Adolescent Development Factors California District Attorneys Use to Determine Whether Juveniles Should Be Tried in Criminal Co
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Adolescent Development Factors California District Attorneys Use to Determine Whether Juveniles Should Be Tried in Criminal Court or Juvenile Court under the Provisions of Proposition 21, Codified as Welfare and Institutions Code Section § 707(d) Chapter One: Introduction A decision on whether or not to take a harder line on juvenile crime was made in California on March 7, 2000, when voters considered Proposition 21. The issues were whether the state’s century-old juvenile court system, which was built around the key components of rehabilitation, confidentiality of minors, and individual treatment, could handle violent criminals. Proposition 21 reflects a national debate on the values of juvenile courts (“California Weighs,” 2000). Proponent Pete Wilson, former Governor of California said, “We cannot ignore the fact that there are kids [in age] who are committing violent adult felonies, and we cannot tolerate it. And youth is no excuse for committing murder, robbery, rape, home invasions, or for terrorizing entire neighborhoods,” reports Jeffrey Kaye of KCET-TV, Online Focus - Juvenile Justice, on California's Proposition 21, which would require more juvenile offenders be tried as adults (Kaye, n.d., ¶ 1). Opponents describe the Proposition another way. We are in the midst of a transformation in the way society treats young people. Tough-on-crime politicians have abandoned the idea that youths are worth society’s rehabilitation and concern, instead embracing the notion that young offenders only deserve restraint and containment (Beiser & Solheim, 2000, ¶ 1). 1 Proposition 21 Background In 1995, the state legislature convened a bipartisan Task Force on Juvenile Crime and the Juvenile Justice Response (Nieves, 2000). They concluded that harsher punishment was ineffective. The commission found that the vast majority of studies point to violence prevention programs, public education, drug rehabilitation and child care as the ways to deter juvenile delinquency. Proposition 21, the “Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998,” grew out of former Governor Pete Wilson’s inability to get his juvenile justice initiative passed in 1996 and 1997 (Smallen, 2000). Declaring “open season against gang violence and juvenile crime,” Governor Pete Wilson proposed a get “tough on crime” set of juvenile justice penalties, including treating some violent offenders as young as 14 as adults in criminal court (Moore, 1997). Wilson recounted that harsher sentencing laws should be a part of anti-gang programs that should also include intervention and prevention. Wilson’s proposal covered offenders from teens who disobey their parents to juveniles who commit murder. He believed that the death penalty must be a possibility in crimes committed by superpredators. Due to the nature of violent crimes in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, superpredators became a term used to describe a new breed of juveniles (Bilchik, 1999). Superpredators are juveniles for whom violence has become a way of life. These new style delinquents were unlike youth of past generations. Although Wilson believes that some 13-year-olds should be tried as adults, he agreed to lower the current age from age 16 to age 14 (Bilchik, 1999). At the same time, he sponsored a measure to recruit 250,000 mentors for youth and to reduce teen pregnancy (Moore, 1997). 2 Wilson faced legislative opposition. State Senator John Burton said, “I think this is a dumb, stupid, mean-spirited program. I don’t think the Legislature is going to put 13- year-olds to death. This package doesn’t do it. It doesn’t provide for programs to turn kids around in the first place” (Moore, 1997, A1). Senate Pro Tem President Bill Lockyer, a democrat from Hayward, sponsored plans to provide prevention and early intervention programs (Moore, 1997). He believed that the governor was taking the wrong approach. Unfortunately, when you pin the money available on very expensive court trials, which adult trials require, then you spend your money on the system of litigation, rather than preventing crimes. I think most of us now are convinced, as are Californians that we need to shift our emphasis from detention to prevention of crime (p. A1). The enactment of Proposition 21 was years in the making (Sanchez & Booth, 2000). Former Governor Pete Wilson, who left office at the end of 1998, had been advocating changes prior to then. In 1998, an ultimatum was given to the Legislature in AB 1735 -- pass it or it will be put on the ballot (Opatrny, 1999). The measure went before California voters only after his attempts to toughen juvenile justice failed to pass the then Democratic-controlled legislature (Sanchez & Booth, 2000). Backers of a get- tough juvenile justice measure that would give prosecutors new authority failed to rally legislative support in 1998 (Opatrny, 1999). But proponents came back in 2000, taking their controversial reforms directly to voters (Opatrny, 1999). Deputy Executive Director of the California District Attorneys Association, David LaBahn, co-sponsored the ballot measure with former Governor Pete 3 Wilson. Their aim was to remove violent offenders from the juvenile court and provide more resources for handling less serious juvenile defendants (Opatrny, 1999). Grover Trask, Riverside County’s District Attorney and President of the California District Attorneys Association said, “When we created the juvenile justice system it was for truants and kids who got in trouble for stealing bikes” (Nieves, 2000, p. A1). Mr. Trask reported that out of 76,000 juvenile arrests during 1999, only a little over 2,000 fell within the “Violent” category. He stated that the overall trend is still troubling, despite a decline in crime in recent years. Democratic Governor Gray Davis, Wilson’s successor, endorsed the measure (Sanchez & Booth, 2000). He believed that the penalties would keep more dangerous juveniles from frightening their communities. He felt that the extra costs to the state that is already a national leader in prison construction and spending are worth it. Although Davis strongly supported education and prevention, he also acknowledged that Proposition 21 was necessary to protect society from those juveniles for whom prevention and intervention fail (Wilson, 2000). This initiative is thought to be one of the most significant tough-on-crime proposals since the passing of Three–Strikes in 1994 (Opatrny, 1999). The proposition is the latest in a string of laws cracking down on juveniles (Moran, 2000). The age at which teens could be tried as adults was lowered to 14 in 1994. Many cities have enacted curfew laws for minors and adopted anti-gang injunctions that limit the civil rights of street gang members. Many of these gang members are teenagers. Meanwhile, AB 1913 was proposed by Democrat State Assemblyman Tony Cardenas (“State Assemblyman,” 2000). This bill would provide tougher penalties for 4 those who actively recruit gang members by force and in our schools. This bill was more concerned with crime prevention, while Proposition 21 deals with the question of what do we do with youth after a crime has been committed (“State Assemblyman,” 2000). Sponsors of AB 1913 said that it would cost about $450 million compared to Proposition 21’s price tag of about $330 million in annual costs and $750 million in one-time costs, as estimated by the state legislative analyst. Proponents of AB 1913 believe this is a comprehensive solution that makes more sense to use resources aimed at prevention, not intervention. As with many controversial topics, there were proponents and opponents of Proposition 21. Both sides needed to gather around 419,000 signatures to qualify the measure for the November 2000 ballot (Bridge, 1999). Then, proponents and opponents raised the thousands of dollars necessary to initiate their campaigns. There are three significant components to Proposition 21 (“Proposition 21,” 2000, ¶ 1). First, this initiative states that district attorneys would now automatically try juveniles who are sixteen-years or older as adults for violent and heinous crimes. Second, district attorneys are now given the authority to make the decision to try a juvenile as an adult; whereas previously, this decision was made by a juvenile court judge. Third, district attorneys have the power to try adolescents under age sixteen for these same crimes. Table 1 summarizes the factors and the specific provisions addressed under the measure as summarized in Children’s Advocate, a newsmagazine published by Action Alliance for Children, which is an advocacy organization. 5 Table 1 California’s Proposition 21 legal factors and provisions Legal Factors Provisions Puts more Gives prosecutors the power to move a juvenile case to juveniles in adult adult court for serious crimes. Judges previously made courts and prisons this decision. Requires adult trial for juveniles 14 or older charged with murder or specified sex offenses. Makes it easier to send juveniles back to prison for probation violations. Prohibits minors charged in crimes involving firearms from being released to their parents before a trial. Weakens Prohibits the sealing of juvenile court records for confidentiality violent crimes. rights in juvenile Authorizes law enforcement agencies to make public proceedings for the names of minors over 14 accused of serious serious crimes felonies. Toughens punish- Creates a series of new, gang-related crimes with ment of gang- stiffer penalties, some with the death penalty. related crimes Requires youth convicted of any gang offense to register with the police, as sex offenders do now. Makes property destruction of more than $400 (instead of $50,000) a felony, and increases the penalty from six months to a year. Expands Three- Adds several new "strike" (serious felony) offenses, Strikes law for such as shooting from a vehicle and throwing juveniles and flammable objects. adults (“Proposition 21,” 2000) Prior to Proposition 21, juvenile court judges decided whether to send a juvenile offender into the adult system based on multiple factors, such as weighing the defendant’s age, criminal record and the charge (Rovella, 2000).