A Comparative Case Study of Lega Nord and Podemos Voters

A comparative case study of Lega Nord and Podemos voters

Voter attitudes of Left- and Right-Wing Populism in South- ern Europe

Cem Tarhan

Supervisor: Thomas Persson Bachelor Thesis, 15 Credits Field of Study: Political Science Department of Government Spring 2020 Pages: 38 Words: 11437 Abstract

As populism in Europe is on the rise there are two sides of populism contesting to make an impact on their societies. In connection with existing research, this study is focusing on the most prominent left-wing populist party in Spain, Podemos, and the most prominent right-wing populist party in Italy, Lega Nord, and examines differences in their voters’ attitudes regarding a couple of crucial indicators of populism.

The study is influenced by a previous study that examined the attitudes of left-wing and right-wing voters. The main distinction between this previous study and the current one is that my study also includes voters from the Spanish left-wing party Po- demos, which was not included in the previous research. The result of my study show that Podemos voters are more positive towards the EU and towards immigration in difference to Lega Nord voters, whereas they have comparable attitudes towards material deprivation and elitism.

Key words: Populism, Left-wing populism, Right-wing populism, Attitudes, Voters, Podemos, Lega Nord

Abbreviations

RWP Right-Wing Populism

LWP Left-Wing Populism

LN Lega Nord

WWII World War 2

EU European Union

ESS European Social Survey

SPSS Statistical analysis software

Table of content

1.Introduction ...... 1

1.1 A Brief Background ...... 1 1.2 The Purpose of the Study ...... 2 1.3 Outline ...... 4

2. Theoretical framework and previous research ...... 5

2.1 Populism ...... 5 2.2 Left-Wing Populism ...... 8 2.3 Right-Wing Populism ...... 10 2.4 RWP in Italy: Lega Nord ...... 13 2.5 LWP in Spain: Podemos ...... 16 2.6 Demands from Populist Voters ...... 18

3. Methodology and research design ...... 22

3.1 The choice of method and data material ...... 22 3.2 Delimitations ...... 23 3.3 Operationalization and Selection of variables ...... 23 3.4 Regression Model...... 25

4. Results and analysis ...... 26

4.1 Descriptive table ...... 26 4.2 Descriptive results and analysis ...... 27 4.3 Regression results and analysis ...... 29

5. Conclusion ...... 31

6. References ...... 33

7. Appendix ...... 35

1.Introduction

1.1 A Brief Background

Populism is on the rise in Europe and has increased tremendously since 2007 with an estimated national vote for populist parties in European countries from around 7% to more than 25% today, according to a research presented by The Guardian in 2018 conducted by the help of several prominent researchers and in partnership with Mat- thijs Rooduijn, a known political scientist from the University of Amsterdam.12 The term populism has been defined by many reputed researchers such as Cas Mudde or Jan-Werner Muller, but the term lacks consensus in the academic community, just like the term democracy. But in most cases populism is presented as an opinion according to which ‘’the people’’ stand against ‘’the elite’’.3

In general, populism is seen as a negative term, which is being described by most critics as an undermining force against democracy while other sees populism as an opportunity for the ‘’excluded minority’’. But in most cases, we tend to label the term populist to a politician which we do not prefer.4 However, in the case of European populism we can see something interesting going on. The rise of populism in Europe is both on the left-wing side as well as on the right- wing. For instance, in Southern Europe such as Italy the far-right Populist Party Lega Nord has been dominating the political scene, while on the western side of the Medi- terranean Sea in Spain the left-wing populist party, Podemos, has been most successful.

Podemos was created in early 2014, right before the European Parliament elections and made an unanticipated impact on the Spanish traditional two-party system, and

1 How populism emerged as an electoral force in Europe, Jon Henley 2018 (accessed 2020-05-19) https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/how-populism-emerged-as-electoral- force-in-europe 2 https://www.uva.nl/en/shared-content/faculteiten/en/faculteit-der-maatschappij-en-gedragswetenschappen/news/2018/11/uva- researchers-contribute-to-the-guardian-series-on-populism.html (accessed 2020-05-19) 3 The Populist Zeitgeist, Mudde Cas 2004, pp 543 4 Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds. Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or corrective for democracy? Cambridge University Press, 2012. pp. 1

won 1.3 million votes in the elections which ultimately gave them a foothold in the European Parliament with five seats. Later on, in 2015 the unexpected success hap- pened for Podemos as they managed to end the two-party system through which PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol) and PP (Partido Popular) ruled in Spain, which had been preserved since the re-establishment of democracy in 1977.5

In the case of Lega Nord, which was established in 1991, they managed to regain success after not having the same success in previous elections prior to 2008. The general election in 2008 improved their position in Italian politics and additionally in 2009 during the European elections, they reached the highest share of national votes with 10.2 percent.6

1.2 The Purpose of the Study

The main objective of this study is to empirically test and present explanations of differences in the attitudes of the voters of Podemos and Lega Nord, which belongs to the left- and right-wing spectrum in the two political systems of Italy and Spain. Both parties have been very successful in attracting dissatisfied voters in their respective countries. The reason why I want to study these two parties is because they are among the most successful parties in their countries and therefore makes it interesting to compare them.

The two parties belong to two countries which can be considered as quite similar when it comes to geographic location, economic situation, social culture, religion etc. The important thing to note is that the comparison is not involved on a national level between the two countries, but between two parties that are associated with populism and are opposite to each other on the ideological scale. Although some scholars say that it is not useful to distinguish between left- and right- wing populism, there are indeed many scholars such as Rooduijin and Akkerman that

5 Lluis Orriols & Guillermo Cordero (2016) The Breakdown of the Spanish TwoParty System: The Upsurge of Podemos and Ciudadanos in the 2015 General Election, South European Society and Politics, 21:4, 469-470 6 Daniele Albertazzi & Duncan McDonnell (2010) The Lega Nord Back in Government, West European Politics, 33:6, 1320

argues that the left and right-wing populist parties do not differ significantly from each other when it comes to their populism and that they have the same message which is that the corrupt elite neglects the interest of ordinary people.7 Other researchers like Robert A. Huber and Christian H. Schimpf also emphasizes that there is some differences with regards to political inclusion between the left- and right-wing populism, but that they share similarities in their ideas of political contestation and control of power. In short, many scholars have taken on the task to compare differences between left- and right-wing populists and therefore this gives me the motivation to take on this study between the differences of Podemos and Lega Nord voters which belongs to left- and right-wing populist parties.8

The analysis will be mostly based on a recent study presented by José Rama and Andrés Santana in 2019 called: ‘’In the name of the people: left populists versus right populists’’9. In their study they compared right-wing and left-wing populists’ parties and their stances to a set of variables. However, it is important to note that other theories and studies will be investigated. The thesis will include the same independent variables as the previous research mentioned, still the difference in this analysis will be that the voters of Podemos are included, as they were not examined in the previous research. The reason for choosing Podemos, although they are not considered in Rama & San- tanas research, is mainly because the party has risen through the ranks in Spain be- coming the 4th largest party in Spain but, there is also a very interesting advantage that Podemos possesses and that is that Podemos is a key actor in the ruling system of Spain. They managed to form a coalition with the ruling socialist party PSOE (Socialist Workers’ Party). Even though Podemos is regarded as a left-populist party, they sure have differences within the ‘’left-populist’’ category. In the book ‘’Populist Radical Left Parties in Western Europe: Equality and Sovereignty’’ by Marco Damiani he highlights the difference between the left populist party of Germanys, Die Linke and the Spanish left populist party, Podemos. Damiani states that there are significant differences between the parties and how they view social inclusion. Podemos holds a higher degree

7 José Rama & Andrés Santana (2020) In the name of the people: left populists versus right populists, European Politics and Society, 21:1, 17-35, DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2019.1596583 p.18 8 Huber, R. A., & Schimpf, C. H. (2017). On the Distinct Effects of Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism on Democratic Quality. Pol- itics and Governance, 5(4) p.148 9 Ibid (Rama, Santana)

of social inclusion and sees for example feminism as an important contribution which can differ from other left-populist parties.10

The study will be focused on four main factors which are: immigration attitudes, attitudes on material deprivation, elitism, and the EU.

The research question addressed in this thesis is: What differences can we find in the attitudes of voters from Podemos and Lega Nord? That is to say what are the voters’ attitudes when it comes to immigration, material deprivation which means affordance of basic resources and services and elitism which refers to the ruling government. This means which questions are crucial for the voters to their choice of right or left populism including what the voters’ attitudes are to the EU. When we talk about populism, Podemos and Lega Nord have been taking a lot of place in media during the years and they are in general very good examples when describing the different kind of populism. This gave me an interest to study even more in what the attitudes for the voters are that have made the parties so successful although they are different on the ideological scale.

1.3 Outline

The outline of the work will be as follows: In chapter two there will be a presentation of the literature review -in regards to the subjects that is involved in this thesis, followed by an introduction of the theory and hypothesis derived from the theory. Chapter three will present the methodology and research design as well as the operationalization and demonstration of the data set used in the analysis. Chapter four will provide the presentation of the regression model alongside with the descriptive statistics followed by the analysis of the results from both models. The last chapter will present conclusions and discussions on further research.

10 Damiani, M. (2020). Populist Radical Left Parties in Western Europe. London: Routledge, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351022668

2. Theoretical framework and previous research

2.1 Populism

Populism is undoubtedly one the main political terms of the 21st century. It is used to describe both left-wing attitudes as well as right-wing attitudes. The broad term has indeed baffled many readers and enthusiasts which has created confusion and incom- prehension of the word. The concept of populism can be conflated depending on where in the world it is defined. For instance, in Europe the concept is often referred to anti- immigration and xenophobia while in Latin America its commonly used to clientelism or economic mismanagement, a more socioeconomic approach. But one thing in common is that the word itself is usually associated with a negative tone.

Populism is usually seen as a political approach were the elite and society are divided in to two groups and people’s voices are being heard, therefore populism is also being seen as a democratic approach and connected to democracy. For understanding this concept, a definition of democracy needs to be emphasized. Democracy is a combination of being government free from external control and voices of the majority who rules. There is two different democracy, one without adjectives and one more liberal, which respects majority rule and establishes independent organizations who are working toward human rights and integrity. When it comes to liberal democracy different stages can be discussed, although all of them are aiming to protect human rights11.

Populism is defined as “a thin-centered ideology” that considers society to be ultimately separated into two categories, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which

11 Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, R., Populism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2017 p.81.

argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”12.

Although some of the major opinions hold that populism itself is an undermining force for a democratic lifestyle, its indeed a powerful method for mobilization of the ‘’common’’ people and for the development of a communitarian model of democracy. Pop- ulism started with understanding the people and then the government. You can say that it is an understanding of the majority. To this approach populism is usually painting liberal democracy as the problem and radical democracy as the solution. It is used to achieve political advantages by reintroducing conflicts and raise mobilization of excluded forces in the society to essentially change the current political conditions.

Populism started as a protest against the elite government in Europe. In the book “Po- pulism, a very short introduction”13 by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser we can read that populism can reintroduce conflicts into politics and develop mobilization that excludes sectors of society to be able to achieve democracy14. Populist parties are today tripling their votes because people connect populism to democracy in Eu- rope15,16. It all started with only two countries having a stable populism during 1998 and it took two whole decades until another nine countries developed populism. The approach using populism in political studies and media is called a folkloric style of politics17. This approach will also include unprofessional political opinions and supporters. When it comes to political questions it is not possible for populism to have complex answers in our modern society which means populism can relate to different societies because of its ability to enter various groups with different shapes and angles.

Populism has three core concepts which are the general will, people and the elite, the people are a construction of reality. The people are the group which makes populism a powerful political ideology because of the way they construct their demands and electorates18. The elite is a big group who works against the general will of the people,

12 Ibid (Mudde,Kaltwasser) p.6. 13 Ibid (Mudde,Kaltwasser) 14 Ibid (Mudde,Kaltwasser) p.3 15 Lewis, P., Revelaed: one in four Europeans vote populist. The Guardian, 20 Nov 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/revealed-one-in-four-europeans-vote-populist (accessed 2020-05-19). 16 Jon Henley, How populism emerged as an electoral force in Europe, The Guardian, 20 Nov 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/how-populism-emerged-as-electoral-force-in-europe (accessed 2020-05-19) 17 Ibid (Mudde,Kaltwasser) p.4 18 Ibid (Mudde,Kaltwasser) p.9.

they include people with the highest and most leading roles in politics, media, or the economy. The populists can take advantage of this by linking this group to an economic power. The third group is almost a combination of the first and second group. The first group “The people” is the historical opposition to the monarchy and about people from the society coming together and making their voices heard19. The idea of a “general will” came up because of the strong corrupt elite’s moral differences20. Populism can be seen as both moral and ethnic at same time and be merged with nationalism. Pop- ulism also has a dark side with people might not see when it comes to the general will, this can lead to authoritarian movements which can create an ideology developed by the German Carl Schmitt. Schmitt said that it is very important to have homogeneous group of people for the existence of a democracy. That means having a unity of people and excluding those who do not belong in the group and this will turn the populism to being restricted for a certain group which can cause intolerant attacks from the excluded individuals21.

According to Mudde and Kaltwasser there is four advantages which means there are four valuable factors that define populism. As mentioned above populism is identified as a thin-centered ideology which has been having a huge impact in different shapes and subtypes in our politics all around the world historically, therefore its very easily influenced. The second advantage to consider is the specific mobilization and leadership populism is using. The third approach is quite unique in order to give a varied and compressive answer in debates about populism, which makes it likely for populism to be a friend and a foe for democracy at the same time. The fourth and last advantage when it comes to populism is how the demand and the supplier are considered at the same time. In most ideologies there is no collaboration between the demands, which is peoples needs, and the suppliers, which is the political elites will, however in this case the focus is on both sides and therefore we can measure the costs and benefits of the gained response from an action performed according to the needs from both sides22.

19 Wodak, R., Khosravi, M. & Mral, B., Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse. 2013 p.6. 20 Ibid (Mudde,Kaltwasser). p.16. 21 Ibid (Mudde,Kaltwasser) p.18. 22 Ibid (Mudde,Kaltwasser).19.

2.2 Left-Wing Populism

The traditional left parties are striving for a better education and how they see inequality between middle-class and high-class people. When it comes to left wing populism it has been strongest in Southern Europe in the debtor nations, where their focus is on campaigns against privatization and political elites23. Populism usually provokes a re- jection from left politics. From the left’s perspective, the populism has been challenging the neoliberal system24. Left-wing populism considers the importance of accounting the sociopolitical conditions to be able to understand the focus of a left-wing populism, how it develops and the existence of important debates for different alternative to ne- oliberalism or future multicultural societies25.

The first principal is called “Party System Crisis” and provokes a disappearance of differences between different parties because they are all funded by the state and follows the same rules. The second principal is “Corruption”, as mentioned before under “Populism, a very short introduction”26 we have the pure people, the general will and the corrupt elite, in this case we are defining corruption as a way of rule for the economic elites by the government. By saying this it means that the government is making their own decision instead of listening to the people’s will, because they do not trust the society to make the right decision27. The last principal which helps us to understand the radical left populism are “Political Movements”. The first two describes how people’s interest are not being considered and how the parties are collaborating. The third one is about how we can have a strong participation and representativeness without protest or social revolts, this to avoid a huge risk for the safety of society. A way to separate the two aspects is their view on the organization, leadership, vision, and strat-

23 Eiermann, M., Mounk, Y. & Gultchin, L., European Populism: Trends, Threats and Future Prospects 2017. p.15. 24 Agustín, O., Left-wing Populism: The politics of the People.2020 p.2. 25 Ibid, (Augustin). p.3. 26 Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, R., Populism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2017

27 Agustín, O., Left-wing Populism: The politics of the People.2020 p.5-6.

egy. A better option is to use rhetoric to articulate opinions about alternatives of organ- izing, this have turned large social movements to political parties. The third principal is therefore giving voices by open participation and engagements, these are the reason to why left-wing populism is getting bigger by their strategies. A left-wing populist should try to orientate demands that will go toward a classless society by using the right approach, so that everyone understands, including the lesser educated citizens. A left populist party believes in the fact that it is possible to have a politics with existence of opposition28.

Today we have seen left-wing populism being called for liberalism and right-wing populism being called for populism. Judith Butler mentions in the book “Left-wing populism: The politics of people” that the left-wing populism leads to a more radical democracy when the right-wing populism is leading toward fascism. She also mentions the importance of left populism when it comes to inclusion of excluded people and groups in our society29.

Populism is not ideological or context specific, that is why it can be difficult to define ‘’left’’ populism. Despite the problematic definition of left populism, left wing populism is characterized as more friendly towards democracy than right-wing populists, and are not being seen as negative as the radical right-wing.The radical left wings go along with anti-capitalism or against the neo-liberalism 30. This ideology is a representative of a democracy like a shadow and civilized by the authoritarian and xenophobic extreme rights because left wing removes populism from monopolization, it encourages, inclusively, formal political and social egalitarianism instead of anti-immigrant and anti- foreign approaches as right wing populism. It is very important to be careful so the ideology will not turn in to a tyranny of the majority, and that can happen if the populist go from populist in style, to populist in substance. Another concern is how populism can exclude or putting pressure on the government and state 31.

Left-populism itself has had a way bigger impact in Latin America than in Europe, with differences of use and point of view of the ideology, as a left social politics with a cross-

28 Mouffe, C., For a Left Populism. 2018 p.36. 29 Agustín, O., Left-wing Populism: The politics of the People.2020 p.8. 30 March, L., From Vanguard of the Proletariat to Vox Populi: Left-populism as a ‘Shadow’ of Contemporary Socialism, 2007, p.71 31 Ibid (March), p.73

class phenomenon in Latin America because of two reasons, the need of socio-economic inequalities and dissatisfaction with the new liberalism, and the big political in- frastructure in the U.S.

H1: We expect that Podemos voters are more positive in their attitudes in difference to Lega Nord voters

2.3 Right-Wing Populism

Right wing populism is a type of politic relatable to all kind of various ideologies. As mentioned before, populism has been a tool to modern democracy because no matter right or wrong the people’s opinions had to be respected. In this way inclusion and exclusion was segments that were considered32. The right-wing populism are strongest in eastern Europe but has exists since end of the World War II and was used by neo- Nazi French and British parties during the war. It is said that radical right-wing populism is consisted as a mixed bag of beliefs, stereotypes, and attitudes of opinion from different type of people. The electorate is having mobilized contradictory divisions33. The right wing is more characterized by a high hierarchy or authority but left-wing is more freely and equal. In Europe, the right-wing populism was based on religion, Christianity in this case. The right-wing are more conservative and therefore do not have a moving support.

It is considered good to have knowledge about who Pim Fortuyn is to be able to understand the difference between right-wing and left-wing populism. He accounted for different aspect of tolerance related to culture such as feminism and homosexuality. Fortuyn’s party was about to defend the liberal values against immigrants and Muslims without destroying the western system. Another example of a leader in the right-wings populism world is Gert Wilders who are defending the human rights against Islam and Muslims, he wants to be a protector of the liberalism34.

32 Wodak, R., Khosravi, M. & Mral, B., Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse. 2013 p.1. 33 Ibid (Wodak, Khosravi) p.19. 34 Ibid (Wodak, Khosravi). p.12.

The right populism made two groups - the contemporary right populism and the traditional extreme far-right populism. The later mentioned group is more popular among lower and middle class, who thinks the socio-economic trend is against their status because they have more to lose than the other group. The contemporary right-wing have a fear of today’s society’s less privileged people because this group likes to see how the welfare system develops. The right-wing parties offers a voice to the victims of modernization at the same time as their voters are usually in lack of higher education and feel threatened by the ongoing globalization35. The right-wing parties in western Europe are trying to avoid Nazism or debates about Hitler or Mussolini. The old extreme right-wing are more against democracy than the today’s new far-right-wing populists who instead of presenting political changes are presenting other alternatives for migration and integration in Europe.

When it comes to right-wing populists, we also have a right-wing populist that are with or without pre-populist. An example of right-wing populism with pre-populist is when Austria became a part of the Nazi movement when they were a populist party at the same time without eliminating the social roots of the Austrian identity. It later became a successful model of populist xenophobia36. An example of a right-wing populist without the pre-populist can be Fortuyn that was presented earlier. Their party was free from the anti-democratic and fascist past and at same time included anti-immigration and anti-Islam campaigns.

There are also right-wing populism parties that consist national revisionist agenda while being inspired just as much as other right-wing populist by the Nazi dictators. An understanding of the outcome from the second world war is called Revisionism. An- other aspect of revisionism is how they are against a certain concept when it comes to human rights. The far-right populists have an anger towards a certain social group of people as immigrants, it is also a link between xenophobia and racism. A description of the European far-right populism could be saying that there is not a “either or” between the two sides of right populism mentioned. It is more about “more or less” of the

35 Ibid (Wodak, Khosravi) p.10. 36 Ibid (Wodak, Khosravi) p.13.

opinions and aspects between the European far-right37. You cannot conclude that Eu- rope´s populism is more liberal than socialist because of the economic in their country.

When it comes to the case of Europe, we can clearly observe that right-wing populist parties are much more influential than left-wing populist parties, most of the European populist parties are set on the right scale. Out of 102 parties in Europe, 74 of them are right-wing populists. There are different ways of dealing with populism such as delegitimizing, isolating and embracing right-wing populism. The first is a defensive democracy and you get a delegitimization when you understand that the freedom for enemies of democratic freedom should not be guaranteed. This describes an extremist political party which had a clear impact on the neo-Nazi parties38. Historically, Eastern Europe has had a strong support for right-wing populist parties dating back to early 2000s. But in 2017 the numbers had rapidly increased and had doubled, mainly in Western Europe after the refugee crisis.

The populist far right parties always want to show the credentials of democracy and are defining themselves as those who are standing for the “right” democracy and states that mainstream parties have difficulties with an acceptance of the real democracy. A party cannot be considered as a far right once it becomes a threat to the rule of law and therefore the extreme far right parties are a majority of the European political parties and system39. The extreme far right parties have a refined electoral program who hiddenly contains different aspects of exclusion and racism from ethnic or religious perspectives.

There are three ways of constructing right-wing populism. After emphasizing the different ideologies in right-wing populism, new social political divisions against left wing populism parties are made. The last approach to consider for a successful right-wing populism party is the strategy for appearance in media or on social medias, usually using young adults as speakers to show their diversity.

37 Ibid (Wodak, Khosravi) p.16. 38 Ibid (Wodak, Khosravi) p17. 39 Ibid (Wodak, Khosravi). p.18.

2.4 RWP in Italy: Lega Nord Lega Nord or Lega Nord per l'indipendenza della Padania, which is translated to ‘North- ern League’ or ‘Northern League for the Independence of Padania’ is the right-wing, anti-EU, anti-immigration party in the north of Italy, Padania. Padania is an alternative name to the northern region of Italy, with its origins in the Cisalpine Gaul. The name Padania was popularized when Lega Nord proposed it as a name for their independent state.

The party was officially founded in 1991 by Umberto Bossi by combining six regionalist parties, Liga Veneta, Lega Lombarda, Piemont Autonomista, Uniun Ligure, Lega Emi- liano-Romagnola and Alleanza Toscana. Umberto Bossi was the federal secretary until 2012 when Matteo Salvini had beaten him in the leadership election in 2013 after an internal crisis and scandals surrounding him.

Studies have found that the average Lega Nord Facebook supporter to be a male under the age of 30, 78% of all the Lega Nord Facebook supporters were male and 69% were under the age of 3040. When this is compared to the average Italian Facebook user a conclusion about that the typical supporter being mostly young males can be drawn. The conclusion contradicts the party’s claims that the they represent all the people of Padania and that they are of mixed demographic, which all far-right parties claim.

The old Lega Nord were advocating for more regional autonomy, but their ultimate goal was an independently Padania. The party was and still is skeptical of many things, the EU-influence, Euro, and immigration to name few. The party was especially against immigrants with Muslim background, this became a bigger focus since Matteo Salvini took power.

Since Matteo Salvini took power Lega Nord have shifted their focus from autonomy to secession and their main focus. The Party have strengthened their stance against Eu- ropean integration and the Euro while establishing strong ties with other far-right populists in other European countries. The party have flourished since more voters are

40 Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J., McDonnell, D., Populism in Europe: Lega Nord, 2012 p.43-51

showing their displeasure with the current political system in Italy, the voters are seek- ing for alternative solutions and therefore see Lega Nord as a qualified candidate for the necessary change. This high disapprovement rate among voters is based on de- industrialization, higher rate of unemployment and political instability, among others41. Lega Nords latest success can even be linked to the campaigns the party have launched against immigration and the European Union.

Lega Nord strongly advocates for a reform of fiscal arrangements between the government and the regions, this is based on strong dissatisfaction with the government and an unwillingness to share their resources from the economically strong northern regions, Padania, with the less fortunate southern regions. Lega’s ultimate goal is to reform Italy’s government into a federal state with financial autonomous regions, this is special because all far-right parties in other European countries tends to advocate for special right for their regions. The party’s rhetoric is sometimes supremacist and racist, but the party’s leaders reject such accusations. They identify themselves as “Europeanists” and “Eurosceptics” at the same time as they see themselves as pro- business and anti-globalization, which can contradict each other. Remaking and shifting the focuses of the party to meet new trends and fresh anxieties in the community makes the party seem unserious42.

The Lega Nord like other far-right parties in Europe have a strong idea of a cultural tradition. The problem with Padania is that there is no shared history or culture, despite Lega Nord’s attempts to invest in a shared flag and a national anthem for Padania. According to Huysseune43, the northerners have many qualities that the southerners lack, “a sense of organization, of thrift, of entrepreneurship, a work ethic, simplicity and matter-of-factness, respect for promises given, sobriety, discretion and moderation”44. Lega Nord uses those above-mentioned qualities to demonstrate their “supremacy” over their southern counterparts.

41 Long, M., Italy’s Lega Nord: Changing Poses in a Shifting National and European landscape, p. 2-3. 42 Ibid (Long) p. 4 43 Michael Huysseune,‘Landscapes as a Symbol of Nationhood: The Alps in the Rhetoric of the Lega Nord’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol.16, No. 2, 2010p 44 Ibid (Huysseune). 177.

“[Lega Nord] Has been effective at presenting northern identity as a ‘community of interests’ that is threatened by a series of enemies ranging from southerners and high taxes to the bureaucracy in Rome”45.

Gold observed in the quote above that the Lega Nord is using the “Us vs. Them”, the enemy in the south and in Rome, strategy to recruit and mobilize an electorate. They succeeded in recruiting an electorate with similar qualities, values, and concerns, about taxes going outside of Padania and getting Muslim immigrants in their region. This electorate wanted a party that can represent them in Rome and focus on their concerns, this can even be linked to their early success. As all the populist parties believe that the elite and the ruling politicians are corrupt and do not care about the ‘ordinary people’, Lega Nord offers their northerners electorate the thought that they are against such elitist. They even believe that the elitists are involved in attacks against ‘ordinary people’, they also believe that the elitist prioritizes minority rights over the indigenous majority rights. Lega Nord believes that the elitist is not doing enough to stop illegal immigrants, especially immigrants from major Muslim countries from arriving in Europe and northern Italy, Padania. They believe that Mus- lims will impose changes in schools, traditions, and norms, to name a few, this is used by Lega Nord to recruit and mobilize a strong electorate who thinks the same way as Lega Nord does.

H2: We expect that Lega Nord voters are more anti-EU and anti-immigration in contrast to Podemos voters.

45 Thomas W. Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 10.

2.5 LWP in Spain: Podemos

Podemos or “We can” as translated in English is the far-left populist party in Spain, the party was officially founded in January 2014 by the political scientist Pablo Iglesias Turrión. Pablo created the party after the 15-M movement in Spain, this movement started with major street protests after the global economic crisis and a worldwide economic recession. The protesters were protesting inequality, corruption, record of high unemployment rates, social welfare cuts and politicians to name a few of the issues.

Podemos consist of political scientists, sociology and economics professors at the base, their theories are built on left-wing thinkers’ theories as Sizek’s, Badiou’s and Laclau’s theories. Their political practice is inspired by Chavism in Venezuela, Correa in Ecuador, and Evo Morales in Bolivia, they are also inspired by Gramscian theories regarding the achievement of hegemony46

The fall and collapse of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party(PSOE) in their final term in office opened the opportunity for Podemos and other left parties to take advantage of the situation to recruit and mobilize PSOE’s dissatisfied voters. Podemos managed to mobilize the young generation and left voters who wanted to punish PSOE at the polls, the electorate felt betrayed and let down. Podemos exploited the economic situation and the disappointment rate among the citizens to boost their radical ideology and their rhetoric, they could therefore recruit voters from the middle class who were distressed by the crisis from both the center-right and the left as well as neutral voters. This was possible thanks to their large and skillful use of social networks, new digital media, and television discussion programmes.

In 2008 Spain was one of the worst hit countries during the economic crisis, this re- sulted in high rates of unemployment which reached its peak in 2013 with 26.2%, this was 15.3% higher than the average EU unemployment rate the same year. Out of the unemployed, 55% was among the younger generation, more specifically those under 25, the unemployment rate among them was as high as 43,5%. This effect has led to an increase in social disruption and mobilization, and gave rise to Podemos, the first

46 Javier Zarzalejos, Populism in Spain: an analysis of Podemos, European View, 2016.p. 185

newly created radical left populist party. The force behind the rise of Podemos managed to get a fifth of people’s voices only a year after they were founded. Researchers have seen how the left-wing populism in Europe is not as successful as their conservative counterparts. The increase of the conservatives has challenged different parties in Spain as Podemos.

In Podemos’s case they could recruit and mobilize an electorate because of the dire situation going on in their country, this can be connected to the rise of populist parties in other countries like Syriza in Greece. Left- populist parties and their electorate is often activated during critical times, financial or political desperate times. Podemos is an excellent example of this pattern, they were activated when the global economy was in a deflation and Spain had the highest unemployment rate in all of Europe.

After Podemos’s election when their politicians, their structure and their history became known to the public and their electorate proved to be hard for Podemos because they did not have any experience from real politics and public scrutiny. Investigations have revealed Podemos political connections with Chavez’s Venezuela and that they are receiving funds from the Iranian regime through a Spanish TV station owned by an Iranian businessman47. This scandal, wrongdoings and a few minor backlashes have damaged their reputation and public image, which were already under suspicion from the public. However, seeing how poorly their allied Syriza in Greece have managed the situation and the economy made the voters more skeptical towards radical populist ideas.

Podemos goal was to overtake PSOE by attracting voters from both the center-right and left, this strategy backfired because the party had radical opinions about certain topics while having a more moderate democratic opinions about other topics. This caused a confusion among their electorate and potential voters, they also failed to recruit those voters among the United Left, a left-wing and far-left coalition bringing in political organizations together. Having an alliance with the United Left and the Com-

47 Dawbar, A., Podemos: Spain's anti-corruption party ‘received illicit funding from Iran’, The Guardian, 14 Jan 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/podemos-spains-anti-corruption-party-received-illicit-funding-from-iran- a6813006.html (Accessed 2020-05-12).

munists worked for the respective leader but it failed among Podemos center-right voters. Iglesias tackled PSOE’s Pedro Sánchez from forming a government with the support of the new party Citizens, this caused a big backlash for Podemos, their voters held Iglesias responsible for a government not let by PSOE and social and left-wing values.

2.6 Demands from Populist Voters

There are similarities and differences between populist electorates. Both the far-right and far-left populists have the same message, the populist message, which basically argues that the good people are betrayed by an evil elite4849. This message can be used with different ideologies to boost their party among populist voters, it can therefore be employed by parties on both the radical right and the radical left. Mainstream parties have sometimes also used this strategy to gain voters although they are not radical-right or radical-left.

There are studies about populist voters that asked, is it true that the majority of this group is citizens with lower educational degrees, lower socioeconomic position and being so-called losers of globalization. One of the above-mentioned studies studied the far-right populist that concluded that it is in fact true, their voter base often consists of citizens with lower socioeconomic position and are Eurosceptic50.

There is also another group of voters who might vote for populism although they do not fit the above-mentioned profile, protest voters, they feel distrust to the political situation and current political parties. According to Bergh, “protest voting is the act of voting for a political party as a means of expressing political distrust.”51. Often, they do

48 Cas Mudde, The populist Zeitgeist, Government and Opposition, 2004., p. 541-563 49 Ben Stanley, The thin ideology of populism, Journal of Political Ideologies, 2008.p. 95-110 50 Marcel Lubbers, Mérove Gijsberts, Peer Scheepers, Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe, European Journal of Political Research, 2002., p. 345–378 51 Johannes Bergh, Protest voting in Austria, Denmark, and Norway, Scandinavian Political Studies, 2004., p. 367-389

not feel that any of the current parties represent them and therefore will express their distrust and dissatisfaction by voting of populist parties. The voters of this group who vote for far-right populist parties do it because the way those parties attack elitists ‘‘established political order’. The far-left populist parties tend to gather votes from protest voters because of the very same reasons. Scandals among the elites proves the accusations of the populist party, that the elites are dishonest and corrupt.

Economic insecurity is another major factor to why people vote for populism. As mentioned earlier populism is more popular in eastern European countries, this can be linked to the economic situation in their country. Many of their voters have according to an ESS survey been unemployed sometime in the last 5 years, have income difficulties, that they find it hard living on their income, they are threatened by globalization. Many of them have been unemployed because of different causes and therefore one their demands have been to fix the unemployment problem. The other cause to why people vote on populist parties is because they have difficulties with their income and therefore demand a better situation, either with a stronger social welfare network or with fewer immigrants who can ‘steal’ their jobs. The last cause according to the ESS survey is that they are threatened by globalization, which is perfect because both radical right and radical left populists have the same opinion about globalization. They think that voting on populist parties will improve their economic situation.

The current political system being unresponsive to changes, this is a key factor to ac- tivation of populist opinion, the risk of activating populist citizens grows if the citizens feel that the current ruling parties ignore them or are being too unresponsive to changes. If they feel too ignored or orphaned by the ruling politician, they will see all politicians’ actions through the map of the populists, “The elites only care about themselves and are not interested in real people”. This is also why many far-right populist in western Europe consist of many lesser educated working class citizens, they feel abandoned by the socialist parties who have shifted their opinions about globalization and multiculturalism towards being more open and welcoming toward immigrants.

“Many believe that ‘the people’ should take the most important decisions instead of giving its sovereign power to professional politicians”52. According to Cas Mudde many of the populist voters believe that “the people” should decide their fate instead of letting professional politicians decide for them. This is as mentioned earlier grows even more if the people feel orphaned by the ruling politicians. This can be linked to the earlier mentioned about the ‘hate’ towards the elitist, therefore one of their main demand is to seize power from the elitist and let the people decide their own fate. This is usually done peacefully with elections but there are a few occurrences where they seized power with ‘Coup d'état’ or ‘Soft coup’, a coup without the use of force.

José Rama & Andrés Santana’s study established how investigation for electoral competition between left-wing and right-wing populist parties given the ideological differences, to what extent the characteristics of the ideologies shapes their competition. The left-populist parties and right-populist parties differ in their attitudes towards immigration and the European Union whilst being similar in their attitudes towards anti- elitism and material deprivation. The process of globalization is likewise apparent to be in the contrast of ‘’winners’’ and losers’’ where the losers are supposed to be mobilized by the right-wing populists and the winners among the left-wing populists. Schol- ars have found that a key explanatory is the European Union process of integration and that voters of right-wing populists tend to have extremely negative position on this issue. In addition, there is undeniably enough evidence from multiple researchers that right-wing populists is often associated with xenophobia and racism.53 Rama & Santana included six European countries where right- and left-wing populist parties coexists which were (Germany, France, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania and The Neth- erlands). In total they examined 17 parties from each of the countries named above.54 The study confines the attention to four factors concerning elitism, material deprivation, nativism (immigration) and euro-skepticism (globalization). Theories about material deprivation highlights that unskilled workers feels that social- ists are no longer willing or able to improve their situation and as a conclusion leads to the workers listening to whomever promises to address their worries. Right-wing leaders also tend to use the unskilled workers worsening situation to a familiar argument

52 Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, R., Populism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2017p. 99 53 José Rama & Andrés Santana (2020) In the name of the people: left populists versus right populists, European Politics and Society, 21:1, pp. 21 54 Ibid (Rama) pp. 22

against immigrants which is the phrase, ‘they steal our jobs’.55 The hypothesis anticipates that both LWP and RWP parties will have similar attitudes towards material deprivation. The most common idea associated with populism regardless of ideological standpoint is the distinction between the ordinary people, against the corrupt elite. Many studies have shown that there is no difference between the RWP and LWP parties when it comes to the attitudes towards the elite.56 Many theories about globalization claims that RWP parties have negative attitudes towards European integration and there is also reason to except that LWP parties will also mobilize those who are critical to European integration, especially radical left parties. Empirical evidence suggests that those who are critical against European integration are more likely to vote for a left-wing populist party. The hypothesis anticipates that negative attitudes towards the EU will be equally likely to vote for LWP and RWP parties. The issue of immigration nonetheless is generally related to RWP parties and is mostly an expression of nativism and this is less clear for LWP parties. Studies have shown that anti-immigration attitudes are highly controversial among LWP parties. Thus, the hypothesis of the study expects that negative attitudes towards immigrants will work in favor of RWP parties.57 The study concludes that there are significant dis- tinctions between RWP and LWP parties in regard to the four factors used by Rama & Santana and that they are indistinguishable when it comes to both material deprivation and elitism, but are very much different from each other when it comes to nativism (immigration) and the globalization theory.58 The conclusion of this study inspired me to see if my own analysis would have the same outcome as Rama & Santanas research.

55 Ibid (Rama) pp. 20 56 Ibid (Rama) pp. 21 57 Ibid (Rama) pp. 22 58 Ibid (Rama) pp. 29

3. Methodology and research design

The following chapter will give a presentation of the data sources, selection of variables, delimitations, descriptive table and regression model.

3.1 The choice of method and data material

To better understand the attitudes of both Podemos and Lega Nord voters the choice of method will be a statistical regression analysis to empirically explain how the voters tend to differ and agree on relevant variables. The aim of this analysis is to test if the explanatory factors varies from the analysis conducted by Rama & Santana. As mentioned, this research will apply the left-wing party Podemos which were not present at Rama & Santanas research. As Damiani highlights, there could be differences between left-wing populists and how they view certain factors which could give this thesis a different outcome from the study made by Rama & Santana.

The data will be collected from European Social Survey which is an academical cross- national survey made across European countries. The survey particularly measures attitudes, beliefs, and behavior patterns.

In this case the dataset will be examined from ESS Round 8 which is a survey done in 2016 in both Spain and Italy.59 The data will be filtered out so that we keep our focus on specifically Podemos and Lega Nord voters considering how they answered to the different questions from the survey. The analysis was done through SPSS which will allow us to simultaneously get reliable results and tables, so that we can understand and declare what our effects are regarding different categories.

3.2 Delimitations

In order to make the analysis possible and relevant to the study it was necessary to recode and filter out a particular variable in the dataset for both countries which was: ‘’What party did you vote for in the last election’’.

This variable involved both Podemos and Lega Nord voters and gave us the necessary information to further continue with our study. The total respondents of both parties registered from the survey were 281 people. 81 of them had voted for Lega Nord in the last election and the remaining 200 were from Podemos.

3.3 Operationalization and Selection of variables

The dataset from ESS round 6 contains in total 535 different variables, which each participant had answered. The choice of variables for this study were selected by the influence of the previous research made in 2019 by José Rama & Andrés Santana

59 ESS Round 8: European Social Survey Round 8 Data (2016). Data file edition 2.1. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS8-2016.

called: In the name of the people: left populists versus right populists60 which is mentioned in the background section above. The study was conducted to compare left- wing versus right-wing populists in different European countries, the dataset used in the previous study are the same source used in this analysis.

The variable labeled ‘’Party voted in the last election’’ from ESS dataset involved multiple parties from each country needed to be recoded in order for us to distinguish between respondents who claims to have voted for Lega Nord and those who have voted for Podemos. The dependent variable was recoded to a dummy variable, labeled ‘’Which party you voted for’’ and the new values were coded as (Y=0) for Lega Nord and (Y=1) for Podemos. The other selected variables were four independent variables and three control variables. A short demonstration of which variables were selected is shown below:

Dependent Variable

• Which party you voted for: 0= Lega Nord, 1= Podemos

Independent Variables • Trust in political parties • European Union: Unification or gone too far • Household necessities • Immigration good or bad

Control Variables • Age • Gender • Education level

60 José Rama & Andrés Santana (2020) In the name of the people: left populists versus right populists, European Politics and Society, 21:1, 17-35, DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2019.1596583

Independent variables: The first independent variable ’‘Trust in political parties’’ focuses on elite-attitudes and have a scale-level ranging from 0-10 (0 = no trust at all, 10 = complete trust). The ‘’European Union: Unification or gone too far’’ variable also contemplate an eleven-point scale capturing the attitudes towards the EU in the following order (0 = unification gone too far, 10 = unification should go further). Household necessities or the belief that ‘’one’s household necessities will be uncov- ered due to money shortages’’61 in the next 12 months have a scale-level ranging from 1 to 4, (1 = not at all likely, 4 = very likely). The last variable ‘’Immigration good or bad’’ which measures attitudes towards immigration in relation to economic dimensions, is set on an eleven-point scale 0 to 10, (0 = bad for economy, 10 = good for the economy).

Control variables: To determine the effect on the attitude difference between the Lega Nord and Po- demos voters I have in this study chosen three control variables which are, ‘’Age’’, that measures the respondents age and ‘’Gender’’, that measures the respondents’ gender (0 = male, 1 = female). The last variable ‘’Education level’’ measures if the respondents have high or low education ranging from 1 to 7 (1 = less than lower sec- ondary, 7 = higher tertiary education, MA level).

3.4 Regression Model

Since this study has two main observations, Podemos and Lega Nord, the most com- patible regression model for the analysis would be logistic regression. The logistic regression itself is useful when the dependent variable is dichotomous which means the values are either 0 or 1. The variables will be controlled one by one in relation to the dependent variable in each column and will be a total of 5 models tested in the regression. The control variables will be consistent in each model throughout the analysis.

61 José Rama & Andrés Santana (2020) In the name of the people: left populists versus right populists, European Politics and Society, 21:1, 17-35, DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2019.1596583 p.22

4. Results and analysis

The following chapter will present the tables of the descriptive statistics and the regression model as well as provide the results and analysis of both models.

4.1 Descriptive table

Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of dependent, independent and control variables N Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Dependent Variable Which party 281 0.71 0 1 0.454 you voted for Indepen- dent variables Trust in po- 280 1.99 0 7 1.947 litical parties

European 263 5.48 0 10 3,025 Union: Uni- fication or gone too far

Household 274 2.15 1 4 0.925 necessities

Immigration 271 5.36 0 10 2.752 good or bad

Control Va- riables Age 281 47,92 20 87 15.175

Gender 281 0.46 0 1 0.499

Education 281 3.80 1 7 2.040 Level Source: Own elaboration from SPSS (ESS, 2016)

The descriptive Table 4.1 above gives information regarding the variables that have been tested in the analysis. Every respondent in the data that has been considered is under the category line N. From the dependent variable we can see that there was a total of 281 individuals in the analysis. Some of the variables contains less than the total number of individuals because of missing data. ‘’Min’’ and ‘’Max’’ explain the variable value ranges while the ‘’Mean’’ calculates the average number and finally the ‘’Std. Deviation’’ which gives us an explanation of the deviation from the average value.

4.2 Descriptive results and analysis

Data from the bar diagrams gives us an in-depth vision of the variables. The variables were recoded from a ten-point scale as dummy (0 = negative, 1 = neutral, 2 = positive).

Table 4.2 Bar diagrams of independent variables

Lega Nord

The first bar regarding immigration shows that Lega Nord voters are more negative towards immigration. Trust in political parties displays that majority of the voters have

negative attitude against elitism. The need for household necessities in 12 months demonstrates that Lega Nord voters are not likely to be in need of affording basic resources (material deprivation). The final bar indicates how Lega Nord voters are more negative in their attitudes towards the EU.

Podemos

The first bar indicates how Podemos voters are in majority positive towards immigration. The following bar regarding trust in political parties shows that Podemos voters are negative in their attitudes towards elitism and the voters are not likely to be in need of affording basic resources (household necessities). The final bar shows Podemos voters are more positive towards the EU.

To summarize the result of the bar diagrams, we can notice differences and similarities between the attitudes among the voters from Lega Nord and Podemos. We can also point out there is a difference in the attitude of immigration and the EU between the voters of Lega Nord and Podemos, which shows us Podemos voters are more positive towards immigration and the EU than Lega Nord voters. When it comes to similarities,

we can see there is hardly any difference in the attitude of elitism or material deprivation between the voters from each party.

4.3 Regression results and analysis

Table 4.3 Logistic Regression M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 Material De- privation Household 0,027 (0,162) 0,034 necessities (0,215)

Elitism Trust in po- 0,016 -0,101 litical parties (0,073) (0,099)

Supranat- ional EU Unificat- 0,489 0,404 ion or too far (0,068)*** (0,078)***

Nativism Immigration 0,440 0,279 good or bad (0,068)*** (0,080)**

Control Va- riables Gender 0,432 0,506 0,656 0,677 0,460 (0,293) (0,289) (0,354) (0,336) (0,382) Age -0,053 -0,053 -0,056 -0,068 -0,065 (0,011)*** (0,011)*** (0,013)*** (0,013)*** (0,015)*** Education le- 0,004 0,034 -0,092 -0,109 -0,177 vel (0,078) (0,074) (0,094) (0,091) (0,104)

R-Squared 0.165 0.178 0,484 0,412 0,531

Constant 3,319 3,198 1,348 2,270 1,368 (0,864)*** (0,727)*** (0,874) (0,827) (1,085) N 274 280 263 271 248 Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The first model in Table 4.2 shows there is no significant difference on the attitudes towards material deprivation, measured as household necessities, between Lega Nord and Podemos voters. The second model similarly reveals there is no difference between the voters of Lega Nord and Podemos when it comes to elitism, measured

as trust in political parties. However, in model three, when testing for attitudes towards the EU, we can confirm a statistical significance on 99% level of confidence. The b-coefficient shows us that Podemos voters are more positive towards the EU compared to Lega Nord voters. The following model number four, demonstrates there is a statistical significance on 99% level of confidence on the effect of the voters’ attitude concerning immigration between the Lega Nord and Podemos voters. Like the previous model this column shows us that the b-coefficient is positive which means the voters of Podemos are more positive towards immigration in contrast to the voters of Lega Nord.

When controlling for all the independent variables and control variables in the final model, we can notice there is still a statistical significance on both the EU and immigration attitudes. However an interesting occurrence in this model is that the significance level on immigration decreased from 99% level of confidence to a 95% level of confidence, but nonetheless does not change the fact that we have a valid explanation on the difference in attitudes between the voters of both parties. The other insignificant variables remain unchanged despite being controlled with all variables com- bined.

Regarding the control variables, the variable age was statistically significant on 99% level of confidence throughout the whole regression. When observing the variable, we can notice the younger the person is the more likely would the person be to support Podemos rather than Lega Nord. The other control variables which were not statistically significant tells us there is no relation between gender and their support for Podemos or Lega Nord. Likewise, when it comes to the education level, it indicates there is no relation between education level and the choice of support for Podemos or Lega Nord.

To summarize the results presented above we need to explain what happens when each of the variables is controlled on its own and what it tells us in the analysis. When looking across all models we can indicate the variables, household necessities, trust in political parties, gender and education level remains insignificant even when it is being controlled, like in the last model. There is no difference in attitude for your support to Lega Nord or Podemos, no matter the education level or if you are a

male or female. The variables ‘’European unification or too far’’, ‘’immigration good or bad’’ and ‘’age’’ are continuously significant across all models, although the difference in the last model of the analysis shows the effect of the EU weakened from 99% level of confidence to 95% level of confidence. This demonstrates there is a difference in attitude in relation to the EU, immigration and age between the voters of Lega Nord and Podemos. Podemos voters are more positive towards immigration and the EU, in comparison to Lega Nord voters and the younger you are, the more you likely support Podemos than Lega Nord.

5. Conclusion

In this study we were able, with the help of an extensive survey by European Social Survey, to investigate the differences of attitudes between the voters of Lega Nord and Podemos. We found there were obvious variations in the attitudes against the EU and immigration among Lega Nord and Podemos voters. Our result demonstrates voters among Podemos are more positive to immigration and the EU, in contrast to voters from Lega Nord. Even though the choice of variables for this comparative case study was inspired by a previous study, there are also other interesting factors which could be considered in this comparative study too. It is important to notice even though the result can justify some theories, there can still be a lack of variation that might have affected the regression results. It is also relevant to emphasize that there was in total 81 respondents from Lega Nord and 200 respondents from Podemos, which can offer an unfair generalization of the voters from each party. Apart from the uncertainty mentioned above, our results still have important theoretical implications.

Hypothesis 1 expects Podemos voters to be more positive in their attitudes in difference to Lega Nord voters being justified through our results. According to Luke March left-wing populists are characterized as more positive than right-wing populists62, which goes in line with our results.

62 March, L., From Vanguard of the Proletariat to Vox Populi: Left-populism as a ‘Shadow’ of Contemporary Socialism, 2007, p.71

Hypothesis 2, Lega Nord voters are more anti-EU and anti-immigration in contrast to Podemos, receives empirical support and is in line with previous research by Jamie Bartlett et al and the theory from Ruth Wodak et al.6364 We can also conclude similar results from my comparative study and the previous study by José Rama & Andrés Santana65. Even though we had an observation from a different left-wing populist party and a distant geographical location (southern Europe) we could still see the same patterns among voters from right-wing populists (Lega Nord) and left-wing populists (Podemos). Other noticeable theories that could be referred to our result, is the similarities of the negative view against elitism from the voters of both parties presented by Cas Mudde66. Future research can bring more value by focus on the extension of populist parties who belongs to the left- and right-wing spectrum or investigating attitudes over time in order to enhance the existing research.

63 Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J., McDonnell, D., Populism in Europe: Lega Nord, 2012 p.43-51 64 Wodak, R., Khosravi, M. & Mral, B., Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse. 2013 65 José Rama & Andrés Santana (2020) In the name of the people: left populists versus right populists, European Politics and Society, 21:1, 17-35, DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2019.1596583 66 Cas Mudde, The populist Zeitgeist, Government and Opposition, 2004., p. 541-563

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Mudde Cas, The populist Zeitgeist, Government and Opposition, 2004. pp.541-563

Thomas W. Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy, Palgrave Mac- millan, 2003

Wodak, R., Khosravi, M. & Mral, B., Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Dis- course. 2013 pp. 951-953

7. Appendix Frequency data of independent variables:

Lega Nord: Immigration bad or good for country's economy Cumulative Per- Frequency Percent Valid Percent cent Valid Bad for the economy 19 23,5 24,7 24,7 1 1 1,2 1,3 26,0 2 7 8,6 9,1 35,1 3 6 7,4 7,8 42,9 4 14 17,3 18,2 61,0 5 16 19,8 20,8 81,8 6 9 11,1 11,7 93,5 7 1 1,2 1,3 94,8 8 2 2,5 2,6 97,4 9 1 1,2 1,3 98,7 Good for the economy 1 1,2 1,3 100,0 Total 77 95,1 100,0 Missing Don't know 4 4,9 Total 81 100,0

European Union: European unification go further or gone too far Cumulative Per- Frequency Percent Valid Percent cent Valid Unification already gone too 19 23,5 24,1 24,1 far 1 10 12,3 12,7 36,7 2 7 8,6 8,9 45,6 3 11 13,6 13,9 59,5 4 12 14,8 15,2 74,7 5 8 9,9 10,1 84,8 6 2 2,5 2,5 87,3 7 5 6,2 6,3 93,7 8 3 3,7 3,8 97,5 9 2 2,5 2,5 100,0 Total 79 97,5 100,0 Missing Refusal 1 1,2 Don't know 1 1,2 Total 2 2,5 Total 81 100,0

Trust in political parties Cumulative Per- Frequency Percent Valid Percent cent Valid No trust at all 27 33,3 33,3 33,3 1 11 13,6 13,6 46,9 2 15 18,5 18,5 65,4 3 12 14,8 14,8 80,2 4 5 6,2 6,2 86,4 5 7 8,6 8,6 95,1 6 2 2,5 2,5 97,5 7 2 2,5 2,5 100,0 Total 81 100,0 100,0

How likely not enough money for household necessities next 12 months Cumulative Per- Frequency Percent Valid Percent cent Valid Not at all likely 15 18,5 19,5 19,5 Not very likely 42 51,9 54,5 74,0 Likely 16 19,8 20,8 94,8 Very likely 4 4,9 5,2 100,0 Total 77 95,1 100,0 Missing Don't know 4 4,9 Total 81 100,0

Podemos:

European Union: European unification go further or gone too far Cumulative Per- Frequency Percent Valid Percent cent Valid Unification already gone too 5 2,5 2,7 2,7 far 1 5 2,5 2,7 5,4 2 5 2,5 2,7 8,2 3 9 4,5 4,9 13,0 4 5 2,5 2,7 15,8 5 31 15,5 16,8 32,6 6 19 9,5 10,3 42,9 7 30 15,0 16,3 59,2 8 33 16,5 17,9 77,2 9 17 8,5 9,2 86,4 Unification go further 25 12,5 13,6 100,0 Total 184 92,0 100,0 Missing Refusal 3 1,5 Don't know 12 6,0 No answer 1 ,5 Total 16 8,0 Total 200 100,0

Immigration bad or good for country's economy Cumulative Per- Frequency Percent Valid Percent cent Valid Bad for the economy 7 3,5 3,6 3,6 1 4 2,0 2,1 5,7 2 4 2,0 2,1 7,7 3 15 7,5 7,7 15,5 4 9 4,5 4,6 20,1 5 44 22,0 22,7 42,8 6 13 6,5 6,7 49,5 7 31 15,5 16,0 65,5 8 39 19,5 20,1 85,6 9 13 6,5 6,7 92,3 Good for the economy 15 7,5 7,7 100,0 Total 194 97,0 100,0 Missing Don't know 6 3,0 Total 200 100,0

Trust in political parties Cumulative Per- Frequency Percent Valid Percent cent Valid No trust at all 70 35,0 35,2 35,2 1 24 12,0 12,1 47,2 2 32 16,0 16,1 63,3 3 21 10,5 10,6 73,9 4 26 13,0 13,1 86,9 5 17 8,5 8,5 95,5 6 5 2,5 2,5 98,0 7 4 2,0 2,0 100,0 Total 199 99,5 100,0 Missing Don't know 1 ,5 Total 200 100,0

How likely not enough money for household necessities next 12 months Cumulative Per- Frequency Percent Valid Percent cent Valid Not at all likely 58 29,0 29,4 29,4 Not very likely 70 35,0 35,5 65,0 Likely 47 23,5 23,9 88,8 Very likely 22 11,0 11,2 100,0 Total 197 98,5 100,0 Missing Don't know 3 1,5 Total 200 100,0