Central Asia: a Space for “Silk Democracy”. Islam and State

CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

Almaty 2017 UDC LBC C Contents:

Elmira Nogoybayeva, political scientist (editor) Sanat Kushkumbaev, PhD, political sciences Farkhod Tolipov, PhD, political sciences Abdugani Mamadazimov, PhD, political sciences Tamerlan Ibraimov, PhD in law (Associate Professor) Sardor Salimov, political scientist

Tatiana Panchenko – proof reader

C Central Asia: A Space for “Silk Democracy”: Islam and State / Edited by E. Nogoybayeva. Almaty, 2017. 48 48 pp.

ISBN

Almaty Club experts continue their reflections on Central Asia in the socio-political context in this paper, Central Asia: A Space for “Silk Democracy”, the second part of that process, with the authors, this time, considering the issue of the interaction between Islam and the state, and analysing the dynamics of changes in the countries of the region. Three distinct approaches form the basis for this work. The first concerns the nature of changes from 1991 to 2016, shown in infographics; the second covers the outlook and perspectives for individual countries; and the third provides a comparative picture of practices across four countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, giving insights into how these states’ policies have changed regarding Islam and other religions, across the entire period from independence to 2016, as well as providing insights into experience in the institutionalisation of religion. This paper is designed for political scientists, religious scholars and historians, as well as all other readers interested in the development of democratic processes in Central Asia, in general.

UDC LBC

ISBN © Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2017 Contents:

Introduction...... 4

A Changing Picture – Political and Religious Institutions (Infographics)...... 5

Government in Central Asia: Politics and Islam...... 13

Uzbekistan – the Islamic Renaissance and the Internal Security Dilemma...... 14

Islam in Kazakhstan: Between Community and Disassociation...... 23

Tajikistan: Islam and Politics...... 33

Kyrgyzstan: Politics and Islamю...... 39

Conclusions...... 45

Author Biographies...... 47

3 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

Introduction

hat is the role and significance of Islam in the countries of Central Asia – countries which were, Wuntil recently, atheist and Soviet? Is it: • a regressive move, back to the source;

• a serious risk and threat;

• a social choice;

• a tool that governments can use to mobilise; or

• an illusion?

How is this to be viewed, through such prisms and lenses? Many researchers are, today, looking for the answers to these questions. But the rate of change is so great, and the subject itself so multifaceted and delicate, that a full analysis of this process has, thus far, proved difficult.

The CAPG “Almaty Club”, involving researchers from four Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – offer their views, from three different perspectives:

I. the rate of change, from 1991 through 2016, shown in infographics;

II. country-based perspectives; and

III. a comparative illustration of practice in all four countries

It is our hope that this approach will provide the impetus for a more in-depth analysis of the process of Islamisation. In what way is Islamisation taking place? How do states endeavour to regulate such processes? In what way does policy in national security impact the state and society’s attitudes to Islam?

4 A Changing Picture - Political and Religious Institutions

A Changing Picture - Political and Religious Institutions A Changing Picture - Political and Religious Institutions

Laws and regulation governing religion Laws and regulation governing religion

State policy in the religious sphere is, in general, driven by specialist state agencies, with the supervision of Stateactivities policy in the in M theuslim religious environment sphere being is, inthe general, responsibility driven of non-governmentalby specialist state institutions agencies, designated with the supervisionin Central Asian of activities countries asin thethe “SpiritualMuslim Administrationenvironment being of Muslims” the responsibility (NB: although of in non Tajikistan- this role falls to the Islamic Council or “Council of Ulema”). governmental institutions designated in Central Asian countries as the “Spiritual Administration of Muslims” (NB: although in Tajikistan this role falls to the Islamic Council or “Council of Ulema”).

CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

Religious affairs are also regulated by various conceptual documents, strategies and concepts. Religious affairs are also regulated by various conceptual documents, strategies and concepts.

A Changing Picture - Political and Religious Institutions

Indicative metrics regarding religious education and development throughout the four countries of Central Asia include: IndicativeI. The rate metrics of growth regarding in the number religious of mosques education and andmadrassas. development throughout the four Information on this growth is only available with regard to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: countries of Central Asia include: • the number of mosques in Kyrgyzstan increased from 1,973 in 2009 to 2,669 in 2015, and I. • the numberThe rate of of mosques growth in in Kazakhstan the number increased of mosques from 68 and in 1991 madrassas. to 2,516 in 2016.

Information on this growth is only available with regard to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan:

. the number of mosques in Kyrgyzstan increased from 1,973 in 2009 to 2,669 in 2015, and . the number of mosques in Kazakhstan increased from 68 in 1991 to 2,516 in 2016.

CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

Consequently, the increase in the number of mosques has been accompanied by an increase in the number of imams. The correlation between the number of imams and population size shows that: Consequently,• Tajikistan has the by increase far the greatest in the concentrationnumber of mosques of imams, has with been one accompaniedimam for every by2,210 an people;increase and in• theUzbekistan number of has imams. the lowest The concentration correlation ofbetween imams, withthe number one imam of for imams every and7,824 population people. size shows that: . Tajikistan has by far the greatest concentration of imams, with one imam for every 2,210 people; and . Uzbekistan has the lowest concentration of imams, with one imam for every 7,824 people.

A Changing Picture - Political and Religious Institutions

Religious – in this instance, Islamic – education is also showing a tendency towards growth, particularly in Kyrgyzstan,Religious –which in this has instance, one Islamic Islamic university, – education nine institutes, is also and showing 102 madrassas a tendency (of which towards 88 are growth, currently active). particularly in Kyrgyzstan, which has one Islamic university, nine institutes, and 102 madrassas (of which 88 are currently active).

9 9

CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

88 88

Religion and Everyday Life: Religious Festivals Kurban-Hayit (or Eid-al-Adha – the “Feast of Sacrifice”) is officially celebrated in all four countries. Three countries (with the exception of Kazakhstan) celebrate Ramadan (Ramzan). A Changing Picture - Political and Religious Institutions The Orthodox ChristmasReligion is celebrated and Everyday in two countries.Life: Religious Festivals Kurban-Hayit (or Eid-al-ReligionAdha – theand “Feast Everyday of Sacrifice”) Life: Religious is officially Festivals celebrated in all four Religion and Everyday Life: Religious Festivals countries.Kurban Three-Hayit countries (or Eid-al -(withAdha the– the exception “Feast of of Sacrifice”) Kazakhstan) is officially celebrate celebrated Ramadan in all(Ramzan). four Thecountries. Kurban-OrthodoxHayit Three Christmas (or Eid-al-Adha countries is celebrated (with – the the“Feast exception in of two Sacrifice”) countries. of Kazakhstan) is officially celebratecelebrated inRamadan all four countries.(Ramzan). Three countries (with the exception of Kazakhstan) celebrate Ramadan (Ramzan). The Orthodox Christmas is celebrated in two countries. The Orthodox Christmas is celebrated in two countries.

Religious parties are officially banned throughout the countries of Central Asia. The Islamic

RenaissanceReligious parties (Revival) are officially Party of banned Turkestan throughout (IRPT), the countrieshowever, of hasCentral operated Asia. Thein IslamicTajikistan Renaissance at different(Revival) times, Party before of Turkestan being (IRPT), banned however, in September has operated 2015 in .Tajikistan at different times, before being ReligiousReligiousbanned parties in Septemberparties are are officially 2015. officially banned banned th throughoutroughout the the countriescountries of CentralCentral Asia. Asia. The The Islamic Islamic RenaissanceRenaissance (Revival) (Revival) Party Party of of Turkestan Turkestan (IRPT), (IRPT), however, however, has operated in in Tajikistan Tajikistan at at differentdifferent times, times, before before being being banned banned in in September September 2015 2015..

CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

In all four countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), state policy on religionIn all four is managed countries in(Kazakhstan, the context Kyrgyzstan, of the objectives Tajikistan and and interests Uzbekistan), of national state policy security on . religion is managed in the context of the objectives and interests of national security.

Government in Central Asia: Politics and Islam

expected that serious political changes and industrialisation would force local residents “to throw religion into the dustbin of history.”1

Today’s re-Islamisation, however, almost a Government century after the beginning of “successful” in Central Asia: atheism, reflects the fact that Islam has always remained an ether permeating Politics and Islam social relations and people’s worldview. The contrast between the post-Soviet process of headlong re-Islamisation (de-atheisation) and the Soviet period of ongoing de- Islamisation (atheisation) is interesting here. The historical turning point between these ver the course of three centuries two realities undoubtedly being Gorbachev’s O(the XVIII–XX centuries), Islam perestroika, which, among other things, freed in Central Asia has experienced a whole up religious identity for all the peoples of the series of challenges – the most significant former Soviet Union. being the anti-religious policy of the Soviet era. Huge resources invested in grandiose Soviet modernisation projects (attitudes The striking contrast between the Soviet thereto notwithstanding) envisaged, among offensive against Islam and its post-Soviet other things, the secularisation of religious revival has revealed a rather contradictory consciousness: which meant large-scale socio-political situation and spiritual projects in education, in the promotion of atmosphere in Uzbekistan. On the one Soviet ideals of “national cultures”, in the hand, the local population embraces Islam film industry, in the emancipation of women, as practiced locally, while, on the other, the and so on. Whole institutions were created to country has become part of the global Islamic support these projects, which could not help world, with the particular challenges inherent but leave their mark on consciousness, and to such practices. Which has meant, on the on the lifestyles of the indigenous population one hand, the revival of Islam as a faith, value, – part of which, incidentally, was not only culture, and so on, and, on the other – its the object, but also the subject (that is, an protection and containment from excessive active initiator) of grandiose changes. It was euphoria and external influences.

1 Sukhareva O.A. and Bikdzhanova M.A., (1955), Past and Present in the Village of Aikyran (Experience in Ethnographic Research into the “Stalin” Collective Farm in the Chartak District, Namangan Oblast), Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR.

13 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

Soviet Uzbekistan, thanks to which thousands of Muslim women threw off their veils and revealed their faces. This was considered a progressive achievement by the new Soviet authority in the traditional and backward Turkestan. In the first Uzbekistan – the Islamic years of national independence in Uzbekistan Renaissance and there was indeed a certain liberalisation in religion the Internal and governmental–religious relations. Thus, Security Dilemma the country’s Muslims had more opportunities for making pilgrimages (the Hajj and Umrah) to Mecca and Medina.2 Even before gaining independence, in June 1991, Uzbekistan adopted the law on “Freedom of Conscience and Religious zbekistan is clearly distinguished from the Organisations”, albeit this law was subsequently Uother Central Asian countries by its large subject to amendments and modifications. Muslim population, a far greater concentration of religious institutions and historical monuments, and by its more deep-rooted religious traditions in The religious revival in Uzbekistan was terms of local forms of Islamic practice. On which accompanied, as it were, by the legalisation of basis, it can be stated that the post-Soviet religious existing mosques, and their emergence from renaissance in independent Uzbekistan has largely the shadows. Thanks to which, the number of been expressed through the continuity of pre- mosques in the country saw a sharp increase, from existing and persistent practices, through its world 300 in 1989 to 6,000 in 1993. During the years of view, and through the interrelationships between independence hundreds of mosques, churches and Islam and the state. prayer houses were built and restored, including Orthodox churches in Tashkent, Samarkand and Navoi, a Catholic church in Tashkent, and an The Soviet atheist political system and ideology did Armenian church in Samarkand. According to a not, entirely, erase the population’s Islamic identity Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers, 15 facilities – neither its Islamic clergy, Islamic institutions, – religious complexes, places of pilgrimage and nor Islamic social relations in the republic. Local tombs – have been transferred to the Spiritual Muslims have been able to overcome the “Soviet Administration of Muslims.Concurrently with challenges” to their religion by responding to these this, however, the thousands of mosques that were with adaptations of various kinds. functioning in the early 1990s did not undergo official re-registration in the late 1990s, and were closed. At present, in a republic with a population A very revealing example of “unfinished” Soviet of almost 32 million people, more than 94 percent modernisation in terms of atheisation concerns of whom consider themselves to be Muslims, there the “Hujum” movement established in 1920s are about 2,450 mosques.

2 It is worth noting that if, in the Soviet era, the number of Uzbek Muslims completing the Hajj reached barely 100 per year, then, in the first years of independence, this figure approached 1,000 people.

14 15 Узбекистан: исламский ренессанс и внутренняя дилемма безопасности

Узбекистан среди центральноазиатских стран, очевидно, отличается своим многочисленным мусульманским населением, значительно большей концентрацией религиозных учреждений и исторических памятников, а также более глубокой укорененностью религиозных традиций в виде местных форм бытования ислама. Поэтому можно сказать, что постсоветский религиозный ренессанс в независимом Узбекистане во многом выразился в виде преемственности сохранившихся практик, мировоззрения и взаимоотношений ислама и государства. Uzbekistan – the Islamic Renaissance and the Internal Security Dilemma Советская атеистическая политическая система и идеология не стерли полностью исламскую

идентичностьAlthough населения: government ни исламскоеpolicy on religion духовенство, in reject anyни faith исламские – as well as институты,the equality of allни исламские социальные отношенияUzbekistan is systemic в республике. and strict, there «Советский are, religions вызов» in Uzbekistan, религии and the secular местные nature мусульмане however, also contradictions. There is a of the state. There is also a ban on proselytism смогли преодолеть,whole body ответив of relevant наlaws него and regulations, разными формами(the propagandisation адаптации. of religion) in place, government structures, media, the education and a ban on the establishment of political Очень показательнымsystem, and примеромa huge ideological «незавершенной» arsenal, parties советской of a religious модерниз nature. Theации Committee в виде атеизации including non-profit organisations affiliated to for Religious Affairs has been established является созданноеgovernment, в in 20-х the service годах of the ХХ state. века Thus, в советскомunder the government, Узбекистане the Spiritual движение Board of «Худжум», благодаря которомуtheConstitution тысячи of the Republic мусульманок of Uzbekistan, сбросили Muslims с of себя Uzbekistan паранджу is in operation, и открыли and лицо. Это the “Law On Freedom of Conscience and the Office of the President of the Republic of считалось прогрессивнымReligious Organisations достиже of the Republicнием молодойof Uzbekistan советской had previously власти established в a serviceтрадиционном и Uzbekistan” and other regulation confirm for religious affairs, headed by an adviser to the отсталом Туркестане.freedom of religion – and the freedom to President.3

Президент СССРPresident Михаил of the USSR Горбачев Mikhail Gorbachev и первый and theмуфтий first Mufti мусульман of Uzbekistan, Узбекистана Sheikh Muhammad Sadik Muhammad Yusuf шейх Мухаммад Содик Мухаммад Юсуф

3 The position of adviser was abolished in 2014. Work in this area under the Office of the President has now been transferred to the Security Council. On which basis, issues of an exclusively religious and cultural nature have become issues of national security; which may indicate a certain degree of difficulty around this problem.

15 16 16

В первыеВ первые годы годыгосударственной государственной независимости не зависимости в Узбекистане дейст в Узбекистаневительно наблюдалась дейст вительно наблюдалась определеннаяопределенная либерализация либерализация в сфере религии в сфе ре и государственно-кон религии и государственно-конфессиональных фессиональных отношений.отношений. Так, мусульманам Так, мусульманам страны были страны открыты были более открыты широкие в озможности более широкие для возможности для 2 совершениясовершения паломничества паломничества (хаджа и (хаджаумры) в Мекку и умры) и Медину в Мекку2. Еще до и Мединуобретения . Еще до обретения независимости,независимости, в июне в 1991 июне года, 1991 в Узбекистане года, в был Узбекистане принят закон был «О свободе принят совести закон и «О свободе совести и религиозныхрелигиозных организациях». организациях». В последующем В последующем в этот закон вносились в этот изменения закон вносились и изменения и дополнения.дополнения. ВозрождениеВозрождение религии религии в Узбекистане в Узбекистане сопровождалось, сопровождалось, если так можно выразиться,если так можно выразиться, легализациейлегализацией и выходом и выходом из тени существовавших из тени существовавших мечетей. Благодар мечетей.я этому в странеБлагодар числоя этому в стране число мечетеймечетей резко резко выросло выросло с трехсот с в трехсот 1989 году в до 1989 шести году тысяч до в 19 шести93 году. тысяч За годы в 1993 году. За годы независимостинезависимости построены построены и отреставрированы и отреста сотниврированы мечетей, церквсотнией имечетей, молельных церкв домов,ей в и молельных домов, в томтом числе числе православные православные храмы в Ташкенте, храмы в Самарканде Ташкенте, и Навои, Самарканде католический и Навои, костел в ка толический костел в Ташкенте,Ташкенте, армянская армянская церковь вцерковь Самарканде. в Самарканде. Согласно постановлени Согласною Кабинета постановлени министровю Кабинета министров 15 15 объектов объектов – религиозные – религиозные комплексы, комплексы, места паломничества места и паломничества усыпальницы – переданы и усып вальницы – переданы в ведениеведение Управления Управления мусульман. мусульман. КомплексКомплекс «ЗангиCENTRAL Ота «Занги ASIA:» (Ташкент AОта SPACE») до (FORТашкент и после “SILK обретения DEMOCRACY”.) до и после независимости ISLAM обретения AND Узбекистана STATE независимости. Узбекистана.

The Zangi-Ota Memorial Complex (Tashkent), before and after Uzbekistan gaining independence 2 2 Стоит Стоит заметить, заметить, что если в чтосоветское если время в советское количество время мусульм количествоан из Узбекистана, мусульм совершавшихан из Узбекистана, хадж, совершавших хадж, едваедва ли доходило ли доходило до 100 человек до 100 в год,человек то уже в в год,первые то годы уже нез в ависимостипервые годы эта цифра независимости приблизилась кэта 1000 цифра приблизилась к 1000 человек.человек. In contrast to neighbouring countries in the In Uzbekistan, religious organisations are region, the principle of the secularity of the state obliged to undergo mandatory registration at is missing from the Constitution of Uzbekistan: the Ministry of Justice, in consultation with nevertheless, religion and religious organisations the Cabinet Committee on Religious Affairs. do not openly exert any serious influence on The Ministry of Justice, and not the courts, political processes, although they are far from can also curtail the activities of any religious excluded from the public arena and community organisation, by mandatory order. life. At the same time, the secularity of Uzbek statehood is guaranteed under the principle of the separation of religious organisations from Religious organisations have various rights, the state (Article 61 of the Constitution of the by law – the main ones of which include the Republic of Uzbekistan). Two thousand two right to conduct religious meetings, services, hundred and 38 religious organisations, from 16 and ceremonies. Religious organisations different denominations, have been registered have the right to conduct such activities at in the country; 2,065 of these being Muslim. such religious organisations’ own premises, at places of religious worship or prayer, and in any areas allocated to them, at places The law explicitly prohibits activities aimed at of pilgrimage, at institutions of religious converting believers from one faith to another organisations, in cemeteries, and in citizens’ (proselytism), as well as any other missionary homes (apartments) (Article 14, the Law activity within Uzbekistan. A key regulatory “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious issue concerns that of state registration. Organisations of the Republic of Uzbekistan”).

16 Uzbekistan – the Islamic Renaissance and the Internal Security Dilemma

The next crucial point concerns religious the Islamic University in 1999 was to educate the education, which can be considered at two modern Muslim intelligentsia, destined to serve levels: the training of religious ministers, and Uzbekistan’s Muslim community, by training the provision of religious knowledge for general specialists in Islamic theology, as well as highly educational purposes. In Uzbekistan, as regards qualified specialists in history, law, languages, religious education, this mainly refers to religious and Islamic finance. Over time, the university has organisations’ activities in training pastoral staff become a secular educational institution providing and ministers, to which end religious organisations limited religious knowledge to programmers, have the right to establish religious (spiritual) economists and historians. educational institutions, albeit subject to a number of stringent requirements. Within the global community, the idea of religious freedoms being severely curtailed in Uzbekistan If, in the Soviet era, religious knowledge was – with religious organisations controlled by the available at only two Islamic educational state, excluded from political and public activism, institutions, it can now be obtained at the and their religious leaders and believers closely Tashkent Imam Bukhari Islamic Institute, the monitored, etc. – is widespread. Many believe Miri Arab Madrassa, and at nine specialist Islamic that a policy of strict control could lead to secondary educational institutions – education Muslims becoming alienated from the state, and and training at which is fully compliant with state to tensions between government and religion. standards, their students acquiring secular as well However, this is a rather complicated issue that as religious and theoretical knowledge. Pursuant should be considered in the context of the overall to a Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of August development of the state and the nation under 22, 2003, diplomas issued to graduates of religious the contemporary realities of globalisation and educational institutions match equivalent state modernisation, as well as taking into account all educational diplomas. those changes

As regards the teaching of religion as a general that have occurred since the beginning of reform educational discipline, this is not possible under – i.e., since gaining independence. The first the state education system. The establishment of president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, in his non-state educational institutions by religious magna opus, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of organisations is also forbidden in Uzbekistan. The the 21st Century (1997), stated that “Islam, the teaching of religion in private is prohibited. religion of our ancestors strengthens people’s faith, purifies and elevates, and makes them stronger in overcoming the trials of human existence; it has Students at the above-mentioned educational also contributed to, and sometimes been the sole institutions, in addition to religious subjects, also means of preserving and transferring, universal study both secular science and foreign languages. and spiritual values from generation to generation. The evolution of the Tashkent Islamic University, That is why religion is a reliable companion to founded by Presidential Decree in 1999, also bears human beings, and a natural part of human life.” the marks of the policy pursued. The main goal of 4 However, Karimov’s policy was driven by the

17 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE notion of the diversity, complexity, contrariety, conceptual issue of how to resolve the dichotomy and polarity of the phenomena foreshadowed of “secularism vs. re-Islamisation” remains open, by the revival of Islamic values.5 Hence the sense and is manifested in some form or another in of circumspection, if not anxiety, regarding the various aspects of day-to-day life. For example, growth of religious sentiments in Uzbek society, high school (lycée) and university students are not where religious activity is often viewed through allowed to leave their studies on Fridays, should the prism of terrorist or extremist threats – and these end at 12–12:30 pm, in order to limit young which, accordingly, have influenced state policy. people’s attendance at mosques for Friday prayers, which start at 1 pm. Women and girls are not allowed to wear religious clothing in public places, Islam Karimov is of the view that “These days, particularly in universities. Cases have been ideological firing grounds are stronger than reported of girls in hijabs being expelled from nuclear ones,” arguing that military, economic and highereducational institutions.7 political threats can be easily seen and prevented, but it is far more difficult to identify ideological threats and their impact.6 This practice, incidentally, contrasts with rules adopted by international organisations in Uzbekistan, where local female employees are Such anxiety has, in fact, not been without allowed to wear such clothes, although it has to justification: Uzbekistan has repeatedly be conceded that either control over what is, for experienced the challenges of Islamic extremism Muslims, a sensitive issue, remains weak, or the and religiously motivated terrorism. The terrorist state is having to put up, so to speak, with the activity of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan inevitable reality, since there are many instances (IMU) in the 1990s, the bombing in Tashkent in of hijabs being worn at certain universities and February 1999, the terrorist attack of the Akromiya government institutions. The state would seem group in Andijan in May 2005, as well as other to be simply trying to keep the situation under incidents, have, to a large degree, all contributed control – which, again, points to the ambiguity significantly to tighter state control over religious and even precariousness of the situation. life in the country.

Television programmes, advertisements, even the Today, the situation within the country – in Internet and mobile phones, strangely enough, terms of reducing the threat of violent extremism are being used by dyed-in-the-wool secularists, – is relatively stable. However, in Uzbekistan, since they divert believers’ attention from the as in many countries around the world, the “other-worldly”. At the same time, the state and

4 Karimov, I. (1997), Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the 21st Century: Challenges to Stability and Progress. Tashkent, Uzbekistan, p. 35. 5 Ibid., p. 33. 6 Karimov, I. Yuksak ma’naviyat – yengilmas kuch, Tashkent: Ma’naviyat. p. 113. 7 The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” states: “The appearance of citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan (with the exception of ministers of religious organisations) in public places in religious attire is not allowed.”

18 Uzbekistan – the Islamic Renaissance and the Internal Security Dilemma the political elite make use of Islamic rhetoric. this policy of active secularisation was carried Public condemnation of Western pop culture, out at a time when a kind of spontaneous de- luxurious weddings, girls’ mini-skirts, all the way secularisation of public life was ongoing. For up to denying concert licences for certain artists example, more and more people need and are known for their outspoken views and onstage visiting mosques at prayer times. The celebration performance, etc., are justified by references to of Ramadan and Kurban Hayit (Eid al-Adha) in national traditions and Islamic values; but such Uzbekistan is becoming ever more large-scale measures either do not work, or their effectiveness and spectacular. It must be recognised that is very low. The contrast between religious life Islam, like all world religions, is a philosophical (with its mosques, places of worship, Koranic system, a worldview, defining the meaning of dictates, and religious rituals) and modern urban life and one’s way of life.From that point of view, life (with its discotheques, nightclubs, and drinking people’s socialisation, in terms of their attitudes to 8 dens) reveals a very complicated picture of the religion, can be deemed to be secular, religious, or contradictory coexistence of these two realities secular-religious. This means that Uzbek society – secular and religious – and their “state of flux”. is a complex series of interactions between those Uzbek society, consequently, appears, thus far, to who are, so to speak, socialised to be secular, those be somewhere between “mayishat” and “zhudat” who are socialised to be religious, and those who (between killing time in high-spirits and drinking are socialised to be secular-religious. in the chihana (traditional Uzbek tea house) and praying in the mosque), under the concurrent impacts of re-Islamisation and westernisation. Against this background, re-Islamisation, as such, and for the purposes of discussion, goes through three mutually intertwined stages in its A distinctive feature of the current political elite development. The first stage, focussed on identity, in Uzbekistan, brought up under the Soviet is associated with the revival of Islamic culture, and development paradigm (itself an offshoot of the people’s identity as Muslims. During this period, developmentalism that prevailed in 19th-century the former atheistic system is dismantled, political classical social thought) is their belief in the rhetoric is saturated with religious expressions, inevitability of modernisation, the one-directional historical places associated with the Islamic past are nature of its course. Hence the simplistic notion of reconstructed, an Islamic university is established, a direct link between the secularisation of society mass pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina begins, and modernising processes, and the view that and so on. modernisation inevitably leads to a decrease in religion’s influence, both in society and on people’s minds. The next stage is, so to speak, intellectually oriented – a thirst for knowledge. During this period, the need for and interest in understanding Under President Karimov, the state tried to offer the meaning of Islam, the content of the Koran its vision of “modernity”, in which religion’s role and the Sunnah (the example and teachings of was, primarily, that of cultural guardian. But the Prophet) become vitally important. More and

8 From the Persian and Tajik “mai”, an alcoholic drink or wine.

19 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE more believers will not just engage in ritual prayer, to power, a “virtual reception” was opened, but will also try to understand what they are and that numerous appeals from members of saying, in Arabic, during prayer. More and more the public regarding religious issues are being people will read the Koran, and understand its received there. The President has responded canons. Finally, more and more believers will to various andquestions including: the legality become pious Muslims. At this stage, there – or otherwise – of prayers being read, and will be an increasing demand for a correct salutations made, on the streets; whether it is interpretation of Islamic rules and Quranic permissible to wear a beard; the problem of surahs and ayahs. Such requests can now be hijabs; legal and illegal convictions on religious observed ever more frequently at mosques grounds; the sounding of the azan (the Muslim during the Friday Khutbah, when, on the one call to prayer) through a microphone; pressure hand, the imams themselves relate this and, on on religious organizations; the wearing of the other, worshippers pass notes to the imam, kerchiefs and shawls; quotas on making the Hajj with questions on various topics. and Umrah; and more.9

Once a “critical mass” of educated, mature On which basis, the sheikh drew attention, in Muslims appears, a third stage – that might be particular, to the continuous increase in quotas described as action- or even politically oriented for the Hajj. Under Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan – will commence. More and more Muslim allowed from 3,800 to 5,200 pilgrims to make activists will now be ready to demand that the Hajj. In 2017, with the arrival of Shavkat government policy be conducted in accordance Mirziyoyev, this quota was 7,200 people. with, and the country be governed by, Islamic values. This does not mean that the principle of secularism will be rejected at this point, but And so, Uzbekistan is now entering a new stage secularists will come up against new challenges in its development. It is important to note that from those of their compatriots who will be the re-Islamisation of society and the state is openly discussing this problem. not a phenomenon isolated from other aspects of national development, but is dialectically connected with these, as part of day-to-day life. In this context, attention is drawn to a major In this context, it is also important to engage in interview given by the Deputy Head of the discourse not only on the relationship between Spiritual Administration of Muslims of secularism and religiosity, but also on the Uzbekistan (SAMU), Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur, relationship between democracy and religion. on Radio Ozodlik, explaining a whole series of questions. It would have been difficult to imagine At his inauguration, on 14 December 2016, the such an interview a short while ago. The sheikh, new President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoev, in particular, drew attention to the fact that on the swore an oath, as is traditional, on both the current president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, coming

9 Interview with Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur, Deputy Head of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Uzbekistan (SAMU), Ra- dio Ozodlik, 27 October 2016. Available at: https://soundcloud.com/ozodlikradiosi/abdulaziz-mansur-dindor-mabuslar-dardiga-ulo-solish-kerak.

Uzbekistan – the Islamic Renaissance and the Internal Security Dilemma

Islamic Pilgrimage

Umrah Hajj Umrah Hajj

I Koran and the Constitution of Uzbekistan. summarised as follows: the post-Soviet freeing-up andA newquestions atmosphere including: is developing the legalityacross the – orof religionAnd (Islam), so, or Uzbekistan the re-Islamisation is now of soci entering- a new otherwisecountry, including – of inprayers relation to being religion. read, andety and thestage state, alsoin bringsits development. with it –in addition It isto important to the values arising from the principles of cultural salutations made, on the streets; whether it note that the re-Islamisation of society and and spiritual revival – the challenges of religious isThus, permissible in inspecting to wear the country’sa beard ;various the problem re- extremism the and stateterrorism. is Thesenot a challengesphenomenon put isolated ofgions, hijabs he will; legal – every and time, illegal without conviction fail – visit s onthe state infrom a difficult other situation: aspectsfor the sake of ofse- national historical holy sites and places of worship, as curity and public stability (i.e., the fulfilment of the religiouswell as engaging grounds with; the clergy. sounding Speaking of tothe at- azanmain functionsdevelopment, of any state), thebut state is dialecticallyuses varying connected (thetendees Muslim at a meeting call of imamsto prayer) in Tashkent through on 15 adegrees ofwith control, th restriction,ese, as partcoercion of and day pun-to- -day life. In microphoneJune 2017, Mirziyoyev; pressure stressed the needon for morereligious ishment. Bthisut for context, the sake of it fully is ensuringalso important believ- to engage flexible policy in religion, calling, for example, for ers’ freedom of religion and right to a religious life, organizationsa review of lists of; individualsthe wearing deemed of tokerchiefs be “polit- andthe state itselfin discourseis required to notshow onlya degree on of limthe- relationship shawlically unreliable”,s; quotas with on a view making to reducing the them. Hajj A anditation andbetween restraint. secularism and religiosity, but new leaf is clearly being turned in the post-Soviet Umrah; and more.9 also on the relationship between history of the relationship between power and religion. However, democracyinterpreting the and situation religion. in terms of a On which basis, the sheikh drew attention,dilemma could be the result of an over-simplified in particular, to the continuous increase inview of theA issue,t his since inauguration, it would appear toon divide 14 December quotasOn which for basis, the analysing Hajj. Under the problems Islam of Karimovdevel- ,state and 2016,religion, thesomewhat new mechanically, President intoof Uzbekistan, oping and formulating state policy in religion leads two different entities, inevitably alienating each Uzbekistanto the conclusion allowed that, by wayfrom of analogy 3,800 with to the 5,200 from the otherShavkat while theyMirziyoev, – with the sworesame inev an- oath, as is pilgrimsdilemma of to security make in thethe international Hajj. In (regional)2017, withitability andtraditional, mutual interdependence on both arethe bound Koran and the system, one can also speak of a dilemma in terms together in their modus vivendi, are separated the arrival of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, this Constitution of Uzbekistan. A new of internal security – the essence of which can be only in their modus operandi. quota was 7,200 people. atmosphere is developing across the country, including in relation21 to religion.

9 Interview with Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur, Deputy Head of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Uzbekistan (SAMU), Radio Ozodlik, 27 October 2016. Available at: https://soundcloud.com/ozodlikradiosi/abdulaziz-mansur- dindor-mabuslar-dardiga-ulo-solish-kerak.

неблагонадежных» в сторону сокращения. В постсоветской истории отношений между властью и религией, очевидно, открывается новая страница. Таким образом, анализируя проблемы формирования и формулирования государственной политики по отношению к религии, следует сделать вывод, что, по аналогии с дилеммой безопасности в международной (региональной) системе, можно вести речь и о внутренней дилемме безопасности. Суть ее сводится к следующему: постсоветское раскрепощение24 религии (ислама), или реисламизация общества и государства, несет с собой, помимо CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE ценностных начал культурно-духовного возрождения, еще и вызовы религиозного экстремизма и терроризма. Эти вызовы ставят государство в сложную ситуацию: ради обеспечения безопасности и общественной стабильности (т.е. выполнения главных функций любого государства) государство использует разной степени меры контроля, ограничения, принуждения и наказания. Но ради обеспечения в полной мере свободы религии и религиозного образа жизни верующих государство должно ограничивать и сдерживать само себя. Вместе с тем подобная интерпретация ситуации в виде дилеммы может быть результатом упрощенного видения вопроса, поскольку оно как бы механически разделяет государство и религию на две разные субстанции и неизбежно отчуждает их друг от друга, в то время как они с такой же неизбежностью и естественным образом взаимно переплетены в своем modus vivendi, но разделены лишь в своем modus operandi. Funeral prayers for the sheikh

Похоронная молитва по шейху

Итак, Узбекистан нынче вступает в новый этап своего развития. Важно заметить, что реисламизация общества и государства является не изолированным от других аспектов национального развития явлением, а диалектически связанной с ними частью бытия. В этой связи важно также вести дискурс не только о соотношении светскости и религиозности, но и о соотношении демократии и религии. На церемонии инаугурации 14 декабря 2016 года новый Президент Узбекистана Шавкат Мирзиёев традиционно принес присягу на Коране и Конституции Узбекистана. В стране

формируется новая7 October общественная 2016 – the Islom Ota атмосфера, Mosque, named вin honour том of числе Islam Karimov, и в отношении религии. Так, 7 октября 2016 года в столицеthe first УзбекистанаPresident of Uzbekistan, состоялось opens in the capital, открытие Tashkent мечети «Ислом ота», инспектируя22 регионы страны, он каждый раз непременно посещает исторические святые названной в честь Первого Президента Ислама Каримова. места, объекты культа и общается с духовенством. Выступая перед участниками съезда имамов в Ташкенте 15 июня 2017 года, Мирзиёев подчеркнул необходимость более гибкой политики в сфере религии. Так, например, он призвал пересмотреть «списки

Islam in Kazakhstan: Between Community and Disassociation

Islam has not, traditionally, been a defining phenomenon in the life of ethnic Kazakhs, although it is, undoubtedly, an important part of their identity. In the 1990s, the Islamic factor did not play any noticeable role in domestic Islam in Kazakhstan: politics. In the very beginning there was no Between Community Islamic alternative, as such, in choosing the and Disassociation path for the development of an independent Kazakhstan, although, not unexpectedly, the social role of religion has expanded during this time.

Beyond the Limits of Secularity slam in Kazakhstan, as in other countries Ithroughout the region, is becoming an Despite the separation of state and religion important part not just of traditional culture, having been officially declared, observers but, taking historical specifics into account, and experts notice a range of contradictions also an increasing factor in social and political in the implementation of this principle in discourse. It should be noted, however, that Kazakhstan. 27

President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev visiting the Khazret Sultan mosque, Astana, on the festival of Kurban Hayit (Eid al-Adha), 24 September 2015 Президент Казахстана Н. Назарбаев на празднике Курбан-Айт посещает мечеть «Хазрет Султан», 24 сентября 2015 года, Астана 23 По сути, несмотря на декларацию, на практике крайне сложно разделять принципы светскости и религиозности, которая очень подвижна. Как отмечают исламоведы, доля тех, кто исполняет все ритуалы и соблюдает нормы ислама в своей жизни, на протяжении последних десятилетий составляет от 7% до 11% от общего числа мусульман в Казахстане. Эти показатели уровня религиозности значительно отличают казахстанцев не только от обществ Ближнего Востока и Южной Азии, но даже от их соседей в Центральной Азии, исторически более религиозно ориентированных. В целом делается вывод, что ислам в Казахстане как политический фактор маргинален11. На данный момент можно с этим согласиться, но современные динамичные процессы, и не только в мусульманском мире, показывают, что ряд стран, в которых политический ислам еще недавно был на периферии общественных процессов, столкнулись со стремительным его «возращением». Количество мечетей в 1991-2016 гг. 1991 2000 2011 2012 2015 2016 6812 1652 2756 222813 2458 251614

11 http://sayasat.org/articles/1008-islam-v-kazahstane-kak-politicheskij-faktor-marginalen 12 http://e-islam.kz/ru/component/k2/item/900-eislam 13 Религиозные объединения в Республике Казахстан// Агентство РК по делам религий, ноябрь 2012 г. 14 Итоги 25-летия независимости Республики Казахстан. Религия и межконфессиональное согласие.

CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

Obviously, it is difficult to implement this the principles of secularism and religiosity, in any “pure” form. The Muslim festival of which are very mercurial. Kurban-Hayit (Eid al-Adha), for example, is, by law, a public holiday – as is the Orthodox Christmas, on 7 January. Nursultan As Islamic scholars point out, the proportion Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan, noted of Muslims in Kazakhstan and performing in one of the country’s key policy documents, all rituals and observing Islamic principles in the “Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy” that: “We are their day-to-day lives has remained at between proud to be a part of the Muslim Ummah. seven and 11 percent in recent decades. These These are our traditions. But we must not indicators of the level of piety clearly distinguish forget that we have a tradition of a secular Kazakhstanis not just from societies in the society, and that Kazakhstan is a secular Middle East and South Asia, but even from state. The secular character of our state is their neighbours in Central Asia, which are, an important condition for the successful historically, more religiously oriented. The development of Kazakhstan. This should general conclusion to be drawn is that, as a 11 be clearly understood by current and future political factor, Islam in Kazakhstan is marginal. Kazakhstani politicians, and all Kazakhstani One can, at the moment, concur with this, but p e op l e .” 10 modern dynamic processes, not just in the Muslim world, show that a number of countries in which political Islam was, until only recently, Ultimately, this declaration notwithstanding, on the periphery of social processes, have come it is, in practice, extremely difficult to isolate up against its rapid “return” or “revival”.

Number of Mosques 1991 – 2016

1991 2000 2011 2012 2015 2016

6812 1652 2756 222813 2458 251614

As is evident from the above table, the number Religious Activities and Religious Associations” of mosques has increased 37-fold in the 25 years that same year, not all mosques were able to from 1991 to 2016, with the greatest number of resume their activities, and those that did were mosques, moreover, being registered in 2011. incorporated into the Spiritual Administration But even after the adoption of the new L“ aw on of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK).

10 http://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/strategies_and_programs 11 http://sayasat.org/articles/1008-islam-v-kazahstane-kak-politicheskij-faktor-marginalen 12 http://e-islam.kz/ru/component/k2/item/900-eislam 13 Agency for Religious Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2012), Religious Associations in the Republic of Kazakhstan, November. 14 Agency for Religious Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, The Outcomes of 25 Years of Independence in Kazakhstan: Religion and Inter-faith Consensus.

24 Islam in Kazakhstan: Between Community and Disassociation

Disassociation in the Islamic It should be noted that Senim-Bilim- Environment Omir, as it gained popularity, increased its network throughout the country. This organisation’s growing community Since the late 1990s the country’s authorities of supporters was even able to act as a have seen a challenge in religious activity kind of parallel or alternative structure to and the emergence of informal religious the government-supported SAMK. It is communities and leaders. The evolution of significant that the entire process against the state’s attitude, moreover, from vigilance the leader and a group of his associates was to active opposition, has been rapid. supported by an informational campaign This concerns not just the so-called non- – biased in favour of the prosecution – in traditional movements and groups in Islam pro-government media. – such as Tablighi Jamaat, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the Salafis – but also those Sufi groups that have relatively long-established roots in This Sufi group’s line of defence, in turn, the in the traditional Kazakh environment. attempted to blame Salafi followers for persecuting them. One of the advocates Along with non-traditional religious for the accused, in fact, claimed that ideologies introduced from abroad (the “this case has been raised by senior civil 15 Caucasus, Middle East, and South Asia), servants, allied to the Wahhabis”. Sufism has, unexpectedly, become the focus of state attention. Accordingly, 2011 saw the It is interesting that an open letter to trial of Ismatulla Abdugappar, leader of the President Nursultan Nazarbayev, sent Sufi Senim-Bilim-Omir (Cенім-білім-Өмір by a group representing the Kazakh or Faith-Knowledge-Life) association which humanitarian intelligentsia, requesting was, at that time, gaining popularity among the release of Ismatulla Abdugappar, also the Kazakh intelligentsia. As early as 2012, highlighted the involvement of the Salafis, this organisation was recognised as extremist, including those in power.16 and banned in the country. Perhaps one of the most important arguments in favour of banning the organisation was the fact that its The guilty verdict, with a long prison leader, while an ethnic Kazakh, was a native sentence for leader Ismatulla Abdugappar of Afghanistan – a former mujahidin who nd his followers, provoked a controversy had received religious education in Pakistan. that continues to this day. 17

15 http://www.dn.kz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24%3Al-r&Itemid=1%20 16 http://www.spik.kz/articles/tolk/2011-08-25/otkrytoe-pismo-v-zashchitu-ismatully-abdugappara 17 http://www.altyn-orda.kz/razzhigali-li-sufii-mezhreligioznuyu-rozn-ili-o-pravovom-bespredele-sledstvennyx- organov-i-suda-vokrug-164-stati/

25 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

The case of this Sufi group, as well as the unconventional religious movements, is also increasing number of other non-traditional growing. According to official data, more than religious movements, demonstrates the 400 people were imprisoned for involvement clear dissociation of the Muslim Ummah in terrorist and extremist activities in 2016. (community) in Kazakhstan and the growing politicisation in this area. It should be noted that local Salafi also hold a variety of views, The ideology of Salafism is a vivid example of from those who recognise authority and influence at the transnational level. The debate power, to those who radically challenge the on the prohibition of Salafism in Kazakhstan existing establishment. Various movements, has been ongoing since 2011, intensifying, based on different schools of thought and periodically, against the backdrop of terrorist differing approaches, can also be observed attacks. within the SAMK. Another risk also arises: in response to calls Although the risks of politicisation through from radicals, the state will also counteract Islam are seen by most experts as relatively these with extreme measures, i.e., a low, they should, nonetheless, not be disproportionate increase in administrative underestimated. As can be seen in the 2016 control and enforcement. In this context, it terrorist attacks in Aktobe and Almaty, is quite appropriate to give voice to warnings a small group of radicals – or even one from theologians that “the harmony of person – can present a challenge to the secular–Islamic relations in Kazakhstan could system. It should be noted that most of be violated both as a result of provocations these radicals are neophytes, and their path by religious radicals, and as a result of ill- to religion chequered. As the experience of considered actions on the part of individual various Muslim countries shows, religiously representatives of state agencies.”18 motivated protests are inevitable, if no other means of expression exists. The viral ideology Many experts rightfully suggest not rushing of the Islamic State organisation (ISIS, or to use prohibitive measures. For example, A. Daesh) with its simplistic and, accordingly, Urazbayev, Chairman of the Presidium of the readily accessible answers to religious “Counter-Terrorism Committee”, a republic questions (for even the least intelligent), is an community organisation, has correctly noted example of this. that “There could be various consequences – including negative ones – from a ban. After Along with the increasing involvement all, the number of adherents to this movement of Kazakhstani believers in the global is estimated, according to the SAMK, at Muslim Ummah, the risk of the greater somewhere in the order of about 16,000. And dissemination of radical religious ideologies, these, after all, are our compatriots – who which the authorities, collectively, identify as could well be lost, or astray.”

18 Kozyrev, T. (2016) “Islam in Kazakhstan – Identity, Community and State”, Kazakhstan Spectre, No. 2, p. 5.

26 Islam in Kazakhstan: Between Community and Disassociation

The country’s authorities take a position era and, as A. Sultangaliyeva has correctly of restraint on this issue, with the Minister noted: «Islam is being institutionalised, and for Religious Affairs and Civil Society, N. the state is fighting its opponents for Islam, Ermakbaev, in November 2016 announcing claiming not just control over Islam but, that “The joint efforts of the society and the instead, ‘religious authority’”.21 state can be more effective than any formal ban at the legislative level. If the application of these measures does not lead to the right It is interesting that the extraordinary outcome, the Ministry will raise the question congress of the SAMK, held on 19 February of an injunction against Salafism and other 2013, at which Yerzhan Mayamerov was religious movements.”20 elected Supreme Mufti, should have been held in Astana at the “Nazarbayev Centre”. On the same day, the Kazakh president held On which basis, the government has chosen a meeting with the new head of the Muftiate a targeted and, in the long-term, more and noted “The necessity of issuing fatwas productive approach, in which state agencies on topical issues – this has been in practice will suppress the spread of Salafi literature, in all Muslim countries, for a long time.” In will prevent unlawful assembly and preaching addition to which, Nursultan Nazarbayev by representatives of Salafism, block radical has emphasised that “The only recognised Internet sites, and prohibit any organisations structure for traditional Islam in our country that propagate the ideology of Salafism. At is the Spiritual Administration of Muslims the same time, the state is seeking to rely of Kazakhstan. The recently adopted law on the republic’s only registered religious governing religious relations stipulates that association – the Spiritual Administration the state recognises the place and role of the of Muslims of Kazakhstan – in this struggle. Hanafi Madhhab in the spiritual life of our people. And that is quite right.”22 The Risks of “Institutionalising” Religion The Kazakh L“ aw on Religious Activities It should be noted that Kazakhstan, like and Religious Associations” emphasises the a number of other post-Soviet countries, “historical role” of the Hanafi Madhhab. largely inherited the Soviet system of state As has been noted, the authorities, in interaction with religion. The SAMK has strengthening the SAMK, are seeking to retained many of the “birthmarks” from that maintain control over religion.

19 https://www.zakon.kz/4825693-zapreshhat-li-v-kazakhstane-salafizm-za.html 20 https://informburo.kz/novosti/v-pravitelstve-ozvuchili-usloviya-zapreta-salafizma-na-zakonodatelnom-urovne. html?_utl_t=fb 21 Sultangalieva, A.K. (2012), The “Return of Islam” in Kazakhstan, Almaty, p. 33. 22 https://www.kt.kz/rus/state/prezident_vstretilsja_s_predstaviteljami_duhovnogo_upravlenija_musuljman_ kazahstana_1153568969.html

27 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

In the same context, attempts need to be Russian is distributed not only on paper, but made to strengthen the administrative also in electronically.”24 status of the Muftiate by transferring its central apparatus to the capital. It should be noted that the disengagement Encouraged to actively oppose illegal religious movements, the President of within the Muslim community can be clearly Kazakhstan has posed the question: “If we discerned in the appeals from a number of give way to young Muslims, then why are we Kazakhstani theologians “to cherish and sitting here? Young people need to avoid going promote the religion of our ancestors, not to 25 the wrong way.”23 follow the ‘sheikhs overseas’”. In addition to which, this is also indicative of the acute shortage of religiously literate spiritual leaders. For example, after the terrorist attacks in Often, imams (literally “leaders”) under Aktobe and Almaty in 2016, and in response the SAMK system do not have any genuine to the Muftiate’s appeals to the authorities, authority in the eyes of believers. Spiritual and/ two advocacy groups were established. One or intellectual authority requires authority of these – at the national (republic) level – (as well as independence) in rulings and comprises 33 Islamic theologians. The second interpretations, whereas – for the state and the group comprises 295 Islamic leaders, working authorities – the loyalty of religious leaders is throughout the regions. The objective for both more important. groups is the same – to prevent the spread of religious extremist ideas, through close engagement with Akimats (or Khakimyats, Those distinctions used by the authorities in local religious organisations), religious ongoing discussions to define “traditional agencies, and local government on the ground, Islam” as having positive connotations and by engaging with mosque attendees in direct “non-traditional Islam” as being negative, discussion of extremist ideas. At the same are also symptomatic of generalised or often time, the SAMK recognises the shortcomings selective interpretations, which, frequently, here arising from poor communication with do not lead to greater clarity. Indeed, in such Russian-speaking Muslims. instances, the state’s proactive determination of something as “traditional” might well be perceived as a synonym of an official definition. According to E. Engarov, Secretary of the Such arguments are relative, however, since SAMK’s Council of Ulema, “We are forced traditions were also once innovations. to admit that an informational vacuum has arisen in the minds of young people, precisely because of the language barrier. A huge All of this demands a serious review of amount of questionable religious literature in engagement, both on the part of the state, and,

23 http://www.ktk.kz/ru/news/video/2013/2/19/21378 24 https://365info.kz/2016/12/v-kazahstane-defitsit-russkoyazychnyh-imamov-dumk/ 25 https://camonitor.kz/26016-tradicionnyy-islam-po-kazahski-protiv-vahhabitskoy-ideologii.html

28 Islam in Kazakhstan: Between Community and Disassociation in fact, within the Muslim community itself. Religious dress, and the debates around this, The strengthening of intellectual discourse, have become a symbolic watershed. Since, including within the Muslim environment, as essentially, the imported Islamic dress code well as flexibility and adaptability, rather than is not appropriate for the traditional Kazakh the alienation of believers and the state, would environment, and is borrowed from the seem to be quite possible and necessary ways countries of the Middle East or Pakistan, of harmonising relations in this respect. dressing in this way creates an additional line of separation from the secular environment. It should be noted that this is typical of Very often, the state’s response to these many states, and not just Muslims. The total challenges is largely due to the continuing number of people wearing religious clothing neo-Soviet practice of state control over is not, in any case, that significant, although religion. For example, in just the last 10 years, bitter disputes have raised the question of the state body for religious affairs has been its acceptability in state and educational restructured five times – on each occasion institutions. involving reactive or expedient changes caused by the state’s response to immediate problems. The authorised state organisation has, several It is revealing that even certain deputies times, held the status of a committee and, in the Kazakh parliament have expressed thereafter, an agency. In September 2016 the opposing views on this matter, with Ministry for Religious Affairs and Civil Society mazhilisman (a member of the lower house was created in response to terrorist attacks. It of parliament) A. Muradov, for example, is obvious that its elevation to the status of a citing the following arguments: “In state agency is a reflection of the authorities’ Kazakhstan, 80 percent are Muslims, and concern over the situation in this area, but, as they choose to wear what is allowed by their has been noted, the tools available – and often faith. But the hijab is an Arabian garment; the steps taken – reflect a different era. indigenous Kazakhs have never worn it. The emergence of a special regulation or law in Kazakhstan that prohibits wearing it in Debates on Religious Dress and Rituals public places is wrong. Each school has the right to make its own decision with regard to schoolchildren’s appearance. I think that Discussions on the attributes of Islamic short skirts for schoolgirls are worse than a clothing have periodically intensified in the h ij a b.” 26 country, particularly since the beginning of the 2010s. With increasing numbers of adherents (with hijabs for women, beards and On the other hand, another deputy, G. short trousers for men) in stark contrast to the Baimakhanova, pointed out that “School is a secular majority, this social disengagement secular institution, and should stick to secular has become clear. rules, including with regard to clothing.

26 http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31441265#pos=1;-173

29 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

But there are religious schools – and in General Prosecutor. The SAMK supported those, by all means, religious affiliation can the authorities’ decision to ban the wearing be demonstrated. If parents are so deeply of hijabs in school. A few protests disagreeing religious – let them hand the child over to the with this decision were expressed through madrasah.”27 an appeal to the President, and attempts to organise a rally in the capital. School uniform was introduced in public schools throughout Kazakhstan in 2011, In addition to religious dress, the question by order of the Ministry of Education and of prayer has also been debated – engaging Science. Despite this, conflicts with parents in which is prohibited in state institutions, of hijab-wearing students have occurred educational institutions and military units periodically, with more than 5,000 appeals under the “Law on Religious Activities and to the ministry by 2016 – this being the total Religious Associations.” The view is that a number of those opposed, and conversely, practising believer can leave the workplace – 28 in favour of wearing the hijab. The ban an educational institution, say – for an after-35 on wearing religious clothing (the hijab) dinner namaz (prayer), but this will depend on was detailed in a ministerial decree in 2016, various circumstances, including, for example, subsequently confirmed by the Office of the the attitude of the head of such organisation.

Friday prayers at the Khasret Sultan mosque, Astanа Пятничный намаз, мечеть «Хазрет Султан», Астана 27 Ibid. 28 http://www.inform.kz/ru/odezhdu-s-religioznoy-atributikoy-deti-mogut-nosit-vne-shkoly-minyust_a2960533 Таким образом, обрядовая сторона ислама становится значимым социальным фактором.

Несомненно,30 одним из важнейших коллективных мусульманских обрядов является паломничество в Мекку. Как известно, в силу престижа хаджа многие политики совершают его, стремясь улучшить свою репутацию. В этом контексте показательна эволюция отношения к религиозным обрядам лидеров стран Центральной Азии, чей карьерный взлет в советские годы был связан с членством в Коммунистической партии и демонстративным атеизмом. Президент Казахстана Н. Назарбаев в ходе своего первого визита в Саудовскую Аравию в 1994 году совершил малый хадж (умру). В 2003 году он осторожно заметил, что, возможно, совершит полный хадж, но не сейчас, так как «пока к этому не готов». Он подчеркнул тогда, что, «как казах, я, естественно, отношу себя к исламской культуре. Поэтому меня зовут совершить хадж. Возможно, я отношусь к этому очень серьезно. Когда я решу, что готов вступить на этот путь, тогда я и совершу настоящий хадж»29. Малый хадж казахстанский лидер совершил и в марте 2004 года в ходе очередного визита в Саудовскую Аравию.

29 https://zonakz.net/articles/4593

Только в октябре 2013 года в Сети появились неофициальные видеоролики малого хаджа казахстанского лидера30. При этом длительное отсутствие официального подтверждения обосновывалось тем, что президент хочет сохранить «нейтральность». Вместе с тем информационная стратегия в этом вопросе очевидно поменялась. В октябре 2016 года президентская пресс-служба широко освещала визит Н. Назарбаева в Саудовскую Аравию и, в частности, посещение мечети Пророка Мухаммада в Медине и совершение им намаза31. Кроме того, в официальных хрониках появились кадры предыдущих посещений Islam in Kazakhstan: Between Community and Disassociation Мекки казахстанским лидером.

25 октябряOctober 20162016 года– President, Н. Назарбаев Nursultan посещает Nazarbayev мечеть visits Пророка the Prophet’s Мухаммада Mosque в Медине. (Al-Masjid an-Nabawi), Medina

The growing role of Islam and, correspondingly, rituals – leaders whose career trajectories in the Следует отметить, что раньше всех своих коллег в регионе хадж совершил первый президент its accompanying rituals, can be demonstrated Soviet era were connected to their membership Узбекистана И. Каримов еще в 1992 году. После этого череда известных событий как в through the increasing numbers of those – of the Communist Party, and their demonstrative includingстране, такcivil и servants в регионе – (возникноobserving вениеthe fast ИДУ, гражданскаяatheism – is revealing. война в Таджикистане, теракты during1999 the года month в Ташкенте),of Ramadan, судяperforming по всему, the побудила узбекского лидера кардинально Hajj, and attending Friday prayers. It is significant that officials and civil servants often try to avoid During his first visit to Saudi Arabia in 1994, 30 http://rus.azattyq.org/a/nursultan-nazarbaev-hadzh-mekka/25154Nursultan245.htmll Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan, business31 meetings on Friday afternoons. http://ru.sputniknews.kz/politics/20161025/883826/nazarbaev-sovershil-namaz-v-mecheti-proroka- 29 muhammada-v-medine.html performed the “minor pilgrimage (hajj)” to Umrah. In 2003, he cautiously noted that he might On which basis, the ritualistic aspect of Islam perform the full Hajj, but not at that time since he becomes an important factor, socially. One of was “not yet ready for it”. the most important collective Muslim rites is, undoubtedly, the pilgrimage to Mecca. As is well He stressed then that, “As a Kazakh, I, natural- known, the prestige of the Hajj means many ly, identify with Islamic culture – and, for that politicians undertake it, in an attempt to improve reason, feel the call of the Hajj. I take it very their reputation. In which context, the evolution seriously, perhaps. When I decide I am ready to in Central Asian leaders’ attitudes to religious set out on that path, I will make the real Hajj.”30

29 https://zonakz.net/articles/4593 30 http://rus.azattyq.org/a/nursultan-nazarbaev-hadzh-mekka/25154245.htmll

31 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

The Kazakh leader undertook the minor pil- make the Hajj, in June 1997, was Emomali Rah- grimage (Umrah, hajj) during the course of his mon, President of Tajikistan, who also made the next visit to Saudi Arabia, in March 2004. Un- pilgrimage to Kaaba in 2001 and 2005. Gurban- official videos of the Kazakh leader making the guly Berdimuhamedow, President of Turkmen- minor pilgrimage (Umrah, hajj) only emerged istan, made the Hajj in April 2007, combining it online in October 2013.31 The longstanding ab- with his first official visit abroad. sence of any official confirmation has been justified on the basis that the President wishes to preserve his “neutrality”. It is noteworthy that most of the Central Asian leaders have made a demonstrative pilgrimage to Mecca in recent years,33 with Almazbek At- Nonetheless, informational strategy on this is- ambayev, President of Kyrgyzstan, perform- sue has evidently changed. In October 2016 the ing this religious ritual in December 2014, President’s press services covered President and Emomali Rahmon, President of Tajikistan, Nursultan Nazarbayev’s visit to Saudi Arabia making the pilgrimage for the fourth time, to- extensively and, in particular, his visit to the gether with members of his family, in January Prophet’s Mosque (Al-Masjid an-Nabawi) in 2016. Turkmen leader Gurbanguly Berdimu- Medina, as well as his taking part in prayers.32 hamedow’s second Hajj, in May 2016, received extensive coverage.

Images of the Kazakh leader’s previous visits to Mecca have also appeared in official reports. It is obvious that this trend is the result of both strengthening ties with the Muslim world, and the increasing role of Islam and religious identi- It should be noted that the first President of Uz- ty in life in Central Asian societies. The second bekistan, Islam Karimov, made the Hajj ahead president of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, of all of his regional colleagues, back in 1992. being (as was Akayev) the true child of the So- Since then, a series of infamous events in both viet era, nevertheless paid more attention to the the country and the region (the emergence of issue of Islam. Emil Nasritdinov, a scholar and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), researcher of religion in Kyrgyzstan, believes the civil war in Tajikistan, the 1999 terrorist at- that “religion, as a political issue, began to tacks in Tashkent), seems to have prompted the come under consideration in Bakiyev’s time – Uzbek leader to radically reconsider his attitude the first law approved by Kurmanbek Bakiyev to the role of Islam. The third regional leader to being the “Law on Freedom of Religion.”

30 https://zonakz.net/articles/4593. 31 http://rus.azattyq.org/a/nursultan-nazarbaev-hadzh-mekka/25154245.htmll. 32 http://ru.sputniknews.kz/politics/20161025/883826/nazarbaev-sovershil-namaz-v-mecheti-proroka- muhammada-v-medine.html. 33 It should be noted that the religious aspect of the legitimisation of power has also played a significant role in the history of the region. There are many examples of regional rulers – khans, emirs, beks – having sought to enlist the support of influential religious classes, through marital unions with the Sa’idi or Khadir clans or other famous holy names, to strengthen their bloodlines and legitimacy.

32 Tajikistan: Islam and Politics

Badahajan” and so on) has a strong impact on this process, creating barriers. • The traditional religious elite of the Tajik people (the Saizod, Hodzhagon, Eshonzoda, etc.), has – the atheistic nature of Soviet power notwithstanding – retained its Islamic identity Tajikistan: and worldview. Islam and Politics

The announcement of the Republic of Tajikistan as a secular state in the early days of independence went against the expectations of that more traditional part of the population who had sought not only to revive the ideas and values of people’s slam plays a major role in Tajikistan, with Islam, but also to create an Islamic state. The lack Ireligious identity (“I am a Muslim”) com- of any idea, concept, or state programme for har- peting – sometimes successfully – with national mony between a secular state and a predominant- self-identification. There are several reasons be- ly Islamic society became a heavy burden in the hind this situation. first decade of the Tajik people’s life as an independent nation.

• Tajiks, as an ancient and settled regional people, cherish their centuries-old traditions and Key Stages in Cooperation between customs, which have deeply religious (specif- Government and Political Islam ically, Islamic) roots. • The Tajik people, who have given the Mus- lim world a whole plethora of Islamic think- The national awakening of the Tajik people in ers (Abu Hanif, Jaliliddin Rumi, Abdurahman the final years of the Soviet Union was closely Jami and dozens of other outstanding imams intertwined with an Islamic awakening, since the of the Islamic Ummah), retain their deep reli- historical memory of the Tajiks had an indissolu- giosity and piety. ble connection with those Islamic values that had been severely suppressed during the years of So- • The Tajik people have been able to maintain viet power. their adherence to the Islamic faith, in its moderate, (not militant) Hanafi form, throughout 70 years of Soviet power. Therefore, national democratic community and • The incomplete consolidation of the Tajik social movements were closely involved with the people – either on a national basis (“I am a rapid and sweeping Islamic revival. The unwill- Muslim”. ingness of the ruling communist nomenklatura to • “I am an Iranian”, “I am a democrat”, or “I engage with secular reformist forces and move- am a communist”, and so on) or in terms of ments forced the democratic forces to enter into 34 local and territorial self-identification (“I’m an alliance with the forces of political Islam. In from Khujand”, “I’m from Kulob”, “I’m from Soviet Tajikistan, one of the first in the region was the Tajik branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party

34 Mamadazimov, A. (2000), A Political History of the Tajik People. Dushanbe, pp. 283 – 298.

33 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

(of the Soviet Union), which, after the country It should be emphasised that during the years of gained independence, became the most pow- civil confrontation, the informal expansion of the erful opposition party in the republic. The first rituals and practices of locally-practised Islam months after the recognition of independence (which saw local communities starting to estab- in Tajik society saw an uncontrollable and lish mosques and prayer houses instead of clubs chaotic process of Islam being politicised and or other public places), the number of people at- politics being Islamified. tending mosques, observing fasting (Ramadan), and wishing to make a Hajj to the sacred sites of Mecca and Medina, increased manifold. State The history of almost a quarter of a century of agencies, while fiercely battling political Islam, at interaction between political Islam and secular the same time, did not interfere with these tenden- state power in Tajikistan can be divided into cies. three stages: the uncompromising struggle for the character of national statehood (1991–1997, the civil war); the maintenance of the status quo During the second stage, following the signing of under the framework of the General Agreement the General Agreement on the Establishment of on the Establishment of Peace and National Peace and National Accord (June 1997), armed Accord in Tajikistan (1997–2010); and the dis- groups from the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) placement of political Islam from the country’s were integrated into the national army and other socio–political arena (2010 to date). law enforcement structures.After this, the Islamic Renaissance (Revival) Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), which had been banned during the years of civ- The first stage saw Soviet (secular) discourse il confrontation (like the Democratic Party), was and communist slogans replaced by Islamic again registered with the Ministry of Justice of rhetoric. The uncompromising confrontation the Republic of Tajikistan. The IRPT again began between political Islam and the existing pow- publishing its weekly newspaper “Najot” (“Sal- er structure – which, because of its atheistic vation”), a magazine, “Nayson”, and launched an nature and incompetence, could not engage in official website.35 A paradoxical situation devel- dialogue – provoked a civil confrontation that oped in Tajikistan between 1997 and 2015: on the lasted more than five years (1992–1997). The one hand, the national state was declared as being consolidation of armed groups of political Is- secular while, on the other, a powerful religious- lamists in the mountainous areas of the coun- ly oriented party functioned just as legally – with, try bordering Afghanistan, where they could moreover, a number of its representatives becom- not be ousted by supporters of the constitu- ing people’s deputies. tional (secular) system, created a stalemate in the country. The sharp deterioration in the situation in neighbouring Afghanistan, which The process of building mosques and prayer hous- provided military and logistical and support es continued to accelerate both during the years to supporters of political Islam, together with of civil confrontation (1992–1997) and under the positive attitude of the guarantors of the post-conflict reconstruction (1997–2008), reach- inter-Tajik settlement in favour of an early res- ing a point at which their number exceeded the olution of this crisis, saw peace and national total number of secondary schools throughout harmony restored. the country.

35 Mamadazinov, A., Kuvatova, A. (2012), The Regulation of Political Parties’ Activities and Women’s Involvement in the Political Life of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, Morif va Farkhang, p. 311.

34 40

Необходимо подчеркнуть, что в годы гражданского противостояния неформальным путем происходило расширение практики обрядов и ритуалов народного ислама, когда местные сообщества стали создавать мечети и молебные дома вместо клубов или других общественных мест. Многократно увеличилось число людей, посещающих мечети, соблюдающих пост (рамазан), а также желающих совершить хадж в священную Мекку и Медину. Государственные органы, ведя жесткую борьбу с политическим исламом, в то же время не препятствовали этим тенденциям. На втором этапе, после подписания Общего соглашения об установлении мира и национального согласия (июнь 1997 года) вооруженные группировки Объединенной таджикской оппозиции (ОТО) были интегрированы в национальную армию и другие правоохранительные структуры. После этого Партия исламского возрождения (ПИВТ), запрещенная в годы гражданского противостояния (как и Демпартия), снова была зарегистрирована в Минюсте РТ. ПИВТ опять начала издавать свою еженедельную газету «Нажот» («Спасение»), журнал «Найсон» и запустила официальный веб-сайт34. Tajikistan: Islam and Politics

The Official Signing of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord (27 June 1997, Moscow) Церемония подписания Общего соглашения об установлении мира и национального Certain local experts began calling for the regu- to the “Law on Political Parties”, any political lation of religious life. The authorities respondсогласия- party must have regional offices in more than ed by adopting legislation including the “Law half of the cities and regions throughout the on the Regulation of National Traditions, Cele- country. Failure to comply with this regulation 34 Мамадазимовbrations and А., Ceremonies Куватова in А. the Регулирование Republic of Ta деятельности- results политиin the closureческих of партий the entire и участие party. женщин в политическойjikistan”, жизни theв Таджикистане. “Law on Parental - Душанбе: Responsibilities Маориф ва фарханг, 2012. - 311 с. in Raising Children”, and so on. Concurrently with this, in September 2015, Deputy Minister of Defence General Ab- The Council of Ulema of Tajikistan, a public dukhalim Nazarzoda and a group of like-mind- organisation, began to come under the control ed individuals attempted a military coup which, of the state. Imam-khatibs at Friday mosques according to the authorities, involved the IRPT were assigned a fixed wage, which meant giv- leadership. This military coup was suppressed, ing them the status of civil servants. At the third and those involved put on trial. On 29 Septem- stage, from spring 2015 (after the last parlia- ber 2015, the Supreme Court of the Republic of mentary elections), when the IRPT began to Tajikistan banned all activities by the IRPT.36 seriously challenge the election results, the The entire leadership of the IRPT, except for situation changed dramatically, with local (dis- Chairman Muhiddin Kabiri, who, by that time, trict and city) IRPT branches starting to be dis- had left the country, were involved in this at- banded, or to disband independently. According tempted coup.

36 https://news.tj/ru/node/215519

35 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

On 18 May 2016 a nationwide referendum was dulloh Nuri in the post-conflict era (from 27 held in the Republic of Tajikistan, posing the June 1997 until his death). question, among others, of banning nationalist and religious political parties – which was approved, by an overwhelming majority.37 The This new situation – of one party having pow- IRPT’s activities will now remain part of the his- er, and, on the other hand a multitude of prob- tory of sovereign Tajikistan as an unsuccessful at- lems relating to its policy on religion, without tempt at the creation of a functioning political having another major player or partner – has party of a religious (Islamic) nature, under an both positive and negative aspects. environment of national secular statehood: the creation of such political parties now being prohibited by law. Many questions from local experts and government agencies have raised the following issues: The Nature of the Authorities’ - the presence of religious people within so- Engagement with Islam after the ciety subject to the influence (propaganda) of Referendum of 18 May Salafism and Wahhabism;38 - the presence of followers of the extremist The secular nature of the national state is not, and terrorist movement “Islamic State”; any longer, subject to competition from po- - the de-urbanisation and deindustrialisation litical Islam, and the government’s agenda in of a number of regions, particularly in the terms of its engagement with strict Islamic so- mountains, creating a breeding ground for ciety has undergone considerable transforma- provincial (unenlightened) Islam; tion. If the IRPT had, previously, been the key - the dilemma facing the clergy, of “loyalty” opponent and/or partner to the authorities and, (to the state) and professional integrity (in re- in tandem, if all relations based on “secular ligious affairs); and power–Islamic society” had been put on the back burner, then the authorities did not, now, - public discussions regarding Islamic dress have any kind of priority partner with whom and rituals (the hijab for women, beards for relations might eclipse all other efforts and ac- men).39 tivities relating to popular (“people’s”) Islam.

According to experts, the initial involve- Following the banning of the IRPT, and par- ment of Tajik citizens in extremist groups oc- ticularly after the national referendum of 18 curred, to a greater extent, among refugees May 2016, the picture began to change dras- and internally displaced persons ending up in tically. No single organisation or structure Afghanistan. It is well known that during the whose activities are in any way connected to years of civil confrontation more than half religious life has enjoyed the status that the a million migrants were forced to leave the IRPT had during the presidency of Sayid Ab- country and cross the Panj-Amudarya riv-

37 https://news.tj/ru/news/v-tadzhikistane-prokhodit-referendum-po-izmeneniyu-konstitutsii-respubliki 38 http://islamio.ru/news/society/na_yuge_tadzhikistana_osuzhdeny_shest_salafitov/ 39 https://news.tj/ru/news/okhota-na-khidzhaby, http://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2015/05/150511_ tajikistan_beards

36 43

- наличие в обществе сторонников экстремистского и террористического движения «Исламское государство»; - деурбанизация и деиндустрализация ряда регионов, в основном горных, что создает питательную среду для провинциального (непросвещенного) ислама; - дилемма «лояльность (к властям) - компетентность (в религиозных делах)» для духовенства; - общественные дискуссии об исламском дресс-коде и обрядах (хиджаб у женщин и борода у 38 мужчин)Tajikistan.: Islam and Politics

er. The United Tajik Opposition (UTO) did It was precisely these groups of people who not have a sufficiently powerful and diffuse did not return to Tajikistan after the signing Поstructure мнению to manage экспертов, the daily lifeпервоначальное of Tajik ref- theприобщение General Agreement граждан on the Таджикис Establishmentтана к экстремистским группировкамugees and internally произошло displaced persons. в большей This степениof Peace средиand National беженцев Accord inи Juneвынуж 1997,денных переселенцев, situation served as a starting point for various instead filling the ranks of international ex- попавшихextremist groups на in Afghanistan, территорию who recruit Афганистана- tremist .groups Общеизвестно, such as the Islamic Movement что более полумиллиона ed supporters among Tajik refugees. This in- of Uzbekistan (IMU), Ansarullah, the Taliban, переселенцевvolvement of Tajik в nationals годы in гражданского extremist and противостоянияand many others. This constituted были вынуждены the first wave покинуть пределы terrorist groups was conducted through the fol- of Tajik nationals in the international extrem- страныlowing channels: и перейти через Пяндж-Амударью.ist movement, Объединенная which, becoming таджикская increasingly оппозиция не имела достаточно• through religious разветвленной institutions in и Afghaniмощной- структуры,marginalised, чтобыdisappeared координирова into the numerousть повседневную жизнь stan, Pakistan, and a number of Arab coun- groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. таджикскихtries, in which беженцев aggressive tendencies и вынужденных (as op- переселенцев. Данное обстоятельство послужило posed to moderate and tolerant Hanafism) отправнойcan be found, точкой calling for для violence различных against эTheкстремистских second wave, consciously группировок attaching itself Афган истана, которые secular authorities; to ISIS (ISIL), caused particular concern and alarm to both the authorities and the public: рекрутировали• through insufficient сторонников literacy regarding среди Is- таджикских беженцев. Данное приобщение представителейlamic academic doctrines Таджикистана and learning, and к экстремистским- unable to reconcile themselves и террористическим to the retention группировкам the recognition of “jihad” in only its most of various atheistic manifestations in state af- проходилоbasic form; по and следующим каналам: fairs (awkwardness about wearing the hijab, or having a beard), these people deliberately emi- • the use of religion as a means of escape grate to Syria and join ISIS; and 38 from difficult living conditions, and the use of weapons https://news.tj/ru/news/okhota-na-khidzhaby to expropriate others’ property, - as, part of the unofficial (semi-legal) assimi- http://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2015/05/150511_tajikismaterial wealth and possessions. lation of the foundationstan_beards of Islam (tradition-

37 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE ally not from the moderate Hanafi Ulema, but ali Rakhmon has, since the beginning of last from adherents of dissident schools of thought year, grasped the “religious initiative”, as ev- (madhhabs) such as Salafism and Wahhabism), idenced by: a certain section of religiously minded youth - his making the “minor pilgrimage” (Umrah) is, concurrently with this, beginning to develop with his family in early 2016; anti-state behaviours in relation to secular authorities and power. These people typically join - his participation in the funeral procession underground extremist groups or emigrate to of the first President of Uzbekistan, Islam Islamic countries, as a result. Karimov, in Samarkand (September 2016), at which Emomali Rakhmon was not only involved in the official part of funeral proceed- Official authority is not, currently, being disturbed ings, but also took part in traditional Islamic by the internal religious life of the community, prayers during the raising of the deceased’s where, apart from discussions about the hijab and coffin (considered an important compassion- the war, there are no other acute problems. ate and charitable act among believers); and - his reading prayers before the closing off of the Vakhsh river by the Rogun Dam (October This view is further supported by the fact that 2016) – broadcast repeatedly on all television the country’s political leadership under Emom- channels.

38 Kyrgyzstan. Politics and Islam

Independence and Discussions Around Islam

It cannot be said that Islam was the only ideological paradigm to which citizens of sovereign Kyrgyzstan turned their attention. The ideas of democracy, the liberal state, human rights and Kyrgyzstan. personal freedom were – and remain –quite at- Politics and Islam tractive. However, these ideas, did not, for one thing, gain universal acceptance and, for another, became corrupted – in some instances beyond all recognition, evoking, in a certain part of the population, the same aversion as had communism. Islam, on the basis of its historical roots in the region, and in the context of the current crisis of he atheistic Soviet regime, which for a long “isms,” began to occupy the vacuum in the coun- Ttime existed under the slogan “Religion is the try’s ideology. Kyrgyzstan’s search for ideologi- opium of the people” never quite eradicated the cal identity is, therefore, ongoing, and Islam is long-standing religious identity of the region. This playing an increasing role in this process. preservation of religious identity was, presum- ably, a way of not losing distinctive characteristics (including ethnically) as well as, albeit to no great It is interesting to note how the rhetoric of the extent, expressing resistance to the communist country’s top officials – for example, the first and system. The religiosity of a certain part of the pop- second presidents of Kyrgyzstan – has changed: it ulation of Central Asia was, to some extent, pres- is becoming increasingly obvious that attention to ent throughout the entire Soviet period, despite Islam, and its role in society, is gradually growing. the revolution of 1917, the persecution and sup- pression of religious institutions, totalitarian ideology, and massive cultural change. Nevertheless, Speeches by the first President of Kyrgyzstan, during the Soviet period, such religiosity did not Askar Akayev, were distinguished by a cautious play any significant role in either the ideological, attitude toward Islam. or, to an even greater extent, the political arena. He, quite deliberately, did not distance himself By the end of the Soviet period the situation from other religions. Islam came more from the was, concurrently with the growing ideological cultural sphere than from the ideological and, still problems of the communist regime, gradually less, political one. The President did not pray, and beginning to change. The avalanche-like growth did not perform Salat (Namaz), at least in public. of economic and social problems – and related In 2000, addressing the country’s Muslim popula- issues – demanded answers. Communist ideol- tion on Orozo Ait (the festival of Ramazan/Rama- ogy was already in a state of crisis. Against this dan) he stressed that the festival being celebrated, background, it would seem logical that one of the representing “a bright and holy ritual of the Islam- key “discoveries” of this time should be the rapid ic religion,” also has a “universal spirituality, the reversion of an ever-increasing part of the popula- essence of which is based in justice, goodness tion to Islam and its postulates. and forbearance”.40

40 Religion and Society (2000), 26 December. Available at: http://txt.newsru.com/religy/26dec2000/oraza.html.

39 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE 47

A photograph taken from the rear of the State History Museum of Kyrgyzstan, the former Фотография, сделанная с задней стороны музея истории Кыргызстана, бывшего музея В.И. Lenin Museum, where his pedestal, as former chief ideologist, has again been pressed into usage Ленинаon the Republic, куда его of Kyrgyzstan’s постамент becoming, как бывшегоindependent. главного In front ofидеолога the museum, был itself вынесен is the country’s еще с принятием независимостиmain КР square,. Перед with самим the main музеем symbol находится of independence главная – the national площадь flag государства и атрибут независимости – государственный флаг. The second president of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek This specialist believes that the issue of reli- ИнтересноBakiyev, being отметить, (as was Akayev) как менялась the true child риторика of gion, первых and theлиц state’s страны, interest на примерin it, mainly первого from и второго the Soviet era, nevertheless paid more attention to the point of view of security, acquired special президентовthe issue of Islam. Кыргызстана Emil Nasritdinov, - станов a scholarится and очевиднымrelevance постепенное with the withdrawal признание of иcoalition рост внимания к researcher of religion in Kyrgyzstan, believes that troops from Afghanistan.42 исламу и его роли в обществе. “religion, as a political issue, began to come un- Речиder consideration первого inпрезидента Bakiyev’s time КР – Аскараthe first law Акаева отличались осторожным отношением к исламу. approved by Kurmanbek Bakiyev being the “Law The issue of Islam, not often articulated in state Онon Freedom намеренно of Religion.” не отделял41 его от других rhetoric, религий. has Исламу become increasingly отводилас ьpronounced скорее культурная сфера, чем идеологическая и тем более политическая. Президент не молился, не совершал 41 The Law “On Freedom of Religion and Religious Organisations in the Kyrgyz Republic”,31 December 2008, намаз,available воat: http://cbd.minjust.всяком случае gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/202498. – публично. В 2000 году, выступая с обращением к мусульманскому населению42 Mengu Discussion страны Club, по “The случаю Religious наступления Model of Kyrgyzstan: праздника Achievements Орозо-Айт and Challenges,» (Рамазан), interview он with подчеркивал, Emil Nasretdinov, Senior Lecturer in Anthropology, American University of Central Asia and a founder of the чтоAnthropological отмечаемый Club, праздник,available at: http://analitika.akipress.org/news:5167. представляя собой «светлый и святой ритуал исламской религии», имеет и «общечеловеческое духовное начало, ибо в его сути заложены основы 40 справедливости, добра и воздержанности»39.

39 Религия и общество. 26 декабря 2000 г. - http://txt.newsru.com/religy/26dec2000/oraza.html

Kyrgyzstan. Politics and Islam since 2000. One the one hand, Islam – as part standing alone, but part of a large community of discussions on legitimacy – is becoming a of likeminded believers. On the other, Islam popular trend within society; on the other hand, has increasingly been designated a “negative religiosity has increasingly come to be seen – factor”, somewhat sweepingly characterised as albeit not publicly – as a potential threat to the “extremist” and “terroristic”. Confrontation here, officially secular state. moreover, strengthens radicalisation.

The situation in Kyrgyzstan has not just been State and Islam in Kyrgyzstan impacted by internal and regional events. The terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 in the Unit- It should be noted that, the greater role of Islam ed States led to changing attitudes towards Islam notwithstanding, all of the countries of Central throughout the world, including in Kyrgyzstan. Asia, with the exception of Uzbekistan, continue to define themselves, constitutionally, as secular states. According to a range of experts, it was the events in New York that brought discussions around Islam to the fore, creating a new wave These processes are taking place against a back- of discussions and evaluations. A major para- drop in which Islam in Kyrgyzstan, as elsewhere dox engulfed the world, and Kyrgyzstan was in Central Asia, is becoming more and more pop- not left out. On the one hand, Islam has come to ular within society – demonstrated by the rapid absorb more and more new followers, engaging growth in the number of mosques and madrassas them by offering an opportunity to find answers in the country, particularly in the regions, where to difficult questions, as well as through a wid- mosques are the main and most accessible places er social adjustment in which one is not simply for social interaction.

Number of Mosques

2009 2010 2011 2012 1973 2143 2181 2200

Geopolitics has, over time, become an increas- Religious belief is becoming an increasingly ingly influential factor on religious commit- popular and open means of positioning and le- ment – the geopolitical location of a country gitimisation for political leaders. In 2010, MP largely determining the religious processes that Tursunbai Bakiruulu, the former Akyikatchy take place within it. If one considers Islam from or Ombudsman of Kyrgyzstan, who previous- this point of view then Turkey, Saudi Arabia ly headed “Erkin Kyrgyzstan”, took the oath in and Syria, Iran, western countries, and the In- the Kyrgyz Parliament not on the Constitution dian subcontinent are having the most active of Kyrgyzstan, but on the Koran. In 2017 he impact on the countries of Central Asia.43 announced his nomination for the presidency of

43 Emil Nasritdinov, N. and Esenamanova, A, (2014), Religious Security in the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek.

41 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE the Kyrgyz Republic, without making any attempt In addition to various spiritual and cultural proj- to hide his religious commitment. ects, such as book publishing, and the “Kalem Zhana Iman” project supporting writers and poets, the Foundation conducts seminars on the further The first prayer room – namazkana – in the coun- education and training of imams. On which basis, try’s parliament building opened in 2011. A sec- seminars were held at Osh State University,46 over ond, with a larger floorspace, was later built in a period of 12 days, in 2015. The Iman Foundation 2015. for the Development of Spiritual Culture has also been paying religious leaders (imams) a monthly stipend since 2017 – the first of these being paid to According to Nazira Kurbanova, ex-chairman those imams passing an examination. A mufti, for of the State Commission for Religious Affairs example, might expect KGS15,000, his deputies (SCRA), this situation is in breach of state pol- KGS10,000, leading imams at a mosque about icy on religion: “First of all, if you open a new KGS10,000, and other imams KGS5,000. namazkana, you also need to build prayer rooms for members of other religions. Concurrently with Pursuant to the Constitution, Kyrgyzstan is a sec- this, such premises will also need to be opened ular state and the law, therefore, does not allow in other public institutions. In addition to which, religious ministers and organisations’ activities to the financing of the agency responsible for gov- be financed. The Foundation is not a government ernment policy by sponsors from an Arab state entity, and was only initiated at the direction of the could be in breach of state policy. If a namazkana president – that is, the President of Kyrgyzstan, is really that necessary, it should have been built at Almazbek Atamaev, having signed a decree on the expense of the “Iman Foundation” established the establishment of the Iman Foundation for the by the President.44 Development of Spiritual Culture.47

The experience of the Iman Foundation for the Given the growing influence of Islam on people’s Development of Spiritual Culture– an attempt hearts and minds, the state, naturally, has become by the government to influence the religious sit- concerned at the quality of education received at uation in what is, officially, a secular state – is religious educational institutions. The State Com- interesting. The Foundation was opened in 2014 mission for Religious Affairs of the Kyrgyz Re- at the initiative of the president of the republic. public, together with the Spiritual Administration Its main objective is to develop spiritual and re- of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan (SAMK) is active in ligious culture, and to support initiatives directed religious education. The “Concept of Religion at increasing citizens’ spiritual and intellectual po- and Religious Education in Kyrgyzstan” has been tential. The Foundation’s website states that it is a initiated, and is actively discussed. Thus far, how- “legal entity pursuing social, charitable, cultural, ever, the level of knowledge of Kyrgyz religious educational and other socially useful goals, of an leaders in direct contact with the faithful leaves exclusively non-commercial nature”45 much to be desired.

44 Radio Azattyk (2014), “New Namazkana Being Built in Jogorku Kenesh”, 19 February. Available at: http://rus. azattyk. org/a/25267864.html. 45 The website for the Iman Foundation for the Development of Spiritual Culture is available at: http://ru.iyman. kg/about_us/. 46 Akipress (2015), “The Presidential Iman Foundation Holds Seminars for Imams in Southern Kyrygzstan”, 28 December, available at: https://kg.akipress.org/news:628998. 47 Radio Azattik (2015), “Imams to be Paid a Stipend”, 17 August, available at: http://rus.azattyk.org/a/27192770.html.

42 Kyrgyzstan. Politics and Islam

According to Zakir Chotaev, PhD, Deputy Di- Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic, a candi- Алмазбекrector of the Атамбаев State Commission в период for своег Religiousо президентства date from в разной the party степен in power,и демонстрировал the Social Demo свою- Affairs, “Only 20 percent of the imams have a cratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK), Sooronbay приверженность исламу. Из всех президентов Кыргызстана он делал это наиболее явно. В basic religious education – so two pilot projects Jeenbekov. своихhave been интервью launched. он частоThe first говорит of these на темыbeing религии,a идентичности и безопасности. Кандидаты theological college, combining secular subjects вand президенты religious disciplines. (нынешний A further 2017 project год con – - год выборовCommenting в президентыon the religious КР) situationтакже in активно the позиционируютcerns the training себяof senior как staff последовательные at the Spiri- мусульмане.country, Almazbek В их Atambayev числе премьер-министрnoted: “Islam is tual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan. the right religion, if you’re going in the right КыргызскойThe Institute Республики,for the Training кандидат and Retraining от партии властиdirection. СДПК We - can,Сооронб in fact,ай see Жеенбеков. how demarcations «ofИслам Management - правильная Staff of религия,the SAMK если has идти been правильнымare occurring, направлением. on religious grounds,Мы же in видим, other coun как- в established within Arabaev University, under tries, in which religious extremism has taken root. других странах,48 где пустил корни религиозный экстремизм, происходит размежевание на state control.” Within two or three months we will put this matter религиозной почве. В течение двух-трех месяцевto the Defence мы представим Council. But we данный will not вопрос be using на proscriptive measures, as was the case under the рассмотрение Совета обороны. Но мы не будем применять запретительные меры, как это Almazbek Atambayev has, during course of his Soviet Union. On this issue, we need ongoing di- былоpresidency, при Советском demonstrated Союзе. his adherence В этой сфере to Is -нуженalogue.” постоянный 49 диалог», – отметил А.Атамбаев, lam, to a greater or lesser degree. комментируя религиозную ситуацию в стране48. На фоне обострения террористических угроз со Againstстороны a backdrop различных of worsening радикальных terrorist движений, threats Of all the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, he has by various radical movements and Islamic State, «Исламскогоdone this most evidently. государства», In his interviews, дискурс религиозного,he religious конкретноdiscourse, specifically исламского Islamic все discourse, больше often speaks about religion, identity and secu- вытесняется в область политики безопасности сis отсылкой increasingly к being«экстр forcedемизму» into the и «терроризму».sphere of se- rity. Candidates for the presidency (presiden- curity policy, with references to “extremism” Долгоеtial elections время in the политика Kyrgyz КыргызстанаRepublic being вdue религиозной and “terrorism.” сфере считалась For a long самой time, либеральной politics in в регионеthis year, Центральной2017) are also Азии. actively Однако positioning в последнее Kyrgyzstan время политика was, in terms Кыр гызскойof religion, Республики consid- themselves as faithful Muslims – including the стала ужесточаться. Все чаще на Совете безопасности государства обсуждается религиозная тема,48 KNEWS все (2016),активней “The силовыеFuture of Religiousорганы занимаютсяEducation in Kyrgyzstan”, проблемами 9 September, радикального available ислама. at: http://knews. kg/2016/08/budushhee-religioznogo-obrazovaniya-v-kyrgyzstane/. 49 Azan.kz., interview with Almazbek Atambayev, available at: https://azan.kz/article/show/id/4049.html.

48 Azan.kz. Интервью с Алмазбеком Атамбаевым.- https://azan.kz/article/show/id/4049.html 43

CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

ered the most liberal in the Central Asian region. Civil servants and law enforcement agencies Recently, however, the policy of the Kyrgyz Re- in our countries basically see an administra- public has become tougher, with religion being in- tive and security solution to solving security creasingly discussed at the State Security Council, issues. Although, if you look properly, it has and with government agencies dealing ever more the appearance of being more superficial in 53 frequently with the problems of radical Islam. suppressing the external manifestation of ex- Известный в Центральной Азии теолог Кадыр Маликовtremism andсчитает, protest что movements.” «Кыргызстан 50 теперь все

чащеKadyr будет Malikov, сталкиваться a theologian с угрозойwell known разных in террористических транснациональных групп, которыеCentral будут Asia, восстанавливать believes that “Kyrgyzstan свой людской will, ресурсDespite за certainсчет посто attemptsянной by вербовкиthe state to молодежи lim- increasingly, be threatened by various trans-na- it religious influence, especially in politics, уже tional внутри terrorist стран groups ЦА that и РФ. will Междуreplenish темtheir борьбаthese с терроризмомprocesses somehow в стра gainнах momentum, ЦА идет не с причинами,human resources а с последствиями. by constantly recruiting Есть две young тактики andборьбы religion с такфири in Kyrgyzstanтским терроризмом: is increasingly один - people already inside the countries of Central penetrating politics. Among high-ranking это Asia научно-просветительский and the Russian Federation. подход In the mean и второй- -officials, чисто силовой, too, and репрессивный. among competing Чиновники, politi- time, the fight against terrorism in the countries cal groups, Islam is increasingly becoming if силовыеof Central структуры Asia goes в on,наших not for странах reasons вof основном prin- notвидят a means администрати of legitimisation,вный иthen силовой a resource метод в решенииciple, but вопросов because of безопасности. consequences. There Хотя are если посмотретьfor mobilising реально, voters. Islam, то этоat the больше country’s носит two tactics in combating Takfiri terrorism: the current stage of development, is increasingly поверхностныйfirst is the scientific характер and educational подавления approach, внешнего tangible проявления both in people’s экстремиз daily life,ма, and протестных in po- позиций»and the49 second. is – pure power and repression. litical competition.

Campaign poster for city elections, Bakten, 2017 Плакат предвыборной кампании на городских выборах. Баткен, 2017 год. 50 Malikov, K. (2016), “Why Information will Lose the Government the War on Terror”, K-NEWS, 30 August, available at: http://knews.kg/2016/08/kadyr-malikov-pochemu-gosudarstvo-budet-proigryvat- v-borbe-s-terrorizmom-idejno-i- informatsionno/. Несмотря определенные попытки государства ограничить религиозное влияние, особенно в 44 сфере политики, эти процессы, так или иначе, набирают обороты, и религия в Кыргызстане все больше проникает в политику. И в среде чиновников высокого ранга, и в среде конкурирующих политических групп ислам все чаще становится если не способом

49 Кадыр Маликов. Почему государство будет проигрывать в борьбе с терроризмом идейно и информационно. K-NEWS. 30.08.2016. - http://knews.kg/2016/08/kadyr-malikov-pochemu-gosudarstvo-budet- proigryvat-v-borbe-s-terrorizmom-idejno-i-informatsionno/

Conclusions

in principle), but is consistent with the new demands of the times. Significantly, the regular meetings between the political leaders of the region testify to attempts to modify state policy here, as well as to Conclusions attempts to formulate a new dialogue with Islam.

• The modification of state policy in this • In the face of stronger statehood, on the area, as well as the formulation of a new one hand, and the strengthening of certain dialogue with Islam, are determined by two factors behind re-Islamisation, on the other, key tendencies that can, for the purposes there is a tendency whereby authorities in of discussion, be designated as: a) fighting the Central Asian states are increasingly for hearts and minds (in particular, for active in regulating the religious sphere. legitimising regimes); and b) fighting for This is reflected in the increasing volume the votes of the electorate. These tendencies of statutory legislation and regulation. often contradict each other.

• The adoption of similar statutory legislation • There is an obvious and objective process and regulation throughout the Central in the growing number of religious Asian states is testament to the frequency organisations (mosques) in the countries of threats and provocations, particularly of Central Asia. In the first years of from religious extremism. independence, this process had an uncontrolled character, with the state subsequently taking steps to streamline • Тhe various Spiritual Administrations of this process by strengthening control and Muslims can be seen as a continuation coordination mechanisms. of the Soviet practice of centralised control over religion, in each of the Central Asian states. The current Spiritual • Initially, the relatively liberal religious Administrations of Muslims have, to a policy of the Kyrgyz authorities led to a certain extent, become the successors to sharp increase in the number of mosques the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of and religious schools (madrassas), in Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM). comparison with other countries in Central Asia.

• State policy on religion does not, entirely, boil down to those regulatory methods • In Central Asia, only Tajikistan has and traditions that have existed in the extensive and multilateral experience in recent past (which would be impossible, the activities of a religious political party.

45 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

The trend of containing and protecting global intellectual and informational battle, society against Islam, however, has led including in terms of gaining a knowledge to the fact that, now, such organisations’ and understanding of Islam. participation in the political life of Tajik society has become impossible. On which basis, activities by religious political • The urgency of the problems raised by the parties are banned by law in all countries challenges and threats arising as a side effect throughout the region. of re-Islamisation are driving the need for protection against the impacts of Islam, in public policy. This, in turn, raises the issue of • There is also an ongoing process of the need for government measures to regulate regulated development in education. This religion, as well as the need to identify the trend is becoming increasingly important principles and basis for establishing mutual in the context of the ever more intense trust between Islam and the state.

Cover photo: the main square in the city of Osh, 24 June 2017.

This and the majority of other photos have been sourced from the Internet, the photographers being users of Facebook.

46 Author Biographies

Author Biographies

Elmira Nogoybayeva, (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan), Director of the Polis Asia Analytical Centre (Kyrgyzstan), is a specialist in comparative political science and political anthropology. Her research has included post-conflict events in southern Kyr- gyzstan in 2010–2011, and the identity of political parties in the Kyrgyz Republic. She has been involved in producing socio-political predictions on the Kyrgyzstan region since 2007.

Tamerlan Ibraimov (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan), Chairman of the Board at the Centre for Political and Legal Studies, was educated at Kyrgyz National University, majoring in jurisprudence. He holds a Master of Laws degree (LLM) from the American University Washington College of Law (Washington, DC, USA), as well as a PhD in Legal Sciences.

Abdugani Mamadazimov, (Dushanbe, Tajikistan), Chairman of the National Association of Political Scientists of Tajikistan, is an Associate Professor in the Department for Foreign Regional Studies at the Tajik National University. He holds a PhD degree in political sciences, and is the author of four academic monographs and more than 50 scientific and scientific–analytical articles in national and international publications.

47 CENTRAL ASIA: A SPACE FOR “SILK DEMOCRACY”. ISLAM AND STATE

Farkhod Tolipov, (Tashkent, Uzbekistan), Director, Bylim Karvoni Nongovernmental Research and Training Centre, is a political scientist, specialising in international and regional security, modern geopolitics, and regional integration in Central Asia. The author of more than 130 academic publications and one monograph, he holds a PhD in political science.

Sanat Kushkumbaev, (Astana, Kazakhstan), a political scientist with a PhD in political sciences, has worked at various analytical centres and universities, as well as the foreign policy department of Kazakhstan. His academic interests include problems in international foreign policy, international relations, and regional cooperation and security in Central Asia.

Sardor Salimov (Tashkent, Uzbekistan) is Editor in Chief of the Taraqqiy online platform, having previously worked as a specialist at various international organisations and political parties. He holds an honours degree from Manchester University as well as a masters in management and public administration.

48 Central Asia: A Space for “Silk Democracy” Islam and State

Contributors:

Tatiana Panchenko – proof reader

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