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IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI Democratic legitimacy | |Political parties |Elections | give political actors newopportunities on voluntary bases. regulations. Othersaremore informal or political, andwould new proposals. Some suggestions may require newformal National democracies canbecome sources of inspiration for Europarties wereall useful attempts. More could bedone. parties in2014;thedesignation of theSpitzekandidaten by in 2007;theupdating of theStatute of theEuropean list;theestablishment of European political foundations at theEUlevel. Andrew Duff’s proposal for atransnational electoral systems of the EP and to strengthen political parties proposed or introduced inorder tohomogenise thenational and aproper partysystem.Recently some changeshave been years, theEuropean Union still lacksaunique electoral system Although much progress hasbeenachieved inthelastsixty ABSTRACT by Enrico Calossi Systems Towards European Electoral andParty keywords IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI 2 scienza politica scienza * 2 1 election asa“second order” one. (as haslong beenthecasewith theEuropean Parliament, EP),citizens usethat when theinstitutions which areto be elected appear tohave nosignificant power outcomes. When the consequences of the electoral process seem to not be clear and of new/oldpoliticians inthe institutional positions andtherelease of policy must beeffective inproducing political consequences, such asthe appointment For them,political elections must beconducted freely andrecurrently, but also considered “normal” byEuropeans. by thepolitical systemsof theEUMember States (MS),i.e.thosesystemsthat are start from theexistingmodelsandnotions. Inevitably, thosemodelsarefurnished speak about aproper European democracy. Any discussion on democracycanonly European Union (EU)leads directly tothequestion of whether it ispossible to Speculating about theexistenceof anelectoral systemandapartyinthe 1. TheEUdemocracyvs“normal” democracies by Enrico Calossi* Towards European Electoral andParty Systems Towards European Electoral andParty Systems . California State University Florence. University State California Union” at European “The teaches (2011-2015) currently and Institute University European at the Research Copyright © Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Centro Studi sul Federalismo (CSF). sul Federalismo Studi Centro and (IAI) Internazionali Affari © Istituto Copyright Programme. Affairs International Paolo, San di Compagnia with partnership strategic of the framework of the in (CSF) sul Federalismo Turin Studi Centro and (IAI) Internazionali Affari managed mainly bynational governments, rather thanbypolitical parties. at theEUlevel, where thepost-election appointments of institutional chargesare the electoral campaigning andthepost-election strategies. Thisdoes nothappen Another element of “normal” democracies isthat political parties primarily manage issues, rather thanon thebasisof truly European issues. or opposition parties, and,overall, thefactthat citizens vote toinfluence national turnouts, greatest electoral percentages for smaller, anti-system, anti-European, Paper prepared within the context of “Governing Europe”, a joint project led by the Istituto Istituto the by led Europe”, ajoint project of “Governing context the within prepared Paper Enrico Calossi was coordinator of the Observatory on Political Parties and Representation (OPPR) Representation and Parties on Political Observatory of the coordinator was Calossi Enrico

Rivista italiana di europea”, Rivista in politica una “Verso Mair, Peter and Katz S. Richard Bardi, Luciano European Journal of Political Political of Journal European in elections”, “Second-order Reif, Karlheinz and Norris Pippa , Vol. 31, No. 1 (January 1997), p. 109-124. p. 1997), , Vol. No. 1(January 31, , Vol. 41, No. 3 (December 2011), p. 347-368. p. 2011), , Vol. No. 3(December 41, 2 Thishasmany consequences, including lower 1 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI 3 could bedone intheshort-term future. systems intheEU, what hasbeendone or attempted toimprove them,andwhat explore thesecond way, analysing thecurrent situation of thepartyandelectoral overcome the“deficit” andmake the EUmore democratic. In thispaper, wetryto as it represents the most democratic polity possible; on the other, many seek to been twofold: on theone hand,many advocate for coming backtothenation-state public problem, with respecttothedemocratic legitimacy of MS.Thereaction has financial crisis,thedemocratic deficit oftheEUstartedtobecome more clearly a When thepositive outcomes have become less evident, such asafterthe2008 was because theintegration process wasconsidered positive initself. rather thanaproportional one. making that election more similar to asingle-member-district plurality election assigns one of its seats toits German-speakingminority (77,000people), electoral behavior of voters aswell. Theeven more provocative one-half isbecause of implicit electoral thresholdsthat affect theelectoral systemsandprobably the elect theirnational delegations through several constituencies causes thepresence (MEPs). Even ifall theMSadopt proportional electoral systems,thefactthat some MS Politics European Union enjoyed a“permissive consensus” 5 4 3 an MEPisassigned every 93,826inhabitants andinMalta only every 69,572. 859,997 inhabitants andintheUnited Kingdom every 884,888,while inLuxemburg bigger ones areunderrepresented. For example, inSpain aMEPisassigned every smaller MSare,intermsof national delegations, overrepresented intheEP, while has tobe“degressively proportional” tothepopulation of theMS.As aconsequence of European citizens’ votes. It isstated inthetreaties that apportionment of seats Another structural problem that regularly affects theEUisdifferent “weights” constituencies four MS (Belgium, Ireland, , and the ) have sub-national No, theEUhasnotsecretly included other21MS.Theprovocative title isbecause 2. Forty-nine-and-one-half proportional electoral systems linked tothenotion of the“democratic deficit.” This difference betweentheEU’s democracyand“normal” democracies isintimately Towards European Electoral andParty Systems 6 -wide the result. by determined electors appoints representatives. of where majority only the single-member districts, in used are rounds), or two one round (with systems voting majoritarian opposite, The of multiple-member districts. use voting the require systems electoral proportional reason, body. this For elected the in proportionately reflected

Germany, , and , too, have subnational constituencies, but the assignment of seats is is of seats assignment but the constituencies, subnational Italy, have too, , Poland, and David Marquand, Parliament for Europe Marquand, David The basic feature of proportional representation (PR) is that divisions in an electorate are are electorate an in divisions that is (PR) representation of proportional feature basic The The Journal of of Journal in The Politics”,Union in European Connection Electoral “The Carrubba, J. Clifford , Vol. 63, No. 1 (February 2001), p. 141-158. p. 2001), , Vol. No. 1(February 63, 5 inwhich theyelect theirown Members of theEuropean Parliament 6 , London, Jonathan Cape, 1979. Cape, Jonathan , London, 3 For along time,however, the 4 regardingsuch deficit. This IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI 4 decision of the EP is not binding, was the most widely-used legislative procedure. widely-used legislative most the was not binding, is EP of the decision the seventies, theEPwasfarfrom beingadeliberative arena, with theprevalent perceptions of theEuropean Parliament at thetime.First, in the MSadopt proportional electoral systems.Thisrecommendation wasinline Concerning theelectoral formulas, in1979theCommission recommended Pandora’s box that MSpreferred nottoopen. why modifyingtheseats assignment criteria hasalways beenadifficult taskanda assigned toMSinasimilar way totheapportionment of theEPseats. Thisexplains Union (also known astheCouncil of Ministers),asits internal weighted votes were seats assignment wasalso due tothefunctioning of theCouncil of theEuropean small Luxemburg wasinthefifth.Theimportance of thecriterion adopted for the represented thethird class;Ireland andDenmark wereinthefourth; andthe of seats; wasasingle-class; theNetherlands, Belgium, , andGreece to theirpopulation: West Germany, Italy, theUK,and France hadthesamenumber friction amongst MS. Until 1995, the extant 12 MS were in five “classes” according The division of seats hasrepresented one of themain points of negotiation and Towards European Electoral andParty Systems 7 of diversification of electoral systemsintheEUMS. results of theelections andthevoting behavior of citizens. Table 1shows thelevel for national elections andfor theEPelections also matters: it influences boththe level nature of theEU, thedegreeof consistency betweentheelectoral systems that characteriseanelectoral system.In addition, because of thespecific multi- degree of openness of partylists(closed, flexible, or open) are all relevant features sub-national electoral constituencies or theunique national-level district, andthe still matter. Overall, thepresenceof thresholds(implicit or explicit), thechoice of is notsufficient tomake their electoral systemssimilar; other electoral elements proportional. However, thefactthat now all the MS adopt aproportional system the exception of theUK,which needed20years toabandon theplurality for the more, theBritish case).Proportional systemswerequickly adopted byall MSwith strongly at oddswith only afew national traditions (like theFrench caseand,even MS. Theproportional systemwascoherent with mostof MSelectoral customs and order to not interfere with the majority of electoral systems already adopted inthe voting systemcanguarantee. Thesecond reason for therecommendation wasin greatest possible number of interests intheEP–something that only aproportional a representative assembly. Therefore, it wasconsidered useful torepresent the

Before the of 1986, the consultation procedure, according to which the the to which according procedure, consultation the of 1986, Act European Single the Before 7 asit wasbasically IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI 5 Source: Author’s own calculations. Table 1|Electoral system’s features inEUMember States Towards European Electoral andParty Systems Countries Belgium Czech Rep. France Germany Ireland Italy Poland Portugal Spain UK Preference yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no no no no no no no no no no no vote Constituencies Sub-national yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no Threshold yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no no no no no no no no no no no national electoral system Homogeneity with yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI 6 “normal” political systems. scarce integration betweenthethreecompetitive arenasthat usually characterise organisations at theEuropean level, andb)at thelevel of theproper system,the party system:a)at thelevel of units, theweakrelations betweenthe“faces”of party In addition totheabove, therearetwo otherreasons for theabsenceof agenuine that only anewtreaty, currently difficult toachieve, could make. likely tochangesubstantially intheshort-term because thiswould requirereforms as the(potentially) mostdemocratic institution of theUnion. Thissituation isnot – andthentolegitimise –theexecutive, continue tounderminetherole of theEP limited power inthelegislative initiative, aswell astheincomplete ability tocontrol prerogatives, after theTreaty of Lisbon, have greatly improved, but its ongoing true only ifthepowers of parliament aresufficiently developed. TheEP’s legislative the legislative powers and balance the powers of the executive. However, all this is for thepresidential andsemi-presidential systems,where parliaments exercise popular legitimacy theyreceive during theelections, but also, toalesser extent, true for all parliamentary systems, where parties submit tothegovernment the democracies parliaments arethemainplacesof parties’ activities. Thisiscertainly “democratic deficit” of the European Union. There is no doubt that in most “normal” The European Parliament haslong beenaccusedof beingthemainreason for the various roles of government andopposition. parties compete intheelectoral arenaandsubsequently operate andinteract in citizens arefully democratic when thereispartypluralism, i.e.asysteminwhich of-party-organization.pdf. at: https://politicacomparata.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/katz-and-mair-1995-changing-models- Politics Party in Party”, Cartel of the Emergence The University Press, 1976. University Press, 9 8 units). institutional bodies of theparty),andpartyon theground (membersandlocal representatives present intheinstitutions), thepartyincentral office (theextra- organisations, dividing theirstructure in“faces”:thepartypublic office (party Richard Katz andPeter Mairproposed ananalytical schemetostudy party 3.1 Weak relations betweenthe“faces”of party organisations According toGiovanni Sartori, 3. Thenever-emerging European partysystem Towards European Electoral andParty Systems 10 EN&file=32371. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument= 2010, the (theincentral office), theparliamentary group

How to Create a Transnational Party System Party How to aTransnational Create al., et Bardi Luciano Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis AFramework Giovanni Systems. and Party Sartori, Parties Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. Democracy. Party and Organization of Party Models “Changing Mair, Peter and Katz S. Richard 10 Thethreefacesof partypolitics at theEuropean level arerepresented by 9 8 agovernment’s actions andtherepresentation of , Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 1995), p. 5-28, available available 5-28, p. 1995), No., Vol. 1(January 1, , Brussels, European Parliament, Parliament, European , Brussels, , Cambridge, Cambridge Cambridge , Cambridge, IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI 7 resources. face –theEPpartygroups –isinaclear advantage from thepoint of view of 2011, p. 12. p. 2011, europea di Sinistra caso Il Enrico degli Calossi, europartiti. efunzioni Organizzazione York, Wiley, 1954. STU%282014%29509992. 2014, p. 87-102, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_ Looking Affairs Stock and in Taking the New Term. in Constitutional Challenges al., et Competition”, and Yves Bertoncini in Cooperation Between funds totheextraparliamentary faceof Europarties, developing within theEP, 15 14 13 12 11 Europarties in theEP(thepartypublic office), and national parties (theparty onthe ground). Towards European Electoral andParty Systems 16 Europe andEurope Canada in of Participation Dilemmas the Citizen. Activating (eds.), Pammett Jon H. and DeBardeleben Vol. 5, No. 1 (2013), p. 55-70. p. Vol. No. 1(2013), 5, Italianin Contemporary Politics Policy”, Security and for Affairs Foreign High Representative EU’s pre-existing social groups. funding, number of memberparties, etc. relative organisational strengths varies from thepoint of view of theirage,public an ideological point of view, but also from anorganisational point of view. Their However, as Table 2 shows, Europarties do not differ from eachother only from of thelimited power of the“central office” in comparison with theother two faces. legislation and policy-making. This is not the case at the European level, because manages thelinkbetweencitizens andgovernment, anddeals with themakingof Ministers. To conclude, in “normal” political parties the“central office” face in this,the direct accesstotheEuropean policy level through theCouncil of although theyrepresent theirmembership, behave asreal competitors, benefiting, Council. In fact,thebiggest problem for Europarties isthat thenational parties, for Foreign Policy the appointment of institutional positions, including theHigh Representative for theEPelections and,through theirMSgovernment representatives, influence contact with theelectorate, but also areresponsible for theselection of candidates National parties largely prevail on theotherfaces.Theynotonly maintain direct national parties. been sofarunsuccessful, leading toEuroparties working infactasnetworks of counterparts. Efforts tointroduce theindividual membership to Europarties have as theconnection with civil society isguaranteed toEuroparties bytheirnational party andtheon theground iseven more unbalanced infavor of thesecond, EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32003R2004. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ 2003, 4November funding, their regarding rules the and

We use the term “Europarties” to define the complexes of relations between these faces. See See faces. these between relations complexes theof to define “Europarties” term We the use Enrico Calossi, “European Parliament Political Groups and European Political Parties: Parties: Political European and Groups Political Parliament “European Calossi, Enrico Luciano Bardi and Eugenio Pizzimenti, “Old Logics for New Games: The Appointment of the of the Appointment The for Games: New Logics “Old Pizzimenti, Eugenio and Bardi Luciano Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the State in the Modern and Activity Organization Their Political Duverger, Parties. Maurice Luciano Bardi and Enrico Calossi, “Models of Party Organization and Europarties”, in Joan Joan in Europarties”, and Organization of Party “Models Calossi, Enrico and Bardi Luciano Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level level at European parties political governing regulations on the No (EC) 2004/2003 Regulation 15 In addition, it canbeobserved that therelation betweenthecentral 11 have evolved according totheinternal genetic model,i.e.initially , Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 151-172. p. 2009, York, New and Macmillan, Palgrave , Basingstoke 16 andthePresidents of theCommission andof theEuropean 12 rather thanalong anexternal model,i.e.representing 13 Even ifRegulation 2004/2003has assigned public , Brussels, European Parliament, Parliament, European , Brussels, 14 nowadays theinstitutional , Pisa, Plus, Plus, , Pisa, , New , New , IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI 8

Table 2 | Currently recognised Europarties Towards European Electoral andParty Systems Europarty Acronym Ideology First 2015 grant N. of member EP political Spitzenkandidat recognised (€ m) parties group European People’s Party EPP , 2004 8.09 51 + 24 EPP Jean-Claude Juncker Party of European Socialists PES 2004 6.54 32 + 21 S&D Martin Schulz

Alliance of and Democrats ALDE 2004 2.09 41 + 17 ALDE Guy Verhofstadt for Europe Party Alliance of European AECR conservatism, 2010 1.95 19 + 5 ECR none Conservatives and Reformists neoliberalism, eurorealism European EGP 2004 1.70 39 + 3 -EFA Ska Keller / José Bové Party of the European Left PEL left-wing, , 2004 1.63 29 + 7 GUE-NGL Alexis Tsipras Alliance for Direct Democracy in ADDE populism, 2015 1.24 7 EFDD n/a Europe Movement for a Europe of Nations MENF euroscepticism, 2015 1.17 5 ENF n/a and Freedom , right-wing EFA , 2004 0.71 41 + 7 Greens-EFA none independence movements European EDP 2004 0.65 14 ALDE Guy Verhofstadt

European Alliance for Freedom EAF euroscepticism, 2011 0.52 Individual ENF, non- none nationalism, right-wing MEPs inscrits European Christian Political ECPM 2010 0.46 18 + 28 ECR none Movement Movement for a Europe of Liberties MELD euroscepticism, national 2012 0.43 7 EFDD, non- none and Democracy conservativism inscrits Europeans United for Democracy EUD eurorealism 2006 0.39 11 GUE-NGL, none ALDE Alliance of European National AENM anti-europeanism, 2012 0.35 7 Non- none Movements far-right Inscrits

Source: Author’s own calculation and European Parliament’s website: Grant amounts (parties), updated 15 October 2015, http://www.europarl. europa.eu/pdf/grants/Grant_amounts_parties_10_2015.pdf. IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI 9 correlation cannotbeobserved for theother,smaller andnewer, groups. European political party(theEPPandtheParty of European Socialists). This MEPs of the group aremembersof national parties that belong to therespective groups (theEuropean People’s Party andthe Socialists &Democrats), virtually all their respective European political parties. For the biggest andmostinstitutionalised Another point of weaknessisthat only partially do thepolitical groups correspond to EP hastwice beenable tostop unwanted candidates tobecome commissioners. emerging role isplayed bythepreliminary hearingprocedure, during which the censorships may becalled only during exceptional andserious cases.However, an In fact,theEPvotes theelection of theCommission only once for termandeventual still-missing “European government” isanotherlimit for theparliamentary arena. The absenceof acontinuous relationship of confidence betweentheEPand constituent units. explicit assignment of roles tothegoverning majority and the opposition tothe parliamentary arenaareal partysystemandabove all arenotcharacterisedbyan spectrum. Thedynamics that follow arenotyet competitive enough tomake the formed at theEuropean level andtheoretically competing along anideological that ismuch more “normal,” beingcharacterisedbythepresenceof political groups the government majority. On paper, the European Parliament is a competitive arena values andpolitical ideologies or on therelationship betweentheopposition and in their MS andthat produces dynamics basedon national interests, rather thanon connotation, hasasystem that consists only of theparties that areingovernment divided into two chambers. TheCouncil of Ministers,considered inits legislative democracies. As for theparliamentary arena,apreliminarycaveat isthat it is MS makes theelectoral arenaof theEUcompletely different from those of “normal” As seenintheprevious paragraph, theheterogeneity of theelectoral rules inthe party governments. developed, but it canbecome fully meaningful especially inthepresenceof multi- size of thevarious coalitions. In thegovernmental arenathepartysystemisless largely determinedbytheirbeingwithin themajority or theopposition, andthe ideological distanceof parties inthesystem.In Parliament, theirinteractions are the electoral rules andareinfluenced bythe number, therelative size,andthe In “normal” democracies, parties compete intheelectoral arenasaccording to provides aseries of interactions inall threearenas. the parliamentary arena,andfinally the government. Apartysystem, tobesuch, national or sub-national levels) inwhich parties compete: theelectoral arena, In national partysystems,thereareat least threecompetitive arenas(at the 3.2 Scarce integration betweenthecompetitive arenas Towards European Electoral andParty Systems 10 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. York, New and Macmillan, Palgrave Basingstoke strength of Europarties. Thehistory of thestrengthening of theEPis,like that of level, any strengthening of theEPprerogatives hasapositive influence on the Since theEPismostimportant locus of political parties’ activity at theEU electoral andpartysystems 4. Recent attempts toovercome thefragmented European same reasons already presented for theCouncil of Ministers. To conclude, intheEuropean Council thereisnotapartysystemeither, for the and not on relations of opposition-majority or on political-ideological differences. convergences (betweenCommissioners with similar portfolios andcompetencies) different departments. Whencoalitions emerge,theyarebased on functional consensus painstakingly built into working groups andthrough contacts between dynamics of theCommission. In fact, it operates asacollegial body, basedon a choice of the other commissioners, but without consequences for the operational a subsidiary way thanother criteria, didpolitical considerations play arole inthe that takes into account theoutcome of theelections of theEP. Only recently, andin orientation andwill of national governments. Only thePresident ischosen inaway Commissioners areselected primarily basedon theirexpertise andon thepolitical surprising. Within theCommission therearenotinfactsigns of partypolitics. The To conclude, certainly theabsenceof aparty system inthegovernment arenaisnot Source: Parties andElections inEurope database: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu. national parties. its existing political groups were able to accommodate almost all of those new parties of thenewMS.Quite surprisingly, theEPpartysystemresponded well and the capability of extant Europarties toinclude thenewandoften naïve national At thetimeof thebig enlargement of 2004,thereweremany concerns about Towards European Electoral andParty Systems 17 Table 3|Political groups intheEPandnot-aligned MEPs not-affiliated MEPs (see Table 3). groups grewagain,but thiswasaccompanied bythe decreaseof thenumber of the Legislature Number of groups MEPs non inscrits Total MEPs % Non inscrits

Europarties after Enlargement. Organization, Ideology and Competition Ideology Organization, Enlargement. after Europarties Bressanelli, Edoardo 17 In 2014,for thefirsttimeintwenty years, the number of theEP 2.20 1979 410 1st 9 7 1984 2nd 1.61 434 8 7 2.32 1989 518 3rd 12 9 4.76 1994 567 4th 27 9 1999 4.15 626 5th 26 7 2004 4.10 732 6th 30 7 4.08 2009 736 7th 30 7 2014 1.86 8th 751 14 , 8 11 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding, 18 December December 18 funding, their regarding rules the and level at European parties political governing the objectives of thepolitical partyat European level.” fundamental values pursued bytheEuropean Union, underpinsand complements party at European level, and which through its activities, within theaims and (CE) 1524/2007,as“anentity or network of entities […to be]affiliated with apolitical The European foundations at theEuropean level wereintroduced byRegulation diminished hispower of influence. last European elections hasnotstopped himfrom beingproactive, but it hassurely a concrete implementation. The factthat Mr.Duffhasnotbeenreelected inthe this hasbeentheonly part of theproposal that had(although notinaformal way) their candidates for theCommission presidencywaspartof theproposal. Actually, party systemmore homogeneous. In addition, thenomination byEuroparties of reduce transnational differences inpartysupport across Europe, thus making the working EUpartysystem.Thisistheonly provision that could, over time,help to would enhanceEU-level electoral competition andtherefore help create abetter- promoting genuine transnational campaigning andEU-level partyprogrammes. It implemented, this would have fostered closer partycooperation at the EU level by for thecreation of a25-MEP strong transnational constituency. Certainly, if albeit very controversial –provision included intheDuffreport wastheproposal 18 ambitious proposal on thefloor. least for thoseMSwith more than20million inhabitants) represented themost for areform of theelectoral procedures of MStowards greater harmonisation (at Constitutional Affairs Committee. Until March 2012, when it wasfrozen, hisproposal Andrew Duffinthe2009-2014 termwasa very active British liberal MEP of the designation bytheEuroparties of candidates for thePresidencyof theCommission. foundations; 3)theupdating of theStatute of theEuropean political parties; 4)the proposal for a transnational party list; 2) the establishment of European political the European parties from theirnational counterparts. Theseare1)Andrew Duff’s recently inorder toconsolidate theEuropean partysystemandtheautonomy of Alongside thesechanges,otherattempts have beenproposed or implemented Council of theEuropean Union. equal footing with theotherchamberof the“parliamentary systemof theEU,” the treaties) has followed the path of strengthening the EP, putting it nowadays on an and its influence. In addition, theLisbon Treaty (incontinuity with theprevious critical (and informal) junctures in which the EPhas publicly increasedits power three proposed membersof theBarroso Commission in2004aretwo examples of EP toobtaintheresignation of theSanter Commission in1999andtherejection of the European Union itself, amixof formal andinformal change.Theability of the Towards European Electoral andParty Systems 19 do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0176&language=EN. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. 1976 2011, September (A7-0176/2011), April 28 20 of of the Parliament European of the Members universal suffrage bydirect the election

Regulation (EC) No 1524/2007 amending Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations regulations on the No (EC) 2004/2003 Regulation amending No (EC) 1524/2007 Regulation European Parliament, concerning for amodification of the onAct aproposal Report 18 Thebest-known andpotentially mosteffective – 19 Theintent wastogive 12 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI (November 2011), http://hdl.handle.net/1814/19156. 2011), (November Working RSCAS EUI Papers Foundations”, in Political of European Development TXT/?uri=celex:32014R1141. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ 2014, October 22 foundations, political European and promote an effective autonomisation of Europarties. regulation (which shall beapplied only from 1January 2016)seemsless keen to transnationalisation at theEUlevel. 2011 bytheEPConstitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO),aimedtofavor thepolitical duty of forming “aEuropean awareness,” etc.The“Giannakou report,” released in weak positions againsttheirnational counterparts, theirweakeffectiveness intheir further amend this regulation and to overcome some shortcomings, such as their them aclear definition andpublic funding. Suddenly adebate beganin order to the light underRegulation (EC)No 2004/2003(later amendedin2007),which gave and toexpressingthepolitical will of thecitizens of theUnion.” Theyofficially saw integration within theUnion. Theycontribute to forming aEuropean awareness which stated that “[p]olitical parties at European level areimportant asafactor for The early origin of theEuropean political parties wastheMaastricht Treaty, etc.) without thecollaborating , often competing, of national parties. contact, even ifstill indirect,with thenational level (media,voters, associations, key strategic support for theaffiliated Europarty because it allows themto have a point of view, have connections inall membercountries. This,for example, isa approach. Another difference isthat bigger foundations, from an organisational the larger(better-funded)foundations seemtoadopt amore centralised top-down adopt adecentralised approach, without aheadoffice in Brussels; onthe contrary, among theEurofoundations aredue totheirdiffering sizes. Smaller ones prefer to sometimes function as“umbrella” organisations. Obviously, some differences organised incollaboration with national foundations, for which Eurofoundations (thus putting the European party in direct contact with citizens). Other activities are activities areorganised byfoundations jointly with thecorrespondent Europarties 21 20 2007, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:32007R1524. the organisation of conferences, seminars,andsummerschools. European political foundations have performed thisrole through publications and of national parties andfreetheEuroparties from theirnational counterparts. their direct contacts with citizens. This should overcome the intermediating role Europarties anewtooltohelp themcarryout theirfunctions andtostrengthen Towards European Electoral andParty Systems 22 European political parties. authority for thepurposeof registering,controlling andimposing sanctions on the European legal personality for European political parties and established an the European Parliament andof theCouncil, which focused on thecentrality of do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0062&language=EN. funding regarding their and at the level European rules parties governing political the regulations

European on Parliament, No 2004/2003 (EC) on the application of Regulation Report Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties parties political of European funding and statute (EU, Euratom) on No the 1141/2014 Regulation Wojciech Gagatek and Steven Van Hecke, “Towards Policy-Seeking Europarties? The The Europarties? Policy-Seeking Van “Towards Steven Hecke, and Gagatek Wojciech (A7-0062/2011), 18 March 2011, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. 2011, March 18 (A7-0062/2011), 22 However, compared totheGiannakou report, thenew 21 Thisled in2014toRegulation (EU)No 1141of 20 , No. 2011/58 , No. 2011/58 Some of these 13 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI systems 5. Possible stepstowards more integrated electoral andparty desirable feature for thepoliticisation of theEuropean partypolitics. executive. Very different from the opposition-majority logic, it isconsidered a national governments). Thishasreinforced theimpression of a“grand coalition” representatives of thelosing Europarties (because Commissioners are proposed by for future elections. Theonly problem isthat theCommission isalso composed of Europarties and for the EP, which will be able to use this procedure as a precedent declared theywould acceptonly Juncker asPresident. Thisclearly wasavictory for procedure. Thepositive aspectwasthat themainEuroparties (soeven the“losers”) not propose any The UKConservative PM James Cameron –amemberof aEuroparty that did Commission. However, thisprocedure wasnotplacidly anduniversally accepted. party, Juncker, was finally proposed bythe as President of the The experiment canbedeemedasuccess because theexponent of thewinning (Greens), played asupporting role, without real chancesof beingelected. (Liberals), Alexis Tsipras (European Left),andthecouple José Bové andSkaKeller to beelected asCommission President. Theothercandidates, Guy Verhofstadt Martin Schulz (Socialists) emergedastheleading candidates with concrete chances to tentelevised debates, the figures of Jean-Claude Juncker, (People’s Party) and politicisation of theEuropean elections. In fact,during thecampaign, also thanks conditions for thepresenceof different political options andtherefore for areal the nomination of the Commission through the EP elections, would also create the competition at theEuropean level of two or more candidates, credibly able toget the Germanword Spitzenkandidaten. Theideaof theproponents wasthat the The major (pro-European) Europarties advanced sixcandidates, known by indicate theircandidate for President of theCommission. Parliament inMay 2013–all themostrelevant political parties decidedexplicitly to provided bytheConstitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) of the European In view of the2014elections, unlike inthepast–andthanksto“suggestion” the governments of theMSconsider anacceptable compromise. ranks of thewinningEuroparty, but theactual choice nonetheless reflects what Parliament. Thismeansthat theappointed President must bechosenfrom the proposes that acandidate needstoreceive aconfirmation vote from the European “[t]aking into account theelections totheEuropean Parliament” (Art. 17.7TEU), an intergovernmental agreement intheEuropean Council. Thisagreement, Currently, thechoice of thePresident of theCommission still takes placethrough Towards European Electoral andParty Systems potential inadequacyof its institutions because of its multi-speed or multi-tiered institutions, andit will beeven more inthenearfuture. TheEUisfacinggrowing A sword of Damocles isover theheadnotonly of theEPbut also of theother EU Spitzenkandidat – explicitly admitted to not recognisingthe 14 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI in theUnited Kingdom, 19 September 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-29281818. 2014, September 19 News BBC in Question’?”, ‘English the is What Referendum: “Scottish Curran, Sean See Assembly. Welsh the and Parliament, Scottish the Assembly, Ireland Northern to the devolved been have that matters voteto unable on are England from MPs side, the other on fact, In onlyEngland. affect that to able vote be should on issues United Kingdom, of the of Commons House the in sitting such as of the MS and legitimacy of the EU. of the legitimacy and MS of the sovereignty as such addressed, to be nowadays complex too of concepts rethinking adeep EP. would require the This in representation without be would likely therefore, which, MS, two of at least population the than larger is that citizens; EU 8-900,000 around by would elected to be MEP each adopted were system amajoritarian If MS. EU of several population small to the related is reason second The aspects. positive one of prominent would its lose system amajoritarian Therefore, onlyin one institution. concentrated power executive an lacks still EU however, the treaties, existing With the executives. to the majorities parliamentary solid and clear to guarantee perfect are systems voting majoritarian that is reason first The level. EU at the system voting of amajoritarian introduction the for example lack of acommon public sphere. first is a longstanding limit to the establishment of a real democracy in Europe: the Beyond thiscaveat, threeotherpreliminaryobservations needtobeexposed.The would beentitled toaddressissues on migration or workers’ circulation. monetary issues, or whether aCommissioner nominated byanon-Schengen MS elected innon- MSwould have thelegitimacy todiscussand take decisions on and, consequently, efficiency. Infact, itis already debatable nowadays whetherMEPs harmonisation policy andcloser toadisintegration process. of theEU’s ongoing crisisof legitimacy, theresults could befarfrom agreater should starttoday, on theeve of anin-out referendum intheUKandmiddle within theboundaries of theexistingtreaties. In fact,ifatreaty revision process the electoral systemsor theemergenceof anEUpartysystemshould bebrought The second observation stresses that any suggestion for the harmonisation of system. a political sphere,potentially offering good soil aswell for thegrowth of aparty any improvement inthisfield would have sideeffects alsorelevant tothebirth of the long-term, because of the language barriers, could it be overcome. However, failure prevents theconstruction of common European identity andthat only in listen totheirown national radio broadcastings. Thereisnodoubt that such a still watch theirown national TVprograms, readtheirnational newspapers, and improvements (above all, thespreadof theuseof theInternet), European citizens 26 25 24 23 configuration. Towards European Electoral andParty Systems Routledge, 2013. Routledge, Media in the Mass the Constitution Contesting of Europe. Politicization net/1814/27460. Perspectives Collected 2013:

The The Trenz, Hans-Jörg and Paul Statham see sphere, public European of the limits the On See Marta Dassù, “Risks and Opportunities in aTwo-Tiered in State of the Union Opportunities Europe”, The and in “Risks Dassù, Marta See The boundaries of existing treaties make some deeper changes impossible to be implemented, implemented, to be impossible changes deeper some make treaties of existing boundaries The The “West Lothian question” refers to whether MPs from Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, and Scotland, Ireland, Northern from MPs to whether refers question” Lothian “West The 23 Abig West Lothianquestion, similar tothat which has happened , Florence, European University Press, 2013, p. 41-44, p. http://hdl.handle. 2013, Press, University European , Florence, 24 islikely toaffect the whole EUinstitutions’ legitimisation 25 Although therehave beensome technological , London and New York, New and , London 26 , 15 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI Day for the Council of Europe. Council forDay the European identity. go tothepolls on would beasteady improvement intheuniqueness of the listand, hopefully, theturnout of the electorate. Having more people thanusual 27 on this system affirm, introduction of vote isimplicitly present in theirsingle transferable vote electoral systems).The lists (with theexception of theMaltese andIrish cases,where thepreferential and is represented by the introduction of the preferential vote within the party Another recommendation could be more effective for its harmonising potential Day. could lead tosome practical consequences, like instituting amore visible Europe are mostly symbolic, such as the presence of the European flag andanthem, but could changeat every European election). Thebenefits of aunique electoral day Election Day (inorder toavoid going againststrong national traditions, theday of harmonisation of theelectoral systems.Onewould beestablishment of aunique least two otherrecommendations could beadvanced inorder toimprove thelevel in mind the impossibility of having a unique electoral system in a short time, at the different electoral systems applied intheMS for the European elections. Keeping The EUhasseveral timesintervened, recommending some criteria toharmonise to automatically allocate seats toMS. a technical domain. In brief, amathematical-statistical criterion should beadopted recognised, thisissue should beremoved from thepolitical sphereandplacedinto feasible nowadays with 28MS.So,inlinewith what even theEuropean Council has a political revision could beacceptable when few membersformed theEU, it isnot the populations of MSaregrowing (anddecreasing)at different paces.Thus, while Surely, aconstant revision of seats distribution will benecessaryinthefuture, as leaders, which hassecuredonly thesimple principle of digressive proportionality. until now thisprocess hasbeendealt with through negotiation betweenpolitical A firstsuggestion concerns theapportionment of EPseats totheMS.As wehave seen, decisions (andregulations), othersamore informal orpolitical approach. Having saidthat, suggestions cantake different forms. Some requireformal the political parties. more power andlegitimacy toits internal actors, themostimportant of which are power tonegotiate with theotherEUinstitutions. Therefore, thiswould ensure should adopt independently notonly would changeits functioning, but also its The third observation is that any reform of its activities that the European Parliament Towards European Electoral andParty Systems 28 184. on World Legislatures Congress of the U.S. Influence The Congress? Exporting (eds.), Rae Nicol J. Reform”, C. and Power Timothy Electoral in

Currently the 9th of May is Europe Day for the European Union, while the 5th of May is Europe Europe is of May 5th the while Union, European for Day the Europe is of May 9th the Currently See Pippa Norris, “Ballot Structures and Legislative Behavior. Changing Role Orientations via via Role Orientations Changing Behavior. Legislative and Structures “Ballot Norris, Pippa See 27 preferential vote , according to what scientific studies conducted 28 would increase the level of knowledge of the members of , Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006, p. 157- p. 2006, Press, of Pittsburgh University , Pittsburgh, 16 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI could betheintroduction of primaryelections , which theEuroparties should adopt membership, alongside thecollective membership represented bynational parties, of thetop leading candidates. Oneway to favor theintroduction of individual positive, hasbeenthelimited individual participation intheselection process One of theshortcomings of the experience of theSpitzenkanditaten, however funds bytheEUbudget. their memberparties declaretheirsupranational affiliation should bedeprived of EU regulation. Thus, European political parties that failed or did notwant to make affiliation duringthe European elections is completely inline with the spirit ofthe a European awareness.” Urging national member parties toshow theirEuropean establishing thepolitical parties at theEuropean level wasto“contribute toforming remember, in fact, that in 2003 the first of the targets foreseen by the EU regulation of Europarties, which receive public fundsfrom theEUbudget. It isimportant to parties, but only for those national parties that are officially registered as members the presenceof aEuropean reference intheballot must notbecompulsory for all the 30 29 campaigns with anti-European tones (especially of horizontal euroscepticism their supranational involvement. This behavior hassometimes allowed electoral The others, even those that arepro-European, have avoided explicitly indicating internal legitimacy have addedtotheirelectoral labeltheirEuropean affiliation. parties with anenthusiastic pro-European profile or with ascarcely-autonomous symbol or name,while contesting theEuropean elections. Until now only national the electoral ballot areferenceofthecorrespondentEuroparty totheirelectoral provision for national member parties, at this point officially recognised, to European political parties. Thisobligation could beintroduced, with theadditional are not required to indicate officially the national parties that are members of the Nowadays, even ifEuroparties mainly work asnetworks of national parties, they strengthening of Europarties. have positive effects on boththeharmonisation of theelectoral systemsandthe additional requirements toberegisteredasEuropean political parties. Thesecould of theEuropean political parties, inparticular with theintroduction of new A couple of suggestions arelinked toachangeof thefreshly-approved statute Towards European Electoral andParty Systems document.html?reference=IPOL_STU%282015%29536464. Structure and the Ballot Format in the Elections: European Cicchi, Participation and Rules Electoral Electoral Lorenzo and Bardi Luciano see harmonization, future their from deriving benefices potential the (December 2014), 352-364. p. (December Science Political European in Euroscepticism”, of Horizontal Challenge The idea that European elections areonly second-order national elections. the absenceof any clear European reference have reinforced intheelectorate the presence intheelectoral ballot of only thesymbolsandnamesof national actors and refrained from criticising theirsisterparties. Another consequence isthat the as well asnational parties with anofficial pro-European attitude, which have not

Luciano Bardi, “Political Parties, Responsiveness, and Responsibility in Multi-Level Democracy: Multi-Level in Democracy: Responsibility and Responsiveness, Parties, “Political Bardi, Luciano For the current situation of the different balloting papers used nowadays in EU MS and about and about MS EU in nowadays used papers balloting different of the situation current For the , Brussels, European Parliament, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/ 2015, Parliament, European , Brussels, , Vol. 13, No. 4 , Vol. 13, 30 However, add on 29 ) 17 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI 31 parties. Obviously, voters could only vote in the primaries for one Europarty. frontrunner amongst apreliminarylistof nameschosenbythenational member in theUS,which citizens could participate inchoosingtheirpreferred Europarty idea would bethat theUnion will convene acycle of primaryelections, ashappens internally, without any involvement of public institutions. In theEuropean case,the Democratic Party. However, inall of thesecasespartyofficials handled primaries electoral leaders for theBritish LabourParty, theFrench Socialists, andtheItalian elections have beenused,torecall some of theseveral cases,tochoosethenational origin, theyarenolonger acomplete novelty inEuropean politics. Party primary some examples that could befollowed. Even ifpartyprimaries have anAmerican in order toselect theircandidate. In thiscase,too,“normal” democracies give us Towards European Electoral andParty Systems 32 handle.net/1814/27460. Perspectives Union Collected 2013: 2010 in the regional elections of Tuscany Italy. in elections regional the in 2010 and 2000 between applied also was procedure similar Avery voting. be will they primary party’s and favor highlighting thedifferences between their own proposals rather than center- of the European Socialists, should adopt a long-term perspective pro-European political actors, thecenter-right European People’s Party andthe interest in focusing all their attention on the pro/anti divide. Thus, thetwo main campaign. Obviously, the eurosceptic forces would refuse that while they have an competition should become theprominent one during theEuropean electoral all theEuropean “normal” democracies istheleft-right divide. Thus, aleft-right European Union. Currently, theonly relevant political cleavage that bindstogether cleavages other than thepro/anti dichotomy would secure theexistenceof the of theEuropean elections andconsequently of European politics on different to Europe andtheanti-Europeanists actually won. In practice, apoliticisation consequences that may occuriftheonly issue of thecampaign weretheyes/no this timeresults werepositive for thepro-Europeans, but one should thinkof the the only alternative that remains for them is to be for or against Europe.” and financial crisis. If theyare not presented with alternative EUpolicies then citizens candisagreeabout theright policies torespond tothecurrent economic Regional Development, Miguel Maduro, also affirmed, “In a democratic Europe the EU. However, thisisvery risky. In fact,astheformer Portuguese Ministerfor the mainthemesof thelastEuropean elections wasthepro/anti attitude towards barrier against who wants to destroy the European Union.” In practice, one of that canbesummarisedinthemotto“Vote for usbecause wearetheonly possible counteract thepolitical campaign of theeurosceptics through thesimple message European political parties (at both the national and the European levels) tended to European political actors.Especially during the2014European elections, thepro- Lastly, a final recommendation should be addressed specifically to the leading totheestablishment of individual membership for Europarties. individual members,guaranteeing theformer apreliminaryselective role, but also This solution would maintain acompromise betweenmemberparties andfuture

This is the same procedure used in most of the US states, where voters must declare in which which in declare must where voters states, US of the most in used procedure same the is This The State of the The in EMU”, the in Reform Constitutional and Capacity “Fiscal Maduro, Miguel , Florence, European University Press, 2013, p. 29, p. http://hdl. 2013, Press, University European , Florence, 32 In fact, pro- 31

18 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI actors’ decision whether toconform or nottothesenewstimuli. elections asreal EUelections basedon European themes.It isfinally apolitical give thepolitical actors (thenational parties included) strong incentives torunthe level. More realistically, theimplementation of thesepossible suggestions could automatically result intheemergenceof real electoral andpartysystemsat theEU and political) should not be interpreted as a definitive ground which could To conclude, the implementation of these multifaceted suggestions (institutional difficult toreverse. consequences of a defeat would be disastrous for the integration process itself and short-term-focused) slogan of defending Europe from theanti-Europeanists. The being tempted to dichotomise the electoral competition with thepopular (but Towards European Electoral andParty Systems Updated 4December2015 19 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI 41-44, http://hdl.handle.net/1814/27460 Union 2013:Collected Perspectives, Florence, European University Press,2013,p. Marta Dassù,“Risks andOpportunities inaTwo-Tiered Europe”, inTheState of the Journal of Politics, Vol. 63,No. 1(February 2001),p.141-158 Clifford J. Carrubba, “The Electoral Connection in European Union Politics”, inThe europea, Pisa,Plus, 2011 Enrico Calossi, thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU%282014%29509992 Brussels, European Parliament, 2014,p.87-102, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ in Constitutional Affairs in the New Term. Taking Stock and Looking Forward, Parties: BetweenCooperation andCompetition”, inYves Bertoncini etal., Challenges Enrico Calossi, “European Parliament Political Groups andEuropean Political Competition, Basingstoke andNew York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014 Edoardo Bressanelli, Europarties after Enlargement. Organization, Ideology and Policy”, inContemporary Italian Politics, Vol. 5,No. 1(2013), p. 55-70 Appointment of theEU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs andSecurity Luciano BardiandEugenio Pizzimenti, “OldLogics for New Games:The Rivista italiana di scienza politica, Vol. 41,No. 3(December 2011),p.347-368 Luciano Bardi,Richard S.Katz andPeter Mair,“Verso unapolitica europea”, in html?reference=IPOL_STU%282015%29536464 Parliament, 2015,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document. in theEuropean Elections: theBallot Format and Structure, Brussels, European Luciano BardiandLorenzo Cicchi, Electoral Rules and Electoral Participation Macmillan, 2009,p.151-172 of Participation in Europe and Canada, Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave in Joan DeBardeleben andJon H.Pammett (eds.),Activating theCitizen. Dilemmas Luciano BardiandEnrico Calossi, “Models of Party Organization andEuroparties”, studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=32371 European Parliament, 2010,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/ Luciano Bardietal., How toCreate aTransnational Party System, Brussels, Science, Vol. 13,No. 4(December2014),p.352-364 Democracy: TheChallenge of Horizontal Euroscepticism”, inEuropean Political Luciano Bardi,“Political Parties, Responsiveness, andResponsibility inMulti-Level References Towards European Electoral andParty Systems Organizzazione e funzioni degli europartiti. Il caso di Sinistra 20 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI Constitution in theMassMedia, London andNew York, Routledge, 2013 Paul Statham andHans-Jörg Trenz, ThePoliticization of Europe. Contesting the Cambridge University Press,1976 Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems. AFramework for Analysis, Cambridge, Political Research , Vol. 31,No. 1(January 1997),p.109-124 Pippa Norris andKarlheinzReif, “Second-order elections”, inEuropean Journal of Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press,2006,p.157-184 Exporting Congress? TheInfluence of the U.S. Congress on World Legislatures, Orientations viaElectoral Reform”, inTimothy J. Power andNicol C.Rae (eds.), Pippa Norris, “Ballot Structures andLegislative Behavior. ChangingRole David Marquand,Parliament for Europe, London, Jonathan Cape, 1979 Press, 2013,p.22-29, http://hdl.handle.net/1814/27460 State of theUnion 2013:Collected Perspectives, Florence, European University Miguel Maduro, “Fiscal Capacity andConstitutional Reform intheEMU”, inThe com/2011/03/katz-and-mair-1995-changing-models-of-party-organization.pdf 1 (January 1995),p.5-28, available at: https://politicacomparata.files.wordpress. Party Democracy. TheEmergenceof theCartelParty”, inParty Politics, Vol. 1,No. Richard S.Katz andPeter Mair,“ChangingModels of Party Organization and RSCAS, No. 2011/58(November 2011),http://hdl.handle.net/1814/19156 The Development of European Political Foundations”, inEUIWorking Papers Wojciech Gagatek andSteven Van Hecke, “Towards Policy-Seeking Europarties? getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0062&language=EN their funding (A7-0062/2011),18March 2011,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ the regulations governing political parties at European level and therules regarding European Parliament, eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0176&language=EN of 20 September 1976 (A7-0176/2011), 28 April 2011, http://www.europarl.europa. the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage European Parliament, Report on aproposal for amodification of the Act concerning State, New York, Wiley, 1954 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in theModern Towards European Electoral andParty Systems Report on the application of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 on 21 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 47 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-72-9 © 2015 IAI Latest IAIWORKING PAPERS Towards European Electoral andParty Systems www.iai.it [email protected] F +39 T +39 Via Angelo Brunetti, 9-I-00186 Rome, Italy and otherpapers’ series related toIAIresearch projects. (AffarInternazionali), two series of research papers (QuaderniIAIand Research Papers) publishes anEnglish-language quarterly (TheInternational Spectator), anonline webzine and theMiddle East;defence economy andpolicy; andtransatlantic relations. TheIAI in the global economy and internationalisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean research sectors are:European institutions andpolicies; Italian foreign policy; trends and abroad andisamemberof various international networks. 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