San Miguel, Corsino (2019) Rethinking False Beliefs About the Law: Trust and the Epistemic Conditions of Responsibility
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San Miguel, Corsino (2019) Rethinking false beliefs about the law: trust and the epistemic conditions of responsibility. PhD thesis. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/76750/ Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Enlighten: Theses https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] Rethinking False Beliefs about the Law: Trust and the Epistemic Conditions of Responsibility By Corsino San Miguel Garcia (LLB) School of Law College of Social Sciences University of Glasgow A doctoral thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) of the University of Glasgow August 2018 II III ABSTRACT The aim of this research is to address the question of how false beliefs about the law should be dealt with by the criminal law. While there has long been discontent with the current position, I argue that proposals to deal with this issue in relation to the mens rea are inadequate, and that a more consistent approach to this problem can only be developed by exploring the place of knowledge of the law as an autonomous concept from mens rea. This approach thus aims to complement the traditional model of criminal responsibility based exclusively on volitional states (mens rea) with one based also on cognitive states. In doing so, this thesis develops a meaningful and operative account of the cognitive or epistemic conditions of criminal responsibility, analytically scrutinising the question of how the criminal law should treat those who act in ignorance of criminal prohibitions and who unwittingly break the law. Part I of the thesis looks at the conditions for the establishment of criminal responsibility from the perspective of an institutional theory of the criminal law. The first two chapters develop a critical account of the two current ways a false belief might be recognised as a defence – mistake of fact and mistake of law – and the ways that different theoretical accounts, characterised as legal positivism and legal moralism, have sought to address this problem. These chapters also survey the ways that a mistake of law defence might be currently recognised and examines the proposals of those authors willing to expand the conditions under which ignorance of law should exculpate. After that, in chapter III, the dissertation begins to develop a fresh approach based on an institutional framework for the criminal law. The chapter explores the connections between criminal law and interpersonal and institutional trust. The last chapter of part I argues that both volitional and epistemic/cognitive conditions are key in a correct account of deliberation or practical reasoning processes before action. Thereafter the Epistemic Condition on Criminal Responsibility (ECCR) is proposed as an algorithmic test, able to distinguish culpable from non-culpable ignorance. Part II of the thesis, rejecting the classical dichotomy of mistake of fact versus mistake of law, introduces a new kind of approach based on distinguishing between brute facts, institutional facts and institutional commands. Chapter 5 discusses and defends the feasibility of the distinction between brute and institutional facts, arguing that the IV perception process of both is dissimilar. Later, the chapter applies the ECCR to existing cases in common law jurisdictions related to false beliefs about brute facts. Chapter 6 scrutinises the practical distinction between false mistakes about institutional facts and false mistakes about institutional commands and applies the ECCR to false beliefs about institutional facts. The last chapter puts the ECCR into practice to address false beliefs about institutional commands. Finally, a general point about false beliefs is considered: when the duty to seek legal advice becomes a right to rely on a trustworthy source. V CONTENTS Page Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………… II Table of Legislation ..................................................................................................... VII Table of Cases ……………………………………………………………………….. VIII Acknowledgement ……………………………………………………………………. XI Author’s Declaration ………………………………………………………………... XII INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………............ 1 PART I CHAPTER 1 ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SOLUTIONS CONCERNING FALSE BELIEFS 1.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………. 14 1.2 False beliefs that negate mens rea ……………………………………………... 15 1.3 Traditional rationales to justify the irrelevance of normative false beliefs ……. 22 1.4 False normative belief as a substantive defence ……………………………….. 25 1.5 A procedural (rather than substantive) defence for false normative beliefs …… 31 1.6 Critique to the current proposals: burden versus duty to know the law ……….. 35 1.7 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………….. 42 CHAPTER 2 THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 2.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………. 44 2.2 Legal moralism versus legal positivism ……………………………………….. 46 2.3 Knowledge of the law in the legal moralist tradition ……………………….…. 49 2.4 The prominence of knowledge of the law in the legal positivist tradition …….. 58 2.5 The guidance view and practical reasoning ……………………………………. 61 2.6 The guidance view of individuals in social groups ……………………………. 65 2.7 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………... 69 VI CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUAL INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 3.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………. 71 3.2 Natural, gregarious and Institutional structures ………………………………... 74 3.3 Categorical, conventional and institutionalised/normative expectations ………. 79 3.4 Expectations, trust and criminal law …………………………………………… 82 3.5 Personhood in law and institutional status ……………………………………... 89 3.6 Institutional responsibility ……………………………………………………... 93 3.7 Knowledge of the law within the institutional framework …………………….. 96 3.8 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………... 98 CHAPTER 4 THE EPISTEMIC CONDITION ON CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 4.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………. 100 4.2 Introducing responsibility conditions ………………………………………….. 101 4.3 The deliberation process before action ………………………………………… 105 4.4 Two psychological momentum in the epistemic condition on criminal 108 responsibility ……………………………………………………………………….. 4.5 Clarifying the epistemic condition: the alternative tracing thesis ……………… 110 4.5.1 The actio libera in causa alternative thesis ……………………………... 111 4.5.2 The akratic alternative thesis …………………………………………… 112 4.5.3 The benighted alternative thesis ………………………………………… 113 4.5.4 Conclusions about the tracing thesis ………………………………….. 114 4.6 Clarifying the epistemic condition: Non-tracing thesis ………………………... 116 4.7 The deontic moment of the epistemic consideration …………………………... 118 4.8 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………... 125 PART II 126 CHAPTER 5 THE EPISTEMIC CONDITION ON CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 5.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………. 133 5.2 The “dead end” of the current solution about error of fact …………………….. 133 5.3 A feasible distinction between brute and institutional facts in the criminal norm: searching for the “critical quality” …………………………………....... 141 VII 5.4 Perception process as the basis for the “critical quality” ………………………. 144 5.5 False beliefs about brute facts …………………………………….. 150 5.6 The Epistemic Condition on Criminal Responsibility in practice ……………... 152 5.7 The ECCR in crimes of strict liability …………………………………………. 163 5.8 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………... 168 CHAPTER 6 FALSE BELIEFS ABOUT INSTITUTIONAL FACTS 6.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………. 169 6.2 Institutional fact versus institutional command ………………………………... 170 6.3 The Epistemic Condition on Criminal Responsibility in practice: Institutional facts …………………………………………………………………………... 178 6.4 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………... 193 CHAPTER 7 FALSE BELIEFS ABOUT THE INSTITUTIONAL COMMAND 7.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………. 195 7.2 Knowledge that precludes exculpatory consequences to false beliefs ………… 196 7.3 The Epistemic Condition of Criminal Responsibility in practice: False beliefs about the command or prohibition ……………………..……………………... 199 7.4 Beyond suspicion: Personal reflection and reliance on third party advice …… 206 7.5 Normative threshold of minimum requirement …………………………………………… 213 7.6 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………... 217 CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………............ 219 BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………………………… 226 VIII TABLE OF LEGISLATION UK Animal Welfare Act 2006 Contagious diseases (Animals) Act 1878, s 61 Control of Pollution Act 1974, s 3 (4) Control of Pollution Act 1974, s 3 (4) Criminal Damages Act 1971, s 1 (1) Criminal Justice Act 1967, s 8 Criminal Law Consolidations Act 1861 Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 s 170(2) Customs Consolidation Act 1876, s 42 Incitement to Disaffection 1934 Act Indecency With Children Act 1960 Metropolitan Police act 1932 Obscene Publications Act 1959 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, s 12, s 13, s 14, s 15, s 18 Sexual offences Act 2003, s 5 Statutory Instruments act 1964, s 3 (2) Theft Act 1968, s 1 (1) AUSTRALIA Australian Criminal Code, s 9.5(3) USA Model Penal Code, s 2.04 (3) b