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KENYAN NAVY SOFTENS up KISMAYO PRIOR to AMISOM ATTACK Kenya's Navy Continues to Play an Important Role in the Multi-National S

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KENYAN NAVY SOFTENS up KISMAYO PRIOR to AMISOM ATTACK Kenya's Navy Continues to Play an Important Role in the Multi-National S Volume X, Issue 17 u September 14, 2012 IN THIS ISSUE: briefs........................................................................................................................1 Dual Blows IMperil the Future of the Cross-Border Haqqani Network By Arif Jamal .................................................................................................................4 Foreign Fighters Bring A Global Agenda to Syria By Chris Zambelis ......................................................................................................5 Foreign Fighters Join Rebels in Syria Kazakhstan Struggles to Contain Salafist-Inspired Terrorism By Jacob Zenn ...............................................................................................................7 Terrorism Monitor is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation. The Terrorism Monitor is designed to KENYAN NAVY SOFTENS UP KISMAYO PRIOR TO AMISOM ATTACK be read by policy-makers and other specialists yet be accessible to the general public. The opinions expressed Kenya’s navy continues to play an important role in the multi-national struggle against within are solely those of the authors Somalia’s al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab movement by shelling the Shabaab-held port and do not necessarily reflect those of of Kismayo in southern Somalia. These operations come at a time when Kenya is The Jamestown Foundation. making significant upgrades to its naval capacity through purchase or donation. These upgrades are intended to enhance Kenya’s ability to carry out anti-piracy and counter- terrorism operations in the Indian Ocean. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of this or any Jamestown publication is strictly Kismayo’s port operations and lucrative charcoal trade are the main source of revenue prohibited by law. for al-Shabaab since it pulled out of Mogadishu last year. Other forces that have gathered around Kismayo in preparation for the final assault include Ugandan and Burundian AMISOM troops, Somali government forces and the local Ras Kamboni militia of Ahmad Muhammad Islam “Madobe,” which were expelled from Kismayo by al-Shabaab in 2009. British experts are reported to have played a facilitating role in planning sessions for the assault on Kismayo held in Nairobi and attended by AMISOM commander Lieutenant General Andrew Gutti (Ugandan) (Daily Nation [Nairobi], September 4). For comments or questions about our Since Kenya joined the campaign against al-Shabaab with Operation Linda Nchi in publications, please send an email to October, 2011, the Kenyan navy has participated in naval operations designed to [email protected], or contact us restrict al-Shabaab supplies of arms and fuel, secure Kenyan waters from terrorist at: infiltrators and deter piracy (see Terrorism Monitor, November 11, 2011). While the Kenyan Army deployment in Somalia formally joined the African Union Mission 1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320 in Somalia (AMISOM) on June 11, the Kenyan Navy and Air Force (which has also Washington, DC • 20036 carried out bombing operations over Kismayo) were not included in the agreement Tel: (202) 483-8888 and thus do not come under the Ugandan-dominated AMISOM command structure. Fax: (202) 483-8337 Copyright ©2011 TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE TERRORISM MONITOR, VISIT http://www.jamestown.org TerrorismMonitor Volume X u Issue 17 u September 14, 2012 Kenyan warships are now playing an important role with the Jasiri’s builders, Euromarine Industries (Nairobi degrading the defenses and military capacity of those al- Star, April 27). Shabaab militants who have not seized the opportunity to join the civilian flight out of Kismayo. There are reports that Mombasa, the Kenyan Navy’s main port, was consumed al-Shabaab has attempted to stiffen its resistance by bringing by deadly street riots when the Jasiri arrived following the in hundreds of reinforcements in armored vehicles (Jowhar. assassination of Muslim preacher Aboud Rogo Muhammad, com [Mogadishu], September 7). Even if al-Shabaab is forced a well-known supporter of al-Shabaab. A statement issued to make a strategic withdrawal from Kismayo, occupying by al-Shabaab urged Kenyan Muslims to “take all necessary AMISOM forces are almost certain to be met by improvised measures to protect their religion, their honor, their property explosive devices, land-mines and ambushes by hidden and their lives from the enemies of Islam” (AFp, August 29). militants (after the pattern of Mogadishu). Nonetheless, Kenyan Chief of Defense Forces, General Julius After reportedly being provoked by an al-Shabaab gunboat, a Karangi, warned that the arrival of the Jasiri had shifted Kenyan navy ship fired ten rounds on Kismayo on September the power equation on the East African coast: “Jasiri has 3, while the port area and airport were shelled the next day capabilities and capacities that we did not have. If there are (Daily Nation [Nairobi], September 5; VOA, September some people out there thinking they can come to our waters 4; BBC, September 4). Kenyan ships fired on what they and worry us, let them know that things can get very tough believed to be a Kismayo arms cache on September 5, killing for them” (Africa Review [Nairobi], August 31). The Navy a reported seven Shabaab militants and destroying a stockpile has not yet announced whether the Jasiri will participate in of “technicals” [armored battle wagons], arms and munitions the Kismayo operation, but its deployment there seems likely (RFI, September 6). Residents of the town said the attack after trials are carried out. began shortly after the militants had dragged the bodies of four Kenyan soldiers killed in the battle for Afmadow into the town square for public display (RFI, September 6). A Kenyan ship fired on a Shabaab anti-aircraft emplacement on September 11. SOUTH SUDAN’S YAU YAU REBELLION CREATING INSECURITY IN JONGLEI STATE In the last few months Kenya has added two ships to its fleet that will significantly enhance its naval strength. In June, Rebellions in remote regions of South Sudan continue to France donated the 1976 vintage patrol boat La Rieuse, one plague efforts to restore security in the new nation and further of ten ships of the p400 class used to patrol the waters of a disarmament process that is ironically being cited as one of its overseas possessions. Equipped with a 40mm cannon, the primary causes of the latest disturbance in South Sudan’s La Rieuse operated in the Indian Ocean from the French Jonglei State. The so-called yau yau Rebellion, named for base at Réunion. Most of the p400 class are now being its leader, failed politician David yau yau, has brought many decommissioned, but La Rieuse (now renamed KNS youth belonging to South Sudan’s Murle tribe into direct Harambee II) was donated in the interests of helping Kenya conflict with troops of the Sudan people’s Liberation Army carry out high seas security operations (Meretmarine.com, (SpLA), the former rebel group that now forms the national June 7; Defenceweb.com, June 10). army of South Sudan. Kenya has also finally taken possession of the 140-ton Jasiri, A former theology student, yau yau was defeated by a a Spanish-built oceanographic survey vessel that has been SpLM candidate in the April 2010 elections. Rather than fitted with naval guns, missiles, machine-guns and radar and accept defeat, yau yau gathered disaffected youth of the communications systems, making it the most powerful ship Jonglei-based Murle tribe and launched an attack on pibor on the East African coast (Nairobi Star, August 30). The in May, 2010, killing several SpLA soldiers. He continued to ship was supposed to be delivered in 2005, but the purchase mount ambushes on SpLA troops and South Sudan wildlife became entangled in Kenya’s Anglo-Leasing corruption rangers until 2011, when he agreed to a ceasefire. [1] During scandal. As a result, the ship sat without maintenance in a his reintegration with the SpLM government, yau yau Spanish dock for seven years. A Kenyan delegation arrived received the usual reward for rebels who have given up their to complete the deal in February but instead rejected the ship struggle—a general’s rank in the SpLA, despite yau yau’s utter on the grounds that much of the equipment was outdated and lack of military experience. no longer functioning. After an unsuccessful attempt to sell the ship to the Nigerian Navy, Kenya finally negotiated a deal The pS LA reported in April that yau yau had fled to 2 TerrorismMonitor Volume X u Issue 17 u September 14, 2012 Khartoum, presumably to obtain aid for a new rebellion their neighbors. The cause of the abductions appears to from the government of Omar al-Bashir, which has been be widespread infertility amongst the Murle, which is engaged in a proxy war with the South for several years commonly believed to be caused by an epidemic of syphilis, (Sudan Tribune, April 8). yau yau has since enjoyed some though very little serious research has been carried out to success in fighting on his own turf in pibor County (south- discover the precise reasons for the problem, which appears west Jonglei State). On August 23, yau yau’s men were joined to be long-standing—some Nuer claim the abductions began by armed civilians in killing as many as 40 SpLA soldiers in the 17th century (Bor Globe, April 9; South Sudan News looking for the rebel leader in the Lekuangole payam district Agency, January 5). of pibor (Miraya FM [Juba], August 27; Upper Nile Times, August 27 ). In the aftermath of the attack, the commander In late December, 2011, a Nuer militia of over 6,000 men of the SpLA’s Division 8, Major General Botros Bol Bol, known as the Nuer White Army (NWA) launched “Operation vowed that “yau yau will die like [George] Athor… they will Ending Murle Abductions” with the assistance of some 900 not escape from our hands,” while Governor Manyang said Twic-Dinka youth eager to end the pattern of Murle child- the army had been instructed to teach the rebels “a lesson abductions and who were credited with providing the they will never forget” (Sudan Tribune, August 28).
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