akrasia, or weakness of the will. No one errs willingly. While it might seem that Socrates is equivocating between knowingly and willingly, a look at Gorgias helps clarify his thesis. Tyrants and orators, Socrates tells Polus, have the least power of any member of the city because they do not do what they want. What they do is not good or beneficial even though human beings only want what is good or beneficial. The tyrant’s will, corrupted by ignorance, is in such a state that what follows from it will necessarily harm him. Conversely, the will that is purified by knowledge is in such a state that what follows from it will necessarily be beneficial.

233 . Ibid. 234 . Ibid. 143

2.1.10.4.7. All Desires Are For The Good:

One of the premises of the argument just mentioned is that human beings only desire the good. When a person does something for the sake of something else, it is always the thing for the sake of which he is acting that he wants. All bad things or intermediate things are done not for themselves but for the sake of something else that is good. When a tyrant puts someone to death, for instance, he does this because he thinks it is beneficial in some way. Hence his action is directed towards the good because this is what he truly wants.

A similar version of this argument is in the. Those that desire bad things do not know that they are truly bad; otherwise, they would not desire them. They do not naturally desire what is bad but rather desire those things that they believe to be good but that are in fact bad. They desire good things even though they lack knowledge of what is actually good. 235

2.1.10.4.8. It Is Better To Suffer An Injustice Than to Commit

One 236 :

Socrates infuriates Polus with the argument that it is better to suffer an injustice than commit one ( Gorgias 475a-d). Polus agrees that it is more shameful to commit an injustice, but maintains it is not worse. The worst thing, in his view, is to suffer injustice. Socrates argues that, if something is more shameful, it surpasses in either badness or pain or both. Since committing an injustice is not more painful than suffering one, committing an injustice cannot surpass in pain or both pain and badness. Committing an injustice surpasses suffering an injustice in badness; differently stated, committing an injustice is worse than suffering one. Therefore, given the choice between the two, we should choose to suffer rather than commit an injustice.

This argument must be understood in terms of the Socratic emphasis on the care of the soul. Committing an injustice corrupts one’s soul, and therefore committing injustice is the worst thing a person can do to himself (cf. Crito 47d-48a, Republic I 353d-354a). If one commits injustice, Socrates goes so far as to claim that it is better to seek punishment than avoid it on the grounds that the punishment will purge or purify the soul of its corruption ( Gorgias 476d-478e).

235 .Site http://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/socrates.html, The Ethics of Socratesm visited on 22/06/2017. 236 . Ibid. 144

2.1.10.4.9. Concept of Liberation And God:

The good of Socrates and Plato goes even beyond God. A mere glimpse of the Good leads to the transformation of the personality of the seeker. Contemplation of and meditation on the idea of the Good, finally leads to the release of the soul from the bondage of senses and restore to the seeker his pristine glory. Hence, the concept of the Good is not an ordinary concept, but a concept which controls the will of the seeker. 237

2.1.10.5. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

2.1.10.5.1. Kantian’s Ethics –

Towards the end of his most influential work, Critique of Pure Reason (1781- 1787), Kant argues that all philosophy ultimately aims at answering these three questions: “What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?” The book appeared at the beginning of the most productive period of his career, and by the end of his life Kant had worked out systematic, revolutionary, and often profound answers to these questions. At the foundation of Kant’s system is the doctrine of “transcendental idealism,” which emphasizes a distinction between what we can experience (the natural, observable world) and what we cannot (“supersensible” objects such as God and the soul). Kant argued that we can only have knowledge of things we can experience. Accordingly, in answer to the question, “What can I know?” Kant replies that we can know the natural, observable world, but we cannot, however, have answers to many of the deepest questions of metaphysics.

Kant’s ethics are organized around the notion of a “categorical imperative,” which is a universal ethical principle stating that one should always respect the humanity in others, and that one should only act in accordance with rules that could hold for everyone. Kant argued that the moral law is a truth of reason, and hence that all rational creatures are bound by the same moral law. Thus in answer to the question, “What should I do?” Kant replies that we should act rationally, in accordance with a universal moral law.

Kant also argued that his ethical theory requires belief in free will, God, and the immortality of the soul. Although we cannot have knowledge of these things, reflection

237 .Y. Masih, op.cit. p. 51. 145 on the moral law leads to a justified belief in them, which amounts to a kind rational faith. Thus in answer to the question, “What may I hope?” Kant replies that we may hope that our souls are immortal and that there really is a God who designed the world in accordance with principles of justice. 238

2.1.10.5.2. Moral Theory 239 :

Kant’s moral theory is organized around the idea that to act morally and to act in accordance with reason is one and the same. In virtue of being a rational agent (that is, in virtue of possessing practical reason, reason which is interested and goal-directed), one is obligated to follow the moral law that practical reason prescribes. To do otherwise is to act irrationally. Because Kant places his emphasis on the duty that comes with being a rational agent who is cognizant of the moral law, Kant’s theory is considered a form of deontology ( deon - comes from the Greek for “duty” or “obligation”).

Like his theoretical philosophy, Kant’s practical philosophy is a priori , formal, and universal: the moral law is derived non-empirically from the very structure of practical reason itself (its form ), and since all rational agents share the same practical reason, the moral law binds and obligates everyone equally. So what is this moral law that obligates all rational agents universally and a priori ? The moral law is determined by what Kant refers to as the Categorical Imperative, which is the general principle that demands that one respect the humanity in oneself and in others, that one not make an exception for oneself when deliberating about how to act, and in general that one only act in accordance with rules that everyone could and should obey.

Although Kant insists that the moral law is equally binding for all rational agents, he also insists that the bindingness of the moral law is self-imposed : we autonomously prescribe the moral law to ourselves. Because Kant thinks that the kind of autonomy in question here is only possible under the presupposition of a transcendentally free basis of moral choice, the constraint that the moral law places on an agent is not only consistent with freedom of the will, it requires it. Hence, one of the most important aspects of Kant’s project is to show that we are justified in presupposing that our morally significant choices are grounded in a transcendental freedom (the very

238 . http:// www.iep.utm.edu/kantview, Kant, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , visited on 21/06/2017, at 1.45pm 239 .Ibid 146 sort of freedom that Kant argued we could not prove through mere “theoretical” or “speculative” reason..

This section aims to explain the structure and content of Kant’s moral theory, and also Kant’s claims that belief in freedom, God, and the immortality of the soul are necessary “postulates” of practical rea

2.1.10.5.3. The Good Will and Duty 240 :

Kant lays out the case for his moral theory in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Critique of Practical Reason (also known as the “Second Critique”; 1788), and the Metaphysics of Morals (1797). His arguments from the Groundwork are his most well-known and influential, so the following focuses primarily on them. Kant begins his argument from the premise that a moral theory must be grounded in an account of what is unconditionally good . If something is merely conditionally good, that is, if its goodness depends on something else, then that other thing will either be merely conditionally good as well, in which case its goodness depends on yet another thing, or it will be unconditionally good. All goodness, then, must ultimately be traceable to something that is unconditionally good. There are many things that we typically think of as good but that are not truly unconditionally good. Beneficial resources such as money or power are often good, but since these things can be used for evil purposes, their goodness is conditional on the use to which they are put. Strength of character is generally a good thing, but again, if someone uses a strong character to successfully carry out evil plans, then the strong character is not good. Even happiness, according to Kant, is not unconditionally good. Although all humans universally desire to be happy, if someone is happy but does not deserve their happiness (because, for instance, their happiness results from stealing from the elderly), then it is not good for the person to be happy. Happiness is only good on the condition that the happiness is deserved.

Kant argues that there is only one thing that can be considered unconditionally good: a good will . A person has a good will in so far as they form their intentions on the basis of a self-conscious respect for the moral law, that is, for the rules regarding what a rational agent ought to do, one’s duty. The value of a good will lies in the principles on the basis of which it forms its intentions; it does not lie in the consequences of the actions that the intentions lead to. This is true even if a good will never leads to any desirable consequences at all: “Even if… this will should wholly lack the capacity to

240 . Ibid 147 carry out its purpose… then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has its full worth in itself”. This is in line with Kant’s emphasis on the unconditional goodness of a good will: if a will were evaluated in terms of its consequences, then the goodness of the will would depend on (that is, would be conditioned on) those consequences. (In this respect, Kant’s deontology is in stark opposition to consequentialist moral theories, which base their moral evaluations on the consequences of actions rather than the intentions behind them.)

2.1.10.5.4. The Categorical Imperative 241 :

In Kant, the law of nature is conceived as a principle of human reason – a kind of rational system capable of rational deduction on ethical lines. Such as ‘pure reason’ cannot be derived from empirical observation or by process of induction. According to him the law of reason is purely logical category not influenced by external factors or end or empirical choices or experiences. Law of reason is moral imperative - it is categorical, obligatory in the form of command directing the human will to do what is morally good for all at all times and place irrespective of ends, consideration of selfish desires. 242 If a good will is one that forms its intentions on the basis of correct principles of action, then we want to know what sort of principles these are. A principle that commands an action is called an “imperative.” Most imperatives are “hypothetical imperatives,” that is, they are commands that hold only if certain conditions are met. For instance: “if you want to be a successful shopkeeper, then cultivate a reputation for honesty.” Since hypothetical imperatives are conditioned on desires and the intended consequences of actions, they cannot serve as the principles that determine the intentions and volitions of an unconditionally good will. Instead, we require what Kant calls a “categorical imperative.” Where hypothetical imperatives take the form, “if y is desired/intended/sought, do x,” categorical imperatives simply take the form, “do x.” Since a categorical imperative is stripped of all reference to the consequences of an action, it is thereby stripped of all determinate content, and hence it is purely formal . And since it is unconditional, it holds universally . Hence a categorical imperative expresses only the very form of a universally binding law: “nothing is left but the conformity of actions as such with universal law” . To act morally, then, is to form one’s intentions on the basis of the very idea of a universal principle of action.

241 . Ibid 242 .Dr. S.N.Dyyani, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence, Allahabad, Central Law Agency, 2011,p.93. 148

This conception of a categorical imperative leads Kant to his first official formulation of the categorical imperative itself: “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”. A maxim is a general rule that can be used to determine particular courses of actions in particular circumstances. For instance, the maxim “I shall lie when it will get me out of trouble” can be used to determine the decision to lie about an adulterous liaison. The categorical imperative offers a decision procedure for determining whether a given course of action is in accordance with the moral law. After determining what maxim one would be basing the action in question on, one then asks whether it would be possible, given the power (in an imagined, hypothetical scenario), to choose that everyone act in accordance with that same maxim. If it is possible to will that everyone act according to that maxim, then the action under consideration is morally permissible. If it is not possible to will that everyone act according to that maxim, the action is morally impermissible. Lying to cover up adultery is thus immoral because one cannot will that everyone act according to the maxim, “I shall lie when it will get me out of trouble.” Note that it is not simply that it would be undesirable for everyone to act according to that maxim. Rather, it would be impossible . Since everyone would know that everyone else was acting according to that maxim, there would never be the presupposition that anyone was telling the truth; the very act of lying, of course, requires such a presupposition on the part of the one being lied to. Hence, the state of affairs where everyone lies to get out of trouble can never arise, so it cannot be willed to be a universal law. It fails the test of the categorical imperative.

The point of Kant’s appeal to the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative is to show that an action is morally permissible only if the maxim on which the action is based could be affirmed as a universal law that everyone obeys without exception. The mark of immorality, then, is that one makes an exception for oneself. That is, one acts in a way that they would not want everyone else to. When someone chooses to lie about an adulterous liaison, one is implicitly thinking, “in general people should tell the truth, but in this case I will be the exception to the rule.” Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative describes it in terms of the very form of universal law itself. This formal account abstracts from any specific content that the moral law might have for living, breathing human beings. Kant offers a second formulation to address the material side of the moral law. Since the moral law has to do with actions, and all actions are by definition teleological (that is, goal-directed), a

149 material formulation of the categorical imperative will require an appeal to the “ends” of human activity. Some ends are merely instrumental, that is, they are sought only because they serve as “means” towards further ends. Kant argues that the moral law must be aimed at an end that is not merely instrumental, but is rather an end in itself . Only rational agents, according to Kant, are ends in themselves. To act morally is thus to respect rational agents as ends in themselves. Accordingly, the categorical imperative can be reformulated as follows: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”. The basic idea here is that it is immoral to treat someone as a thing of merely instrumental value; persons have an intrinsic (non-instrumental) value, and the moral law demands that we respect this intrinsic value. To return to the example of the previous paragraph it would be wrong to lie about an adulterous liaison because by withholding the truth one is manipulating the other person to make things easier for oneself; this sort of manipulation, however, amounts to treating the other as a thing (as a mere means to the comfort of not getting in trouble), and not as a person deserving of respect and entitled to the truth.

The notion of a universal law provides the form of the categorical imperative and rational agents as ends in themselves provide the matter . These two sides of the categorical imperative are combined into yet a third formulation, which appeals to the notion of a “kingdom of ends.” A kingdom of ends can be thought of as a sort of perfectly just utopian ideal in which all citizens of this kingdom freely respect the intrinsic worth of the humanity in all others because of an autonomously self-imposed recognition of the bindingness of the universal moral law for all rational agents. The third formulation of the categorical imperative is simply the idea that one should act in whatever way a member of this perfectly just society would act: “act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends”. The idea of a kingdom of ends is an ideal (hence the “merely possible”). Although humanity may never be able to achieve such a perfect state of utopian coexistence, we can at least strive to approximate this state to an ever greater degree.

150

2.1.10.5.5. Postulate of Practical Reason 243 :

In Critique of Pure Reason , Kant had argued that although we can acknowledge the bare logical possibility that humans possess free will, that there is an immortal soul, and that there is a God, he also argued that we can never have positive knowledge of these things. In his ethical writings, however, Kant complicates this story. He argues that despite the theoretical impossibility of knowledge of these objects, belief in them is nevertheless a precondition for moral action (and for practical cognition generally). Accordingly, freedom, immortality, and God are “postulates of practical reason.”

Kantian ethics refers to a deontological ethical theory ascribed to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. The theory, developed as a result of Enlightenment rationalism, is based on the view that the only intrinsically good thing is a good will; an action can only be good, therefore, if its maxim, the principle behind it – is duty to the moral law. Central to Kant's construction of the moral law is the categorical imperative, which acts on all people, regardless of their interests or desires. Kant formulated the categorical imperative in various ways. His principle of universalizability requires that, for an action to be permissible, it must be possible to apply it to all people without a contradiction occurring. His formulation of humanity as an ends in itself requires that humans are never treated merely as a means to an end, but always also as ends in themselves. The formulation of autonomy concludes that rational agents are bound to the moral law by their own will, while Kant's concept of the Kingdom of Ends requires that people act as if the principles of their actions establish a law for a hypothetical kingdom. Kant also distinguished between perfect and imperfect duties. A perfect duty, such as the duty not to lie, always holds true; an imperfect duty, such as the duty to give to charity, can be made flexible and applied in particular time and place. Good will and duty. Although all of Kant's work develops his ethical theory, it is most clearly defined in Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals , Critique of Practical Reason and Metaphysics of Morals . As part of the Enlightenment tradition, Kant based his ethical theory on the belief that reason should be used to determine how people ought to act. 244

243 . http:// www.iep.utm.edu/kantview, Kant, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , visited on 21/06/2017, at 1.45pm

244 . Brinton, Crane . "Enlightenment". Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2. Macmillan,1967, p.519. 151

He did not attempt to prescribe specific action, but instructed that reason should be used to determine how to behave. 245 2.1.10.5.6. Good will and duty:

In his combined works, Kant constructed the basis for an ethical law from the concept of duty. 246 Kant began his ethical theory by arguing that the only virtue that can be unqualifiedly good is a good will. No other virtue has this status because every other virtue can be used to achieve immoral ends (the virtue of loyalty is not good if one is loyal to an evil person, for example). The good will is unique in that it is always good and maintains itsmoral value even when it fails to achieve its moral intentions. 247 Kant regarded the good will as a single moral principle which freely chooses to use the other virtues for moral ends. 248

For Kant a good will is a broader conception than a will which acts from duty. A will which acts from duty is distinguishable as a will which overcomes hindrances in order to keep the moral law. A dutiful will is thus a special case of a good will which becomes visible in adverse conditions. Kant argues that only acts performed out of duty have moral worth. This is not to say that acts performed merely in accordance with duty are worthless (these still deserve approval and encouragement), but that special esteem is given to acts which are performed out of duty. 249

Kant's conception of duty does not entail that people perform their duties grudgingly. Although duty often constrains people and prompts them to act against their inclinations, it still comes from an agent's volition: they desire to keep the moral law. Thus, when an agent performs an action from duty it is because the rational incentives matter to them more than their opposing inclinations. Kant wished to move beyond the conception morality as externally imposed duties and present an ethics of autonomy, when rational agents freely recognize the claims reason makes upon them. 250

245 . Singer, Peter, Hegel: A Very Short Introduction , Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 42.

246 . Blackburn, Simon . "Morality". Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Second edition revised ed.2008, p.240

247 . Benn, Piers . Ethics. UCL Press.1998, p.101f. 248 . Guyer, Paul, " Kantian Perfectionism". In Jost, Lawrence; Wuerth, Julian. Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics . Cambridge University Press. 2011, p. 194. 249 . Wood, Allen . Kant's Ethical Thought . Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 26f. 250 . Ibid, p. 37. 152

2.1.10.5.7. The Theory of Kant:

Kant’s first principle is that ‘there is nothing in the world or even out of it that can be called good without qualification except good will. Kant illustrates this principle in two ways: (i) He points out that the ‘gift of fortune’, talent, and worldly wisdom are good only on condition that they are used by a good will. They are not good if they exist quite alone; and when wealth or intelligence is used by a bad will, the evil of the whole situation is increased and not lessened. It is a fact that we ordinarily speak of wealth and intelligence as good things, but, according to Kant, this is not the case unless they are being used by a good will. Of course, wealth and intelligence, as used by good will, are good. Kant himself maintained that happiness is good when it is the consequence of virtue so that ‘virtue-cum-happiness’ is an intrinsically good whole. Kant’s language certainly suggest that the goodness here does not depend on the presence of good will, but on the fact that happiness is deserved; yet good will is present in the form of virtue. (ii) Kant’s other illustration goes further in maintaining that a good will is itself an intrinsically whole, for it is good even when it exists quite alone. Kant wrote: ‘If with its greatest efforts (the good will) should yet achieve nothing, and they should remain only the good will, then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. He spoke of the good will as being always and unconditionally good, and by unconditionally good he meant good with whatever accompaniments it is found. 251

2.1.10.5.8. Perfect and imperfect duties:

Applying the categorical imperative, duties arise because failure to fulfill them would either result in a contradiction in conception or in a contradiction in the will. The former are classified as perfect duties, the latter as imperfect. A perfect duty always holds true, there is a perfect duty to tell the truth, so we must never lie. An imperfect duty allows flexibility -beneficence is an imperfect duty because we are not obliged to be completely beneficent at all times, but may choose the times and places in which we are. 252 Kant believed that perfect duties are more important than imperfect duties: if a conflict between duties arises, the perfect duty must be followed. 253

251 . William Lillie, op. cit. pp.147f. 252 . Driver, Julia,. Ethics: The Fundamentals . Blackwell, 2007, p. 92. 253 . Ibid, p.93. 153

2.1.10.5.9. Virtue and Pleasure in Kant:

For Kant being virtuous means acting in accordance with duty, for duty’s sake, and not due to some other motivation in the place of duty (even if the same action would result).There are some philosophers, who have claimed that Kant’s notion of duty eliminates the possibility of pleasure-that is, if you take pleasure in any said action, it eliminates any dutiful intent that was previously present.

For Kant, an action can only have moral worth (i.e. be virtuous) if and only if it is done from duty, for duty’s sake. So, in order to understand exactly when we can claim under Kant’s theory that we are being virtuous, we need to understand exactly how we are meant to do out duty, and to do this, we need to examine the categorical imperative. Although Kant does state that there is only one categorical imperative, ‘he offers three different formulas of that law’, so sometimes in philosophy the term is used more generally to describe these three formulas (and their associated examples) as a whole, rather than just the first formula by itself. 254

2.1.10.5.10. Concept of God:

2.1.10.5.10.1. The Value of Transcendental Theology:

The transcendental theology has a great deal of negative value. It rebuffs all attempt to know anything with the help of empty concept alone. No idea can validate its own existence.

But if God cannot be proved, it cannot be disproved either. So the reality of God is safe in the ivory tower of faith, against all attack of atheism, deism and anthropomorphism. If positive assertion concerning God is not possible, then counter- assertion against the reality of God is equally futile. God, therefore, has a rightful claim for being an object of faith, the justification for which comes from moral life. 255

2.1.10.5.10.2. Primacy of Practical Reason :

The critique of pure reason shows that the scientific knowledge of God, World and soul is not possible. Paralogisms show that soul cannot be said to exist independently of the body; antinomies show that the freedom of will cannot be discursively established; and ideals of reason make it clear that God’s existence cannot

254 . https://www.ukessays.com/disseRtation/examples/philosophy/virtue-and-pleasure-in-aristotle-and- kant.php, accessed on 11/08/2017 at 7.30 p.m. 255 . Y. Masih, op. cit. p. 386. 154 be demonstrated. From these negative conclusions it does not follow that there are no nominal. Kant did not deny their existence and so he was not a skeptic. 256

2.1.10.5.11. Applications:

2.1.10.5.11.1. Medical ethics:

Kant believed that the shared ability of humans to reason should be the basis of morality, and that it is the ability to reason that makes humans morally significant. He therefore believed that all humans should have the right to common dignity and respect .257 Margaret Eaton 258 argues that, according to Kant’s ethics, a medical professional must be happy for their own practices to be used by and on anyone, even if they were the patient themselves. For example, a researcher who wished to perform tests on patients without their knowledge must be happy for all researchers to do so. She also argues that Kant’s requirement of autonomy would mean that a patient must be able to make a fully informed decision about treatment, making it immoral to perform tests on unknowing patients. Medical research should be motivated out of respect for the patient, so they must be informed of all facts, even if this would be likely to dissuade the patient. 259 Jeremy Sugarman 260 has argued that Kant's formulation of autonomy requires that patients are never used merely for the benefit of society, but are always treated as rational people with their own goals. Aaron Hinkley notes that a Kantian account of autonomy requires respect for choices that are arrived at rationally, not for choices which are arrived at by idiosyncratic or non-rational means. He argues that there may be some difference between what a purely rational agent would choose and what a patient actually chooses, the difference being the result of non-rational idiosyncrasies. Although a Kantian physician ought not to lie to or coerce a patient, Hinkley suggests that some form of paternalism, such as through withholding information which may prompt a non- rational response, could be acceptable. 261

In her work How Kantian Ethics Should Treat Pregnancy and Abortion , Susan Feldman argues that abortion should be defended according to Kantian ethics. She proposed that a woman should be treated as a dignified autonomous person, with control

256 . Ibid, p.390. 257 . Eaton M ārgaret, Ethics And Busibess of Bioscience, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004,p.39 258 . Ibid, p.40. 259 . Ibid, p.40 -41 260 . Sugarman Jermy, Methods of Medical Ethics, Georgetown University Press, 2010, p.44. 261 .Engelhardi Hugo Tristram, Biothica Critically Reconsidered Having Second Thought, Springer, 2011, pp.12f. 155 over their body, as Kant suggested. She believes that the free choice of women would be paramount in Kantian ethics, requiring abortion to be the mother's decision. 262 Dean Harris has noted that, if Kantian ethics is to be used in the discussion of abortion, it must be decided whether a fetus is an autonomous person.263 Kantian ethicist Carl Cohen argues that the potential to be rational or participation in a generally rational species is the relevant distinction between humans and inanimate objects or irrational animals. Cohen believes that even when humans are not rational because of age (such as babies or fetuses) or mental disability, agents are still morally obligated to treat them as an ends in themselves, equivalent to a rational adult such as a mother seeking an abortion. 264

2.1.10.5.11.2. Sexual ethics

Kant viewed humans as being subject to the animalistic desires of self- preservation, species-preservation, and the preservation of enjoyment. He argued that humans have a duty to avoid maxims that harm or degrade themselves, including suicide, sexual degradation, and drunkenness. 265 This led Kant to regard sexual intercourse as degrading because it reduces humans to an object of pleasure. He admitted sex only within marriage, which he regarded as "a merely animal union". He believed that masturbation is worse than suicide, reducing a person's status to below that of an animal; he argued that rape should be punished with castration and that bestiality requires expulsion from society. 266

Feminist philosopher Catharine MacKinnon has argued that many contemporary practices would be deemed immoral by Kant's standards because they dehumanise women. Sexual harassment, prostitution and pornography, she argues, objectify women and do not meet Kant's standard of human autonomy. Commercial sex has been criticized for turning both parties into objects (and thus using them as a means to an end); mutual consent is problematic because in consenting, people choose to objectify themselves. Alan Soble 267 has noted that more liberal Kantian ethicists believe that,

262 .Axinn Kneller Jane, Autonomy And Community Reading On Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy, Suny Press,1999, pp.265f. 263 .Humes Dean, Ethics In Health Servicesand Policy, A Global Approach, John Eiley and Sons, 2011, p.15. 264 .Cohen Carl, The Case For The Use of Animal In Biomedical Research, New England Journal of Medecine,1988, p. 865. 265 .Denis Lora, Kant On The Wrongness of Unnatural Sex, Illinois, University of Illinois Press, 1999, p.225. 266 . Wood, Allen, Kant's Ethical Thought . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.2 267 . Soble, Alan, Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical Encyclopedia . Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006, p.549 . 156 depending on other contextual factors, the consent of women can vindicate their participation in pornography and prostitution.

2.1.10.5.11.3. Animal ethics:

Because Kant viewed rationality as the basis for being a moral patient, one due moral consideration, he believed that animals have no moral rights. Animals, according to Kant, are not rational, thus one cannot behave immorally towards them. 268 Although he did not believe we have any duties towards animals, Kant did believe being cruel to them was wrong because our behaviour might influence our attitudes toward human beings: if we become accustomed to harming animals, then we are more likely to see harming humans as acceptable. 269

2.1.10.5.11.4. Lying:

Kant believed that the Categorical Imperative provides us with the maxim that we ought not to lie in any circumstances, even if we are trying to bring about good consequences, such as lying to a murderer to prevent them from finding their intended victim. Kant argued that, because we cannot fully know what the consequences of any action will be, the result might be unexpectedly harmful. Therefore, we ought to act to avoid the known wrong lying rather than to avoid a potential wrong. If there are harmful consequences, we are blameless because we acted according to our duty. 270 Driver argues that this might not be a problem if we choose to formulate our maxims differently: the maxim 'I will lie to save an innocent life' can be universalized. However, this new maxim may still treat the murderer as a means to an end, which we have a duty to avoid doing. Thus we may still be required to tell the truth to the murderer in Kant's example. 271

2.1.10.5.12. Virtue and Vice 272

Kant defines virtue as “the moral strength of a human being’s will in fulfilling his duty” and vice as principled immorality. This definition appears to put Kant’s views on virtue at odds with classical views such as Aristotle’s in several important respects.

First, Kant’s account of virtue presupposes an account of moral duty already in place. Thus, rather than treating admirable character traits as more basic than the notions

268 .Driver, Julia , Ethics: The Fundamentals . Blackwell. 2007, p.97. 269 .Ibid, p. 98. 270 . Rachels, James, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (Third ed.). McGraw-Hill, 1995, p. 120 271 Driver, Julia, op. cit. p.96. 272 . Site, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral, StanFord Encyclopedis of Philosophy, visited on 22/06/2017 at 3.00pm 157 of right and wrong conduct, Kant takes virtues to be explicable only in terms of a prior account of moral or dutiful behavior. He does not try to make out what shape a good character has and then draw conclusions about how we ought to act on that basis. He sets out the principles of moral conduct based on his philosophical account of rational agency, and then on that basis defines virtue as a kind of strength and resolve to act on those principles despite temptations to the contrary.

Second, virtue is, for Kant, strength of will, and hence does not arise as the result of instilling a “second nature” by a process of habituating or training ourselves to act and feel in particular ways. It is indeed a disposition, but a disposition of one’s will, not a disposition of emotions, feelings, desires or any other feature of human nature that might be amenable to habituation. Moreover, the disposition is to overcome obstacles to moral behavior that Kant thought were ineradicable features of human nature. Thus, virtue appears to be much more like what Aristotle would have thought of as a lesser trait, viz. , continence or self-control.

Third, in viewing virtue as a trait grounded in moral principles, and vice as principled transgression of moral law, Kant thought of himself as thoroughly rejecting what he took to be the Aristotelian view that virtue is a mean between two vices. The Aristotelian view, he claimed, assumes that virtue typically differs from vice only in terms of degree rather than in terms of the different principles each involves. Prodigality and avarice, for instance, do not differ by being too loose or not loose enough with one’s means. They differ in that the prodigal person acts on the principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of enjoyment, while the avaricious person acts on the principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of possessing them.

Fourth, in classical views the distinction between moral and non-moral virtues is not particularly significant. A virtue is some sort of excellence of the soul, but one finds classical theorists treating wit and friendliness alongside courage and justice. Since Kant holds moral virtue to be a trait grounded in moral principle, the boundary between non- moral and moral virtues could not be more sharp. Even so, Kant shows a remarkable interest in non-moral virtues; indeed, much of Anthropology is given over to discussing the nature and sources of a variety of character traits, both moral and non-moral.

Fifth, virtue cannot be a trait of divine beings, if there are such, since it is the power to overcome obstacles that would not be present in them. This is not to say that to be virtuous is to be the victor in a constant and permanent war with ineradicable evil impulses or temptations. Morality is “duty” for human beings because it is possible (and 158 we recognize that it is possible) for our desires and interests to run counter to its demands. Should all of our desires and interests be trained ever so carefully to comport with what morality actually requires of us, this would not change in the least the fact that morality is still duty for us. For should this come to pass, it would not change the fact that each and every desire and interest could have run contrary to the moral law. And it is the fact that they can conflict with moral law, not the fact that they actually do conflict with it, that makes duty a constraint, and hence is virtue essentially a trait concerned with constraint.

Sixth, virtue, while important, does not hold pride of place in Kant’s system in other respects. For instance, he holds that the lack of virtue is compatible with possessing a good will. That one act from duty, even repeatedly and reliably can thus be quite compatible with an absence of the moral strength to overcome contrary interests and desires. Indeed, it may often be no challenge at all to do one’s duty from duty alone. Someone with a good will, who is genuinely committed to duty for its own sake, might simply fail to encounter any significant temptation that would reveal the lack of strength to follow through with that commitment. That said, he also appeared to hold that if an act is to be of genuine moral worth, it must be motivated by the kind of purity of motivation achievable only through a permanent, quasi-religious conversion or “revolution” in the orientation of the will of the sort described in Religion . Until one achieves a permanent change in the will’s orientation in this respect, a revolution in which moral righteousness is the nonnegotiable condition of any of one’s pursuits, all of one’s actions that are in accordance with duty are nevertheless morally worthless, no matter what else may be said of them. However, even this revolution in the will must be followed up with a gradual, lifelong strengthening of one’s will to put this revolution into practice. This suggests that Kant’s considered view is that a good will is a will in which this revolution of priorities has been achieved, while a virtuous will is one with the strength to overcome obstacles to its manifestation in practice.

Kant distinguishes between virtue, which is strength of will to do one’s duty from duty, and particular virtues, which are commitments to particular moral ends that we are morally required to adopt. Among the virtues Kant discusses are those of self-respect, honesty, thrift, self-improvement, beneficence, gratitude, sociability, and forgiveness. Kant also distinguishes vice, which is a steadfast commitment to immorality, from particular vices, which involve refusing to adopt specific moral ends or committing to act

159 against those ends. For example, malice, lust, gluttony, greed, laziness, vengefulness, envy, servility, contempt and arrogance are all vices in Kant’s normative ethical theory.

2.1.10.6. Axiological views of Stoicism:

Stoicism originated as a Hellenistic philosophy, founded in Athens by Zeno of Citium (modern day Cyprus), c. 300 B.C.E. It was influenced by Socrates and the Cynics, and it engaged in vigorous debates with the Skeptics, the Academics, and the Epicureans. The name comes from the Stoa Poikile, or painted porch, an open market in Athens where the original Stoics used to meet and teach philosophy. Stoicism moved to Rome where it flourished during the period of the Empire, alternatively being persecuted by Emperors who disliked it (for example, Vespasian and Domitian) and openly embraced by Emperors who attempted to live by it (most prominently Marcus Aurelius). It influenced Christianity, as well as a number of major philosophical figures throughout the ages (for example, Thomas More, Descartes, Spinoza), and in the early 21st century saw a revival as a practical philosophy associated with Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and similar approaches. Stoicism is a type of eudaimonic virtue ethics, asserting that the practice of virtue is both necessary and sufficient to achieve happiness (in the eudaimonic sense). 273 Stoicism is predominantly a philosophy of personal ethics which is informed by its system of logic and its views on the natural world. According to its teaching, as social beings, the path of happiness for humans is found in accepting that which have been given in life, by not allowing ourselves to be controlled by our desire for pleasure or our fear of pain, by using our minds to understand the world around us and to do our part in nature’s plan, and by working together and treating others in a fair and just manner. The Stoics taught that emotions resulted in errors of judgment which were destructive, due to the active relationship between cosmic determinism and human freedom, and the belief that it is virtuous to maintain a will (called prohairesis ) that is in accord with nature. Because of this, the Stoic presented their philosophy as an art (techne ), one art concern with transforming one’s way of life, ( lex divina ), elsewhere he suggest the best indicator of a person’s philosophy was not what a person said but how that person is behaved. The following Stoic thought from Epictetus on nature and function of philosophy:

273 . Site, http://www.iep.utm.edu/stoicism/ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed on 14/08/2017 at 8 pm. 160

“Philosophy does not promise to secure anything external for humans, otherwise it would be admitting something that lies beyond its subject matter, for just as wood is the material of the carpenter, bronze that of the statuary, so each individuals own life is the treatment of the art of living” 274

To live a good life, one had to understand the rules of the natural order since they taught that everything was rooted in nature. 275

Later Stoics such as Seneca and Epictetus emphasized that, because "virtue is sufficient for happiness “, a sage was immune to misfortune. This belief is similar to the meaning of the phrase "stoic calm", though the phrase does not include the "radical ethical" Stoic views that only a sage can be considered truly free, and that all moral corruptions are equally vicious. 276 From its founding, Stoic doctrine was popular during the Roman Empire and its adherents included the Emperor Marcus Aurelius . It later experienced a decline after Christianity became the state religion in the 4th century. Over the centuries, it has seen revivals, notably in the Renaissance and in the modern era.

2.1.10.6.1. Ethics And Virtues of Stoicism:

The Stoic ethics follows from Stoic metaphysics and psychology. In their ethics, the Stoics mention three things, namely Nature, Virtue and Duty . By ‘nature’ Stoics means that it is working according to laws and all the processes within it are full determined. Hence, nature means ‘necessity’. Secondly, this nature is the logos of the world and is fully rational. Man is a part of world reason in which he is bound by necessity to obey the natural laws. Man is said to be rational, when he submits himself to his own rational nature. However, the Stoic psychology tells him that man is not only rational, but there is something external to him, namely,

a) Appetites, passion and emotion which disturb the rational working of man.

b) Fortune, riches, poverty, disease, health etc., which man has no control.

Further, the Stoics maintained that virtue is really one , for it is matter of mental disposition and character of being guided by reason alone. This doctrine strengthens the rigorous division of men in the two absolute compartments of virtuous and fools. However, soon the doctrine of virtue led to another key-word ‘duty’. Duty really means

274 . John Sellers, Stoicism, New York, Routledge,Tayler and Frances Group, 2014, pp.31f. 275 . Pollard Elizabeth, Worlds Togeather, Worlds Apart Concise, edit. Vol. 1, New York, W.W.Norton & CO. p.204. 276 .Stoicism, Stanford Encyclopedias of Philosophy 161 the same thing as virtue. However, it means moral act in accordance with rational, all embracing Nature in which the rational man lives in full harmony with nature. Here in his performance of duty a wise man is not only in his own rational nature and in his full command by annihilating his impulses. But he feels that in his moral ‘ought’, he is experiencing a command and an imperative form his higher self called God. Thus, the Stoics in their ethical emphasis on ‘duty’ contained the essentials of Kantian rigorism. 277

The ancient Stoics are often misunderstood because the terms they used pertained to different concepts in the past than they do today. The word "stoic" has come to mean "unemotional" or indifferent to pain because Stoic ethics taught freedom from "passion" by following "reason". The Stoics did not seek to extinguish emotions; rather, they sought to transform them by a resolute " askesis " that enables a person to develop clear judgment and inner calm. 278 Logic , reflection, and concentration were the methods of such self-discipline.

Borrowing from the Cynics , the foundation of Stoic ethics is that good lies in the state of the soul itself; in wisdom and self-control. Stoic ethics stressed the rule: "Follow where reason leads." One must therefore strive to be free of the passions , bearing in mind that the ancient meaning of "passion" was "anguish" or "suffering", 279 that is, "passively" reacting to external events, which is somewhat different from the modern use of the word. A distinction was made between pathos (plural pathe ) which is normally translated as passion , propathos or instinctive reaction (e.g., turning pale and trembling when confronted by physical danger) and eupathos , which is the mark of the Stoic sage (sophos ). The eupatheia are feelings that result from correct judgment in the same way as passions result from incorrect judgment.

The idea was to be free of suffering through apatheia (literally, "without passion") or peace of mind ,280 where peace of mind was understood in the ancient sense, being objective or having "clear judgment" and the maintenance of equanimity in the face of life's highs and lows.

For the Stoics, reason meant not only using logic, but also understanding the processes of nature - the logos , or universal reason, inherent in all things. Living

277 .Y. Masih, A Critical History of Western Philosophy, Delhi, Motilal BanaRsidass Publishers, 1994, pp.124f. 278 .Grover Margaret, Stoicism And Emotion, Chicago, University of Cicago Press, 2009 279 .Passion’ Marriam Webstar Encyclopedia Brtanica 280 .Seddion Keith, Epicitetus, Handbook And Tablet of Cebes, New York, Routledge, p. 217. 162 according to reason and virtue, they held, is to live in harmony with the divine order of the universe, in recognition of the common reason and essential value of all people.

The four cardinal virtues of the Stoic philosophy is a classification derived from the teachings of Plato :

• wisdom (Sophia) • courage (Andreia) • justice (Dikaiosyne) • temperance (Sophrosyne).

Following Socrates , the Stoics held that unhappiness and evil are the results of human ignorance of the reason in nature. If someone is unkind, it is because they are unaware of their own universal reason, which leads to the conclusion of kindness. The solution to evil and unhappiness then, is the practice of Stoic philosophy: to examine one's own judgments and behavior and determine where they diverge from the universal reason of nature.

The Stoics accepted that suicide was permissible for the wise person in circumstances that might prevent them from living a virtuous life. 281 Plutarch held that accepting life under tyranny would have compromised Cato 's self-consistency (constantia ) as a Stoic and impaired his freedom to make the honorable moral choices. Suicide could be justified if one fell victim to severe pain or disease, 282 but otherwise suicide would usually be seen as a rejection of one's social duty. 283

2.1.10.6.2. Spiritual exercise:

Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic emperor Philosophy for a Stoic is not just a set of beliefs or ethical claims, it is a way of life involving constant practice and training (or askesis ). Stoic philosophical and spiritual practices included logic, Socratic dialogue and self- dialogue, contemplation of death, training attention to remain in the present moment (similar to some forms of Eastern meditation) and daily reflection on everyday problems and possible solutions, philosophy for a Stoic is an active process of constant practice and self reminder.

281 . Don E. Manetta, Introduction To Ancient Philosophy, Sharpe, pp.153f. 282 . Ibid, pp.153f. 283 . Willam Braxton Irvine, A Guide To The Good Life, The Ancient of The Stoic Joy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.200. 163

In his Meditations , Marcus Aurelius defines several such practices. For example, in Book II.I: Say to yourself in the early morning:

“I say thus to thyself every morning: today I may have to do with some intermeddler in other men’s affairs, with an ungrateful man; an insolent, or a crafty, or an envious, or an unsociable selfish man. These bad qualities have befallen them through their ignorance of what things are truly good or evil. But I have fully comprehended the nature of good, as only what is beautiful and honourable; and of evil, that it is always deformed and shameful; and the nature of those persons too who mistake their aim; that they are my kinsmen, by partaking, not of the same blood or seed, but of the same intelligent divine part; and that I cannot be hurt by any of them, since none of them can involve me in anything dishonorable or deformed. I cannot be angry at my kinsmen, or hate them. We were formed by nature for mutual assistance, as the two feet, the hands, the eyelids, the upper and lower rows of teeth. Opposition to each other is contrary to nature: All anger and aversion is an opposition.” 284

Prior to Aurelius, Epictetus in his Discourses, distinguished between three types of act: judgment, desire, and inclination .285 According to French philosopher Pierre Hadot, Epictetus identifies these three acts with logic, physics, and ethics respectively. Hadot writes that in the Meditations, “Each maxim develops either one of these very characteristic topoi (i.e. acts), or two of them or three of them.” The practices of spiritual exercises have been described as influencing those of reflective practice by Seamus Mac Suibhne.286 Meditation strengthens the soul, improves its health, and serves as a means of identifying and attaining virtue. Although virtue is essentially the same as wisdom. It also becomes manifest as four main virtues: the primary virtue of meditation and the three resulting virtues of courage, self control, and justice. (Note the Cleanthes, however, preferred endurance instead of meditation, as the primary virtue.) Unlike Aristotle, who interpreted virtue as a means between two extremes, the Stoics believed that each virtue has one, and only one, opposing vice; for example, the vice opposite to virtue is depravity, while the opposite of wisdom is foolhardiness. Whoever

284 . Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations of The Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Indiana, Liberty Fund Inc.,2008, p. 11 (Book II,1) 285 .Davidson A.I., Pierre Haddot And Spiritual Phenomenon of Ancient Philosophy, In Philosophy as a Way ofLife, Haddot P., Oxford Blackwells, 1995, pp.. 9f. 286 . Mac Suibhne s., Wrestie To Be The Man Philosophy Wished To Make You, Mareus Auredius, Reflective Practioners, Reflective Practice, 2009, pp. 429ff.

164 has not yet attained genuine wisdom is intellectually deficient and, similarly, whoever has not yet attained true virtue is morally in a state of evil or vice. Moreover, the descent from virtue to vice may be abrupt and immediate. Only by gaining wisdom can one make certain that he will remain virtuous. Perfection, then, is what the Stoic seeks, and perfection is the sine qua non of happiness, while inevitably imperfection result in unhappiness. All human beings, as frail mortals, are lacking in wisdom, hence in happiness. Just as wisdom accompanies virtue, so foolhardiness is accompanied by vice; just as the healthy mind constitutes happiness, so the diseased or evil mind constitutes chaotic unhappiness. But as the individual gains virtues, the more holy or divine like he becomes; he who excels in virtue will be comparable to Deity in the enjoyment of happiness. 287

2.1.10.6.3. Concept of GOD:

According to the Stoic physics and Cosmology, 288 the universe is a material, reasoning substance, known as God or Nature, which the Stoic divided into two classes, the active and the passive. The passive substance is matter, which “lies sluggish, a substance ready for any use, but sure to remain unemployed if no one sets it in motion.” The active substance, which can be called Fate, or Universal Reason ( Logos ), is an intelligent ether or primordial fire, which acts on the passive matter:

The universe itself is God and the universal outpouring of its soul; it is this same world's guiding principle, operating in mind and reason, together with the common nature of things and the totality that embraces all existence; then it might and necessity of the future; then fire and the principle of a ether; then those elements whose natural state is one of flux and transition, such as water, earth, and air; then the sun, the moon, the stars; and the universal existence in which all things are contained.

Everything is subject to the laws of Fate, for the Universe acts according to its own nature, and the nature of the passive matter it governs. The souls of people and animals are emanations from this primordial fire, and are, likewise, subject to Fate:

Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one substance and one soul; and observe how all things have reference to one perception, the perception of this one living being; and how all things act with one movement; and how all things are the

287 . William S. Shakian, op. cit. pp. 39f. 288 . Site, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stoicism, Stoicism Wikipedia, Visited on 22/06/2017, at 5 pm.

165 cooperating causes of all things that exist; observe too the continuous spinning of the thread and the structure of the web.

. Individual souls are perishable by nature, and can be "transmuted and diffused, assuming a fiery nature by being received into the Seminal Reason ( logos spermatikos ) of the Universe." Since right Reason is the foundation of both humanity and the universe, it follows that the goal of life is to live according to Reason, that is, to live a life according to Nature.

2.1.10.6.4. Stoic Ethical Philosophy :

Beginning with acceptance of the cynic doctrine of self-control and their attitude of indifferences in worldly affairs, the Stoic introduced their rational interpretations of evil as consisting only of vice and of virtue (wisdom as being the only good. To the Stoic evil meant the failure of man’s reason to control his passions, thus allowing them to rule over his reason; virtue meant the act of living in accordance with the nature, allowing reason to control one’s passions. Thus Stoicism identified reason with nature and virtue with obedience to reason. According to Stoic philosophy, since passions are a disease of the soul, the individual must expel them completely from his personality; he must never allow his feeling to deteriorate into passions, which are both unnatural and irrational. Man conquered the world only by overcoming his own impulses. External things cannot control him unless he by an act of his own will permits them to do so; and he will gain self-control and self-sufficiency, if he shows utter indifference both to pleasure and to pain. A person must maintain an unconquerable will, which surrenders to no man . The Stoic warned each individual; let no one break your will, Stoic philosophy interpreted values as consisting of three things; (1) action in harmony with nature, which are norms or true values; (2) unnatural actions (action contrary to nature), which are called devalues; and (3) action neither good nor bad, which constitute neutral values. 289

To live according to virtue just is to live in agreement with nature. That virtue is the single goal of life had been taught by the Cynic Antisthenes, whose view according to Diogenes was that "'Life according to Virtue' is the End to be sought," to which he adds, "exactly like the Stoics. For indeed there is a certain close relationship between the two schools ." Zeno himself was a disciple of the Cynic Crates. The identification of

289 . William S. Shakian, op. cit. pp.38f. 166 virtue with the goal is reasonable in that the ancient Greeks conceived of virtue as excellence, and living according to nature is the highest form of rational activity, given that it follows the divine law of the cosmos, and nothing can be better than that.

Like the Cynics, the Stoics held that virtue as well as vice exist. Our failure to live a virtuous life consists in our living contrary to divine law, due to corruption: "sometimes because of the persuasiveness of external activities and sometimes because of the influence of companions". There is a close connection between virtue and knowledge, as was taught by Socrates. The Stoics believed that virtue can be taught because people do become more virtuous. The key connection is that living according to nature requires a knowledge of nature, which can only come through education. It is no accident that the perfectly virtuous person is the "wise man."

Aside from virtue conceived abstractly, the Stoics discussed the individual virtues, producing a bewildering series of classifications of virtues. The four primary virtues are described by John Stobeaus as follows:

• Prudence: (concerns appropriate acts) knowledge of what one is to do and not to do and what is neither • Temperance: (concerning human impulses) knowledge of what is to be chosen and avoided and what is neither • Justice: (concerning distributions) knowledge of the distribution of proper value to each person • Courage: (concerning standing firm) knowledge of what is terrible and what is not terrible and what is neither.

There does not seem to be much systematic unity to this list, which the same as that offered by Aristotle. What is important, however, is that each one is a form of knowledge. Any virtues which are not intellectual "crafts," such as health of the soul, are capabilities which exist as the result of practice, and thus are dependent upon or "supervene" on the "intellectual" virtues. The soul becomes healthy as a result of "a sufficient tension in judging and acting and in not doing so," just as bodily health is promoted by sufficient tension in the muscles.

An extreme doctrine held by the Stoics is that there is nothing between the base and the virtuous. The argument for this is that virtue itself is a kind of completion, so that

167 by nature it cannot be incomplete. Thus anyone falling short of a fully virtuous life is base, and only the wise man is virtuous, since he "does everything in accordance with all the virtues; for his every action is perfect, and so bereft of none of the virtues".290

2.1.10.6.5. Happiness:

It is characteristic of Greek philosophers to maintain that there is a close connection between virtue and happiness. With the Stoics, as usual, the connection is necessary: the virtuous person is happy just by being virtuous. This is not surprising, because the Greeks understood happiness as a kind of optimal or "flourishing" state of the human being. As virtue is living a perfectly rational life, the virtuous person achieves the best condition possible for a rational animal. Chrysippus is said to have held that living consistently with nature "is the virtue of the happy man and a smooth flow of life". Hecaton is quoted as giving a more specific argument in terms of one of the virtues: "magnanimity is sufficient for making one superior to everything and if it is a part of virtue, virtue too is sufficient for happiness, holding in contempt even those things which seem to be bothersome".291 True happiness is a state of inner tranquility, of freedom from disturbance, a state of mental composure, or peace of soul. This state of happiness reflects the rational character of the soul which enables it to attain an inner peace. Thus Stoic agreed with Socrates in identifying virtues with knowledge (rational insight) knowledge of what is morally right strengthens the will and the power of the individual so that his mind becomes impervious to worldly vicissitudes and disturbances. 292

2.1.10.6.6. The Idea of Universal Brotherhood:

All prize kindness to fellow-men, friendship, benevolence, brotherhood; and both Stoic and Epicureans widened the circle of sympathy to include all mankind. But Epicurus tended to base it on self interest (in theory): we cannot be happy unless we are at peace with our surroundings. The Stoics, on the other hand, made love of neighbor a good in itself: my fellow-man is not a mere means to my happiness, but, so far as I am concerned, an end in himself.

290 . Site, http://hume.ucdavis.edu/mattey/phi143/stoaeth.htm,The Ethics of The Stoic visited on 22/06/2017 291 , Ibid 292 . William S. Shakian, op. cit. p.39. 168

In the value which it placed on man as such, the ethical philosophy of Stoicism even transcended that of Plato and Aristotle. Both of these moralists defends slavery and both are influenced by national prejudices; both look upon “barbarians” as inferior people and upon slavery as a natural and just institution. The idea of universal brotherhood and equality was not there. They preached justice and equal right for all full- fledged and equal citizens of the State, and held that the State was made for peace and not for conquest. The idea of universal brotherhood was preached by Stoic. According to Stoic, the value of a man depends not on wealth, or rank, or class, but on his moral worth, on the good will. “Virtue despises no one, neither Greek nor barbarian, man nor women, rich nor poor, freeman nor slave, wise nor ignorant, whole not sick.” Character is the supreme test, and this no one can give and no one can take away. 293

2.2. Eastern Philosophy: Eastern philosophy or Asian Philosophy includes the various philosophies of South and East Asia including Chinese, Indian Philosophy, Korean Philosophy, Japanese philosophy and Buddhist philosophy dominant in Tibet, Bh ūtan, Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. But in this work only Eastern Philosophy such as Hindu, Jaina and Buddhist philosophy are studied.

2.2.1 . The Hindu Philosophy:

2.2.1.1. The Nature And History of Hindu Philosophy: One of the salient feature of Indian Philosophy is its staunch insistent on values and it has consistently given foremost place to values. Philosophical speculations in the West began with the Greeks in the 6 th century BC, while in India philosophical thinking began in the Vedic age. The Ṛgv ēda is the most ancient book of humanity, it itself contain great philosophical hymn like the Nasadiya-sūkta, Puru ṣa-sūkta, and Asyavana śyasūkta etc. wherein we came across the highest philosophical ideas. In India, philosophy is not treated as intellectual game; it is seriously perused as a discipline of life. It is not only a view of life but a way of life. It is expected that philosophy should solve our basic problems as regard the meaning of life and existence. It must give us goal to live for. Thus philosophy in India is mainly axiological and subsidiary

293 . Frank Thilly, op. cit., pp. 115f. 169 cosmological and epistemological. According to Prof. T.M.P. Mahadevan, 294 it was because of this fact the Indian Philosophy could maintain its close alliance with religion.

Indian philosophy comprises the ancient philosophical traditions of the Indian subcontinent. The schools of Indian philosophical thought is classified as either orthodox or heterodox - āstika or nāstika depending on one of three alternate criteria: whether it believes the Vēdas are a valid source of knowledge; whether the school believes in the premises of Br āhma ṇa and Ātman and whether the school believes in after life and Devas. 295

There are six major schools of orthodox Hindu philosophy, Ny āya , Vaisheshika , Sāmkhya , Yoga , Mīmāṃsā and Vēdanta and five major heterodox schools Jain, Buddhist, AJ īvaika, Ajñana and Cārv āka. However, there are other methods of classification; Vidyaranya for instance identifies sixteen schools of Indian philosophy by including those that belongs to Saiva and Rasesvara traditions.

The main schools of Indian philosophy were formalized chiefly between 1000 BCE to the early centuries of the Common Era. According to philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, the earliest of these, which date back to the composition of the Upani ṣhads in the later Vedic period (1000–500 BCE) constitute "the earliest philosophical compositions of the world." 296 Competition and integration between the various schools was intense during their formative years, especially between 800 BCE and 200 CE. Some schools like Jainism, Buddhism, Yoga, Śaiva and Advaita Ved ānta survived, but others, like Ajñana, Cārv āka, and Ājīvika did not .Ancient and medieval era texts of Indian philosophies includes extensive discussions on Ontology (metaphysics, br āhma ṇa, Ātman Sunyata-Anatta ), reliable means of knowledge (epistemology, Pram āna ), value system (axiology) and other topics. 297

The primary sources of Indian philosophical thought are the Vēdas, br āhma ṇas (including Aranyak ās) , Upni ṣhads, and epic poems, the Mah ābh ārata (which includes the Bhagavad G ītā:) and the Rāmāyana , A sense of timelessness pervades the pages of these ancient books. 298 The religion and culture of the Hindus are rooted in the Vēdas

294 . T.M.P. Mahadevan’s article in cultural heritage of India, Calcutta, Ramkrishna Mission, 1955, Vol.I , p. 165. 295 . Wendy Doniger , On Hinduism, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 2014, p. 46. 296 . Harper Collins , The Principal Upani ṣads , 1994, p 22 297 . Arvind Sharma . The Puru ṣārthas: a study in Hindu axiology, East Lansing, Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University. 1982 298 .St. Elmo Nauman Jr., Dictionary of Asian Philosophy , London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 171. 170 which no specialist, either eastern or western, has much later than 1500 B.C. Some have placed them very earlier. 299

Indian Philosophy is an invaluable treasury of human knowledge and experience. It is a stream of consciousness running through the entire civilization of the past, present and future. This itself shows that Indian philosophy is both a Dar śana and Sādhana . It is not a merely study of discipline ( Śā stra ), but a science of a moral and spiritual conduct ( yoga ). It is quest after truth and knowledge; intent meditation and concentration from the basis of its understanding. The student of Indian Philosophy is an ardent seeker. Awareness is his primary quality. It is this insight into the nature of the whole reality which helps him to know and realize the eternal truth. The Indian philosophy recognizes the reality of the world; that world is the basis of worldly and the other worldly experience. With few exceptions, the Indian philosophical system affirms the reality of self. That self is a continuous stream of consciousness. It is a permanent reality, it is the basis of all realization etc., is admitted by one and all Indian seekers of wisdom. All the schools of Indian Philosophy except the nāstika school of Cārv āka believe in the law of karma . A right action will lead to right result and a bad action will lead to bad effect or consequence. This is dharma and adharma or Pāpa and pu ṇya in Indian philosophy. The transmigration of the soul is a corollary of the law of karma . Merits and demerits are produced by right and wrong actions determine the kind of birth. Sams āra is bondage ( bandha ), a beginning-less series of births and deaths. The idea of liberation ( mok ṣa) is common to all systems of Indian Philosophy particularly the āstika. Again this liberation is of two kinds. Liberation while living in this very world (Jīvānmukti ) is different from liberation from the misery and bondage of this world in death ( mok ṣa). Indian philosophy maintains its own individuality throughout its methodology. 300

2.2.1.2. Important Role of Religion In Axiology:

The problems of religion, philosophy and morality have, from very early times, in some form or other, occupied a place of supreme importance and interest in the history of human thought. From the very remote period of human civilization, when man had just begun to be awakened to newer problems of life, and had learned to think in a subtle and refined way in response to the need of something higher than the mere satisfaction of

299 . A.C.Bose, The Call of V ēdas, Mumbai, Bharatiya Vidya Bhawavan, 1999, p. 1. 300 .V.N.K. Reddy, Eastern And Western Philosophy,An Introduction, Delhi, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1980, pp. 4f. 171 biological demand, he had been, in one way or another, trying to think out a systematic account of the mysteries of life and to set before himself an ideal to be achieved. 301 Religion is mainly concern with the relationship between man and man and between man and God. Religion tries to restrain, discipline and consequently to sublimate the animal in man. It is mainly concerned with the problem of moralization and spiritualization of man. It attempts to harmonize various individual desires with social demands. Religion emphasizes the spirit in man and teaches universal fellowship. It teaches man to be compassionate towards the down-trodden. It emphasizes self control and conservation of values Hoffdind defined religion as a faith in the conservation of values. Human personality itself is a value. Man should try to realize the highest possible individual value as well as social values. 302

While describing the function of religion, Eucken says: 303 “Religion holds up before us, over against the surrounding world, a new kind of existence, a new order of things, and divides reality into different province and world. Religion may be obtained without belief in God, but without a dualism of worlds without an outlook on a new existence, religion becomes an empty sound”

Euken further says “that higher order must not merely exist in itself, it must be effective for us, it must place our existence on a new foundation” 304 . That man has a dual existence in him, one that ties him to the experience of ordinary life, and another that taken him beyond it; it has been beautifully expressed in one of the passage of the Mu ṇḍ aka Upani ṣad (3.1). There it is described that two birds are sitting on the branch of same tree; one of them eats the fruits of the tree, while other does not taste them at all, but merely looks on. This when interpreted would mean that while the biological self in us plunges headlong into the experiences of ordinary life, the spiritual self remains unaffected. The dualism in man raises the problem of harmony. As to how these two opposite nature can be brought into accord. The solution of this problem is to be sought in religion, which not merely reveals two different order of existence in man, but help to harmonize them. McTaggart 305 in his “Some Dogmas of Religion”, describes religion as an emotion resting on a conviction of harmony between ourselves and universal at large.

301 . Surma Dasgupta, Development of Moral Philosophy in India, New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co, 1965, p.1. 302 . S.G.Nigal, op. cit., p.10. 303 . Rudolf Eucken, Truth of Religion, New York, G. P. Patranis Sons,1913, p. 187 304 .Ibid, p. 187 305 . McTaggart,John McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion , London, E. Arnold, 1906, pp.3f. 172

But to establish the harmony between world and ourselves we have to seek it within, amongst the conflicting tendencies and passions of our mind, because the world outside reflected and represented through our mental states, and thus form a constituent of ourselves. The opposition therefore is not between our self on one hand and the not self on the other; but between the different tendencies within, which have, as it were, drawn the external world in us by acting and reacting on it in various ways. Surma Dasgupta 306 in her book “Development of Moral Philosophy in India” asserted that “Religion has a very important bearing on our practical life and this leads us to the question of morality, which is very intimately connected with religion. Morality implies a system of practical rules of conduct of man in the light of his religion. When a man is filled with religious emotion, he may either plunge into an ecstatic state, or trance, or may feel an inner urge, a call from within, to give expression to it, and it is his moral sense that is rouse and direct the way through which his feelings and will can glide on. Due to sweetening of emotion and its purifying influence moral principles of truthfulness, charity, sympathy, love and generosity blossom forth in the mind, like so many flowers, and the religious artist has his greatest satisfaction. Morality is technique of his self expression; it gives concrete form to his dream, help him to actualize his vision by practicable details. Morality losses its true significance, if separated from religion in a higher sense, that of spiritual attainment. Theories of social ethics may, however be formulated simply for the maintenance of peace and order in society; but they often fail to serve their purpose if not founded on some higher principles. Mere prudential consideration cannot lead to the progress and stability of society. Love and friendliness, kindness, non-injury and truthfulness cannot come out of barren maxim which one may be forced to observe to owing social pressure, but they must be spring from the fullness of the spirit within. Higher morality, therefore, flows from religion. Religion merely in the sense of certain beliefs and observance of some form of rituals is, however, different from this”. The term dharma (religion) derived from the root dh ṛ ( to support) means that which sustains one’s life and , therefore, implies the conviction or faith which hold, as it were one’s entire existence. Dar śana (Philosophy) derived from the root dṛś (to see), means the act of perceiving, and hence implies looking deeply into the mysteries of reality: but in India this ‘seeing’ melted into ‘being’. To see the truth deeply is to believe it fully, and to believe intensely is to be, or, become. Dar śana generates

306 . Surma Dasgupta, Development of Moral Philosophy in India , New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1965, p. 4. 173 conviction, an emotion for truth, and from this start the process of becoming. So philosophy is transformed naturally into religion and morality. In fact most systems of Indian philosophy had a religious basis and proceeded from the concept of a possible betterment of human life. In this respect the development of philosophical thought in India differ from that of the West. Greek philosophy started purely from an ontological enquiry, though later on the quest of the summum bonum or the highest good came to supplement it. In comparatively, recent times, almost every professor, who occupied a chair in Germany, spun out a philosophical theory of his own which in most cases had nothing or little to do with his life. In India, however, we not only find philosophy and religion inseparably blended together, but can see that the concept of a possible betterment of life was the first to dawn and inspire the mind of the people, and was later on elaborated and woven into a complex structure of thought. Thus yogic practices were welded into the philosophy of Sāṃkhya,; the simple rules of conduct, propounded by Lord Buddha, were supplemented and converted into philosophy by subtle dialectical and philosophical reasoning of later thinkers. 307 It is dharma which supplies the nucleus of the ethical theory that can be oven in the Indian context. 308 Now let us see the axiological approach of the various Indian Philosophies.

2.2.1.3. Major scriptures of Hindu Philosophy:

The Scripture include the Vēdas and Upani ṣhad s the Bhagavad G īta: and the Āgamas .309 The foundational Scriptures of the Hindus are the Vēdas . They are usually designated ‘ Śruti ’, while all other scriptural texts go under the omnibus term ‘Sm ṛti ’. The authority of the Śruti is primary, because it is a form of direct experience Sources of authority and eternal truths in its texts play an important role, but there is also a strong Hindu tradition of the questioning of this authority, to deepen the understanding of these truths and to further develop the tradition. 310 While that of the Sm ṛti is secondary. Śruti literally means what is heard, and Sm ṛti means what is remembered. Śruti is revelation; Sm ṛti is tradition, whereas Sm ṛti is secondary, since it is recollection of that experience. The Hindu believes that the Vēdas which constitute Śruti are not composition of any human mind. The Vēdas are eternal ( nitya ) and impersonal (apauru ṣeya ). They are the breathe of god, eternal truths revealed to the great ‘ Ṛṣ iḥ’ of yore. The word ‘ Ṛṣ iḥ’ is significant It means a seer, from drs to see. The Ṛṣ iḥ saw the

307 Ibid, p. 4,5 308 . S.S.Barlingay, A Modern Introduction To Indian Ethics, Delhi, Penman Publishers, 1998, p.132. 309 .Zeehner R.C., Hindu Scripture, Penguin, Random House, 1992, pp. 1ff. 310 . Frazier Jassica, The Continuun Companion To Hindu Studies, London, Continuum, 2011, pp. 1ff. 174 truths or heard them. Hence Vēdas are what heard ( Śruti) . They represent the spiritual experiences of the ancient sages, the glorious heritage of Āryav ārta .311 . Vēda is fundamentally a record of experiences of intuition and revelation. These experiences are varied, and they belong to various stages of development and exploration. The Vēda records not only the experiences of poets who have composed the hymns of the Vēda , but also the experiences of the ancestors ( pit ārah , poorvajanah ). Vēda thus describes the knowledge contained in the pre-vedic tradition as also the Vedic tradition proper. 312 . The word ‘ Vēda’ means knowledge of wisdom; and as applied to scripture it signifies a book of wisdom. The Vēdas are four: the Ṛg-Vēda , the Yajur- Vēda , the Sam- Vēda , and the Atharva- Vēda . Of these, the first is the most important because it lends many of its mantras (hymns) to the others and reputed to be the earliest collection ( sambita ). In the Atharva- Vēda we find a rapprochement made between the worship of the higher Gods and the popular cult, Each Vēda consist of four parts: Mantra , Br āhma ṇa, Aranyak ā and Upani ṣad. The Mantras are hymns in praise of the Vedic Gods; they are prayer addressed to the deities in order to gain prosperity here and happiness in a hereafter. The Br āhma ṇa are guide books for the performance of sacrificial rites which were then the principal modes of pleasing Gods. The Aranyak ās or ‘forest books’ give philosophical interpretation of the ritual by allegorizing them. And the Upani ṣads which are concluding portion of Vēda (i.e. Vēdanta ) are speculation in philosophy, as also mystical utterances revealing the most profound spiritual truths. There are many works bearing the name Upani ṣad . The chief them are twelve: Isha, Kena, Katha , Pra śna, Mu ṇḍ aka, Māṇḍ ūkya, Taittiriya, Ch āndogy a, Bṛhad-Āra ṇyaka, Kausitaki and Svetasvatara. 313

Next in importance to Śruti are the Sm ṛtis or secondary scripture. Sm ṛti is a word which is so classic that it includes a variety of works on religious duty and philosophy. Besides the books which are specifically called Sm ṛti , there are the Itihasas , Pur ānas , Āgamas , the Dar śana literature and treatises and poems written in the popular language. All these may be called Sm ṛtis because they draw inspiration from the Vēdas and reheard the Vēda as the final authority. The works which are expressly called Sm ṛti are law books dharma-Śā stra’s. Their purpose is to lay down the laws that should guide individuals and communities in their daily conducts and to apply the eternal truths of the Vēda to the changing conditions of time and clime and thereby preserve the integrity and ensure the progress of Hindu society. The Itihasas are the two great epics, the

311 . T.M.P. Mahadevan, Outline of Hinduism, Bombay, Chetana Pvt. Ltd., 1999, pp.27f. 312 . Kireet Joshi, The Vēda And Indian Culture, Ujjain, Bharatiya V ēda Vidya Pratishthan, 1994, p. 6. 313 . T.M.P. Mahadevan, op. cit. pp. 28f. 175

Rāmāyana ,and the Mah ābh ārata . They are stories in song of the noble deeds of great national heroes. The purpose of reading the life stories of great men is to understand the use and excellence of the laws of virtues. The Rāmāyana , whose author is Valmiki, relates the story of Ramacandra , the ideal man. How an individual should behave towards his elders, equals and inferiors, how a king ought to rule his kingdom, and how a community may live in harmony and peace may all be learned from this master piece of Sanskrit literature which has been characterized as the Adi-kavya , the first epic poem,

The Pur ānas are of the same class as the Itihasas . The two together are known as the Fifth Vēda (pancamo Vēda ). The aim of the Pur ānas is to broadcaste religious knowledge and evoke religious devotion among the masses, through myth and stories, legends and chronicles of great national events. Tradition recognizes eighteen main Pur ānas and an equal number of Upa-Pur ānas . The chief Pur ānas are:

Br āhma , Padma, Visnu, Siva, Bhagavata, N ārada, Markandeya, Agni, Bhavisya , Br āhma ṇavatvaria, Linga, Varaba, Skanda, Vamana, Kurma, Matsya, Garuda, and. Br āhma ṇanda

The Āgamas are theological treatises and manuals of worship. The three main sect of Hinduism, viz., Saivism, Saktism , and Vaisnavism , base their doctrine and dogmas on their respective Āgamas . The Saivas recognize twenty eight Āgamas of which chief is the Kāmaika . To the Sakta cult belong seventy-seven Āgamas . Known as the Tantras . The Vaisnavas consider the Pancaratra Āgamas to be authoritative. The Dar śana literature is philosophical. Dar śana literally means sight or vision means a system of philosophy. There are six systems of philosophy grouped into three pairs:

(1) The Ny āya and the Vaisesika (2) The Sāmkhya and the Yoga (3) The Mīmāms ā and the Vēdanta . Each of these system has its sūtra-kara , i.e. the one who systematized the tenets of the school and stated them in the form of short aphorism or sūtras . Gautama systematized the principle of Ny āya . Kan āda is said to be the author of the Vaisesika s ūtras , The authorship of the Sāmkhya system is ascribed to Kapila . The first systematizer of the Yoga school is Patañjali whose Yogas ūtra is the basic text. Mīmāms ā is based on the ritual sections of the Vēda , has its own sūtra whose author is Laimini . The teaching of the Upani ṣads are strung together in the Vēdanta s ūtras by Badarayana , and it is on the foundation of these sūtras that the different Vēdanta schools are built. 314

314 .Ibid, pp.35f. 176

2.2.1.4. Axiology of The Hindu Philosophy.

A human beings we are advised to lead a moral life. Such advice comes from different quarters. In India, by and large, the authority of the scriptures, especially that of the Vēdas, has been recognized to be the primary source of our moral ideas and beliefs. ‘Vedo dharmam ūlam’ says the Gautama Dharmas ūtra . After the Vēdas , the authority of the Sm ṛti is accepted in this respect ( tadvidam ca Smrtisile). In general, therefore Vēdas and the Sm ṛtis together have been regarded as the source of morality, ‘Śruti Sm ṛti vihito dharmah’, says the Vasistha Dharmas ūtra . The Bhagavad G ītā also takes the śā stras to be the sole authority and guide in matter of morality. The Gītā specially counsels to take the śā stras and śā stras alone as the final arbiter of right and wrong action. 315

2.2.1.4.1. Cardinal Virtues of Hindu Philosophy:

All the sects and offshoots of Hindu philosophy have the same moral ideals. The cardinal virtues of Hindu philosophy (sadh āran ā dharma ) are to be cultivated by all irrespective of distinction of varna and Āsrama , to the best of their abilities. Goodness is not a priority of any one class or community. The Hindu scriptures give several lists of virtues. The Bhagavad- Gītā in chapter XVI enumerates these are godly virtues; absolute fearlessness, perfect purity of mind thought, steadfastness in knowledge and devotion, alms-giving, self-control and sacrifices, study of the scriptures, austerities, and uprightness, non-violence in thought, word and deed, truthfulness and gentility of speech, absence of anger even on provocation, renunciation, tranquility of mind, aversion to slender, compassion to living being, freedom from covetousness, gentleness, modesty and steadiness, courage, patience, fortitude, purity and freedom from malice, sublime, forbearance, bearing enmity to none and absence of self-esteem and overweening conceit. 316 All these virtues, however may be regarded as manifestations of the five cardinal virtues: (1) purity, (2) self control, (3) detachment, (4) truth, and (5) non- violence; it is these ideals/morals which have given the people of India a common idea of the good life.

2.2.1.4.1.1. Purity:

Purity of body and mind is the first rung in the moral ladder. The restrictions in diet and dress and in daily habits are all designed to make the mind pure. The body is to

315 .Kedar Nath Tiwari, Classical Indian Thought, Delhi, Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2007, p. 15. 316 .Bhagvadgita, Chapter XVI, 1-3. 177 be regarded as a temple of God and the minds its inner sanctuary. The door of heaven is barred to those who are unclean in heart. Cleanliness is part of godliness. Purity, implies cleanliness in thought, word and deeds, and comprises such virtues as straightforwardness, frankness, innocence, and absence of sinful thoughts. He who has cultivated these qualities will find the practice of the next cardinal virtue, self control, easy and smooth.

2.2.1.4.1.2. Self Control:

Self control again implies both the control of flesh and the control of the mind. The senses must be first restrained. One should not be slave in the wayward senses. The Kathopa ni ṣad compares senses to the horses and the sense-object to the spheres of their roving, the body to the chariot, the intellect to the charioteer, the mind to the rein, and the self to the lord of the charioteer. 317 If the reins are not held firm, then the senses like wicked horses, will become unmanageable; and if the individual has no control over his senses and mind, he will come to ruin. Self control, however, does not mean self-torture. It only implies moderation and self mastery.

2.2.1.4.1.3. Detachment:

The third cardinal virtue is detachment – detachment from the sense object. The Gīta regard attachment to objects sense as the root of all evils. A man first thinks of an object as worthy of an attainment. He feels drawn to it. From this attachment arises desire, Desires prompts him to activity. If he is a frustrated in his attempts, he gets angry. Anger breeds delusion, and delusion, the loss of recollection. Sentry takes leave of such a person and he perishes at last. 318 To escape this doom, the cultivation of detachment is enjoined.

2.2.1.4.1.4. Truth:

When person is no more beguiled by the evanescent objects of sense, he sees the truth. Truth is the sovereign virtue. It means not mere truth speaking but the supreme Truth, viz. God who is the source and sustenance of all existence and the spring of all values. The surest way to realize this principle is to be truthful in thought, word, and deed. Harichandra is regarded as a great hero and a paragon of virtue because he was a devotee of truth. Truth is always associated with non-violence in the Hindu Scripture.

317 . Katha, I, iii, 3-6. 318 . Bhagvad-Gita, Chapter II, 62-63. 178

2.2.1.4.1.5. Non-violence:

The last of the cardinal virtues, is the expression of truth. The Hindu sages, from the Vedic seers and the Buddha to Mahatma Gandhi have laid the greatest stress on the practice of this virtue. If truth is all, then, nothing should be injured. The Vedic command runs: Do not injure any being’ The Buddha was the incarnation of compassion. He taught: let man overcome anger by love; let him overcome evil by good; let him overcome the greedy by liberality, the liar by truth’. The salvation of the human race lies in the practice of these two virtues- truth and non-violence- which constitute the crown and glory of ethical life.

2.2.1.4.2. The Ethical goal of Human Life:

Prominent themes in Hindu beliefs include the four Puru ṣārthas the proper goals or aims of human life, namely Dharma (ethics/duties), Artha (prosperity work), Kāma (desires/passions) and Mok ṣa Liberation/freedom/salvation); 319

Besides the Aranyak ās and the Upani ṣhads the doctrine of Purus ārtha : (Puru ṣa + artha = what is desired by man). It is doctrine that explains that man’s life is governed by four goals or ‘ends’ of life. According to Indian Philosophy human life has a definite aim, final goal, that is required to be achieved, either in the current span of life or in the series of lifespan. A human being remains entangled in the vicious circle of births and deaths, until the final goal is attained. 320 The achievement of final goal requires fulfillment of certain objectives or obligations. One has to crossover many milestones before the final destination is reached. Even in the material world, one has to acquire certain qualification or meet particular standards, before one can achieve desired target or objective of life. One has to meet higher standards and requires much superior qualifications to attain the goal in the spiritual domain, where the path is more difficult, and efforts require dare far more arduous, The attainment of spiritual goal cannot be made possible in an instant or by some strange miracle of God. There has to be a well laid out path, a definite plan to achieve the goal. On the basis of their knowledge gained through the highest spiritual efforts ( Sādhana ), the ancient spiritual scientists (called the Ṛṣ iḥ) had discovered a plan of life to achieve the final goal of life. Accordingly they had standardized certain OBJECTIVES of human life, for the guidance of all mankind. There are ‘FOUR

319 . Flood Govin, The Bhagvad Gita of Our Time, Oxford, Oxford Press, 1997, pp.11f. 320 . J. M. Mehta, The Philosophy of Hinduism, Four Objective of Human Life, Delhi, Pustak Mahal, 2006, p. 12. 179

OBJECTIVES OF HUMAN LIFE’, by following of which, the highest goal of life can be achieved. These four objectives are as follows:

1. DHARMA - The religion or righteousness through right conduct. 2. ARTHA - Acquisition of wealth and its proper use. 3. KĀMA - Fulfillment of noble desires. 4. MOK ṢA - Liberation or final goal.

By following the above mentioned objectives, an individual can achieve the final goal of life in a single span of life or through a series of life spans depending upon the quality of efforts made earnestly, dedication and devotion, etc. of the aspirant. 321

2.2.1.4.2.1. The Virtues of Dharma: The ancient Indian philosopher and law-giver, Maharishi Manu has codified their moral values which may be briefly described as follows :- 1.Forbearance : This is the quality which builds power of endurances and makes person keep his cool and remain calm and composed even in the face of hardship. This moral virtue enables a person to face all the difficult situation of life, with patience and wisdom. 2.Control of Mind: The mind is restless and ever changing. It is always engaged in some thought process and the fluctuations of mind travel with the fastest speed. The activities of life will not run smoothly. If the mind remains tense and restless. It is therefore, necessary to control the mind and make it peaceful. This can be possible through constant practice, proper understanding and non attachment, logical thinking, right action, practice of meditation, engagement in noble activities and constant remembrance of God helps to make mind consistent. For example: Regular practice of Pr ānayam (regulation of breath) is a sure means to control the mind. 3.Forgiveness: There is popular saying, “To err is human, to forgive divine” It is quite difficult to exercise this moral virtue in an atmosphere of hatred and jealousy in human relationships. One has to be physically and morally strong to practice this quality. A righteous and weak person wronged by a powerful sinner cannot be granted pardon to the latter. It is also not advisable to forgive a habitual wrongdoer and an evil minded person, as far as possible .

321 . Ibid, pp. 13ff. 180

4,Non-Stealing: This moral virtue involves absence of greed. One should not take away or acquire anything which does not belong to him, without paying proper price and without the permission of rightful owner . 5.Cleanliness: This includes both internal and external aspects. Thus, the body, physical environment and the mind should be kept clean and pure. While it is easy to keep our body and the external environment clean with water and cleansing material, it is much more difficult to keep the mind clean and pure. The motto in everyday life and behavior should be – ‘See no evil, hear no evil and do no evil.’ 6. Control of Sense: These are the five senses of knowledge and five senses of action. When these senses come in contact with the external world, attachment and desire are produced. Desires, if not kept under check, leads evil consequences. One should never be slave to those senses but be their master. 7. Wisdom: One should acquire wisdom through right knowledge, as enshrined in religious books, scriptures and other good literature. Experience is also a great teacher. One should also learn from one’s own experience, as well as , from the experience of others. Past mistakes should not be repeated. One also can learn from good company and by hearing sermons and discourses. 8.Knowledge: One should acquire knowledge of both the material and spiritual world. Right knowledge and proper understanding, and utilization of that knowledge are useful for present and future lives. Steadfastness and hard work are necessary for acquiring right knowledge. Study of good literature, guidance of competent teachers, good company and self efforts are some of the important means of acquiring knowledge. 9.Truth: One most practice truth is thought, word and deed. A truthful behavior is very essential for a truly religious life. 10.Non-Anger: One should remain calm and balanced in the face of provocation. Anger, not only hurts others, but also causes damage to the angry person. It is therefore necessary to exercise patience and restraint to avoid and control anger. Non-anger leads to peace of mind which is essential for the practitioner of religious life 322 . Socio-moral duties and character values which are essential for man’s psycho- social existence. Modern thinkers are coming around to the recognition of the necessary of these values. Stressing upon the imperative necessary of such values, Patrick, avers –

322 . Ibid, pp. 24ff. 181

“The values which have been preached to us from every pulpit and platform are liberty, equality, opportunity, efficiency, democracy, organization, science, invention, and discovery. We still believe in them heartily and fully. But the time has come when our attention must be focused on other values which condition the welfare of society itself such as discipline, self respect, self control, and respect for law, obedience to law, limitations of desires, temperance, co-operation and education. The practice of these virtues has become urgent and imperative ”323 A healthy social life is possible only if the members of the society have a sense of social responsibility and co-operative good will.

2.2.1.4.2.2. The Virtues of Artha: It implies that accumulation of wealth has to be based on Dharma or moral values. Possession of wealth is essential but observance of Dharma should take the first priority. It is better to be righteous and poor than to be wealthy through unfair and dishonest means. The meaning and scope of Artha or wealth as follows:- 1.Knowledge: It has been described as greatest wealth as nothing can be achieved without knowledge, Knowledge has been compared with light which removes darkness. It removes ignorance. Broadly speaking knowledge nay be divided into material knowledge and spiritual knowledge. 2.Material Wealth: It includes money, jewelry and other movable and immovable material possessions. Money is the basis of all the material wealth as it can buy all the objects, 3.Health: Health is different type of wealth. There is popular saying “ Health is wealth ” 4.Contentment: It is the greatest wealth, which is different from material wealth and health. Contentment means the absence of desire to possess more and more of the requirement of life. It implies that one should work honestly and be satisfied with the result of his efforts. 324 The Ṛg-Vēda says Na ṛte śrāntasya sakhyay Dev āḥ God helps and supports only he who works hard and sweats to his utmost capacity. God help those who help themselves. Even the earthly values, viz, Artha and Kāma (prosperity, profit, political ends, success or pleasure or emotional satisfaction and aesthetic enjoyment) must be legitimately realized. There is famous episode in the Aitareya Br āhma ṇa (33.3) , This

323 . G.T.W. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy, Revised with the assistant of F.M.Chapman, Bostan, Houghton Miffin, 1952, p. 440. 324 . J. M. Mehta, op. cit. pp. 34ff. 182

Br āhma ṇa belongs to Ṛg-Vēda itself, in this episode Indra advises Rohit to make efforts and toil to achieve the objectives of life ( Caraiveti caraiveti). Indra administers Rohit:325 Is there anyone who has earned wealth without hard work? Remember, the idle man is sinner. God help those who entertain higher aims. Therefore, I ask you to work and achieve the goal. An idle man who always sleeps in the emblem of Kaliyuga kali ḥ Śay āno bhavati ( the age of all round degradation, one of the four echos). Further Indra says: “Just see a bee collects honey by moving from flower to flower. The birds enjoy fruits by flying from tree to tree. Does the Sun expect rest or respite even for a moment? ( Caranvai madhu vindati caransv ̄ adumuudum s ūryasya pa śya śrem ānam ye na tandrayate caran caraiveti). Hence, strive to obtain human ends (caraiveti).” Thus, Sun is placed before us as an ideal model of selfless activism. The passage gives us a robust philosophy of activism. Thus even being realistic, the Vedic seers were also progressive idealists. They would struggle for existence, In fact for better existence and try to come out with success and victory. They would not allow any encroachment upon the society from within or without. They would pray to God to help them to kill their enemies, but they would help those who would be friendly to them. They would not like to be idle nor in fear. One of the seers says: “let me go ahead without fear. The Sun and the Moon, the day and the night, go on without rest or fear. Similarly, let me proceed ahead”( Atharva Vēda 5.20) Even in earthly life, they valued the pairs of values of light and liberation, liberality and love. With labour they would like to achieve their earthy ends and thus, to get freedom from their worries, poverty, and environment and social slavery. 326 In Ṛg-Vēda honest labour and its gain are recommended, the following hymn says: +IÉè®Âú ¨ÉÉ nùÒ´ªÉ: EÞòʹɨÉÂ

325 . S.G. Nigal, op. cit. pp. 36ff. 326 .Ibid, , p.38 327 . Rg-Vēda, X.34.13 183

Means do not play with dice: cultivate thy cornfield: Delight in that wealth, thinking highly of it. O, gambler! There is thy cattle and there thy wife: So the noble Savita has told me. Here the habit of trying grow rich by gambling is denounced and honest labour and its gain are recommended. A man is called upon to work in his field with his cattle and run the household with his wife. 328 Next hymn says earn wealth through the path of law:

{ÉÊ®ú ÊSÉxÉ ¨ÉiÉÉÇä pùÊ´ÉhÉƨɨÉxªÉÉnÂù @ñiɺªÉ {ÉlÉÉ xɨɺÉÉ Ê´É´ÉɺÉäiÉ * =iÉ º´ÉäxÉ GòiÉÖxÉÉ ºÉÆ ´ÉnäùiÉ ¸ÉäªÉÉƺÉÆ nùIÉÆ ¨ÉxɺÉÉ VÉMÉÞ¦ªÉÉiÉ ** 329 Means let a man think well on wealth and strive to win it by the path of law and by worship: And let him take counsel with his own inner wisdom, and grasp with spirit still greater ability. A man should obtain wealth by honest and rightful means, and become progressively efficient by taking thought with himself. Rita, eternal moral law, should guide all attempts at growing rich. 330

2.2.1.4.2.3. Ethical Virtues of K āma: Kāma is the third pursuit or objective of life. It involves the sexual gratification and fulfillment of worldly desires. It is born out of attraction and attachment at the physical and mental levels. Kāma as a value must be distinguished from lust or desire for carnal gratification. Thus unrestrained desire for sensual enjoyment or carnal gratification is not accepted as a value. It is a value provided, it is pursued in accordance with moral and social norms.

2.2.1.4.2.3.1. Ethics of marriage institution in Vedic Society: The Vēdas never condemned sex. On the contrary, all the Vēdic poet-philosopher or seers and sages were married citizens of the Vēdic society. They never taught the

328 . A.C.Bose, op. cit. P. 241. 329 . Rg-Vēda, X.31.2. 330 . A.C.Bose, op. cit. P. 243. 184 morbid and negative ascetism. Nevertheless, they were men of outstanding moral and spiritual height. The bachelor, widow or widower had no right to participate in ceremonial religious sacrifices. The institution of marriage and family life were highly developed both in respect of utilitarian order of civilization as well as moral, intellectual, and spiritual order of culture. In matter of sex premature, premarital and extra martial sex is conspicuous by its absence in Vēdic society. It was never tolerated. Analyzing the concept of morality in the Vēdic times, Macdonell says: “The standard of morality was comparatively high, may be inferred from the fact that adultery and rape were counted among the most serious offences and illegitimate births were concealed”. 331 Thus Vēdic society was not a permissive society in which any one could have sex with any girl he happened to seduce; it was not a society on the level of primitive Communism in which anyone can have sexual relation with anyone whom he happens to encounter. This type of society is called ‘Orgy Society’ in modern times. The whole point of an Orgy Society is not to know who one’s partner is in sexual intercourse. Such a sexuality or sexual pleasure is not a value at all. On the contrary it goes against human values and reduces man and women to a meaningless and dehumanized hominid, such an attitude to sex reduces it to a commodity and body becomes a functioning machine. Such sex-perversion and absurdity were forbidden to thrive through the institution of marriage and family. Marriage was a sacred institution. Sex enjoyment within the norms of married life and social life was permitted and enjoined. The householder’s stage in life is very much lauded by the later traditionalist and law givers like Manu. But it also has its social obligation. Sex for sex’s sake was never advocated by the ancient seers and sages. It was tried to man’s procreative needs and social obligations. But one thing is certain that sex was never treated as sin in Vedic times. On the contrary, its creative value was well-acknowledged by them. Natural urges and drives including sex are organic needs and hence their proper satisfaction is a value provided they do not go against the spirit of higher values and consequently fails to make man happy. Sex, if properly practiced becomes a source of personal affection and harmony in family life as well as a social life. Understood, in this sense it is a great source of emotional values, while satisfying higher human needs like need for meaning, need to love and to be loved, need to belong, need for affiliation. Notwithstanding that marriage is a committed relationship, or a kind of pledged togetherness, it also brings a closeness of meeting and a profound sense of

331 .A.A. Macdonell, History of Sanskrit Literature, New Delhi, Munshiram, Manoharlal, 1061, p. 164. 185 responsibility. 332 Even Vatsyayana does not give us an ideal of a lustful bachelor. Commenting on this Krisna Chaitanya writes: “Vātsyayana’s Kāmas ūtras gives us the ideal of the Nagarak. Surprisingly enough, he is not an irresponsible bachelor but a married man. His wife is presiding deity of the household”. 333 According to Gītā, Lust, Anger and Greed are the three gateways to hell. Thus Kāma or lust is placed in first place, because it can lead to both anger and creed. It is follows from the above discussion that while we have to satisfy Kāma to a desirable level, it has to keep under check in order to make life useful and peaceful. It may be relevant to mention that the observance of principles of Dharma , which play a vital role in the curbing and control of unwanted and harmful desires.

2.2.1.4.2.4. The Mok ṣa- Final Goal of Life: Mok ṣa is the fourth and final objective of life. It is the final goal, which implies a state of liberation from misery and pain. It is state of ‘perfect Bliss’ or Ānanda, after attaining which nothing more remained to be attained. Hence it must be realized that this soul is not a petty empirical little ego but, it is expressed by the Vēdic Sages, the divinity in man and that the Divine in the universe and the Divine in the man are the same. They are not two entities. The Yajur Vēda identifies the true self in man with the Universal-self – ‘Yo’ s āvasau puruso so’ham asmi’ 334 The spirit ( Puru ṣa) that is in the sun, that spirit am I. Axiologically, the realization of this ontological facts leads to bliss of eternal felicity, it is the same as realizing immortality – Amaratva, Am ṛtava ( Spiritual liberation). According to Swami Dayananda, immortality is synonymous with emancipation. 335 The Vēdic concept of Mok ṣa is not a term of escapism because they did not preach the doctrine of running away from life and the world. Their outlook towards the world is affirmative and positive. But the trouble with this world is that it cannot fully satisfy man. One has to realize what Julian Huxley calls, ‘the higher level of being’ which gives man greater fulfillment and deeper satisfaction. This spiritual development approach gives direction and meaning to the whole of human life. Mere material

332 . S.G.Nigal, op. cit. pp.62f. 333 . Krishna Chaitanya, New History of Sanskrit Literature, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1962, p. 24. 334 . Yajur Vēda 40.17 335 . Swami Dayananda, An Introduction to the Commentary on the V ēdas, tramsalated from the Sanskrit by Pandit Shasiri Ram, New Delhi, Janagyan Prakashan, 1973, p. 77. 186 prosperity either of the individual or of the society and even the maintenance of society cannot constitute the highest idea of human life. It ultimately consists only in self- realization or the direct knowledge of the Ultimate Reality. Hence, the final or consumatory value consist in spiritual realization in which one finds complete fulfillment and plenitude of joy. Man cannot be fully satisfied by power or self. He has to lead the life of spirit which consists in pursuing the realization of higher values. The approach makes even the pursuit of secular values geared to the achievement of moral perfection and spiritual liberation in which one gets the fulfillment of one’s spiritual aspirations. In this connection, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the great champion of activitism, write: “Although we accept the maintenance of society as being the chief outward use of Dharma yet we never loss sight of the Ātma Kalyana or Mok ṣa (spiritual realization or emancipation) which is the highest ideal according to the Vēdic religion and which is the special feature of our view point. Further, emphatically stressing the importance and supremacy of the spiritual value of self realization, he writes,’ whether maintenance of the society or material welfare of all, if these principles obstruct the Atmalogical Realization, we do not want them”. 336 There is no explicit theory of ethics in Upani ṣhad , but it is implicit in their teaching. S.Radhakrishnan states: The Upani ṣhads insist on the importance of ethical life. They repudiate the doctrine of self sufficiency of the ego and emphasizes the practice of moral virtues. Man is responsible for his act. 337 Since the prime concern of the Upani ṣhadic teaching is not to elucidate the norms for ethical living, but to present the outlines for the ultimate concerns of man, i.e. his self realization with the Absolute, the Br āhma ṇa. This ultimate concern of the Upni ṣhadic man is well presented the Bṛhad-Āra ṇyaka Upani ṣhad verses: Led me from the unreal to the real ! Lead me from darkness to light ! Lead me from death to immortality! (BAU 1.3.27) 338 The implicit ethical reflections in the Upni ṣhadic period are spread out in different Upani ṣhads and these ethical reflections are based on two dogmatic principles or laws: the law of karma and law of dharma. As regards karma and its fruits, we have seen that it has been held in the Upani ṣads that rebirth is determined by one’s action. There is one important point

336 . Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Bhagavad G īta: Rahasya or Karma Yoga śhāstra, transalated into English by B.S.Sukthankar, 1935, Vol. I, pp. 91f. 337 . S. RadhaKrsnan, The Principle Upani ṣhad s, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1953, p. 104 338 . F. Max Muller, ed, The Upani ṣhad s, Part II, New York, Dover Publications, Inc, 1962, pp. 83f. 187 which needs mention here. In the Upani ṣads we find meditation taking the place of actual worship. Thus one could attain the same results, or even more, by meditation, than by actual performance of sacrifices. These points to the emphasis that was laid on the intellectual or spiritual aspect of an action than on the external. 339

2.2.1.5. Law of Karma: The life of the individual is very much shaped by his own action. He is conditioned by his Karma. His present life patterned in accordance with the past actions and his future is well conditioned in accordance with the present deeds. According to one’s good or bad actions in the present life one passes at death into the body of higher or lower being. One’s thoughts and deeds are very much influential in the process of next birth. According to one’s deeds the embodied assumes forms in various bodies , Bṛhad-Āra ṇyaka Upani ṣhad : ‘verily, one becomes good by good action, bad by bad action,’ again in another place it presents good and evil conduct in term of good and evil actions: ‘Accordingly as one acts, accordingly one conducts himself, so does he become good. The doer of evil becomes evil. One becomes virtuous by virtuous action, bad by bad action’ (BAU 4.4.5). 340 Karma (action, intent and consequences), Sams āra (cycle of rebirth), and the various Yogas (paths or practices to attain mok ṣa). 341

2.2.1.6. Law of Dharma: The various Upani ṣhads state the necessity of practice of virtues. Deussen refers to Ch āndogy and Taittiriya Upani ṣhad . In Ch āndogy Upani ṣhad , life is regarded allegorically as a great soma festival. In this miniature ethical system in five words is incidentally interwoven, when as the reward of sacrifice ( dakshi ṇa), which is to be offered at the great sacrificial feast of life, are named:- (i) Tapas, asceticism; (ii) dānam, liberality; (iii) Arjavam, right dealing, (iv) ahi ṁsā, no injury to life; and (v) satyavac’anam, truthfulness. 342 In Taittiriya Upani ṣhad , twelve duties are enumerated, by the side of each of which ‘learning and teaching of the Vēda ’ are constantly enjoined. These are: Right dealing and truthfulness, asceticism, self-restraint, and tranquility; and as duty of a householder, maintenance of sacred fire and agnihotram, hospitality and courtesy, duties

339 . Ibid, p.13 340 . Robert Ernest Hume, ed., The Thirteen Principal Upani ṣhad s, Madras, Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1949, pp. 110ff. 341 . Klostermaier Kiaus, A Survey of Hinduism , New York, State University Press,2007, p. 46-52. 342 . George Olivera, Virtues in Diverse Tradition, Bangalore, Asian Trading Corpo., 1998 pp. 141f 188 to children, wives and grand-children. Ninian Smart briefly point outs ethical teaching in Mu ṇḍ aka and , Bṛhad-Āra ṇyaka Upni ṣhads : Mu ṇḍ aka Upni ṣhad refer to five virtues of austerity ( tapas ), giving, right conduct, non-injury ( ahi ṁsā) and truthfulness , Bṛhad- Āra ṇyaka Upni ṣhad sums up morals into three: self control ( dāma) , giving ( dāna ), and mearcy ( day ā).343 The Āra ṇyaka and the Upni ṣhadic teaching presuppose the āśrmadharma , that is life of the individual is well compartmentalized into four stages ( Āśrama ). 344 Jean Antoine Dubois illustrates the good virtues practiced by the individual by following the various life stages. The Brahmac āri who devote his time to the study the Vedic scripture is respectful and totally submissive in obedience to his parents and teacher, and affable to his equals. 345 The gṛahastha , is the house dweller and his duties to his family are the prime concern at this stage of his life. The name of gṛahastha is, strictly speaking, given to those who are married, and who already have children. 346 The vānprastha who must renounce the society, even of his own caste and must live in the jungle, has to observe his brahminic ritual duties in scrupulous accuracy. He has to practice virtues of justice, honesty, compassion and must teach these virtues to others by precepts and example. 347 And the Sanny āsi’s first and most important duty is to destroy, root and branch, any feelings of attachment that may still linger in his heart for the world and its vain pleasures. 348 Upani ṣads which are the concluding portions of the Vēdas , i.e. Vēdanta are speculations in philosophy, as also mystical utterances revealing the most profound spiritual truths. And it is they that constitute, in fact the foundation of Hindu philosophy. Even western scholars have been amazed at the lofty heights scaled by the Upani ṣadic thinkers. Max Muller compare the philosophy of the Upani ṣads to the light of the morning and to the pure air of the mountains – so simple, so true, if once understood. Schopenhaur, who was in the habit, before going to bed, of performing his devotion from the pages of the Upani ṣads , regarded them as the solace of his life and left sure that they would be the solace of his death. In the 1 st Volume of the Sacred Books of East Series, where Max Muller quote from Dara Shukoh Anquetil Duperron, Schopenhauer’s Ponega, 3 rd edn, p. No. 426, that –

343 . Ibid, p. 142. 344 . S. RadhaKrishnan,, The heart of Hinduism, Madras, G.A.Natson & Co., 1945, p. 30 345 . Jean Antoine Dubois, Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies trans. Henry K. Beauchamp, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1905, p. 171 346 . Ibid, p. 236 347 . Ibid, pp. 505ff. 348 . Ibid, p. 528 189

“I feel the most perfect confidence in reading that translation, and that confidence soon receives its most perfect justification. For how entirely does the Oupnekhat breathe throughout the holy spirit of the Vēdas ! How is everyone who by a diligent study of its Persian Latin has become familiar with that incomparable book, stirred by that spirit to the very depth of his soul! How does every line display its firm, definite, and throughout harmonious meaning! From every sentence deep, original and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit. Indian air surrounds us, and original thoughts of kindred spirits. And oh, how thoroughly is the mind here washed clean of all early engrafted Jewish superstitions, and of all philosophy that cringes before those superstitions! In the whole world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Oupnekhat. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death!” 349

2.2.1.7. Vitrue And Vices of Vedic Period: The Vedic people seemed to have a simple code of morale. The performance of sacrifices was regarded as the principle virtue which was rewarded by the attainment of heaven. Along with this idea of ritual virtue, there also grew the concept of social virtues and vices, such as truth and falsehood, charity and absence of generosity, and so on. Virtues were eulogized, not for their own sake, as having any intrinsic value of their own, but as means to the attainment of pleasure in this and other world. 350 Truth has always been praised and falsehood condemned. The concept of truth might have been originally associated with the immutable relation of uttering the mantras and their consequences. 351 Among the sins mentioned lying is very strongly condemned. Crimes of fraud and violence are also condemned. To cheat others, to lay a snare for another, to be evil minded and arrogant, are sin that have been prohibited. One may suffer not only for one’s misdoing, but may be involved in the sin of others as well, notably those committed by the fore-father. Sin has often been compared to fetters or a noose which one cannot shake off; and Aditi and Varuna are invoked for releasing the bonds. Sin is thus conceived as something the presence of which brings harmful

349 . Max Muller, Sacred Books of the East Series, Vol. 1, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1879, p.vii. 350 . Surma Dasgupta, op. cit. p. 54. 351 . Ibid , p.55. 190 consequences, and the worshipper of the Gods is anxious that he may be free from punishments either in hell or in this life. The inner sense of purity, freedom from moral guilt necessary for spiritual regeneration seems to be absent. All that concern the Vedic people is the harm that may befall them in consequence of sins. 352 Besides truth, the virtues which have been emphasized in the Vēdas are tapas , brahmacarya, sraddha , liberality (dāna ), hospitality, friendship, non cheating, and non- violence. Similarly, the vices that have been so often emphasized are lying, gambling, arrogance etc. While some of these have social implication (liberality ( dāna )), hospitality, non cheating etc), other pertains to individual morality ( tapas, brahmacarya etc.) Thus in Ṛgveda the morals are of a very simple nature, as the primitive society does not yet know any intricacies of a more advanced civilization; yet the appreciation of truth, chastity, condemnation of lies, arrogance, fraud and violence shows that the people have the fundamentals of religious and social virtues. We find in Atharva Vēda the hymn often consist of charms, with a view to the attainment of long life, healing of diseases, discomfiture of rivals and the like. The Gods have been divested of all there grandeur and moral qualities, and a host of all varieties of spiritual beings have been postulated for the good or injury of men; these spirits and rituals have ousted the gods as it were. The existence after death in the world of the fathers (pit ṛs) is admitted and the departed are believed to possess great power of doing good or injury to men on earth, and, therefore a number of hymns has been dedicated to them to win their favour. From the hymns to the father it appears that the people believed that all men after death were invested with such powers, but from the concept of punishment and reward of deeds in hell and heaven, from the description of a possible downward course for those whose funeral rites were not properly attended to, it seems that karma as condition of future well being or suffering was admitted. 353 In a later period the ideas of after-life and retribution of karmas were spun out into a systematic theory. Further two different currents flowed in different courses : one in the ritualistic line, then in social, and legal laws and rules of conduct in the sūtra and Dharma- śā stras , and the other in the intellectual and spiritual aspect culminating in the Upanis ̩ ads and hence in so many philosophical schools of thought. These two ideals are of entirely different types. In the sam ṃhit ā, the Br āhma ṇa, and the sūtras, performances of sacrifices are emphasized for the well being of mundane life, the aim is

352 . Ibid , p.9. 353 . Ibid , p. 10. 191 directed to material gain and prosperity, and in the Dharma- śā stras the concept of personal well being has been welded with that of social good and stability. But in the Upanis ̩ ads we find concept of good and evil of worldly life and experience the ideal is concern with spiritual uplift and regeneration of man which can be attained by negating this worldly life, its joys and sorrows, and is therefore transcendental. 354 Commenting on the Vedic period Purusottama Bilimoria notes: “Despite overall ritualistic worldview, the Vedic hymn do praise certain humanistic virtues and moral ideas, such as truthfulness ( Satya ), giving ( dāna ), reatraint ( dāma ) austerities ( tapas ), affection and gratitude, fidelity, forgiveness, non-theft, non-cheating, giving others their just desert, and avoiding injury or hi ṁsa to all creatures. 355

2.2.1.8. Ethical Standards of Upani ṣhads: The Upani ṣads , on the whole, maintain that the ultimate reality underlying the universe to Br āhma ṇa with whom the essential element in man, the Ātman, is identical (tat tvam asi). The ultimate end of the man Mok ṣa, lying in knowing this identity of self with the Br āhma ṇa. But this knowledge is not achieved by mere intellectual training. It requires purity of character and conduct. As KathaUpani ṣad says, ‘Not he who has not ceased from evil conduct ( du ṣcarta) can obtain Him by knowledge’. So good conduct is a necessary condition for realizing the unity between the Self and the Br āhma ṇa, Bṛhd āra ṇyaka Up. clerely says that identity with Br āhma ṇa is impossible for one who has not become “calm, subdues, quiet, enduring and collected”, 356 These are the virtues connected with individual morality, in the Taitt īriya Up, it is mentioned that when student is about to depart from his teacher after getting education the teacher exhorts the departing student by saying “Speak the truth ( Satyam Vada), practice virtues (dharma cara)” This shows that the Upani ṣadic teacher is not only concern about the intellectual training of the pupil, but about his moral perfectness also. 357 The ethical virtues (or duties) so often emphasized in the Upani ṣads are – satya (truth), yaj nā (sacrifice), tapas (penance), dāna (liberality), adhayayana (study of the Vēdas ), self control, compassion, right dealing, etc. One can see very clearly the list includes virtues regarding both the individual and social morality. While yajna, tapas, adhayayana , self control may be taken as example of the former, truth, liberality,

354 . Ibid , p.10,11 355 . Purusottama Bilimoria, et al, Indian Ethics, Hamosphire, England, Ashgate Publis. Ltd., 2007, p. 45 356 . Bṛh. Up. 4.4.23. . 357 . Kedar Nath Tiwari, Classical Indian Ethical Thought, Delhi, Motilal Banarasidass Publisheres Private Limited, 2007, p. 50 192 compassion, right dealing etc. may be taken as example of the later. However, there has been emphasis on the former virtues in the Upani ṣads . Than the latter. The pupil is interested to observe , tapas, yajna, adhayayana and dāna as a part of dharma . In Pra śna Up. Tapas, brahmacarya and sraddha are regarded as indispensable conditions of knowledge. Similarly sama ( tranquality), and dāma (self-control) are also duty emphasized.358

2.2.1.9. Concept of Ṛta – Moral Order: The concept of Ṛta as found in Ṛgveda. Ṛta means ‘the course of things’ or ‘the course of nature’. It comes from root Ṛ which means to join, to bind together skillfully, to fit into one another. The word Ṛta has the same meaning as the English word ‘right’ in its sense of straight, correct and true. But the truth meant here is the practical or ethical truth, or rather the correspondence of an action to the Vedic injunction, including rites. Macdonell ( Vedic Mythology p. 11) observed that this word was also used to denote the ‘order’ in the moral world as truth or ‘right’ and in the religious world as ‘sacrifice’ or ‘rite’ 359 Ṛta is the physical order. It governs the uniformities of nature. Ṛta reigns everywhere, i.e. in the sky, in the sun, in mountain, in sacrifices, and in truth. It is the course of nature, i.e. natural order. The sacrifices should conform to Ṛta. That is, the law of rites. It is the social law, the law of truth, right, and justice. Thus, it is the moral law. Varu ṇas the custodian of moral law or Ṛta. He supports the right, and punishes the sinful, He is the God encompassing the whole universe and rewarding those who follow Ṛta. Varuna is identical with the Greek deity ‘Ouranos’, meaning the god of heaven and the Ahura Mazda of the Avest ā.360 It may be regarded as the foundational source of morality in India. In its original form the concept is found to be a repository of cosmic order, specially the order of the heavenly bodies, the day and night and the various seasons. 361 In a sense it is fundamental source of the whole of Indian institution of moral life. Bloomfield remarks regarding Ṛta that “We have connection with the Ṛta a pretty complete system of ethics, a kind of counsel of perfection.” 362 The first essential of Dharma, then, is Truth. The

358 . Ibid 359 . Benedict Kanakappally, Kala Aharya, et. al., edt., Hindu Christian Dictionary, Mumbai, Somaiya Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2017, p.204 360 . Ibid, pp. 204f. 361 . Kedar Nath Tiwari, op. cit. , p. 119. 362 . Bloomfield, Religion of V ēdas, Delhi, Indological Book House, 1972, p. 125. 193 second is ‘Ṛta’. Eternal order, Eernal Law. In its moral aspects Ṛta is cognate with truth. Ṛta and Satya are spoken of by the Ṛg-Vēda as being born ‘born ardone’. As Satya upholds the earth, so does Ṛta upholds the heaven. Ṛta in its moral aspect, however, is wider than truth; it includes justice and goodness, and is almost synonymous with Dharma as an ethical concept. So Ṛta is opposed to evil and the opposition is severe; therefore it is spoken of as ‘stern and fierce’ ( ugram )363 Beyond this identification of Ṛta with truth there is little definite mention of ethical qualities that go to form its content. The ‘pretty complete ethical system’ of which Bloomfield speaks certainly is not more than an embryonic one. We have references to Brihaspati, the ‘upholder of the mighty Law’ as ‘punisher of the guilty’ and ‘guilt-avenger’; the Adityas, ‘true to eternal Law’, are the ‘debt-exactors’ the prayer is offered to Varuna that he would loose the worshipper ‘from sin as from a bond that binds me: may we swell, Varuna, thy spring of Order’. We find these and other gods be sought to lose their worshippers from sin and to forgive sin. It is clear search in vain for clear indications as to forms that conduct, in accordance with Ṛta takes as against conduct that is sinful. Not only so, but in following the scattered hints that we find as to the content of morality, it is difficult to discover any guiding thread. The conception of Ṛta is so wide in its application that it loses correspondingly in depth. 364 Ṛta has been shown to be identified with truth: truth is a principle that belongs to the constitution of the universe. As a natural application of this, truthfulness is demanded of man, and lying is condemned as a sin. In one prayer, the Waters are entreated to remove far from the worshipper the sin of lying or false swearing. The sin of ‘injuring with double tongue a fellow mortal’s held up for condemnation. We meet in one hymn the protest, ‘I use no sorcery with might or falsehood’, and the indignant exclamation, ‘Agni, who guard the dwelling-place of falsehood? Who are protectors of the speech of liars?’ In a notable hymn Indra-Soma are praised as in a special way the supporters of truth and enemies of falsehood. Soma slays him who speaks untruly, and protects that which is true and honest. The prayer is offered that the speaker of untruth may be ‘like water which the hollowed hand compresses’. And special punishment is invoked on false accusers.’ 365 Crimes of fraud and violence are condemned. To injure with double tongue a fellow mortal, ‘to cheat as gamesters cheat at play’, to lay a snare for another, to threaten another without offence of his, to be evil-minded, arrogant, rapacious, are sins against

363 . A.C.Bose, op. cit. pp. 42f. 364 . J. McKanzie, Hindu Ethics, London, Oxford University Press, 1022, pp. 8f. 365 . Ibid, p. 10. 194 one’s fellow-men that are held up to reprobation. The hatred even of enemies is more than once referred to as sinful. The adversary, thief, and robber, those who destroy the simple and harm the righteous, the malicious - upon these judgment is invoked. Notable also is the place that is given to friendship. In a hymn to the praise of Vach (speech) it is said that he who has abandoned his friend who knows the truth of friendship has no part in Vach ; ‘naught knows he of the path of righteous action’. In all this there is nothing specially significant. The virtues and vices are such as we expect to see marked in such an early type of society; they are such as are connected with the very coherence of a society maintaining itself amid hostile peoples. 366

2.2.2. The Jaina Philosophy:

The word Jaina is derived from ‘Jina’ which means ‘conqueror’ – one who has conquered his passions and desires, it is applied to liberated souls who have conquered passions and desires and karmas and obtained emancipation. The Jaina believe in 24 Tīrtha ṅkaras or ‘founders of faith’ through whom their faith has come down from fabulous antiquity. Of these first was Ṛṣabhadeva and the last, Mah āvīra , the great spiritual hero, whose name was Vardham āna . Mah āvīra the last prophets, cannot be regarded as the founder of Jainism, because even before him, Jaina teachings were existence. But Mah āvīra gave a new orientation to that faith and for all practical purposes, modern Jainism may be rightly regarded as a result of his teaching. He flourished in the sixth century B.C. and was a contemporary of the Buddha. His predecessor, the 23 rd Tīrtha ṅkara, Pārshvan ātha is also historical personage who lives in the eighth century B.C. 367 The most important part of Jaina philosophy is its ethics, metaphysics and epistemology. in fact knowledge of any kind is useful for Jaina in so far as it help him to right conduct. The goal of right conduct again is salvation ( Mok ṣa) which means negatively removal of all bondage of the soul and positively attainment of the perfection. 368

The Jaina ethics which are normally interpreted on individual and collective aspects centre round the individual perfection on one hand and social welfare on the

366 . Ibid, p. 10. 367 . Dr. Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Delhi, Motilala Banarasidass, p. 48. 368 . Satishchandra Chatterjee, Dhirendramohan Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Delhi, Motilal Banarashidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2016, p. 98. 195 other. This trend resembled the Stoicism of early Greek thought which also emphasized individual austerity and universal social well-being. 369

2.2.2.1. Ethical Classification of Tattva-The Jaina Categories: 370

The Jainas admits nine categories, namely, the jīva (self), the ajīva (matter), pu ṇya (good), Pāpa (bad), āsrava (passion), samvara (control), bandha ( bondage), vinirjar ā (purification) and mok ṣa (liberation. Of these, the jīva or the self, is characterized by consciousness, and ajīva is its opposite. The latter again is of five kinds, namely, dharma, adharma, ākāś a, kāla and pudgala . All the existents of the world can be brought under these two divisions: jīva and ajīva . Attributes like knowledge, colour, taste and others, which may belongs to substances, actions, and the problem of universal and the inseparable relation of inherence, can have no status without the jīva and the ajīva. The categories of sorrow and its origin, as have been accepted by the Buddhist, can have no separate existence since jīva and ajīva permeate the whole universe. It cannot be said that in that case the categories of pu ṇya and Pāpa , also, become useless on the ground that these can likewise be subsumed under the all permeating categories of jīva and ajīva, for they serve other ends. It has been laid down in the scriptures that samvara (control) and nirjar ā (purging of passions), are necessary for the attainment of salvation, āsrava (passions) for bondage, pu ṇya and apu ṇya (good and evil) for the Sa ṃsāra or the cycle of existence. These again have their respective subdivisions which have seen enunciated in the Tattv ārth ādhigama-sūtra .

1. The J īvā – Knowledge (general and particular), good conduct, happiness and misery, vigour, propriety or impropriety, attainability by pram āṇas or ways of knowing, essence of substance, capacity of maintaining life and of being modified by anger and such other emotions, the state of being in the Sa ṃsāra and of being free and the capacity of being distinguished from others, are the attributes which characterize a jīva.

2. Aj īva (Matter) – Ajīva is the opposite of jīva. It is inert, different and not different from ajñ āna (ignorance) and such other qualities. It does not continue from birth to birth, nor is the agent of any action, nor does it experience the consequences It is of five kinds, dharma, adharma, ākāś a, kāla and pudgala . Dharma is that which pervades the lokas

369 .V.N.K. Reddy op. cit. , p. 17 370 .Surama Dasgupta, op. cit. pp. 189ff. 196

(worlds), eternal, formless, exists in space, pervading infinite number of space-point and is conductive to motion. Adharma has all characteristics of dharma , only with this difference that it is conductive to rest instead of motion. Dharma and adharma pervades the lok ākāś a or the world, and therefore, the jīvas can move therein and when liberated they remain stationary at the top of it, but cannot migrate into the alok ākāś a because that can devoid of dharma and adharma .

Ākāś a or space is also eternal and all pervasive, it offers facilities for extension. It is again two kinds: lok ākāś a and alok ākāś a. Lok ākāś a are that which gives facilities of extension to those substances which can exist in space and does not generate the capacity of extension in them. Alok ākāś a is that which has no capacity of facilitating extension, but, since there is no dharma or adharma beyond the world, it does not have to do so.

Kāla or time is that subtle indivisible element which is manifested by the sunrise and such other phenomena, and which is the condition of changes in the thing by which they are distinguished as past, present or future or previous or succeeding. It is condition of the modificatory operation of the changes in vegetation, other forms of life and human bodies in their various stages as childhood, youth and decay. It is not generating cause of things, but things having being, exist in time, so it is also called the apek ṣā-kāra ṇa. It is substance and operates only in the human world.

Pudgala or matter is characterized by touch, taste, smell and colour. Of these succeeding ones depend on the preceding qualities. Of the six substances, Jīva is the principle of life and consciousness, pudgula is the principle of matter and constitutes the body of the Jīvās under bondage, while dharma, adharma, kāla and ākāś a are the accessories for the movement, change and stay of both the pudgala as also of jīva . jīva is the foremost of all the categories since the problem of karma , rebirth, the ethical path and the final goal, namely, liberation, are all centralized in the jīva as the pivot.

3 & 4. Pu ṇya and P āpa (Good and Evil) - Good or pu ṇyas has been defined by physical imagery as also from the stand-point of its consequences. Pāpa or evil has always been defined as that which is opposed to pu ṇya . These pu ṇyas and Pāpas are neither too massive nor too subtle. The jīva draws in the karma matter which is capable of being transformed into pu ṇya and pāpa and which lies embedded in the same space as

197 his and he can draw it only when he is afflicted by anger and jealousy, just as a person anointed with oil can be smeared with dust.

5. Āsrava (Passion) - It has been defined as that modification of the soul by which the karmas enter it. It has also been defines as that form which the karmas flow. Elsewhere it has been described by analogy as well. Just as water enter a lake by channel, so karmas enter a soul through āsravas . The point is that āsravas are the impure elements by which the soul is polluted, and by this pollution the way is prepared for the influx of actions into the soul. If it is asked how do these impure elements come to be associated with the soul which is pure by its nature, the answer seems to be that these are caused by the previous actions. Tattv āarth ādhigama-sūtra distinguishes three types of action or yoga : the physical, mental, and vocal. All these three types are known as āsrava because good or bad actions flow from them. Yoga here means the potency of actions which actualizes itself into concrete acts. The āsravas are broadly divided into two classes : (1) bh āvāsrava (2) dravy āsrava , or karm āsrava. The bh āvāsrava are of five kinds, which in their turn, have many sub-divisions : (1) Mithy ātva (falsity), (2) avirati (lack of self control), (3) Pram āda (inadvertence or falling off the standard), (4) yoga (activity of the mind, speech and body), (5) ka ṣāya (the four passion, namely, anger, pride, deceit and greed. Of these Mithy ātva is of five kinds : (a) ek ānta- mithy ātva, (b) Viparita-mithy ātva , (c) Vinaya-mithy ātva (d) Sa ṃś aya-mithy ātva, (e) Ajñ āna-mithy ātva.

Avirati, non-cessation, or lack of control, is also of five kinds, (a) hi ṃsā (spirit or injury), (b) an ṛta (falsehood), (c) caurya (stealing), (d) abrahma (incontinence), (e) parigrah ākāṃak ṣā (desire to accept a thing which is not given ). Parigraha has been described by Um āsv āti as the desire for anything internal or external, in any object conscious or unconscious. He takes these five as prohibited or avratas, from which one must cease and cultivate the positive virtues known as vratas . One should think of the futility and defects of injury, and of falsehood as also of the miseries that come out of them. Thus one should picture before one’s mind that the spirit of injury begets injury in return and inauspicious results after death. Besides, by analogy, a person should think that as misery is undesirable to him so it is to all other beings and, therefore, he should not injure others . So also he should abstain from theft. He is also directed to meditate on the positive virtues and to counteract evil tendencies. He should cultivate friendliness (Maitri ) towards all being: ‘I am friend of all, and have no enmity towards anybody.’ He should delight in the superiority of good men ( pramoda ), feel compassion for the 198 distressed ( kāru ṇya ) and indifference ( madhy āsthya ) towards the arrogant or haughty. Injury here means destruction of life, and the body, mind, and speech have been taken to be the joint factors for such an action. This indicate that if an act of violence be purely physical, as may be due to some accident, and mind does not co-operate, that may not be entitled as him ṣā. Thus the ground for distinguishing between an intentional and unintentional action is laid down here.

The third bhavasrava, the Pram āda , or inadvertence, to be careless about one’s owns self and its impurities. It consists of vikath ā (reprehensible talk), ka ṣāya (passion) Indr īya (to be dominated by the senses), Nidr ā (sleep), and Rāga (attachment). Of these, ka ṣāya being an important factor itself. Yoga implies the potential or latent tendency of physical, mental and vocal actions, which, in a later stage, transform themselves into the corresponding acts, or karma material.

Ka ṣāya are four in numbers, namely, anger, pride, deceit and greed. These admit of variations in degrees. In some works, other state states as hāsya (laughter), rati (pleasure), arati (pain), śoka (grief), bhava (fear), jugups ā (hatred), and the knowledge of different sexes, have been enumerated as no-ka ṣāya, i.e. as a sub-division of Ka ṣāya in a neutral manner. The word Ka ṣāya is derived from root Ka ṣ (to injure), Ka ṣs is that by which living beings hurt one another or Ka ṣa is that by which they are possessed by physical and mental suffering.

6. Bandha (Bondage) - As a result of the influx of karma matter into the soul, certain changes takes place, which checks the freedom of soul and keep it in bondage (bandha) of the jīva , and cause him to undergo various experiences of the Sa ṃsāra . This bandha , like other characteristics of the soul, has been viewed from two stand-points : (1) the bh āva-bandha , that is, when due to the influx of karmas through āsravas , the soul is excited with attachment or aversion, and is thus tied down by those mental states, and (2) the dravya-bandha which involves, as a result of the bh āva-bandha , the actual interpenetration of the karma -matter with the soul.

7. The Samvara (Control) - Samvara has been defined as that which steps the causes of karmas, i.e . āsravas . This means, therefore, the controlling of passions. This has again been looked at from the internal aspects as bh āvasamvara, and dravysamvara , bh āvasamvara implies the internal opposition to pollution (by controlling the senses and 199 the mind), while the stoppage of actual influx of karmas is the dravysamvara . The Vardham ānapur āṇa, XVI. 67.68, defines bh āvasamvara as a particular modification of consciousness which is free from attachment and aversion, and dravysamvara as the observance of great vows taken by the yogins , which stops all kind of influx. This bh āvasamvara has many sub-divisions of which the principle divisions as follows :

(1) vrata, which are of five kinds, namely , ahi ṁsā (non-injury), satya (truthfulness), asteya (non-stealing), Brahmacarya (continence), and aparigraha (absence of desire for, and non acceptance of things)

(2) Samitis which are also of five kinds (a) īrya : using paths trodden by others so as not to cause injury to any creature which may be lying therein, (b) bh āṣā: gentle and beneficial talk, (c) eṣaṇā: receiving alms, and avoiding the faults mentioned in the śā stras , (d) ad ānanik ṣepa : receiving and keeping things which are necessary for religious purpose only (e) utsanga : attending to calls of nature in unfrequented places.

(3) Gupti or restraint, again, is of three kinds : kāya-gupti , control of the movement of the body, vāg-gupti , restraint of speech, so as not to utter bad langusge, manogupti , control of the mind, regarding forbidden thoughts.

(4) Dharma , or observance of certain rules of conduct, is of ten kinds and consists in practising some of the vratas as also some additional virtues in higher degrees. These are : uttam-karma : highest forgivenesss; uttam-mārdava : deepest humility; uttam-ārjava : sincerest straightforwardness: uttam-satya pracising highest truth; uttam-śauca : excellent cleanliness; uttam-samya ṃa: greatest restraint; uttam-tapas : excellent penance; uttam- ty āga : highest renunciation; uttam-ākiñcanya : supreme indifference; uttam-Brahmacarya : complete celibacy.

(5) Anupreksa or reflection is of twelve kinds : (a) anity ānuprek ṣā, i.e. reflection on the transitory nature of the world, (b) asara ṇānuprek ṣā or thinking again and again that there is no refuge for us in the world except the knowledge of ultimate truth, (c) Sa ṃsārānuprek ṣā : reflecting on the cycle of worldly existence, (d) ekatv ānuprek ṣā: thinking that a person is solely responsible for his own acts whether hood or bad, (e) anyatv ānuprek ṣā : to feel that non-ego and the ego are separate, (f) aśucitv ānuprek ṣā: thinking that the body all that related with it, are unclean, (g) āsrav ānuprek ṣā : reflecting

200 on the cause of influx of action of karma, (h) samvar ānuprek ṣā: meditating on the nature of samvara or checking the influx of karma, (i) nirjar ānuprek ṣā : thinking of the removal of impurities that have polluted the soul, (j) lok ānuprek ṣā, contemplating on the nature of the soul, matter and other realities, (k) bodhidurlabh ānuprek ṣā, thinking of the difficulty of attaining perfect faith, perfect knowledge and perfect conduct, and (l) dharm ānuprek ṣā, reflecting on the essential principles of the universe.

(6) Pari ṣahajaya is the sixth type of samvara and means conquering all the troubles that may beset a hermit. It involves victory over hunger and thirst, feeling of insult, disappointment, sex attraction, distress due to physical, and mental cause and the like. This involves two kinds of victory over troubles.

(7) Cāritra or right conduct is of five kinds : (a) samayika-cāritra , equanimity or self possession, in which a person refrains during his whole life, or for a certain period from injury, falsehood, stealing, lust and acceptance of gifts. (b) chhedopasth āpan ā consist in a attempt to re-establish the balance after a fall from it. (c) Parth āra-vi śuddhi , purity attained by refraining from injury to living beings. (d) Sūkṣma-sampar āya: the state in which the passions have subsided. (e) Yath ākhy āta, perfect right conduct, in which all passions have been destroyed. Thus conduct involves different stages of development of one’s mind.

8. Nirjar ā (Release) - The destruction of karmas already done is nirjar ā or vinirjar ā. We have seen that by samvara we can stop further influx of karmas. But the question arises how can we be freed from the karmas that have already entered and polluted ourselves? The answer is that by nirjara or by shedding off, we can be freed from them. This nirjar ā or purgation of karmas is of two kinds, bh āva-nirjar ā and dravya-nirjar ā. The former involves that modification of the soul which precedes and favours the separation of karma matter from the soul. dravya-nirjar ā is the actual separation of karma from the soul. bh āva-nirjar ā is of two kinds : savip āka and avip āka, karmas are destroyed by two ways : (1) after their fruits are fully enjoyed, and (2) by penance, before they can yield their fruits. The first kind of nirjara come in natural course, for karma matter is liable to destruction after a proper period. As this disappearance takes place without the activity of a person, it is known as akāma nirjar ā. It cannot, however, be said that in that case all beings may be liberated without emerging for liberation; for though karma matter may be destroyed in its own course, there may be new influx of 201 action due to passions. So one should attempt not to accumulate further action which can be done by uprooting the passions from one’s mind and thus can one be liberated.

The second kind of nirjar ā takes place when accumulated actions are forced to disappear by austere penances without giving their results. This is attained by active effort and before reaping the fruits of past actions and, therefore, it is known as sakāma or avik āpa-nirjar ā.

9. The Mok ṣa (Liberation) - When the soul is purged all kinds of impurity, it attain mok ṣa or liberation. That modification of the soul which causes freedom from all pollutions and karma is bh āva-mok ṣa and actual state of liberation is dravya-mok ṣa. Mok ṣa is the absolute freedom from the body, the five senses, physical life and all the ties of virtues and vice (Pāpa and pu ṇya ), rebirth, and such others originating from ignorance, and is a state of infinite knowledge, bliss and activity. Some object to this definition saying that body being a produced thing, dissociation from it is not possible, but the absolute freedom from passions, which have no beginning , is really impossible.

2.2.2.2. Yoga and other virtues:

Hemacandra, in his Yoga śā stra:, deals elaborately with the ethical virtues, and praises the efficiency of yoga in removing karmas. Yoga destroys sins though these be many. It also destroys sins accrued not only in the present life but accumulated through cycles of births, just as a single spark of fire burns away fuel collected through a long course of time. Mok ṣa is the foremost of the four desirable ends of life, namely, dharmas (duties), artha (object of enjoyment), Kāma (desired ends), and mok ṣa (emancipation), and yoga leads to it. Jñ āna (knowledge), śraddha (faith), and cāritira (good conduct), are the three gems constituting yoga , Jñ āna , is first one, is the proper knowledge of jīva and ajīva. Faith in Jaina philosophy is the second gem; this can be natural or spontaneous or derived from the instructions of the teachers. The third gem is the good conduct which consists in giving up all the sinful actions with knowledge and faith. 371

371 . Ibid, p. 206-207. 202

2.2.2.3. Jaina Philosophy of Ethics 372 :

Given that the proper goal for a Jain is release from death and rebirth, and rebirth is caused by the accumulation of karma , all Jain ethics aims at purging karma that has been accumulated, and ceasing to accumulate new karma . Like Buddhists and Hindus, Jains believe that good karma leads to better circumstances in the next life, and bad karma to worse. However, since they conceive karma to be a material substance that draws the soul back into the body, all karma , both good and bad, leads to rebirth in the body. No karma can help a person achieve liberation from rebirth. Karma comes in different kinds, according to the kind of actions and intentions that attract it. In particular, it comes from four basic sources: (1) attachment to worldly things, (2) the passions, such as anger, greed, fear, pride, etc., (3) sensual enjoyment, and (4) ignorance, or false belief. Only the first three have a directly ethical or moral upshot, since ignorance is cured by knowledge, not by moral action.

The moral life, then, is in part the life devoted to breaking attachments to the world, including attachments to sensual enjoyment. Hence, the moral ideal in Jaina philosophy is an ascetic ideal. Monks (who, as in Buddhism, live by stricter rules than laymen) are constrained by five cardinal rules, the "five vows": (1) ahi ṁsā, frequently translated "non-violence," or “non-harming,” satya , or truthfulness, aṣteya , not taking anything that is not given, Brahmacarya , chastity, and aparigraha , detachment. This list differs from the rules binding on Buddhists only in that Buddhism requires abstention from intoxicants, and has no separate rule against attachment to the things of the world. The cardinal rule of interaction with other jīvas is the rule of ahi ṁsā. This is because harming other Jīvas is caused by either passions like anger or ignorance of their nature as living beings. Consequently, Jain s are required to be vegetarians. According to the earliest Jain documents, plants both are and contain living beings, although one-sensed beings, so even a vegetarian life does harm. This is why the ideal way to end one's life, for a Jain, is to sit motionless and starve to death. Mah āvīra himself, and other great Jain saints, are said to have died this way. That is the only way to be sure you are doing no harm to any living being.

372 Jain Philosophy internet, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,, http://www.iep.utm.edu/jain/ site visited on 29/12/2016 at 6.10 P.M 203

While it may seem that this code of behavior is not really moral, since it is aimed at a specific reward for the agent and is therefore entirely self-interested, it should be noted that the same can be said of any religion-based moral code. Furthermore, like the Hindus and Buddhists, Jain s believe that the only reason that personal advantage accrues to moral behavior is that the very structure of the universe, in the form of the law of karma , makes it so.

2.2.2.4. The Ethics of Jainism :373

The perfect Jain is an ascetic, humble, inoffensive, and unvindictive, Love as well as hate must be abandoned, because both are form of attachment. The chief virtues of Jainism are mendicant, ascetism, and non-injury. Mah āvīra enjoined upon the followers “Five great Vows” which prohibit killing, lying, stealing, all sexual pleasure, and attachments.

Like Buddhism, Jainism also is very near to Hinduism in the matter of essential teachings. But it is nearer to Buddhism that to Hinduism in one important respect of rejecting Vedic ceremonialism and sacrificialism. Like Buddhism, Jainism also takes ahi ṁsā to be the most important ethical virtue and consequently denounces the Vedic sacrifices. In the observance of ahi ṁsā, Jainism rather surpasses even Buddhism . But in so doing it sometimes invites annoyance and even ridicule. In the observance of ascetic virtues also, Jainism goes further than Buddhism , especially in the case of monks and this it seems more influenced by the Hindu concept of tapas . In general, however, the Jain morality consists in the essential observance of the pañcamah āvratas , which are the ingredient of right conduct. For the attainment of mok ṣa, Jainism prescribes a threefold path known as triratna (Three jewels). These are right faith ( samyagdar śana, right knowledge ( samyagjñ āna) and right conduct ( samyagcarita ). All the three are essential for the attainment of mok ṣa, but Jainism gives primary importance to the third without which it is useless to observe the former two. 374

373 Robert Ernest Hume, The Worlds Living Religions , New Delhi, Crest Publishing House, 2000, p. 49. 374 Kedar Nath Tiwari, op. cit. p.66.. 204

2.2.2.5. Moral Values of Jainism 375 :

Moral Values in Jainism are directed towards the deliverance of the person. Thus its orientation is religious. All beings seek bliss and try to avoid pain and loss. The practice of Dharma enables them to attain this end. The distinct feature of Jainism is the interconnection between religion and morality. According to H. S. Bhattacharya uniqueness of Jainism "Lies not only in emphasizing this all prominent condition of all religious and ethical activities but in justifying their position by looking upon morality, not as an adjunct to human nature, but as part and parcel of it." One needs to first learn to live a good life in this world and then yearn to go higher to divine perfection. Jainism has formulated two levels of religious existence: one which sets ethical standards for laymen, and one for monks.

376 2.2.2.6. Virtues of Jainism : Jainism presents the practice of ten great virtues for the one who sets out on the path toward perfection. These are Supreme Forbearance, Humility, Straight forwardness, Ideal Truthfulness, Purity, ideal Self-restraint, Austerity, Total Renunciation, Non- attachment, and Celibacy. These virtues are to regulate thought, speech, and action. They are a necessary part of Jain ethics, and are like "ten inextinguishable lamps" which illuminate the path of the beginner. Jainism does not separate between religion ( Dharma ) and morality because both are related to the well-being of the person in the world in keeping with his own nature. The word Dharma signifies the nature of things.

2.2.2.7. Path of Divine Practice in Jainism 377 : Jain religion encompasses a threefold path of divine practice. It includes right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. The three components are interrelated and interdependent and are known as "The Three Jewels", because of their value for redemption.

Right Faith - It is primary and first divine practice. It signifies belief in the Nirv āna of the divine teachers. It assumes a life based on principles and morality on the part of the

375 .http://www.indianetzone.com/59/moral_values_jainism.htm , accessed on 11/08/2017 at 4.30 p.m. 376 . Ibid. 377 . Ibid. 205 householder. The Holy Scriptures of Jainism describes the eight organs of right faith. Yasastilakacampu states that right faith is the "prime cause of redemption." Right Knowledge - this is the second divine practice that follows from faith. It is obtained by studying the teachings of the twenty four Jain Tirth ānkar ās as it is the basis of right conduct. It ranges all the way from sense knowledge to reasoning, clairvoyance, direct awareness of the thought forms of others and infinite knowledge (Kewal-Gyan). These represent progressive stages. Right knowledge encompasses the nature of things in this world. While discussing the qualities of materialistic particles, Jainism finds they are of infinite number. The qualities of a thing do not get exhausted by the comprehension of it, and there is always more than what meets the eye. Philosophically, this is known as the theory of non absolutism (Anekantavada) and calls for an attitude of openness. The limitations of knowledge state a style of relativity. The linguistic manner of expressing different qualities of matter is called Syadvada (the philosophy of qualified assertion). The style of Syadvada allows no room for assertions. This Jain theory of knowledge, that includes the two tenets of non-absolutism and relativity made an esteemed contribution towards liberalizing the mind of man. Right Conduct - it is the third divine practice. The Jain Holy Scriptures approaches this in progressive succession; conduct for householders and for monks. For the householders, the goal sought is the growth of the person and society. For the latter, it is self-realization. All aspirants dedicate themselves to proper conduct through vows (Vratas ) and sub-vows. Vows are an important part of Jain morality. These are taken with complete knowledge of their nature and a determination to carry them throughout life.

2.2.2.8. Meditation In Jain Scripture 378 : Meditation ( Dhy āna ) is the process of concentrating mind on a single topic; preventing it from wandering. Virtuous meditation can be practiced by a person with a physical constitution who can keep his thought-activity from drifting and concentrate solely on the nature of self. When the soul gets rid of all auspicious and inauspicious intentions and dilemmas, and attains a state of unbiased absorption in all bonds of karma break down. In fact, meditation entails forgetting all worries, intentions and dilemmas,

378 .http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~pluralsm/affiliates/jainism/article/meditation2.htm , accessed on 11/08/2017 at 4.30 p.m. 206 and stabilizing the mind. It involves contemplating about the nature of soul, thinking of the difference between soul and matter, and concentrating on the true self.

Meditation purifies the mind, speech and body. However, it is of no avail to inflict pain on the body without purifying the thoughts. One who stabilizes the mind and concentrates on the self definitely achieves salvation. Meditation is the only means to stabilize the mind.

Meditation is of four kinds:

• Sorrowful (aarta) meditation • Inclement (raudra) meditation • Righteous (dharma) meditation • Spiritual (shukla) meditation

Of these the first two are inauspicious because their cause the influx of undesirable karma. The last two are auspicious because they help destroy karma.

2.2.2.9. The Jainism- Ethics of Ahi ṁsā:

Ethics of Jainism is centered around the core notion of ahi ṁsā, Jains are the first one s to make ahi ṁsā, non – violence, into a rule of life. 379 The respect for life ( Jīva ) in all its form and kinds is the dogma of Jaina faith and morals. All the thoughts, speech and action are well regulated according to the norm of this central motion, ahi ṁsā. Hence the worst offence possible, according to Jaina view, is the killing or injuring as a living being; himsa, ‘the intend to kill’, Ahi ṁsā, non injury, correspondingly is the primarily jaina rule of virtue. In order to clarify how life is to be protected, Jain s outlined four types of violence; intentional, non-intentional, related to profession, and performed out of self – defence. Since thought is considered the father of action, violence is thought (Bhavahi ṁsā) merely precedes physical injury ( dravya -hi ṁsā). Violence in thought is then the greater and more subtle form of violence, arising from passionate ideas of attachment and aversion, due to men’s negligence ( Pram āda ) in their behavior. Jainism

379 .Sarvapalli RadhaKrishnan & Charles A. Moore, eds., A source of Book in Indian Philosophy, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1957, p. 251 207 enjoins avoidance of all forms of injury ( hi ṁsā), physical, or otherwise , whether committed by mind, body, or speech. 380

Commenting on Jainas practice of non-violence, Bijaynanda Kar states: Jainas compassion for all living beings need not suggested as animistic tendency. Human interest cannot be fully accomplished if it becomes fully apathetic toward other creatures, It seems that Jaina dharma, in so far as it emphasizes the cause of living beings, virtually pleads for what can be said in modern terminology: ecological balance. 381 .

The ethics of Jainism are austere, simple and straightforward. The practice of non-violence, in thought, word and action is the cardinal virtue. The Jaina should, under no circumstances, inflict pain and suffering on any sentiment being, but should always act with kindness, charity, gentleness, and compassion toward all living being. Truthfulness, utter lack of greed, and purity of heart are to be cultivated by every follower of Jaina. These moral virtues, meditation on the profound truths taught by the Jain, and faith in oneself lead man to liberation, a state characterized by four perfections: infinite knowledge, infinite faith, infinite power, and infinite bliss. Like all Indian religions, Jainism emphasizes the inseparability of moral perfection and perfection of knowledge. Perfect knowledge cannot be had without perfect conduct, and vice versa. 382

2.2.2.10. Notion of Karma and Jīva: Karma is the central point, the core of Jainism . The Jain notion of Karma is not the same as the one that is found in other system and religions of India. In Jainism, Karma does not mean a dead, or some invisible mystical force. It is a substance, a fine atomic particle ( suksma-pudgala-parmanu ) It is complexity of a very subtle matter which is super sensuous and which pervades the whole world. Now the Karma which pervades the whole world can ensnare the Jīva (or the soul) and as a consequence jīva can be held in ‘bondage’. Now in the world of everyday experience, all phenomenons are linked together in a universal chain of cause and effect. Every event has a definite cause behind it. By nature each soul ( Jīva ) is pure, possessing infinite knowledge, bliss and

380 . George Olivera, op. cit. pp. 170f. 381 . B ījayananda Kar, The dhamma in Jainism .” International Philosophical Quartely 24, 1986, p. 167. 382 . R. Puligandla, Fundamental of Indian Philosophy, New York, Abingdon Press, 1975 . p. 48. 208 power. P.T.Raju states that in Jainism, when the Jīva is bound by karma that constitutes the man of Sams āra .383 Now the nature and the operative faculties of the soul such as its pure nature, capacity of infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and infinite power can be restricted by the karma . The karma can invade the domain of Jīva and it can be held in bondage. The cause of bondage is due to false knowledge, or the ignorance of truth (Mithy ā Dar śana ), incontinence ( avirat ), negligence (Pram āda ), passion ( Ka ṣāya ) and action ( yoga ). There are four main passions which binds the soul with the karma . They are anger ( krodha ), greed ( lobha ), pride ( mana ), and delusion ( Māya ) which are called Ka ṣāya or sticky substances where Kārmic particles or sticky substances attracts the flow of Kārmic matter towards the soul. Hence the destiny of the bonded soul is very much regulated by the law of karma. 384

2.2.2.11. The Jain theory of karma 385 This theory is most interesting because karma is regarded as a form of impure matter that gets attached to the pure soul with the result that the latter is reduced to a state of subjugation. Freedom cannot be won unless the soul is divested of this Kārmic matter through an arduous process of practicing austerities. Karma may be likened to the worthless, husk like and earthen accretion that has enveloped a precious diamond. Without removal of Karma the soul will never experience the non-reincarnating state of eternal bliss. This subtle and invisible matter of Karma gets attached to the soul and it is the amalgam that causes the soul to migrate miserably from one life to another depending on whether one’s store of Karma happened to be favourable or otherwise, one is reborn into a pleasant or unpleasant state respectively. One has to reap the fruits of past deeds in the form of Karma, and only when the effects of Karma have been fully discharged is the soul free again. This process of purgation or purification, called nirjar ā, if extended to the entire range of one’s accumulated Karma, results in the emancipation of the soul. According to dualistic philosophy of Jainism , the contents of the universe are either Jīva (conscious) or aj īva (unconscious). The immortal and non material souls or jīvas are to be found not only within man but in all living matter. Souls are in destructible and never loss their identity be, merging into any divine entity. The aj īva or

383 . R.V.De Smet, Guideline in Indian Philosophy, Pune, Jñ āna Deepa Vidyapeeth, 1968, p. 65. 384 . Ibid, 385 . Susunaga Weeraperuma, Majour Religion of India, Bombay, Chettana Pvt. Ltd., 1985, pp. 38f. 209 unconscious part of the universe is comprised of matter of various sorts. In contrast, the jīva , the spirit or the soul, has the qualities of intelligence, peace, power and faith. But these desirable qualities of the soul disappear, when the jīva itself is enmeshed in the materialistic web of Karma. The problem, then, is to strip the jīva of the undesirable ājīva elements that have got attached to it. The soul, in other words, has to be thoroughly cleansed of its kārmic matter. When one is cleansed of Karma , there is flowering of the triratna (“The three Jewels”) or three excellences of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct, which are the prerequisites for the attainment of Nirv āna .

2.2.2.12. Concept of God In Jainism:

Jainism believes that the universe is infinite and eternal. It is atheistic in its unqualified rejection of any God or Supreme Being as the creator and sustained of the universe. The Jaina advances a number of arguments against the existence of God. The Jaina pointed out that the claim that God exist is not based on perception but on inference is doubtful and unwarranted. 386 Jainism further believes that the universe and all its substances or entities are eternal. It has no beginning or end with respect to time. Universe runs own on its own accord by its own cosmic laws. All the substances change or modify their forms continuously. Nothing can be destroyed or created in the universe. There is no need of someone to create or manage the affairs of the universe. Hence Jainism does not believe in God as a creator, survivor, and destroyer of the universe. However Jainism does believe in God, not as a creator, but as a perfect being. When a person destroys all his karmas , he becomes a liberated soul. He lives in a perfect blissful state in Mok ṣa forever. The liberated soul possesses infinite knowledge, infinite vision, infinite power, and infinite bliss. This living being is a God of Jain religion. Every living being has a potential to become God. Hence Jains do not have one God, but Jain Gods are innumerable and their number is continuously increasing as more living beings attain liberation. Jains believe that since the beginning of the time every living being (soul) is attached with karma and also it is in delusion (ignorant) state of its true nature. The main purpose of the religion is to remove this delusion through self-knowledge and self-effort. This knowledge will

386 . R. Paligandia, Op. cit. p. 46. 210 remove karmas which are associated with it from the beginning of time. When all karma get removed, the soul becomes liberated soul. 387

2.2.3. The Buddhist Philosophy:

The Buddhist philosophy has become a part and parcel of Indian life in some way or other. Historical reasons however dominate over all other contributory causes for its universal appeal. The eightfold path of Buddha have been acclaimed as one of the useful clues to solve the life misery of the people. It is an ideal blend of realism, pragmatism, and individual perfection sponsored by almost all the idealist Schools of Indian thought. The generic ideal – the ideal of Bodhisattva preached by the Mah āyāna Buddhism has generated a new feeling of social realization in Indian philosophical tradition. This has been equally emphasized by Socrates and Confucius in the West, That liberation cannot be confined to individual perfection alone. It must invariably transcend the narrow limits and enter into the wider field of social realization, social betterment and social fulfillment. Nirv āna. Buddhism and Jainism are considered to be the most ancient ethical and moral philosophies of India, 388

In many respects Buddhism is very near to Hinduism. The difference mainly lies in (1) the rejection by Buddhism of the ritualistic and ceremonial aspects that were very strongly prevalent in Hinduism under the influence of Vēdas and (2) making the concept of karma more ethical. McKenzie rightly says . “In the teaching of Buddha karma was largely ethicized. The only act which was regarded as meritorious was moral act and belief in the efficacy of rites and ceremonies. Buddhism becomes able to emphasis ahi ṁsā as a real moral virtue in its truest and purest spirit. Ahi ṁsā was given a positive meaning also and that meaning was love. Thus the virtue of love was given a prominent place in the ethical teaching of Buddhism . In general we can say that as virtue (or duties) of social morality Buddhism emphasizes the following: humility, charity, love, gratefulness, sympathy, forgiveness, veracity, justice etc. And again as virtue of individual morality, it emphasizes the following: self restrain temperance, contentment, gentleness, celibacy, patience, purity etc. 389

387 . http://www.jaina.org/ConceptofGod, accessed on 12/08/2017, at 5 p.m. 388 . V.N.K Reddy, op. cit. p. 23 389 .S. Tachibana, The Ethics of Buddhism, London, Curzon Press, 1926, p. 95. 211

The Buddha clearly enunciated the morality of Ahi ṁsā. He says, “May all beings be happy and secure, may they be happy minded”. Let no one deceive another, let him not despise another any place, let him not out of anger or resentment wish harm to another”. “Let man overcome anger by love; let him conquer evil by good. For hatred does not cease by hatred at any time, hatred ceases by love. “Returning good for good is very noble, but returning good for evil is noble still” “Good men melt with compassion even for one who has wrought to harm” “To the man who foolishly does me wrong I shall return the protection of my ungrudging love; the more the evils come from him, the more the good that shall go from me’. “ With pure thoughts and fullness of love. It will do the others what I do for myself”. Hatred is conquered by love”. The wrongdoer cannot affects the purity of a virtuous person but he offends himself and degrades his character. If a man offends a harmless, pure, and innocent person, that evil falls back upon that fool, like a light dust thrown up against the winds”’ Evil should be conquered by good”. Do not speak harshly to anybody; those who are spoken to will answer therein the same way. Angry speech is painful; blows for blows will touch thee”

Buddha says in his teaching “control your own mind. Keep your mind from greed, and you will keep your behavior right, your mind pure and your words faithful. By always thinking about transience of your life, you will be able to resist greed and anger, and will be able to avoid all evils. 390

2.2.3.1. The Fourfold Noble Truth ( Ārya satya ): 391

1) There is Suffering ( du ḥkha ) - Life is full of misery and pain. Even the so-called pleasure arte really fraught with pain. There is always fear lest we may lose the so-called pleasure and their loss involves pain. Indulgence also results in pain. That there is suffering in this world is a fact of common experience. Poverty, diseases, old age, death, selfishness, meanness, greed, anger, hatred, quarrels, bickering, conflicts, exploitation are rampant in this world. That life is full of suffering none can deny. In fact life that is not free from desire and passion is always involved with distress. This is called truth of suffering. 2) There is cause of suffering ( du ḥkha - Samudaya ): Everything has a cause. Nothing comes out of nothing – ex nihilo nihi fit. The existent of every event depends

390 . Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai, The Teaching of Buddha, Tokyo, Kosaido Printing Co. Ltd., p.20. 391 . Dr. Chandradhar Sharma, op. cit. pp. 71f. 212 upon its causes and conditions. Everything in this world is conditional, relative, limited. Suffering being fact, it must have a cause. It must depend on some conditions. ‘This being, that arises’, ‘the cause being present, the effect arises’, is the casual law of Dependent Origination. The cause of suffering undoubtedly found in the thirst of the physical body and in the illusion of worldly passion. If these thirsts and illusions are traced to their source, they are found to be rooted in the desire of physical instinct. Thus desire, having a strong will to live as its basis, seeks that which it feels desirable, even if it is sometime death. This is called the Truth of the cause of Suffering. 3) There is cessation of suffering ( du ḥkha -nirodha): Because everything arises depending on some causes and conditions, therefore if these causes and conditions are removed the effects must also cease. The cause being removed, the effect causes to exist. Everything being conditional and relative is necessarily momentary and what is momentary must perish. ‘That which is born, must die’ Production implies destruction. The desire lies at the root of all human passion, can be removed, then passion will die out and all human suffering will be ended. This is called the truth of the cessation of suffering. 4) There is way leading to this cessation of suffering (du ḥkha - nirodha- gāmin ī-pratipat): There is an ethical and spiritual path by following which misery may be removed and liberation attained. In order to enter into a state where there is no desire and no suffering, one must follow a certain path. The stages of this Noble eight fold path are : (1) Right View/faith (samyag d ṛṣṭi), (2) Right Resolve (sankalpa ), (3) Right Speech ( vāk), (4) Right Action ( karm ānta ), (5) Right Living (ājīva), (6) Right Effort ( vy āyāma ), (7) Right Thought (sm ṛti ), (8) Right Concentration ( Sam ādhi ), This is open to the clergy and the laity alike. In the old books we also find mention of a triple path consisting of Sh īla or right conduct, Sam ādhi or right concentration and Prajñ ā or right knowledge. They roughly correspondence to Dar śana ,. Jñ āna and Ch āritra of Jainism , Sh īla and Sam ādhi lead to Prajñ ā which is the direct cause of liberation. These are called the Truth of Noble Path to the cessation of the Cause of Suffering. These are code of conduct that embraces a commitment to harmony and self- restraint with the principal motivation being non-violence, or freedom from causing harm. It has been variously described as virtue right conduc t, morality, moral discipline and precept.

213

2.2.3.2. Suffering: 392

The emphasis that all the conditioned processes that compose a person, and all worlds of rebirth, are impermanent, du ḥkha and not-Self forms an important part of the philosophical basis of ethics in Buddhism . The aim of overcoming du ḥkha , both in oneself and others, is the central preoccupation of Buddhism , and one towards which ethical action contributes. As Buddhists come to appreciate the extent of du ḥkha in their own lives, and to see that they so often contribute to it by their deluded response to life’s happenings, the natural human feeling of sympathy (anukamap ā ) for others – solidarity with them in the shared situation of du ḥkha – is elicited and deepened. Accordingly, the importance of ‘comparing oneself with others’ is stressed, for both self and other ‘yearn for happiness and recoil from pain’. When explaining the five basic ethical precepts, the Buddha once gave the following reflection as a reason for keeping them: For a state that is not pleasant or delightful to me must be so to him also; and a state that is not pleasing or delightful to me, how could I inflict that upon another? In a more general context, the Buddha is also reported to have said: ‘Having traversed the whole world with my thought, I never yet met with anything that was dearer to anyone than his own self. Since the self of others is dear to each one, let him who loves himself not harm another.

2.2.3.3. Impermanence:393 While impermanence often leads to suffering, it also means that people, having no fixed Self, are always capable of change for the better and should be respected accordingly, rather than dismissed as unworthy by saying, for example, ‘Oh, he’s a thief.’ A famous example of such change is reported in Buddhist texts, which tell of a time when the Buddha deliberately visited the haunt of the murderous ascetic-bandit. Aṅgulim āla , as he saw that he needed only a little exhortation to change his ways, become a monk, and soon attain Nirv āṇa, Whatever a person is like on the surface, it is held that the depths of their mind are ‘brightly shining’ and pure . This depth purity, referred to as the ‘embryo of the Truth-attained One’ ( Tath āgata-garbha ) – or ‘Buddha- nature’ in the Mah āyāna , represents the potential for ultimate change: the attainment of enlightenment, and as such is a basis for respecting all beings.

392 Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, Newyork, Cambridge University press, 2000, pp. 33f. 393 , Ibid, p. 34,35 214

2.2.3.4. The Noble Eight-fold Path: 394

1) Right Views ( samm ādi ṭṭ hi or damyagd ṛṣṭ i) – As ignorance, with its consequences, namely, wrong views ( Mithy ādrsti ) about self and the world, is the root cause of our sufferings, it is natural that the first step to moral reformation should be the acquisition of right views or the knowledge of truth. Right view is defined as the correct knowledge about the four noble truth. It is the knowledge of these truths alone, and not ant theoretical accumulation regarding nature and self, which, according to Buddha, helps moral reformation, and leads us towards the goal Nirv āna . 2) Right resolve ( samm āsa ṅkappa or samyaksa ṇkalpa ) – A mere knowledge of the truths would be useless unless one resolves to reform life in their light. The moral aspirant is asked, therefore, to renounce worldliness, to give up ill feelings towards others and desist from doing any harm to them. These three constitute the contents of right determination. It is the determination to do what is right and desist from doing what is wrong and to uproot attachment to sensual pleasure, ill will towards others, and desire for doing harm to them. It is aspiration for renunciation, benevolence, and compassion. 3) Right Speech ( samm āvācā or samyagv āk) – Right determination should not remain a mere ‘pious wish’ but must issue forth into action. Right determination should be able to guide and control our speech, to begin with. The result would be right speech consisting in abstention from lying, slander, unkind words and frivolous talk. Truthfulness ought to be cultivated. Truth should be in harmony with right and wrong. 4) Right Conduct/Action ( samm ākamamanta or samyakkarm ā) – Right determination should end in right action or good conduct and not stop merely with good speech. Right conduct includes the Pañca-Sīla , the five vows for desisting from killing, stealing, sensuality, lying and intoxication . 5) Right Livelihood ( samm ā-ājīva or samyag ājīva ) - Renouncing bad speech and bad action, one should earn his livelihood by honest means. The necessity of this rule lies in showing that even for the sake of maintaining one’s life, one should not take to forbidden means but work in consistency with good determination. It consists in earning living by honest means, fraudulence, bribery, crookedness, mutilation, prosecution, robbery, and plunder are forbidden.

394 . Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendrsmohan Datta, op. cit. pp. 125ff. 215

6) Right Efforts ( samm āvāyāma or samyagvy āyāma )– While a person tries to live a reformed life, through right views, resolution, speech, action and livelihood, he is constantly knocked off the right path by old evil ideas which were deep rooted in the mind as also by fresh ones which constantly arise. One cannot progress steadily unless he maintains a constant effort to root out old evil thoughts and prevent evil thoughts from arising a new. Moreover, as the mind cannot be kept empty, he should constantly endeavour also to fill the mind with good ideas, and retain such ideas in the mind. This fourfold constant endeavour, positive and negative, is called right effort. This rule points out that even one high up on the path cannot afford to take a moral holiday without running the risk of slipping down. It consist in constant vigilance, Endeavour and activity which are necessary for self control, arrest of evil thoughts, stimulation of good thoughts, and concentration of the mind on universal good will. 7) Right Mindfulness ( samm āsati or samyaksmrti ) – The necessity of constant vigilance is further stressed in this rule, which lays down that the aspirant should constantly bear in mind the things he has already learnt. He should constantly remember and contemplate the body as body, sensations as sensations, mind as mind, and mental states as mental states. About any of these he should not think, “This am I,” or “This is mine.” This advice sounds no better than asking one to think of a spade as a spade. But ludicrously superfluous as it might appear to be, it is not easy to remember always what things really are. It is all the more difficult to practice it when false ideas about the body, etc. have become so deep rooted in us and our behaviors based on this false notions have become instinctive. If we are not mindful, we behave as though the body, the mind, the sensations and mental states are permanent and valuable. Hence there arise attachment to such things and grief over their loss, and we become subject to bondage and misery, but contemplation on the frail, perishable, loathsome nature of these, helps us to remain free from attachment and grief. This is the necessity of constant mindfulness about truth. It consists in recollection of the impurity of the body, of the nature of the mind endowed with greed, hatred, and delusion, of the nature of dharma, and the four noble truths. Right mindfulness is indispensable for right concentration. 8) Right Concentration ( samm āsam ādhi or samyaksam ādhi ) – One who has successfully guided his life in the light of last seven rules thereby freed himself all passions and evils thoughts is fit to enter step by step into the four deeper and deeper stages of concentration that gradually take him to the goal of his long and arduous journey – cessation of suffering. It consists of four meditations. The first concentration is

216 a state of joy born of destruction of sensuality. The second concentration is a state of joy born of deep tranquility; thought is tranquilized in it, and intuition predominates. The third concentration is state of neutral consciousness in which all passions are destroyed. The fourth concentration is a state of complete tranquility and self-possession in which joy and sorrow are destroyed. Buddihism stresses right conduct, right concentration, and right insight. All should meditate on love and friendship for all creatures, compassion for distressed creatures, and joy for virtuous person and indifference to all vicious persons. These meditations are enjoined by Jainism also. The Yoga and Gītā also inculcate the cultivation. To sum up the essential points of the eightfold path (or, what is the same, Buddha’s ethical teachings), it may be noted first that the path consists of three main things conduct (śī la ), concentration ( Sam ādhi ), and knowledge ( Prajñ ā) harmoniously connected. However, the above is only a general account of Buddhists virtues of individual and social, morality. Speaking somewhat specifically, we may see that that characteristic Buddhist ethical discipline is contained in the eight-fold path that Buddha himself gives out as leading to the highest end Nirv āṇa. The first two of the eightfold path comes under what is known as Prajñ ā, the next three comes under śī la, and last three under Sam ādhi. More specifically speaking, it is sila which represent Buddhist morality.

Of the three silas mentioned above, the most important obviously is Pañca-Sīla coming under right action. This essential according to Buddhism for all, for the laity, and the saint or mendicant alike. But Buddhism also speaks of aṭṭ ha śī la and dasa śī la, the former meant for persons in the laity who are comparatively less attached to family life and the latter meant for monks. The aṭṭ ha śī la includes the following three, besides the above five: abstaining from taking untimely meals, abstaining from dancing, singing, music etc. and from using garlands, perfumes, cosmetics, and personal adornments; abstaining from using high seats. The dasa śī la includes the following two besides the aṭṭ ha śī la: sleeping on mat spread on the ground and abstaining from the use of gold and silver. 395

The most of the virtues included under aṭṭ ha śī la and dasa śī la are virtues of austerity and penance a very closely related to the Upani ṣadic conception of tapas . These are specifically meant for withdrawing the mind from the attraction of the world,

395 . Kedar Nath Tiwari, op. cit. , pp. 64f. 217 so that it could be directed toward the attainment of the spiritual goal, Nirv āṇa. To a large extend virtues related to individual purity have been emphasized in Buddhism also, although among the virtues to be inculcated by the laity, those relating to social morality have been emphasized. These virtues have been given a greater and purer ethical meaning that they were given in the Hindu system. 396

2.2.3.5.The gist of Buddha’s message: 397

It is contained in his famous lines –

“Not to do evil,

To increase good,

To purify the mind”

The last line of this verse implies that the teachings of all the Buddhas were identical or at least more or less the same. One is led to the inevitable conclusion that each Buddha emphasized the importance of virtue and unconditioning of the mind. It is the function of each Buddha to rediscover this eternal Trusts and restate them in the phraseology of his time.

2.2.3.6.The five virtuous Precepts .398

By observing the five virtuous Precepts ( Pañca-Sīla ) the Buddhist tries to ensure that his life has a certain sound ethical foundation. These precepts are –

1. I accept the precept not to kill. 2. I accept the precept not to steal. 3. I accept the precept not to commit adultery. 4. I accept the precept not to lie. 5. I accept the precept not to take intoxicating liquors or drugs.

These five precepts are not commandments in the Judaic Christian sense but guideline.

396 . Ibid , p. 65 397 Susunaga Weeraperuma, Major Religion of India , Bombay, Chetana Pvt Ltd., 1985, p. 67. 398 Ibid, p.67. 218

The first precept: non-injury corresponds to the Hindu and Jain concept of ahimsa i.e. ‘non-injury’, and is generally regarded as the most important one: ‘Non- injury is the distinguishing mark of Dhamma’. The second precept: avoiding theft and cheating. This precept also covers fraud, cheating, forgery and falsely denying that one is in debt to someone. To cheat a buyer using false weights and measures, to fob off a worthless article on a buyer, to sell counterfeit gold and silver, not to pay due wages or conveyance charges or customs or taxes etc. comes under the second precept. The third precept: avoiding sexual misconduct. The monastic ideal of Buddhism involves celibacy, but it is acknowledged that not everyone feels able or willing to follow this ideal: The wise man should avoid the uncelibate life like a pit of burning coals. But if he is incapable of living a celibate life, he should not transgress against another’s wife. The third precept relates primarily to the avoidance of causing suffering by one’s sexual behaviour. Adultery. The fourth precept: avoiding lying and other forms of wrong speech. The first three precepts relate to physical actions and keeping them is equivalent to the ‘right action’-factor of the Eightfold Path Keeping the fourth precept is equivalent to the Path-factor of ‘right speech’, for while the precept specifically refers only to avoiding false speech, it is generally seen to entail avoiding other forms of ‘wrong speech’ which cause mental turmoil or other forms of suffering in oneself or others. The fifth precept: sobriety. This precept is not listed under the Path-factors of either ‘right action’ or ‘right speech’, but can be seen to act as an aid to ‘right mindfulness’: when one is intoxicated, there is an attempt to mask, rather than face, the sufferings of life, there is no mental clarity or calm, and one is more likely to break all the other precepts. 399

2.2.3.7. The Philosophical Implications of Buddha’s Ethical Teaching :400

Some of the more important ideas about man and the world underlying Buddha’s ethical teachings. Some of these are explicitly stated by Buddha himself. The four of these views are mentioned here, on which his ethics mainly depends, namely, (1) the theory of dependent origination (2) the theory of karma (3) the theory of change, and (4) the theory of non-existence of the soul.

399 . Peter Harvey, Op. cit., pp. 69ff 400 . Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta, op. cit. , pp. 131ff. 219

1.The Theory of dependent origination – There is spontaneous and universal law of causation which condition the appearance of all events, mental and physical. This law (dharma or dhamma) works automatically without the help of any conscious guide. In accordance with it, whenever any particular event (the cause) appear, it is followed by another particular events (the effect). “On getting the cause, the effect arises.” The existence of everything is conditional , dependent on a cause. Nothing happens fortuitously or by chance. This is called the theory of dependent origination.

2.Theory of Karma: According to this theory, the present existence of an individual is, according to that of karma, the effect of its past; and its future would be the effect of its present existence. According to Narada, the author of The Buddha and His teaching, Kamma is the law of moral causation. Rebirth is its corollary. Both Kamma and the Rebirth are interrelated, fundamental doctrine in Buddhism. Although Buddhism attributes the variation to the law of Kāmma . As the chief cause amongst a variety, it does not however assert that everything is due to Kamma. The law of Kamma , important as it is, is only one of the twenty four casual conditions, described in Buddhist Philosophy .401

3.The Doctrine of Universal Change: The doctrine of dependent origination also yields the Buddhist theory of transitory nature of things. All things, Buddha repeatedly teaches, are subject to change and decay. As everything originates from some condition, it disappears when the condition ceases to be. Whatever has a beginning has also an end. Buddha, therefore, says, “Know that whatever exists arises from causes and conditions and in every respect impermanent. That which seems everlasting will perish, that which is high will be laid low; where meeting is, parting will be ; where birth is, death will come.

4.The Theory of Non-existence of the Soul – The law of change is universal; neither man, nor any other being, animate or inanimate, is exempt from it. It is commonly believe that in man there is an abiding substance called the soul ( ātma ), which persists through changes that overcome the body, exists before birth and after death, and migrates from one body to another. Consistently with his theories of conditional existence and universal change, Buddha denies the existence of such soul. But Buddha

401 .N ārada, The Buddha And His Teaching, Mālaysia, Buddhist Missionary Society, 1977, pp 333ff. 220 does not deny the continuity of the stream of successive stats that compose his life. Life is an unbroken series of states: each of these states depends on the condition just preceding and give rise to the one just succeeding it. The continuity of life series is, therefore, base on a casual; connection running through the different states. The soul is thus replaced by a continuous stream of states.

2.2.3.8. Concept of God, According To Buddha Philosophy:

Buddhism believes in the existence of neither God nor soul in the theistic sense. It is essentially a religion of the mind, which advocates present moment awareness, inner purity, ethical conduct, freedom from the problem of change, impermanence and suffering, and reliance upon one's own experience and discernment on the Eightfold path as the teacher and guide, rather than an external authority other than the Dhamma. One may take guidance from a teacher, but insightful awareness and experiential knowledge of the Dhamma are vital to progress on the path. 402 Unlike the other major religions of the world, Buddhism is not centered on the concept of God as the upholder and sum of all or a universal supreme being, who is responsible for the creation and dissolution of the world and the existence of sentient beings.

2.2.3.9. Path of Liberation according to Buddhism: The main element in the path to liberation is the satipa ṭṭ hāna . satipa ṭṭ hāna is a Pali term that is translated by: "application of the attention". This training, that only Buddha discovered and which is still taught now a days by the monks of the therav āda , is the only one enable us to reach nibb āna , the cessation of all kinds of suffering, The way of Nibb āna is the middle path which avoids the extreme of self- mortification that weakens the intellect and the extreme of self-indulgence that retards moral progress. The middle path consists of the eightfold factors. 403

402 . http://www.hinduwebsite.com/buddhism/buddhaongod.asp, accessed on 11/08/2017 at 5 p.m. 403 . N ārada, op. cit., p.512. 221